

SRH 012

THE ROLE  
of  
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE  
in the  
AMERICAN - JAPANESE NAVAL WAR  
VOLUME II

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

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The Role of Radio Intelligence

in the

American - Japanese War

Volume II

Introduction

This is the second volume in a series which is devoted to telling the story of the part played by the U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence units in the present war. The chapters in this volume are very closely linked to Volume I, and should be read with that understanding.

It will be recalled that Volume I dealt with the behind the scenes background of Pearl Harbor, and then went on to relate the secret activities which led to U.S. victories at Coral Sea and Midway. Volume II will paint a more complete picture of the Midway period by outlining (in Chapter I) the preparations of the Japanese to invade the Aleutian Islands simultaneously with their assault against Midway. The Japanese succeeded in taking some of the Aleutians, not because

their plans were unknown, but because U.S. naval authorities wished to take no chances at Midway. The important role played by U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence in furnishing the information which made possible the great victory of the U.S. Navy at Midway has already been told in Volume I.

Chapter II may be of interest to U.S. Navy readers since it summarizes the intelligence garnered from Japanese messages which were intercepted during the actual Battle of Midway. Had not the enemy changed its cipher just before the battle, this intelligence would have had immense tactical rather than historical value. However, the messages do provide a valuable demonstration of the potential tactical value of communication intelligence in actual battles. It is interesting to note that the conclusions arrived at in this chapter were written before the great Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13 - 15, 1942, in which the tactical value of communication intelligence was proven to be no longer merely theoretical but very practical.

The next two chapters deal with a problem which

has caused all American cryptanalytical agencies great concern. Chapter III discusses publicity leaks which almost undermined years of intensive efforts. It briefly summarizes the disclosures of cryptanalytical activities throughout the world since World War I, and then discusses the widespread publicity given to certain newspaper stories which explained the success of the U.S. Navy at Midway. Chapter IV points out the terrible damage done to U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence operations by the above publicity leaks, and stresses the measures taken by American authorities to prevent similar occurrences.

It will be seen, therefore, that all four chapters of Volume II revolve around the Battle of Midway, which took place in June, 1942, though the effects noticed were still being felt in March, 1943. Succeeding volumes in this series will follow the fortunes of the U.S. Navy in the Solomons. Volume III is now in preparation, and will appear shortly.

CONFIDENTIAL

1942

Chapter I

Background of the Aleutian Campaign

Summary <sup>1</sup>

Though considered at first only as a move to divert U.S. forces from Midway, the Aleutian Campaign has grown in significance with the passage of time. It is interesting to know that the intentions of the Japanese concerning the Northern Area were as well known as their plan for Midway and Coral Sea. (See Vol. I, Chap. III and App. III)

March 9  
1942

As early as March, 1942, there were vague indications of possible enemy operations

April 27  
1942

in the Aleutians,<sup>2</sup> and in April the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Second Fleet asked for charts of the Gulf of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and the Bering Sea. This definite clue

- 
- (1) For a detailed story with complete dispatches see Appendix I. A map of the Aleutians will be found on Chart I.
- (2) Hereafter, references will be noted as follows: I, No. 1. All references are to Volume II unless specified otherwise.



served as a warning to watch for other actions,<sup>3</sup>

May 1  
1942 and the continued interest of the Japanese in air operations in Hawaiian, Alaskan and Samoan Areas was a further indication of future plans.<sup>4</sup>

Their evident concern about Aleutian patrols and defenses<sup>5</sup>, and their constant gathering of weather reports from the Northern Areas left

May 9  
1942 little doubt that an attack was about to occur.<sup>6</sup>

An operations schedule was decrypted at this time, and in this way important departure dates

May 14  
1942 for the Aleutian Forces were obtained.<sup>7</sup>

An evening message mentioned the AOB

May 15  
1942 Occupation Force, and since a message of December 5, 1941, sent by the Japanese Naval General Staff had designated AOB as Kiska, it was concluded that this was the Japanese objective.<sup>8</sup> Preparations for the campaign had to be made by the enemy, and thus, decryption of

- 
- (3) I, No. 4
  - (4) I, No. 5
  - (5) I, Nos. 6-7
  - (6) I, No. 8
  - (7) I, No. 9
  - (8) I, No. 10

messages ordering materials afforded valuable hints as to future movements.<sup>9</sup> As Japanese messages were intercepted and deciphered in increasing numbers, it became very evident that both the Midway and Aleutian Campaigns were developing simultaneously. Operational estimates were made by U.S. naval officers which May 16 clearly indicated that the Japanese planned to 1942 divert the fleets of the U.S. to the north by an attack on the Aleutians, while their main forces struck at Midway.

Traffic analysis produced several May 17-18 associations of enemy units which indicated the 1942 makeup of the Aleutian Forces,<sup>10</sup> and, in addition, these helped identify some of the new May 18 Japanese calls introduced at this time.<sup>11</sup> 1942

Since Japanese success in the Aleutian area depended on the prior removal of American submarines, the enemy made elaborate preparations to combat this menace. New depth charge equip-

---

(9) I, Nos. 12-13  
(10) I, Nos. 14-16  
(11) I, No. 17

ment was installed, and practice exercises for this purpose were ordered.<sup>12</sup> An estimate of the forces to be used by the Japanese in the Aleutian area was now made on the basis of traffic analysis,<sup>13</sup> and evidence of an increase in their air strength was discovered.<sup>14</sup>

May 20  
1942

Ominato was to be the rendezvous and fitting out base for the Aleutian units, and, consequently, most of the preparations took place there.<sup>15</sup> The identification of many more Japanese radio call signs was of great help in outlining the organization of the Northern forces,<sup>16</sup> and the inauguration of special broadcasts from Tokyo indicated that operations were about to commence.<sup>17</sup> Additions

May 22  
1942

to the Aleutian forces were now noticed,<sup>18</sup> and, in particular, the use of converted air-

- 
- (12) I, Nos. 18-20
  - (13) I, No. 22
  - (14) I, No. 23
  - (15) I, Nos. 28-30
  - (16) I, No. 31
  - (17) I, No. 32-33
  - (18) I, No.s 34-41

craft carriers was worthy of attention.<sup>19</sup> Many signs of increasing Japanese air strength were observed also,<sup>20</sup> and an important U.S. bulletin was now issued which warned that in advanced operations the Japanese used fighter float planes operating from seaplane tenders.<sup>21</sup> The usual coordination of Japanese submarine activities with their fleet movements was now put in operation,<sup>22</sup> and the necessary preparations involving ammunition, oil, plane and personnel replacements continued.<sup>23</sup> There could be no doubt by this time that an extraordinary concentration of enemy forces was taking place in the Northern area,<sup>24</sup> and the fact that Japanese Army and Navy leaders were consulting about this Occupation Force emphasized the gravity of the situation.<sup>25</sup>

- 
- (19) I, No. 42  
(20) I, Nos. 43-46  
(21) I, No. 47  
(22) I, No. 48  
(23) I, Nos. 49-52  
(24) I, Nos. 53-58  
(25) I, No. 59

May 24  
1942

Interesting aspects of the enemy's preparations were the increased use of Japanese Radio Intelligence posts,<sup>26</sup> and their efforts at the same time to maintain radio silence in the Aleutian area.<sup>27</sup> An intercepted message gave the outline of most of the Japanese Aleutian strength,<sup>28</sup> and traffic analysis demonstrated that most of these forces were active in the North.<sup>29</sup> Important departure dates were learned from decryptions,<sup>30</sup> and the identification of

May 25  
1942

several area designators was useful for future interceptions.<sup>31</sup> Each day brought more details of the Japanese organization,<sup>32</sup> and another resume of the forces expected to operate in the Aleutian Area was given at this point.<sup>33</sup> The Japanese, on the other hand, were sparing no effort to gather information covering the Allied forces, prior to the attack.<sup>34</sup> The concentration

- 
- (26) I, Nos. 59-60
  - (27) I, No. 61
  - (28) I, No. 63
  - (29) I, Nos. 64-71
  - (30) I, Nos. 69-71
  - (31) I, Nos. 72-73
  - (32) I, Nos. 74-80
  - (33) I, No. 80
  - (34) I, No. 81

5 202 1942

May 27  
1942 of Japanese forces continued at Ominato.<sup>35</sup> Other indications of impending action were the constant reports of the enemy's weather ships, the increase of enemy Radio Intelligence activities in the Hawaiian and Aleutian Areas,<sup>36</sup> and the evidence of the Japanese Army's interest in the Occupation Force.<sup>37</sup>

May 28  
1942 Close supervision was kept over Japanese submarine and airplane traffic,<sup>38</sup> and the radio silence of the carriers,<sup>39</sup> plus the support of heavy bombers from the Kuriles Area<sup>40</sup> were some of the items noticed. Decipherment of enemy messages furnished the rendezvous point of some of the Japanese forces<sup>41</sup> and radio call lists for their ships in the coming campaign were also obtained.<sup>42</sup>

May 29  
1942 Details of Japanese air strength were now intercepted,<sup>43</sup> and warnings were issued to the U.S. Navy that the Aleutian Striking Force

- 
- (35) I, Nos. 82-83  
(36) Vol. I, II, No. 85  
(37) I, No. 87  
(38) I, Nos. 85-88  
(39) I, No. 87  
(40) I, No. 88  
(41) I, No. 89  
(42) I, No. 90  
(43) I, No. 91-94

was now believed to be underway.<sup>44</sup> Another detailed resume of Japanese strength in the Aleutians was issued at this time as a final check list,<sup>45</sup> and an amazingly accurate operational estimate of Japanese moves was made on the basis of all the foregoing intelligence.

May 30  
1942

An important Operation Order of the enemy was now decrypted,<sup>46</sup> and traffic analysis was able to show that some of the enemy submarines were in the Aleutian area.<sup>47</sup> Planes were also en route to the Northern Kuriles, as were the carriers, whose dangerous presence was indicated by their silence in radio traffic.<sup>48</sup> All signs pointed to a closely coordinated Japanese attack on both Midway and the Aleutians.<sup>49</sup>

May 31  
1942

As the date of the attack approached, enemy radio traffic decreased in accordance with the usual procedure. The change in the basic code of the Japanese on May 28 at 0000 also proved to be a difficult obstacle to overcome,

- 
- (44) I, Nos. 97-98
  - (45) I, No. 99
  - (46) I, No. 100
  - (47) I, No. 101
  - (48) I, No. 103
  - (49) I, No. 104

but traffic analysis indicated that Ominato was keeping in touch with the carrier, RYUJO, and submarine units in Northern waters.<sup>50</sup> As

June 1-3  
1942 the unusual quiet continued, matters grew more intense since both Midway and the Aleutians were on the alert.<sup>51</sup> The Japanese Radio Intelligence was very active, indicating that special efforts were being made to gather information on our forces prior to the attack on Midway and the North.<sup>52</sup> A complete and very valuable picture of enemy radio traffic was now given, and the location of the various Japanese fleets and commanders pointed out.<sup>53</sup> This was an important summary of intelligence, for the enemy was soon to be sighted by the fleets of the U.S. Navy.

June 4  
1942

There was no surprise about the Japanese attack when word was flashed to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet that enemy planes had suddenly appeared over Dutch Harbor. Evidence of Japanese intentions for such an assault had been piling up too long.

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(50) I, Nos. 105-108  
 (51) I, Nos. 109-110-114  
 (52) I, No. 111  
 (53) I, Nos. 115-117



ORIGINAL

And so with the actual fighting beginning, the prelude to the campaign of the Aleutians ends.

CHAPTER II

Potential Value of Radio Intelligence in  
Naval Battles as Illustrated at Midway

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CHAPTER IIPOTENTIAL VALUE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCEIN NAVAL BATTLESAS ILLUSTRATED IN BATTLE OF MIDWAYPREFACE

The story of the Battle of Midway is already well known, for until the beginning of the Solomon Islands campaign, Midway was certainly the most important engagement of the war in the Pacific. Dozens of eye witnesses have told their stories through the medium of press publications and radio. Thorough factual reports of the encounter have been made by U.S. naval officers who were engaged in the operations, and objective analyses of these data have been completed by the commanding officers of the units concerned. It may be said then that a rather complete portrayal of the Midway campaign from the American viewpoint can now be written.

This chapter, however, makes no attempt to tell the whole story of Midway. The purpose here is to analyze some of the enemy messages intercepted during the campaign to learn lessons for the future. Since the

5. 22. 1943

battle began June 4 (our June 3) and the first intercepted message is dated June 5 (our June 4) it is evident that this resume is far from complete. However, no matter how sketchy the material may be, every student of the Battle of Midway will be interested in the enemy's reports. Their importance lies in the fact that they were sent during battle, and the enemy considered the information contained therein to be valuable enough to break the protective cloak of radio silence.

A - JUNE 4, 1942 (our June 3)

On June 4 about 9:00 A.M. the long expected sighting of a strong Japanese Occupation Force was made by U.S. Navy patrol planes some 700 miles off Midway. The Japanese force, composed of many cruisers, transports, cargo vessels, and destroyers, was proceeding eastward in five columns. Nine U.S.A. "Flying Fortresses" were sent immediately to attack this force, and they succeeded in severely damaging a cruiser and a transport with minor damage to other vessels. That night a remarkable moonlight attack by four Navy "Catalinas" achieved two torpedo hits on large enemy ships. This was the first night torpedo attack ever launched by U.S. Navy patrol planes.

B - JUNE 5, 1942 (our June 4)

June 5 was the most important day of the whole campaign. Land based Army and Marine torpedo planes, bombers left Midway at dawn to attack the approaching Japanese forces, and in face of heavy losses succeeded in inflicting one torpedo hit and six bomb hits on carriers, two bomb hits on a battleship, and one other bomb hit on an enemy vessel. Both the Occupation and Striking Force of the Japanese were discovered by this time. Meanwhile, Midway Island itself was attacked at 6:35 A.M. by carrier based enemy planes, estimated at over 80 in number. The badly outnumbered Marines, in planes far inferior to those of the enemy, shot down 40 to 50 Japanese planes.

Though our Midway based air forces had won a notable victory, the furious fighting had exacted a heavy toll. The situation was very grave at this moment for while Midway's full strength had been expended, the enemy was still pushing forward with 70 out of 80 ships intact. Meanwhile, between 8:30 and 9:30 A.M. the Japanese carrier force had begun to retreat northwestward. This change of course was not observed at first, because our shore based planes had returned

ORIGINAL

5 APR 1947

to Midway after completing their attack. Consequently, when the carrier based planes of the U.S. Navy were launched, some of the air groups could not locate the Japanese. One torpedo squadron, suspecting the change in course, found the enemy, and without waiting for fighter support immediately attacked. Not one of the 15 planes succeeded in escaping, and only one flier lived to tell the story of this heroic exploit. However, other torpedo planes from our carriers continued to harass the enemy, and were so dangerous a threat that the Japanese fighters centered their attention on them. This left our dive bombers unhampered, and three Japanese carriers, the KAGA, AKAGI, and SORYU were set on fire. In addition, during this phase of the battle two of their battleships and one destroyer were severely damaged.

Shortly after this action planes from the HIRYU attacked the U.S. carrier YORKTOWN, and though 14 of the 18 were shot down, they obtained three hits. Another wave of enemy torpedo planes escorted by fighters was destroyed completely a little later, but again the YORKTOWN was struck. Out of action because of this, her planes still continued to operate from other carriers,

5 APR 1943

and they succeeded in locating the HIRYU, then protected by battleships, cruisers and destroyers. A fierce assault by our carrier planes scored many hits on the HIRYU, and, blazing from stem to stern, she sank the following morning. Two enemy battleships and a heavy cruiser were also damaged severely.

Thus, June 5 (our June 4) was a momentous day for the United States Forces. Despite the loss of the YORKTOWN, the U.S. had won air supremacy around Midway. Four enemy carriers, hit at various times by Marine Corps dive bombers, army bombers, carrier-based planes, and in one instance by torpedoes from a submarine, either sank or were completely out of action. Two enemy battleships and several other ships had been damaged, and one enemy destroyer was sunk.

It was on this day, June 5 (our June 4) that many Japanese messages were intercepted, and they will follow here in chronological order. That material is presented in chronological fashion so that the reader can share the experience of Radio Intelligence analysts, who must pick out main trends from the accumulation of many details. Remember that June 5 (-9) is June 4 according to our time. The Japanese had changed

5 287 1943

their code on May 28th, and, consequently, these messages could not be read at the time when they would have had great operational value. However, since then Radio Intelligence has been able to read the messages which follow:

American destroyers were sighted early in the morning, and the Japanese Striking Force announced to the rest of the fleet that it was going to attack.

No. 1

From: Striking Force. 0600, 5 June  
To: Combined Fleet.  
Info: 2nd Fleet.

5 enemy DD's bearing distance 240 miles from Midway. Heading for them.

More definite information concerning the American forces just sighted was evidently received, for another message with more details followed closely. Notice that the Submarine Force also received this information:



No. 2

0600, 5 June

FROM: Striking Force.  
TO : Combined Fleet.  
INFO: 2nd Fleet. TURA: Sub Force.

At 0500 enemy 1 CV, 5 CA, 5 DD were 100 240 miles from Midway heading for them.

The Occupation Force was ordered to retire very early in the day, for at 10:00 A.M. a subchaser group, escorting transports, was turned back and headed for Wake. No reason was given in the dispatch.

No. 3

1000, 5 June

FROM: DesRon 2.  
TO : Sub Chaser Div. 21; HETIYO MARU.  
INFO: Flag Comb. Fleet; Flag and Fleet.

Turn back. Head for Wake temporarily, inform me your position.

At 11:20 A.M. a dispatch from the Japanese #1 Striking Force shows that the location of American carriers was now known. The grid system of location used by the enemy in these messages was solved by Communication Intelligence, and is believed to be correct to the nearest twenty minutes of Longitude

5 APR 1943

and latitude. At noon the enemy reported two certain torpedo hits on a United States carrier.

No. 5

1200, 5 June

FROM: Flag, CarDiv. 2.  
TO : NAGARA.  
INFO: Striking Force.

Battle results of 2nd carrier attack force. Attacked enemy ENTERPRISE class (not the one previously bombed) and got two certain torpedo hits.

The position of the retiring Occupation Force was: 30° N; 174° E at this time according to the next dispatch.

No. 6

1305, 5 June

FROM: Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet.  
TO : Chief of Staff, 2nd Fleet.  
INFO: Flag, 11th Air Fleet; MURKAWAMI (?);  
Message Sect. Navy Ministry.

With respect to the resumption of the Midway occupation. The retiring occupation force is generally in position 30° N; 174° E carrying out pertinent operations.

Info: Chief of 1st Section Imperial Headquarters.

An enemy estimate of American forces based on scouting reports was given to the Japanese Striking Force.

No. 7

1325, 5 June

~~FROM:~~ Flag, CarDiv 2.  
TO : Striking Force.

From reports of returned personnel the enemy has 3 CV, 5 CA and 15 DD. 2 carriers were (damaged) by our attack.

The Japanese Commander-in-Chief asked for a report of the attack on Midway, since he was planning the next day's operations.

No. 8

1355, 5 June

FROM: Flagship CinC Combined Fleet.  
TO : Flagship CinC 1st Air Fleet.  
INFO: Flag CruDiv 3; Flag, CarDiv 2.

Desire immediate outline of results of attack on Midway (particularly whether the enemy can use land base tomorrow and the air strength of the base).

An important message in which the position of the main Occupation Force was disclosed came next:

No. 9

1415, 5 June

FROM: Striking Force, Comdrs; Flagship,  
TO : Combined Fleet; Flagship CruDiv 3  
Occupation For. OpOrd #12.

The main force of the occupation will reach

5 APR 1943

No. 9 Cont'd.

position TO (30-30 N, 179-50 W) about 2100. Striking Force destroy remaining enemy in night action. Until that time if enemy movements permit continue sweep and search eastward.

Word of a Japanese disaster was flashed to their Commander-in-Chief. The carrier KAGA had been put out of action by American planes.

No. 10

1500, 5 June

FROM: Comdr. 1st Air Fleet.  
TO : Comdr. Combined Fleet.  
INFO: Comdr. 2nd Fleet; CarDiv 4 Flagships.

KAGA out of action position (28-50 N, 179-50 W) survivors transferred to DDs.

Information which American forces could have used to great advantage was disclosed in the following:

No. 11

1535, 5 June

FROM: Flag 1st Air Fleet.  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_  
INFO: \_\_\_\_\_

From: ComDesRon 2.

This force (less DisDiv 15) will arrive at position (29-30 N, 177-50 E) at 1800. Then expect to go to course 65° speed 26 knots.

5 APR 1943

More valuable information was available in the next dispatch. From the messages already read it can be seen that Radio Intelligence has a very important potential value in actual battles. If these messages had been read at the time of the engagement our victory would have been more complete. Air reconnaissance, though indispensable, cannot read the plans of the enemy.

No. 12

1600, 5 June

FROM: Flag 2nd Fleet.  
 TO : Flag 11th Air Fleet.  
 INFO: Flag Combined Fleet; Flag, CruDiv 7;  
 Flag DesRon 2; Comdr. Combined Special  
 Landing Force.

Occupation Force Order #11:  
 It is planned to reestablish the Midway occupation. The Occupation Force Air Force and its escort assemble in the vicinity of 30° N, 174° E and carry out pertinent operations.

Damage to another carrier was now announced by the Japanese Striking Force:

No. 13

1-30, (1630 ?) 5 June

FROM: Comdr. Striking Force.

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No. 13 (cont'd)

TO : All Comdrs. Combined Fleet.  
INFO: All Comdrs. CarDiv 4; All Comdrs.  
2nd Fleet.

HIRYU hit by bombs on fire.

Announcement of the rendezvous for the Occupation Force was sent to transports and their escorts.

No. 14

1730, 5 June

FROM: Flag 11th Air Fleet.  
TO : KANIKAWA MARU; Patrol Boat #35.

Tomorrow 0700 rendezvous point \_\_\_\_\_  
(30 N, 174 W).

An overly optimistic report by the Japanese covering the condition of the air field at Midway was sent that evening. Much equipment had been destroyed, but the field was still useful at this time.

No. 15

1620, 5 June

FROM: Chief of Staff, 2nd Fleet.  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_ Rans.

The equipment of the air base at Midway is completely destroyed and the airfield cannot be used - - - (rest garbled) - - -.

The position of the Japanese Striking Force,

5 JUN 1943

which was retiring, was divulged in the next dispatches.

The HIRYU and AKAGI were still afloat at this time.

No. 16

1840, 5 June

FROM: Comdr. Striking Force.  
 TO : Flag Combined Fleet.  
 INFO: Flag 2nd Fleet; Flag 1st Fleet; Station  
 of Comdr. 11th Air Fleet.

Enemy force consisting of — CV, 6 CA, and 15 DD  
 at 1530 in vicinity of (30-50 N, 176-  
 10 W) going west. We are escorting the HIRYU and  
 retiring northwest speed 18 knots. 1830 position  
 (31-30 N, 179-50 E).

Details of Japanese escort procedure can be  
 gleaned from the following report of the AKAGI's escort.

No. 17

1900, 5 June

FROM: DesDiv 5.  
 TO : Comdr. Advance Force; Combined Fleet;  
 Flag 2nd Fleet.  
 INFO: \_\_\_\_\_; Striking Force.

1st Section of DesDiv 4 is about 7 kilometers  
 to the south of the AKAGI, 2nd Section of Des-  
 Div 17 is about 7 kilometers to the north of  
 the AKAGI patrolling the east-west line. The  
 2nd Section of DesDiv 4 is patrolling within  
 the 5 kilometer circle of the AKAGI.

Though conscious of the damage already received  
 the Japanese were not ready to give up yet. Having  
 grouped their forces and reorganized their commands,  
 new orders were issued to the Striking and Occupation

5 APR 1943

Forces to coordinate their movements in anticipated night action. Notice the disclosure of their rendezvous point in No. 20 and No. 22.

No. 18

1955, 5 June

FROM: YAMATO.  
TO : Flag 2nd Fleet; Flag 1st Air Fleet.  
INFO: CruDiv 8; Flag 10th Division; Flag 1st Fleet.

Order #160: Comdr. 2nd Fleet take command of Striking Force (HIRYU, ARAGI and their escort).  
From: Cinc Combined Fleet.

No. 19

2040, 5 June

PART 2  
FROM: \_\_\_\_\_  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_; Striking Force.  
INFO: Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 6th Fleet.

Striking Force (less HIRYU, ARAGI and their escort) turn back at once and participate in occupation forces night action.

No. 20

2040, 5 June

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_; Striking Force.  
INFO: Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 6th Fleet.

The Occupation Force will reach position (30-50 N, 178-50 W) at 0000 the 6th. After that search for the enemy to the east and carry out night action in accordance with Striking Force SMS #560.



No. 21

2100, 5 June

FROM: Flag 2nd Fleet.  
 TO : Striking Force; \_\_\_\_\_  
 INFO: Flag Combined Fleet. Flag 1st Fleet.

Part I - Expect to meet the enemy after 2200.  
 Part II - Search preparations (- - - -) Des-  
 Ron 2; CruDiv 5; CruDiv 4; DesRon 4. At inter-  
 vals of 6 kilometers and BFP Div. 3 roughly 10  
 kilometers astern of CruDiv 4.  
 Part III - Striking Force engage in night ac-  
 tion (this part garbled).

No. 22

2220, 5 June

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_  
 TO : \_\_\_\_\_; Striking Force; Flag  
 Combined Fleet.

Part I - Occupation Force main body 2200 posi-  
 tion \_\_\_\_\_ (30-30 N, 179-50 W) course 305°  
 speed 24 knots. In preparing for night action  
 follow movements of main body.  
 Part II - DesRon 2 follow astern of main body.  
 Part III - Striking Force under its commander  
 join the main body.

A very complete battle report was sent by the  
 Japanese Striking Force as June 5 (our June 4) came  
 to a close. It contained information which would have  
 strongly corroborated our own scout reports, and  
 greatly helped our striking forces.

No. 23

(566 (I-4) of 2330, 5 June

Striking Force Battle Report, #1.

Part I. June 5, carried out air attack on Midway as scheduled. Shot down about 30 enemy planes and although inflicted considerable damage to equipment, details are not clear. Even after the attack it seemed that the enemy was able to use the air field.

Part II. From 0400 - 0730 more than 100 enemy planes attacked, among which more than 50 were shot down. Even though we avoided all the torpedoes, because of the attack of the shipboard bombers we received many direct hits. As it was impossible to continue the battle because of fires, I gave the order to retreat and with 6 destroyers in company shifted flag to the NAGARA. With the remainder of this force, proceeded towards the enemy striking force and attacked. An aircraft carrier of the HORNET class received considerable damage with 2 torpedo hits.

At 1430, because of an extremely serious attack by enemy shipboard bombers, we sustained great damage. It was a terrific battle. The air attacks continued in succession until about 1600.

Part III. After retiring to the northwest we turned to attack. This force's 1800 position was \_\_\_\_\_ (30-50 N, 179-50 W) course 320°, speed 20 knots. The enemy's main force consisted of 3 HORNET type aircraft carriers (one of which was listing, burning, and drifting) 2 aircraft carriers and a number of destroyers. 1500 position of 10 ships \_\_\_\_\_ (30-55 N, 176-05 W) course 280°, speed 24 knots.

Part IV. Although the fire on the HIRYU has slackened a bit, she lies in the enemy's track, and the fire cannot be brought under control. If it were possible to put out the fire, she might be able to get underway. She is under escort of two destroyers and retiring to the northwest. The SCRYU sank and the KAGA also sank. The AKAGI

5 APR 1943

is burning fiercely and it is not expected to be brought under control. Getting underway is impossible. She is at approximate position \_\_\_\_\_ (30-40 N, 178-50 W) under escort of two destroyers.

Meanwhile, provisions were made to refuel the escorts and carriers limping northward in retirement.

No. 24

2105, 5 June

FROM: Flag Air Fleet 1.  
 TO : ARKISHO.  
 INFO: CarDiv 4; Flag 1st Fleet; 2nd Fleet.

Send two tankers to position 44-40 N, - - - - by the morning of the 7th to supply CarDiv 4.

The anxiety of the enemy concerning these severely damaged carriers is evident from the frequent reports of their position.

No. 25

2120, 5 June

FROM: Flag 1st Air Fleet.  
 TO : Flag Combined Fleet \_\_\_\_\_  
 INFO: Flag CruDiv 8.

2100 position \_\_\_\_\_ (32-10 N, 178-50 E)  
 escorting the HIRYU. Tomorrow at dawn arrive  
 at position \_\_\_\_\_ (32-10 N, 177-30 E) -  
 - - (rest garbled) - - -

ORIGINAL  
5 APR 1943

Another part of the Japanese forces which had been ordered back to Wake, now reported surveillance by an American plane.

No. 26

2300, 5 June

FROM: Flag DesRon 2.  
TO :  
INFO: Flag of CINC Combined Fleet; Flag  
CRUDiv 7.

Since 2230 the convoy (SEVDAN) has been shadowed by an enemy plane. Our position  $44^{\circ} 52'$  - - - - miles from Wake. Until 0200 course  $40^{\circ}$  speed 11.

The position of the supply ships of the main forces was disclosed in the next dispatch. These would have been splendid targets if our forces had known their locations.

No. 27

052240

Combined Fleet.  
MU TI I

#30500 of 5 June.

#1 Supply Detachment of the main body and the SHIKIYAMA are in the vicinity of  $33^{\circ}$  north,  $170^{\circ}$  east.

5 JUN 1942

C - JUNE 6, 1942 (our June 5)

The Japanese forces were now in full retreat, but difficult flying conditions made the task of finding their widely dispersed units very hazardous. U.S. Army Flying Fortresses succeeded in finding some enemy battleships and cruisers to the west of Midway, and scored two bomb hits on a cruiser, which was left listing badly. Later, another Army attack dropped a bomb on the stern of a heavy cruiser, and about noon Marine planes obtained one direct hit on one of the damaged cruisers. Earlier in the morning a Japanese submarine, evidently unaware of the changes in his force's plans, shelled Midway without effect, and was driven off by our return fire.

In the afternoon the Army Flying Fortresses attacked again, and hit one of the enemy cruisers with three bombs. Bad weather kept American carrier planes from finding the enemy in the northwest area, but all through the day and night of June 6-7 (our June 5-6), the carriers steamed westward in pursuit.

Many Japanese messages were intercepted on this

ORIGINAL

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day also. Had Radio Intelligence been able to read these battle orders with the same success it had during the Battle of Coral Sea, Midway would probably have been an even more decisive victory than it was; e.g., an important tactical order was issued during the night:

No. 28

0030, 6 June

FROM: Flag Main Body.  
TO : All Comdrs. Striking Force; --All  
Comdrs. Screen Force; NISSEIN.

All forces join up this morning and take screening formation AB.

Part I - SUJHO and HOSHO go north with BatDiv 1.

Part II - Division 10 flagship in the position of DesRon 1 Flagship.

Part III - CruDiv 5.23 and 25  
CruDiv 8.26 and ---.

Part IV - Outer and Inner Lines.

Screen vessels - 40 to 430 30 to 33.

Under occupation for Comdr. 44 to 470 34 to 37.

Part V - DesDiv 11 and DesDiv 19 (less SEIKINAMI)  
20 to 23 \_\_\_\_\_, etc.

Another position was disclosed in this next dispatch:

No. 29

0100, 6 June

5 1943

No. 29 (Cont'd)

FROM: GYOKUTO MARU.  
 TO : Flag 1st Air Fleet.  
 INFO: Flag CarDiv 4; NIPPON MARU; KOKUYO MARU.

In accordance with 1st Air Fleet SMS #563, at 0200, 6th, position 35-10 N, 172-50 E, detach NIPPON MARU and KOKUYO MARU - speed 14 knots, to arrive the 8th.

Warning of the presence of a submarine was issued to the Japanese cruisers.

No. 30

0100, 6 June

FROM: Flag CruDiv 7.  
 TO : HOGAMI; MIKUMA.

A submarine submerged 45° 8 kilometers from the KUMANO.

More enemy units were ordered to report at the refueling rendezvous. Knowing this one position alone would have meant great opportunities, particularly for our submarines.

No. 31

0200, 6 June

#760

MIKAZUKI (DD), SATA, TSURUMI, GENYO MARU, and GENYO MARU proceed immediately to the rendezvous for fueling at position 33 E, 170 E.

ORIGINAL  
3 1944

No. 32

0200, 6 June

FROM: Flag 2nd Fleet.  
TO : Occupation Force.  
INFO: Flag Combined Fleet.

Cancel of Midway occupation. (Remainder garbled.)

No. 33

0210, 6 June

FROM: 11th Air Fleet.  
TO : KYCKUTO MARU; ARIGUMA.  
INFO: Combined Fleet; CarDiv 4.

Cancel the diversion of tankers. Go to position  
38 N, 170 E, and wait.

A series of dispatches ordering more support for  
Japanese cruisers was now issued.

No. 34

0325, 6 June

FROM: Occupation Force.  
TO : CruDiv 7.  
INFO: DesDiv 8.

Comdr. Support Force Detail DesDiv 8 to escort  
2nd Section CruDiv 7.

No. 35

0325, 6 June



No. 35 (Cont'd)

FROM: MIKUMA  
TO : Flag CruDiv 7; Flag Combined Fleet;  
Flag 2nd Fleet.

We are in contact with one large enemy cruiser.  
Position \_\_\_\_\_ (28-10 N, 179-30 W) course  
270°, speed 12 knots.

No. 36

0330, 6 June

FROM: Comdr. DesDiv 8.  
TO : Staff CruDiv 7.  
INFO: ARASHIO.

Inform 0300 position course and speed of CruDiv 7.

A Japanese report on the YORKTOWN was sent at  
this time.

No. 37

0340, 6 June

FROM: Flag 1st Air Fleet.  
TO : Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 6th Fleet.

Enemy carrier of YORKTOWN class suffered great  
damage, listing to starboard and drifting in  
position \_\_\_\_\_ (39-30 N, 176-10 W).  
(Error in this position - probably 30-30 N,  
176-10 W.)

One of the units in retreat sent word of the di-  
rection of its movements.

No. 38

0420, 6 June

FROM: SubChaser Div. 22.  
To : \_\_\_\_\_

Heading for Wake.

Returning to the cruisers already mentioned, a number of dispatches deal with the attacks of American planes on the MIKUMA and MOGAMI.

No. 39

0500, 6 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : Flag, CruDiv; Flag Combined Fleet;  
Flag 2nd Fleet.

8 enemy bombers attacking, we are firing. Position \_\_\_\_\_ (28-10 N, 179-50 W).

No. 40

0545, 6 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : Flag, CruDiv 7; Flag, Combined Fleet;  
Flag 2nd Fleet.

Although we were attacked by 8 B-17's at 0534, we drove them off without damage.

5 APR 1943

No. 41

0605, 6 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : Flag CruDiv; Flag Combined Fleet;  
Flag 2nd Fleet.

MCGAMI is receiving a series of bombing attacks.  
Add one plane shot down, no damage.

No. 42

0635, 6 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : DesDiv 8.  
INFO: CruDiv 7; 2nd Fleet.

2nd Section CruDiv 7 0600 position  
(28-10 N, 179-50 E) course 270°, speed 12 knots.

No. 43

0830, 6 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : CruDiv 7; Combined Fleet; 2nd Fleet.

Part I - (Garbled).  
Part II - MCGAMI's maximum speed 14 knots.

While this important action was going on, an enemy destroyer division was attempting to rendezvous with a supply ship before joining the cruisers. Meanwhile a report on the condition of the HIRYU was made.

COMM  
5 173 1913

No. 44

0530, 6 June

FROM: DesDiv 8.  
TO : NICHISEI MARU (?).  
INFO: CruDiv 7.

What is your 0600 position, course and speed?

No. 45

0820, 6 June

FROM: \_\_\_\_\_  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_

According to reconnaissance by HCSG planes at 0420, the HIRYU was burning in position \_\_\_\_\_ (32-10 N, 173-50 E). A number of survivors were on deck. Investigating condition and will take off survivors. (Last part garbled.)

Later in the day when the destroyer division had received fresh supplies, presumably fuel, it made plans to join the damaged cruisers HOGAMI and MIKUMA.

No. 46

1500, 6 June

FROM: DesDiv 8.  
TO : CruDiv 7; HOGAMI.

Expect to meet you at 0200 tomorrow (7th). Inform me your 2200 position, course, and speed. This unit's position at completion of supplying (1730) was \_\_\_\_\_ (31-10 N, 172-30 E).

The Japanese Occupation Force was still moving westward according to the next dispatch.

No. 47

1610, 6 June

FROM: Flag 2nd Fleet.  
TO : L  
INFO: Flag Combined Fleet.

- - - - - Escort Force and Occupation Force continue westward until further orders.

No. 48

1800, 6 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : \_\_\_\_\_

1800 position \_\_\_\_\_ [23-10 N, 176-10 E],  
course 300°, speed 12.

No. 49

1800, 6 June

FROM: Flag, Screen Force.  
TO : Screen Force Supply Force.  
INFO: KAGIRO.

Screen Force Order #36 \_\_\_\_\_  
When Supply Force reaches position 33 N, 165 E,  
wait. What is your estimated position 0600 the  
7th?

ORIGINAL

No. 50

1800, 6 June

FROM: SADA.  
TO : Flag, 2nd Fleet.  
INFO: Flag, Combined Fleet.

This ship's 1800 position \_\_\_\_\_ (31-10 N,  
169-50 E) heading toward rendezvous point de-  
signated in Combined Fleet SMS #320.

Warning that the United States Forces were pro-  
ceeding westward, and that all the carriers of the  
Japanese Striking Force were out of action was sent to  
the enemy Commander-in-Chief.

No. 51

1950, 6 June

FROM: Combined Striking Force.  
TO : Flag Combined Fleet.

RE: Combined Fleet Order #158.  
Enemy CV (possibly including converted carriers)  
are now 4, cruisers 6, and destroyers —. They  
are proceeding west. All carriers of this force  
are out of action. Tomorrow morning will try to  
contact enemy with scout seaplanes.

The Japanese were on the lookout for the pur-  
suing United States Forces.

138

No. 52

2008, 6 June

FROM: Flag 1st Air Fleet.  
TO : TANIKAZE (DD).

Search until 2200 and if nothing is sighted return.

No. 53

2030, 6 June

FROM: YAMATO.  
TO : Comdr. 11th Air Fleet; Air Flotilla 24; 14th Air Unit.  
INFO: Flag 2nd Fleet; CruDiv 7.

Tomorrow search sector "X".  
From: Cinc Combined Fleet.

The presence of another Japanese carrier was disclosed in the announcement of a dawn attack. The ZUIHO is a carrier, and the HARUSAME is a destroyer.

No. 54

2115, 6 June

FROM: Flag 2nd Fleet.  
TO : Striking Force; Occupation Force.  
INFO: Flag Combined Fleet; Chief of Naval General Staff.

ZUIHO (CV) and HARUSAME (DD) are in position (31-50 N, 179-50 W). Carry out dawn attack.

Plans to bombard Midway were cancelled at this time, and the cruisers supposed to engage in this attack were ordered to meet the main Japanese forces.

No. 55

2120, 6 June

FROM: Flag Main Body.  
TO : CruDiv 7.  
INFO: Flag, 2nd Fleet.

Cancel bombardment of Midway. Head for tomorrow morning 0600 position of Main Body (32-10 N, 178-10 E).

Evidently the AKAGI had not yet sunk, for just before midnight a query as to its condition was intercepted.

No. 56

2320, 6 June

FROM: Occupation Force.  
TO : DesDiv 4.  
INFO: Flag 1st Air Fleet.

Inform condition of AKAGI immediately.

As June 6 came to an end the Japanese Occupation Force sent word that it was enroute to the rendezvous with the main forces.



No. 57

2330, 6 June

FROM: Occupation Force.  
TO : All Comds. CruDiv 7.  
INFO: ARASHIO.

This force heading for main body, course 200,  
speed 21 knots; 2300 position (28-  
50 N, 177-10 E).

B - JUNE 7, 1942 (our June 6)

An early morning search by American carrier planes disclosed two groups of Japanese ships, each of which contained cruisers and destroyers. One of these groups was attacked by our planes, and several bomb hits were scored on the heavy cruisers MIKUMA and HOGAMI, and one destroyer was sunk. Other attacks were made during the rest of the day until the MIKUMA finally sank. The HOGAMI, which was reported sunk, finally succeeded in making its escape. All day the Japanese were on the alert for more attacks, and at last their planes at Waka were ordered to be ready to attack our carriers. The series of dispatches covering the MIKUMA and HOGAMI now follow:

3 488 1217

No. 58

0700, 7 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 2nd Fleet;  
Flag CruDiv 7.

At 0645 received attack by large group of enemy carrier based planes. Fear another attack.

No. 59

0705, 7 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 2nd Fleet;  
Flag CruDiv 7.

We are being attacked by enemy carrier (planes).

No. 60

0745, 7 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 2nd Fleet;  
Flag CruDiv 7.

In contact with 2 enemy scout seaplanes.

No. 61

0800, 7 June

FROM: MIKUMA.  
TO : Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 2nd Fleet;  
4th Air Attack; Flag CruDiv 7.  
INFO: Flag Air Flotilla 24; CHITOSE Air Grp.

We are being shadowed by enemy carrier planes. Heading for Wake. Position 30° 710 miles from Wake.

No. 62

0810, 7 June

FROM: Air Base #138.  
 TO : MIKUMA.  
 INFO: HOGAMI, Flag CruDiv 7; Combined Fleet;  
 2nd Fleet; Wake Air Base; - - - - -.

Inform estimated position of enemy CV. An as-  
 sembling Wake's planes.

No. 63

0830, 7 June

FROM: 11th Air Fleet.  
 TO : HE 2.  
 INFO: Flag Combined Fleet; 2nd Fleet; 4th  
 Fleet; Flag CruDiv 7; MIKUMA; Defense  
 Force 65; HE 2 less GOSHU HARU.

Assemble as much strength as possible at Wake  
 and prepare to attack enemy CV.

No. 64

0855, 7 June

FROM: Flag Combined Fleet.  
 TO : Flag 5th Fleet; Flag 2nd Fleet; Flag  
 1st Air Fleet.  
 INFO: Flag CruDiv 7; HOGAMI; MIKUMA; - - -

Part I - Commander Occupation Force with ships  
 under his command (including CruDiv 8) assist  
 2nd Section of CruDiv 7.

Part II - Temporarily suspend operations of  
 Combined Fleet Order #163.

ORIGINAL

The carrier ZUIKAKU was ordered into action at this time, as well as other air units.

No. 65

0920, 7 June

FROM: 1st Air Fleet.  
TO : ComCardiv 5.  
INFO: Flag Combined Fleet.

Cancel SMS #576. ZUIKAKU complete preparations for getting underway immediately.

No. 66

0930, 7 June

FROM: HE 8.  
TO : HE 8 less GOSHU MARU.  
INFO: Staff of Cinc 11th Air Fleet; Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 4th Fleet; Flag 2nd Fleet; Flag CruDiv 7; MIKUMA; Defense Force 65.

4th Air Attack Order #43:

Part I - 2nd Unit transfer 2 sections of land based planes to Wake.

Part II - The above detachment will temporarily be under command of Wake Detachment of CHITOSE Air.

Part III - Wake Detachment of CHITOSE Air prepare to attack enemy carrier which attacked MIKUMA (0330 position .. (29-10 N, 174-30 E)).

Every effort was being made by the Japanese to protect the HOGAMI and MIKUMA. The main strength of

the Occupation Force was ordered to support the crui-  
sers, and the carrier ZUIHO was to attack the American  
carrier. The desperation of the enemy is evident in  
the order directed to the 2 seat observation planes to  
attack the American carrier with bombs. Using planes  
of this type on such a mission is generally suicide.

No. 67

0950, 7 June

FROM: Occupation Force  
TO : Occupation Force  
INFO: Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 11th Air  
Fleet; Flag Air Flotilla 24.

0930 position of Occupation Force Main Force  
course 170° (corrected at 1100 to  
180°) speed 20. Going to assistance of 2nd  
Section CruDiv 7. 1st Section CruDiv 7 oper-  
ate with Main Force.  
(Note: 33-30 N, 169-30 E appears to be wrong  
grid position.)

No. 68

1100, 7 June

FROM: Occupation Force  
TO : Occupation Force  
INFO: Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 11th Air  
Fleet; Flag Air Flotilla 24.

2nd Fleet SMS #772 correct course 170° to 180°.

No. 69

1040, 7 June

FROM: Flag 2nd Fleet.  
 TO : Occupation Force ; CruDiv 8.  
 INFO: Flag Combined Fleet; Flag 6th Fleet;  
 Flag 11th Air Fleet; Flag Air Flotilla  
 24.

Occupation Force Order #15.

Part I - Main Force of Occupation Force (less  
 BatDiv 3) and DesRon 2 and CruDiv 8 destroy  
 enemy carrier force and assist MCGAMI and MI-  
 KUMA. Course west.

Part II - Supply Force is waiting at position  
 (30-10 N, 167-50 E).

Part III - ZUIHO prepare to attack enemy CV.

Part IV - Prepare to utilize full strength of  
 all forces seaplanes. 3 seat observation planes  
 search. 2 seat observation planes attack enemy  
 carrier. (Equip with two common bombs each.)

Orders to search for United States ships were  
 issued at this time, and one report of their presence  
 was made very shortly thereafter.

No. 70

1045, 7 June

FROM: Flag Air Flotilla 24.  
 TO : 14th Air Group.  
 INFO: 11th Air Fleet; Combined Fleet; 1st  
 Air Fleet; CruDiv 7; MIKUMA.

Part I - Comdr. Unit #3 with a type 2 flying  
 boat is to depart this evening to search sec-  
 tor "P" (if one plane is used he will advance

No. 70 (Cont'd)

1500 miles 100° from PW (WCTFE) left turn 290°  
120 miles (?).

Part II - At sunrise he will have reached ap-  
proximately 1200 miles.

No. 71

1120, 7 June

FROM: Flag 2nd Fleet.  
TO : Flag 11th Air Fleet; Flag Air Flotilla  
24; CHITOSE Air Group.

ARASIMO sighted what appeared to be an enemy  
ship at 1100 position 30° 650 miles from Wake.

The positions of some of the Japanese cruisers  
and also a seaplane tender were given in the next dis-  
patches. Notice that the HISSHIE has only one sea-  
plane left in operation.

No. 72

1445, 7 June

FROM: Flag CruDiv 7.  
TO : Flag 2nd Fleet; Flag Combined Fleet.  
INFO: DesDiv 8; MIKUMA; MUGAMI.

1st Section completed supplying (80%) at 1430.  
Joining Occupation Force Main Force. Position  
course 135°, speed 26.

5 197 1943

No. 73

1600, 7 June

FROM: NISSEIY (Seaplane Tender).  
 TO : Flag, Combined Fleet.

This ship's position 31-17 N, 168-57 E, course 180°, speed 18. One G type scout seaplane in commission.

A report by the retreating Japanese to Wake Island summarized some of the events outlined above, and gave an estimate of the American forces which were trailing them.

No. 74

1730, 7 June

FROM: 11th Air Fleet (#0791).  
 TO : Wake Air Base; 4th Air Attack; 6th Air Attack; Air Base #5J.  
 INFO: Flag Combined Fleet; 2nd Fleet; 6th Fleet.

Part I - 2nd section CruDiv 8 was bombed in the vicinity of 29-30 N, 174 E, at 0530 the 7th, and the HARUNA and TANIKAZE were bombed the afternoon of the 6th - both by groups of enemy ship based planes (no damage).

Part II - The enemy striking force which is composed of from 2 to 4 CV and ICV, about 5 heavy cruisers, and 10 or more DDS, is shadowing our surface force from the east.

Part III - (This message in rather poor shape - following not complete translation.) 2nd Section CruDiv 7 speed roughly 14 knots course west. (This force) including ZUIHO charged with assisting them.



No. 75

2350, 7 June

FROM: HAGATO (battleship).  
TO : Flag (Combined Fleet).

High waves. Transfer operations difficult.  
Took off 329 men (176 wounded).  
2215 suspended (operations) joining up. Speed  
24.

E - JUNE 8, 1942 (our June 7)

The Japanese ships succeeded in escaping during the night, and after this the United States Forces could not establish contact with the enemy. Had these intercepted messages been read by Radio Intelligence at that time, contact would have been easily reestablished, and our carrier planes would have given an even better account of themselves.

The air strength of Wake and Marcus Islands was now brought into action to search for U.S. forces. Notice the importance given to torpedoes in the following dispatch:

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No. 76

0050, 8 June

FROM: 11th Air Fleet (#304)  
TO : 4th & 6th Air Attack Forces.

In case there is no report of the enemy today, tomorrow, 9th, Waka and Marcus Forces will carry out a search for the enemy. Attack groups load as many planes as possible with torpedoes. Friendly surface forces are at position 28 N, 167 E, carrying out fueling from the afternoon of the 8th over the 9th (remainder garbled).

The HIRYU was still afloat early in the morning of June 8 (our June 7), and a query concerning her condition was sent.

No. 77

0450, 8 June

FROM: CofS 6th Fleet (Sub) (#847).  
TO : Combined Fleet.

According to the HCSHO planes the HIRYU is drifting at position (32-05 N, 178-50 E). Her subsequent condition is requested, as it is desired to dispose of her with a submarine of the advance force if it becomes necessary.

There are no messages available from this time on until three days later. By that time all hope of joining battle was gone, and the Japanese were sending their occupation troops back to Japan.

June 11, 1942 (our June 10)

No. 78

11 June

FROM: Comdr. 2nd Fleet.  
TO : 2nd Fleet.

#799 (Chichijima).

Occupation Force Order #19:  
The #2 Combined Landing Force Comdr. and #11 Pioneer Force Comdr. will embark the troop and equipment in the transports as stipulated in the Combined Fleet's SMS #201, and will immediately carry out preparations for getting underway for YOKOSUKA. One part of DesRon 2 will be designated by ComDesRon 2 to act as escort for the above force.

No. 79

11 June

FROM: Comdr. Combined Fleet.  
TO : Combined Fleet.

Following forces and equipment will be assigned to the Northern Force:

One company of artillery, one company of field troops, one anti-aircraft company, all of the #2 Special Combined Landing Force, and the Submarine Base Force.

As many as possible of the 6" anti-aircraft guns, 5 centimeter guns, and anti-airmachine guns, including ammunition, together with necessary personnel and equipment, under command of the detachment commanders.

No. 79 (Cont'd.)

The above forces, in accordance with the orders of the Comdr. 2nd Fleet, after preparations have been completed upon arrival YOKOSUKA, will take orders from the Comdr. 5th Fleet.

C - JUNE 14, 1942 (our June 13)

The following dispatches are very important because they are Japanese reports of their own losses. Notice the extreme precautions taken to insure secrecy as to these losses:

No. 80

1620, 14 June

FROM: Combined Fleet.  
TO : All Major Commands; Combined Fleet.  
INFO: Tokyo Vice Naval Minister.

Part I - No particulars about recent operations (excluding those items announced by the Imperial General Headquarters) are to be requested within or outside the department. Give strict instructions to your men not to reveal anything beyond the following facts:

\*Our damage: Carriers - 1 lost, 1 damaged (?); cruisers - 1 damaged (?). (The names of the above ships have not been made public, but for naval consumption where the information is vital, you may reveal that the KAGA was lost, the SORYU

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and MIKUMA were damaged.) 35 airplanes have not returned yet. No information on casualties."

Part II - This information, except in those cases where duty requires individuals to know it, is to be handled as a military secret. Moreover, even where such duty is involved, go no further than is absolutely necessary for the discharging of that duty, as it is an infringement of orders. This must be understood. (OpNav translation.)

The next dispatch gives some interesting details concerning the sinking of the MIKUMI. The collision of the two cruisers MIKUMA and MIKUMI was caused by the presence of an American submarine.

No. 81

Occupation Force Battle Report #1 (Covers period from May 28 to June 14).

1. A considerable part of the Occupation Force Air Force made emergency preparations at FS on the 28th (part of the Occupation Covering Fleet on the 26th), - - - - - off HASEIRA JIMA, - - - - - at GUAM, and all sailed forth on the 29th.
2. At 07-- on the 4th, a contact was made between the Escort Force and enemy flying boat(s), and it was followed up by an enemy attack using - - - - - aircraft, but we suffered no damage. At 2250, in a torpedo attack in which the enemy aircraft came from all points of the compass, the AKIBONO MARU was hit and a fire started forward as well as some other damage. In similar manner, we had another contact with enemy aircraft, while proceeding at standard speed, about 600 miles from AF.

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No. 81 (Cont'd.)

3. CruDiv 7, while returning to join the Main Force after cancelling the shelling of Midway at 2120, at 2330 maneuvered to avoid an enemy submarine. During the maneuver, the MIKUMA collided with the MOGAMI. MOGAMI suffered great damage to the bow and was unable to proceed at high speed, so she proceeded with the MIKUMA and DesDiv 8 which acted as her escort. However, during the morning of the 7th, they were overtaken and furiously attacked by enemy carrier based aircraft. The MIKUMA was sunk, and the MOGAMI, ARASHIO, and ASASHIO all suffered considerable damage.

4. The main unit, acting in accordance with orders from the Combined Fleet, immediately headed south to their rescue, but it was unable to aid the MIKUMA. The MOGAMI, ASASHIO, and ARASHIO were taken under their protection in the morning of the 8th.

5. The MOGAMI, DesDiv 8, - - - - were attached to CruDiv 7, "LD", and DesDiv 18, and sent to PT under their escort to effect emergency repairs, the IKKI Detachment of the 2nd Combined Special Landing Force was sent to Guam, the 11th and 12th - - - (Pioneer ?) units were sent to PT, all escorted by units of the Escort Force.

6. The main unit, in company with SeaPlatDiv 11 (less KAMIKAWA MARU) rendezvoused with the Main Force in the afternoon of the 9th, and arrived Hashira Jima 1800, 14 June.

7. During the period of this operation, our strength as set by the disposition of the military strength, has been in accordance with Occupation Force Dispatch Op Order #18 and #20.  
(Rest not clear). 1900.

H - JUNE 16, 1942 (our June 15)

The remaining messages at hand deal with the

MOGAMI, and supply more evidence to refute the assumption that this cruiser had been sunk.

No. 82

0900, 16 June

FROM: MOGAMI. #150

In reply to your - - - - #237 (garbled) we have aboard 54 officers of warrant rank and about 788 petty officers and men.

I - JUNE 17, 1942 (our June 16)

No. 83

0700, 17 June

FROM: MOGAMI. #151

Request HAYAKAWA and HORENOUCHI report aboard at TRUK.

J - JULY 16, 1942 (our July 15)

No. 84

1800, 16 July

FROM: MOGAMI. #158  
TO : All Major Comdrs.; ComDiv 7.

Upon completion of emergency repairs about 22

July, will depart on 23 July and arrive SASERO  
29 July.

Thus, with the limping home of the MOGAMI, the  
story of Battle of Midway ends.

K - SUMMARY.

The messages intercepted during the Battle of  
Midway had little actual value at that time, because  
the Japanese change in codes on May 28 at 0000 meant  
that these dispatches could not be read. However,  
sufficient warning of the enemy plans had already been  
given to the proper authorities by Communication In-  
telligence.

But the valuable contributions which could have  
been made had these messages been read in time should  
not be forgotten. Since there will be future actions  
in which the enemy will not have had time to change  
his codes, the following potential values supplied by  
Communication Intelligence during battles should be  
realized:



1) Previous knowledge of the enemy's plan of battle in sufficient time to prepare defenses.

Global warfare is fought over such tremendous distances that, if not warned in time, our forces would be scattered over thousands of miles when the enemy attacked. The victory of Midway was possible only because U.S. authorities knew of the planned attack some weeks in advance and could dispose our forces to meet it. It is possible that air reconnaissance on June 3 would have discovered the enemy even if our planes had not been warned to be on the alert. But had not sufficient forces been there to defend Midway, the island would have been captured easily. Thus, the potential tactical value of Communication Intelligence in future naval battles has been illustrated in part by its actual value at Midway.

2) Knowledge of enemy's plans during the battle.

Several messages given above indicated changes or cancellations of operational plans by the enemy, and these new positions would have been of great value to

our searching forces.

3) Knowledge of friendly forces' activities.

Our forces sometimes do not break radio silence to announce each attack on the enemy, and enemy reports frequently will give such information.

4) Knowledge of damage done to enemy.

Planes and submarines damaging the enemy are destroyed very often before they can reach home, or send back the information. Valuable intelligence of this sort was gleaned from the messages shown above.

5) Check on claims of damage to the enemy.

Our planes have often claimed direct hits, or great damage done to the enemy. If the possibility of deception is kept in mind, no better check on these claims could be had than the enemy's own reports of damage.

6) Directing of searching parties.

Information as to positions of enemy ships would cut down the area to be searched to narrow limits. This would save valuable time and fuel, and, perhaps, preserve the lives of air crews forced to fly in bad weather.

7) Possibility of destroying the enemy.

When the enemy has broken off contact because of losses and damages, the opportunity to deal a death blow is present. Naturally, the enemy's position must be located, and if bad weather intervenes to prevent air reconnaissance, there is no other method left except Communication Intelligence. At Midway the Japanese were able to get away under the cover of adverse weather. In all probability, some of the messages read above would have made this escape impossible.

8) Knowledge of Japanese tactics.

Knowing the tactics adopted by the Japanese during the course of a battle would be of great use to American naval leaders in future engagements. No bet-

ter source of information can be found for this study than the intercepted messages of Japanese commanders. Communication Intelligence is able to provide much valuable material for this purpose which could be obtained nowhere else.

9) Historical background of the battle.

The historian who writes the story of Midway and other naval battles of this war will have a much more complete and clearer picture of these events because of intercepted messages of the enemy forces. The historian will not be able to publicize the source of his information, but he will be happy to comply with this restriction in exchange for the valuable data available to him. It would be hard to find a more accurate check on the battle claims of American forces than the secret battle reports of the Japanese to their own commanders after the engagements.

It should be noted also that these conclusions were written before the historic Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13-15, 1942. It was during this battle that

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the values discussed above were brought out of the realm of theory, and became important operational realities. Mention is made of this only to demonstrate that claims made ever since the last World War by Communication Intelligence experts in every nation of the world, as to the usefulness of cryptanalysis and traffic analysis during the course of a sea battle, were proved beyond further doubt at Midway.

CHAPTER III

Publicity Leaks Concerning  
Communication Intelligence

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Publicity Leaks Concerning Communication IntelligenceChapter IIIPreface

In earlier centuries communications could be entrusted to special couriers, who might take weeks to reach their destination. Today important decisions of commanders must be relayed instantaneously to subordinates. Couriers would arrive much too late even if they could find their swiftly moving addressees.

Radio has provided the means of attaining this necessary speed of communications, but its use of the air waves has created a problem of security. No longer need a commander worry so much about the quick delivery of his messages as about the safety of his ciphers. The reason is evident. He who listens to the radio may learn, and both friend and foe may now intercept any message in a given area. This explains the tremendous growth of communication intelligence organizations in every large nation since the last World War. With the increased use of radio in diplomatic and military affairs, realism has dictated a

policy of expansion in such work. It has been found that intercepting every message of an enemy or potential enemy nation to discover its secret plans has meant tremendous savings in men and money in actual warfare. Also, the advantages in diplomacy, which accrue to anyone who knows the secret instructions of his fellow diplomats, are only too evident.

The importance of cryptanalysis has suddenly increased with the quick growth of radio, and the subsequent rapid development of radio intelligence. In the history of diplomacy and international intrigue, cryptanalysis had been important for centuries, but not till the advent of radio could experts obtain cryptographic material to work upon by such an easy method as mere radio interception. Furthermore, the knowledge that radio messages were open to all who possessed receiving sets brought the art of creating ciphers and codes to the highest level in history. Consequently, to derive any intelligence from the messages of an enemy, every nation was forced to make use of the most expert cryptanalysts it could discover.



The startling success of these cryptanalysts during the past two decades has become fairly well known to informed observers throughout the world. In fact, so much has been divulged that in this golden age of cryptanalysis there is grave danger that the science may receive a severe setback. Most ciphers are solved because of the carelessness of those using them, but so much public attention has been focused on cryptanalytical activities recently that the great advance in security precautions which has resulted from this publicity may at least temporarily defeat the cryptanalyst.

It would be wise to emphasize here that no cipher, except a one time system, has ever withstood determined attack by experts. However, proper security measures can so delay the solution of a cipher that the intelligence derived therefrom is useless for operations. The U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence organization was created not to achieve success in the academic field of solving ciphers, but to provide operational intelligence by means which may involve decipherment only incidentally.

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Therefore, publicity leaks, such as are discussed in Chapter III, which inspire the enemy to become more careful in his use of ciphers, are greatly damaging to our activities.

Publicity in America concerning the success of Communication Intelligence seems to have occurred in three major spurts: -

- A. The Post War Disclosures - which ran from 1920 - 1930 approximately.
- B. The Yardley Era - from the publishing of "The American Black Chamber" in 1931, up to the outbreak of the American-Japanese War.
- C. The American-Japanese War - which occasioned the most dangerous disclosures of all.

A brief study of each of these periods will be of value in understanding the background of extreme security precautions which must be taken in modern Communication Intelligence work.

A - Post War Disclosures

It must be remembered that intelligence is derived from radio by two principal methods - (1) Decryption and (2) Traffic Analysis. Decryption is the process of discovering the contents of a message by cryptanalysis, i.e., solving the code or cipher in which the meaning is hidden. Traffic analysis is the process of extracting intelligence from enemy messages by methods short of cryptanalysis, i.e., by observing the volume and flow of communications, the addresses, signatures, frequencies used, characteristics of the operators, priority, call signs, and other features of the message. Radio direction finding, and the identification of the sending characteristics of operators and the emission characteristics of transmitters are extremely valuable in this field. Cryptanalysis is an old art, but traffic analysis is as new as radio itself. It is a product of World War I, and in modern times where ciphers are shifted frequently to delay cryptanalysis, traffic analysis is an important phase of Communication Intelligence work.

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For the sake of convenience, it will be easier to catalogue the revelations which follow according to the country concerned. We shall deal only with the major powers involved in the World War:

I. - The Allies

(a) - France

Prior to the war it was said by some that France was the leader in Radio Intelligence work. Certainly there was much to support this contention when one considered the important works written by the French concerning the subject, and especially when the results of their activities during the World War were recalled. Suffice it to say that the writings of Gylden<sup>1</sup>, a Swede, Cartier<sup>2</sup> and Givierge<sup>3</sup> among others, attest to the success of the French during the Last World War. Cryptography and cryptanalysis had long been studied scientifically in France, and, as a consequence, several bureaus

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- (1) Yves Gylden - The Contribution of the Cryptographic Bureaus in the World War, (Translation of Chifferbryaernas Insatser I Varleskiget Till Lands), United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1935.
- (2) Henri Cartier - "Le Service D'ecoute Pendant La Guerre", Radioelectricite, No. 16, 1923, P. 454. "Le Secret en Radiotelegraphie", Radioelectricite, No. 97, 1925, P. 445.
- (3) Marcel Givierge - "Questions de Chiffre", in Revue Militaire Francoise, Paris, 1924, P. 409. Translated in U.S.A. Signal Corps Bulletin, March and May, 1926.

were in full operation for the Government before war broke out. Due to the intelligent direction of the Military Cryptographic Commission composed of several experts, the French entered the war in 1914 thoroughly familiar with German codes and ciphers. Many statistical studies on the German language and military expressions had long been compiled, intercept stations were already well organized, and everything pertaining to German communications had received detailed study. In addition, the French had been reading German<sup>4</sup> and Italian<sup>5</sup> diplomatic messages for many years.

The French had great success during the opening days of the war and were quickly able to inform their generals of the enemy's plans and positions. The German use of stereotyped military phraseology made the task of the French much easier, and careless communication habits made possible the solving

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- (4) The Living Age, May 2, 1925, P. 233 mentions the incident before the World War when M. Caillaux, a French leader, disclosed, through a careless reference, the success of French cryptanalysts to the Germans. An important source of information was lost for a time because the Germans changed their code.
- (5) Gylden, op cit. P. 12

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of their ciphers. But the principal reason for French success was that the war work of the cryptanalytical bureaus had been very well planned in time of peace. Excellent cooperation between military and diplomatic leaders in regards to the work of the bureau also helped a great deal in achieving results. Much of the success of the French in the World War can undoubtedly be traced to their excellent Radio Intelligence units. They clearly surpassed the Germans in this work, and the advance knowledge they gained of the enemy's plans helped to frustrate many attacks.

(b) - England

There is much less official information about British activities than the French. This may be explained by some as evidence of a national characteristic of reticence, but a more probable explanation is the long and excellent training of British representatives in the need for silence concerning such matters. Though there are few official histories which mention it, every student of modern English diplomatic affairs has been aware of the excellent work of the Foreign Office in

cryptanalysis. Added to this unit was the bureau of Scotland Yard, plus those of the Army and Navy, and so when war broke out there were enough civilian and military experts available to do splendid work for England. Gylden points out that the English Army and Navy Intelligence departments had well organized cryptographic bureaus, distinguished by a very great centralization of work.

We can with certainty presume that this centralization was of great importance for crypt-analytical work instituted at the beginning of the war; for in this way it was possible to obtain for the cryptanalysts exceedingly important collateral information within the shortest possible time.

A quick collection of material, a careful examination and selection, and a skillful collation of information have at all times characterized the British Intelligence Service.<sup>6</sup>

The British were noted also for the excellent use made of radio direction finders and intercept stations. Traffic analysis, or estimating the

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(6) Gylden, op cit, P. 20

the enemy's plans from an investigation of the volume of messages sent from one place to another, the call signs, characteristics of operators, priorities, and many other elements, really came into its own with the development of the technique by the British. Close cooperation between cryptanalysts and traffic analysts brought information of great strategic and tactical value to the fighting forces of England, and in particular, to the Navy. Some publications issued after the war gave a partial insight into the secret activities of British Communication Intelligence. Captain Ferdinand Tuchy revealed a great deal of the methods used in direction finding and code work in a book published in 1921. *EVEN THE RUDIMENTS OF TINF AND R. F. P. ARE EXPLAINED IN THIS WORK.* A volume of Ambassador Page's letters was issued in 1925, and this disclosed the success of the British in decrypting the famous Zimmerman note. It also pointed out the stupidity of America in permitting German

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(7) Ferdinand Tuchy - The Secret Corps, London, John Murray, 1920, pp. 132 - 171.



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messages to be tagged on its diplomatic dispatches from Berlin.<sup>8</sup> In December, 1927, the "best kept secret" of the Great War was disclosed by Sir Alfred Ewing, Principal of the Edinburgh University in a lecture entitled "Some Special War Work" which he delivered to the Edinburgh Philosophical Institute.<sup>9</sup> In the course of his talk he told of the activities carried on in the famous Room 40 O.B. of the British Admiralty in which the dispatches and orders of the Germans were deciphered. In an interview some years later, in 1931, Sir Alfred Ewing added some personal details.<sup>10</sup> When the war began, he was Director of Naval Education and a member of the explosives committee, to which he had been transferred from his post as Professor of Mechanism and Applied Mechanics at Cambridge University. Sir Alfred Ewing said:

"On the day the war began I was asked to undertake the task of dealing with enemy cipher. Admiral

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- (8) Burlin J. Hendricks - The World's Work, 1925, N.Y. Reviewed in Washington Star, Nov. 1, 1925.  
(9) Daily Express, Edinburgh, Dec. 14, 1937.  
(10) Article by Hayden Church from London in "New York Times Magazine", Nov. 8, 1931.

Sir Henry Oliver, then director of naval intelligence, knowing that I was interested in methods of ciphering, handed me some wireless intercepts, saying that there was no department for dealing with them, and inviting me to attempt the job.

I got a few friends to come and help me; they worked hard and had remarkable luck. The deciphering office was soon established as a separate branch of the Admiralty under my direction; the staff of cryptographers was gradually increased until it numbered about fifty; numerous listening stations were set up, at which the fleet signals and other wireless messages of the enemy were systematically taken in, and from which they were telegraphed to the Admiralty to be deciphered.<sup>11</sup>

Ewing revealed that as many as 2,000 messages a day were deciphered in Room 40 with never more than twenty-four hours delay. The discovery that the Germans planned to raid the east coast of England led to the Battle of Jutland for Jellicoe, forewarned, moved his fleet to meet them. Incidentally, this statement is confirmed by another source which pointed out that the Admiralty knew of the plans of the German fleet at least twelve hours before it moved from its base. Admiral Jellicoe was sent a message of warning at 5:40 p.m. on May 30, 1916, and the Germans did not weigh anchor until 3:00 a.m., May 31.<sup>12</sup>

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(11) Ibid.

(12) Hector C. Bywater and H. C. Ferrabey - Strange Intelligence: Memoirs of Naval Secret Service, Richard R. Smith, N.Y., 1931, P. 183.

"At 10:48 (German time) on the morning of May 30, a wireless signal was made by Scheer ordering all German vessels to concentrate in the outer roads of Wilhelmshaven at 8:00 that night.

At 11:58, Greenwich Mean Time, or two hours and ten minutes after Scheer made the signal, the Admiralty was already issuing warnings to those forces under their immediate jurisdiction (Dover Patrol, East Coast, and Thames Estuary), and it is fairly obvious that Jellicoe was also told something previous to the telegram of 5:40 p.m., because at the very moment that telegram is timed, he hoisted the preparatory signal for putting to sea, as did the Admiral in the Second Battle Squadron at Cromarty."<sup>1</sup>

Ewing continued in the interview:

"Through amazing pieces of good fortune certain of the enemy's code books came into British hands.<sup>14</sup> To take advantage of them, however, there had to be a constant discovery of keying processes, which were liable to be changed, and which were, in fact, often changed. In 1916, the Germans contracted a habit of changing the key of their principal naval signal book every night at 12:00; but the deciphering staff of Room 40 had by that time become so expert that the changes caused the night watch no serious embarrassment. They were reading messages in the new key two or three hours later."

"The Zeppelins were remarkably locuacious, especially in telling of their exploits when on their way home. So, too, the submarines would detail their 'bag'. In May, 1915, for instance, U-20 exultantly reported by wireless cipher her sinking of the Lusitania."<sup>15</sup>

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(13) Ibid.

(14) Richard Wilmer Rowan, Spy and Counter Spy, The Viking Press, N.Y., 1928, P. 39, states that Shipwright E. C. Miller, a diver, investigated almost all of the 60 odd German submarines sunk by the British, and recovered their code books.

(15) N.Y. Times Magazine, Nov. 8, 1931.

Room 40 dealt with diplomatic ciphers as well as naval dispatches and, therefore, was able to give warning of the Easter rebellion in Ireland, as well as information of German activity in Persia. Its success in breaking the code used by Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States, after six months of arduous labor paid many dividends.

Ewing pointed out:

The Zimmerman message which revealed a conditional offer in Mexico of an alliance against the United States, was deciphered in Room 40, after being intercepted in the manner described in the third volume of the Page Letters. President Wilson was then hesitating on the brink of war, reluctant to plunge, clinging painfully to the idea of neutrality which seemed to be almost part of his religion.

The message was communicated very confidentially by Lord Balfour to Mr. Page and, through the latter, to President Wilson, who gave it to the American press. Its publication was decisive in converting American opinion to the necessity of war.<sup>16</sup>

The text of this famous message sent by Zimmerman, Undersecretary at the German Foreign Office, to von Eckhardt, Undersecretary at the German Foreign Office, on January 16, 1917, reads as follows:

We shall commence unrestricted U-boat warfare

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(16) Ibid.

on February the 1st. Nevertheless, we hope to keep the United States neutral. If we should not succeed in this, we shall propose to Mexico an alliance on the following terms: We shall wage war and conclude peace in common. We shall provide general financial support, and stipulate that Mexico shall receive back the territory of New Mexico and Arizona, which she lost in 1848. The details will be left to you to carry out. You are instructed to sound Carranza in the strictest confidence, and as soon as war against the U. S. is certain, you will give him a hint to enter into negotiations with Japan on his own initiative, requesting her to join in and offering to act as intermediary between Japan and Germany. Draw Carranza's attention to the fact that the carrying out of unrestricted U-boat warfare will make it possible to bring England to her knees and compel her to sue for peace within a few months. Confirm receipt. Zimmerman.<sup>17</sup>

The details of the story behind the interception and decipherment of this message are quite interesting and are to be found in a very revealing book by a former German Naval Intelligence officer, Von Rintelen.<sup>18</sup> He worked in America before 1917 to sabotage our efforts to aid the Allies, though we were not yet at war. Rear Admiral W. R. Gherardi, USN, who had been the American Naval Attache in

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- (17) Captain Von Rintelen - The Dark Invader, (Wartime Reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence Officer) Lovat Dickson, Ltd., 38 Bedford St., London, 1933, P. 214.
- (18) Ibid.

Berlin during the World War, vouched for the accuracy of most of the details in this book:

"So much of the story checks with well-established facts in confidential archives or in the memories of those still alive that due credence must be given to the remainder."<sup>19</sup>

Von Rintelen stated that the Germans had five ways of sending information to America or Mexico, and that none were safe. They were as follows:

- (1) By wireless directly across the ocean, and these were in code.
- (2) Every telegram was sent to Stockholm, enciphered in the Swedish Foreign Office code, and either cabled or wirelessly to the German Ambassador in Washington.
- (3) Every telegram was wired to Holland, and simultaneously to Spain, whence it was cabled to New York in the same cipher as when cabled from Berlin.
- (4) German Foreign Office telegrams

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(19) Special report, O.N.I. Library, July 19, 1933, P. 3.

went through the American Embassy before entrance of America into war.

(5) Sent by wireless to new radio station in Mexico.<sup>20</sup>

Von Rintelen, who was captured by the British on his way back to Germany from America, reports that Admiral Hall, the Chief of English Naval Intelligence, was able to tell him all the five ways used by the Germans:

He began by telling me that the Zimmerman telegram had been radioed direct to New York, and I was not surprised to hear that it had been intercepted and deciphered. It was common knowledge, for its text had been published in the United States. Hall told me, however, that the Stockholm route had not been safe either, for the British possessed the key to the Secret Code of the Swedish Foreign Office as well. The third way, via Holland and Spain, was no better than the other two, since England had agents in her pay in the post office of those countries who passed the German wires on to the Naval Intelligence; and they were in the code that Admiral Hall was able to read. A telegram handed in by the German Naval Attaché at Madrid led eventually to Mata Hari being shot at Vincennes!

Even the fourth route, through the American Embassy in Berlin, was accessible to Admiral Hall, for I now learned that Mr. Gerard, even when the United States were completely neutral,

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(20) Von Rintelen - op cit., P. 215.

sent our telegrams by cable to the chief telegraph office in London for transmission to America. Since the English were in possession of the key, and Geram let them know which wires came from the German government, they had no difficulty in reading them.<sup>21</sup>

Strangely enough, the Germans continued to use the same codes for months after the Zimmerman expose. Admiral Hall made every effort to conceal his success and succeeded admirably. He did this by calling in a reporter, and getting him to print a story about the clever Americans who had succeeded in deciphering the German codes, while the English had not been able to decode even one. Evidently the article convinced Berlin that the decoded telegrams had leaked in some way from the German Legation in Mexico.

Von Rintelen gave another example of German ineptness in the use of codes. One of his agents discovered that the "Most Secret Code" of the German Naval Attache had been compromised. A girl in the employ of British agents played up to an underpaid German secretary, who made a copy of the code for her, and then restored it to its place undiscovered. Yet German authorities refused to

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(21) Ibid., P. 216.



accept Rintelen's warning, and continued to use the same code, though obviously the British were reading their messages. This seems unbelievable in view of modern security measures but, of course, at that time the value of Communication Intelligence was not fully recognized by those who should have known better.

Von Rintelen also pointed out that before America entered the war in 1917, American representatives were reluctant to send cablegrams through British hands:

I was on good terms with Major Langhorne, the American Military Attache in Berlin, who, too, had his difficulties owing to the British control of the foreign cables. He was in search of a way to send his telegrams to Washington without London reading or intercepting them. They were, of course, in code, but the Attache had no illusions about England's practice in this connection. He was positively convinced that the British would succeed in deciphering his code.<sup>22</sup>

Von Rintelen also reported that Admiral Hall, the British Intelligence chief, disclosed to him the methods of radio deception used in getting rid of Admiral Spee's squadron at Falklands. It will be recalled that Admiral Spee had destroyed a British squadron off Coronel, and then put into harbor at

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(22) Ibid, P. 58

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Valparaiso. Quickly and rather unexpectedly, he left at full speed to round Cape Horn towards the Falkland Islands. There he ran into a heavy and superior British force which defeated him. The trap had been set by a British agent in Berlin who sent a fake message to Spee in a code known to the British. The message had been written on forged paper with forged seals, and it looked authentic to those handling it. Spee obeyed the order which commanded him to destroy the British wireless station at Port Stanley, and went right into the trap hastily created by the British. Admiral Sturdee was at the rendezvous with the Invincible and Inflexible on December 7th, and by noon December 8, 1914, the German squadron had been destroyed.<sup>23</sup>

Confirmation of this story came from a British source, which disclosed that the British victory at Falklands was due to the seizure of a German code book in a German steamer at Melbourne. Dr. Wheatley, C.B.E., late Headmaster of the Royal

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(23) Von Rintelen - Op cit., PP. 206 - 213

Australian Naval College at Jervis Bay, served during the war on the War Staff at the R.A.N. office in Sydney, where he had charge of all intercepted wireless messages. Wheatley worked out the new key for the code, and from then on all German messages in that code could be read. Captain W. E. Thring, R.N., who was intelligence officer at the Australian Naval Headquarters at the outbreak of the war confirmed this fact.<sup>24</sup>

A very authoritative source as to the activities of the British in World War I is the book written by Hugh Cleland Hoy, who became Secretary to Admiral (then Captain) W. R. Hall just after the latter had become Director of Naval Intelligence in October, 1914. He tells of the origin of the special department in Room 40, Old Building at the Admiralty:

A department that in many ways may now be considered to have been the very hub of the mechanism of the Great War.<sup>26</sup>

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- (24) Hector Eywater - "Daily Telegraph", London, September 4 and 6, 1934.  
(25) Hugh Cleland Hoy - 40 O.B., or How the War was Won, Hutchinson and Co., London, 1935.  
(26) Ibid, P. 21

Commenting on the remarkable talents of Sir

Alfred Ewing and his staff, Hoy said:

It was men of this calibre who played an important part in keeping the naval arm forewarned of enemy diplomacy and plans. Their work can never in the nature of things be adequately recognized, save by the few who were in the inner counsels of the Government and the High Command. Often, to their own intimate circle of acquaintances, they were only known as being "something at the Admiralty or the War Office," and they were frequently subjected to sneers as holders of "cushy jobs" or, worse than that, occupants of "funk holes."

...In a quiet wing of the Old Building of the Admiralty a home was found for this most secret of all War work, and there in Room 40, or 40 O.B. (Old Building) as it came to be called, Sir Alfred Ewing and his staff installed themselves. 40 O.B. was of the Intelligence Division, but not in it. It was, in fact, situated nowhere near the offices allotted to the I.D., and very few knew of its existence at all. Even Cabinet Ministers knew next to nothing of this mysterious department, the high officials of the Admiralty were also in the dark, and the simple name 40 O.B. was adopted to avoid arousing any curiosity about it. But those whose work brought them into contact with the hidden activities of this essentially confidential office were of the opinion that 40 O.B. won the war.

Yet its existence was not made known to the public until a few years ago when Sir Alfred Ewing created a sensation by referring to it in a speech made at Edinburgh University. Of it, too, the late Earl Balfour said:

To Room 40, the country owes an immense debt of gratitude — a debt which at the time, at least, could never be paid. Secrecy was of the very essence of the work, and never was

secretcy more successfully observed.<sup>27</sup>

Ray Hoy also revealed the means by which the British kept the Germans from suspecting the security of their codes. It was likely that the enemy would have become suspicious after such incidents as the Battle of Dogger Bank and the Battle of Jutland, since these would have been great surprises in ordinary circumstances. However, a French counter-espionage agent who worked for the Germans, though secretly in the employ of the British, was able to deceive the enemy by making them believe that their secrets were being sold by a high placed German. The frantic efforts of the Germans to discover the traitor in their midst must have had some demoralizing effects on their own organization, but the most important result was to throw them off the track of Room 40 O.B.

Among the best informed writers on naval affairs was the Englishman, Hector Bywater, whose

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(27) Ibid., PP. 24 - 25

many special articles and books on the English Navy are known to naval men all over the world. In a chapter entitled "Men Who Heard the U-Boats Talk"<sup>28</sup> he discussed the process of direction finding which was developed during the last war, and revealed the success of the British in traffic analysis and in decoding the submarine calls of the Germans. He also told the story of Sir Alfred Ewing and the famous Room 40.<sup>29</sup> A chapter in another book was devoted to a fuller discussion of Communication Intelligence work by this same author<sup>30</sup>; and special attention was given to direction finding and cryptanalysis.

One of the most interesting stories of the last war, and from all indications one of the most authentic, was that of Captain H. Landau of the British Secret Service. He described his activities in setting up information posts in Holland to obtain data on train movements in Belgium and

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(28) Bywater and Ferraby - Strange Intelligence.

(29) Ibid., P. 222

(30) Hector C. Bywater - Their Secret Purposes, London, Constable and Co., 1932, Ch. XIII

occupied France. His work was not that of Communication Intelligence, but indirectly he was of great assistance to Room 40 as indicated by the following:

However, in all probability, the most valuable information we got in Holland by far was a copy of every ciphered telegram sent out by the German Legation, the Consulates, and other German services.<sup>31</sup>

The great value of this service was readily appreciated by the British for this gave them ample research material when attempting to decipher a new German system. This was not the only British collection center in Europe. Lord Fisher's memoirs testify that, before the World War broke out, the British Fleet had a bureau established in Switzerland to collect foreign code telegrams.<sup>32</sup> It is not to be doubted that similar precautions have been taken in this war.

(c) - Russia

It is surprising to find that Russia entered the World War I very badly prepared for

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(31) Captain Henry Landau - All's Fair: The Story of the British Secret Service Behind the German Lines, G. P. Putnam's Sons, N.Y., 1934-

(32) Glyden - Op cit., P. 20

cryptographic and cryptanalytical work. The surprise comes from the fact that in the diplomatic field the Russians were very well versed in cryptanalytical practices, and had very often been successful in decoding Turkish, British, Austrian, and Swedish diplomatic codes. Police work against the Nihilists very often necessitated clever cryptanalytical work, and the success of these operations was based on the ability of the police to read the opposition's codes. But the situation in the military field was badly disorganized, and it seems that little work was done by the Russians in cryptanalysis, and not much more in cryptography. Though the Russians eventually solved some of the German codes, they seemed to learn nothing about the dangers of carelessness in cipher work.<sup>33</sup> As will be seen later, the ineptness of the Russians in this regard, paved the way for great German successes.

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(33) Gylden - op cit., P. 69



(d) - Italy

Before the first World War I, Italy was very deficient in cryptanalytical development, and there is no evidence yet published to prove that she was any better during the war.

2 - Central Powers

(a) - Germany

Though the Army, Navy, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs had cryptographic bureaus before the World War Broke out, very little research was carried on because the personnel was inadequate and ill trained. Their basic assumption that complicated ciphers and codes were more difficult of solution than simpler ones was indicative of the German deficiencies in cryptanalytical training. With no centralized organization, no leadership, and a great deal of misunderstanding of the problems involved in cryptography and cryptanalysis, it is amazing that the Germans were as successful as they were during the War. However, it is true that during the early years of the war, the French were enabled to decipher the messages of the Germans because of the errors and omissions of the Germans themselves. Not until late in the war, 1917 - 1918 were the Germans successful in cryptanalytical work

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in the West for they had to train themselves without the benefit of previous experience. They never equalled the accomplishments of the Allies.

On the Eastern Frontier, the Germans were more successful because the Russians found their own codes so clumsy that very often they were forced to send messages in the clear. All the Germans had to do to learn the plans of the advancing Russians was to listen to the radio.

General Hoffmann, in his renowned work, "Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten", says of these indiscretions:

This carelessness facilitated the conduct of warfare in the East for us; in many situations it alone really made it possible for us to carry on war.<sup>34</sup>

Certainly, the Germans knew as much, if not more, than some of the Russian commanders about the plans which led up to the Battle of Tannenberg. After this battle, the Russians began to use cipher, but a German philologist, Professor Deubner, by dint of self training, was able to decrypt their messages.

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(34) Gylden - op cit., P. 1

after some time had elapsed. Henceforth, the obvious importance of cryptanalysis was not lost on the Germans. Their great success in deciphering Russian messages threw the armies of the Czar into such chaos that Russia was eventually eliminated as an opposing force.

A British writer states that the Germans were overhearing British signals and wireless conversations after 1916 and, therefore, for the rest of the war they were always prepared for British attacks. The disclosures by Sir Alfred Ewing of the work of Room 40 during the World War brought forth an anonymous description of the corresponding German department in the "Vossische Zeitung" which had wrestled with intercepted British signals in a mysterious wireless station surrounded by barbed wire on a lonely moor near Neumunster. A former wireless officer who belonged to the Neumunster staff, Lieutenant Commander N. Kraschutzki, confirmed this in the same newspaper.<sup>36</sup> Gylden thinks this

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(35) Ferdinand Tucky - op cit., P. 218.  
(36) London Times, January 3, 1928.

bureau was not successful in solving British naval ciphers until some time in 1916.<sup>37</sup> Yet Von Rintelen reported that, at the outbreak of the war, when some German ships were far from home, Admiral Spee was aware of the fact that his movements were being followed with particular interest by the Admiralties in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg. His wireless officers had intercepted the messages of cruisers which belonged to other nations, and thus he was fully warned of their intentions.<sup>38</sup>

In the diplomatic field, the Germans were probably better equipped for cryptanalytical work than in the military. An example of this skill, which also demonstrates the naivete of an American, was the case of Major Langhorne, the American Military Attache in Berlin. He was trying to avoid sending his code messages through London since he knew they would be read by the British. Von Rintelen

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(37) Gylden - op cit., P. 43

(38) Von Rintelen - op cit., P. 34

tells the story:

So I proposed to him that he should give us the code telegrams and that we should have them sent via Nauen to the American wireless station, which had just been completed. In this way, they would speedily reach his Government at Washington. The Yankee was startled for a moment, but then accepted my offer with gratitude, although he insisted that his telegram should be in code.

He arrived with his first telegrams, which were sent off immediately via Nauen. I had copies made of them and called on a celebrated cipher expert, who shut himself up with the texts, and the Fates were favourable to us. It was to be presumed that the American Attache had included in one of the telegrams, which was very long, an extensive official report from German G. H. Q., and this conjecture turned out to be correct. The expert substituted the German text for the code letters and figures, and everything fitted in. We were now in possession of the Attache's code, and preserved it as though it were sacred. From now on we were "reading in" Langhorne's telegrams. When we gained these great victories against Russia, I cabled "my own text" to America. I re-wrote Major Langhorne's telegrams so that they gave a clear account of our military position, and added the whole extent of the evening's defeats in such a way, of course, that the American government was bound to believe that these telegrams came from its own Military Attache.

Things went on well for weeks. When the next batch of American newspapers arrived, a certain change of view was already noticeable in the more serious journals. Germany's strategic position was regarded and criticized more favorable, and I rejoiced at this success.<sup>39</sup>

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(39) Von Rintelen - op cit., P. 58

ALL good things must come to an end, and after a very pro-German message had been sent by Von Rintelen in the name of Langhorne, the Major was recalled. Naturally, the secret was disclosed, once the Major had read in America the messages supposedly sent by him.

(b) - Austria

There is little information concerning the activities of Austria in cryptanalysis and cryptography before the World War I, though some light has been thrown on the matter by General Ronge, Chief of the Austrian Military Intelligence Service during the World War.<sup>40</sup> He stated that there had been much practice in cryptography because of correspondence with Austrian Military Attaches and spies, but that cryptanalysis was entirely unknown in his country until 1908, when he began to work on intercepted Italian naval dispatches. Messages of other countries, in particular, Russia, had been deciphered for years, but solution had been obtained through acquisition of the keys by spies, rather

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(40) Gylden - op cit., P. 21.

than by cryptanalysis. During the Italian-Turkish war, intercepted traffic grew so heavy that Ronge was able to acquire some assistants. In 1914, the Evidenzbureau of the General Staff was reorganized, and new efforts were made to stimulate cryptanalytical activities. However, the fact that Serbian and Russian dispatches were being read before the war, only because their keys had been obtained by the intelligence services, indicates that primitive cryptanalytic methods were in use. Despite its inadequacy, the existence of the cryptanalytic bureau established by Ronge gave many Austrian officers a chance to analyze the Russian system. As a result of their superior training, the Austrians were able to solve the Russian ciphers much more quickly than the Germans.<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, knowledge of the Italian systems, which was also acquired by espionage before the war, was of great value in solving Italian dispatches during the days of conflict.

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(41) Gylden - op cit., P. 22

Since Ronge fully realized the importance of cryptanalysis in discovering the plans of the enemy, the Austrian bureau was developed quickly during the World War. A French source states that at least 26 cryptanalysts were employed in February, 1916 in the office at Vienna alone.<sup>42</sup> As for the part played by his organization, Ronge himself wrote the following concerning the campaigns of 1914:

It was reassuring to our command that the radio-intercepting service played on the Russian grouping as on a piano, instantly was able to report the intent and purposes of the enemy's command, and so well helped in the determination of the enemy's forces that as early as the end of October (note the date) the diagram of the early disposition of the Russian forces, even down to the divisions, could not have been much unlike the diagram which was found at Stavka or at the headquarters of the Command on the southwestern front at Cholm. Consequently, we may be certain that a troop unit which disappeared from the front without any explanation as to what had become of it could be located within a short time in its new position.<sup>43</sup>

Carlswald, who had been Chief of Operations in the Austrian Army wrote concerning the campaign of the fall of 1914:

In those days of breathless tension, there were available almost every evening decrypted

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(42) Gylden - op cit., P. 22  
(43) Gylden, - op cit., P. 66



radiograms of the enemy from which the whole scope of the dangerous situation could be inferred; these invaluable messages informed us that the command which had advanced to Teschen not only knew where the enemy was located yesterday and today, but also where he expected to be located tomorrow and the next day. Quite unexpectedly, the intercepted radiotelegrams sometimes gave information concerning the location of the Russians, exposing the location of their armies and army commanders. Our weakness prevented us from utilizing this information; nothing could be done about it. The highly reliable information which thus unknown to the enemy, reached the armies of the Central Powers, was quite valuable to us in making our decisions.<sup>44</sup>

A statement by Von Glaise-Horstenau who was chief of the war archives at Vienna, privy councillor, and former officer on the Austrian General-Staff gives further testimony to the value of the Austrian radio intelligence organization:

If we had not intercepted the Russian radiograms, we should most probably have lost the war as early as in the winter of 1914 - 15.

### 3 - United States

Very little was known by the American public about its cryptanalytical agencies until the time of Yardley's disclosures, which we shall discuss in the next section of this chapter. However, there were a few instances where decrypting activities were

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(44) Ibid., P. 72

mentioned. Lt. Colonel Walter Sweeney of the United States Army stated in a book written in 1924 that:

The Code and Cipher section of the Intelligence Service at American G.H.Q. in France demonstrated that any code or cipher could be read. The question was simply one of the time required to read it.<sup>45</sup>

No exhaustive study of American newspaper files could be made for this report, but another disclosure was noticed in a Washington paper in 1930.<sup>46</sup>

Here are some of the pertinent paragraphs:

G-2 got secrets not only from scraps of paper but out of the air. Some of its best work was intercepting and decoding German radio. On March 11, 1918, the Germans commenced using a new code that was absolute Greek to the allies. This looked like the forerunner of the anxiously awaited Spring offensive, and French, British and Americans put their best men to work to solve it.

On March 13, our intercept station heard one German station sending another a message in the new code. Then, to our amazement, the reply came: "We haven't received new code books yet. Please repeat in old code." The sending station repeated the same message—in the old code, that we knew like a book. Putting the two together, our experts

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- (45) Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney - Military Intelligence: A New Weapon in War, Fred A. Stokes, N.Y. - 1924
- (46) The Sunday Star, Wash., D.C., Magazine Section  
Pg. 5, April 13, 1930.

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got the meaning of every code group in the first message, and the system used. We sent what we knew to the French by telegraph and to the British by airplane. Three days later, all three were reading the new code almost as well as the Germans. When the great offensive finally started March 21, the German's messages were being read all along the line.

Code and cipher reading was developed to such an extent in the World War that it is doubtful if radio will be used much in the next war, unless secret radio is developed. The allies were so good at decoding intercepted wireless messages that sometimes they knew, by this means alone, where two-thirds of the divisions in the German army were. The French didn't let even their own army staff know where they got all the information. The fewer in a secret, the better.

The British admiralty was especially clever at finding out what the German fleet and submarines were up to by deciphering wireless and other codes. "Room 40," did this work very quickly, and little has been said about it. Russian divers first got the German code from the stranded cruiser Magdeburg in 1914, and often afterward German code books were fished up from submarines.

Once American G-2 got from a zeppelin a code-book that played havoc among submarines. In October, 1917, the last great German zeppelin raid was a failure, and most of the fleet were brought down or had to come down. One landed at Bourbonneles-Bains, in the American training area behind the Lorraine front, and the crew were nabbed before they could destroy all the contents of the gondola. G-2 seized the golden opportunity. Almost simultaneously an American secret agent working under Lt. Col. H. W. Campanole, head of our espionage service, found a book containing wireless code the Germans used to transmit orders to their submarines and Capt. Hubbard put together the torn pieces of a map showing the North Sea area allotted to each

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submarine. The dread enemy was delivered into our hand.

From Chammont, Col. R. H. Williams sent maps on a breakneck journey to London, personally escorted most of the way by Brig. Gen. Macdonald, Chief of the British Imperial Intelligence Department. Admiral Sims was away, but his aide jumped from a sick bed to take them to Room 40. Then began a terrible week for German submarines. Obeying allied orders in their own code, they came to the surface amid destroyers waiting to pounce. If not caught, they could be trailed and so could sink few merchant ships. Before the Germans had discovered the situation and changed the code, Lloyd George announced that fewer British ships were being sunk than at any time since the submarine campaign commenced. He might have added that more submarines were sunk in the week after the American feat than in any week until then.

Though some war novels and detective stories of this period stressed the role of ciphers in spy work, it can be rather safely said that up to 1931, with the exception of those with a military background in World War I, little was known by the American people about the role of cryptanalysis in war and statecraft. Even those formerly engaged in military activities knew comparatively little, because of the security measures in operation all through the war. But in 1931 the importance of cryptanalysis in modern diplomacy was brought very forcibly to the

attention of the whole world, and in particular to the American people, when Major Herbert O. Yardley, formerly of the U.S. Army, broke the veil of self-imposed silence which cloaks the activities of most cryptanalysts, and published his famous "The American Black Chamber".<sup>47</sup>

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(47) Herbert O. Yardley - The American Black Chamber, Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1931.

B - The Yardley Era

1 - Major Yardley's Revelations

Some indications of what was to appear in Yardley's book were seen early in 1931, when the Saturday Evening Post, a weekly magazine of tremendous national circulation, published a series of articles written by this same author.

They were as follows:

<u>Title</u>	<u>Date of Publication</u>	<u>Volume</u>
" <u>Secret Inks</u> "	April 4, 1931	203, No. 40
" <u>Codes</u> "	April 18, 1931	203, No. 42
" <u>Ciphers</u> "	May 9, 1931	203, No. 45
" <u>Cryptograms and their Solution</u> "	November 21, 1931	203, No. 73

The articles discussed frankly the existence of code-breaking organizations in various countries, their methods, successes and failures. Analysis of the different types of ciphers and codes in use by these nations, with unflattering criticism directed at the United States State Department, was one of the principal themes.

The book entitled "The American Black Chamber" was even more revealing. It contained material already

published in the Saturday Evening Post, and much more besides. Yardley stated that his organization, which he had established in 1917, and which had worked undercover for the United States till 1929, had solved over forty-five thousand cryptograms during that period. At one time or another they had broken the codes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, England, France, Germany, Japan, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Russia, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Soviet Union and Spain. The passages in the book which were to have the most damaging results as far as the work of the U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence unit was concerned were those which laid bare the fact that all Japanese code messages received or sent by the representatives of Nippon during the Washington Naval Conference had been read by American cryptanalysts. Here is a newspaper account of the reaction the book caused in Japan itself:

The author and his publisher will no doubt experience a sneaky feeling of satisfaction if they know that the book has created something more than a sensation in Japan, and that it may yet prove the cause, at least a contributing cause, of a Cabinet crisis at Tokyo. ....

5. 1931. 1943

No sooner had the book appeared than the Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi-Nichi had their New York correspondents interview Mr. Yardley somewhere in Indiana, and published, along with the interview, the substance of the above mentioned three chapters under sensational headlines by no means flattering to America. In the next few days they published interviews with unnamed officials of the Foreign Office, the Navy and the Army, as well as with some members of the Diet. Some of the headlines read: "Betrayal of International Trust," "Treachery at the Washington Conference," "Disgrace to the Convener of the Conference." The translation of the book is still being published serially in the two newspapers.....Now the embarrassing fact is that Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Ambassador to America at the time of the Washington Conference, is at present Foreign Minister in the Wakatsuki Conference. Many hold him responsible for his failure to change the diplomatic code immediately before and in the course of the conference in order to baffle prowling agents.....

In the midst of the mingled humiliation and indignation caused by the revelation of the book, the Japanese have not stopped to think that in espionage and cryptography Europe is much more "advanced" than America, and that the American Black Chamber was but an imitation of, say, Scotland Yard. If the Japanese had a little more sense of humor, they would thank Mr. Yardley, instead of denouncing him as they are doing, for writing this book which serves a very useful purpose to unsuspecting and trustful diplomats.....<sup>48</sup>

Incidentally, in July, 1930, an officer of the United States Navy was approached by an employee of a Japanese Consulate, who offered several Japanese codes

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(48) K. K. Kawakami - writing from Washington, D. C. in "The Baltimore Sun," August 17, 1931.



in exchange for \$10,000. This offer was rejected.

Meanwhile, American diplomatic circles were busily engaged in denying some of the more sensational claims of the imaginative Yardley. A story in the usually staid New York Times carried the following headlines:

PLOT TO KILL WILSON

IN PARIS IS CHARGED<sup>49</sup>

It went on to quote Yardley, who related that a plot to give Wilson influenza germs in ice had been discovered by intelligence agents during the Paris Conference. Naturally, this aroused a great deal of interest, and the Times also printed on the same page comments on this story by Joseph D. Tumulty, who had been Wilson's secretary, Rear Admiral Cary T. Grayson, physician to the former President, and W. H. Moran, Chief of the United States Secret Service at the time of the Conference. All denied knowledge of the existence of any such plot.

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(49) New York Times, June 1, 1931, P. 3, Col. 1

The Times printed a few passages from Yardley's

book as follows:

With this information (derived from deciphering other nations' codes) in its hand, the American Government, if it cared to take advantage of it, could not lose. All it need to do was to mark time. Stud poker is not a very difficult game after you see your opponent's hole card.<sup>50</sup>

And he characterized Stimson, the Secretary of State who dissolved his organization in 1929 in the following terms:

"Although well aware that all great powers have their Black Chambers, he was the first diplomatist who had the courage — or was it naivete — to announce that diplomatic correspondence must be inviolate.<sup>51</sup>

The day after the publication of these allegations, the State Department issued a bulletin which denied that Yardley's story of the plot to poison Wilson had any authenticity.<sup>52</sup> Nothing was said concerning the validity of other remarks made by Yardley, who now assumed the post as special lecturer in the criminology department at Northwestern University.<sup>53</sup>

The book reviewers helped spread the tidings about Yardley's book, and, thus, hundreds of others who never

(50) New York Times, June 1, 1931, Pg. 3, Col. 1

(51) Ibid

(52) New York Times, June 2, 1931, Pg. 18, Col. 3

(53) New York Times, June 7, 1931, Pg. 28, Col. 2

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read the book were apprised of its contents. The following reviews may be of interest to the Navy reader, since they are samples of some of the public's reaction to Yardley's activities.

...Seemingly, in war time it is decent and sensible to carry on espionage in order to learn all one can about enemy plans, and it is a mere incident that among other things this involves using beautiful women and unlovely counterfeiters and safecrackers, and employing numerous practices that finicky folks from the country sniff at as unsavory. Both sides play the same game, and to the cryptographer and other participants it is a matter of professional pride to outdo the other fellow.

The writer of "The American Black Chamber" states that he was told in London during the war that "Captain Hickings, their most brilliant cryptographer, was worth four divisions to the British Army." The more one learns about the late struggle to ruin or save democracy the more one wonders as to the relative importance of the men who merely did the actual fighting in the field!

The Allies were seemingly more or less willing to swap information, surreptitiously obtained, that might be useful in helping to defeat the enemy. But their devotion to one another did not go much beyond that. They foresaw a peace conference and rivalries not only during it but afterwards. While the author found the French military officials willing to cooperate, he was shuttered back and forth and finally balked in his efforts to get a peek into La Chambre Noire where he felt certain that foreign diplomatic messages were being deciphered.

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...Whether there is any ethical argument for a man putting in a book knowledge acquired while holding a confidential government position, or whether there is any ethical justification for a government by hook or by crook getting hold of the diplomatic messages of another and deciphering them, are questions each reader is free to pass on for himself... The Major himself seems to have no qualms in regard to his work or his actions. To him, apparently, there are in his field no nice distinctions to be made between peace time and war time—and perhaps in these days of grace he is right. He does reveal, however, one of those curious professional attitudes which amuse the outsider. It is necessary for governments to have codes and ciphers. Their preparation can only be entrusted safely to experts. These in turn acquire much of their skill in trying to break the codes and ciphers of other governments. They must work continuously as only thus can they keep up with new developments and be familiar with the lines of reasoning employed by foreign cryptographers.

...During the World War the censorship, involving decipherment of messages, was increasingly used to secure economic information which was used to further trade and financial control. This subject is not dealt with in this book. But it is one of vital concern to bankers and businessmen, who are quite as naive as some of the diplomats, referred to by Major Yardley in thinking that a code and cipher give security. However, the Major says that indecipherable methods of communication can be devised and that when in common use the cryptographer will join the down and outs.<sup>54</sup>

It is of interest to note that Yardley's prophecy in 1931 that the cryptanalyst would eventually meet defeat with the development of modern cryptographic

(54) Walter S. Rogers - The Saturday Review of Literature, June 20, 1931, Pg. 908.

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methods has not yet come true. There has been great progress in the creation of codes and ciphers since his time, and cryptanalysts would be helpless, if they had to depend on the methods of solution which were current in World War I days. But the extensive use of mathematical machinery in this work has lessened the burden for the person attacking even the most difficult machine cipher. It is still a fact that, given enough material and enough time, any cipher can be read by the expert cryptanalyst.

Another review from the liberal magazine, The Nation, is worthy of attention for its realistic attitude:

...The essence of diplomacy has been and still, alas, continues to be, in spite of Woodrow Wilson, secrecy. One of the many devices resorted to by diplomats in their assiduous pursuit of secrecy is the use of codes. Their fellow patriots, the spies and "secret agents," also use codes and secret inks. But just as national states have dignified diplomats into gentlemen and spies into heroes, so they have decorated with medals and more intangible honors the men who devote themselves to solving the codes and bringing the secret writings to the light of day. Yardley remarks that his work was largely destructive, for he spent most of his time for sixteen years prying into the secrets of enemies and friends of this country by destroying the secrecy they sought through codes.

...As to the morality of much of Yardley's type of work there is room for at least two

opinions. Either one can take Stimson's dogmatic view that it is wrong or one can hold that as long as diplomacy remains secret it is right—that it is necessary and will continue to be so as long as the national state with its dubious ambitions last. The destruction of Yardley's bureaus leave this country pretty much at the mercy of the more realistic foreign governments that still support cryptographers. The existence of these man is an open secret. Every Foreign Office knows that its dispatches are scrutinized by both friends and enemies, and the wonder is that diplomats ever take the risk of committing their secrets to the tender mercies of foreign cryptographers. Certainly without a man like Yardley in service America is just a tender lamb among the wolves. The American State Department is at once the autocratic and the most bungling of all the government departments. Such successes as it does chalk up are attributable not to skill and resourcefulness but to the economic strength of the country it represents to the world.55

Those who knew Yardley only through his book may be interested to know that he wrote two articles late in 1931. One dealt with the cryptanalytical activities of the British, and the other attempted to explain his motives for revealing government secrets. The first article, entitled "Doublecrossing America", discussed British methods of obtaining copies of every dispatch that entered or left England. There were some illuminating passages which are quoted as follows:

...And now that the United States is no longer engaged in this sort of espionage, I am

(55) C. Hartley Grattan - The Nation, August 19, 1931, Pp. 186-187.

often asked whether such countries as England continued after the war to supervise the diplomatic messages of friendly nations. We are all familiar with the fame of the British naval cipher bureau, obtained during the war under the direction of Admiral Hall. But did this bureau continue its secret activities after the war?

On December 16, 1920, this question was asked indirectly of Newcomb Carlton, president of the Western Union Telegraph Company, who was testifying before the Senate committee on cable landing licenses. "as I recall it," Mr. Carlton said, "after a message has been in our office in London for, I think, ten days, to give it a good start so there cannot be any question about it, that message in its original form—ninety per cent of them are in code—is taken to, I think, the British Naval Intelligence Bureau. They hold them not more than a few hours, three or four or five, and then return them. They do not hold them long enough for anything like deciphering..." The chairman might have pointed out to Mr. Carlton that, though it may take several hours or perhaps weeks or months to decipher a document, only a few seconds are required to make a photostatic copy. Once the telegrams are photostated, the cryptographers can take their time solving them. Mr. Carlton went on to say that he had instructed his vice president in London not to deliver the messages, but was assured by the British Government that the messages would not be deciphered but that they wanted to know who was cabling.

On January 10, 1921, Mr. Carlton was again questioned by the same committee:

**THE CHAIRMAN:** "Mr. Carlton, as I recall it, when you were on the stand here a couple of weeks ago or so, you made the statement that all commercial messages were turned over to the Navy Department of Great Britain, but you did not know whether that included government messages or not. I would like to know whether that does not include government messages."

Mr. Carlton asked to be excused from answering. The chairman did not insist, but after taking other testimony he requested an answer.

MR. CARLTON: "I must first describe what takes place. It appears that the British Government was desirous of supervising in and out cable messages to certain European countries in the interest of British peace and quiet. In order to avoid an appearance of discriminating against other European countries, they decided to take charge, physical charge, of all in and out cable messages from every country, and they therefore adopted the plan of waiting ten days, that is, to give ten days between the handling of messages and the time that the government called at the cable offices for the messages. The messages were then placed in large bags, sealed, I believe, and put in wagons. Those wagons were drawn away under custody of the Admiralty, and lodged overnight in a storehouse and returned to the cable office next morning...."we have further investigated and are satisfied that during that period not a single message, commercial, diplomatic, or otherwise, has been actually handled by the Naval Intelligence Bureau, and the contents are unknown to the British Government because of that fact."

Just how one would go about investigating what happened to the telegrams during the night Mr. Carlton does not say. Having directed the secret activities of the American Black Chamber over a period of twelve years, I ask to be pardoned if I am skeptical. During the war I was in London several weeks, studying cryptography under the British and was in a good position to know something of the espionage methods of the Admiralty cipher bureau.

Clarence E. Mackay, president of the Postal Telegraph-Cable Company, testifying before the same committee, said: "Since censorship ceased the



British Government have required us to turn over all messages ten days after they have been sent or received. This is a right which they claim under the landing licenses they issue to all cable companies." Mr. Mackay did not say that the British made no attempt to decipher the messages.

In any case, members of our diplomatic corps tell a story that hardly fits into Mr. Carlton's picture. They take it as an accepted fact that Great Britain attempts to decipher our messages—take it good-naturedly, as most diplomats do. Not long ago a former secretary to the American Embassy in London thought he had a huge joke on the British Admiralty cipher bureau when he told me the following tale.

"As you know," he said, "code words are often garbled in transmission and cannot be deciphered. One day Washington cabled us in London, asking that we confirm and repeat several code words in a message that had been dispatched a few hours earlier. The original code message had been sent to the British authorities for transmission, and through an inadvertence we had not retained a copy. So we telephoned them to return the original at once. Evidently a new clerk answered the telephone, for he replied, "That message isn't here. It's over at the Admiralty."

The secretary leaned back in his chair and laughed long and loud at this. I thought it amusing myself. However, someone must have overheard the new clerk, for shortly thereafter he telephoned the embassy to say that he was mistaken about the message being at the Admiralty. They had found the message and were returning it to the embassy. "Of course," concluded the secretary, "what actually happened is that they realized the clerk had tipped their hands, and sent an urgent call to the Admiralty to rush the telegram back to us." But whether Mr. Carlton was overoptimistic or not, the American Black Chamber was not so fortunate as to have wagonloads of code and cipher messages delivered to it under naval escort. Our cable lines are not controlled

by the government, and there were therefore periods when it was difficult to obtain copies of the telegrams of foreign governments. Often it was necessary to resort to dangerous espionage-56

The other article by Yardley was a justification of his revelations. It was entitled "Are We Giving Away Our State Secrets?", and its sub-title was "A cipher expert's view of the methods used by the Government in its diplomatic correspondence." He severely criticized the State Department's inadequacy in cipher work, and issued copies of letters to the State Department which he had sent to them before publishing some of his disclosures. He summed up his apologia with the remarks:

"One of my deep regrets at the reception of my book, The American Black Chamber, is that it has been accepted as a story of romance, intrigue, and ingenuity in the tracking down of spies through secret inks and ciphers, and the uncovering of foreign machinations through the decipherment of diplomatic messages, instead of as an expose of America's defenseless position in the field of cryptography.

"I had hoped to bring home to my government and to the public the dangerous position that America holds by abolishing the Black Chamber, and at the same time retaining antiquated codes to carry our diplomatic secrets. All great powers have their Black Chamber where the best cipher brains in the world puzzle out our codes." 57

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(56) Herbert O. Yardley - "Doublecrossing America," Liberty Magazine, N.Y., October 10, 1931

(57) Herbert O. Yardley - "Are We Giving Away Our State Secrets?", Liberty Magazine, Dec. 19, 1931

Yardley's career since 1931 has been one of mystery, though it may be presumed he has been subject to occasional official checks. Hollywood beckoned with a finger of gold, and eventually "The American Black Chamber" became the basis for a William Powell picture, "Rendezvous with Love." From Hollywood in July, 1934 came Yardley's comments on a story from Moscow that the Japanese had discovered an undecipherable cipher machine,<sup>58</sup> The two items follow:

Moscow, May 24--(I.N.S.)

The Japanese government at last has solved the "insoluble" problem that has confronted cryptographers for more than a thousand years, it was learned here today, and has created a system of diplomatic and military codes which even the greatest foreign experts have been unable to decipher.

A newly perfected telegraphic machine, closely resembling the automatic telegraph printer machine in use by news-agencies, is the device which finally has defeated the boast of code-smiths that any man can decode what another man codes. Hereafter, according to authentic information received here, secret messages of Japanese military chieftains and diplomats will be sent over these new machines. Success of the devices, it was predicted, will mean the eventual disappearance of the old-fashioned "codes," with one word standing arbitrarily for another, and the "scyphars," with their arbitrary transposition or

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(58) The Times, Washington, D.C., July 8, 1934 printed Yardley's comments on June 5, 1934 concerning Lindsay Parrott's (INS Staff Correspondent) story from Moscow on May 24.

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substitution of characters.

A dramatic situation which arose during the Washington arms conference in 1920 was said to have led to the invention. At that conference, the story goes, United States experts were able to decipher secret messages between the Japanese delegation and the home government. Because of this leakage of official secrets, the Japanese declared, they were forced to accept the distasteful 5-5-3 naval ratio. So the Japanese started figuring a way to guard their secrets from even the cleverest experts and, after fourteen years, have reputedly achieved success.

Although the mechanism of the new machine is complex the principle is declared to be simple. Hitherto, cyphers have been solved because of the regular and logical transposition of characters, which close study always eventually would reveal. The telegraphic machine, however, is said to "scramble" the characters according to no logical system, baffling the logic that always defeated the purpose of the old-fashioned codes. The electrical impulses the machine sends out along the wires fall into no repetitious pattern and can be sorted into proper order only by a corresponding piece of mechanism, tuned to the same pitch, at the receiving end. The existence of a machine at the receiving end which automatically "unscrambles" the code message, also eliminates the arduous task of decoding secret messages which long has been the bane of existence of many a chancellery clerk.

Hollywood, June 5.

"Japan is to be congratulated as the first nation to adopt scientific code methods." Such was the assertion today of Major Herbert C. Yardley, famous cryptographer and once head of the "American black chamber" where, during the war, the codes of all nations were unravelled.

"The Japanese," Major Yardley added, "have apparently adopted a code telegraphic machine such as cryptographers have been advocating for years." "But," he warned, "I am not so sure that it is undecipherable."

Commenting on an International News Service dispatch from Moscow revealing the new, secret Japanese machine, Major Yardley asserted that such devices have been known to experts for some time, but that governments have been reluctant to utilize them, instead clinging to their old fashioned codes. "Even a bad code machine is better than an ordinary code," said Yardley. "Judging from the type of ciphers that the Japanese used while I was head of the 'black chamber' for a period of 17 years during which time we deciphered some 10,000 of their messages, Japan was without technical advice except in one instance when a Polish cryptographer was employed. "there are many patents for machine ciphers registered in Washington, but no doubt Japan is using one of these devices. "All of these, however, are decipherable in the hands of scientific cryptographers, and I doubt where Japan's communications are a great deal safer today than they were ten years ago. "All cipher machines are based on some mathematical formula, and with a machine and messages in an expert's hand—even not knowing the key—the formula can be discovered."

The principle of a code machine, said Major Yardley, is roughly that of a huge drum on which are 1,000 or so letters. This rotates as the message is typed out on an ordinary keyboard, transposes the letters and sends them out "scrambled" only to be "unscrambled" by the machine at the other end of the line, which must possess a similar key drum.

Several years later, a letter from a reader of Time Magazine, asked what Yardley was doing at that time March 3, 1941, and the reply was:

"Last year he was reported living in

Chungking under an alias, breaking Russian and Japanese codes for the Chinese Government."

As late as 1942 there was great interest in Yardley's "The American Black Chamber." Copies of the book had become very scarce, and a second hand copy if obtainable, would bring \$4.00, though published originally for only \$2.00. An attempt was made by the publishers to reissue it again, but the necessary permission was denied as the result of the following letter:

CONFIDENTIAL

Op-20-G/jac

(88)A7-1/CM

Serial 0304620

CGA 3/26/42

The Bobbs-Merrill Co.

March 28, 1942

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Receipt of your letter FE 894.727/48 of March 19, 1942, regarding authorization for publication of the book entitled, "The American Black Chamber," is acknowledged.

The Navy Department has consistently maintained the attitude that every effort should be made to conceal from general knowledge the results of our cryptanalytical operations.

It is considered that republishing such a book as "The American Black Chamber" would only serve to stir up curiosity regarding present activities and thereby work contrary to our security aims.

Sincerely yours,

James Forestal

Acting

5 APR 1943

## 2. The Friedman Publicity.

Widespread interest in the romantic stories of beautiful female spies, secret codes and ciphers which Yardley had told caused editors from this time on to become keenly conscious of the news value of such stories. Consequently, when in 1934 magazine and newspaper accounts broke concerning Mrs. Elizabeth Smith Friedman, a Coast Guard cryptanalyst, a number of similar incidents followed:

### 1. March, 1934 (American Magazine, Vol. 117:47)

Publication of Mrs. Friedman's picture with a caption which indicated her connection with the Coast Guard as a cryptanalyst, and also told of her husband's profession.

### 2. April 23, 1934 (Washington Post)

An article on Mrs. Friedman discussed her comments on the famous Bacon cipher. It went on to mention her Coast Guard activities in cryptanalysis, and spoke of her husband who performed work of a similar nature with the Army Signal Corps.

### 3. May 25, 1934 (Radio broadcast)

Mrs. Friedman was interviewed on the radio at 2:00 p.m., and discussed her duties as head of the Cryptanalytical Bureau in the Coast Guard. She was identified as the wife of Major William Friedman, Chief of the Signal Corps Intelligence Service in the War Department, who was in charge of military codes and communications.

### 4. May 26, 1934. (Washington Post)

A news item gave the details of the above broadcast.

### 5. June 3, 1934 (Washington Post)

Mrs. Friedman's picture was displayed in the Sunday edition with a caption explaining her cryptanalytical duties.

6. June 30, 1934 (Seattle Daily Times)

An article emphasizing that Mrs. Friedman was a woman cryptanalyst. "Mrs. Friedman was her husband's assistant during the World War and helped decode secret military ciphers."

7. July 22, 1934 (Washington Sunday Star)

The picture of Mrs. Friedman illustrated an article in which the details of the famous "I'm Alone" case were given. This was one of the boot-legging cases which were solved by deciphering the codes of the smugglers.

Some of these stories reached the public because Mrs. Friedman had to testify in court as to the method by which certain evidence was obtained. Naturally, she had to divulge certain secret details, which were then no longer secret. This is one of the reasons why the use of police agencies in cryptanalysis is dangerous. Conviction of a criminal demands proof, and though giving testimony concerning success in a certain instance may obtain conviction, it will also jeopardize the source for future reference. To publicize a deciphering success in military or diplomatic work is to dry up the source of information for a long time.

From 1934 to 1937 the Friedmans remained unmolested in seclusion, but in 1937 another series



of accounts describing their work began:

8. January 4, 1937 (Sunday Star)

This sensational article described Major Friedman's solution of a code which had been sent by Hindus, who were arranging a mutiny in India. He had to testify in the trial which ended April 23, 1928, when one of the conspirators, Ram Chandra, was shot by another, Ram Singh. However, the background material of this article told of the activities of Colonel George Fabyan, who had lent the services of the 20 staff members of his Riverbank Laboratory at Geneva, Illinois to the government during 1916 and 1917. In 1918 they were brought to Washington with all their data and records, and Major Friedman disclosed that he had been one of this group.

9. June 5, 1937 (Washington Star)

An article and picture of Mrs. Friedman identified her as a cryptanalyst and as wife of the Chief of Signal Intelligence Service of the Army.

10. August, 1937 (American Legion Magazine)

An article "Codes-Fact and Fallacy" described in detail some of the activities of Mr. and Mrs. Friedman.

11. September, 1937 (Reader's Digest)

This magazine, which reaches millions of readers throughout the world, reprinted the American Legion Magazine article.

12. Circa September 1, 1937 (Washington Evening S

A reader inquired as to the activities of Colonel W. Friedman, and he was informed that he was a cryptanalyst.

13. September 12, 1937 (Syndicated News Article)

This article, which was furnished to many

newspapers, stressed the secrecy of Mr. Friedman's work.

"Visitors are barred from the rooms in the squat munitions building where the work is actually done. And the size of Friedman's staff is kept secret."

14. October 7, 1937 (Washington Evening Star)

A reader asked the name of a woman crypt-analytical expert, and the reply was "Mrs. Friedman". There was also an article about her in Modern Mechanics about this time.

15. February 9, 1938 (Washington Post)

A picture of Mrs. Friedman and a news item, which told of her part in the conviction of five Vancouver Chinese on the charge of smuggling opium, were published. She had been loaned to the Canadian government for this purpose.

16. February 10, 1938 (Washington Herald)

A picture of Mrs. Friedman, and a long article on the Chinese dope smuggling ring were featured.

17. February 15, 1938 (Look Magazine)

A picture of Mrs. Friedman, and a caption describing her work were published.

18. February 21, 1938 (Washington Post)

Mrs. Friedman was mentioned in Alice Hughes' column as a cryptanalyst.

19. November 23, 1939 (Washington Times-Herald)

In an article on "Quser Federal Jobs" by Jerry Klutz, Mr. and Mrs. W. F. Friedman were described as cryptanalysts:

"Mr. Friedman is Chief of the Signal Intelligence Section of War's "War Plans and Training Division," and his wife Elizabeth S. is the Coast Guard's crypt-analyst.

Navy also has a cryptanalyst. And, oddly enough, it is a woman, Agnes M. Driscoll, 121

She not only deciphered codes in foreign languages, but teaches naval officers the secrets of her profession."

20. October 3, 1941 (Washington Star)

This story told of Colonel William Friedman's interest in the Poe ciphers, and pointed out that he was Chief Signal Officer in the War Department. (Colonel Friedman has never been Chief Signal Officer-Ed.)

Undoubtedly, there were many other items similar to those published throughout the country. No informed observer in Washington could escape knowing who the principal cryptanalysts of the Army and the Coast Guard were. Publicity of this nature was particularly unfortunate in that Yardley's book had provided a perfect cover for work of this nature. It will be recalled that the former head of the United States cryptographic bureau had vented his wrath on Secretary Stimson for abolishing his unit. Ostensibly then, there was no more cryptanalysis of other nation's codes going on in Washington. But revelations of the activities of the Friedmans could lead to only one conclusion on the part of espionage agents — decryption of other nation's codes was in progress behind the scenes.

(It may be pointed out that these publicity leaks did not divulge any diplomatic secrets, but it must be

remembered that incidents of this kind were certainly enough to make every potential enemy agent in Washington much more cautious about communication security. These security measures will be discussed later.

### 3. - Pre-Japanese War Leaks.

Other references to cryptanalytical activities were occasionally found during these years, and some of these will be given here.

A story in English which appeared in an unidentified Japanese newspaper on June 19, 1934 is remarkable not only for its style, but also for its message. It was headlined as follows:

CODE THAT IS TOO SIMPLE

FOREIGN OFFICE SUSPICIOUS  
THAT MESSAGES ARE READ

THE CODE QUESTION

The other plan is to appoint officials in exclusive charge of telegraphic communication to the principal Embassies and Legations abroad. At present, there are only three such officials at the Foreign Office, and none at the Embassies and Legations. The volume of telegraphic correspondence between the Foreign Office and these institutions abroad has increased considerably and these messages exchanged between them include an increasing number which involve strict secrecy. In order to ensure the secrecy of telegraphic business and the speedy dispatch of such business, it is proposed that officials in charge of such business exclusively should be appointed to the principal Embassies and Legations abroad.

The adoption of a telegraphic code more complex and more difficult of decipherment is also contemplated. The code now in use by the Foreign Office is somewhat antiquated and is inferior to those in use by the War Office and the Navy Department; it is said.

The usually cautious J. Edgar Hoover in 1934 delivered a speech describing the excellent work of his men, and said

among other things:

Our men are taught to shoot, and to know every sort of weapon. They are experts in ballistics. We have code decipherers, the chemical processes for identifying charred paper, etc. ....59

Certainly no great secrets were divulged by this remark, but it did indicate that cryptanalytical experts were available for use by the United States.

An interesting example of American naivete in diplomatic affairs was observed in a newspaper description of the State Department's code room, which also included a picture of this sanctum sanctorum. It is to be hoped that other nations could testify to the accuracy of some of the claims which follow:

....It is believed that the present secret code of the Department is almost impossible to "break". The "key" is being constantly changed so that should the agents of a foreign nation be successful in working out one of the "keys" they would be confronted with a new one almost immediately. The American Government makes no attempt to "break into" the secret codes of diplomatic communications of other countries.

....During the year ended June 3, 1934, the State Department sent and received 1,106,871 instructions and dispatches.60

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- (59) Washington Herald, August 9, 1934.  
(60) The United States News, August 13, 1934.

A confidential report on British activities in the Near East disclosed that there was no lull in their crypt-analytical work at this time:

My informant then remarked that a British wireless station in Palestine had intercepted code messages passing between Rome and the Italian authorities in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland some two months before the recent frontier incident between Ethiopia and Italy which had been decoded and read by the British authorities. These messages not only set forth the plans in general of the Italian authorities in East Africa but went actually so far as to fix the date of the incident which was to be made the occasion for pressure upon Ethiopia and provided for all the details of the incident itself in the most minute manner.<sup>61</sup>

Evidence of French secret activities was discovered in the Washington "Savings Journal."

The French Government is taking drastic measures to prevent the publication of private memoirs which disclose State secrets, says the Evening Standard (London). The late General Givierge, who was head of the Cipher Department at French G.H.C. during the war, wrote a book in which he explained how the enemy's messages were intercepted and deciphered.

The General's heirs decided to publish his memoirs. The French Military Intelligence intervened, and obtained an order from the courts prohibiting publication and sequestering the general's manuscript.

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(61) From Teheran, on May 7, 1935 by J. Rives Childs, Charge d'Affaires, formerly of Cipher Solving Section, Radio Intelligence Division of General Staff, GHC-A.E.F.

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1937 1942

The Givierge family have protested against these summary proceedings, and the question has now been referred to arbitration.<sup>62</sup>

The memoirs of General Givierge would have been most illuminating, for he had been one of Europe's foremost cryptanalysts. His book on cryptography had been a best seller in military circles all over the world, and this new volume would have had an equally wide circulation. However, the mere announcement of the above suppressive action of the French government was an indication to cryptanalysis enthusiasts that the famous French Black Chamber was still very much in operation in 1937. It would have been most surprising if the French had abolished their deciphering unit, since they had been pioneers in the modern development of cryptanalysis. No nation knew better than the French how valuable such work could be in keeping friendly nations friendly, and making hostile nations less dangerous. Both the French and English, judging from their actions, have always argued thus: "All other nations, allies or enemies, must be watched by us. A friendly nation will not mind our efforts to make certain that it remains friendly, and a

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(62) January, 1937, Vol. XLIII, No. 1



hostile nation will expect that we will do as much as it is doing to keep us from becoming too dangerous. Therefore, we will check every communication we can intercept."

Realism is the keynote of such thinking. It may also be remarked that these nations did not stop their crypt-analytical activities when the Armistice was signed in 1918. They recognized that totalitarian war was emerging in embryonic form even then, and that all aspects of man's life — political, commercial and diplomatic — would be involved in the next military struggle of the twentieth century. Thus, when the first phase of the World War ended in 1918, the English and French maintained their deciphering units through the twenty odd years of diplomatic and economic maneuvering that intervened before the second phase of the World War broke out in 1939. When this second military phase has run its course, and the Nazi menace has been destroyed, there is little doubt that the Black Chambers of France and England will return to their diplomatic and economic duties.

Returning to the American scene, another disclosure of supposedly hidden activity was found in a newspaper item

which discussed the U. S. Treasury's search for a cryptanalysts, who could read and write Italian and German.

The salary was to be \$2,000.<sup>63</sup>

In the April 14, 1939 issue of Life Magazine there was published a reply to two letters to the editor which had questioned a statement in an article on Ambassador Bullitt (March 27, 1939). The article had stated that all foreign governments knew United States codes by heart. Life's reply to the questioners was as follows:

Every government maintains a Black Chamber to break the codes and ciphers of every other government. U. S. Government codes and ciphers, though good, have not yet proven themselves invulnerable to this process. The U. S. Navy uses mostly code which requires a code book to clear. The U. S. Army prefers cipher and the U. S. State Department uses a combination of code and cipher. These are changed about every six months. Code and cipher are judged not on the basis of whether they can be eventually broken or not, but on how long it takes to dig out their secret messages.—Ed.

A headlined story in the Washington Post on September 23, 1939 announced that United States agents had opened a drive in New York on foreign spies who had stolen Army and Navy secrets.<sup>64</sup> It reported that investigators of the F. B. I. and the Federal Communications Commission were checking all

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(63) George D. Riley - "US and Us" in Washington Times Herald, March 2(?), 1939.

(64) An International News Service Story from New York on September 22, 1939.

powerful radio transmitters to determine whether any had been used to transmit spy codes to Germany. Most of the information contained in the story had been derived from "The Hours," a publication which was devoted exclusively to information on conditions in the Third Reich and Nazi activities in the Americas. A passage which undoubtedly attracted the attention of U. S. Navy readers follows:

In the disappearance and ultimate sale to Germany and Japan of the United States Navy Department secrets, a highly prized code scrambling machine may be said to have served as the first important lead to the discovery of the existence of the ring. More than \$1,000,000 was spent by the Navy to perfect the machine.

Another newspaper account which was damaging to American cryptanalysts had the following headline:

FCC REVIVES THE BLACK CHAMBER<sup>65</sup>

It announced that a bureau had been recently established to decode diplomatic and business cables, and then reminisced about Yardley's American Black Chamber and Stimson's action in abolishing the bureau. The article was not completely harmful because it stated that from Yardley's time till

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(65) Frank C. Waldrop - Washington Times-Herald, October, 1939

the present the government had not engaged in cryptanalysis.

...After Mr. Yardley's literary endeavors, Black Chamber operations were put entirely out of mind by our Government, and not until a few weeks ago was the revival undertaken.

Just how Chairman Fly intended to run such a cumbrous society of private company file snatchers and rival governmental espionage organizations as he has devised without anybody knowing about it is difficult to say.

A newspaper column by Jay Franklin called "We, the People" described the sad state of affairs existing in 1939 in American diplomacy. The evidence for this statement could be found in the fact that Ambassador Kennedy had to fly home from London to give President Roosevelt his messages.<sup>66</sup> Franklin pointed out that every government possessed a Black Chamber which deciphered all foreign codes. Everyone in Europe was able to solve our antiquated codes, and Kennedy knew that his messages would be in possession of the British Intelligence in less than twelve hours after he had dispatched them. Franklin continued in the following veins:

At one time when the famous Captain Yardley of "The American Black Chamber" was operating, we had a

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(66) The Evening Star, Washington, D.C., December 11, 1939

code program as well as a code policy. But the Hoover administration junked Captain Yardley's outfit, for reasons which still stupefy—that it was wrong for this Government to decipher the messages of foreign governments. Since the outbreak of the war, a "black chamber" has been set up in New York, under the jurisdiction of the F.C.C. in order to prevent abuse of our neutrality in coded messages to foreign countries. But the State Department still limps along with a code system which was already obsolete and which has become virtually as prehistoric as pig Latin with the passage of 25 years.<sup>67</sup>

The newspaper attack in October, 1939 on the entrance of the FCC into radio intelligence was renewed with increased vigor by the same columnist in 1940. Several excerpts follow:

Several months ago it was reported in this column that the famous "American Black Chamber" of World War days had been revived after a fashion, with the Federal Communications Commission in charge, to conduct espionage upon all messages leaving this country by wire or wireless. There were a few half-hearted noises made by Chairman Fly, of the FCC, intended to make it appear that the report was false. In fact, it was absolutely correct, as Mr. Fly admitted privately to a number of persons after saying that whoever disclosed the new chamber's existence ought to be run out of the Government.

And now it develops that the message espionage work, instead of being reduced, is being increased. President Roosevelt has given the FCC \$1,600,000 out

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(67) Ibid.

of his special emergency funds for defense to buy machines which will tap in on all wireless transmissions, as other machines tap in on telephone wires. For the record, these machines are called monitors for discovery of unlicensed radio transmitters. In fact, they are pure espionage devices.

The disclosure here of their existence and purpose is done not to interfere with the national defense. It is intended to help improve that by showing how important assignments fail when put in wrong hands. The FCC is the wrong set of hands to do such important work as this radio espionage, and everybody knows it. Its staff has no experience or knowledge concerning law enforcement or the value of military information... And before it even gets to that second assignment, it is permitted to undertake a police duty for which it is utterly unfitted and for which the Army and Navy intelligence services and the Department of Justice are perfectly equipped.

This situation is bad government, and it can end only in failure if not in disaster. Somebody had better bail the FCC out of its espionage assignment before it sinks the boat. It is grasping for powers it has no right to nor any ability to use.<sup>68</sup>

Officials of the State Department must have reacted in emphatic fashion after the next bit of information reached the public eye:

The Dixie Clipper of Pan American Airways left for Lisbon yesterday... Carl Forkel, who said he had recently completed an intensive training course in codes and methods of deciphering them at the State Department in Washington and was going to Vichy as assistant at the United States Embassy.<sup>69</sup>

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(68) Frank C. Waldrop - Washington Times Herald, October 7, 1940  
(69) Herald Tribune, New York, April 14, 1941.

CCD  
An item from Walter Winchell's column in April, 1941 mentioned Nazi success in deciphering:

Washington's concern over the tip or lead on one of their coded messages, which Nazis in Puerto Rico deciphered before scuttling two ships last week. 70

On April 25, 1941 Winchell explained to U.S. authorities that his source was a Washington newsman, who quoted an Australian at a British Embassy party. The Australian, in turn, was quoting an American Naval Officer, but no one knew who the officers were.

Revelation of Naval cryptanalytical activity came to public notice through a very indirect method.

Professor Marston Morse of the Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton, New Jersey granted an interview to a news columnist, and proceeded as follows:

Under the direction of Professor Engstrom of Yale, an officer in the Naval Reserve, several able young mathematicians are engaged in an intensive study of "cryptoanalysis," as the art of solving such puzzles is known. It is expected that they will find the key to almost any secret message system an enemy may devise .....But only something expressed in the higher algebras" — mathematical systems compared to which relatively is simple—could baffle permanently the group

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(70) April 8 or 9, 1941, Times Herald, Washington, D.C.

working with Professor Engstrom. At least, they would recognize very quickly whether the code was "crackable" or not.71

The capture by the F.B.I. of Paul Huisel, a Nazi spy, and the discovery of some documents he had in his possession elicited the following remarks in a news story:

The code sheet, its torn parts carefully pasted together, and a Bible with words ringed in pencil, apparently at random were sent to the Black Chamber, or code section.72

The Army received some undesirable publicity in June, 1941 when a picture of seven officers from the University of Illinois R.O.T.C. unit was published with a caption stating that they had been trained in cryptography, and were now on duty in the Signal Intelligence Section, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C.73

Hunter College announced in September, 1941 a course in Cryptography which was to be taught by Rosario Candela. Further publicity emphasized the importance of the work, and told of opportunities in

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- (71) Thomas R. Henry - "Of Stars, Men and Atoms" in the Star, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1941.  
(72) Daily News, New York, June 2, 1941.  
(73) Illinois Alumni News, University of Illinois, Illinois, June 1, 1941.



government service for persons trained in this profession.

A very detailed article describing the whole Federal radio monitoring system appeared in October, 1941. It mentioned eleven counter-espionage radio-stations, and eighty odd secondary mobile units. A description of new antennae, which were to be used to fix the position of transmitters, was featured, and the use of plastic disks in recording messages was noted. The reader was also informed that there was one machine which unscrambled intentionally scrambled human speech.<sup>74</sup> Anyone reading this article would have a rather complete picture of the FCC's activities in time of war.

All the foregoing examples of violations of security happened during a time of peace. Some were minor, many were serious in that they had an effect on the success of communication intelligence activities in the future which we shall discuss later. But the most important disclosures were yet to come, since leaks in war are much more dangerous than revelations of secrets in peace.

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(74) Times, Los Angeles, California, October 13, 1941.

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C. The American-Japanese War.1. Pearl Harbor Aftermath.

The day after Pearl Harbor a Washington newspaper ran the following:

HAD JAPANESE HERE  
ADVANCE WORD OF WAR?

"Whether or not the Japanese Embassy here had advance warning of the stunning attack upon Hawaii yesterday probably won't be known for a decade, but all surface signs indicated the staff of 2514 Massachusetts, H.W. was as surprised as other Washingtonians.

(However, reliable informants report the War Department has broken down the Japanese code. They pointed out that this fact, probably known to Tokyo, prevented any communication with the Embassy, for fear of "tipping off" Washington.) #75

Another news item in the same paper, which spoke of the Japanese officials who were then interned in their embassy, also commented on American cryptanalytical success:

"An American who was in the Embassy told the News that the first report of the bombing rolled off the embassy news-ticker while most of the staff was at the funeral of Col. Kenkita Sinzyo, late assistant military attache. There were reliable reliable reports that the War Department has broken the Japanese code, which would cut the embassy's grapevine to Tokyo and leave it uninformed." #76

{75} Daily News, Washington, D.C., December 8, 1941.  
{76} Ibid.

Two days later the following story appeared in the same newspaper:

#### WHAT WAS IN JAP'S TRUNKS?

"A melodramatic episode involving Japanese attaches added to the growing mystery of whether Tokyo envoys here knew in advance of the attack on Pearl Harbor, as it was disclosed G-men are playing a dime-novel game with five trunks destined for the Embassy, which never arrived...."

Much conjecture about the Japs knowing beforehand.

"Thru all this conjecture runs a serio-comic note: The U.S. "broke" the Japanese code in 1932. Undoubtedly the Japs knew this. The U.S. knew they knew it, and so....)" 77

Another FCC leak was disclosed in a story printed in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. The State Department had refused to let the F.B.I. move in to stop an illegal transmitter from the German Embassy, because it did not want to upset negotiations for the safe exchange of diplomatic personnel in Germany. After the first story broke, the FCC then added two other points: (1) Every message sent had been decoded; (2) The Embassy transmitter had been neatly jammed the moment it started sending messages. 78

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{77} Daily News, Washington, D.C., December 10, 1941.  
{78} Time Magazine, January 5, 1942.

Readers of Volume I of this series will recall a Japanese message which set up an elaborate signalling system of lights, fires and newspaper advertising for its agents in Hawaii. The following excerpt from Drew Pearson's column is a reminder of that dispatch:

"After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese consulate was taken over and its papers searched. Among them was found a code of signals by lights; so many lights would show that the U.S. destroyers had left Pearl Harbor; so many would indicate that the battleships had left; another light arrangement would show that the destroyers had returned, and so on. This code completely corroborated Hoover's contention that the Japanese consular agents were the main-spring of Japanese espionage.<sup>79</sup>

Another revelation of American success in cracking the Japanese codes was found in a later column of Pearson, which attacked the methods of the FCC in handling the espionage monitoring system:

"It didn't come out in the published report, but the Pearl Harbor Board of Inquiry was informed that the FCC refused to allow intelligence authorities to obtain copies of cable and radio messages sent by the Jap consulate in Honolulu to Tokyo.

When the consulate was raided after the sneak attack and its papers seized, numerous messages were found which, when decoded contained detailed information about U.S. naval and Army signals in the area and other vital military data."<sup>80</sup>

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(79) Times Herald, Washington, D. C., January 6, 1942.  
(80) Times Herald, Washington, D. C., February 6(?), 1942.

More details of F.B.I. activity at Hawaii were disclosed in the following article, which seemingly has been inspired by Pearson's attack on the F.C.C.:

**FBI EXCUSE IN JAP ATTACK RECEIVES JOLT  
WAR AGENCY TOLD ALL TOKYO-HAWAII MESSAGE  
COPIES WENT TO HOOVER**

The excuse of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of its counter-espionage service in Hawaii to detect plans for the surprise Japanese attack on December 7 was jolted severely yesterday by information emanating from a meeting of a Government war agency.

According to this information, the F.B.I., notwithstanding the contrary findings of the Roberts Commission, had copies of all messages transmitted between Honolulu and Tokyo over the commercial radio circuits for a period of several weeks prior to December 7.

F. B. I. Got Messages.

It is reported in official quarters that the communications service of the Navy and the signal service of the Army kept the commercial circuits between Tokyo and Honolulu under constant surveillance, and gave copies of all messages to the F.B.I.

When asked about this information yesterday, the F. B. I. issued a formal denial, as follows:

"Any statement implying that cable or radio messages between Hawaii and Tokyo prior to Pearl Harbor were cleared through or shown to the F.B.I. is absolutely inaccurate and emphatically denied by the F.B.I."

This statement served to recall F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover's denial, shortly after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, that an executive order issued by the President late in 1939 made the F.B.I. primarily responsible for the investigation and prevention of espionage in Hawaii.

F.B.I. Excuse Accepted.

The report of the Roberts Commission stated that the F.B.I. was "primarily responsible for investigation of matters connected with the civil population" in Hawaii. The Roberts Commission, however, accepted the F.B.I.'s excuse that peace time restrictions "prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu and Japan."

Senator Harry S. Truman (D) of Missouri, chairman of the Senate Interstate Commerce subcommittee on wire tapping legislation, told the Senate on Tuesday that, notwithstanding the report of the Roberts Commission, the record will show that "wire tapping and interception of messages were fully practiced prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor."<sup>81</sup>

A news broadcast by Leon Pearson on a Mutual Broadcasting System program in February, 1942 disclosed the following information:

"One of the Intelligence Services of the Government only tonight has uncoded certain messages from the French West Indies — Martinique and Guadeloupe — of incriminating character, which has led officials to believe that German submarines have been refueled from the small ports on the Atlantic coast of Guadeloupe."<sup>82</sup>

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(81) Chester Manly — Times Herald, February 7, 1942.

(82) War Department Radio Digest, February 26, 1942, #216.

So much newspaper publicity had been given the cryptanalytical units of the United States by this time that many colleges now began to inquire of the Navy about the possibility of instituting courses in the technique of deciphering. Naturally, they were interested in preparing their students for war duties. When consulted as to the answer to be made to one of these colleges, the Director of Naval Communications in March, 1942 expressed the policy of U. S. naval authorities in the following memorandum:

1. Other colleges have offered to teach cryptography and cryptanalysis in our behalf. It is considered advisable to decline politely these offers and to express the Navy's desire that no such courses be offered, without entering into the reasons for such objections.

2. The publicity which would accompany such courses would be harmful; the Navy would have no control over who takes the training; the training, itself, unless restricted Navy material were used, would be of no particular value to the student.

In July, 1942 and for some months following, magazine articles entitled "How War Came" purported to tell the inside story of diplomatic intrigue which went on behind the scenes just before the war.<sup>83</sup> Later, these were published in book form. Some of the passages revealed quite plainly that diplomatic messages

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(83) Forrest David and Ernest K. Lindley—"How War Came," Ladies Home Journal, July, 1942, Pg. 106.

were being intercepted and read by others than those to whom they were addressed. Here is one indication:

In exchange for an exclusive franchise to conquer and pillage in Southeastern Asia and the South Pacific, Hirohito and his government were willing to assume a full-fledged partnership in the Rome-Berlin Axis. That was the price they would pay, but they insisted on the delivery of Indo-China before signing on the dotted line at Berlin. The Japanese were, as usual, being cagey with Europeans.

Early in September, 1940, they initiated the transaction by serving an ultimatum on the French colonial authorities at Hanoi in Tonkin, the northernmost of the Indo-Chinese native states, a copy being handed at the same time to Laval in Vichy.

As Tokyo desired, the decision was made in Berlin, where the ultimatum had been obediently referred by Laval. Hitler gave it his endorsement. Hence, on September nineteenth, an imperial council voted to join the Rome-Berlin Axis. It was a deathly secret in Tokyo, but the American and British diplomats knew of it almost as soon as the last councilor had noted ave, and a lady of the British embassy startled a Japanese minister at dinner that night by putting it bluntly to him, "Why did you do it?".....<sup>84</sup>

Another passage which violated security was this:

"Midway of January, 1941, Sumner Welles warned Curstantine Czumansky that Hitler had marked Russia for slaughter in the following June. A precise diplomatic technician who weighs his words with the care of a pharmacist compounding a prescription of deadly drugs, the Under Secretary did not qualify his warning. This Government "knew" that the decision to breach the Nazi-Soviet accord had been taken in Berlin.



Nor was Welles' declaration based merely on such reports as those of the Chinese and Polish military intelligence or the gossip circulating in the highest diplomatic circles in Europe. It had a firmer, and amazingly interesting, foundation which cannot, at this time, be disclosed...

The fact that Welles set June for the invasion should be noted, conflicting as it does with a widespread impression, growing up after the event, that Hitler had planned to march in May, or even April, but that his timetable had been disrupted by the uprising in Belgrade. The knowledge possessed by this Government in January was explicit on the time, virtually to the day, and the Soviet Ambassador was so advised.

"Ambassador Oumansky called at the State Department on the twenty-sixth, where Acting Secretary Welles displayed quiet satisfaction in recalling his warnings in January and March, assuring his somewhat chastened visitor that their previous differences were "past history" to him. Oumansky, regretting the rigor with which he had formerly pressed his demands, observed that he had thought well enough of the warning in January to resort on it "in full", a point which Welles dryly assured him he had known.

What Welles did not mention was this Government's knowledge that Oumansky had also reported the warning to the Nazi Charge d'affaires, Hans Thomsen, the Soviet and Nazi embassies being at that time on terms of candid association, up to the point of sharing confidences concerning the democratic powers.<sup>85</sup>

But the most important publicity leak in the past generation concerning communication intelligence has not yet been discussed. In early June the U. S. Navy saved Midway and Pearl Harbor from invasion in one of the greatest naval battles of modern times. Tremendous damage had been dealt the Japanese fleet, and this unexpected disaster had forced the invaders into retirement. Then a newspaper story appeared which divulged the secret of the Navy's success.

2. Battle of Midway Expose.

On June 7, 1942 the following story appeared in three newspapers which possessed very wide circulation:

U.S. NAVY KNEW  
IN ADVANCE ALL  
ABOUT JAP FLEET

Guessed There Would  
Be Feint at One Base,  
Real Attack at Another

The strength of the Japanese with which the American Navy is battling somewhere west of Midway Island in what is believed to be the greatest naval battle of the war was well known in American naval circles, reliable sources in the Naval Intelligence disclosed here tonight.

The Navy learned of the gathering of the powerful Japanese units soon after they put forth from their bases, it was said. Although their purpose was not specifically known at that time, the information in the hands of the Navy Department was so definite that a feint at some American base, to be accompanied by a serious effort to invade and occupy another base, was predicted. Guesses were even made that Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians and Midway Island in the Hawaiian group might be targets.

In Three Sections

It was known that the Japanese Fleet—the most powerful yet used in this war—was broken into three sections—first, a striking force; next a support force, and finally an occupation fleet.

It was apparent to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz's strategists in Hawaii that the feint would probably be made by the supporting force, the real blow struck by the striking fleet, with the occupation force standing by, ready to land troops as soon as defenses were broken down.

Had the attack on Midway been successful, Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands would have been the next point of attack.

The advance information enabled the American Navy to make full use of air attacks on the approaching Japanese ships, turning the struggle into an air battle along the modern lines of naval warfare.

Exactly how the Japanese disposed their units as between Dutch Harbor and the Midway Islands is not known here.

#### How Forces were Divided

However, before the fleet was divided for attacks on the Aleutians and Midway, the various forces were made up approximately as follows according to Navy information here.

The striking force: Four aircraft carriers, the Akaga and Kaga of 26,900 tons each, and the Hiryu and Soryu, of 10,000 tons each.

Two battleships of the Kirishima class—29,300 tons, with 14-inch guns.

Two cruisers of the Tone class—new 8,500-ton 6.1-inch gun ships.

Twelve destroyers.

#### Occupation Force

The occupation force included:

Four cruisers—the Chakas, Myoko, Chitose and Choda, all believed of 8,500 tons with main batteries of 6.-inch guns.

Two armored transports of the Kunikida Maru class—converted liners.

Four to six troopships.

Eight to 12 supply vessels.

Twelve destroyers.

Ten submarines.

Well informed as it was, the Navy was on the alert for the first movements of this force. When it turned eastward into the Pacific from the vicinity of the Chishima or Kurile Island chain all American outposts were warned.

#### Real Goal Concealed.

American naval dispositions were made in preparation for the various possible attacks the Japs were believed to be planning. Up to this time the Japanese had not committed themselves to any action. They were still in position to turn their real threat against either Dutch Harbor or Midway. By last Tuesday the Americans were able to conclude that a feint was to be made at Dutch Harbor.

Meanwhile, preparations among all available American forces in the vicinity of Midway were being rushed in the hope of striking a telling blow against the Japs. The wisdom of this course became apparent on Wednesday when the feint was made in the form of air raids on Dutch Harbor. The same day the fleets in the Midway area commenced their now historic battle.<sup>86</sup>

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(86) Daily News, N.Y.; Tribune, Chicago, Ill.; Times Herald, Washington, D.C., June 7, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

The significance of the above story could not have been missed by any enemy agent. It was perfectly evident that the Navy had been reading the messages of the Japanese. However, the damage done did not stop with the publication of this story.

In a broadcast on July 5, 1942 Walter Winchell stated that on two occasions advance knowledge had saved the United States forces from defeat. An item from his column on July 7, 1942 was even more specific:

The story all over Washington and Newspaper Row here concerns Col. R.R. McCormick's paper in Chicago... It again tossed safety out the windows—and allegedly printed the lowdown on why we won at Midway—claiming that the U.S. Navy decoded the Jap's secret messages, etc. ... True or not, we dunno... Official Washington was so incensed at the publisher's persistent disregard for military secrecy—it decided to teach him a lesson... What one man saved him?... His deadliest enemy in Chicago, publisher Frank Knox.<sup>87</sup>

Meanwhile, action was being instituted to indict those responsible for printing the story. On August 8 newspapers throughout the country carried the announcement of Attorney General Biddle that the case was to be investigated by a Federal grand jury in Chicago:

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(87) Daily Mirror, New York.

**MIDWAY DISPATCH  
IS UNDER INQUIRY**

**Biddle Asks a Grand Jury at  
Chicago to Weigh Story Used  
by the Tribune There**

The publication by The Chicago Tribune and some other newspapers of a news dispatch said to have contained confidential information concerning the Battle of Midway is to be investigated in Chicago by a Federal Grand jury.

Attorney General Biddle said today that he had acted as a result of a preliminary inquiry by the Justice Department and the recommendation of the Navy.

The grand jury, he said, would be directed to investigate the possible violation of any criminal statute, particularly the Act of June 15, 1917, as amended by the Act of March 28, 1940, concerning the unlawful communication of documents or information relating to national defense.

He announced that he had appointed William D. Mitchell of New York, former Attorney General, who had conducted the preliminary inquiry, to direct the grand jury investigation and any resulting prosecution as a special assistant to the Attorney General.

Mr. Biddle's statement mentioned only "certain newspapers" as having published the confidential information but an Office of War Information spokesman said that The Chicago Tribune was meant, and that among the other newspapers involved were The New York Daily News and The Washington Times Herald.

The despatch described in great detail the composition of the Japanese fleet which attacked Midway. It described the types of ships which composed the forces and related how the Navy had learned that the armada had sailed almost as soon as it left its base.

It is said that this disclosure of the completeness of the Navy's information proved highly embarrassing to its intelligence service since it tended to reveal the source of its knowledge to the Japanese and thus to render it unavailable.

The penalties provided by the amended Espionage Act for the unlawful communication of documents or information pertaining to national defense are \$10,000 fine, ten years' imprisonment or both. It has not hitherto been applied to a newspaper in this war.<sup>88</sup>

More publicity was given the case as time progressed. Newsweek Magazine reprinted the headlines and essential details of the June 7 story, and added:

"The scoop" blew the lid off Navy Department reserve. Infuriated officials called for an investigation on the ground that the dispatch violated the Voluntary Censorship Code and tipped off to the Japs sources of Navy information, thus making such sources useless.<sup>89</sup>

Eventually, the Grand Jury failed to indict Colonel Robert R. McCormick, Managing Editor James Loy Maloney, and Reporter Stanley Johnston. The following account of the reasons for acquittal is from Newsweek Magazine:

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(88) Times, New York, August 8, 1942

(89) August 17, 1942, pp. 64-65.



...From the day it was published, the Navy insisted the article had potential value to the enemy. Laymen could deduce only that the Japs, learning from the Tribune that our Navy had advance knowledge of their strength, could plug the leak through which we got the information.

Whatever the case, Attorney General Biddle's Justice Department thought it grave enough to investigate and ticklish enough to have the inquiry conducted by a political neutral, William D. Mitchell, Attorney General under President Hoover. Biddle stood ready to prosecute vigorously if the evidence promised a conviction. But he wanted no indictment followed by an acquittal and gloating aspersions on the department's motives.

Mitchell, after conferences with the Navy and Tribune, advised against prosecution. He conceded that the Japs could have been aided by the dispatch. He was extremely doubtful that the government could prove willful intent to aid as required by the Supreme Court interpretation of the espionage act. Biddle and his staff agreed with Mitchell.

But the Navy unconcerned with the Justice Department's prestige, reminded the White House it was fighting a war at sea and wanted protection against leaks at home. Its spokesman, Secretary Frank Knox, insisted an example be made of The Tribune.

Reluctantly and "at the insistence of the Navy," Mitchell presented both the Navy's and Tribune's case to the grand jury. He counted on an indictment or some lesser technical charge providing the Navy told the jury why the story could have been useful to the enemy. To his amazement the intelligence officer assigned to present the Navy's case refused to go into this crucial question. Before entering the jury room

he explained he could assure the jurors the enemy stood to benefit; how, was a naval secret he could not confide even to them.

Though the "secret" had been bandied about for weeks in Washington Clubs, pressrooms, and cocktail bars, the Navy remained obdurate. So, presumably, did the grand jury, which apparently considered the evidence insufficient for indictment.

As one Justice Department partisan summed up the fiasco: "Knox pushed Biddle out on a limb, followed him there, then sawed them both off."<sup>90</sup>

Time Magazine also printed a report of the investigation, and speculated a bit as follows:

The grand Jury considering the matter of the publication on June 7 in the Chicago Tribune and other newspapers of an article relating to the Japanese fleet in the Midway battle has decided that no indictment should be returned... Its conclusion that no violation of law was disclosed settles the matter.

...If it was true, as the Tribune said in its story, that the information about the Japanese dispositions came from naval intelligence, the story may have given away a Navy secret. But the jury apparently accepted the explanation of Editor Maloney and Reporter Johnson that they had doped out the whole story in the Tribune Office.

Strangest was the Government's procedure from beginning to end. Ordinarily no very conclusive evidence is needed to secure an indictment. If the Government's case was so weak that an indictment was not likely, why had it raised the issue? Why had it publicized its intention by an advance announcement (Time, Aug. 17)? Why had former

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Attorney General Mitchell, who conducted the investigation with scrupulous fairness, allowed Maloney and Johnston the unusual privilege of appearing to make a defense? If the Government was leaning over backwards to be fair to an anti-Administration paper, why did it attempt to prosecute? And if its case was not shaky, what happened? Answers to these questions will be heard after the war.

The Chicago Times speculated:

If anyone in our naval intelligence had disclosed the make-up of the Japanese attacking force, which presumably our profound scholars in Washington cubbyholes had identified by deciphering the secret Japanese code, there would have been a violation of the Espionage Act. ... Of course the Japs would immediately change their code and that would hinder our war effort and endanger our fighters until we cracked their new code.<sup>91</sup>

The effects of these Midway disclosures will be discussed in the next chapter, but it should be recorded here that serious damage was done to the progress of U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence operations. Though not quite accurate in details, the following item indicates that the press was aware of some of the after effects of the expose:

...the Japs changed their naval code within 48 hours after the publication of a story here hinting that we had broken their code. There was

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(91) August 31, 1942, pp. 63

just about time enough for a message to clear to South America and be relayed on to Japan...<sup>92</sup>

An excellent method of hiding the real source of cryptanalytical information was found in another news item. It praised the scouting work of our submarines which had led to the success at Midway:

The total for our Pacific undersea boats is 115, of which 74 were definitely sent to the bottom. This score is impressive, but only a part of the service rendered by our subs... When the entire story of the Pacific war is told it will not be improbable that stress will be laid on the scouting by submarines that has notified the command of the fleet of the movements of Japanese vessels. Our naval success at Midway, which broke up a thrust intended to put Hawaii in danger was made possible by accurate advance information. It seems clear that the subs were on the alert.<sup>93</sup>

It will be recalled that the British have been very successful in this method of giving credit to scouting planes and submarines for successes which were gained by cryptanalysis. They always hasten to have stories printed about their excellent scouting so that no one will begin wondering just how it did happen that the British were at the right spot at the right time so very often.

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(92) Gladstone Williams — Constitution, Atlanta, Ga.,  
October 16, 1942.  
(93) Globe, Boston, Mass.—October 3, 1942.

### 3. Espionage Disclosures.

The Midway publicity was not to be the last of these unfortunate incidents. In September, a magazine article described the work of counter-espionage agents in uncovering illegal shipments of mercury from Mexico to Japan:

Our man in Mexico handled the touchy situation neatly and effectively. Our counter-espionage agents accumulated exact information. On the basis of this information the American and British consuls in Manzanillo, in the first week of October, 1941, informed the Mexican government that the Japanese freighter, Azuma Maru, about to sail from Manzanillo, contained a cargo of metals contraband under the agreement between our governments. The Mexican government ordered a special customs examination of the ship.<sup>94</sup>

The article did not mention Communication Intelligence specifically, but an informed enemy agent might easily have guessed the source of the "exact information".

The following statement regarding action in Guadalupe appeared in newspapers during November, 1942:

Holcomb said General Vandergrift's men captured

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(94) Harpers Magazine, September, 1942, Pp. 392.

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the Japanese landing code, and he knew when and where they were coming in.<sup>95</sup>

Another leak which concerned the operations of a clandestine station in South America was found in Time Magazine:

Its complicated coded and transposed messages were intercepted and turned over to the U.S. experts, who broke the code. From then on, officials in Washington followed carefully the work of Nazi spies in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Mexico, and even in the U.S.<sup>96</sup>

Not only the newspapers, but radio helped to spread the word about American intelligence success. Gabriel Heater, broadcasting on the Mutual Broadcasting System on March 28, 1943, announced:

American military intelligence is doing an amazing job anticipating every Tojo move. We were ready, our warships against his. He finally turned and ran.<sup>97</sup>

A leak from South America disclosed another American cryptanalytical success, which may be very damaging to future activities:

An Axis spy plot against the United States involving a captain of artillery in the Brazilian

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(95) Post, Washington, D. C., November 11, 1942.

(96) November 16, 1942.

(97) Navy Department, Office of Public Relations, Analysis Section, No. 532, March 29, 1943, Pg. 5.

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Army and other Brazilian nationals, as well as present and former Axis diplomats, was reported yesterday with publication of a full police report of charges to the Tribunal of National Security.

Interception by United States authorities of a message by clandestine radio from Brazil to Germany revealed the attempt of the Brazilian officer, Capt. Tullio Regis do Nascimento, to obtain official permission to visit American war plants and to study fire control apparatus on American naval vessels, the report indicated.

A request to Berlin for \$3,000 by Albrecht Gustav Engels - later arrested as one of the chief figures in German espionage in Brazil - for Nascimento's expenses on a trip to the United States, for which Nascimento already had asked permission of American authorities at Rio, revealed the heart of the plot, the report said.<sup>98</sup>

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(98) Evening Star, Washington, D.C., March 30, 1943, Pg. A 3.

One of the messages which uncovered the above spy ring is the following:

From: South America (Alfredo)  
To: Germany  
February 20, 1942

In two weeks a local captain is leaving in our service on an assignment. (He) will be active on invitation of L. (at Sperry (plant) in arsenals and airplane factories. I have promised trip (expenses ?) and \$3,000. (He) will get ink.

(Army German Trans. 2/24/42)

That this unfortunate disclosure will have very bad effects on the work of American communication intelligence experts can not be doubted when the significance of the following dispatch is realized:

From: Lisbon  
To: Berlin  
March 30, 1943

The Tuesday evening press publishes under large headlines reports from Brazil concerning the uncovering of an alleged spy organization under the leadership of Captain TULLIO REGIS de NASCIMENTO. Pro-Allied criticism points particularly to the fact that the espionage ring also had maintained connections with the alleged Axis agents in Argentina. In cable that may be quoted further details are added to that which has already been announced. United Agency by way of introduction reports to the effect that it was not German Ambassador Pruefer, but Captain NASCIMENTO, who carried out control flights on the Atlantic Coast in a sport plane. The intended trip of NASCIMENTO to the United States had as its special purpose the obtaining of details about the Sperry bombsight as well as about fire-control (apparatus) in warships. In order to carry out this trip he had tried hard already last year to obtain permission from the United States Military Attache at that time



However, the United States Embassy had been warned in time by intercepting a secret radio message. At the same time it was stated that ALBRECHT GUSTAV ENGELS had requested radio-telegraphic approval from Berlin for granting NASCIMENTO \$3,000 for his expenses. To Be continued.

German Inter. 3/31/43 (3)  
Rec'd 3/31/43

D. Summary.

A brief analysis has been made of the three principal periods during the last twenty-five years, in which Communication Intelligence activities received a great deal of publicity. Many instances have been given to demonstrate how widespread was the knowledge of this work, and to show that many millions of unauthorized persons were aware of the existence of supposedly secret organizations.

But no evidence has been given as yet of the influence exercised by such revelations on the security system of our Pacific enemy. This will be discussed in the chapter which follows immediately. Unfortunately, there is much to record of Japanese reaction to our security lapses.

CHAPTER IV

(Pages 162-283) of SRH-012 Vol II

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**by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS**

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CHAPTER IV

Effects of Publicity Leaks on U.S. Naval  
Communication Intelligence Activity

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CHAPTER IVEffects of Publicity Leaks on U.S. Naval  
Communication Intelligence Activities

It is apparent from a perusal of the evidence in the preceding chapter that every nation in the world has gradually become more conscious of the existence of Black Chambers in other countries. As men of affairs during the World War began to write their memoirs which referred to cryptanalytical successes, as Yardley's disclosures rocked the foundations of the diplomatic world, and as various other sources disclosed the existence of a cryptanalytical organization in America, a very dangerous potential enemy of the United States began to grow apprehensive about the security of its codes. This nation was Japan.

A. Japanese Security Measures

Japan was quite perturbed about Yardley's disclosures, and a series of assassinations of leaders who had been associated with the Washington Conference showed the feelings of the chauvinistic militarists of Japan. But the most dangerous effect of all was the interest taken

by them in stricter cryptographic security measures. Their Diplomatic Codes were changed considerably in 1932, and their research on a machine cipher eventually culminated in the adoption of this technique in 1934.

Fortunately, however, the Japanese Navy seemingly was not aware of the necessity of security precautions in radio operating procedure, though they were becoming much more strict in their use of ciphers and codes. Their general radio discipline was weak, and little attention was paid to preserving the security of their call identities. Call signs were assigned systematically in such a manner that having reconstructed the garble table from which the calls were derived, a given call could be identified as to type and even by name, if its number on the Navy List were known. These calls were changed at fairly long intervals, but even when revised they offered no particular difficulty in identification. During war maneuvers, special codes, ciphers and call

signs were used, which indicated that they realized the advantage of concealing the external indicators of those engaged in operations. But even then their low standards of radio discipline permitted their radio operators to compromise their calls.

About 1935 the Japanese Navy began to introduce improvements in radio technique, and a definite trend toward complete communication security became evident about the time of the Japanese Grand Maneuvers in 1937. Circuit discipline improved, calls were changed more frequently, ship movements were encrypted, plain language decreased, and the Japanese began to intercept United States naval communications. During the four years preceding the outbreak of the American-Japanese War, the improvement in Japanese communication security was quite sound in principle, and was very effective. It should also be noted that around 1939 new efforts were made to improve the Japanese Naval Codes. In retrospect, then, it can be said that the Japanese had made long preparations before December 7, 1941 for the successful and secure

use of their communications system during an American war. 1

A survey of the precautions taken in their diplomatic traffic will not be out of place here, since the dispatches are available for our use. Also, they reflect the attitude of the Japanese Army and Navy in regards to cryptographic affairs. We shall begin our study in 1940, so that Japanese communication security activities in the immediate pre-war period may be observed.

1. Before Pearl Harbor

The first message indicates that knowledge of the sources of certain leaks was in possession of the Japanese:

- 
- (1) Information as to Japanese cryptography and traffic procedure obtained from Sections GY and GT of Op-20-G, Navy Department.



S F 25

~~SECRET~~MARCH 7, 1940No. 1

FROM: RIO (Kuwajima). #15. March 7, 1940.  
TO : BUENOS AIRES.

Received from Tokyo as Circular #438.

Transmission of conversations with foreign officials, minutes of an international conference, and cables sent between foreign countries, in the general codes, offers foreign countries excellent materials with which to study our code systems. This is dangerous from the standpoint of security. Although we would like to send such messages in the simplified code, sometimes this cannot be done because we wish to keep the information contained therein from getting into the hands of a third country. ...

Another warning was observed in June, 1940:

JUNE 29, 1940No. 2

FROM: TOKYO (Arita). #52 June 29, 1940.  
TO : BOGOTA.

Re your #84<sup>a</sup>.

Don't encode this sort of message in CHI. It must be done in HYAKU. Be careful of your use of our codes.

A - See S.I.S. #7911.

(Evidently a certificate suggested by Minister Sakane to be filled out by prospective German passengers on NYK and OSK Steamship Lines before the issuance of tickets and visas. This message was in a JIG system.)

#7912  
KING

Trans. 7/3/40 (2)  
O-1834

Another potential source of leaks was shut off when Japanese commercial firms in Europe were barred from receiving diplomatic intelligence. Note the reason given in the following dispatch:

AUGUST 12, 1940.

No. 3

FROM: ROME (Amsu)  
TO : TOKYO

August 12, 1940.

Confidential.

The Chief of the Intelligence Section.

We expect to be able to receive general intelligence a few days after the arrival of ECOSMO here. Among our diplomatic offices in Europe, some, it seems, make a practice to distribute intelligences among Japanese firms. Since there is danger of foreign governments detecting them, I think it might be well for you to call their attention to the danger and forbid distribution outside of the offices. I personally intend to distribute such information within our office and to keep it strictly secret outside.

#9708

Trans. 8/16/40 (1)

The next dispatch indicated the routes used by the Japanese couriers in their trips from Tokyo to Berlin, which was the transmitting center for all of Japan's European representatives:

~~SECRET~~SEPTEMBER 2, 1940No. 4

FROM: TOKYO (Matsuoaka) #583                      Sept. 2, 1940  
TO : BERLIN

In the present unsettled state of world affairs it is by all means necessary for our high officials in Europe to keep in close contact with each other. Suddenly the increased necessity for the use of couriers has become manifest and we shall have to reject our policy hitherto of sending couriers once a month in favor of exchanging couriers between Tokyo and Berlin twice monthly. We will call these couriers the first and second groups. The first group will leave Tokyo on the 10th of the month proceeding around Scandinavia and the British Isles to Lisbon. The second group will leave Tokyo on the 20th and travel straight to Berlin via Moscow. Thence it will proceed to the Balkans. Both groups will return to Japan via Berlin. Traveling facilities subject to weather conditions, etc., may vary, so regular information will be sent regarding the progress of these couriers.

In order to keep the Imperial Ministry at Cairo in touch with the Home Office, and in order to keep the various high officials in touch with each other, we will extend the service between Berlin and Ankara to Cairo, and for the time being have the Cairo Ministry contact this Berlin-Ankara line once monthly. We will have the Berlin-Ankara line also contact the Portland (?) Consulate. Please transmit this to Moscow and to all high officials concerned.

#10292

Trans. 9/5/40

ARMY 42

~~SECRET~~

Next a warning was sent which urged that all Japanese be on their guard against American intelligence agents, and advised them to be wary of telephone tapping:

SEPTEMBER 29, 1940

No. 5

FROM: WASHINGTON (Horinouchi). #1570  
TO : TOKYO (Gaimudaijin). Sept. 29, 1940.

Action all U.S. consuls (plus Honolulu) as Circular #437.

Strictly secret.

With the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian treaty, we must expect that relations between Japan and the U. S. will from now on become increasingly important and delicate, and it is to be imagined that the Americans will expand their intelligence nets, and that telephone tapping and every other means will be resorted to in keeping strict surveillance over our consulates, government agencies, chambers of commerce, Japanese associations, and influential business firms and banks. Each consular office will therefore redouble its precautions in the matter of preservation of secrecy and also give suitable guidance to staff members and resident Japanese within its jurisdiction in regard to carefulness about the use of the telephone and also about statements made at banquets and elsewhere.

(D-0-3438-N 29 Sept. 1940 Trans. 10/4/40 (X))

P 83

ORIGINAL  
SEP 30 1940  
~~SECRET~~

However, the Japanese were not averse to obtaining all the information possible by using their own espionage agents. The next dispatch disclosed their plans to appoint naval officers, disguised as clerks, on the staffs of their American consulates:

SEPTEMBER 30, 1940

No. 6

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (Kawasaki). #123  
TO : WASHINGTON (Japanese Ambassador). Sept. 30, 1940

Action Tokyo as #254.

Strictly secret.

With regard to the contents of the last paragraph of your message #500\* to Washington:

For the purpose of prognosticating future U.S. actions which may involve Japan, we are of the opinion that it is of utmost importance to have facilities for obtaining military intelligences available.

However, gatherers of such intelligence, must have knowledge and experience of an expert along those lines. Although our navy officers who are officially serving in this country, such as the officers in the Attache's office, the New York inspector's office, and in the Los Angeles office, are qualified from the above standpoints, their official status makes free action almost impossible.

To circumvent this draw-back, I believe that it would be best, though I realize that

~~SECRET~~

this is a very delicate maneuver, to appoint one naval officer each to the consulates in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle, and New York, as clerks on the staffs of said consulates.

In view of the fact that considerable danger would be involved in putting such a plan into effect, it will be necessary, of course, to exercise much care in the selection of the men and in the method to put the plan into effect.

Relayed to Washington and New York.

\*D (O-3435).

D(O-3437)-H

Trans. 10/4/40 (X)

Efforts to standardize the classification and indexing of secret messages were made by the Japanese in the following:

NOVEMBER 16, 1940

No. 7

FROM: TOKYO (Matuoka). #2512  
TO : WASHINGTON (Koshi).

Nov.16,1940.

Circular.

In order to standardize the classification of messages throughout this department and offices abroad, please adopt the following system of classification and indexing, after November 21st:

(1) Secret matters connected with the Military Secret Preservation Law:

- (A) GUN KIMTU= Military confidential
- (B) GUN GOKUHI= Military-Strictly confidential
- (C) GUN HI = Military secret

(2) Secret matters connected with Military Resources:

- (A) GUN SI HI= Military Resources Secret

(B) 1 BU GUN SI HI- Partly Military Resources Secret

(3) Secret matters connected with the National General Mobilization Law:

(A) SITEI (designated) SOODOOIN KIMITU

(4) The following sub-classifications should be made for all 3 classifications mentioned above:

(A) diplomatic matters; GAI KIMITU-  
Diplomatic confidential

(B) non-diplomatic matters; KIMITU-  
Confidential

(a) The above classifications ( (1) to (4) inclusive), (except GUN HI) should be numbered in consecutive order. All other secret matters, not belonging to the above classification should be classified as follows, depending on the degree of secrecy:

- (A) KIMITU- Confidential.
- (B) GOKUHI- Strictly confidential.
- (C) HI = Secret.

(b) When quoting from another message the following classification should be made:

- (A) Re
  - (A) Regular code message; (1) GAI KIMITU  
(2) KIMITU
  - (B) Abbreviated code message: (1) GOKUHI  
(2) HI

(c) The index tab should be in red and its size 3 cm x 1.5 cm.

(JD-0: 5463 Navy Trans. 11/27/40 (S))

Suspicion that foreign countries were reading their dispatches brought discontinuance of some of the Japanese codes. The message, indicating this, reads as follows:

NOVEMBER 20, 1940

No. 8

FROM: TOKYO (Matuoka). #2528  
TO : WASHINGTON (Koshi).

Nov. 20, 1940.

Re: my Circular #2434\*

(Strictly secret).

In view of the fact that the KC vocabulary of the TI series and the RI codes have been in use for a considerable period of time, it is suspected that foreign countries are able to read messages encoded in them.

For this reason, if reports of our conversations with foreign officials are dispatched in these systems, there is a probability that their contents will be learned by others. This, of course, will act as a great obstacle in any diplomatic negotiations we may wish to conduct.

Hereafter, therefore, when submitting reports on such subjects as the above, resort to codes other than those listed below as well as the two referred to above:

MATU, HINOKI

and, even in those offices which are not equipped with the above,

TU and the "G" for publication purposes (black of the "B" of the "A" table of that code).

In this way, do everything in your power to protect the code systems and at the same time maintain the highest degrees of security for the contents of the messages. ...

\* Not available

(JD-0: 5529 20 Nov., 1940 Navy Trans. 11/29/40 (S&4))



The Japanese were conscious that their messages in certain codes were being read, but decided to continue using them for purposes of deception. Notice the following:

NOVEMBER 26, 1940

No. 9

FROM: TOKYO (Matsuoka). Nov. 26, 1940.  
TO : SINGAPORE

Circular #2550 Strictly Secret.

Despite what I said in my telegraphic Circular #2549, <sup>a</sup> your office <sup>b</sup> will please retain the Ren codes. We wish to use these in connection with our under-handed (or "misleading", or "deceiving") political schemes against England, the United States, China and such who are thought to be reading this code, but of course, in such cases, separate telegrams containing the real meaning should be dispatched. <sup>d</sup> This message has also been sent to London, as #915.

(#12673 ARMY-NAVY Revision Trans. 12/5/40 (6))

Further warnings against the spy systems of other nations, which were trying to obtain Japanese codes, was included in the next dispatch:

NOVEMBER 26, 1940

No. 10

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO (Ishii). #260  
TO : SANTIAGO (Koshi) Nov. 26, 1940.

Received from Tokyo as Circular #2549.

Of the following codes or instructions therefor, if you are holding any in your safes, please destroy them by burning immediately:

... Upon their destruction, submit a certificate to that effect to this office. Be sure to submit a list of all the systems being held as of the end of the year.

The various foreign countries are redoubling their efforts to intercept each other's coded messages of late. At the same time, these countries are making more use of their spy systems and other means to get to the codes.

For these reasons, there is a great need for taking every precautionary measure to protect our codes and other secrets. In each of your offices, the chief of the office himself must assume this responsibility and see to it that there are no slip ups.

No doubt these words of advice are superfluous, but in view of the times I wish to let them act as reminders.

Please give this message the same routing and distribution as you do the urgent intelligence reports.

(JD-0: 5454 26 Nov.1940 Navy Trans. 11/27/40 (7))

Indications that their mail and diplomatic pouches had been opened by Canadian censorship authorities caused the Japanese to raise a protest:

NOVEMBER 28, 1940

No. 11

FROM: SEATTLE (Sato). #187 Nov. 28, 1940  
TO : TOKYO (Gaimudaijin).

The mail which was sent from Japan to the U. S. by the Hikawa Maru that arrived Vancouver the 16th, was sent here by railway route as per usual procedure. We immediately got in touch with the consul at Vancouver and had him make inquiry regarding mail addressed to Japanese firms and individuals having been opened and censored by the Canadian authorities. We have been informed that the censorship now in force was carried out in the case of the said mail, and that this procedure will continue to be in effect from now on --- (have reported in detail by mail). It seems also that pouches --- we re also inspected in the same way when this ship put in --- (last part quite garbled).

(JD-0: 5581 28 Nov. 1940 Navy Trans. 12/3/40 (7))

They were much more disturbed over the possibility of American censorship, as the following text proves:

NOVEMBER 28, 1940

No. 12

FROM: TOKYO (Matuoka). #300 Nov. 28, 1940.  
TO : NEW YORK (Riyoji).

According to an Asahi special dispatch from your city on the 25th, the U.S. has begun censoring mail belonging to Japanese. Please investigate the truth of this, and advise also on any situation pertaining to inspection of mail between this office and the offices in the U.S. and between those offices as well.

Relay to Washington as instructions from this Minister.

(JD-G: 5683 28 Nov.1940 Navy Trans. 12/10/40 (S))

It was soon discovered, however, that the censoring had been done by Canadian authorities. Yet it will be noticed that Japanese officials in New York stressed the fact that they had always used diplomatic pouches for official communications. Evidently they did not want their security record besmirched.

NOVEMBER 29, 1940

No. 13

FROM: NEW YORK (Iguchi). #741 Nov.29, 1940.  
TO : TOKYO (Gaimudaijin).

Re your #300\*

(1) Having discovered that mail addressed to a member of our office personnel had been censored, we immediately took the matter up with the New York Central Post Office, but they say that the U.S. is not doing any censoring. Since then we have learned that the mail in this instance (having been sent on the Hikawa Maru that arrived

Vancouver the 17th) had passed through Canadian censorship, and we had the Domei send a message on the 27th setting the above right.

(2) While thus far we have had no case of official mail received at this office having been opened or censored, as far as possible we have been using the embassy pouches in sending official communications to your office.

\*Not available.

(JD-0: 5585 29 Nov., 1940 Navy Trans. 12/2/40 (7))

The following outline of security regulations is an indication of the extreme care being taken by the Japanese at this time:

NOVEMBER 29, 1940

No. 1A

FROM: WASHINGTON (Morishima). #500 Nov. 29, 1940.  
 TO : OTTAWA, BOGOTA, MEXICO CITY, PANAMA,  
 CARACAS, NEW YORK, CHICAGO, NEW ORLEANS,  
 HAVANA, SAN SALVADOR.

Received from Tokyo as Circular #2559.

Re Tokyo Circular #2512\*

(1) The original text of a message which has been subsequently encoded, as well as the sheet on which an encoded message has been decoded, shall be given the same amount of security as the code books themselves. These shall all be given the classification of "Foreign Office Secret" (Gai Kimitu).

Those messages which were translated from or into the abbreviated forms, shall be classified under the label of "Confidential" (Hi).

(2) Without regard to the contents of paragraph (1), the sender of a message shall, at the time of such transmission, classify the message into one of the following classifications: "Foreign Office Secret" (Gai Kimitu); "Secret" (Kimitu); "Strictly Confidential" (Gokuh); "Confidential" (Hi); and "Plain" (hira).

The title of the class into which the message falls, shall be clearly marked on the original text, following the space allotted for the serial number of said message.

The person who is in charge of the telegraph section will select the system into which the message is to be transformed in accordance with the classification title.

(3) When the necessity arises for conveying information contained in a message which falls under the "Foreign Office Secret" classification, (i.e. the encoded messages), to persons outside of the department, be sure to very carefully paraphrase the message. The text which has undergone such paraphrasing may then be classified as "Secret", "Strictly Confidential", or "Confidential", in accordance with the nature of the contents.

Messages which bore the classification of "Confidential" (i.e. those messages which employed the abbreviations) may, upon its being paraphrased, be given the classification of "Plain", if the contents of the message permit it.

Please put these instructions into effect upon receipt of this message.

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DEC 17 1940

~~SECRET~~

Relay this message in accordance with the established distribution routings for "Urgent Intelligence Reports" (Sikyū Zyōhō).

JD-0: 5586 Navy Trans. 12/2/40 (8)

The proper procedure for Japanese vessels, which were boarded by examining officials, in war zones, was outlined in the next dispatch:

DECEMBER 17, 1940

No. 15

FROM: TOKYO (Matuoka) #2647  
TO : SAN FRANCISCO (Riyōji)

Dec. 17, 1940.

Circular (In 2 parts, complete)

The procedure to be followed when our vessels in war zones are boarded by examining officials, and are faced with a situation involving the forcible opening of safes carried on such vessels, is explained in the "Rules for Masters of Vessels in War Time", \* which has already been distributed to all our vessels by the Navy Department. However, as our officials abroad have received many inquiries on this point, we are furnishing herewith, on the advice of the Navy Department, the necessary information, which please convey to all our vessels now at your respective ports:

(1) Not much can be done to prevent the boarding officials from examining the contents of safes carried on these vessels. However, if persuasion fails and the examining officials threaten to open the safes by force, it is necessary to yield to their demands. Therefore, our vessels, upon approaching war zones or in port, should take care to place all codes and

secret documents near the boiler-room, ready for burning in anticipation of search by the examining officials. . . .

(JD-1: 272 17 Dec., 1940 Navy Trans. 1/14/41 (S))

Some important messages had been sent from New York to Tokyo in very insecure codes. Hence, the following dispatch was sent as a warning:

DECEMBER 22, 1940

No. 16

FROM: TOKYO (Matuoka) #315  
TO : NEW YORK (Riyoji)

Dec. 22, 1940.

(Secret)

Among messages to and from your office, there have recently been a number whose contents were of a highly secret nature. In view of the times, there will no doubt be an increase in the traffic of messages of this nature.

At present it is unavoidable that highly confidential messages from our governmental organs, business firms, and banks in your area, are being transmitted to Tokyo in code and cipher systems having only comparatively moderate degrees of security.

We are therefore desirous of placing in your hands a code machine to be used for highly secret messages from you, as well as to transmit important messages from business and other organs in your area.

However, you have no facilities for keeping a man on duty at all times. Therefore, even if we were to send you a very good safe, we could not rest at ease.



We suggest that a large enough safe, one which could hold the codes, code machines, and related papers, be placed in your official residence. The telegraphic clerk shall pursue his duties in this residence under this plan.

Please advise if such a plan is feasible. (If it is not possible or advisable to do so, a staff officer shall be dispatched to Washington to file any very secret message which is of a highly confidential nature from the New York office.)

(JD-1: 45 22 Dec. 1940 Navy Trans. 1/4/41 (S))

Protestations that every security precaution had been taken were now sent back from New York to Tokyo:

DECEMBER 24, 1940

No. 17

FROM: NEW YORK (Iguchi) #772  
TO : TOKYO (Gaimudaijin)

Dec. 24, 1940.

(2 parts, complete)

Re your #315\*

(Secret)

1. Since we have received similar instructions in the past, we conferred with the landlord. As a result, we have been keeping a twenty-four-hour watch in the consulate-general offices since August (Sept.?) of this year. In this and other ways, we have been doubling our efforts to maintain a high degree of security.

We are not in favor of your suggestion of placing the code machine in the consul-general's residence, because it is not a detached building -

necessitating a twenty-four-hour guard to be placed on the premises. Moreover, the security would be considerably endangered en route to and from the office to residence.

After giving the points due consideration, we are of the opinion that the office would be the better place in which to install the machine.

2. This office has been constantly advising the other governmental, business, and banking organs located here to exercise the utmost of caution in the matter of communication security.

In view of the fact that we recently received the substitution tables from our home office, we are intending to demand that these commercial and governmental organs dispatch all of their important messages through this office as "request cables". Will you please, therefore, notify the various offices in Tokyo of this procedure? ...

\*JD-1: 45

(JD-1: 131 24 Dec., 1940 Navy Trans. 1/9/41 (2))

Japanese officials in Chicago were also having their difficulties as is evident from the next dispatch:

JANUARY 9, 1941

No. 18

FROM: CHICAGO (Omori) #001  
TO : TOKYO (Gaizundaijin)

Jan. 9, 1941

(Secret)

Re your circular #2707 of last year:\*

R F 88

The work done in the official residence about which I reported in my plain communication #91 of \_\_\_\_\_ 9th, was limited to only a few alterations to an ordinary apartment dwelling.

Therefore, even if we were to move the telegraph room to these quarters, we do not believe that it would offer sufficient security, if we take into consideration the location of the building and its architectural designs.

Hence, as a temporary measure, that is, until we are able to move to a more appropriate location, there seems to be no way out except to send the codes which are to be used for messages requiring a high degree of security, to the Embassy in Washington for safekeeping.

\*JD-1: 176

JD-1: 217 9 Jan., 1941 Navy Trans. 1/13/41 (7)

Over in the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch Intelligence officers were annoying the Japanese diplomats exceedingly:

JANUARY 10, 1941

No. 19

FROM: BATAVIA (Daihyo) #12 January 10, 1941.  
TO : TOKYO

Strictly Secret.

To the Head of the Intelligence Section  
from the Military Attache.

Save in the case of open mail, the Netherlands India officials are practicing censorship of all letters. Letters marked "in care of" addressed to people who are supposed to have diplomatic immunity under the Consulate General are in no case excepted. None will escape. So will you please impress this upon all the staff and advise them to send anything secret which they have to transmit by trust-

worthy couriers.

Meanwhile, the Japanese were trying to get permission to lay a cable between Japan and the Dutch East Indies. In the light of future events, we can see how farsighted the Japanese were, since a cable would have been most convenient once they had seized the Dutch East Indies.

JANUARY 17, 1941

No. 20

FROM: BATAVIA (Daihyo) #25 Red Jan. 17, 1941.  
TO : TOKYO Part 2 of 3.

The question of communication:

HO pointed out that since there is a powerful wireless telegraph and telephone system between Japan and the Dutch East Indies, he could not see any necessity of laying a cable line between these two countries. ISIZAWA explained: "What the Japanese Government is planning to lay is a cable line which has the highest efficiency in transmission of telegrams, photographs, etc., and which does away with all the shortcomings of the radio. Furthermore, it will function in a new way with an efficiency several times greater than the radio and would be very necessary in promoting both friendly relations and economic cooperation between the two countries. In fact, the Dutch East Indies also will greatly benefit from such a cable system."

a - Part 1 available, being translated. Part 3 not available.

b - HOFSTRAATEN, Assistant to the Director of Economic Affairs.

ARMY #13778 Page 2. Trans. 1/22/41 (5)

The next dispatch is quite amusing. The Japanese protest against the censorship of their communications by the Dutch, and, then, as an afterthought suggest that it would be a good idea to censor the Dutch messages.

JANUARY 17, 1941

No. 21

FROM: BATAVIA (Isizawa) #48 Red Jan. 17, 1941  
TO : TOKYO

The officials of the Dutch East Indies Government are strictly censoring not only communications from the Islands to Japan (communications of every sort, including telegrams and letters), but also those being sent from Japan to the Islands, although they make an exception (?) of matters for diplomatic offices such as Consulates and for Consuls, for the Japanese representatives at the Japanese-Dutch East Indies negotiations and for the offices of these delegates. In fact, they are censoring all mail matter, giving for their pretext the fact that martial law has been declared. They are examining those being exchanged not only between Japanese, but also between foreigners, and thus they are watching the activities carried on by the Japanese residents. This is, indeed, disadvantageous to us. It is necessary, therefore, to call the attention of the Japanese people at large by publishing this fact suitably in the Japanese newspapers, (however, without mentioning the fact that this report originated at this office).

Furthermore, it seems to me that it would

be well for us to censor all communications exchanged between Japan and the Islands not only by the Japanese but by foreigners.

Will you please arrange to have the Foreign Office inform our intelligence officials in Manchukuo and China as well as our officials in offices having to do with South Sea affairs?

(#14407 ARMY 832 Trans. 2/10/41 (6))

A request for stricter handling of telegraphic codes was received in Tokyo from Kurusu in Berlin.

JANUARY 19, 1941

No. 22

FROM: BERLIN (Kurusu) #46 Purple Jan. 19, 1941  
TO : TOKYO

Re my #45.<sup>a</sup>

Recently some telegraphic codes were enclosed among Foreign Office documents sent through this office to other offices. As no notification had been made to this office of these enclosures, the official in charge of documents had no way of knowing the contents of these papers and for that reason actually sent these papers as they were to the persons to whom they were addressed through the next mail. This, we know, is not in accordance with our understanding. Therefore, henceforth when telegraphic codes are to be forwarded, please let us have a listing of the contents and notify us of necessary details.

(#13773 ARMY 360 Trans. 1/22/41 (6))

A communication leak in Panama was a disturbing factor in Japanese diplomatic circles at this time:

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JAN 23 1941

JANUARY 23, 1941~~SECRET~~No. 23

FROM: TOKYO (Matuoka) #004  
 TO : PANAMA (Koshi)

Jan. 23, 1941.

(Chief of Office Routing)

The statement issued by the President of the Japanese Association and others during (April ?) of last year, regarding the manipulation of the books in your office, was apparently based on communications between your office and mine.

This raises a very serious question on security. How did the contents of these official communications leak out to the above persons? Please investigate this matter immediately and submit a report.

We questioned Matsumoto concerning this matter recently, and he explained that it was of your doing. Please explain.

JD-1: 568 23 Jan. 1941 Navy Trans. 1/29/41 (S)

Further indications of the tightening up of security precautions were observed in the following dispatches:

JANUARY 24, 1941No. 24

FROM: LOS ANGELES (Fukushima). #012  
 TO : TOKYO (Gaimudaihin). Jan. 24, 1941.

Re your #603 of last year to Washington\*.

RIP 88

In view of the fact that it is impossible at this time to remove them to the official residence, there is apparently nothing that can be done except for this office to go without high security code systems.

\*JD-1: 176 Direct steps to be taken to improve security of codes.

(JD-1: 598 24 Jan. 1941 Navy Trans. 1/3/41 (2))

JANUARY 29, 1941

No. 25

FROM: WASHINGTON (Morishima).  
TO : RIO DE JANEIRO (Koshi).

Jan. 29, 1941.

(In 2 parts, complete).

Action Tokyo as #56.

I have long regretted the fact that our organs on the scene have had inadequate liaison between each other, making unified and efficient course of action impossible. I am, therefore, heartily endorsing, in theory, the various proposals outlined in message #37\* from Mexico to Your Excellency.

However, when taking into consideration such realistic matters as the present inadequacy of personnel, code machines, Japanese typewriters, and insufficient funds in the various offices in the Americas, as well as from the viewpoint of security, I cannot give my unreserved approval. Unless the personnel is increased, offices are equipped with machines, funds increased, and in other ways have the central authorities completely revise the foreign office set up, I doubt that the contents of paragraphs two and three



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of the message referred to above could be effectuated. (For example, because of lack of machines, much of the most important relay work between the Embassy and New York has to be done by couriers).

Although there is much wanting in the way of efficiency, the only thing that I can suggest at this time is to establish contact with Mexico by a monthly courier service similar to the system already established for U.S. - Canada connections. We would find it very convenient if you would approve this emergency measure.

Will you please give your consideration to the matter of establishing and maintaining better connections with the offices in Brazil, Argentina, and other places.

\*JD-1: 724 - Japanese Minister in Mexico recommends closer coordination of diplomatic representatives in western hemisphere.

(JD-1: 896 29 Jan. 1941 Navy Trans. 2/12/41 (I))

JANUARY 31, 1941

Fears that America would enter the war led to a survey of communications available in Mexico:

No. 26

FROM: TOKYO (Matsuoka). #020 Jan. 31, 1941.  
TO : MEXICO CITY (Koshi).

So that we may better know how to manage our telegraphic work without interruption in the event that the U. S. becomes involved in the war, will you please advise us of the financial background of the telegraph companies in the country to which

~~SECRET~~

you are accredited, with particular notes as to their relations with the Mexican government and the U. S.

Secret.

JD-1 779 31 Jan. 1941 Navy Trans. 2/6/41 (S)

FEBRUARY 1, 1941

Arrangements to bring a cipher machine into Batavia had to be worked out carefully by the Japanese for security reasons:

No. 27

FROM: TOKYO (Matsuoka) #66 Red. Feb. 1, 1941.  
TO : BATAVIA

Secret.

KURIHARA . . . will be carrying with him one cipher machine (contained in one wooden box weighing 60 kilos and marked as a typewriter) and secret documents. Therefore, after you have arranged immediately for his passing through customs without any difficulty, please have a member of your staff go out to the boat to meet him and to receive this machine.

Furthermore, we have no objection to KURIHARA assisting you in telegraphic work.

(#14222 ARMY 708 Trans. 2/4/41 (5))

CONFIDENTIAL  
~~SECRET~~

FEBRUARY 3, 1941

No. 28

FROM: BATAVIA (Isizawa). #104 Red. Feb. 3, 1941.  
TO : TOKYO (Gaimudaijin).

Regarding your message #66\*.

I understand that clerk Kurihara is bringing with him a radio set (for listening to news reports), (our present set is to be transferred elsewhere), a "B" code transposition machine, and some secret documents.

However, foreign officials of "clerk" rating do not enjoy diplomatic courtesies regarding baggage inspection, etc. therefore, please arrange to have a courier bring the articles mentioned above instead of clerk Kurihara.

\*JD-1: 708. Advises Batavia that Kurihara will arrive Batavia 5 March with a cipher machine and secret documents.

(JD-1: 825 3 Feb. 1941 Navy Trans. 2/9/41 (6))

FEBRUARY 4, 1941

American accusations that their courier pouches had been opened by the Japanese were emphatically denied by Tokyo:

No. 29

FROM: TOKYO (Matsuoka) #52 Red. Feb. 4, 1941.  
TO : WASHINGTON

Message to Manila #26.

~~SECRET~~

Re your #12<sup>a</sup>.

When I inquired of the Communications and Finance Ministries, I learned that it is absolutely untrue that we have demanded opening of diplomatic mail pouches belonging to the American couriers thus far. Furthermore, our air transport companies have no authorization to examine the hand baggage of passengers and have absolutely never laid their hands on them. Therefore, as you know, in view of the tendency for South Seas bound couriers to use clipper services more and more, to demand the opening of these pouches containing diplomatic documents and papers would be contrary to established International practice. They would like to have you tell them that this sort of practice will not happen in the future. Furthermore, I would like to have your confidentially ascertain whether or not they are actually according us the same kind of treatment as they would accord foreign couriers, as they say they are.

Relayed to Washington.

a - Not available.

(#14376 ARMY 805 Trans. 2/8/41 (1))

FEBRUARY 6, 1941

Changes in the Japanese Navy "S" Code were announced for the near future in the following dispatch:

No. 30

FROM: TOKYO (Matuoka). #242  
TO : SAN FRANCISCO (Riyoji).

Feb. 6, 1941

(Strictly confidential).

The Navy Ministry reports that the changes noted below will be made in the usage of the Navy "S" code. Please be advised of these changes. Regardless of whether your office is on the distribution list of the "S" code or not, will you get in touch with all Japanese vessels which come in to your port, and, making certain that they are on the distribution list, advise them of these changes. ...

(JD-1: 882 6 Feb. 1941 Navy Trans. 2/12/41 (S))

FEBRUARY 7, 1941

The Japanese office in Chicago was advised to stop further secret communications because of inadequate security:

No. 31

FROM: TOKYO (Matuoka). #002  
TO : CHICAGO (Riyoji).

Feb. 7, 1941.

(Secret)

If it is impossible to remove the code safe and transfer the telegraphic duties to the official residence, there is no way out (in view of the fact that certain circumstances require giving the codes

added protection) except for your office to discontinue secret communication. You will have to rely on the nearest office to handle your secret communications.

Relay copies of this message, as a "Minister's Instruction" to Los Angeles and Portland; also to Washington for information.

(JD-1: 956 7 Feb. 1941 Navy Trans. 2/14/41 (S))

FEBRUARY 12, 1941

In line with other precautions, South America was to be covered by a courier system to ensure the safe delivery of all secret documents.

No. 32

FROM: TOKYO (Matsuoka) #29  
TO : MEXICO

Feb. 12, 1941.

Secret.

Re Circular #336<sup>a</sup>.

Please handle this matter according to your proposal.

Beginning this fiscal year we are going to put the courier system into effect in South America. When we start this policy please make the best possible use of it and be sure to send by courier all documents requiring a high degree of security.

a - Not available.

(#14795 ARMY 1073 Trans. 2/21/41 (S))

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FEBRUARY 14, 1941

The next text is of interest in that it ascribes the garbling of several messages from Tokyo to Mexico to deliberate action on the part of American companies.

No. 33

FROM: MEXICO (Miura) #16  
TO : TOKYO

Feb. 14, 1941.

Message to Buenos Aires as #1.

Re your Circular #16.

Since all six messages cannot be deciphered, will you either rewire them or reencipher and send them. Recent messages, excepting those coming from the Foreign Office, have all been badly garbled. I suspect that, in view of the present political situation, the American companies, through which these messages are sent, are purposely garbling the texts either for the purpose of discovering the key to their decipherment or for some other purpose.

(#14667 ARMY 1001 Trans. 2/18/41 (7))

FEBRUARY 17, 1941

The guarding of communication rooms was a problem for Japanese staffs all over the world. Here is a message to India:

No. 34

FROM: TOKYO (Japanese Foreign Minister). #022  
TO : CALCUTTA (Japanese Consul General). Feb.17,1941.

Re your #035\*

It would be difficult to have just one person assigned to guard duty at all times. Moreover, there would be something left to be desired from the standpoint of security.

Please arrange to rent just one room and have staff members take turns at guard duty.

\* Not available.

(JD-1: 1130 17 Feb. 1941 Navy Trans. 2/25/41 (S))

An analysis of Mexican foreign communications was now sent in response to message No. 26 from Tokyo, which we have already seen:

No. 35

FROM: RIO DE JANEIRO (Ishii). #039 Feb. 17, 1941.  
TO : CARACAS (Koshi).

Originated Mexico City.

Concerning your secret telegram #20\*.

1. There are only two companies in this country which handle foreign telegrams.

No. 1 is the "Mexican Radio". It is government established and is under the Department of Communications. This company handles wireless



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messages for Japan, Europe, Central America - - - - -  
via America.

No. 2 is the "Mexican Telegraphic Company", otherwise known as "Western Union", capitalized at \$2,000,000 of which 60% is invested in Western Union and ----- % in All American Cables and - - - - -. It has a "concession" on foreign communications from this country. Communication with Japan goes by way of Mackay in San Francisco.

In case America enters the war this second company will interrupt service to Japan but as long as this country maintains its neutrality communications can be carried on by use of company No. 1. Viewing present relations with America, it is plain that pressure is being applied to this country. Messages are delayed and other inconveniences are occurring, hence it is necessary to exercise precautions.

This has been relayed to the U.S.I, Cuba, Panama, and Brazil. Brazil please broadcast to our offices in South America.

\*JD-1: 779. In order to avoid interruption to our telegraphic work in the event U.S. enters the war, advise us of the financial background, in relation to U.S. and Mexico, of the telegraphic companies in the country to which you are accredited.

(Jd-1: 1607 Navy Trans. 3/20/41 (X))

FEBRUARY 28, 1941

A change in courier routes and the correct procedure for traveling from Tokyo to Berlin was now suggested:

No. 36

FROM: BERLIN (Osima) #200 Purple. Feb. 28, 1941.  
TO : TOKYO

From Minister SAKAYA.<sup>a</sup>

In spite of the fact that the recognized routing for regular couriers bound for Europe is from Moscow through Finland and Sweden to Berlin, actually they are going directly from Moscow to Berlin and from there going through the Scandinavian countries. Not only does this cause a waste of time and money, but also, in view of recent irregularities in airplane service from Berlin to the Scandinavian countries, couriers use up all the time that is allotted to them, but on the other hand the direct course from Moscow to Finland would be of particular advantage because of the possibility of making stops on the Soviet-Finnish border. Therefore, I hope that you will put into effect the regular routing.

a - Japanese Minister in Helsinki.

(#15224 ARMY 1377 Trans. 3/11/41 (6))

~~SECRET~~

MARCH 11, 1941

The query from Tokyo concerning leakage of official secrets in Panama unearthed a bitter inter-office feud:

No. 37

FROM: PANAMA (Nagamine). #019                      March 11, 1941  
TO :

Re your #004\*.

There can be no doubt at all that the (leakage of secrets) is Matsumoto's doings. The code books, etc., were locked up in his - - - -. I tried somehow to get him to own up to it but he seemed to be obsessed by some kind of a - - - - notion, and all I could get out of him was an obstinate avowal over and over that he would take the entire responsibility of his doings. I really didn't know what to do, so in regard to the matter of - - - - I called all those concerned, and placing the papers before them, strictly questioned them, but they all claimed they knew nothing about it. - - - - papers "confirm" it.

The only reason I can give for Matsumoto's trying to smear me with the blame for leakage of secrets is that it is his way of getting even with me for my not letting him in on secret matters. (This obsession of his became most aggravated because I have not taken him in on - - - - and let him know of - - - -. I have strictly forbidden his reading of official mail and dispatches). - - - -. I can swear by Heaven that my record is clean.

\*JD-1: 568. Highly secret information which has leaked out indicates a laxity of communication security at your office. Investigate immediately.

(JD-1: 2415 (F) Navy Trans. 5/8/41 (S))

MARCE 20, 1941

The Japanese officials in Berlin learned something at this time which made them suspect that the British were reading their most secret system, but Tokyo sent reassurance as follows:

No. 38

FROM: TOKYO (Konoe) #245 (Purple) Mar. 20, 1941.  
TO : BERLIN

Regarding your #275 (not available)

Before Foreign Minister Matuoka left on his trip I mentioned, during my conversation with the British Ambassador and others, that Mr. Matuoka would like to visit Vichy if possible. In view of the fact that the British Ambassador has telegraphed this information to his government and that this information was no doubt also disclosed to Ambassador Otto, I feel that we need not worry about our code messages being deciphered.

Regarding your message #45 to Moscow (not available).

As Mr. Matuoka did not intend to go to Vichy until he had first conferred with Foreign Minister. I feel that your anxiety on this point is not warranted.

~~SECRET~~

Note: It is apparent that the Jap. Embassy in Berlin has learned something which makes them suspect that the British are reading this system, which the Japanese rate as their most secret one.

(JD-1: 1622 Navy Tr. 3/21/41)

APRIL 14, 1941

However, Osima was still very suspicious of his allies, if not of the British, as is disclosed in:

No. 39

FROM: BERLIN #407 (Purple) April 14, 1941.  
TO : TOKYO

Intelligence wires emanating from our offices in the Near East and Egypt to our offices in Germany and Italy should be appropriately paraphrased before transmitting their contents to the German and Italian authorities. This procedure is advisable in order that there be no danger of giving the German and Italian authorities clues in decoding our codes. Therefore, in intelligences of this type emanating from that area, the "I" code and the "SC" code should be discontinued, using only the more efficient "WO" code. In communicating other secret matters I would like to have you use the "TSU" code and other appropriate codes. Please follow this procedure.

Relayed to Italy and Turkey.

(JD-1 2030, SIS 16312 - Army Trans. 4/16/41)

APRIL 16, 1941

No. 40

FROM: TOKYO: #329 (Purple) April 16, 1941.  
TO : BERLIN

Secret.

Re your #407.

We suspect that the several codes I, SC and OITE are being cryptanalyzed by foreign powers and today we have none too many code books to spare. Therefore, when it is necessary to send a message, and at the same time insure its secrecy, please dispatch them by machine or by TSU code. In case revelation of the contents are made to foreign powers, take care to paraphrase them from beginning to end. I want you to use OITE for messages of relatively slight importance.

(JD-1: 2030 ARMY 16407 2086 Trans. 4/19/41 (5))

APRIL 17, 1941

Japanese diplomats were much disturbed over the selection of military men as diplomatic couriers. The situation was particularly acute in the Dutch East Indies.

No. 41

FROM: BATAVIA (Ishizawa). #301 (Red) April 17, 1941  
TO : TOKYO (Gaimudaijin).

Regarding my message #149\*.

5 APR 1941

~~SECRET~~

Persons connected with other departments are still being dispatched here as diplomatic couriers. So far, every one of these persons has been easily spotted as a military man, from the way he spoke and conducted himself. Furthermore, as most of them do not know foreign languages, it has caused no end of embarrassment and worry to our officials who stood by while they were being questioned by Immigration and Customs officials and some of these couriers have wasted away several days still carrying documents entrusted to them, thus deepening the suspicion of the Netherlands Indies authorities. If a stop is not put to this situation, I am certain that, eventually, the Netherlands Indies government will take steps to prevent the entry of our couriers altogether, thus disrupting tremendously this consulate's service. In spite of this, if it is necessary to continue to dispatch these persons, please take extreme care in selecting the candidates and explain to them, beforehand, the risks they must take as couriers.

\* Not available.

(JD-1: 2214 Navy Trans. 4/26/41 (AR))

APRIL 23, 1941

Anxiety about Navy secret documents caused the issuance of a general bulletin from Tokyo:

No. 42

FROM: TOKYO #001 April 23, 1941.  
TO : ALL MERCHANT VESSELS.

~~SECRET~~

Secret documents issued by the Navy are marked in such a way as to be able to distinguish them from ordinary documents at a glance. Therefore, these documents are easily spotted out by foreign examining officers boarding our vessels. For the sake of security it is necessary to cover these documents with appropriate paper covering.

(JN-1: 55 Navy Trans. 423-41 (X))

APRIL 24, 1941

Despite their many complaints against foreign nations, the Japanese were also using spies to obtain other nations' codes. Notice the fact that the Japanese knew what was in a British Attache's telegram:

No. 43

FROM: TOKYO (Matsuoka) #222 Purple (Very urgent)  
TO : BANGKOK April 24, 1941.

Strictly secret outside the department.

To be handled in Government code.

Re my #167<sup>a</sup>.

According to an unimpeachable report, as a result of a secret investigation recently carried on by the Netherlands Ministry in Bangkok, it was found that a native employee of this ministry had possession of keys to all safes and was in contact with the Japanese Military Attache.



A British Attache in Bangkok has made a telegraphic report of these facts so, for the time being, please stop the schemes we had afoot.

a - See S.I.S. #16013 - Tokyo tells Bangkok telegraphic clerk ITC will leave Tokyo on the 5th in order to transmit intelligence received directly.

(JD-1: 1873 ARMY 16621 2204 Trans. 4/26/41 (5))

MAY 24, 1941.

One Japanese consulate in England had continued to use a code which had been discontinued except for purposes of deception. Naturally, this was a serious leak:

No. 44

FROM: TOKYO (Jap. Foreign Minister) #181 May 24, 1941  
TO : LONDON (Purple)

In spite of the instructions in my last year's Circular #2549, our Consulate at Liverpool has not yet burned up the Ren code, and is still using it. As I said in my #915 of last year (JD-0: 5627 Tokyo believed it likely that the U.S., British, etc. were reading some of the Japanese diplomatic codes. Directs that three of these, used widely between 1 June and 15 July, and in less important legations and consulates since then, be retained for sending deceiving dispatches and other information), yourself and only a few other high officials are to be allowed to use this code for certain foreign machinations; therefore, will

~~SECRET~~

you please inform Liverpool in a suitable way to burn up this code at once.

(JD-1: 2699 -SIS- 17581 (Army Tr. 5/28/41))

MAY 30, 1941

Warning that espionage had made dangerous the use of a certain code for both Germans and Japanese was sent to Berlin:

No. 45

FROM: TOKYO (Totus) #969 May 30, 1941.  
TO : BERLIN (Rikugun)

As printed out in part 3 of Tokyo telegram #115<sup>a</sup>, regarding communication of both the Japanese and German armies, on account of espionage the German code machine number 31 is to be used only for service telegrams. Do not use this for any other type of communication.

a - Not available.

(C.I. #1012 (Japanese) Inter. 5/30/41 (?)  
Trans. 3/24/43 (P-d))

JUNE 2, 1941

A very important dispatch now follows. It indicates that the Japanese were aware of the fact that codes were being deciphered in various Black Chambers throughout the world. Despite this fact,

however, we have seen indications that some Japanese diplomats considered their codes to be absolutely safe.

No. 46

FROM: TOKYO Circ. #1166 June 2, 1941.  
TO : ROME, WASHINGTON, BERLIN, MOSCOW, BAHIA AND RIO

Relayed as Washington Circular #126

In various countries the science of cryptography and cryptanalysis is being practiced more and more. To tell the truth, no absolute confidence can be placed in the secrecy of a code. We, ourselves, in this office, are worrying about drawing up a set of new codes, so we would like for you to give us some suggestions from time to time as to suitable procedures. Please pay the strictest attention always during the transfer and tenure of codes and heed the following points on the maintenance of the security of codes, independent of reliance on safes alone.

1. Needless to say, courier mail is a more secure method of transmitting information than by reliance upon codes, so when there is some secret matter which might arouse a given nation, please send the message by courier mail, or some other method equally as safe. ... Further, as a matter of principle, and save in cases of necessity, the sending of code messages using (systems) other than the above will be stopped, except to your office.

The above prohibition is intended to alleviate the excessive load now imposed on communication clerks by virtue of increased vigilance necessary

for communication security, and because of the increased complexity of the codes themselves, and does not mean that we are trying to change arbitrarily the past procedure of sending code messages. Please see to it that there is no misunderstanding in this regard.

(JD-1: 3229 Navy Trans. 6/25/41)

A general warning was sent from Tokyo at this time to all important subordinates. It dealt as usual with security precautions:

No. 47

FROM: TOKYO (Matsuo) Circ. #1167 June 2, 1941 (Purple & Red)  
 TO : ROME, VICHY, MOSCOW, BERNE, BERLIN,  
 BANGKOK, WASHINGTON, SINGAPORE, and  
 BATAVIA

As stated in Circular #1166 from the Foreign Minister, the strictest care is necessary for the protection of the secrecy of codes. To send a message in Matsu (A machine) or in Hinoki (B machine) may be enough, and yet another step may be necessary. In the case of matters which must necessarily be kept secret, after encoding in ~~■~~ please perform a second encipherment in Hinoki (B machine). (You may if you wish, continue to superencipher YO(?) and CA(?) in Matsu and Hinoki (A & B machines), but as you know, they are not as secret as this code.) Well, our telegraphic staffs are already busy without the aforementioned innovations, and this is but another added burden, so please have them cut down dispatches to the absolute minimum.

(JD-1:2939 Army Tr. 6/10/41)

END

JUNE 4, 1941

The next message indicates that the Germans were reading American diplomatic messages. Notice the underlined sentence:

No. 48

FROM: LISBON  
TO : WASHINGTON

June 4, 1941.

Message to Tokyo #93.

The fact that in his Fireside Chat ROOSEVELT referred to the Azores gave Portugal a severe shock. The Brazilian Ambassador told me that in case England and in the United States win the final victory the domineering manner of the United States will be much more difficult to endure than that of Germany and that henceforward the position of the extreme pro-British and pro-American wing will weaken and a strong anti-American sentiment will sweep the country.

From the 28th to the 31st hostile editorials appeared in the newspapers, but since then no comment has appeared. I have received a report to the effect that condemnation of the speech which was to have been published in the Government organ on the 1st has been withheld. I got in touch with the German Embassy to find out what had happened in the meantime and the German Embassy informed me that on the evening of the 31st a special envoy arrived in Lisbon by plane bearing a message from Secretary HULL to the effect that the United States does not now intend to occupy the Azores. The German Embassy said they got that information from two places in their communications net. On the 2nd, an official, second in attendance on the Premier,

confidentially told me that within the Government there is a mounting cry for the Premier to make a tour of the Azores and to proclaim sovereignty thereover to the Portuguese and to the outside world.

(2953 Army #18182 Trans.6/14/41 (X))

JUNE 18, 1941

Ambassador Nomura reiterated the usual security precautions in this dispatch to all consuls in the U. S. and Manila:

No. 49

FROM: WASHINGTON (Nomura) #407  
TO : TOKYO

June 18, 1941.

Message to all Consuls in U.S. and Manila  
as Circular #1281

As you know, we are exempt from the President's order freezing the financial assets of Germany and Italy and other nations in the United States. Still, it is quite possible that the economic and financial activities of the nationals of other countries will be investigated. The order itself implies this. Not only financial matters, but also various other activities, are going to be investigated in the United States. You can see this by the fact that German and Italian consulates, as well as their commercial and propaganda organs, have been investigated. The Dies Committee is also tracking down foreign agents and lately certain men connected with our Navy have been investigated on the accusation of carrying on espionage activities on the West Coast. Hence, needless

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to say, communications between yourself and the various organs of our nations in this country, as well as between our various companies and banks, must be kept secret. In the transmission of messages and written data, and in the use of the telephones, etc., great care is of the utmost necessity. Please instruct all concerned to this effect. I am sure that you are already sufficiently aware of all this but these are extremely critical times and an additional word of caution is never too much.

This message addressed to all Consuls in the United States and Manila. Relayed to Tokyo.

(#18551 Army #3170 Trans. 6/24/41 (2))

JUNE 20, 1941

Carelessness in handling codes seems to have been a characteristic frequently present in Japanese diplomatic officials:

No. 50

FROM: TOKYO (Matsuoka) #53  
TO : LOS ANGELES

June 20, 1941.

(Strictly Secret)

In spite of the fact that in my telegram #202 of March last year I instructed you to use the "TA" code when reporting the movements of ships, you persist in using the "TSU" code. Henceforth, in reporting this kind of information please use the "TA" code and see to it that everyone concerned understands this.

~~SECRET~~JUNE 21, 1941No. 51

FROM: BATAVIA (Japanese Consul) #497 (Red) June 21, 1941.  
TO : TOKYO

...6. There are some commercial codes which are used in request telegrams which have not been revised for nearly 16 years; please order those who are still relying on these obsolete codes to change codes.

(JD-1: 2960 Navy Tr. 6/14/41)

JUNE 22, 1941

The question of using military men as couriers again came up, and the following text is a candid appraisal of such a policy:

No. 52

FROM: BATAVIA (Isizawa) #531 (Red) June 22, 1941.  
TO : TOKYO

I have, up to the present, from time to time submitted for your consideration my humble views on the diplomatic courier system. In the light of recent actual examples, I would again invite the reconsideration of our department on the following points:

1. Officially chosen couriers are to be members of our department. To have any others act in this capacity naturally contravenes the very nature of this system. Things being as they are



throughout the world at present, the censoring of telegrams and letters is a common practice and quite inescapable. Now when documents are regarded as of such great secrecy as to require their being sent by this system to which we are gradually attaching more and more importance, it certainly behooves us to send them by members of our own department who have a full understanding of their responsibility. At the same time direct verbal contact can be kept up between our department and its agents abroad through these men, quite aside from the business involved in the documents they carry. Now if we let men who are not members of our department engage in this work, not only would we be deprived of such conveniences, but also, we would have to rely upon people who lack education, who may be uncouth, and who have too slight a knowledge of languages. It is very dangerous to send people like this who are obviously not members of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Needless to say, some of them are intelligent enough to have a great distaste for carrying secret documents. To rely on ship captains as couriers is a terrible mistake. Who knows how they will store the documents? They have no contact with the high officials concerned, and in many cases enemies are on their ships. This is a very bad practice. Already the insular officials are beginning to entertain suspicions concerning Japanese couriers, and if things go on this way, they may deprive us of the privilege of courier mail. I am quite sure of this.

2. Now if it is impossible to send forth a member of the Foreign Department, I would like to have you please arrange to have our offices in the field, at least once a month, send a member of their staff to the Home Office so that direct verbal communication can be carried on. I would also point out that offices which have direct contact with Japan through such excellent means as air routes would save both time and money by using this system rather than relying on telegrams.

(#3226 Army 18614 Trans. 6/25/41(5))

Numbering telegrams was prohibited as a violation of security:

JUNE 23, 1941

No. 53

From: Tokyo #568 (Purple) June 23, 1941  
To: Shanghai

At the end of your letter #1611 of June 14th, you quoted the telegram number. This is strictly prohibited for reason of communication security. Please be careful hereafter.

(JD-1: 3337 Navy Tr. 7-1-41)

The Japanese took the utmost care with all messages concerning business in America:

AUGUST 15, 1941

No. 54

From: Tokyo #479 (Purple) Aug. 15, 1941  
To: Washington

There was a message from Financial Attache Nishiyama to the Minister of Finance regarding the resuming of sending Japanese ships and the said Minister contacted me in regard to it, however such problems should be dealt with by your Ambassador or the Consul General in New York. Not only that but as I have already wired you previously, in order to prevent secrets from leaking out to America, even telegrams concerning merchants are handled through embassy code telegrams, therefore in the future please maintain closer relations with Attache Nishiyama and have him make similar requests through your Ambassador or the Consul General in New York.

(JD-1: 4618 Navy Tr. 8-18-41)

~~SECRET~~

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OCTOBER 1, 1941

Notice the mention made of the American Black Chamber in the following dispatch:

No. 55

FROM: BOGOTA #169 October 1, 1941.  
TO : TOKYO

Re my #154 (available, not translated, J19 dated 11 September re: securing permit for export of goods contracted for in Brazil).

A telegram was sent from New York, Mitsui to Sugawara regarding this matter. This wire included many details of this matter and various items connected with this matter.

At this time when it is reported that the U. S. "Black Chamber" is greatly developing, it seems a dangerous matter to send wires between Mitsui in New York and Tokyo on this matter, as it might lead to full detection by them.

Please instruct Mitsui to be very careful on this case hereafter.

(JD-1 - 6912 Navy Trans. 11/29/41)

NOVEMBER 25, 1941

Since diplomatic conditions were badly strained at this time, instructions for destroying code machines were coming into Washington, (See Volume I for complete details). One of the many typical messages was this:

No. 56

FROM: TOKYO            Circ.#2398 (Purple) Nov.25, 1941.  
TO : WASHINGTON

In view of the times the code machines, (the A printer and the B scrambler), have been designated as objects of national secrecy and in order to prevent the leakage of secrets, etc., they fall within the scope of the Preservation of National Defense Enactment. Therefore, please exercise extreme caution in preserving the security of the machines in the custody of your office.

Furthermore, please write on the right side of the number tag attached to the printer and scrambler in red enamel, the words "National Secrecy." ...

(JD-1: 6789 Navy Tr. 11/25/41)

Word was sent to Tokyo that the Germans had succeeded in deciphering one of the English Military codes. This decryption had taken place at the latest by November, 1941. How much longer they had been reading it is not known. A description follows:

No. 57

FROM: BERLIN (GMBRK) #29            Nov. 25, 1941.  
TO : TOKYO (Summer)

To Section 18.

(A description of the cypher is given.)

... 5. This code is used by the army and war department (or air force) of England proper.

(#974 Trans. 3/9/43 (B-g))

On December 4, 1941 there was a change in the most important Japanese naval system -- the Japanese Fleet General Purpose System. It had changed every six months before this, and another change was expected on January 1, 1941. But the advent of war advanced the date, and this in itself was a warning that something unusual was about to occur. December 7, 1941 (their December 8) brought the assault on Pearl Harbor, and the long expected American-Japanese War was begun.

~~SECRET~~2. After Pearl HarborDECEMBER 23, 1941

Another violation of security rules was reprimanded by Tokyo as follows:

No. 58

FROM: TOKYO #338 (Purple) December 23, 1941  
TO : HCME

We assume that your message of the 22nd which begins Ianictmonu is a request message. Please advise firm's name.

The message referred to at the beginning used both the abbreviated code and some other system. See to it that this does not happen again.  
(JD-1: 7804 Navy Tr. 12-24-41.)

DECEMBER 24, 1941

DECEMBER 31, 1941

DECEMBER 30, 1941

War was causing interruptions along the usual communication channels, so alternate methods of transmission were now being discussed:

No. 61

FROM: BERNE #178 (Purple) December 30, 1941  
TO : TOKYO

To the Chief of the Telegraphic Bureau  
from Kihora.

Accompanying the current difficult situation, communications between the Home Office and overseas office has virtually been suspended. Therefore, in order that we might prepare methods of protecting our secrets, I do not know but what it might be a good idea to make arrangements so that preparations can be made for immediate revision in as simple a manner as possible in preparing more than one alternative measure with regard to codes, etc.

(JD-1: 8013 Army #27073 Army Tr. 12-31-41)

3 APR 1943

R F 88

~~SECRET~~JANUARY 8, 1942

The next dispatch expresses perfectly the real reason for the complete secrecy practiced by the U.S. Navy in regard to any success it may obtain in cryptanalysis:

No. 62

FROM: TOKYO (Togo) #16 (Purple) January 8, 1942  
TO : HANOI

Re your #22.

This code book is now in use and we want to keep the enemy using it as long as possible. We have already photographed the code book. If we can get intelligences this way without the enemy knowing about it, we will be in a very superior position to cope with the situation, so we want to keep them using this code as long as possible without suspicion. Consequently, I want you to talk with the Army and find out under what circumstances the book was obtained and if there is any possibility that the enemy knows it.

(JN-1: 256 SIS: 27703 Army Tr. 1-10-42)

JANUARY 16, 1942

Instructions were now issued to confirm or disprove their suspicion of American and Soviet success in reading their dispatches:



~~SECRET~~No. 63

FROM: TOKYO #9 (Purple) January 16, 1942  
TO : ROME

(Strictly Secret)

According to message #530 (not available) from the Military Attache in Rome to the Vice Chief, there are suspicions that the United States of the Soviet may be reading our codes and ciphers. It is requested that you investigate the factual details of this matter and reply immediately by dispatch.

(JD-2: #426 SIS: #28165 Tr. 1-17-42)

JANUARY 24, 1942

No. 64

FROM: TOKYO (Togo) #23 (Purple) January 24, 1942  
TO : ROME

(Strictly Secret)  
Re your #51 (not available)

From the words "the opinion is almost unanimous", in the first paragraph of Military Attache message #530 (not available), the rest of the message has not arrived. The Army has also sent an inquiry, and its reply, too, was so garbled that not much could be made of it. They are, therefore, inquiring again. We cannot grasp the main points at all. Now, diplomatic codes are concerned in this matter, and if necessary we must take swift measures. Please wire me back just why it is suspected that our codes have been compromised.

(JD-2: 671 Army #28638 Trans. 1-24-42)

In view of all the above precautions, Japanese assurance that their codes were foolproof seems to be out of character. However, Unexplainable as it may be, this self-confidence was to help American cryptanalysts considerably. Observe the following:

No. 65

FROM: ROME #86                      January 24, 1942  
TO : BUENOS AIRES

We have taken into consideration the important observations contained in your #77 (SIS 23374).

We can have no doubt about the intensification in Buenos Aires of the Secret Service activities of North America. The interception of our communications (?) has not, however, led us to feel that the cryptographic systems which have been adopted for your Embassy should not be considered absolutely foolproof as long as they are used in the way prescribed, viz: - - - - -  
(JD-2: 74 SIS: 29375 Army Tr. 2-7-42)

JANUARY 29, 1942

On the other hand, the following message was sent during the same period:

No. 66

FROM: TOKYO #004                      January 29, 1942  
TO : CHENGWAI

In your office you seem to still be using

~~SECRET~~

the WO(CO) code. Now, this code has been decided to be not safe, so please after decoding this message, stop using this code. As regards code, please consult with TAI (Thai) Embassy.  
(JD-2: 926 Navy Trans. 2-3-42)

JANUARY 29, 1942

An investigation into the use of cipher machines by Germany and Sweden was unproductive, but the facts reported from Berlin should be of interest to U.S. Navy readers. It will be observed that, if the translation of the sentence underlined is correct, the Japanese were very certain of the impregnability of their own machine ciphers. It may be remarked in passing that American scientists have proved that any machine cipher can always be solved by reconstructing the original machine.

No. 67

FROM: BERLIN #351                      January 29, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

To the 11th section and the 18th section,  
from Hayashi.

I have been asked by the 11th section to investigate the use of cipher machines by the (German ?) war department and the Swedish war department, but because I have no facilities for secret investigation I cannot say definitely. However, for your information I am sending the following details, which I have been able to find out.

S.F. 98

~~SECRET~~

No. 67 (Cont'd.)

1. Although we can assume that they are mostly using cipher machines, it is not certain to what extent they are equipped nor how much they use them. If our army could be equipped with cipher machines, from the standpoint of organization of the army and whether the production of machines can be adopted, and other details which would come to light.

2. The important thing about a cipher machine is the formula for its use. Thus it is necessary to produce a cipher machine which can still be used by changing the formula for use in case the machine itself should fall into the enemy's hands, or which can be altered in a variety of ways as needed.

3. At present no countries are making much progress in (solving?) cipher machines.

4. I expect to send you - - - machine by the earliest available ship.  
(C.I. #795 Inter. 1-29-42 (12) Tr. 12-31-42 (3-1))

The next dispatch indicates how American officials were able to keep in close touch with the latest development in Japanese codes:

No. 68

FROM: TOKYO #221 (Purple) January 29, 1942  
TO : SAIGON (Circular)

Re my Circular #155\*

We will change the name of this code to the Overseas Commercial Use code. Beginning February 1, it will be used as heretofore by the Navy Department and Foreign Office.

\*SIS 28678; JD-2: 676; dated 24 January, 1942.  
"The tables and use of the inter-office code (3-office code) are to be suspended after February 1."

(JD-2: 830

Navy trans. 1-30-42)

~~SECRET~~

That the Germans were working on Russian codes, and that they were passing this intelligence on to the Japanese is evident from the following dispatch. There is also good reason to believe that though they could not read the Russian machine cipher, they had been able to decipher an English code:

No. 69

FROM: TOKYO #352 [redacted], January 29, 1942  
TO : BERLIN

1. As the man in charge of Russian code for the Germans has been absent since the end of last year, I was unable to contact him, but today I met him and the following is what I obtained from him:

a. The 5 digit code Oll-A is used.

b. Although what seems to be machine code appears infrequently we do not know whether it is machine code or not and we are unable to read it.

2. England has discontinued the use of "India" in the diplomatic service in this area.

\* This appears to be the name of a code.  
(C.I. #996 Inter. — Trans. 3-18-43 (E-d))

FEBRUARY 5, 1942

Russia was cleared by Tokyo of complicity in regard to delaying distribution of Japanese codes, and Tokyo assured its ambassador in Rome that there was no need to worry about leaks of secrets:

No. 70

FROM: TOKYO #045 (Purple) February 5, 1942  
 TO : ROME

Regarding your #077

We have made investigation regarding Russia. There is no evidence that the American Attache delayed the distribution at the time we were procuring telegraphic codes and it appears that all codes are there as delivered. Hence we recognize that there is no anxiety regarding the leakage of codes.

(JD-2: 983 Navy Trans. 2-6-42)

February 25, 1942

Warnings that codes of low security should never be used to send material of great importance were again issued as follows:

No. 71

FROM: TOKYO #243 (?) (Purple) February 25, 1942  
 TO : BANGOR

C.C.D.

Regarding your #006 (?)

The Chief of Office code is very simple and cannot be considered to be more than an abbreviation system insofar as security is concerned. Please, therefore, never send such matters as was contained in your - - - - (?) in just the Chief of Office system. (CA) Always further encipher it in the machine or some other adequate system.

(JD-2: 1442 Navy Trans. 2-26-42)

No. 72

FROM: TOKYO #86 (Purple) February 25, 1942  
TO : VICHY

Re your #99 (not available)

There are no objections to your handling the matter in the manner you described. No doubt you are well aware of the fact that the X must be used for only matters of a lower degree of secrecy and must never, under any circumstances, be employed for any matter requiring a high degree of security. We believe that this is a needless instruction at this time, but we mention it for the sake of reassurance.

(JD-2: 1420 Navy Trans. 2-26-42)

MARCH 24, 1942

When the Japanese abandoned a code, explicit orders were sent to destroy the code books, and a careful check was made:

No. 73

FROM: TOKYO #209 (Purple) March 24, 1942  
TO : HSIKING

Since we are abandoning the MATC code, please burn them and send a list of what you have burned.

(JD-1: 2206 Army 31860 Army Tr. 3-25-42)

APRIL 7, 1942No. 74

FROM: TOKYO (Togo) Circ. #618  
TO : BERLIN

April 7, 1942

No. 74 (Cont'd.)  
(Secret)

We are discarding the following telegraphic codes, so please dispose of them by burning and having done so wire the one group 00011 (plain text no number), and if possible present a list of what you destroyed.

WD G $\bar{C}$ . TA G $\bar{C}$ . Simplified form of TA G $\bar{C}$ .  
(JD-2: 2666 Navy Trans. 4-10-42)

MAY 1, 1942

On April 26, 1942, the Japanese call signs were changed again, and since the last major change had occurred on April 10, it seemed evident that the American system of frequent call changes had served as a model. In early May, 1942, an U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence unit commented on the increased use of concealed addresses by the Japanese. (COM 14-030722, Copek). This was an obstacle to traffic analysis, and was a certain indication that the Japanese had become more security minded.

Observe the security precautions which are ordered in this next message:

No. 75

FROM: TOKYO #229 (Purple) May 1, 1942  
TO : BANGKOK

Re your #232



~~SECRET~~No. 75 (Cont'd.)

Please convey the following message to Vice Consul Kayuno at Singapore:

1. Regarding IWS code and the safe for its storage, it is this office's policy to limit as much as possible the distribution of this code. However, please let me know the arrangement of your communication office, security facilities, possibility of assigning night watchmen, etc.

2. At present we are unable to assign a special communication clerk, but will send as an emergency measure a regular clerk who knows how to handle communications.

(JD-1: 2400 Navy Trans. 5-8-41)

May 7, 1942

The following dispatches disclose the fact that the Germans were reading the dispatches of their allies. The Japanese were aware of this, but were still confident that their machine cipher was impregnable.

No. 76

FROM: BERLIN (Oshima) #596 (Purple) May 7, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

According to what a specialist attached to the Military Attache's office of this office has ferretted out, it appears that the Germans are reading some of our codes. (Just which one is not clear.) This office has in its custody the codes of this office as well as the Military, Naval, and Commercial Attache's codes, and seven or eight varieties of commercial codes. It is very clear that there can be no danger of the machine code having been read. Hence it is

~~SECRET~~

No. 76 (Cont'd.)

perhaps some of the commercial codes or the abbreviation codes, I believe. That the Germans are reading our codes is evidenced by the fact that they are losing faith in their security and are admonishing us regarding the procurement of important reports, etc. Therefore, I believe that it is important at this time to come to a joint agreement with Germany that all commercial messages between the two countries be sent by means of the Commercial Attache's code and that commercial requests be suspended.  
(JD-2: 3367 Navy Trans. 5-9-42)

MAY 12, 1942

No. 77

FROM: TOKYO #380 (Purple) May 12, 1942  
TO : BERLIN

Re your #596

In regard to your approval of the use of the secret codes by trade firms between Germany and Japan, considering the changing situation I am afraid now only that there would be difficulty in control of the German firms, but also that there is so much in the Japanese telegrams to be sent secretly that there is a possibility that the secrecy might leak out. Since this would have a very grave effect, we would be uneasy if commercial firms were freely sending and receiving messages in code even though we subjected them to strict supervision; therefore, please leave things as they are now.

In order to increase the secrecy of commercial request messages, we will compile a new code, but until then please act according to my #379 (not available). It is not that I do not

No. 77 (Cont'd.)

consider the integrity of our diplomatic codes, and there is no doubt that (the ordinary use of a common abbreviated code or something of this standard is bad for the secrecy of a more secure code?). However, we ask you to take pains to carry out the sense of my circular #835 (not solved) in selecting the contents of messages and choice of codes.

Now, although we have completed a total revision of our codes, it will be impossible to put them into practice speedily because of transportation difficulties.

(ID-2: 3446 ARMY #35410 ARMY Trans. 5-13-42)

On May 28, 1942, at 0000, the Japanese changed their Fleet General Purpose System. This occurred a few days before their attack on Midway, and was in accordance with their normal procedure before an important engagement. As a result, U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence units could not read enemy naval dispatches until some time after May 28, though, fortunately, intelligence concerning Japanese plans had long since been furnished our operational authorities.

### 3. After the Midway Expose

In the previous chapter the publicity concerning the Battle of Midway has already been discussed. There is no Japanese dispatch which positively links a publicity leak to the changes made in Japanese cryptographic systems, but it is surely more than a mere coincidence that within a few weeks after the Midway expose, drastic changes were made in all Japanese codes and ciphers. Whether it was the original story, or the furor created by bringing the persons responsible for the story to trial, which caused Japan to hear of the decipherment of its codes, there is no way of telling.

#### a. Cipher and Code Changes.

In August-September, 1942 practically every code and cipher of the Japanese was changed as follows:

(1) The Japanese Fleet General Purpose System changed on August 15, 1942 after only two months, which was much before a change was normally expected. This was immediately after the Chicago Tribune's and Walter Winchell's publicity.

(2) The Japanese Merchant Ship-Naval Liaison system changed on September 1, 1942. This was probably a normal revision for it had been in effect since August 18, 1941. It will be recalled that this code had been superseded as a result of a maladroit performance by the F.B.I. in August, 1941. They had seized a code book on a Japanese merchant ship against the protestations of its captain, and after photographing it had returned it to the captain. Needless to say, the code was changed a few days later, and thus, a U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence Publication, which contained a complete solution of the code, and which had been printed 18 months before, was rendered completely useless.

(3) The Japanese South Sea Area System changed on September 30, 1942. This was a lower security system for confidential dispatches.

(4) An Operational and Communication Intelligence Code began on November 19, 1941, and went out August 15, 1942.

(5) Patrol Vessels Cipher began on July 30, 1942, and still exists. This was a new cipher.

(4) An Operational and Communication Intelligence Code began on November 19, 1941, and went out August 15, 1942.

(5) Patrol Vessels Cipher began on July 30, 1942, and still exists. This was a new cipher.

(6) Reporting of Enemy Operations Code began on August 28, 1942, and still continues. This was another new code.

(7) A German Merchant Ship-Japanese Navy Cipher began in August, 1942. Only a few messages have been intercepted in this new system.

(8) A Japanese Army-Navy Liaison Code was instituted in the Solomons in July, 1942. It is a very minor system.

~~SECRET~~

(9) A Submarine Cipher - began on April 10, 1942 and went out on August 31, 1942.

(10) Another Submarine Cipher was introduced on November 1, 1941, and was changed on August 31, 1942.

b. Call Sign Changes

Traffic analysis is one of the modern developments in communication intelligence work. Cryptanalysis has existed for centuries, but it was only with the development of radio during World War I that analysis began to be made of the external features of intercepted dispatches. Call signs, frequencies, traffic routing methods, procedure and operating signals, station and message serial numbers, zone times, volume of traffic, station activities, movement reports, signal strength, characteristics of operators, methods in relaying, and priority indications -- all of these will give the informed observer a great deal of information without reading the texts of the dispatches.

By following a message from its point of origin through its numerous relays to the ultimate delivery point for each addressee, the location of the originator and every addressee is revealed. By compiling this information systematically, the location and organization of almost the entire enemy Navy is revealed. If every call could be identified, and if the ultimate delivery point for every addressee could be determined, the administrative and tactical organization of all enemy naval units could be deduced. During the past year since Midway, the Japanese have made many changes in their general radio procedure. All were designed to conceal information from U.S. Navy traffic analysts. Some of these changes will now follow.

Before the war broke out, the Japanese were accustomed to change their assigned calls at intervals of six to eight months, though shore activities retained calls of a different type for longer periods. In 1941 the Fleet Commands were provided with alternate calls so as to hide their identity by reducing the volume of messages sent to one addressee.



~~SECRET~~

This method had little success. With the coming of war, efforts were made to change the Japanese call books with greater frequency, but distribution problems prevented this. However, changes of the general call book had been made on November 1, 1941 and December 1, 1941, just before hostilities broke out. Another change was made on April 10, 1942 which contained ten supplementary call lists for the high commands and major shore radio stations. These lists were to change at intervals of 17 days.

This major change was somewhat successful in concealing the identities of the high commands since there were enough alternate calls provided to reduce the occurrences of similar calls. It also concealed the major shore stations to a lesser extent. After the Battle of Midway, a decision was made to decrease the length of the effective periods, and put a new list into effect on September 1. Distribution difficulties intervened once again, however, and so it was necessary to use the same lists until October 1, though the supplementary lists were rotated irregularly on September 4, 9, 15, and daily thereafter.

~~SECRET~~

Another security measure was adopted by the Japanese in the middle of August, 1942. This consisted of an encipherment of a special basic call list with the original calls changing at ten days intervals. Finally, on October 1, 1942 the entire call sign system was changed. Two sets of calls were assigned to every Japanese Navy activity, one for ordinary matters, and the other for use when the greatest possible security was needed. The latter type is always enciphered in a key which changes daily. The adoption by the Japanese in July, 1942 of a concealed identity call sign for originators, which is similar to the U.S. Navy's use of NERK, has also been a difficult obstacle to overcome.

c. Omission of serial numbers.

From the outbreak of the war it had been the practice for the originator of Japanese naval messages to assign each message a serial number in regular order. In addition to this, each communication office assigned a second serial number to the message, as it

was received or sent, for reference and service purposes. Thus, by a study of these numbers, it was possible to follow a message with a given originator through call changes and shifts of location. But in the middle of June, 1942 certain commands and stations commenced to scramble the station serial number series in individual efforts to overcome the weakness of the previous system. Some success was achieved by this, and on August 15, 1942 the message serial number was discontinued, except in the case of some dispatches in minor cipher systems. On November 1, 1942 all station serial numbers were discontinued.

d. Routing of traffic

Much information was derived from the Japanese procedure in handling messages until the "broadcast" system of delivery was adopted almost universally in July, 1942. This method is also used by the U.S. Navy, and was devised years ago to prevent the disclosure of tactical information to the enemy. The adoption of this security measure by the Japanese was

only another indication that Midway had taught them a lesson, and that U.S. naval radio procedure was to be imitated as closely as possible.

An example of the working of this "broadcast" system by the Japanese Navy may be of interest to U. S. Navy readers:

A Cruiser Division Commander at sea off New Britain calls Rabaul by radio. An urgent message, addressed to several commands, is sent by the Commander to Rabaul, which immediately broadcasts it. Truk copies all Rabaul broadcasts, and then, in turn, rebroadcasts the message within five minutes after receiving it. Jaluit, Tokyo, and Ominato rebroadcast the same message shortly thereafter. Thus all the addressees, wherever they may be, are reached by one of these broadcasts, and no evidence has been given of the location of any addressee. However, a time study will show the probable area location of the originator, if every broadcast has been intercepted. Beginning in

July, 1942 the use of a special symbol in the heading of every message, which indicated the individual addressee being served on that particular transmission, was gradually eliminated from the broadcasts. This prevented the making of even an estimate of the general area in which an addressee was located. Point to point traffic still continues, but the "broadcast" system has almost completely superseded it.

e. Published Confirmations

The foregoing details concerning Japanese security measures were provided by Communication Intelligence experts stationed at the Navy Department. Confirmation of their views will be seen in the following reports:

OCTOBER 7, 1942

No. 78

...The daily shift of calls and other security measures adopted by the Japs continue to provide a highly effective screen against any but sketchy traffic analysis. Of slight comfort is the fact that they are evidently experiencing difficulty in handling a complex and bulky call system as indicated by a large number of enciphered addresses, recirculation of old traffic and compromise of calls through service despatches.  
(Com4, T.I. Summary, Oct. 7, 1942)

OCTOBER 10, 1942

No. 79

...(a) Increased Japanese naval communication security since August, and particularly since October 1, has greatly added to the difficulties of obtaining intelligence from this source. ... (ONI Secret Supplement, October 10, 1942, Pg. 1)

OCTOBER 11, 1942

No. 80

...(d) Gilberts Islands.

The alertness of Japanese naval commands to the importance of radio security is reflected in instructions given by a command in the Gilberts in the middle of September to maintain radio silence at all times except in emergencies. The necessity for this, he pointed out, was due to the unrelaxing attempt by the enemy to gain radio intelligence on the Japanese. (ONI Secret Supplement, October 11, 1942, Pg. 2)

OCTOBER 16, 1942

Notes on Japanese procedure in radio jamming and communication intelligence activity were given in an Army intelligence report. Frequent examples of their attempts at radio deception were noted.

No. 81

(For details see Intelligence Summary No. 43, October 17, 1942, Headquarters Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.)

OCTOBER 21, 1942

No. 82

Very few dispatches appear these days that are obviously urgent from outward appearances. This may be due to a change in procedure indicators but it is also apparent that several dispatches came through with no indicator. Consequently it is believed that the Japanese may depend on the cryptographic systems as designators or may depend on the Radio Operator to handle urgents accordingly. (Com 14, T.I. Summary, October 21, 1942)

OCTOBER 25, 1942

No. 83

One interesting feature noted in Submarine traffic was the lack of dispatches in the Four Kana nigori system. Practically all identifiable Sub traffic was in five numeral code. This indicates security measures have been increased. (Com 14, T.I. Summary, October 25, 1942)

OCTOBER 31, 1942

No. 84

In raids of the Makin type, the Japanese forces are warned, all publications must be destroyed immediately upon being attacked and thereafter all endeavor will be made to annihilate the enemy. (ONI Secret Supplement, October 31, 1942)

NOVEMBER 1, 1942

No. 85

Radio station serial numbers (NRs) were eliminated from all traffic on November 1st.

This was the last remaining serial identification after the SMS number disappeared in mid-August, but were admittedly a poor means of identification under normal circumstances. Many stations had been scrambling MFS for some months. The date and time group is now used with practically all types of traffic and will provide a chronological sequence of messages originated by stations sending moderately large amounts of traffic.  
(Com14 T.I. Summary, November 1, 1942)

NOVEMBER 5, 1942

No. 86

...2. Many indications have arisen of increased reliance placed by the Japanese upon radio intelligence which appears to play an important part in the Solomons operations, with wide dissemination given to this type of dispatch. Practically no patrol plane traffic has been noted during the past 24 hours, indicating the possibility that the Japanese are satisfied with intelligence concerning our intentions and the dispositions of our forces obtained by intercepts, traffic analysis, and an active and efficient D/F system. While admittedly a well-ordered system of radio intelligence administered by a competent staff plays a vital part in any important operation, the obvious methods of counterattack should not be overlooked, viz; increased security, radio silence except when absolutely necessary, and finally, if possible during the strategic phases of the operation, a well-planned system of radio deception.  
(ONI Secret Supplement, November 5, 1942) (Pg.1)

NOVEMBER 9, 1942

No. 87

...5. The Japanese D/F net is becoming increasingly active, with further reliance upon



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this type of intelligence indicated. Observations from individual stations appear to be consolidated at four centers, viz; Tokyo, Saipan, Truk and Jaluit, with free exchange of interesting bearings between stations. Tokyo issues short "flash" type signals to the Net - probably designations of U.S. frequencies presently active, and occasionally issues summaries to Major Fleet commanders. Rabaul, Ambon, and Singapore report bearings to Tokyo Control and to Major Commands, but do not appear to be coordinated into the "flash"-control system.

(ONI Secret Supplement, November 9, 1942)

November 13, 1942

No. 88

Administrative type traffic slacked off and four kana operational types increased early on the 13th (-9) followed in a few hours by a complete cessation on all circuits of all but high precedence operational traffic with only a small percentage of five numeral type appearing, chiefly involving submarines. Due to the tightened security measures of the enemy, especially those adopted since the October 20th action, identification of individual units is virtually impossible until all data has been examined over a considerable period and much difficulty is being experienced in identifying the larger task groups in time to be of tactical value.

(Com14, T.I. Summary, November 13, 1942)

DECEMBER, 1942

No. 89

...The Japanese are firm believers in securing detailed intelligence about their opponents, and have been very successful to date in this aspect of

operations. They have prepared maps of great detail, even of jungle areas. They have had considerable success in radio interception, taking good advantage of the information obtained. (Pg. 2)

...On one of the small islands taken in the Solomons, the Marines ran into some tough fortified opposition and called for 1,000-pound demolition bombs. The group air commander of an aircraft carrier was directed to bomb the island, and, on his way to the island, he received a counter-order stating that the Marines had now gained possession of the island and that he was not to drop any bombs. "Authenticators" (pass words) had been worked out among the pilots the night before, using the pilot's nickname. The voice countermanding the order was unable to furnish the correct authenticator and the bombing was carried out. The commander discovered that the voice on the radio was that of a Jap, who was speaking English and using a perfect American accent. (Pg. 9)

...Direction Finders — The Japanese are now using radio direction-finding equipment in the Solomons to detect the approach of aircraft. Their equipment has not been very effective to date. Antiaircraft guns sometimes do not fire until our bombers have made their first run, and sometimes our bombers arrive over the target before the Jap fighters are able to take off. (Pg. 12)  
(Vol. 1, No. 4, Intell. Bull. Dec., 1942. M.I.S. War Department)

DECEMBER 30, 1942

No. 90

Possibly as an aftermath of the Midway campaign, a general order to all Japanese naval activities on July 30 instituted the system of cover calls, designed to conceal the originator of

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dispatches. Forces afloat were particularly instructed to employ this method of communication in important messages in view of the intense Allied Radio Intelligence activity. Careful instructions were also promulgated to insure increased communication security.  
(ONI Secret Supplement, December 30, 1942)

f. Summary

It is evident that immediately after the Battle of Midway the Japanese were shocked into revolutionary changes in their communication security. They imitated U.S. Navy procedure in every way possible, and were so successful in their methods that American traffic analysts have had great difficulty in identifying any but the most important commanders' and shore activities' calls. Fortunately, cryptanalysis has solved the most recent Japanese ciphers, and the U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence units have been able to continue supplying important operational intelligence to fleet commanders.

It is difficult not to conclude that there is an inescapable relationship between the publicity given to the success of U.S. Navy Communication

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Intelligence at Midway, and the swift reaction of the Japanese which almost closed off this important source of operational intelligence. It is only fair to say that had these changes occurred a year before, when the sub-division under Cp-20-G was but a fraction of its present size, there would have been grave doubts as to the ability of the organization to successfully overcome the many obstacles thrown up in its path. Fortunately, such a contingency had been foreseen, and enough personnel were available during the late summer of 1942 to cope with the situation. However, though Communication Intelligence has been able to win back its former position in decipherment, our traffic analysts have never been able to recover fully from the after effects of Midway publicity. Each day they have to start from an absolute zero of identified calls.

The seriousness of this position should be recognized. Traffic analysis was evolved by radio intelligence experts as the one means of obtaining intelligence concerning the enemy when texts of messages could not be deciphered. If the Japanese

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suddenly decide to revamp all their ciphers and call signs again, and to carry out both operations at the same time, the U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence units may well be helpless until they can work out cryptanalytical solutions. This assumption is not too far fetched because our traffic analysis has been badly crippled by Japanese security measures.

Cryptanalysis of a new cipher often takes much time, and in the interim, the Japanese may move to attack our forces.

4. Recent Japanese Precautions (July, 1942 - March, 1943)

JULY 10, 1942

There are other messages which testify to Japanese precautions after the Battle of Midway. Most of these are found in their diplomatic traffic, but will be of interest since they reflect the similar attitude of Japan's military leaders. Here is one:

No. 91

FROM: TOKYO #1300 (Purple) July 10, 1942  
TO : SAIGON

(Strictly secret)

1. In view of what has been happening to our ships lately, we must evidently be much more concerned over keeping the movements of our ships most secret. As you know, messages which have any definite bearing must be in Foreign Office code. Why, in these commercial messages going and coming by the commercial concerns concerning cargoes, etc. there are hints revealing the whereabouts of our ships....

(SIS #41332 Army Tr. 7-11-42)

AUGUST 3, 1942

A very close check was maintained by Tokyo on all naval codes, which had been ordered to be destroyed:

No. 92

FROM: TOKYO Circ. #1365 (J-19) August 3, 1942  
TO : KABUL

Re my Circular 802#. Strictly secret.

Please telegraph the names of the codes which you destroyed and the date on which they were burned. Please also take the first opportunity to send me a detailed list of everything which was destroyed in accordance with my orders.  
(SIS #35233 - Instructions to destroy discontinued naval codes.)

No. 93

FROM: TOKYO #78 (J-19) August 3, 1942  
TO : KABUL

Please note that we have commenced to use the NE code.

As soon as you have decoded (this message?) (the message in question?) kindly wire me to that effect.

AUGUST 5, 1942

Japanese espionage agents were at work in Russia, according to the contents of this next dispatch:

No. 94

FROM: HSINKING #555 (Purple) August 5, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

According to report (a) from Harbin, the following exchange of telegrams regarding Russia strategy against Japanese shipping has taken place.

1. From the Soviet Foreign Office to the Soviet Ambassador in China (dated July 28th.)

"The peoples commissary for naval affairs recognize the necessity of drastically cutting down Japanese shipping and has conferred with the American war council. It was decided there that we must negotiate more with the Chinese toward maintaining strategic (connection ?) with the ports in Shanghai, Hongkong, Canton and Saigon. Appropriate instructions were sent to the various Chinese communist centers for this purpose. And it was also considered advisable to get in touch with the communists in all the southern ports."

2. The Soviet Ambassador in China sent the following to the Soviet Foreign Office (dated July 30th.) "The Chungking authorities have held discussions with the American representative on this matter but at present nothing special is being done. We are working alone in Shanghai but there is need for getting Chungking to do something in the other ports. We are in touch with the communists in the countries to the south. However, they do not have funds for carrying on demolition but I think that the British and American secret agents who have sufficient supplies (funds ?) will distribute some of these to them." (This was sent to me from the Consul General in Harbin under date of August 3rd and is to be handled with extreme secrecy.)  
 (#43967 ARMY) (P-1) (Trans. 8/7/42 (5))

AUGUST 12, 1942

A complete revision of communication procedure between Japanese higher officials was planned at this time:

No. 95

FROM: TOKYO (Togo) Circ. #1500 (J-19) August 12, 1942  
 TO : KABOUL

Re my circular #1452

In order to maintain secrecy in our messages I am very anxious to make a complete revision of our present



arrangements for communications among the higher officials. If, by any chance, there is anything in the directions for use (of the code) that is not clear to you, please let me know at once. In any case, please reply to this message immediately.  
(SIS #45500 Army Tr. 8-20-42)

AUGUST 13, 1942

New codes were being introduced in Japanese diplomatic circles, all of which caused some confusion:

No. 96

FROM: KALGAN #223 (J-19) August 13, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

Re your circular #1500a  
We are studying but haven't been able to solve it yet. However, code clerk Kato from Peking is coming on the 17th and then we should be able to manage.  
a - SSD #45500 — Re arrangements for use of a new code.

No. 97

FROM TOKYO #1212 (Purple) August 17, 1942  
TO: SHANGHAI

Since Amoy does not understand how to use the "YA" code, please have Secretary Saito explain the use of this code thoroughly to the Amoy office when he goes to his post there.  
(Army #6136 Army Tr. 8-24-42)

AUGUST 22, 1942

It would seem that the enemy suspected that our

submarine successes were due to information concerning ship movements, which leaked out from messages sent by commercial firms:

No. 98

FROM: TOKYO #1559 Cir. (Purple) August 22, 1942  
TO: BANGKOK

1. Since the Navy must convoy our merchant vessels, and in view of the necessity of maintaining absolute secrecy, the Navy, Maritime Commission, and Foreign Office held a conference regarding the sending of messages relating to ship movements.

As a result of this meeting, it has been decided to handle all messages concerning the movements of merchant ships in the following manner: (You are also to follow these same rules.)

a. On and after September 1st. all telegrams relating to ship movements are to be handled as Navy messages.

b. The Maritime Commission will notify the Navy Ministry and Foreign Office of all planned sailing schedules and of any changes in previously scheduled movements of vessels.

c. The Navy will notify the Foreign Office and the Maritime Commission as soon as any messages are received relating to ship movements, i.e., names of steamers and ports of departure, dates and hours of sailing, scheduled destinations, dates and hours of arrival, etc. The Navy will also telegraph the destinations to the diplomatic officials at the port concerned (Bangkok, Hanoi, Saigon, and Haiphong.)

d. Telegrams which concern only the cargoes will be treated as diplomatic messages, as in the past.

2. In compliance with the above regulations, diplomatic messages may give information on the name of

A. P. 00

vessel, type of cargo, tonnage, and port of destination; but any information concerning the actual movements of vessels, i.e. sailing and arrival dates and hours, must be dealt with in Navy messages only.

(Please revise the August and September schedules for sailings to French Indo-China and Thailand in accordance with my Cir. #1547<sup>a</sup>.)

3. There is danger that the enemy may indirectly obtain information on ship movements through messages about cargoes sent by private business houses. It is only reasonable that private companies should put up with some sacrifices in the present period of emergency, and it will be necessary to prohibit such messages dispatched from firms in Japan. We are now consulting with the firms in question about this matter.

Regarding telegrams from Thailand and French Indo-China relating to cargoes, it will be convenient to have these handled as diplomatic messages, as in the past. Please prohibit private firms in your locality from dispatching any such messages. We have already discussed this matter with home offices of the companies concerned.

4. Regarding the goods destined for Japan, please keep me informed of the quantities in warehouse, crop prospects, etc., as this information is required by the Maritime Commission in order to make up sailing schedules and for other similar purposes.

(This message is being transmitted from Saigon to Hanoi as official instructions from the Foreign Minister. Please have Hanoi transmit it to Haiphong. The present message is addressed to Bangkok and Saigon.)

a - Not Available.  
(#46167 (H-1) Army Tr. 8-27-42 (12-T)

AUGUST 28, 1942

The following general bulletin to all Japanese diplomats indicates anxiety about their cyphers:

No. 99

FROM: TOKYO (TOGO) Circ. #1609 (J-19) August 28, 1942  
TO : LISBON

We have wired instructions that code keys and secret things like that must be destroyed as soon as the special clerk memorizes them. Anything we wire of this nature must, as we have instructed you, never be jotted down. We have heard that sometimes these data are retained, and what is infinitely worse—terrible, in fact—set down and kept in memorandum books. This is extremely dangerous from the point of view of security, so will you please see that any diplomatic official possessing any such material burns it immediately.  
(Army #46864 Army Tr. 9-2-42)

AUGUST 31, 1942

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The reason for this procedure is undoubtedly found in the following passage which appeared in the Australian Broadcasting Commission, Short-Wave Division Weekly Review some time prior to July 31, 1942:

RIP 08

No. 101

Our main source of radio information about conditions inside Japan is the Tokio radio. Although it is reasonable to assume that Japanese broadcasts are carefully censored, they still contain important indications of Japan's general problems. This is especially true of the Tokio Home Service in Japanese.

SEPTEMBER 11, 1942

Retransposition of high grade security ciphered messages were now ordered to ensure safe communications:

No. 102

FROM: TOKYO (TOJC) (Purple

#308

September 11, 1942

TO : BUENOS AIRES  
Supplementary telegram.

Special "C" regulations for use of the TSU Code (TSU HEI).

1. These regulations are used for resecuring a code text already made secure by use of the "E" regulations for the TSU code (TSU OTSU).

2. These regulations will be used only for exceptionally secret communications between the home office and your office and affiliated offices.

3. Method for re-securing the code is as follows.....

OCTOBER 6, 1942

PAGE NUMBER 259 IS NOT RELEASABLE

OCTOBER 12, 1942

Japanese interests were suffering in South America, where only Argentina was friendly. Therefore, special care had to be taken with their ciphers, since England and America were suspected of examining their dispatches:

No. 104

FROM: TOKYO (TIKNS) #5 October 12, 1942  
TO : BERLIN (RIKUGUN)

The Chilean Telegraph Bureau (DENSHIN KYO KU) has ceased to handle code messages to destinations outside the continent. Therefore we wish all code messages to the Chilean Attache sent via Argentina.

We desire to have all the "A" additive tables #4 and the old Hatted conversion tables for Attache use, held in all countries other than Argentina, burned.

(C.I. #909 Army Tr. Inter. 10/12/42(12)  
Trans. 2/8/43 (E-d)

No. 105

FROM: TOKYO #116 October 19, 1942  
Revised translation of Part 1  
TO : BUENOS AIRES

In order to (conceal ?) messages between the Attache in Chile and Tokyo or Europe, please make use of the





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OCTOBER 22, 1942

Relations with Chile were precarious, so the following dispatch warned the Japanese Embassy at Santiago as to the procedure to be followed in the event of an emergency:

No. 107

FROM: TOKYO #300 J-19 October 22, 1942  
TO : SANTIAGO

The following instructions shall be carried out in the event of relations being broken off:

1. All codes are to be burned, and when completed the one word 00059 is to be sent.
2. Files of incoming and outgoing telegrams, etc., confidential correspondence are all to be burned.  
(Army Tr. 11/25/42 (C-d))

No. 108

FROM: BERLIN #74 J-19 October 23, 1942  
TO : LISBON

SUMMARY

The framing of the cryptographic code is progressing very well and as we hope to have the burning of the old codes finished by the latter part of November, it seems inadvisable to transfer the code clerks while in the midst of the work. So we have arranged to substitute SAITA for HORIUTI not earlier than the 20th (November). Please acknowledge the above. I expect it will take about a month to complete the book.  
(Army Tr. 11/18/42 (W-d))

NOVEMBER 6, 1942

Japanese reports from South America were being delayed, so they took the precaution of inserting the

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time of sending in the message itself. This provided a check on the service accorded them by the cable company:

No. 109

FROM: BUENOS AIRES (TOMII) #922 (Purple)  
 TO : TOKYO November 6, 1942

1. The "Asahi" special correspondent here has word from his home office that cables sent from October 28 through November 4, through the local Italo Cable, had not arrived by today, the 5th. Furthermore, word has been received from the home office of Italo Cable in Rome that due to bad conditions in Japan, it was impossible to send east of Rome press cables that had been sent from here to Japan, from October 30 to November 2. Please investigate promptly whether there are really these bad conditions in Japan, and let us know. If necessary get in touch also with the Italo Cable head office in Rome.

2. As there is no inquiry from the home office about missing numbers, I suppose that all messages sent through Italo Cable are arriving without delay. If this is not the case, please wire me.

3. In line with your #327<sup>a</sup>, we are now entering in plain text the time when a message is sent, but as the time is apparent, it would be possible for the company to willfully change this figure, therefore I think it should be sent in code or abbreviation code.

Please let me know about this. (Our cable officer thinks that "Transradio" and Italo Cable are now both giving good service.)

a - S.S.D. #52900: Instructions indicating date and time message was dispatched.  
 (Army Tr. 11/18/42)

NOVEMBER 9, 1942

The next message mentions a direction finder, and it may be presumed that the Germans had provided this machine for use of the Japanese.

No. 110

FROM: BERLIN #475 November 9, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

To the 18th corps.

We have had an investigation made concerning the code (machine ?) and documents sent in February and have verified that they arrived at your place, so I believe you will receive them. (The distribution will have been sent).

As the direction finder also arrived at the same time, please get in touch with those concerned.  
(Army Tr. 1/2/43)

NOVEMBER 10, 1942

It was learned from the next dispatch that Mussolini was suffering from stomach ulcers.

No. 111

FROM: SANTIAGO (YAMAGATA) #403 J-19 (C-2)  
TO : BUENOS AIRES (Santiago-Tokyo #884)  
Strictly Secret. (Confirmed report from Rome.)

It is a secret of government and diplomatic circles in Rome that Premier MUSSOLINI is suffering from ulcer of the stomach and is in poor health, and that the Ambassador to Spain is to take his place. In order

to keep up public morale, MUSSOLINI is appearing before the public as often as he can.  
(Army Tr. 11/13/42)

But the informed observer may very well wonder if there was not a leak in our own diplomatic circles, after reading the following news item in American papers:

No. 112

Premier Mussolini of Italy is considering an operation for stomach ulcers, reliable information from the continent said today.

Il Duce's stomach trouble first developed about four years ago, these independent sources with Axis connections said. A recent diagnosis disclosed the ulcers which were said not to be serious at present. (Associated Press, New York, November 24, 1942.)

The Japanese had made every effort to ensure cryptographic security in their communications, and had written a booklet which gave the details necessary for such security:

No. 113

FROM: PEKING                      Extra J-19 November 18, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

From KATO to the telegraphic section. I think it would be helpful to the new Greater East Asia Ministry to have a copy of "Important Details in Which Care is Required for the Preservation of Cryptographic Security," compiled by the Foreign Office telegraphic section, for future reference.

Therefore, how will it be if we turn over our copy of the above together with the codes we hand over? Please reply at once.  
(Army Tr. 11/18/42)

The announcement of the arrival in Tokyo of materials sent from Berlin contained some interesting disclosures. Evidently, the Germans had solved some British and American codes:

No. 114

FROM: TOKYO ~~350000~~ November 10, 1942  
TO : BERLIN (Rikugun)

To Col. HAYASHI

We received today the following which I think you sent on the 31st of January of this year:

Code machine (SU I SEC 2)  
3 wireless sets  
5 digit additives  
British "E" additives  
\*\*\*\*\*

American (diplomatic? Military?) code \*\*\*\*\*  
And the documents from Lt. Col. HIROSE.  
(C.I. 7973 Tr. 3-5-43)

NOVEMBER 16, 1942

Some of the precautions noted above may be observed also in the following dispatch. It is indicative of their complete assurance in the safety of their ciphers that most of their precautions were aimed at espionage agents.

During the last World War the British led the Germans to believe that the remarkable success of the British intelligence services was due to the work of spies. Not only were the German messages being read, but the Germans themselves were disrupted by the paralyzing fear that a high-placed traitor or espionage agent was in their midst. Here are more Japanese security precautions:

No. 115

FROM: TOKYO (Aoki)      Cir. #93 (J-19) November 16, 1942  
TO : HANOI              (Part 2 of 2-part message<sup>a</sup>)

List.

1. Keep the code books in a secure safe and as speedily as possible inaugurate a duty schedule so that there shall be no loopholes. Please wire me regarding the situation in your office and any ideas you may have on the above.
2. Needless to say, if there are any among the codes you hold, specified as "State Secret," they are to be handled with extra-special precaution, but please make it clear that if by any chance there should be any slip, it would have a profound influence, not only on the status of the person responsible, but also on our telegraphic communication.
3. Keep to the smallest possible limit the number of copies made of incoming telegrams.
4. (Destroy completely all work-sheets of telegrams sent ?). Handle original forms now in use in the same manner as copies of incoming telegrams.
5. Offices which allow Chinese messengers entry to the code rooms should change over to Japanese messengers as speedily as possible.

a - Part 1 not available.  
(Army Tr. 12-2-42)

NOV 21 1942

NOVEMBER 21, 1942

As has been pointed out before, the Japanese were very certain of the security of their machine ciphers. Therefore, the sending of these machines to various embassies in Europe was another precautionary measure:

No. 116

FROM: HSINKING #785 J-19 November 21, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

Re your circular to Kuibyshev and Vladivostok #1781<sup>a</sup> and your #752<sup>b</sup>.

1. 1 set printing section, 1 "B" cryptographing section, 1 rectifier<sup>c</sup> (type 3 A-1), and one box of accessories (including 12 "B" and electrical \*\*\*\*\*) have been packed and addressed to the embassy in Kuibyshev.....

The above are now being carefully guarded. Is this all right? For the ones addressed to our embassy in Russia shall I make the address of the sender the embassy in Hsinking or the foreign office in Tokyo?

a - Not available.

b - C. I. #638. Instructions for packing the HINOKI machine.

c - Japanese term — SEIRYUKI.  
(Army Tr. 11/25/42)

NOVEMBER 28, 1942

FROM: LIEBON (MORISHIMA) #858 J-19  
TO : TOKYO November 28, 1942

Will you please arrange to forward a Purple (HINOKI) at the earliest opportunity in the care of someone who is proceeding to his new post in Europe, as you will readily understand the lack of this impedes the

work of this office considerably.  
(Army Tr. 12/2/42)

NOVEMBER 24, 1942

The huge task of compiling a new diplomatic code was nearing completion in Berlin, and some extra compensation was asked for the fifteen men who had been employed at this work:

No. 113

FROM: BERLIN (OSIMA) #1354 (Purple) November 24, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

The work of copying the codes in this office is nearing completion thanks to the efforts of each of the staff, and soon we will begin binding them up.

This work has been unusually difficult for not only have they had to stand at their work in a tightly closed room but in spite of every precaution their clothes and shoes have been damaged by chemicals and liquid boric acid. I feel that we ought at the very least to give the fifteen men who have been working on this job some compensation for their losses, so I would like for you to supply us 300 yen for each of the fifteen who have done this copying, making a total of 4,500 yen. Please cable an answer as to what will be done.

(Army Tr. 11/27/42)

NOVEMBER 28, 1942

Documents sent by couriers were also to be safeguarded, and it was decided that each document should be



given a serial number so that a check could be made at all times. Perhaps, the Japanese had missed some of their documents:

No. 119

FROM: TOKYO  
TO : HANOI  
Cir. #162 J-19,  
November 28, 1942

Because documents sent and received between this office and our foreign offices and foreign joint offices require special secrecy, and to prevent danger of their being lost, it has been decided that from the 1st of December they will be given serial numbers as "regular" or "secret" with a series for each office. If this is already in effect, continue as before.

Transmit this as an ordinary intelligence.  
(Army Tr. 12/2/42)

DECEMBER 4, 1942

Relations with Chile were more precarious than ever at this time, so the following open code was devised to keep Tokyo informed of every eventuality:

No. 120

FROM: BUENOS AIRES (BUEAS)  
TO : TOKYO (AUTUMN)  
#474  
December 4, 1942

(2 parts)

To the General Affairs Section.

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Additions to the list of telegraphic communication symbols between Tokyo and Argentina.

Army.....Yamagata  
Navy.....Togo  
Air Force.....Tokugawa  
Military base established.Kawasaki  
Will?.....Mizemoto

Chile (has decided?) to break relations - Yoshiko is not very well.

Chile (has decided to declare war?) - Yoshiko is seriously ill.

Chile is continuing a neutral attitude - Yoshiko is well.

Propaganda funds - Jinken<sup>a</sup>.

a - Rayon  
(Army Tr. 12/16/42)

DECEMBER 10, 1942

Doubts of the safety of their codes seems to have assailed the Japanese authorities at last. The following dispatch indicates this fact:

DECEMBER 10, 1942

No. 121

FROM: TOKYO #413 (J-19) December 10, 1942  
TO : LISBON

Re part 2 of your #869\*

I am studying this matter seriously; so please wire me an idea of the structure and phraseology of the code you have in mind. Also send me by some safe method the code you construct.

\* S.S.B. #58145 - Re laying better plans for communication.  
(C.I. #784 Inter. 12-10-42 (2) Tr. 12-16-42 (A-1)

DECEMBER 12, 1942

A suggestion that each message be sent half in plain language, and half in code, so as to comply with the limitations imposed on code messages in Argentina, was emphatically rejected:

No. 122

FROM: BUENOS AIRES #1030 (Purple) Dec. 12, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

Re my #1060 (not available)

Since the address and the signature is going to be counted in the limited code messages, I suggest the following to save space:

1. Send several items of business in each wire.

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No. 122 (Cont'd)

2. Divide each message in half, sending one part in plain text and one part in code. Write them so that the message is unintelligible unless you have both parts. On my part I'll be careful that my plain text message will not enable anyone to guess the code.

What would you think about this plan?  
Kindly wire me.  
(C.I. #785 Inter. 12-12-42 (1) Tr. 12-16-42 (I-1))

DECEMBER 23, 1942

No. 123

FROM: TOKYO (Tani) #425 (Purple) Dec. 23, 1942  
TO : BUENOS AIRES

Re your #1030 (C.I. #785)

1. No objections.
2. To encipher a part of a message, no matter how careful you are, jeopardized the system you are using, so please do not do it.

However, in case of necessity, please handle enciphered parts according to the following:

3. You may use TU as a machine cipher. However, put in the indicator for TU - FUJI and encipher everything below the number of the message. Be sure to leave nothing in plain text.  
(C.I. #812 Inter. 12-23-42 (2) Tr. 12-26-42 (A-j))

DECEMBER 17, 1942

The next dispatch is very important. It indicates that Sweden has been supplying Japan with essential war materials, and it also demonstrates that Sweden warned

Japan that the Allies were deciphering her commercial messages:

No. 124

FROM: STOCKHOLM (Okamoto) #441 (J-19 \_\_\_)  
TO : TOKYO December 17, 1942

Re your #157 (not available)

On the 17th, I had some business with the Foreign Office so I called there and talked with the Vice Chief of the Commercial Bureau. (He said that the Chief was away in Germany carrying on negotiations for a commercial pact.) He said to me, "The Swedish Government is very glad that these negotiations are going along nicely in Tokyo. We are doing our very best to satisfy the requests your government makes. About two weeks ago we wired our Ambassador in Tokyo all the details. The only thing is, you see, these things you ask for are very special things and our capacity for the production of them is limited. We couldn't make them all in a jiffy and hand them over to you.

"I want to caution you about one thing. Our workers must not learn that we are sending this stuff to Japan; so we must be very careful."

I replied, "You are right about that. We have got to keep this under our hats, haven't we? I would know that without your even telling me."

The Vice-Chief continued, "Well, I have something in particular I want to ask you to do. Your companies in Berlin, like the Okura Gami, are sending messages to Swedish Companies and your enemies are intercepting them, according to the indications we have. Of course, we have told these Swedish Companies to be on the look-out, and have kept our Tokyo talks absolutely sub rosa. Now, as I have said, I want to ask

you to have your government make these companies stop sending messages which might be harmful. Wireless messages are particularly susceptible to interception."

"I am not sending your caption message to our Ambassador in Berlin, so I hope you will take care of this from Tokyo."

(SIS #59590 Inter. 12-18-42 (3) Trans. 12-22-42 (A-1)

DECEMBER 19, 1942

The news agency "Domei" was used occasionally for collecting diplomatic intelligence, and an effort was now made to disguise this fact:

No. 125

FROM: BUENOS AIRES #1041 (J-19) December 19, 1942  
TO : TOKYO

From now on in sending messages through Domei we will leave out the customary Foreign Office headings and use the full name "Tukamasao" as a signature. Please have an understanding with the Domei head office on this.

(C.I. #819 Inter. 12-19-42 (1) Tr. 12-30-42 (P-1)

Precautions as to the use of numbers in telegrams were also taken. Numbers in a message are always excellent breaking points for cryptanalysts.

No. 126

FROM: SANTIAGO ) Dec. 19, 1942  
TO : WASHINGTON

In order to maintain the order of separately numbered telegrams of a special and confi-

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ORIGINALNo. 126 (Cont'd.)

dential nature, please use the special number only in telegrams enciphered on the machine.  
(C.I. #810 Inter. 12-20-42 (59) Tr. 12-30-42 (G-e)

DECEMBER 22, 1942

Further instructions concerning secret Japanese dealings with Sweden were now issued:

No. 127

FROM: TOKYO (Tani #982 (J-19) December 22, 1942  
TO : BERLIN

Re the message from the Minister to Sweden to the Foreign Minister #441\*.

I have cautioned the commercial firms engaged in trade between Japan and Sweden to be exceedingly careful to maintain the strictest secrecy in connection with their correspondence. As there are Japanese firms in Germany who have no representative living in Sweden who send plain text messages in the course of their business transactions, I wish you to do everything possible to convince them of the necessity of maintaining the strictest secrecy in all their correspondence.

Please forward this to Sweden.

\* S.S.B. #59590 - Re necessity of keeping secret the fact that Sweden is furnishing Japan with goods.  
(SIS #60069 Inter. 12-23-42 (2) Tr. 12-28-42 (E-e)

DECEMBER 23, 1942

Doubt as to the future action of Turkey in the war

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ORIGINAL

caused the Japanese to prepare for rapid evacuation:

No. 128

FROM: TOKYO #131 (Purple) December 23, 1942  
TO : ANKARA

Secret outside the department.  
Re paragraph 1 of your #398 (not available).

Get in touch with the Ministry in Bulgaria and arrange to send it all including A 50, to our Embassy in Berlin.

In the event of an emergency, it takes quite a while to destroy a cipher machine, so please make all preparations in advance.  
(J.I. #857 Inter. 12-23-42 (92) Tr. 1-8-43 (AA-d))

DECEMBER 30, 1942

Precautions, which were ordered in the next dispatch, were the usual ones we have seen in other Japanese messages:

No. 129

FROM: TOKYO Circ. #360 December 30, 1942  
TO : SAIGON

Please take the following steps in connection with your message center:

1. Send us a list of the codes and old Foreign Office keys in your possession.

Lump the codes of the former East Asia Development Company (kept in the Legation) and the Foreign Office Codes together.



No. 129 (Cont'd.)

2. Begin a new numbering series on January 1.

3. Report the names of all message center employees at the end of June and the end of December. Also inspect code books and send in report.

Please report when any new employees are added to staff.

(C.I. #848 Inter. 12-30-42 (3) Tr. 1-7-43 (2-1))

JANUARY 21, 1943

The Japanese had not permitted their most secret code to be used in the offices of the Greater East Asia Bureau:

No. 130

FROM: TOKYO (Tani) #24 (Purple) January 21, 1943  
TO : RCME

As you may remember, your #39-, which was to be relayed to Hanking, was in Purple. How-  
ever, none of our offices in the Greater East  
Asia Area are equipped with this code, so we had  
to paraphrase your message before sending it on.  
Please be careful about this.

Also, please change my #21 (concerning the Japanese-German Economic Pact) to #22.  
(C.I. #894 Inter. 1-21-43 (3) Tr. 1-29-43 (2-d))

MARCH 11, 1943

There was much opposition on the part of Japanese officials to the use of private codes by their commercial

firms in the Greater East Asia Area:

No. 131

FROM: HANCOI (Kuriyama) #217;    March 11, 1943  
 TO : TOKYO

Re your Circular #371 (C.I. #971).

Before the inauguration of the Greater East Asia Ministry, according to instructions from the Foreign Office, the Boeki Tosei Kai, the Toa Kaiun, the Kaigai Kogyo, and the Senpaku Uneikai\* (none of these have private codes), sent their secret request messages through us. - - (2 lines garbled) - -. In the interest of the security of our codes, as far as possible we have urged that private codes be not used. We would like to have your instructions concerning the handling of these request messages.

\* These are various associations concerned with shipping.  
 (C.I. #993 Inter. 3-11-43 (5) Tr1 3-15-43 (I-j))

MARCH 12, 1943

Carelessness in handling codes was rebuked severely by Tokyo in the following dispatches:

No. 132

FROM: TOKYO (Tani) #54;    March 12, 1943  
 TO : BERNE

Well, your number 98\* was certainly some error. To send a message through in Tsu code (Translator's our J-19) straight without any

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL  
1943

No. 132 (Cont'd.)

transposition is frightful from the point of view of secrecy, so please be sure - very sure - that this slip-up never occurs again.

\* S.S.B. #70618.

(Translator's note: Actually, our men worked on this message for 9 days with no success, never suspecting that anyone would have sent such a message untransposed.)  
(C.I. #991 Inter. 3-12-43 (92) Tr. 3-20-43 (A-g))

MARCH 13, 1943

No. 133

FROM: TOKYO (Tani) #58  
TO : BERNE

March 13, 1942

I told you in my circular #39 (C.I. #986) how to compose messages concerning the relinquishment of extra-territoriality in China, but now in your #98 (not available) you come along and tell me that a grave slip-up has been made; therefore, if we still continue to use that code to communicate on this subject, we will make it easy to cryptanalyse. So please, from now on, have messages concerning this matter go through HENOKI.

This certainly was a serious blunder from the point of view of maintaining the secrecy of our messages in this most critical of times. Will you please be good enough to wire me back the name and character of the one who is to blame for it.  
(C.I. #987 Inter. 3-13-43 (3) Tr. 3-16-43 (A-e))

MARCH 19, 1943

The next dispatches indicated that the long-awaited new codes were finally being distributed to the

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL

Japanese Embassies in Europe:

No. 134

FROM: TOKYO (Tani) #94                      March 19, 1943  
TO : ROME

Please get in touch with our Berlin Embassy at once and arrange to have one copy each of HAKATA #1, HAKATA #2, and FUKUOKA transferred from your office through Berlin to the legation in Portugal.

Please relay to Berlin.  
(C.I. #1009 Inter. ? (62) Tr. 3-25-43 (B-d)

MARCH 20, 1943

No. 135

FROM: TOKYO #486                      March 20, 1943  
TO : PEKING

Clerk Kijima expects to arrive in Peking on the 23rd via (Binnai ?) with the CTSU code books.  
(C.I. #1008 Inter. 3-23-43 (5) Tr. 3-25-43 (B-d)

No. 136

FROM: TOKYO #144                      March 20, 1943  
TO : KALGAN

Clerk Kijima will arrive in Kalgan on the 25th with copies of the Foreign Office code and the CTSU code.  
(C.I. #1007 Inter. 3-23-43 (5) Tr. 3-25-43 (B-d)

MARCH 24, 1943

No. 137

FROM: TOKYO No Nr. 1 March 24, 1943  
TO : DUBLIN

Re part 2 of your #19\*.

We are considering methods for making this key more secure, so please wait for instructions from us.

\* Evidently a mistake for #18 - C.I. #924.  
(C.I. #1010 Inter. — (93) Tr. 3-24-43 (B-d))

This ends the record to date of Japanese security measures. Many improvements were made in both their diplomatic and military communication systems, though it can be safely said that the diplomatic codes have not become as difficult as the military ciphers. The Japanese Navy has been making such strides in security precautions that fear concerning the small amount of intelligence which will be derived from enemy messages in the future, by some American authorities.

Although it may be said that no code or cipher, except a one-time system, has as yet withstood determined attack by experts, the publicity concerning the solution of codes and ciphers has resulted in such advances in

security that solutions, which once could be achieved by relatively few experts and simple means, now require complex machinery and large forces of personnel. Moreover, what is more important, solution has become so difficult and time-consuming that the problem of obtaining intelligence in time to be of operational value may soon be almost insurmountable.

It is for this reason that American cryptanalysts have not been idle in trying to eliminate the dangers of careless publicity. We shall now watch their activities in this respect in the next chapter.

CONFIDENTIAL  
[Redacted Box]

Chapter V

American Measures Against Communication

Intelligence Publicity

Summary<sup>I</sup>

As early as June, 1939, the President of June 26 1939 the United States, the Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt, had decreed that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage matters would be controlled by the F.B.I., and Army and Navy Intelligence divisions. The directors of these agencies were to function as a coordinating committee.<sup>I</sup> After Pearl Harbor these agencies conferred on specific details of their responsibilities, and issued a secret agreement coordinating special intelligence operations in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>2</sup> Feb. 25 1942

---

(1) Documents accompanying the text will be found in Appendix II. Hereafter, references will be made to these documents as follows: II, No. 1.  
(2) II, No. 2.

March 28  
1942

Some very important correspondence passed between the Director of Naval Intelligence and the State Department at the time. It was occasioned by the arrest of Axis agents in Brazil, which had brought about the disclosure of the fact that their messages had been intercepted and read by American cryptanalysts. The Director of Naval Intelligence suggested that the State Department be the determining agency in deciding what the proper course of action should be in regard to future discoveries of clandestine operations. Obviously, there was much concern about the unwise dissemination of the results of communication intelligence activities. The State Department welcomed the suggestion of the Director, and instituted several conferences by those who were most concerned in the matter.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, the Navy Department not only was April requesting a tightening up of security precautions by 1942 others, but was also restricting the handling of communication intelligence within its own circles.<sup>4</sup>

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(3) II, Nos. 3-4-5-6.  
(4) II, Nos. 7-8.



June  
1942

On June 18, 1942, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee sent a letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff which suggested that Presidential approval be obtained for the limitation of cryptanalytical activities in America to the Army, Navy, and the F.B.I.<sup>5</sup>

June 20  
1942

It was about this time that Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, issued an important bulletin to his Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and the Southwest Pacific Force. It stressed the extreme importance of radio intelligence as a reliable source of enemy information, and warned that every precaution must be taken to avoid drying up of its source. Strict regulations controlling the dissemination and use of radio intelligence were set forth in this bulletin.<sup>6</sup>

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(5) II, No. 9.  
(6) II, No. 10.

5 APR 1947

June 30  
1942

To return to the conferences going on between the Army, Navy, and F.B.I., a tentative allocation was made on June 30, 1942, of the cryptanalytical duties of each agency.<sup>7</sup> Following the suggestion of the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Com-

July 6  
1942

mittee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memorandum to the President of the United States requesting that the above allocation of duties be given Presidential approval.<sup>8</sup> The President then sent a memorandum to

July 8  
1942

the Director of the Budget which indicated his agreement with the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It ordered the discontinuance of cryptanalytical units in other than the organizations of the Army, Navy, and the F.B.I.<sup>9</sup>

Sept. 24  
1942

The request of Ambassador Claude G. Bowers for certain decoded dispatches brought a statement of policy from representatives of U.S. Naval Communication Intelligence, which explained the reasons for

- 
- (7) II, No. 11.  
(8) II, No. 12.  
(9) II, No. 13.

denying the request.<sup>10</sup> Suggestions were also made  
November for eliminating some of the possible sources of leaks  
1942 which had led to undesirable publicity.<sup>11</sup> An Alnav  
 from the Secretary of the Navy reminded all naval per-  
 sonnel that no mention was even to be made of the  
 nature of the sources of naval intelligence.<sup>12</sup>

Dec. 11 The Secretary of War, in agreement with the  
1942 Secretary of the Navy, sent the Director of Censor-  
 ship a valuable suggestion that the "Code of Wartime  
 Practices for the American Press" be revised to  
 include the following paragraph:

Enemy Communications

To the end that the enemy may not have  
information concerning any success we may at-  
tain in deciphering his encoded or enciphered  
communications, no mention should be made of  
available or captured enemy codes or enemy  
ciphers, or about the intelligence gained from  
intercepting and studying enemy radio messages.<sup>13</sup>

- 
- (10) II, No. 14.  
 (11) II, No. 15-16.  
 (12) II, No. 17.  
 (13) II, No. 18, 18A, 18B.

Dec. 17  
1942

The Director of Naval Communications delivered another statement of policy concerning the disclosure of communication intelligence activities when he forwarded the results of some interceptions on clandestine stations to the authorities concerned.<sup>14</sup> The proper procedure to adopt in dealing with the clandestine stations was finally agreed upon by representatives of the Army, Navy, and F.B.I.

Feb. 6  
1943

In March, 1943, Admiral King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, issued another bulletin to his major commanders in regard to the controls to be exercised over the dissemination and use of communication intelligence. It pointed out that momentary tactical advantage was seldom worth the risk of compromising the source, for such compromise would stop the flow of information and thereby vitally affect operations on all fronts and in all areas.<sup>16</sup>

- 
- (14) II, No. 19.  
(15) II, No. 21.  
(16) II, No. 22.

Dec. 26  
1942

It is evident from all the foregoing that American authorities have become keenly conscious of the delicate nature of communication intelligence activities. Though errors have been made in some instances, definite action has been taken to make recurrences improbable. It is imperative that no further damage be done by avoidable leaks. The fate of thousands of American lives has often been held in the balance during the present war while communication intelligence experts hurriedly strove to pick fragments of information from intercepted messages. Had they failed to be successful, the war in the Pacific might well have taken a different turn. It is hoped that from now on, American cryptanalysts and traffic analysts will have to deal only with the obstacles created by an ingenious and treacherous enemy, and that their success will not be endangered by carelessness on the part of their own people. As for the feeling of the press in regard to what might be considered a violation of their freedom, the following passage reflects what must be the attitude of every truly American journalist:

SUGGESTIONS

Censorship is foreign to the American idea and is always suspect. There have been two main purposes of censorship, so far. The first has been to prevent dissemination of information that would be helpful to the enemy or, even more importantly, directly harmful to our own forces and operations. As to the necessity for such censorship, there can be no question. After the Battle of Midway, there was a newspaper publication which revealed that America had broken the Japanese naval code. In consequence, our naval forces in the Pacific were deprived of priceless information. After Pearl Harbor, one newspaper columnist undertook to reveal (monstrously exaggerated) the full extent of our losses. The syndicate handling the column refused to distribute it and the author, under pressure, also recalled it, but one newspaper did, through error, publish it. Information of that character is of extraordinary value to the enemy. As between an ethical professional requirement that a journalist hold nothing back and a patriotic duty not to shoot one's own soldiers in the back, we have found no difficulty in making a choice. Freedom of the press does not carry with it a general license to reveal our secret strengths and weaknesses to the enemy. (WINSTON CHURCHILL AMERICAN LETTER, 12/26/42.)

CHAPTER VISuggestions for the Future

The constant efforts of American naval and military authorities to suppress publicity concerning the success of communication intelligence have already been noted, and many excellent reasons for such a procedure have been established. It is felt, however, that two-fold action is necessary in any future instance where victory is achieved by possessing knowledge of the enemy's plans prior to an attack.

It is recommended that the following methods be employed:

I. Negative Approach.

As has been suggested in the preceding chapter (V), each newspaper, magazine, newsreel and radio reporter must be requested, and, if necessary, prevented from making any disclosure of communication intelligence success. Freedom of speech will not be involved, since all right thinking men draw a line between liberty and license. No one has the right to jeopardize



thousands of lives for the sake of one sensational scoop.

2. Positive Approach.

This is even more important than the negative approach. It means issuing immediately, after each future engagement, a fictitious account of the remarkable scouting performance of one of our submarines or planes, which has led to the discovery of the enemy. It is interesting to note that a naval aviator was honored with a medal for discovering the Japanese forces at Midway, but this came too late to have any effect on the previous publicity engendered by the Chicago Tribune and Walter Winchell. The recent success of General MacArthur's planes in destroying a Japanese convoy of twenty-two vessels was handled well. The intelligence which made this precedent establishing air raid a possibility was furnished by a unit of the U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence. However, the newspapers published the fact that the enemy's plans had been revealed through the discovery of the convoy by an American observation plane. The newspaper article about the importance of scouting submarines at Midway, which was

mentioned in a preceding chapter, was another instance of good publicity, since it drew attention away from Communication Intelligence success.

### 3. Post War Period.

The combination of the preceding negative and positive methods should ensure adequate protection for cryptanalytical work in the future. The problem of post war activities along these lines should not be overlooked, either. Now is the time to prepare against any revelations which may jeopardize the existence of a tightly knit, well trained and coordinated Naval Communication Intelligence organization. It is imperative that once the United States falls heir to much of the post war responsibility for restoring peace throughout the world, she be able to know what subversive forces are at work to sabotage her efforts. The responsibilities of the U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence Organization are very great in this present war; they will be even greater in the future peace.

ALUTIAN INVASION

APPENDIX IBACKGROUND OF THE ALEUTIANS CAMPAIGN

Though it may be said that the Aleutians Campaign was merely a diversion to ensure Japanese success at Midway, the strength of the forces involved and the strategic importance of the area made the northern attacks very important in themselves. The Aleutians became even more significant after the major threat to Midway and Pearl Harbor had been successfully turned back, for the Japanese had succeeded in obtaining a foothold there. It should be remembered, of course, that the Japanese plans for an assault on the Aleutians had been known by the United States Navy for some time before operations began. Chapter III (and App. III) in Volume I, which deal with the Battle of Midway, mentioned the existence of this danger. The evidence which disclosed Japanese intentions in the Aleutian area will now follow.

Messages are catalogued under the date they were translated, e.g., a message of May 19 will be found under May 22, since it was deciphered only on the latter date.<sup>1</sup>

-MARCH 9, 1942

As early as March 9, 1942 there were vague indications of possible enemy operations in the Aleutians. Though far from definite, this next message served as a warning to watch for future actions:

No. 1

FROM: COM16                      3091400      March 9, 1942  
TO:    COM14  
      CINCPAC  
      OPNAV  
      COMINCH  
      COMSOWESPAC

...(3) 1st air attack force in discussing air operations with 5th Fleet gives impression these two units arranging as yet unknown operations northern sector involving close coordination sea and air activities. Same forces involved in Bali-Java attack. Appear to be replenishments and upkeep schedules 9 to 19 March staying at Kendari and Makassar City areas.

It was remarked:

"If this impression is correct it may indicate possible operations against Aleutian Islands with air and sea forces."

---

(1) Beginning on May 15, 1942 Radio Intelligence Summaries were issued twice daily in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department. Messages after May 15 are catalogued in this appendix according to the date on which they appear in the Summary.

ORIGINAL

5 APR 1942

APRIL 22, 1942

In April there was a reference to a Northward Force, but nothing of value could be gleaned from this.

No. 2

FROM: BELLCONNEN #220430 April 22, 1942  
TO: OPNAV  
CINCPAC  
COMIL  
COMINCH  
COMANZAC  
COML6

#102 says that in compliance with Northward Force Operations Order Number 58, this detachment being unable to go to Yokosuka in order to refuel will stop at \_\_\_\_\_ instead.

It was noted:

\* appears to be call for unidentified

Maru."

APRIL 26, 1942

That the Japanese were interested in the scouting activities of planes in the Alsatians, as well as in Hawaii, was evident from the following:

No. 3

FROM: COMIL #261916 April, 1942  
TO: OPNAV  
CINCPAC  
BELLCONNEN  
COMINCH  
COMANZAC  
COML6

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) According to a Jaluit Radio station Intelligence Report dated the 25th, and only partly readable, the Americans are operating 6 planes in the Aleutian (or Alaska) Area, and 24 planes in the Oahu Area for scouting operations.

APRIL 27, 1942

The first definite clue concerning the Aleutians came from a request of the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Second Fleet for charts of the Gulf of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and the Bering Sea. With this as a signal of danger, great care was taken from this time on to prevent the growing importance of the Midway Campaign from obscuring the Aleutian developments. Here is the message itself:

No. 4

FROM: COM14 #271032 April 27, 1942  
TO: COMINCH  
OPNAV  
CINCPAC  
BELLCOMWEM  
COM16  
COMANZAG

(CinC 2nd Fleet), #590, April 27 requests that charts be delivered to his office and all ships under his command including areas 50 to 61° north and 140° west to 65 east (probably means 165 east). He makes special reference to charts or monographs of coastal areas near above region.

ORIGINAL

From (Jaluit Radio) Serial 521,  
of May 1 as follows: U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence  
Report (0400, 1 May) 14 Naval planes were heard.  
Apparently an air patrol for units sortieing.

Com 14 remarked:

A greatly intensified interest in air operations in Hawaiian, Alaskan and Samoan Area has been shown by Japanese recently. All messages are priority while this one alone was urgent.

Washington observed:

This is remanifestation of an impending campaign — the preoccupation of Radio Intelligence and Direction Finder units with the area in which the campaign is to be undertaken.

No. 6

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV  
COM16  
BZLCOINVEN

#011108, May 1, 1942  
#011136,  
#011112,  
#011138,  
#011132.

Various Radio Intelligence stations have recently exhibited interest in Aleutians. Best indicator of future operations is Tokyo Office which assigns place name designators. Last January this office listed places in Aleutians indicating they were areas of forthcoming operations. Therefore, second choice for operations of available forces is raid in Aleutians. This is considered unlikely at this time, but certainly probable at a later date. CinC Second Fleet will command available forces.



ORIGINAL  
7 11 1942

May 5, 1942

No. 7

FROM: COMIL  
TO: COMINCH  
BELLCONMEM  
OPNAV  
COMANZAC  
CINCPAC  
COM16

#050926 May 5, 1942

From Jaluit #541, 1st Part of 2 -  
says that as of 0600 on the 3rd there were 8 planes  
heard in Oahu area, 2 in Midway, 2 in Palmyra, 2 in  
KL area and 22 in AOE area. Can Opnav identify  
last 2 places? First one in Sitka or Canada; last  
are probably Dutch or Kodiak.

It was commented:

KL is unknown  
AOE is Dutch Harbor.

MAY 9, 1942

Weather reports which were absolutely essential  
for Alaskan operations were being gathered by the  
Japanese from their aerological ships.

No. 8

FROM: BELLCONMEM  
TO: COMINCH  
OPNAV  
CINCPAC  
COMANZAC  
COMIL  
COM16

#090720 May 9, 1942



(2) Main Aerological Ship continues reporting weather from northern area and indications are that she is gathering weather information probably for future projected operations.

It was observed:

This comment probably comes from CinC 2nd's recent order for charts of the Aleutian Islands.

MAY 14, 1942

Decryption of a Japanese message gave some very important departure dates for the Aleutian forces.

No. 9

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV  
#140732 May 14, 1942  
#140746

From Desron 1 to Cine 1st Fleet, #40, May 11, 1942: "Operations schedule for this unit (less 2 Desdivs) is as follows: (1) This unit less units mentioned above will depart Sasebo between 18 and 20 May, and will be \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ May where Desdiv \_\_\_\_\_ (less LDB) will join up. From there we will depart for the scene of forthcoming operations. (2) Desdiv \_\_\_\_\_ will screen Cardiv 3 as far as the Operations Area. (3) Desdiv \_\_\_\_\_ (less 1 DB) will depart Sasebo on \_\_\_\_\_ May as a screen Hiei as far as \_\_\_\_\_ Shima Channel. (4) Departing Sasebo May 26 and proceeding to the Operations Area. (Note - discrepancy in dates here.)

Com 14 commented:

Note inclusion of Combatdiv 3. He has been recently connected with Cardivs 1 and 2 who do not appear. This may be a local movement within the Empire but is believed connected with the projected operations mentioned previously by us. Recent air operations and critique in Kyushu may have been rehearsal.

MAY 15, 1942.

Details of the Japanese preparations for this campaign were garnered from occasional messages such as the following:

No. 10

FROM: (Comdesron 1) 7045 May 13

(ONLY PARTLY READABLE)

(1) Reference my serial 42, paragraph 7: the motor boats for the AOB Occupation Force desires handle \_\_\_\_\_. (2) Request 1200 meters of hose for \_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ (or some branch).

Com 14 remarked (May 15):

AOB is Aleutian Area.

The identification of AOB was a matter of considerable importance, since the specific place

of attack in the Aleutians was not yet definitely known. Back on December 5, 1941 a message (#771) from FUATU, which was a section of the Japanese Naval General Staff, gave AOB as a place designator for Kiska. For that reason OP-20-G maintained that Kiska was the principal objective of the Japanese. Estimates of other Japanese area designators were able to be made after the next message was received.

No. 11

FROM: COM14  
TO: CPNAV  
CCMINTCH  
CINCPAC  
CCMANZAC  
HULLCORNER

#151144 May 15, 1942

From #277, of May 12: "What appears to be a boat (call) G6GQ, 4265 klcs. at 1915 was in vicinity of AOI. Communicating with NFR (AOE).

It was commented:

AOE estimated to be Dutch Harbor  
AOI estimated to be Adak  
NFR estimated to be Radio Dutch Harbor  
G6GQ on 12th decipherers into NICE = USS CASCO

Arrangements for fueling the Aleutian Force had to be made, and such messages as the following accorded bits of information:

No. 12

FROM: COM14  
TO: COMINCH  
CINCPAC  
HELLCOMNEN  
OPNAV  
COMANZAC  
COM16

#151142 May 15, 1942

From [redacted] to A MARU, A MARU (in Kure), a fleet unit (believed in Crudiv 6 in New Britain), a ship (in Malay Force): This unit will execute 2 Campaign. (Place in Northern Japan) has been decided upon as the port of departure. Upon receipt of operations orders all units will complete preparations and depart. Top off fuel, etc at Ominato.          arrange for berths at          prior to departure.

Comment from Com 14:

[redacted] is 5th Fleet. Ominato is in Northern Honshu.

The date for beginning operations was fast approaching as this next message demonstrates:

3 MAY 1942

No. 13

FROM: COM11  
 TO: OPNAV  
 COMSOPAC  
 CINCIPAC  
 COMANZAC  
 HELLCONHEM

#151144 May 15, 1942

----- #574, of 14th to Chief of Staff com-  
 bined Fleet: Only partly readable but indicates  
 that date of attack changed. Data of Cardiv 3 and  
 Crudiv departing from port in Northern Japan,  
is set as SONIKU (or Shaku) (Re) Cardiv 3, Desdiv  
and Crudiv arrive Ominato.

It was noted:

Cardiv 3 on May 13 was associated by traffic  
 analysis with Supply Offices in Sasebo, Kure and  
 Yokosuka. A decryption on May 11 indicated that  
 Desron 1 was in the vicinity of Sasebo and would  
 escort Cardiv 3 to scene of forthcoming operations  
 between May 18 and 20. Soniku (or Shaku) is date  
 of sortie from Northern Japan for AOB operations.

Dispatches concerning Midway as well as the  
 Aleutians were being intercepted and deciphered at  
 this time (c. Vol. I, Ch. III), and it was obvious  
 that the two campaigns would develop in conjunction.  
On May 15, 1942 an operational analysis of the available  
intelligence was made, which clearly indicated the  
future main movements of the Japanese. An attack on

the Aleutians would be made on May 30-31 to divert the attention of the U.S. Navy. This Striking Force would retire on June 3. Meanwhile, a Japanese Striking Force would arrive at Midway on May 30, and would retire June 2. It was also thought that a second force would reach Midway on June 6, and retire June 9.

MAY 16, 1942

Another operational estimate based on the information gleaned from enemy messages was made on May 16, 1942. This said that the attack on Midway would probably be on June 1, though the Japanese forces could arrive on May 30. The same opinion was held concerning the Aleutians, where the probable date was fixed at June 2 or 3, despite the fact that it was known the AOB force could strike on May 30. Incidentally, these estimates concerning the Aleutians were based on the feeling that Dutch Harbor would be the probable object of attack rather than the less important Kiska as indicated by Radio Intelligence. The importance of these operational estimates must

ORIGINAL  
3 APR 1942

not be overlooked, for it may be said that for the first time in the history of the United States a major disposition of the American fleet was governed by information furnished by Radio Intelligence. Under the circumstances it took great courage on the part of operational authorities to risk so much on this relatively untried source of intelligence.

MAY 16, 1942

Traffic analysis was able to indicate some associations of Japanese ships, which furnished hints as to the ultimate makeup of the Aleutian forces.

No. 14

FROM: HELLGOWEN  
TO: OPNAV

#160717 May 16, 1942

Cardiv 3 currently associated with 5th fleet is now appearing in traffic heading with CinC 1st, Crudiv 7 plus HAYA and ATAGO, Desdivs 21 and 17 plus 2 unidentified calls which may be additional Cruiser or 2 Destroyer Divs. These associations may indicate preparations for operations Northward. This force may operate jointly under CinC 1st and 5th Fleets.

It was observed:



5 APR 1943

Cardiv 3 has been formerly indicated associated with 5th Fleet, Desron 1, Subron 3, Batdiv 3, Subron 1, Combined Fleet. An unidentified Desdiv of Desron 1 will screen Cardiv 3 as far as the Operations Area (18-20 May?). CinC 1st Air Fleet says that 3 crystals are to be given Cardiv 3. Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and another carrier will receive 3 crystals each. The Commander in Chiefs 1st and 5th Fleet have been associated in other dispatches with similar addressees. Maya and Atago are carriers.  
(Summary, 161500, May, 1942, Pg. 1)<sup>1</sup>

MAY 17, 1942

No. 15

FROM: COMIL  
TO: OPHAV

171026 May 17, 1942

From: (5th Fleet) #602 May 16, 1942

#5 Weather Observation Vessel unit will prepare to proceed to \_\_\_\_\_; however, #1 to #5 (billeting party) ship will be ready to proceed by May 20. This is Northern Force Operation Order #22.

It was remarked:

Cardiv 3, Crudiv 7, MAYA, ATAGO, Desdivs 17 and 21, and 2 unidentified calls are associated with CinC 1st Fleet and the 5th Fleet: these associations may indicate preparations for operations Northward. Subrons 1 and 3 and #1 Air Attack Force also associated with 5th Fleet.  
(Summary, 171400, May, 1942)

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(1) All references at the end of each message, e.g. (Summary, 161500, May, 1942, Pg. 1), are to the Radio Intelligence Summaries issued twice each day in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.

MAY 18, 1942

No. 16

FROM: COMINT  
TO: OPNAV

180050 May 18, 1942

Association Desron 1, Consubron 1 (aboard or in company with HACHI) and 5th Fleet continued with indications they will operate in or from Kuriles Area.

It was commented:

Subron 1 has recently been connected with Cardiv 3 but only in traffic intelligence. It has been in the Yokosuka Area and is believed to be attached to the 4th Fleet. Comdesron 1 sent a dispatch 13 May about the motor boats for ACB (in Aleutian Area) Occupation Force and will very likely be in that campaign.  
(Summary, #180600, May, 1942)

MAY 19, 1942

The Japanese changed their call signs fairly frequently, but fortunately traffic analysis, plus some decryption, kept the situation well in hand. It will be remembered (cf. Vol. I, Ch. III) that the Japanese did not change their basic code until May 28th, long after both the Midway and Aleutian Campaigns had been discovered.

SECRET

5 APR 1943

No. 17

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#190006 May 19, 1942

Level of priority dispatches remains high in a normal traffic volume. All service calls apparently changed at midnight, shore stations positive and fleet probably.

It was noted:

It is believed only Major Fleet Commands and Shore Station calls changed. Ship units seem to be the same.  
(Summary, #190600, May, 1942)

To be successful in the Aleutian Area, the Japanese were fully conscious that the American submarine menace must be countered. Therefore, special exercises to test the depth charge equipment on their patrol boats were ordered.

No. 18

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#181906 May 18, 1942

From (5th Fleet) #629, May 17, to Tokyo addressees, 5th Flt. Patrol Force: #2 Patrol Boat Group: Since the Number 5 HAKU MARU of the 2nd Patrol Boat Groups is to be used for patrol of the base area in the 10 area, request you arrange to have 1 gun for use against subs and depth charges (or depth charge equipment) installed as soon as possible.

311

ORIG: 11  
3 172 1942

It was remarked:

AO area is Aleutian Islands Area.  
(Summary, #190600, May, 1942)

No. 19

FROM: COMLL #190642 May 19, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

From (unidentified) #630, May 17:  
Since the No. 5 Shirotetsu Maru is to be used for patrol in the AO area during the forthcoming campaign please have \_\_\_\_\_ completed.  
(Summary, #190600, May, 1942)

No. 20

FROM: COMLL #190346 May 19, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

From (ATAGO) #279, May 18: On the 19th the ATAGO and TAKAO have been ordered to carry out (type exercise No. 2) and test of depth charge racks. These ships will accordingly depart \_\_\_\_\_ on the 22nd and arrive (in Northern Japan) on the morning of the 25th.  
(Summary, #190600, May, 1942)

Keeping track of the movements of the Northern units was necessary so as to know when the Japanese would be leaving their home waters.

No. 21

FROM: COMLL #190948 May 19, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

From (ATAGO) #280, May 18: After the destroyers of your unit which have been

ORIGINAL  
8 1942

assigned to the Northern Force arrive at Ominato, they should join (2nd section Crudiv 4?). For your information our movements are as follows: Depart \_\_\_\_\_ at 0800, 22nd, arrive \_\_\_\_\_ forenoon, 25th.

It was indicated:

According to traffic analysis the ATAGO has been addressed as a separate unit in traffic including CinC 5th, 6th Air Attack, Cardiv 3, Desron 1, Yokosuka and Ominato Commandants. Decryption indicated on 14 May that the ATAGO and TAKAGI were ordered to make a test on the 19th of May of depth charge racks and would arrive in a Northern Japanese Port on the morning of the 25th. Incidentally, Melbourne (#190840, in translating the above text said "Depart Kure at 0800, of 22nd. (Summary, #191400, May, 1942)

An estimate based on traffic analysis was now made of the Japanese forces slated to take part in the Aleutian attack.

No. 22

FROM: COM14 #190006 May 19, 1942  
TO: CENAV

From Traffic analysis the following group is to operate in southeastern Pacific under CinC 5th Fleet:  
Subron 1 with flag in NACHI;  
Desron 1 consisting of  
Desdive

The latter is now in Truk Area but may rejoin with Crudiv 5. Cardiv 3 plus carrier and may be KORYU; which is

ATAGO as a separate unit;  
5th Fleet Patrol Vessels;  
and MARUS;  
portion of Airon 23 and  
6th Air Attack Corps.

(Summary, #190600, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

It was observed:

This should be northeastern Pacific in connection with the attack on the Aleutians. Com 14 made the correction in #192128, Cetyh. (Summary, #200600, May, 1942)

MAY 20, 1942

More evidence that the Japanese air forces in the North were being strengthened came from this:

No. 23

FROM: BELCORNEW  
TO: OPHAY

#190740 May 19, 1942

Chief of Staff, Airon 22, of 3rd Air Attack Force, was shown at Tatayama giving further indication this command will operate with Northern Air Force.

It was mentioned:

On May 15 traffic analysis indicated that Airon 22 might return to the Empire to join 1st Air Attack Force in operations with the 5th Fleet. Tatayama is on Boosa Peninsula in Yokohama Area.

(Summary, 200600, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

The exercises to test the depth charge equipment of the cruisers assigned to the Alsatian Campaign were now completed.

No. 24

FROM: BELCONHEM  
TO: OPNAV

#200550 May 20, 1942

(Cruciv 7?), #171, May 19, 1942,  
reports exercises completed. Cancelled night  
exercises because of weather.  
(Summary, 201400, May, 1942)

No. 25

FROM: BELCONHEM  
TO: OPNAV

#200556 May 20, 1942

From (ATAGO), #286, May 19, 1942:  
ATAGO left 0830 and arrived KurellCC.  
"Blank" after ATAGO possibly TAKAO.

It was noted:

Cruisers, including ATAGO, were indicated by decryption 15 May to have had depth charge racks altered. Decryption May 18 indicated that on the 19th, the ATAGO and TAKAO were ordered to carry out (type exercises Number 2) and test of depth charge racks. These ships were to depart \_\_\_\_\_ on the 22nd and arrive (in Northern Japan) on the morning of the 26th.

(Summary, #201400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

An interesting example of how closely all radio messages are inspected in modern traffic analysis can be seen in the following dispatch, where this one reference was deemed worthy of attention.

No. 26

FROM: BELCONWEN #200734 May 20, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

ATAGO originated short dispatch apparently movement report, and also association of this vessel with 5th Fleet was noted. One instance of association is noted between tentatively identified Batdiv 2 and 5th Fleet.

It was remarked:

Decryption on May 1 indicated that Batdiv 2 was available for other defensive or offensive tasks. On May 17 Batdiv 2 was associated with Combined Fleet in the Urgent 4-part dispatch of that date originated by the Communication Officer of the Combined Fleet.  
(Summary, #201400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

It will be recalled that there was some question in certain quarters concerning the correctness of the identification by Radio Intelligence of ACB as Kiska. This inspired the following message:



ORIGINAL

No. 27

FROM: COM11  
TO: OPNAV

#202142 May 20, 1942

AREA DESIGNATORS

"AOA" is Chickagof; "ACC" is Agatha. These identifications were obtained from a message giving the location of "AO's" and "AP's". AOB was not mentioned.

It was remarked:

This is in answer to Opnav 191840 -- "Request comment on possibility of following Area Designator identifications: AOA - Uninak, AOB - Akun, ACC - Akutan.  
(Summary, 210600, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

MAY 21, 1942

The base at Ominato loomed large in Japanese preparations for the coming campaign. Evidently, it was to be the center of supplies for all the units.

No. 28

FROM: BULCOMNAV  
TO: OPNAV

#201305 May 20, 1942

From (Desron 1) #062 May 19, 1942  
Reference this Force message #40: In schedule of this Force (less Code Groups and ) make following revisions: (1) This Force less \_\_\_\_\_ will depart Sasebo 1000 (-9) on

20th; will rendezvous with (Code Group  
at \_\_\_\_\_; will arrive Ominato on morning of 22nd.  
(2) Desron \_\_\_\_\_ (less Code Groups \_\_\_\_\_ and  
and second section of Crudiv 4 \_\_\_\_\_ to Ominato

(Summary, #210600, May, 1942, Pg. 2)

No. 29

FROM: BELCONMEN  
TO: OPRNAV

#201305 May 20, 1942

— (Desron 1), #063, May 19, 1942:  
This is an order for Desron \_\_\_\_\_ (less Code Group  
to \_\_\_\_\_ Ominato in accordance with orders  
of the Commanding Officer of the ATAGO. \_\_\_\_\_ Unit  
(Code Group \_\_\_\_\_ will rendezvous with another  
vessel (code group \_\_\_\_\_ on course 040, speed 16,  
at 1800 (-9) 20 May, 13 miles north of \_\_\_\_\_ Point.  
Remainder not readable.  
(Summary, #210600, May, 1942, Pg. 2)

No. 30

FROM: CHIEF OF STAFF, 5th Fleet #577 May 14, 1942  
TO: COMDESRON 1 ( \_\_\_\_\_ others)

Ominato (?) has been designated as the  
(Operating Center ?) for this fleet's (?) operations  
during the (second phase ?). All units be prepared  
to proceed there immediately upon issuance of the  
operation order. Fueling repairs, supplies, etc.  
will be at Ominato.  
(Summary, #210600, May, 1942, Pg. 2)

Traffic analysis of enemy messages offered  
several interesting possibilities, which appeared as  
follows:

ORIGINAL

No. 31

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#202328 May 20, 1942

Comdesron I traffic continued in association with 5th Fleet, Cardiv 3, and ATAGO, Desdivs plus an unidentified

It was observed:

Com 14 traffic analysis suggests to be 1st Fleet. and are believed part of Desron 1. is believed by Belconnan to be Desdiv 17. Desron 1, ATAGO, Cardiv 3, and 5th Fleet have been previously associated.  
(Summary, #210600, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

No. 32.

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#202214 May 20, 1942  
#202328

Tokyo Radio broadcasting to Northern Forces on 5635 kcs. is also new. Russian station Diomedes (VWV) causes interference. This is possibly intentional. Inauguration of this broadcast is believed to indicate that Northern Force has commenced operations.

It was observed:

It is believed the Northern Force will operate against AOB (some place in the Aleutians).  
(Summary, #211400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

No. 33

FROM: BELLCONNEM  
TO: OPHAV

#210657 May 21, 1942

Tokyo Operations Section sent long 5-part  
dispatch probably relative to forthcoming operations,  
to all ships and stations.  
(Summary, #211400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

A bulletin from the U.S. Hawaiian unit discussed  
the probable cruiser strength of the Japanese Northern  
forces.

No. 34

FROM: CINCPAC  
TO: OPHAV

#210329 May 21, 1942  
#Bull. 67

2 cruisers of Crudiv 4 expected to operate  
with forces northeast of Japan.

It was indicated:

This is probably deduced from (unident.)  
#260 of May 18, in which 4th Crudiv ? and 2nd Desdiv?  
are to be included in the Northern Force to arrive  
at Ominato. Also the Force expects to leave Kure  
0800 22 May for \_\_\_\_\_ on the morning of the 25th  
(Com 14 - 190948 )  
(Summary, 211400, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

The addition of several units to the Japanese  
Northern Forces was learned from the following decrypted  
dispatches:

ORIGINAL

5 1942

No. 35

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#210908 May 21, 1942

From Tuyo 4 (Cardiv 3), #847, May 19, 1942,  
to (A cruiser? or Air tender?): Effective  
your unit has been ordered to join the Northern  
Force. This unit proceeding to (in Northern Japan)  
arriving (blank) date. Please inform us at once of  
your schedule.

It was indicated:

This ship is believed enroute Yokosuka and  
went south with the Ryukaka as far as Truk. In  
view of this order coming from Cardiv 3 it seems  
more than likely it is an air tender.  
(Summary, #211400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

No. 36

FROM: BELCORNEM  
TO: OPNAV

#210424 May 21, 1942

From HOSORU (Unidentified) #108, May 19, 1942

Komogawa Maru departed Chinkai  
0400 18th for \_\_\_\_\_ and will arrive 17 \_\_\_\_\_  
on the 22nd.

It was observed:

From the length of the run the most likely  
place is the northwest coast of Japan, or in the  
vicinity of Shanghai.  
(Summary, #211400, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

321

No. 37

FROM: BELCONNEM  
TO: OPNAV

#210740 May 21, 1942

From (2nd Fleet): Crudiv 5 (ATAGO, TAKAO and \_\_\_\_\_); Batdiv 3 (Kongo, Earuna and \_\_\_\_\_); Desron 4 less 1 Div, Subron 10, ship \_\_\_\_\_ and Desdiv of Desron 4 departed Yokosuka at 1400.

It was remarked:

This was covered by Com 14 191610 with substantially the same results.  
(Summary, 211400, May, 1942, Pg. 5)

No. 38

FROM: BELCONNEM  
TO: OPNAV

#210740 May 21, 1942

From (CinC Combined Flt.) #153  
May 17, 1942.

Referring to \_\_\_\_\_ message 148, Crudiv 5 less Mati and Desdiv \_\_\_\_\_ are to be deleted from the South Seas Force and \_\_\_\_\_ respectively and included in the Northern Force. Desdiv (same one) and Crudiv 5 are to remain under command of that Commander until return to home waters.

It was noted:

Desdiv mentioned was screen for Crudiv 5.  
(Bell #210740, -pl, This message was in  
Com 14 172308 which was substantially the same with

the following exceptions: Mati was Machi and Desdiv was Desdiv of Desron 1. The cardiv was assigned to 2nd Fleet, while the Desdiv was assigned to the Northern Force.

(Summary, #211400, May, 1942, Pg. 6)

MAY 22, 1942

There could be no doubt that Desron 1 was to be part of the Northern Forces after the next messages were read.

No. 39

FROM: CCM14  
TO: OPNAV

#220009 May 22, 1942

From (Desron 1), #061, May 19, 1942:  
Request information on channel entrance Ominato.

It was commented:

Desron 1 has been associated with the Northern Forces which are to attack AOB. (#198, from May 20) Ominato was mentioned as a refueling port to be used prior to the rendezvous for this force. Desron 1 was reported on May 20th to have left Sasebo for Ominato.

No. 40

FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPNAV

#211104 May 21, 1942

From (Desron 1), #066, May 20: This force less \_\_\_ (Code Group) left Sasebo for Ominato.

3 MAY 1942

It was noted:

A message to Desron 1, #063, May 19, was an order for Desron \_\_\_\_\_ (less Code Group) to originate in accordance with orders of the ATAGO Commanding Officer. (Summary, #220600, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

A previous identification of a radio call was now termed erroneous (See No. 26), and therefore, it was changed. Though this might seem insignificant, some worthwhile data was recovered.

No. 41

FROM: COMNA  
TO: OPNAV

#212336 May 21, 1942

Cannot confirm Bell identification of as a Batdiv. This call, where predecessor was identified as a Desron 3, has been carried over several call changes as a Destroyer Unit, and the succession of calls has been clear. Since Batdiv 1 and 2 have never been identified, consider this sufficient evidence to throw out Batdiv identification. (Summary, #220600, May, 1942, Pg. 1)

The results of traffic analysis divulged some new appearances in the Northern Area.



No. 42

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#220100 May 22, 1942

Fleet Units, More I, appeared on 5th Fleet -  
Ominato circuit.  
(Summary, #220600, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

Some difficulty with their regular carriers  
caused the Japanese to resort to other means of air  
support.

No. 43

FROM: BELCONWEM  
TO: OPNAV

#211104 May 21, 1942

From (Combined Fleet), #174, May 19,  
1942: Because Cardiv 5 less \_\_\_\_ (something to do  
with #1 or #2 operations), desire that all 12 or  
more fighters belonging to \_\_\_\_ (air unit) be landed  
on Hishin Maru.

It was observed:

Hishin Maru not previously mentioned. It  
is possible that the ship referred to is the  
NISSIN MARU; it is known that Japan had two whalers  
convertible to aircraft carriers by that name.  
Com 14 #212250, gave the same message.  
(Summary, #220600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

5 APR 1942

No. 44FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#212250 May 21, 1942

From #160, May 19, 1942: Since the ZUIKAKU will take part in the campaign upon completion of repairs, do something about pilot replacements.

Com 14 noted:

Interpret this and #174 above, to mean that the campaign cannot wait for the ZUIKAKU, but will get underway at once, the ZUIKAKU joining later, all information indicates that the ZUIKAKU will be part of the Northern Force rather than the "AF" force.

It was indicated:

ZUIKAKU, believed to be en route Japan, appeared using Chickijima Radio as originator on May 19.

(Summary, #220600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

Traffic analysis gave indications that the air strength of the Japanese was being replenished for the Aleutian Campaign.

No. 45FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#220010 May 22, 1942

Comcardiv 1 appeared in several dispatches with Cardiv 5. Since this unit is already with 5th Fleet it is possible that a unit of Cardiv 5 will join.

It was observed:

The Cardiv 5 unit would probably be the ZUIKAKU which is returning to the Empire to replenish planes. #160 (above) indicates that the campaign will not wait for this unit, but that the ZUIKAKU will join up with the Northern Forces (questionable according to Opnav) as soon as she has replaced her planes and pilots. (Summary, #220600, May, 1942, Pg. 5)

The NISSHIN MARU was to bring plane replacements on its trip north.

No. 46

FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPNAV

#220349 May 22, 1942

(Crudiv 187) asks if possible NISSHIN MARU load six fighters from 6th Air. (Summary, #221400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

No. 47

FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPNAV

#220349 May 22, 1942

(1st Air Fleet), #476, May 20, 1942, indicates departure? NISSHIN MARU departing Sasebo

7 197 1942

date to arrive Ominato 25th and depart 26th.  
(Summary, #221400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

A warning, which grew even more significant after the Aleutian attack had taken place, was now issued from Hawaii.

No. 48

FROM: CINCPAC  
TO: OPELAV

#220333 May 22, 1942  
#Bull. 68

Attention invited to the fact that fighter float planes habitually operate from Japan's sea-plane tenders which are particularly active in advanced operations.  
(Summary, #221400, May, 1942, Pg. 1)

Coordination of submarine activity was now sought by the enemy, and definite positions were assigned to their units. Every Japanese campaign has been marked by similar close cooperation between air and submarine fleets.

No. 49

FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPELAV

#220328 May 22, 1942

From: (Jalnit Radio) #661 May 18, 1942  
To: SUBMARINE UNIT ? (c.g. 19518) Originator

ORIGINAL

5 100 1942

c.g. Please change the directive for the movements of the AF (Midway) and AO (Aleutian) Occupation Forces and related Forces in the following manner, in accordance with \_\_\_\_\_ Operation Orders. The position in which Submarines \_\_\_\_\_ must be prior \_\_\_\_\_ will be 150 miles more or less to Eastward of AI (Oahu Area?) (Questioned by Opnav) (Summary, #220600, May, 1942, Pg. II)

MAY 23, 1942

The preparations for the new operations kept the enemy's radio traffic very heavy, and the usual instructions concerning ammunition, oil and replacements were found therein.

No. 50

FROM: BELCONNEN #230423 May 23, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

From (ATAGO), #P May 20, 1942:  
Please make arrangements to accommodate \_\_\_\_\_ ammunition of the ATAGO and TAKAO which according to schedule will depart Kure early morning of the 22nd and arrive Ominato during the 24th.

It was observed:

ATAGO, Desron 1, Cardiv 3, and other units have been connected with the AOB (Aleutian Campaign).

ORIGINAL  
[Stamp]

The arrival of more air units in the North was a certain indication of imminent action, for the Japanese had made no attack in the war without first increasing their air strength in the area involved.

No. 51

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#222108 May 22, 1942

From [redacted] (Unidentified), #694, May 21, 1942, to 11th Air Fleet:

Since Bichoro Air's Heavy Bomber Squadron is advancing to NCB and in view of bad weather there, and prospects for more bad weather, request you detail one destroyer to operate under Base Patrol and Air Patrol Group.

Com 14 remarked:

Suggest Horomushiro for NCB as this place is address in WE system. Value for Bichoro Air not definite. This group was placed in the Malay Area on May 2, and on May 9 was apparently at Kamrank Base en route to TAKAO.

(Summary, #230600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)  
(Summary, #231400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

No. 52

FROM: BELCONNEX  
TO: OPNAV

#220903 May 22, 1942

From Comairon 22 to Chief of Staff, Combined Air Force; Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet; #1 Air Attack Force; Horomushiro Base Commander.

5 MAY 1943

It was observed:

Traffic analysis suggests that all or part of Airron 22, recently transferred from the Malay Area, may operate from Horomushiro in conjunction with the 5th Fleet, and #1 Air Attack Force in the Northern Area, and might also be used as a counter-acting force against air attack from the Aleutians. (Summary, #230600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

No. 53

FROM: COMINT  
TO: OPNAV

#220052 May 22, 1942

and — in Omiate Area.

It was noted:

is believed to be a carrier associated with Cardiv 3. is suspected to be KORYU. (Summary, #230600, May, 1942)

Traffic analysis and decryption of enemy messages made it very evident that an unusual concentration of Japanese forces was taking place in the Northern Area.

No. 54

FROM: COMINT  
TO: OPNAV

#222024 May 22, 1942

5 APR 1943

Indications are that the 5th Fleet is concentrating units in the Ominato - Kuriles Area.  
(Summary, #230600, May, 1942)

The following dispatches give testimony to the accuracy of Com 14's statement in No. 54.

No. 55

FROM: COM 14 #222350 May 22, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

From [redacted] to AOB Occupation Force, #010,  
May 22, 1942: Expect to enter Ominato at 1100  
(-9) on 23rd.

It was commented:

[redacted] is a new command which appeared on 16 May. Only other reference to AOB Occupation Force appeared in Comdesron 1, serial 045, of 13 May - "The motorboats for the AOB Occupation Force [redacted]."  
(Summary, #230600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

No. 56

FROM: OPNAV #231400 May 23, 1942  
TO: TUNA

From [redacted] (unidentified) #002, May 22/1220,  
to [redacted] (5th Fleet?), [redacted] (unidentified),  
MARAKI (Kure Personnel?), Info [redacted] (unidentified),  
KIHOKU (Kure Radio Assoc. Military Stores?).



5 APR 1942

The #2 \_\_\_\_\_ MARU (#2 HISHI MARU?) shall depart \_\_\_\_\_ as soon as she leaves drydock at 0800 and will arrive in Kure on the 24th. As soon as possible after loading operations have been completed she shall depart Kure and arrive in (Ominato?) on May 31.  
(Summary, #231400, May, 1942, Pg. 2)

No. 57

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: TUNA

#231400 May 23, 1942

From \_\_\_\_\_ (Unidentified) #003 May 22/1300, To \_\_\_\_\_ (unidentified), \_\_\_\_\_ (Unidentified),  
KIRIKI (Kure Radio Associated Military Stores?)  
Info \_\_\_\_\_ (5th Fleet), \_\_\_\_\_ (C Flt. Co ?),  
MARAKI (Kure Personnel?).

Very fragmentary, indicates that the #2 HISHI MARU with 800 drums of oil will arrive Kure early on the 24th.  
(Summary, #231400, May, 1942, Pg. 2)

No. 58

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: TUNA

#231400 May 23, 1942

From \_\_\_\_\_ (Air Tender) #093 May 18, 1942, To \_\_\_\_\_ (#1 Air Attack Force)

Scheduled to arrive tomorrow the 19th at 1730.

It was pointed out:

\_\_\_\_\_ (Air Tender) was associated with TAKAO airon, 11th Air Fleet, Airon 11, 5th Fleet, combined

in early May. The 1st Air Attack Force appears to have been transferred to operate with the 5th Fleet in the Northern Area. It is indicated that Airon 22 may return to Empire to join 1st Air Attack Force and 5th Fleet in Northern Area, and it appears that this may operate from Horomshiro and might also be used as a countering force against air attack from the Aleutians.  
(Summary, #231400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

The British Far Eastern Radio Intelligence sent in a report concerning the extraordinary activity of the Japanese Northern Forces.

No. 59

FROM: COLOMBO  
TO: OPHAV

#221240 May 22, 1942

Northern Force (5th Fleet). This has always been in being, but is now considerably reinforced. Included are Cardiv 3, part of Desdiv 21, flagship Desron 1 with Cruiser MAYA in command. This force is to rendezvous on the 25th in anchorage 2 days steaming from Sasebo. Anchorage possibly in Japan Sea.

It was remarked:

ATAGO, TAKAO and Desdiv 17 are believed in Northern Force.  
(Summary, #231400, May, 1942, Pg. 1)

Consultation between the Japanese Army and Navy representatives indicated that considerable attention was being paid to the Occupation Forces.

No. 60

FROM: BELCONNEM  
TO: OPNAV

#230427 May 23, 1942

From HOKARI, #490, May 22, 1942: Not clear, but involves the Army and a consultation regarding operations, after which Chief of Staff (or Staff Officer) IMOTO will be dispatched to Ominato to arrive the morning of the 24th. (Bell 230427) (Summary, #231400, May, 1942, Pg. 2)

MAY 24, 1942

The activity of Japanese Radio Intelligence increased considerably during the course of the war, and now great interest was shown in the patrols of American planes in Hawaii and Alaska. Notice the details in this deciphered dispatch:

No. 61

FROM: COMIL  
TO: OPNAV

#232002 May 23, 1942

From (Jalnit?), #714, Part I of II: U.S. Radio Intelligence: Two patrol planes, call signs and were patrolling in the vicinity of Johnston Island. They landed at Johnston at two twenty five (0225).

Com 14 commented:

Numerous messages of this type are sent daily with particular emphasis on aircraft activity. Number of planes, hours in air, direction of scouting, et cetera, in Hawaiian, Alaskan and Samoan-Canton Area.  
(Summary, #240600, May, 1942, Pg. 2)

As the following message demonstrates, the importance of radio silence was also realized by the Japanese. One of the interesting aspects of Japanese communication procedure since the beginning of the war is the gradual elimination of many of their old peacetime mistakes. Radio silence is now faithfully maintained just before the operations begin, especially in the case of carriers.

No. 62

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#232106 May 23, 1942

From (Naval General Staff) to High Commands: (Only fragmentary) says, to exercise care in routing traffic to the South and West of \_\_\_\_\_ Area, AO Area (Aleutian?), and NG Area.

Com 14 remarked:

Inference is that effort is being made to keep activities in this area quiet. NG looks good as Kamchatka-Kuriles, or Hokkaido Area.

No. 63

FROM: BELCOHNNEN #7 May 24, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

Comment on Opnav  
191840 regarding AO indicators:

FUATU, #854 of January 1, 1942, in 2 parts, is a supplement to several indicator lists. In it, AOA is Chickagof, AOC is Agatha Island, AD is Unimak, AOB is not mentioned. If a later directive changing these was sent, we did not intercept it. The above generally indicates that AO designators are used for the Aleutians Islands proper, while AP is used for locations on or near the Alaskan Peninsula. The serial mentioned was previously reported from Com 16, but cannot reference the dispatch. Will send complete translation again if requested.

It was remarked:

Com 14 has reported AP designators as in the Aleutian chain as well as near the Alaskan Peninsula. Com 16 dispatch referred to is Com 16 - 170040 of Feb. 1942.  
(Summary, #240600, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

An important dispatch which outlines the makeup of the Japanese Northern Forces was now decrypted.

No. 64

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#231922 May 23, 1942

From (5th Fleet ) to (See comment); (Cardiv 3); (MAGO);  
-- (Desdiv Desdiv 27?); (Air Group 11?);  
(5th Fleet Unit); (MARU);  
(unident); (Tokyo Weather Bureau);  
(Detachment Comdr ); (Yokohama Air?);  
INFO: (Combined Fleet ); (Naval General Staff): At 1300, \_\_\_\_\_, will hold conference on board WACHI regarding forthcoming operations. All Division Commanders and Commanding Officers are requested to attend.

Com 14 remarked:

From various fragments believe that commencement of operations, that is, date of departure from Ominato is 27th, or, at earliest, 26th.  
(Summary, #240600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

As the subsequent messages point out, the Northern Forces were very active.

No. 65

FROM: BELCONGEN  
TO: OPNAV

#231157 May 23, 1942

Comcardiv 5 in the ZUIKAKU has apparently arrived in the Empire.  
(Summary, #240600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

No. 66

FROM: COM11  
TO: OPNAV

#232234 May 23, 1942

5th Fleet traffic implicates Cardiv 3, Crudiv 5, section of Crudiv 4, and Subron 1.  
(Summary, #240600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

No. 67

FROM: BELCONGEN  
TO: OPNAV

#231157 May 23, 1942

(tentative HISSHI MARU) is apparently included with Cardiv 3 in the 5th Fleet Operations in Northern Areas.

It was remarked:

AKU is also tentatively identified as a Desdiv.  
(Summary, #240600, May, 1942, Pg. 5)

No. 68

FROM: BELCONGEN  
TO: OPNAV

#240645 May 24, 1942

Traffic for the ATAGO noted being routed in care Ominato Radio.

It is noted:

The ATAGO (CA) has recently been associated with the forces expected to participate in the Northern Operations.  
(Summary, #241400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

An indication of the thorough preparations the Japanese were making for this campaign was the fact that five weather reporting MARUS were operating. One was up near the Aleutians. (Summary, #240600, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

Deciphered dispatches produced more details about the departure dates of the Aleutian units, and also gave warning that more supply ships were being sent.

No. 69

FROM: CCNA  
TO: OPNAV

#232108 May 23, 1942

From (Cardiv 3), #865, May 22, 1942:  
Cardiv 3 plus one Desdiv (less one destroyer) left Tokuyama for Ominato.  
(Summary, #240600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)



No. 70

FROM: COM11  
TO: OPNAV

#231922 May 23, 1942

From [Comcardiv 3??] to  
(Comdesdiv \_\_\_\_\_, possibly Comdesdiv 27); INFO:  
(Chief of Staff, 1st Fleet): This unit  
will depart Ominato on the afternoon of the 24th.  
As soon as Desdiv \_\_\_\_\_ preparations are completed,  
advise time of arrival at Ominato.  
(Summary, #240600, May, 1942, Pg. 5)

No. 71

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: TUNA

#241130 May 24, 1942

From Hisa 9 (3rd Air Att. For.?), #689, May 19,  
1942, To \_\_\_\_\_ (11th Air Flt.?), INFO:  
(Comb. Flt?), \_\_\_\_\_ (unidentified),  
(Crudiv 187), \_\_\_\_\_ (Hyakurihura Alron?): Please  
arrange to have the number 18 SEINOZI MARU available  
for use in connection with the \_\_\_\_\_ move. KENJO MARU  
with arms and military supplies is scheduled to  
arrive in Tateyama on the 26th.

It was observed:

KENJO MARU is believed to be a 3142 ton,  
325 feet seaplane tender, was reported hit by 1  
bomb at Rabaul on April 18. The SEINOZI MARU is  
believed to be SEINOZI MARU 2556 tons, 251 feet.  
(Summary, #241400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

No. 72

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: TUNA

#241130 May 24, 1942

From (Desdiv 27?), #345, May 22, 1942,  
To (5th. Flt.?), MOSE 55 (unidentified),  
Info: (unidentified): (1) One section of  
this unit will leave on the 22nd arriving Yoko-  
suka during 23rd. 2 days will be needed for repair-  
ing equipment. Will be able to depart Yokosuka on  
the 26th. (2) DD will remain at Yokosuka.  
(3) Regarding mention that articles which  
are not received by the time of departure from  
Kure on 22nd will be requisitioned at Yokosuka  
upon arrival there.  
(Summary, #241400, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

MAY 25, 1942

More Japanese Radio Intelligence dispatches  
were intercepted, and these helped in identification  
of certain area designators.

No. 73

FROM: COM 14  
TO: OPNAV

#242006 May 24, 1942

From (RabouI), #292, May 22, 1942:  
Is an intelligence report and says in part  
is at AOI. Another part says: " is at AOB  
or ACC."

Com 14 noted:

is Radio Station at Danewa(?) and AOI  
from previous translation is ADAK. is at Kiska.  
by previous translation is Agatha. This would  
place in vicinity of Kiska.

Washington. Remarkd:

is Radio Station Dutch Harbor, Alaska,  
while the and indicate portable stations.  
It is believed that the positions as given by  
are by direction finder and therefore cannot be de-  
pended on as an area designator confirmation.  
(Summary, #250600, May, 1942, Pg. 5)

No. 74

FROM: COM 14  
TO: OPNAV

#240654 May 24, 1942

From (Tokyo Rdo. Intell.), #295,  
May 23, 1942: Gives usual radio intelligence in-  
formation. Interesting part is that ACE Radio  
Station is (Dutch Harbor previously sent this  
in.); Radio Station is (Kodiak). These  
two stations were transmitting patrol call sign  
which was sending to . Aircraft in Palmyra  
and Johnston Island were also heard.

Com 14 observed:

It is apparent that entire Japanese radio  
intelligence organization is concentrating on  
Hawaiian and Alaskan areas and obtaining results.

It was also noted:

(has been in numerous radio intelligence messages before but is unplaced.  
(Summary, #250600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

No. 75

FROM: COM14 #250150 May 25, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

Tokyo Radio Intelligence at 0800, 24th, sent Urgent to 5th Fleet Commander in Chief and 5th Fleet Patrol Force, information to Ominato.  
(Summary, #250600, May, 1942, Pg. 6)

Routine messages announcing arrivals and departures, and seemingly very insignificant in themselves, gave important details concerning the Aleutian organization of the Japanese.

No. 76

FROM: OPNAV #241920 May 24, 1942  
TO: TUNA

From (5th Fleet), #594, May 15, 1942  
To (Comb. Flt.), (Tokyo Movement Report Office); Info: (Desron 1), (Crudir 5)  
(Cardiv 3), (Subron 1), (5th Fleet):  
MACHI arrived Ominato at 1400.

It was noted:

The Information addresses (Desron 1, Cardiv 5, Cardiv 3 and Subron 1) are believed to form the strength of the AOB attack Force.  
(Summary, #250600, May, 1942, Pg. 6)

No. 77

FROM: OPNAV #241925 May 24, 1942  
TO: TOKA

From (Desdiv 17) #236, May 20, 1942,  
To (Yokosuka); Info: (Desron 1):  
Departing Yokosuka 21st repeat 21st for Ominato?

It was remarked:

Desdiv 17 is believed to be Cardiv 3 plane guards. Cardiv 3 and at least a part of Desron 1 are believed to be part of the AOB Force which is assembling at Ominato.  
(Summary, #250600, May, 1942, Pg. 6)

Com 14 sent a last minute check list of the Japanese units, and warned that they were now ready for action.

No. 78

FROM: COM14 #250150 May 25, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

List of Units, previously reported as comprising 5th Fleet Forces, is unchanged and they now seem ready for operations.

It was remarked:

Units believed in 5th Fleet Forces are  
Cardiv 3 - ATAGO and TAKAO  
Desdiv 17 - 2 Cruisers of Crudiv 4  
Desron 1, Subron 1, parts of Airon 23 and 6th  
Air Attack Forces.  
(Summary, #250600, May, 1942, Pg. 6)

MAY 26, 1942

The addition of two units to the Japanese forces in the North was now noticed. Traffic analysis disclosed the presence of one, decryption was responsible for the other discovery.

No. 79

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#252332 May 25, 1942

Subron 1 is operating in high North Area. Unidentified is believed to be with such unit in that vicinity also, but is not yet associated Subron 1.

It was observed:

Subron 1 has been associated with the (Kiska) Attack Forces. In #1687, Pg. 2 of Summary, #260600, May, 1942 was definitely identified as Kiska.  
(Summary, #260600, May, 1942, Pg. 7)

No. 80

FROM: OPMNAV  
TO: TUMA

#251925 May 25, 1942

From (Desdiv 17, Staff Communication Officer) #039, May 18, 1942, To \_\_\_\_\_; Info: \_\_\_\_\_ (1st Air Flt., Staff Communication Officer); \_\_\_\_\_ (Comb. Flt., Staff Communication Officer):  
In reply to your serial #\_\_\_\_\_. The schedule is for (c.g. \_\_\_\_\_ (Isokaze?). The said ship has completed \_\_\_\_\_ and is being added to this force.

It was commented:

The ISOKAZE is a destroyer, now added to Desdiv 17 which is believed to be the plane guards for Cardiv 3.  
(Summary, #260600, May, 1942, Pg. 6)

An important resumé which gave a detailed analysis of the enemy's Aleutian Force was now issued to the Commanders in the Pacific. From this and all the preceding messages it is evident that the U.S. Navy was as well aware of the danger in the North, as it was at Midway and at Coral Sea.

No. 81

FROM: CINCPAC  
TO: OPMNAV

#260331 May 25, 1942  
Eull. 72

1 Carrier as well as a possible auxiliary carrier, 2 heavy cruisers, 3 destroyer divisions,

1 submarine squadron, training and small craft are expected to depart Ominato Area soon. Western Aleutian Islands is probable destination. Support from approximately 30 heavy bombers from Northern Kurile Islands. Air search from Kurile Islands expected daily.

It was added:

Confer Summary, #250600, P. 6, Parag. 4.  
(Summary, #260600, May, 1942, Pg. 7)

Traffic analysis indicated that the Japanese Radio Intelligence was attempting to clear up certain difficulties before operations began.

No. 82

FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPHAV

#260850 May 26, 1942

An unusually large volume of intelligence traffic being originated by Jalnit indicates the special effort being made to gather information on the Allied Forces prior to the attack on Midway and to the Northward.

(Summary, #261400, May, 1942, Pg. 7, No. 15)

MAY 27, 1942

The concentration of forces at Ominato continued as the end of May neared.



No. 83

FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPHAV

#270317 May 27, 1942

From (Cardiv 3), #871, May 25, 1942:  
Announces arrival Cardiv 3 and Desdiv 6 less  
Hibiki at Ominato.

It was noted:

The HIBIKI is the 4th Destroyer in Desdiv 6.  
(Summary, #270600, May, 1942, Pg. 4)

No. 84

FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPHAV

#270317 May 27, 1942

From (Unidentified), #043, May 26, 1942:  
Repairs to \_\_\_\_\_ are expected to be completed  
morning of 27th. Operating schedule depart Sasebo  
1200 27th, arrive Ominato 0900 29th.

It was observed:

\_\_\_\_\_ has not been received before so it  
is probably a small unit. Desron 1 has been over-  
hauling at Sasebo and left 20 May. This is probably  
the destroyer HIBIKI.  
(Summary, #270600, May, 1942, Pg. 4, No. 13)

Japanese messages were checked as carefully as  
ever, and this traffic analysis produced the following  
results:

No. 85

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#262244 May 26, 1942

Lack of carrier traffic usually means they are at sea.

(Summary, #270600, May, 1942, Pg. 3)

No. 86

FROM: CINCPAC  
TO: OPNAV

#270233 May 27, 1942  
Bull. #73

Vessels reporting weather are eastward of Marshalls and in vicinity of Wake, Kamchatka and Adirans.

...Japanese Radio Intelligence activities increasing with emphasis in Hawaiian and Aleutian areas.

(Summary #271400, May, 1942, Pg. 2, No. 1-2)

No. 87

FROM: BELCONWEM  
TO: OPNAV

#270620 May 27, 1942

Association of 3rd, 4th and 6th Air Attack Forces, Sub(?) Force, 4th and 5th Fleets indicate extensive preparation for cooperative action in forthcoming campaigns.

(Summary, #271400, May, 1942, Pg. 2, No. 3)

Another indication of cooperation between the Japanese Army and Navy for the Aleutian attack was discovered in the following report:

5 APR 1943

No. 88FROM: HELLCOHNET  
TO: OPNAV

#270620 May 27, 1942

Enciphered addressee "Hotukaisitaiten" aboard unidentified MAEU in dispatch from Army originator "UTIMA", (cf comment) which was broadcast to 5th Fleet by Ominato is first indication of Army participation in connection with 5th Fleet operations in Northern Area, and may be Occupation Force to be used in the Aleutians. Hotukai may also be translated as the Gulf of Pichili (off Tientsin), but this is considered unlikely in view Radio routing.

It is commented:

Hokukaisitaiten translates into Northern Seas Detachment Commander (Probably Army Commander as SIPAI is normally used for Army.) A decrypted message indicated on 22 May: "From HOKOKU not clear but involves the Army and a consultation regarding operations, after which Chief of Staff (or Staff Officer) IMOTO will be dispatched to Ominato to arrive the morning of the 24th." (Summary, #271400, May, 1942, Pg. 3, No. 6)

MAY 28, 1942

Close supervision of Japanese submarine and plane traffic brought the following items into prominence:

No. 89

FROM: COMIL  
TO: OPNAV

#? May 28, 1942

One indication was noticed that Biforo Air will operate with the 5th Fleet probably from Horomushiro.

It was observed:

The Biforo Airon recently removed from the Malaya Area to the Empire and is now based at (Horomushiro approximately 50-29 N; 156-07 E?) (Summary, #280600, May, 1942, Pg. 4, No. 9)

No. 90

FROM: COMIL  
TO: OPNAV

#280012 May 28, 1942

Subron broadcasting his traffic to 5th Fleet on 6490 and 13040 kilocycles. Ominato repeats on 5055 kilocycles. 5th Fleet Units using secret calls. Carrier in Ominato Area and is believed a part of Cardiv 3.

It was remarked:

Subron I is believed to be a section of the Kiska Attack Force and has been operating in the high North Pacific Ocean recently. (Summary, #280600, May, 1942, Pg. 4, Nos. 10-11)

The continued absence of Japanese Carrier messages meant only one thing to Navy observers — that the operations were already underway.

No. 91

FROM: COM114  
TO: OPMAY

#272332 May 27, 1942

Except for carriers and Comdr. First Air Fleet overall traffic remains about the same. No traffic from carriers or commands.

It was mentioned:

Both the Kiska and Midway Attack Forces are believed to be underway.  
(Summary, #280600, May, 1942, Pg. 6, No. 16)

A week old message was now deciphered, and from it was gathered the plans for air support in the Aleutians.

No. 92

FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPMAY

#280532 May 28, 1942

From (11th Air Fleet?), #863, May 22, 1942: In accordance with Airon Secret Dispatch \_\_\_\_\_ Unit Heavy Bomber Force will advance to NCB (Horomoshiro) and NDH Areas for a period of about 20 days, beginning May 29th \_\_\_\_\_ (Kana digraph first Kana re group). In view of the fact that the \_\_\_\_\_ destroyers will be \_\_\_\_\_ in our Force, one ship (DD?) will be allocated to the NCB Area. Request a plan for cooperation from unit (08679 Biboro Air?).

The Melbourne Unit commented:

3 APR 1947

HORO is a character as in SAPPORO. Thus Horomushiro is some place as Paramushiro, off South tip Kamchatka.

Washington added:

Traffic analysis on May 22 indicated that all or part of Airon 22 was recently transferred from the Malay Area, and may operate from Horomushiro in conjunction with 5th Fleet and 1st Air Attack Force in the Northern Area, and might be used as a countering force against air attack from the Aleutians. A message from an unknown originator on May 21 said: "Since Bithoro Air's Heavy Bomber Squadron is advancing to NGE and in view of bad weather there and prospects for more bad weather, request you detail one destroyer to operate under Base Patrol and Air Patrol Group. NDH (area indicator) is unidentified. (Summary, #281400, May, 1942, Pg. 4, No. 6)

Decryption of an intercepted dispatch revealed the rendezvous point of some of the Aleutian forces, though the date was not available.

No. 93

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#280024 May 28, 1942

From ((Comdesron 1), #80, May 26, 1942:  
Tanker ? rendezvous with this force at 1030  
date (c.g. 85953) 74 miles 180° from Otchishi Cape  
(this unit speed 10, course 90 to a point 17 miles  
180° from Erimisaki thence on course 80.

It was observed:

MAY 1942

Trimosaki is on the south tip of Hokkaido approximately 42.5 N; 143 E. Part of Desron 1 (Desdiv 6?) arrived in Ominato with Cardiv 3 on May 25, while another division was believed to have arrived with the OTAGO on May 24.  
(Summary, #280600, May, 1942, Pg. 4, No. 7)

Valuable data was garnered from the decryption of the next dispatch, for it furnished the call list of the Japanese for the coming campaign.

No. 94

FROM: COMIL  
TO: OPHAV

#280040 May 28, 1942

From (Sinc 5th Fleet), #743, May 25, 1942: In Call List No. 11 and in Combined Fleet tactical list enter following calls: (Northern Force change number 2) thesis) page 8;

----- #2 STRIKING FORCE  
----- Occupation Force  
----- AQB Occupation Force  
----- Northern Force Shore Based  
----- Submarines Northern Force  
----- Attacked units Northern Force  
----- AO Force;  
----- AOB Force;  
----- Army \_\_\_\_\_ Unit

Com 14 noted:

This is the first appearance of AO.

Washington added:

Area designators starting with AO and AP are in the Aleutian Islands. AQ has not been mentioned before but may possibly be the Pribilof Islands.

(Summary, #280600, May, 1942, Pg. 5, No. 73)

MAY 29, 1942

Some of the details of Japanese air strength for the Aleutian Campaign were gleaned from the following dispatches:

No. 95

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: TUNA

#290030 May 29, 1942

From (Comcardiv 3), #851, May 19, 1942 to (Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet):  
Planes on hand in (code group probably same as originator) are 20 type Zero fighters (of which 17 belong to the "6 Air (Attack Force?) and 19 Attack (?) plane pilots. Please send immediately the fighter plane pilots scheduled to be transferred from (Cardiv 5?). This unit will report on the 22nd, arriving Ominato on the 25th, and depart thence on the 26th.

It was remarked:

Cardiv 3 reported arrival at Ominato on 25th.  
(Summary, #290600, May, 1942, Pg. 4, No. 5)



No. 96

FROM: OPNAV #290600 May 28, 1942  
 TO: TUNA

From (6th Air Attack Force), #214,  
 May 22, 1942: 24 type Zero fighters from 6th Air  
 Group and 1 "D" transport plane from KISARAZU Air  
 Group left for at 0845.  
 (Summary, #290600, May, 1942, Pg. No. 6)

No. 97

FROM: BELCONNEN #290245 May 29, 1942  
 TO: OPNAV

From association and traffic routing the  
 following assumptions appear likely: The section  
 of Tokio Air recently shifted to Empire from  
 Andamans will operate in conjunction with 6th Air  
 Attack Force in Northern Area and will base at un-  
 identified air station  
 (Summary, #291400, May, 1942, Pg. 3, No. 5)

No. 98

FROM: BELCONNEN #290755 May 29, 1942  
 TO: OPNAV

Comdr. (Newly formed Air Attack or  
 Occupation Force?) is in Ominato Area and closely  
 associated with CinC 5th Fleet and Tokio Air Group.  
 (Summary, #291400, May, 1942, Pg. 3, No. 4)

The Radio Intelligence units of the Japanese  
 were very active during these last days of preparations.

No. 99

FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPNAV

#290745 May 29, 1942

Unusually heavy volume intelligence traffic noted originating from Tokyo, Jaluit, Truk and Raboul to usual addresses.

It was observed:

It is believed these stations are working overtime in radio intelligence to inform their striking Forces of the latest positions of U.S. Forces in the areas which they are about to attack. (Summary, #291400, May, 1942, Pg. 3, No. 7)

No. 100

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: TUNA

#291652 May 29, 1942

R.I. type messages being sent by Jaluit and Air Units in Marshalls and at Wake to 5th Fleet, among other addresses.

It was commented:

Jaluit has been concentrating very strongly on the aircraft movements in the Aleutians and Hawaii. The messages have been either operational priority or urgent classification. (Summary, #291400, May, 1942, Pg. 3, No. 8)

On the other hand the activities of the Japanese were not being neglected, and warning was sent to the Pacific and Aleutian defenders.

No. 101

FROM: OPNAV #291652 May 29, 1942  
TO: TUNA

Traffic routing 21 May indicates part or all of forces operating under Commander in Chief, 5th are at sea, (definitely) the following:

- (A) Chief of Staff, 5th Fleet
- Abukuma and units of Desron 1
- Cardiv 3

Cominate broadcast operational traffic for 5th Fleet during the day. (GT 102-Cpnav 291652-TI)

It was remarked:

Since these units belong to the AOB (Kiska) Striking Force, it is now believed to be underway.  
(Summary, #291400, May, 1942, Pg. 4, No. 9)

No. 102

FROM: COMINT #282122 May 28, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

5th Fleet units believed to be underway.  
(R.I.S. #290600, May, 1942, Pg. 4, No. 8)

An important bulletin was now issued from Hawaii, giving the strength of the Aleutian Forces in greater detail than before. It has already been observed that the plans of the Japanese were fully known.

No. 103

FROM: CINCPAC  
TO: OPNAV

#282153 May 28, 1942

Task Orange Northern Force is indicated to seize and secure advanced seaplane and Naval Operating Bases in Aleutians (Kiska Occupation Force designated plus Occupation Force for another place possibly Attu.) Indicated strength, 1 NACHI, 2 MAYA, 1 KYUJO, 1 XAV, 1 ABUKUMA, 1 KUMA, 4 HIBIKI, 8 SHIGURE, 1 CHITOSE, 2-3 XAV, 8 SS, plus train, transports, cargo vessels. Orange heavy bombers will base at Horomushiro and Paramushiro Island, and Kuriles for reconnaissance and support.

It was stated:

- NACHI is a CA,
- MAYA is a CA,
- KYUJO is a CV,
- ABUKUMA is a CL - destroyer leader,
- KUMA is a CL,
- HIBIKI is a DD,
- SHIGURE is a DD, and
- CHITOSE is an AV.

(Summary, #290600, May, 1942, Pg. 5, No. 9)

Another operational estimate was made on the basis of all this data on May 29, 1942, and some very accurate appraisals of future Japanese movements were summarized. It assumed that the Striking Force would depart from Ominato at 0800 on May 26, -7 zone, and at a speed of 15 knots would arrive in the vicinity of the Aleutians on the morning of May 29, /12 zone, and at Dutch Harbor on the morning of May 31, /12 zone, As for the Occupation Force, a speed of 12 knots would permit it to reach Kiska at noon of May 31, /12 zone, or in the afternoon of June 1 at 10 knots. If Dutch Harbor were the objective of the Occupation Force, the time of arrival would be the night of June 1-2, /12 zone at 12 knots, or at 10 knots the night of June 3-4, /12 zone. Meanwhile, the Midway Striking Force would depart from Empire waters on May 27, -7 zone at 2000, and arrive at Midway on June 3, /12 zone at 0400. The Occupation Force was to rendezvous at a designated spot, and was to be at Midway on June 5, /12 zone at 1900. It was because of these operational estimates that our forces were able to be at the right spot at the right time in early June, 1942.

MAY 30, 1942

A Japanese Operation Order was disclosed when the following message had been decrypted:

No. 104

FROM: BELCONNEN #291330 May 29, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

From (Ominato Operation Intell. Center), #6, May 27, (Partially readable): Operation Order Number 45: (1) For the attack by the Northern (group 52806) Force following units will leave (\_\_\_\_\_ place) at times and dates as indicated:

28th 1200 1st Base Force Flagship or ship/MARU  
KAWA MARU  
Ship or Unit  
1st Section Desdiv 6  
NITA MARU

29th 0900 Desron  
Ship or unit 5th Fleet  
Ship in Desron 3  
Ship or Maru

29th 2000 WACHI ?  
2nd Section Desdiv 6

(2) The \_\_\_\_\_ Defense Force under the direct orders of the Commanding Officer will escort or screen the landing ? as well as (\_\_\_\_\_ unrecovered place and an adjacent area). (3) The air group will carry out patrols under its own orders and will also patrol the landing? as well as {\_\_\_\_\_ in the place mentioned in paragraph 2).

It was noted:

1701  
5 1701

Suggest KAMUKAWA MARU for KAWA MARU  
in paragraph 1. This AV has been associated with  
the Northern Force.  
(Summary, #300600, May, 1942, Pg. 2, No. 4)

It will be recalled that the Japanese changed  
their codes on May 28th at 0000, and so most of the  
information from this time on had to come from traffic  
analysis. Fortunately, this very contingency had been  
foreseen when the analytical sections had been built  
up. Now, even though cryptanalysis was at a loss for  
the time being, intelligence could be derived from  
the radio procedure of the enemy.

No. 105

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPHAV

#292226 May 29, 1942

All Radio Intelligence centers are busy with  
Tokyo sending info to Subron 1 and 6th Air Attack.

It was indicated:

It is believed that the subs are to act as  
scouts in the Aleutian Campaign.  
(Summary, #300600, May, 1942, Pg. 3, No. 6)

No. 106

FROM: COM13  
TO: OPHAV

May 29, 1942

Among the radio calls assigned for the North-  
west Sea Frontier were for the aerological  
station at KANAGA, and for the aerological  
station at KISKA. (Com 13)

It was pointed out:

This information appears to fully confirm  
are designators ACB and ACI as Kiska and Adak  
respectively.  
(Summary, #301400, May, 1942, Pg. 2, No. 1)

No. 107

FROM: OPHAV  
TO: TUNA

#302025 May 30, 1942

A detachment of 11th Air Group is at, or  
in vicinity, Ominato. Comdr. 3rd Air Attack Force  
is at Hyakurihara (or Biforo) Air  
Ominato broadcasts to Ryujo indicating  
that this unit is at sea with other units of  
Northern Force.

It was remarked:

It is believed that this is a section of  
the 6th Air attack Force stationed at Ominato, or  
else a group en route to the Northern Kuriles.  
Hyakurihara is another name for Horomushiro Air  
Base on Paramushiro Island (Kuriles). Cardiv 3  
arrived in Ominato May 25, and was believed to have  
left the 26th or 27th.  
(Summary, #301400, May, 1942, Pg. 3, Nos. 3-4-5)



Indications that the Japanese forces at Midway and Aleutians were working in close cooperation were discovered in the next message:

No. 108

Dispatch originated by CinC 2nd at 1830 29th is obviously a directive to units of Striking Force and indicates preparations completed for K (Midway - Oahu?) Campaign and units may now be underway eastward from Saipan Area. Units addressed for action are Crudiv 7, Desron 2, Desron 4 less Desdiv 4, Crudiv 5 less questionable 2nd Section and unidentified Command Roha Ø probably Crudiv 6 less Second Section; for information Batdiv 3, Crudiv 8, Desron 1 and Cofs Combined 1st and 5th Fleets, plus Cofs 1st Air Fleet. Information addressees are units which have been associated with 5th Fleet units and are believed to comprise Striking Force toward Aleutians. This dispatch suggests units working in close conjunction and may strike objectives at same time. Yokahama Flying Boat Squadron may furnish patrol aircraft for Midway Campaign. (Bell 300910-TI)

It was commented:

...Desron 1 is definitely attached to the Northern Force. All indications have pointed to Batdiv 3 being with the Southern Forces. ... The Biforo Air Force has been in the Northern Kurile Islands.  
(Summary, #301400, May, 1942, Pg. 9, No. 16)

After reading the previous dispatch, the reader may be interested in knowing how closely Communications Intelligence in its reports before the actual engagements approximated the Japanese forces at Midway and the Aleutians. Here is the line up as indicated in No. 108.

For Action

Crudiv 7  
Desron 2  
Desron 4 less Desdiv 4  
Crudiv 5 less 2nd Section  
Roha Ø (Crudiv 4 ?)

For Information

Batdiv 3  
Crudiv 8  
Desron 1  
CofS Combined  
CofS 1st Fleet  
CofS 5th Fleet  
CofS 1st Air Fleet

The actual lineup of Japanese forces at Midway, and the Aleutians, as nearly as known by American sources, is as follows:

Japanese Battle Forces

Midway

Crudiv 7  
CinC Combined  
1st Air Fleet  
Desron 2  
Desron 4  
Crudiv 8  
Batdiv 3  
Crudiv 4  
Crudiv 5  
1st Fleet (home waters ?)  
Cinc 2

Aleutians

5th Fleet  
Desron 1

MAY 31, 1942

As the date of attack approached, the radio traffic of the Japanese decreased. This was in conformity with the pattern of previous operations -- radio silence just before an assault. However, there were a few things noticed:

No. 109

FROM: COM16  
TO: OPNAV

#310044 May 31, 1942  
#310056

Ryujo is on the Ominato circuit, and was the only carrier heard on May 30.

It was stated:

Ryujo believed to be at sea with the  
Northern Force.  
(Summary, #310600, May 1942, Pg. 4, Nos. 11-12)

No. 110

FROM: CINCYPAC #300241 May 30, 1942  
TO: OPNAV Bull. 76

Ryujo is in Northern Waters.  
(Summary, #310600, May, 1942, Pg. 4, No. 13)

No. 111

FROM: COM11 #302342 May 30, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

Ominato Radio now serving submarines in the  
North Pacific in the same manner as Jaluit Radio  
has served submarines in the past.  
(Summary, #302342, May, 1942, Pg. 5, No. 2)

No. 112

FROM: COM11 #310056 May 31, 1942  
TO: OPNAV

Subron 1 is in the North Pacific, and what  
few bearings were obtained indicated that some  
units may be as far East as the Alaskan Coast.

It was commented:

On May 29 Tokyo Radio Intelligence Center  
was busy sending information to Subron 1 and 6 Air  
Attack Force.  
(Summary, #310600, May, 1942, Pg. 5, No. 20)

JUNE 1, 1942

Very little of interest was discovered on June 1, though it was believed that the Japanese submarines were already in action.

No. 113

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#312106 May 31, 1942

Major Commanders unusually quiet.  
(Summary, #010600, June, 1942, Pg. 2, No. 1)

No. 114

FROM: COM14  
TO: OPNAV

#312134 May 31, 1942

Believed submarines have been given the green light for their part in campaign.  
(Summary, #010600, June, 1942, Pg. 11, No. 32)

JUNE 2, 1942No. 115

FROM: CENCPAC  
TO: OPNAV

#020347 June 2, 1942  
Bull. 79

Enemy radio intelligence unusually active. There are indications of further air movements to the Kuriles.  
(Summary, #021400, June, 1942, Pg. 2, No. 5; Pg. 3, No. 8)

JUNE 3, 1942

Decryption of some messages of May 25 furnished interesting details of the Japanese preparations.

No. 116

FROM: OPHAV #023248 June 2, 1942  
TO: TUNA

From (Cardiv 3) to (1st Air Fleet), #870, May 25, 1942: Please make arrangements to supply fuel for the fighter planes of the 6th Air Group and also to fuel the \_\_\_\_\_ and destroyers from the supply ship attached to your force. Moreover we anticipate the need of more fuel for the homeward voyage of the (c.s. 16362).

It was observed:

Cardiv 3 is believed to be attached to the AOB (Kiska) force.  
(Summary, #030600, June, 1942, Pg. 5, No. 10)

No. 117

FROM: OPHAV #022233 June 2, 1942  
TO: TUNA

From Isure (Ominato address) to #990, May 25, 1942; Info: (5th Fleet ?), Operation Order #43 - The \_\_\_\_\_ Defense Force will cooperate with the ( \_\_\_\_\_ (-Northern) Force in the AI Operations. It will come under the orders of \_\_\_\_\_ - Air Activity ?) in so far as dispositions and operations are concerned - - - - NACHI will arrive at Z anchorage on early morning of \_\_\_\_\_.

It was noted:

This is the first appearance of "AL" operations. In Operation Order #45 from Isure, the NACHI was ordered to get underway at 2000 on the 29th; other units believed to be with CinC 5th Fleet also appeared in this latter operation order. HAKA 44 was information addressee of Isure Order #37 of May 9 which said "According to intelligence reports, evening submarine activity in the Northern Area will probably increase. Take all measures to search out and destroy enemy submarines in Zones, A, B, C, D, and E."

There is a remote possibility that AO was meant in this message, but that the "O" was incorrectly encoded.  
(Summary, #030600, June, 1942, Pg. 6, No. 13)

The Japanese fleet commanders still maintained their radio silence.

No. 118

FROM: OPNAV  
TO: TUNA

#022255 June 2, 1942

No traffic received June 1-2 from any Fleet CinC except 4th and China Fleets.  
(Summary, #030600, June, 1942, Pg. 3, No. 5)

A good picture of the Japanese radio traffic just before the battles of Midway and the Aleutians was conveyed in the following dispatches:

No. 119

FROM: COMML  
TO: OPNAV

#030042 June 3, 1942

Traffic pictures about same as for past few days. Southeast Asia continues normal. Radio Intelligence activities maintaining constant stream of traffic. Major Commanders who are interested in operations against U.S. possessions, appear to be CinC Combined in general charge, CinC 2nd in command of Invasion Forces in Midway Area, CinC 1st Air Fleet in command of Striking Forces against central Pacific bases, CinC 5th in command of Invasion and Striking Forces in North, Comdr. 11th Air Fleet in charge shore bases aircraft in both areas. Comsubfor in charge of observations CinC 1st Fleet appears interested only to extent that his position as Comdr. Empire Screening Force demands. Significant that no traffic has been originated by first four Commanders listed above since 28-9 May.

(Summary, #030600, June, 1942, Pg. 3, No. 2)

No. 120

FROM: BELCONREN  
TO: OPNAV

#030807 June 3, 1942

Use of specially assigned tactical calls, one of which is identified as #2 Striking Force (Northern Area) in headings of apparent intelligence reports and directives from Subforce headquarters at Jaluit, strongly suggests that the Aleutians Campaign is developing. These intelligence reports and directives are probably also addressed to the Midway Striking Force, since several calls were unidentified and the dispatches broadcast by Tokyo. The Abukuma (Also 2 - Desron 1 Flagship) was called by Ominato in delivering one of these dispatches.

(Summary, #030400, June, 1942, Pg. 2, No. 1)



5 APR 1943

No. 121FROM: BELCONNEN  
TO: OPNAV

#030811 June 3, 1942

Lack of traffic from major fleet commanders... is considered particularly significant at this time in view of impending operations and indicates they are at sea according to a prearranged plan and maintaining comparative radio silence.  
(Summary, #031400, June, 1942, Pg. 2, No. 3)

JUNE 4, 1942

In view of the foregoing intelligence, it was scarcely a surprise when the enemy was sighted at Midway and Dutch Harbor.

No. 122FROM: CINCPAC  
TO: OPNAV#040101 June 4, 1942  
Enll. 81

Enemy planes reported over Dutch Harbor 031545. Report enemy CV sighted 2100 hours Z posit 53-07 N; 167-10 W.

Enemy force of 11 ships sighted bearing 261, distant 700 miles from Midway, course 90, speed 19.  
(Summary, #040600, June, 1942, Pg. 5, No. 10;  
Pg. 7, No. 18)

Since the purpose of this report has been merely to demonstrate the background of American preparations, this story ends with the beginning of the

15

Battle for the Aleutians. That the Japanese were more successful in the North than at Midway is proof not of a complete surprise, but of the necessity of keeping our major forces to meet the most important attack.

20



of

APPENDIX II

American Measures against Communication  
Intelligence Publicity

JUNE 26, 1939

As early as June 26, 1939 the President of the United States, the Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt had decreed that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage and sabotage matters would be controlled by the F. B. I., and Army and Navy Intelligence divisions. The directors of these agencies were to function as a coordinating committee:

No. 1

THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington

Hyde Park, N.Y.  
June 26, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR— THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF WAR  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE POSTMASTER GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.

No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above.

I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data, information, or material that may come to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage.

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

FEBRUARY 25, 1942

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, these three agencies came to a secret agreement which read as follows:

No. 2

February 25, 1942

**SUBJECT: SECRET AGREEMENT BETWEEN MID, ONI AND FBI FOR COORDINATING SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.**

I. The undersigned, in order to reduce to writing the basic principles regulating the operation and responsibilities for Special Intelligence operations in the Western Hemisphere in accordance with the Presidential instructions of June 24, 1940, and January 16, 1942, and previous instructions referred to therein, and in harmony with the "Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division" dated February 9, 1942, agree upon the assignment of responsibility. as given in paragraphs II, III, and IV.

Responsibility assigned to one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide, by the most expeditious means possible consistent with requisite security, to the other subscribing agencies all pertinent information received in that field, but it does not imply that the responsible agency alone is interested in, or that it only will work in, that field. Close cooperation among the headquarters of the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II. MID will be responsible for:

- 1. A continuation of the work normally outlined for and executed by Military Attaches.
- 2. The collection of information needed by the military forces. To this end, authority to maintain such personnel as the War Department deems necessary for the performance of such duties is recognized.

III. ONI will be responsible for:

- 1. A continuation of the work normally outlined for and executed by Naval Attaches.
- 2. The collection of information needed by the naval forces. To this end authority to maintain such personnel as the Navy Department deems necessary for the performance of such duties is recognized.

IV. FBI will be responsible for:

1.

2. The Special Intelligence Service will obtain, primarily through undercover operations, supplemented when necessary by open operations, economic, political, industrial, financial and subversive information. The Special Intelligence Service will obtain information concerning political movements, organizations, and individuals whose activities are prejudicial to the interest of the United States.

3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will be responsible for the furnishing to the Military and Naval Intelligence services of all pertinent information obtained.

V.

1. In times of stress, by which is meant, times that are such as to anticipate periods of predominant military interest, the collection of and the coordination of efforts to obtain additional intelligence of interest to our armed forces, also becomes a responsibility of the military (naval) commander, who is primarily charged with the military (naval) operations conducted within his potential theater of operations.

2. The general type of military and naval information alluded to includes, amongst other items, the following: location of air fields; submarine bases; fueling stations; rendezvous for hostile military forces, land sea and air; concentrations of munitions of war, and other supplies susceptible to military use; unusual assemblies and actions of individuals, organizations or communities; demonstrations of undue friendliness or hostility; undue interest in individuals, organizations or communities; or other information indicating preparations for or carrying on of open or surreptitious military operations.

3. In periods of predominant military interest, the Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Military Intelligence (Director of Naval Intelligence) will advise the Director of Naval Intelligence (Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Military Intelligence) and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the nature of information desired from those two services and shall advise the two named Directors of any coverage desired beyond the normal coverage of those agencies. The Director of Naval Intelligence (Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Military Intelligence) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation will undertake to perform the additional tasks requested in so far as it is practical and possible within the limitations of the facilities available. They will advise the Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Military Intelligence (Director of Naval Intelligence) of the additional assistance, if any, which they will be able to render, and it will then be the responsibility of Military Intelligence (Office of Naval Intelligence) to take the necessary steps under its own direction to satisfy its own requirements.

4. In periods of stress (see paragraph V (1)) when additional responsibilities have been indicated in preceding paragraph for the military (naval), the FBI will have the additional responsibility of effecting delivery of any information of interest to the cognizant military (naval) commander (V(1)). Transmission of such information will be made through the most expeditious channels consistent with the requisite security of the information and its sources.

VI. Knowledge of the existence of the Special Intelligence Service is closely held, and every effort will be made to safeguard its existence and responsibilities. To that end, only a limited distribution of this document is being effected by the headquarters of the subscribing services. Recipients of copies of this document are likewise requested to comply with the letter and spirit of the instructions contained in this paragraph.



/s/ Raymond E. Lee,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
War Department.

/s/ T. S. Wilkinson,  
Director, Office of Naval Intell-  
igence.

/s/ J. Edgar Hoover,  
Director, Federal Bureau of  
Investigation.

/s/ J. B. W. Waller,  
Captain, U. S. N.

Approved by the above signatories on Wednesday, Febru-  
ary 25, 1942.

MARCH 28, 1942

In March, 1942 some very important correspond-  
ence passed between the Director of Naval Intelligence  
and the State Department concerning the disclosure of  
intercepted messages:

No. 3

N A V Y D E P A R T M E N T  
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations  
W A S H I N G T O N

Op-16  
(SC)A6-2(2)  
Serial No. 0569216

March 28, 1942

My dear Mr. Berle:

In connection with the recent arrest of Axis agents in Brazil and the question of the disclosure of intercepted messages requisite to accomplish their prosecution, I have much appreciated your consulting me in the matter.

It occurs to me that similar occasions may arise from time to time and that perhaps, to my knowledge at least, no general policy has been established for their disposition. The advantage of such a policy may be inferred from the fact that there are some six agencies receiving and breaking down these messages at present, and any of them might, unless guided by some general instructions, take action on its own initiative, which might be contrary to the interests of the others or, more particularly, of the United States.

It would appear desirable that, for matters within this Hemisphere, the State Department should be the determining agency as to the primary decision whether action should be taken upon a decoded intercept, or whether no action should be initiated, for the purpose either of allowing arrangements indicated in the intercept to continue, in order that we might obtain more information, or to avoid the risk of enemy knowledge of the fact that we are breaking down the code. Presumably the State Department would consult and be receptive to the wishes of the intercepting and interested agencies named.

Again the question arises, as in the recent instance, of the desirability of allowing decoded intercepts to be disclosed for purposes of prosecution. It would appear that no clear-cut decision could be reached on this, but that, admitting the general principle of withholding to a maximum degree the disclosure of any intercepts, decision on specific cases must be based upon the importance of the prosecution on the one hand, and the prospective value of further communication in the same vulnerable channels, that is the value of avoiding the risk of a shift of code, on the other hand. In this case also it would appear that consultation with the interested agencies would be desirable.

Within the United States groups, questions present themselves as to allocation of interception and of processing, and as to the optimum dissemination consistent with security. If you consider it desirable to arrange a discussion of these matters, I should be glad to see to the designation of Navy Department representatives. and

Very sincerely,

/s/ T. S. Wilkinson,  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Director of Naval Intelligence.

The Honorable

A. A. Berle, Jr.,  
Assistant Secretary of State.

No. 4

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

March 31, 1942

Dear Admiral Wilkinson:

I acknowledge your letter of March 28 relating to the method of determining action taken upon decoded intercepts so that disclosure of such intercepts may be withheld to a maximum degree consistent with effective action.

Your courtesy in suggesting that the Department of State take the leadership in determining action is appreciated though determination on that subject may perhaps be placed before the meeting you suggest.

In line with your suggestion, I am asking that a representative, respectively, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Communications Commission, the Signal Corps of the United States Army, the Military Intelligence Division and the Coast Guard meet in my office on Thursday, April 2, at 1130 a.m. I should be obliged if you would name a representative, unless you care to come yourself.

I have taken the liberty of assuming that the Coast Guard, though under the Navy, might wish to be separately represented.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

Received ONI  
011438 April 1942

APRIL 3, 1942.

Conferences were held on the problem of publicizing cryptanalytical success, and the result of one meeting was the following letter.

No. 5

April 3, 1942.

Hon. Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,  
Department of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Berle:

It is my understanding that the following is the partial agreement reached at the Intelligence Conference held in your office on April, 1942:

"No action toward the closure of international clandestine radio stations or apprehension of individuals engaged in clandestine radio communications in which there is any military or naval interest, or action requiring disclosure of intercepted communications, shall be initiated without the joint approval of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, or their designated representatives."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Geo. V. Strong,  
Major General

APRIL 23, 1942

Finally, another agreement was reached by the three agencies as to the respective spheres of jurisdiction each was to possess:

No. 6

April 23, 1942

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE APPOINTED TO EXPLORE THE CRYPTANALYTICAL WORK OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, NAVY DEPARTMENT AND FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

---

The subcommittee met in the office of Mr. D. M. Ladd, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on the afternoon of April 21, 1942. On this occasion, there were present:

For the War Department: Colonel John T. Bissell  
Colonel Carter Clarke

For the Navy Department: Commander John R. Redman  
Commander J. N. Wenger  
Lieutenant Commander  
Alwin D. Kramer

For the Federal Bureau  
of Investigation: Mr. E. P. Coffey  
Mr. D. M. Ladd

This subcommittee took up the question of the coordination and cooperation of the cryptanalytical work of the three services and the question of the processing of coded communication intercepts. It was agreed by all representatives present that there was a definite need for some coordination in this field; and it was pointed out that one of the primary interests in this work was the desire for the security of information to the effect that such activities were being carried on, and for the purpose of retaining this knowledge in the possession of the minimum number of people.

It was further agreed that in view of the limited and talented personnel available, the available personnel should be concentrated in the fewest possible agencies rather than spread out through numerous Governmental departments; that concentration of this personnel in a few agencies would eliminate the competitive bidding for the services of such personnel. The desirability of maintaining the minimum number of units handling cryptanalytical work suggests that this work should properly be confined to those agencies which have for some years been responsible for the handling of this work; and your committee recommends that the cryptanalytical work of the Government be limited to the War Department, Navy Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This recommendation is made because of the close relationship which has existed between these three agencies and because of the fact that these three agencies are those which are primarily interested in this work inasmuch as it is definitely investigative intelligence, and the investigative jurisdiction in national defense matters rests with these three agencies.

In view thereof, it is the recommendation of your committee that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference endeavor to secure the issuance of an executive order restricting the setting up of any cryptanalytical sections other than in the War Department, Navy Department, and the FBI, and the disbanding of any cryptanalytical sections other than these three which are now in existence in the Federal Government. There is attached hereto a proposed executive order in line with the recommendation of your committee.

In carrying out the provisions of the attached directive, it is believed that a Communications Intelligence Committee which will be known as the CI Committee should be established as a sub-committee of the Inter-departmental Intelligence Conference and shall be composed of one representative to be appointed by the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This CI Committee should

hold frequent meetings for the purpose of farming out the work to be delegated to it by other Governmental agencies, for the purpose of eliminating duplication of effort and for the purpose of working out policy matters. All policy matters of procedure and dissemination should be referred by the CI Committee to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference for appropriate action.

FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Colonel John T. Bissell

Colonel Carter Clarke

FOR THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

Commander John R. Redman

Commander J. N. Wenger

Lt. Comdr. Alvin D. Kramer

FOR THE FBI

Mr. E. P. Coffey

Mr. D. M. Ladd

APRIL 23, 1942

Indications of the extreme caution exercised by U. S. naval officials in the handling of communication intelligence are seen in the following correspondence:



No. 7

Op-20-vb  
(SC)A6-5

April 23, 1942

240630

MEMORANDUM

**From:** The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.  
**To:** The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.  
**Subject:** Internal Distribution of Radio Intelligence Reports.

1. In the interest of preventing any information getting into the hands of the enemy in regard to the functioning of our Radio Intelligence unit, Radio Intelligence reports should be treated with the utmost secrecy and given the absolute minimum of dissemination.

2. Accordingly it is proposed to make internal distribution directly from the Radio Intelligence Section of Naval Communications to the War Plans Division (F-1) and Naval Intelligence Division (Op-16) and no other distribution of these reports as such will be made.

3. Your concurrence in this procedure is requested.

F. J. FORNE

241400

No. 8

FPL/A6-5  
Serial 0700

April 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.  
To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations  
(Director of Naval Communications)

Subject: Radio Intelligence Reports, Internal  
Distribution of.

Reference: (a) Vice CNO Conf. Memo Op-20-vb (SC)  
A6-5 of April 23, 1942.

1. The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet is in complete accord with paragraph 1 of reference (a).

2. Present procedure requires delivery of three (3) copies of subject reports to either the Communication Officer or Assistant Communication Officer of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, in Room 3057. It is desired that this procedure be continued except that delivery be effected in sealed envelopes similar to the handling of "Sealed Secret" despatches.

/s/ RUSSELL WILLSON,  
Chief of Staff.

JUNE 18, 1942

On May 25, and June 5, detailed reports on the findings of the above conferences were issued, copies of which are on file in Op-20-G. Our principal interest, however, is in the agreements reached by these agencies. On June 18, 1942, the Director of Naval Intelligence, in his capacity as Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, sent the following letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

No. 9

June 18, 1942.

From: The Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee. (Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, U.S.N.)  
To: The Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
Subject: Limitation of Cryptanalytical Activities.

1. The informal standing Committee, composed of the Heads of the three Intelligence agencies, F. B. I., M. I. S., and O. N. I., has conducted a study of present and prospective cryptanalytical activities, in order to assure the maximum security and efficiency in the conduct of this essential work.

2. The Committee concludes, in the interest of secrecy, elimination of unnecessary duplication, and most efficient use of the limited number of talented personnel skilled in cryptanalysis, that this work should be controlled and undertaken by a minimum number of agencies. In view of the fact that the Army, the Navy, and the F.B.I. now have large organizations well equipped

for and capable of handling the processing of all the raw material currently intercepted, the Committee recommends that the processing of that raw material be limited to the three agencies aforementioned.

3. It is intended by the Committee that any and all necessary cryptanalytical work will be allocated among the three agencies named, so that the field can be satisfactorily covered.

4. In addition to the organizations named, it is understood that at present small cryptanalytical units exist in the offices of (1) Director of Censorship, (2) Federal Communications Commission, and (3) Coordinator of Information. It is possible that other Offices have installed or are contemplating cryptanalytical units.

5. In view of the range of the governmental agencies involved now, and possibly more in the future, it appears that Presidential approval of this be recommended and that such approval be obtained.

T. S. Wilkinson.

CC: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.  
Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2).  
Vice Chief of Naval Operations.  
Director of Naval Communications.

JUNE 20, 1942

U. S. naval authorities were so concerned over the harmful publicity about communication intelligence which had been engendered by the Midway success, that Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, sent the following letter to the commanders of his major units:

No. 10

Op-20-G/1r  
(SC) A6-2/A8  
Serial 0325520

June 20, 1942.

From: The Commander-in-Chief, United States  
Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.  
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States  
Atlantic Fleet.  
The Commander-in-Chief, United States  
Pacific Fleet.  
The Commander, Southwest Pacific Force.  
Subject: Control of dissemination and use of  
radio intelligence.

1. The extreme importance of radio intelligence as a reliable source of enemy information has been repeatedly demonstrated. From no other form of intelligence can the enemy's intentions be so positively determined.

2. In view of these facts, it is imperative that every possible precaution be taken with regard to controlling the dissemination and use of radio intelligence in order to avoid drying up its sources. Any disclosures in the past with regard to the source of radio intelligence have invariably resulted in an immediate change in the enemy's communications and the consequent loss of weeks or months of painstaking effort on the part of our radio intelligence personnel. It is recognized, of course, that radio intelligence is of no value unless proper operational use can be made of it. However, momentary tactical advantage is seldom worth the risk of compromising the source, for such compromise will stop the flow of information and thereby vitally affect operations on all fronts and in all areas.

3. In order to further the maintenance of high security in regard to radio intelligence, the following regulations for the dissemination and use of this intelligence are hereby prescribed:

- (a) The utmost secrecy shall be used in dealing with decryption intelligence, i.e., information resulting from the reading of enemy encrypted despatches.
- (b) Radio intelligence should be passed on to subordinate commanders only in the form of operational directives whenever practicable.
- (c) When such intelligence must be given out to lower commanders as information it should be passed without any reference to its secret source and should contain, somewhere near the beginning of the message, the word "ULTRA" or the word "ZEAL".
- (d) Special care must be taken in every command to insure that radio intelligence is provided with special security safeguards and is seen and handled by the absolute minimum number of persons required for its use. Cryptographic systems of the highest available security and the narrowest distribution which includes the originator and addressees shall always be used for transmitting radio intelligence.
- (e) Every effort must be made to avoid indicating any connection between the source of intelligence and the outcome of operations. When action is based on radio intelligence, local commanders will insure that the action cannot be traced to this source of intelligence alone. All copies of radio intelligence messages should be destroyed by burning as soon as possible after being read. Ships at sea, where enemy action is possible, should

take particular precautions to destroy all evidences of intelligence sources in order that there may be no possibility of their falling into enemy hands.

/s/ E. J. KING

Copy to:

The Commander, South Pacific Force.  
The Director of Naval Intelligence.  
The Director of Naval Communications.

By Officer Courier.

JUNE 30, 1942

Since the problem of dissemination of the results of cryptanalysis was the main reason for all the preceding conference reports and correspondence, the next report will be of interest since it outlined the eventual solution:

No. 11

June 30, 1942

Subject: Report of Conference Appointed to Study Allocation of Cryptanalysis.

In accordance with your directive a conference of representatives of the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was held on June 30, 1942, at which time the conference was advised of your directive which was as follows:

"That a committee be designated composed of one representative from each service to consider the entire field of cryptanalysis to assure themselves that the three services can cover the entire field, and having assured themselves that they could cover the entire field, to avoid duplication of effort by allocation of the cryptanalysis, among the services, of those types which the respective services are best qualified to undertake. Provision should be made for pooling of effort aside from this allocation whenever circumstances require. Consideration should be given to the formation of a standing committee to pass upon any questions of allocation or pooling of efforts which may arise from time to time."

A study was made of the entire field of cryptanalytical work for the purpose of determining whether the three designated agencies, i.e., the Army, the Navy, and the FBI, were able to handle all such work.

The survey of this field reflected that this work fell generally into the following classes:

1. Diplomatic
2. Enemy Naval Operations
3. Enemy Military Operations
4. (a) Western Hemisphere Clandestine  
(b) International Clandestine other than Western Hemisphere
5. Trade Codes
6. (a) Army Weather  
(b) Navy Weather
7. Domestic Criminal
8. Voice Broadcast
9. Cover Text Communications
10. Miscellaneous



After surveying this field, it was the unanimous opinion of this conference that all of this work could be adequately handled by the cryptanalytical sections of the three interested agencies.

A study was made by the conference with reference to the question of the allocation of this work, and the conference agreed on the following allocation:

1. Diplomatic: Army
2. Enemy Naval Operations: Navy
3. Enemy Military Operations: Army
- \*4. (a) Western Hemisphere Clandestine: FBI-Navy  
(b) International Clandestine other than Western Hemisphere: Navy
- \*\*5. Trade Codes: To be assigned by committee
6. (a) Army Weather: Army  
(b) Navy Weather: Navy
7. Domestic Criminal: FBI
8. Voice Broadcast: FBI
9. Cover Text Communications: FBI
10. Miscellaneous: To be assigned by committee

\*The conference felt that there was sufficient material to occupy both FBI and Navy with reference to the handling of Western Hemisphere Clandestine work inasmuch as both are presently engaged in it and have a vital interest in the results. It was suggested that the duplication in this field be eliminated by agreement among the members of the committee to be appointed.

\*\*Inasmuch as this work involves the question of which agency possesses the proper library material applicable to the particular code, it was believed that these cases should be assigned by a standing committee, which committee should have in its possession the complete list of the code book material possessed by all three agencies.

The conference recommended that a standing committee composed of one representative from each of the three agencies (Army, Navy, FBI) be appointed, and it was recommended that the committee should be made up as follows:

1. Officer in Charge, Signal Intelligence Service of the Army.
2. Officer in Charge of the Radio Intelligence, Office of Vice Chief of Naval Operations
3. Officer in Charge of the Technical Laboratory, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This committee is to meet at frequent intervals for an exchange of information and for the purpose of eliminating any duplication and for the purpose of passing upon any questions of allocation or pooling of efforts which might arise from time to time.

FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Col. Carter Clarke  
Col. Frank W. Bullock  
Mr. William Friedman

FOR THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

Comdr. John R. Redman  
Comdr. J. N. Wenger  
Lt. Comdr. A. D. Kramer  
Lt. Comdr. L. T. Jones

FOR THE FBI

Mr. E. P. Coffey  
Mr. D. H. Ladd

JULY 6, 1942

Acting upon the foregoing report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following memorandum to the President:

COPY

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

July 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, in the interest of maximum security and efficiency, cryptanalytical activities should be limited to the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

At present, small cryptanalytical units exist in the offices of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Director of Strategic Services. It is also possible that other offices have installed or are contemplating cryptanalytical units.

In the interests of secrecy, elimination of unnecessary duplication, and most efficient use of the limited number of talented personnel skilled in cryptanalysis, it is believed that this work should be controlled and undertaken by a minimum number of agencies. As the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation now have large organizations well equipped and capable of handling the processing of all the raw material currently intercepted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that these activities be limited to the three agencies mentioned. An agreement has been reached with regard to the allocation of this work between the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Presidential approval of the foregoing is respectfully requested.

(Signed) F. J. HORNE (Signed) G. C. MARSHALL

E. J. KING  
Commander in Chief  
U. S. Fleet

G. C. MARSHALL  
Chief of Staff

JULY 8, 1942

President Roosevelt then issued the following memorandum to the Director of the Budget:

No. 13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum received today from the Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet. I agree with them. Will you please have the proper instructions issued discontinuing the cryptanalytical units in the offices of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission and the Strategic Services. If you are aware of any other agencies having services of this character, will you please have those discontinued also.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

SEPTEMBER 24, 1942

The request of an American Ambassador in South America for certain decoded material brought the following statement of policy from U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence:

No. 14

September 24, 1942.

Op-20-G/jac

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN ZACHARIAS:

**Subject:** Request of Claude G. Bowers for certain decoded material.

**References:** (a) Copy of secret ltr from Admiral T. S. Wilkinson to Hon. A. A. Berle, Jr., Asst. Secretary of State, dated March 28, 1942.

**Enclosure:** (A) Secret ltr from Maj. Gen. Geo. V. Strong to Hon. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., dated April 3, 1942.

1. The question of supplying decoded material for prosecution purposes has arisen from time to time, as in this case. The Radio Intelligence Section has always taken the stand that no material should be supplied and believes it essential that this policy should be continued.

2. The same question arose in connection with the closing up of clandestine stations in Brazil. Unfortunately, the matter got out of hand and it became public knowledge that the ciphers used

by the espionage agents in that territory were being read by our government. Both the Army and the Navy became very much concerned over the situation, and a conference was called by the State Department to discuss ways and means of handling similar situations which might arise in the future. It was agreed that no action should be taken to close clandestine stations without the consent of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations. The idea behind this was that it might be much more valuable to the military services to obtain the information flowing through clandestine stations than to close them up. Furthermore, there was always involved, as in this case, the possibility of having to disclose the source of evidence to be used in prosecution.

3. I believe that the State Department is aware of the foregoing decision and should be guided thereby. In this connection I should like to invite your attention to reference (a), a letter to Mr. Berle, of the State Department, from Admiral Wilkinson, and also to enclosure (A), which is a copy of a letter from General Strong to Mr. Berle.

Respectfully,

J. N. WENGER

NOVEMBER 18, 1942

Recommendations for more restricted handling of communication intelligence in the Navy Department itself were now agreed to after some dangerous publicity leaks had occurred in the newspaper:

Op-20-G/jac

November 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM

From: Op-20-G-1.  
To: Op-20.  
Via: Op-20-G.

Subject: Publicity concerning radio intelligence activities.

1. On November 11th there appeared in the "Washington Post" the following statement regarding action in Guadalcanal: "Holcomb said General Vandergriest's men captured the Japanese landing code, and he knew when and where they were coming in."

2. In the November 16th issue of "Time" the following statement appeared concerning communications of a certain clandestine station in South America:

"Its complicated coded and transposed messages were interceded and turned over to the U. S. experts, who broke the code. From then on, officials in Washington followed carefully the work of Nazi spies in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Mexico, and even in the U.S."

3. Bearing upon these disclosures, the following very significant statement appears in a secret Japanese message from Madrid to Tokyo, dated November 12, 1942: "From my experience of the past three years, all leakage of the war plans of the United Nations can be laid to the door of the United States."

4. The unfortunate "Chicago Tribune" affair should have taught us a good lesson but it apparently did not for the publicity continues. The work of the radio intelligence organization is extremely difficult. Its value is recognized. Only yesterday, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, sent a dispatch of

appreciation to the organization saying that "once again radio intelligence has enabled the fighting forces of the Pacific and Southwest Pacific to know where and when to hit the enemy."

5. If the operating forces are to continue to benefit by radio intelligence, drastic steps must be taken to prevent further disclosures of the sort mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. This action is particularly important now that we are about to undertake the analysis of other Axis communications. The new work, as pointed out in my memorandum of September 3, 1942, will involve a large expenditure of funds. The success of the undertaking will depend very largely upon our ability to maintain secrecy. Should word leak out that we are reading the enemy's communications, it is almost certain that changes will be made, possibly rendering the entire project useless. The last change resulted in inability to read these communications for about a year. During that time we have suffered very serious loss of property and life in the Atlantic, much of which might have been prevented had we been able to read the enemy's communications.

6. As it stands now, there are many people who see the results of our work whose duties do not actually require them to have the information. They read these dispatches out of mere interest or curiosity. The argument usually given against any effort to restrict dissemination is that everybody knows about radio intelligence anyway, and there is no use trying to conceal it. That the existence of radio intelligence organizations is known must be taken for granted. The results obtained by these organizations are not known, however, unless they are disclosed, as are ours. If we are not to "kill the goose that lays the golden egg," then those who need the results must take the necessary action to prevent further disclosures.



7. In order to improve the present unsatisfactory situation, it is urgently recommended that an immediate survey be made of present methods of dissemination, as well as all individuals who are given or have access to this information, with a view to reducing dissemination to the absolute minimum necessary for operations. It is also recommended that stricter compliance with COMINTCH Secret Serial 0325520 of June 20, 1942, be required.

Respectfully,

/s/ J. H. WENGER

Op-20-G-1.

NOVEMBER 19, 1942

No. 16

Op-20-G/ir

November 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR OP-20,

Via Op-20-1.

1. I concur fully with Commander Wenger's remarks.

2. It will probably be necessary verbally to prohibit newspapers and magazines and radio commentators from mentioning anything pertaining to enemy codes, enemy ciphers or about results of radio or other communication intelligence gained from intercepting or studying enemy communications.

3. The Army and Navy Public Relations Officers and the Office of War Information probably could verbally instruct representatives of publishers concerning such a prohibition, but I think that initial announcements by the Commander in Chief and by the Army Chief of Staff (possibly at Press conferences) would be most effective. There should preferably, however, be nothing in writing prohibit-

ing mention of enemy codes, enemy ciphers, or about radio or other communication intelligence activities.

4. No doubt the number of persons who read dispatches merely for their own information or to satisfy their curiosity can and should be reduced. This probably includes many young officers (aids and assistants) as well as a few more senior officers who have access to the offices where secret dispatches must be delivered and used.

/s/ E. E. STONE,  
Op-20-G.

NOVEMBER 24, 1942

In November, 1942, the Secretary of the Navy, Honorable Frank Knox, assisted operational authorities in the campaign to keep communication intelligence safe from unwise dissemination:

No. 17

From: SecNav To: ALNAV #250

Released by: Frank Knox

Date: 24 November 1942

RESTRICTED MAILGRAM

241327/250

All officers and men are reminded of the vital necessity of restricting to those who need to know the nature of the sources of our intelligence information of the enemy.

Except as required by official business no reference should be made to interrogation of prisoners of war, captured documents, counter espionage or any other sources.

Before arrival in port following a period of combat operations personnel going on shore leave shall be specially cautioned concerning these security measures.

Action Copy

Departmental Distribution:

Lists I II III IV V VI (VIII, IX, X) VII XI XII (15)  
War Department (5)

DECEMBER 11, 1942

This desirable action was followed very shortly by a letter of the Secretary of Navy, Honorable Frank Knox to the Secretary of War, Honorable Henry L. Stimson. It contained a paragraph which was eventually sent to the Director of Censorship by the Secretary of War as a statement of policy agreed to by both the Army and Navy. The correspondence outlining this policy follows immediately:

No. 18

Serial 0300320

November 30, 1942

The Honorable,  
The Secretary of War.

Sir:

Referring to the "Code of Maritime Practices" for the American Press, copy attached, I recommend that action be taken to incorporate the following therein:

**ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS**

To the end that the enemy may not have information concerning any success we may attain in deciphering his encoded or enciphered communications, no mention should be made of available or captured enemy codes or enemy ciphers, or about the intelligence gained from intercepting and studying enemy radio messages.

If the Army concurs with the Navy in this matter, will you please take appropriate action to effect this addition to "Code of Wartime Practices" for the American Press?

Recently, two cases have been noted at the Navy Department wherein disclosures were made in publications concerning results of communication intelligence activities. It is not considered desirable in presenting the above information to the Office of Censorship to point out these or other specific cases, since to do so might emphasize them unduly. However, experience has shown that when the enemy codes and ciphers are changed, and communication methods modified, thereby nullifying much constructive work which may have been accomplished only after months or years of effort on the part of those engaged in communication intelligence activities.

Respectfully,

/s/ FRANK KNOX

No. 18A

WAR DEPARTMENT

Washington

December 11, 1942

The Honorable,  
The Secretary of the Navy.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

You are advised with reference to your communication of November 30, 1942, that the War Department concurs in the recommendation that the "Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press" be revised so as to include the Navy Department's proposed paragraph covering "Enemy Communications."

In accordance with your suggestion, a letter, copy of which is attached, has been directed to Mr. Byron Price, Director of Censorship, requesting that the second paragraph of your letter be inserted in the "Code of Wartime Practices."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. SIMSON  
Secretary of War

Incl:

Cy. ltr. to Dir. of Censorship

No. 18B

December 11, 1942

Mr. Byron Price,  
Director of Censorship,  
Apex Building,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Price:

There has recently been brought to the attention of the War Department by the Navy Department that

406-B

8 APR 1918

information has been published which disclosed results obtained from communication intelligence activities. Experience has shown that when the enemy learns of benefits gained from communication intelligence, codes and ciphers are changed and communication methods modified thereby nullifying much constructive work which may have been accomplished only after months or years of effort on the part of those engaged in communication intelligence activities.

It is therefore requested that the "Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press" be revised so as to include the following paragraph; and that notice of this change be given proper distribution:

#### ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS

To the end that the enemy may not have information concerning any success we may attain in deciphering his encoded or enciphered communications, no mention should be made of available or captured enemy codes or enemy ciphers, or about the intelligence gained from intercepting and studying enemy radio messages.

Your kind cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON  
Secretary of War

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the U. S. within the meaning of the Espionage Act, U.S.C. 50; 31 and 32. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DECEMBER 17, 1942

The following is an important statement of policy from the Director of Naval Communications concerning the disclosure of information about clandestine stations in Latin America:

No. 19

Op-20-G/jac  
Serial 0372020

December 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL THOMASON, U.S.N.C.

Subject: Information disclosed in clandestine communications transmitted from Chile which may have resulted in sinkings.

1. Enclosed is a list of certain ships which were mentioned in clandestine messages transmitted from Chile on the circuits indicated. These ships were sunk on the dates shown, possibly as a result of these messages.

2. It is understood that this information is desired for use in connection with restrictions to be placed upon Axis communications from Argentina. In this regard, it should be pointed out that although certain exposures have already been made concerning these clandestine operations, nevertheless the cryptographic systems employed are still used on at least two other circuits, and it would be inimical to our future cryptanalytical operations should further disclosures result. The closing of clandestine stations in South America and the prosecution of the agents involved have

resulted in unfortunate publicity. The latest occurred in the November 16 issue of "Time," wherein the following statement appeared concerning communications of a certain clandestine station in South America:

"Its complicated coded and transposed messages were intercepted and turned over to the U. S. experts, who broke the code. From then on, officials in Washington followed carefully the work of Nazi spies in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Columbia, Mexico, and even in the U.S."

3. In connection with this matter, the following excerpts from a report on discussions held on April 2, 1942, in a conference at the State Department under the chairmanship of Mr. A. A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, it is believed, are pertinent:

"The desirability of consulting proper responsible authority in the U. S. Government prior to initiating any action with regard to closure of clandestine radio stations, or apprehension of individuals engaged in clandestine communications, was emphasized in order that the necessity for taking such action may be weighed against the disadvantage of disclosing information obtained from intercepted and decrypted messages sent by such stations or individuals. After thorough discussion of this matter it was the general opinion of the conference that, unless the type of information transmitted by such radio stations or individuals was of a nature that constituted direct jeopardy to allied shipping or military operations, it would be more desirable to permit the clandestine operations to continue. It was agreed that in any event wherein the

2



13 APR 1943

sole basis of action against individuals engaged in clandestine communications was information obtained from cryptanalytical attack on intercepted messages, serious consideration must be given to the fact that disclosure of success would generally result in discontinuing the codes and ciphers in use, thus stopping the source of information and usually resulting in a new cryptographic system more difficult to solve.

"It was decided in the conference that any questions of closing clandestine radio stations or apprehending individuals connected therewith should be referred to the Chief of Staff of the Army and to the Chief of Naval Operations before any positive action was initiated."

4. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that every possible precaution be taken in the use of the attached information to prevent its falling into unauthorized hands.

/s/ CARL F. HOLDEN  
Op-20.

SECRET

SHIPS MENTIONED IN INTERCEPTS LATER SUNK

<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Mentioned</u>	<u>Sunk</u>	<u>Circuit</u>
1. Bayou	2/19/42	2/27/42	PYL
2. Santa Rita	3/1 /42 3/4 /42	7/9 /42	PYL
3. Berganger	3/31/42	6/2 /42	PYL
4. Alchiba	4/2 /42	7/8 /42	YLL
5. U.S. Mercury(men)	5/1 /42		
Mercury Sun		5/18/42	PYL
6. Mikoyan	5/6 /42	10/3 /42	PYL
7. Maldanger	5/6 /42	6/27/42	PYL
8. Ogontz	5/8 /42	5/19/42	PYL
9. Rio Blanco	5/11/42	4/1 /42*	PYL
10. Edward Luckenback	6/11/42	7/2 /42	PYL

\* Date should be checked.

ENCLOSURE TO VCNO SECRET SERIAL 0372020

JANUARY, 1943

A government agency was responsible for one violation of security, and caused the following letter to be written by the Army:

No. 20

SPSIS 311.5-General

SPSIS-7

MEMORANDUM For: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
War Department

Subject: Suppression of cryptographic information

1. Attention is invited to SSB translation #64001, which contains what purports to be "a summary of an American memorandum entitled 'American Information on Nazi Spying in Argentina', published by the Consulting Committee for Policies of Emergency Continental Defense".
2. This translation indicates that information concerning "secret radio stations....invisible inks....methods used to compile information from the countries of this continent and contents of telegrams exchanged with Germany, which have been completely deciphered" was published in certain newspapers. That the message of reference states the case fairly accurately is shown by the accompanying article which appeared in the New York Times of January 23, 1943. Presumably this whole story has had a very wide circulation already.
3. The efforts of the War and Navy Departments have for some time been directed toward the suppression of information of this very character. The Joint U.S. Communications Board is even now engaging in

FEB 1943

drafting a detailed paper dealing with the "Security and Suppression of Cryptographic Information", the intent of which is to coordinate all U.S. efforts toward this end.

4. If the information divulged as indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 above is authentic and if it was furnished by any Department or Agency of the U. S. Government, the inconsistency in U. S. policy becomes obvious, since on the one hand the armed services are striving to prevent such occurrences and on the other hand certain U.S. agencies are facilitating their occurrences, thus nullifying the efforts of the armed services which are responsible for the security of information of the nature of that dealt with in this memorandum.

5. Incidents of this nature have come to notice several times in the recent past and steps toward their repetition were presumably initiated. It is suggested that steps should be taken once for all to insure that similar incidents will be positively prevented in the future.

For the Chief Signal Officer:

W. Preston Corderman  
Colonel, Signal Corps

Incl.  
Clipping

FEBRUARY 6, 1943

Clandestine stations in Latin America had been a problem to American cryptanalysts not only because of their subversive activities, but also because revelation of American success in deciphering their codes would have meant the drying up of very valuable sources of information. Finally, suitable action was agreed upon as follows:

No. 21

February 6, 1943

**Subject:** Agreement between FBI, MID, and ONI for the operation of a network to locate clandestine radio stations in Latin America, and the action to be taken upon the information derived therefrom.

1. The agreement of December 1, 1942, subject, "Agreement between FBI and MID for the operation of a network to locate clandestine radio stations in Latin America, and the action to be taken upon the information derived therefrom," is hereby cancelled. The undersigned, in order to reduce to writing the basic principles regarding the operation of a network to locate clandestine radio stations in Latin American countries, agree upon the assignment of responsibility as described in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

2. MID will be responsible for:

- (a) The establishment of a network to locate clandestine radio stations in various Latin American countries including the West Indies by lending direction-finding and communication equipment to the several countries concerned, by furnishing technical assistance and by coordinating the stations involved.
- (b) Disseminating the information obtained to representatives of FBI, ONI and the appropriate agency of the local country.

3. FBI will be responsible for:

- (a) Taking the action considered most advisable, after concurrence by representatives of MID and ONI, either by

1 12 1943

eliminating, operating or leaving unmolested the clandestine stations that have been located.

- (b) Keeping representatives of MID and ONI supplied with all information that establishes or tends to establish the existence and/or location of any clandestine station, and which has been received by FBI through other means than those described in paragraph 2(a).
- (c) The transmission of such material by an operated clandestine station as is requested by MID or ONI.

Major General George V. Strong,  
Assistant Chief of Staff,  
G-2, War Department.

Rear Admiral H. C. Train,  
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Hon. J. Edgar Hoover,  
Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

MARCH 25, 1943

In March, 1943, another important bulletin was issued by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet in regards to use of communication intelligence. It summarized the best thoughts of American and British cryptanalytical organizations as follows:

No. 22

UNITED STATES FLEET  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FPL/ A6-2  
Serial: 00551

March 25, 1943.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,  
and Chief of Naval Operations.  
To: Commander in Chief, United States  
Atlantic Fleet.  
Commander in Chief, United States  
Pacific Fleet.  
Commander, Seventh Fleet.  
All Commanders of Sea Frontiers.  
All District Commandants.  
Chiefs of All Air Technical, Primary  
and Intermediate Training.  
Subject: Control of dissemination and use of  
communication intelligence.  
Reference: (a) Cominch Secret serial 0325520 of  
June 20, 1942.

1. Reference (a) is hereby superseded and shall be destroyed by burning.

2. The extreme importance of communication intelligence as a reliable source of enemy information has been repeatedly demonstrated. From no other form of intelligence can the enemy's intentions be so positively determined.

3. In view of these facts, it is imperative that every possible precaution be taken with regard to controlling the dissemination and use of communication intelligence in order to avoid drying

up its sources. Any disclosures in the past with regard to the source of communication intelligence have invariably resulted in an immediate change in the enemy's communications and the consequent loss of weeks or months of painstaking effort on the part of our communication intelligence personnel. It is recognized, of course, that communication intelligence is of no value unless proper operational use can be made of it. However, momentary tactical advantage is seldom worth the risk of compromising the source, for such compromise will stop the flow of information and thereby vitally affect operations on all fronts and in all areas.

4. In order to further the maintenance of high security in regard to communication intelligence, the following regulations for the dissemination and use of this intelligence are hereby prescribed:

A. General.

(a) Particular care must be taken in every command to insure that communication intelligence is provided with special security safeguards and is seen and handled by the absolute minimum number of selected persons necessary for its handling and use.

(b) In exposed locations where enemy action is possible, particular precautions shall be taken to destroy all evidence of communication intelligence sources, including authorized files of communication intelligence messages, in order that there may be no possibility of its falling into enemy hands.

B. Cryptanalytical, or "Special," Intelligence.

(c) The utmost secrecy shall be used in dealing with cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence, i.e., information resulting from the reading of enemy encrypted dispatches.

(d) Cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence shall be passed on to subordinate commanders only in the form of operational directives whenever practicable.



(e) When such intelligence must be given out to lower commanders as information, it shall be passed without any reference to its secret source and shall contain, somewhere near the beginning of the message, the word "ULTRA", or the word "SUPER".

(f) Only cryptographic systems of the highest security, i.e., Type X, ECM, HCM, CCM, or one-time cipher, and of the narrowest distribution which includes the originator and addressees, shall be used for transmitting cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence, or any direct reference thereto.

(g) However, in exceptional instances where it is absolutely necessary to pass cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence to non-holders of these cryptographic systems, only the barest essentials required for necessary action by the addressee(s) shall be given, and the information shall be transmitted in the cryptographic system of the highest available security.

(h) In disseminating cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence to lower echelons, care shall be taken to avoid, when possible, quoting exact dates, times, positions, or actual names of enemy units in a manner whereby the disseminated information, if intercepted by the enemy, can be tied to the original source.

(i) Every effort shall be made to avoid indicating any connection between the source of intelligence and the outcome of operations. When action is based on cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence, local commanders should insure that the action cannot be traced to this source of intelligence alone.

(j) All copies of translations and paraphrases of cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence shall be stamped "ULTRA" or "SUPER" in addition to the usual secrecy classification.

(k) No reference to cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence shall be made in war diaries, reports, proceedings, etc., however limited the circulation, without specific authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

C. Traffic Intelligence or "Y" Inferences.



(1) Traffic intelligence or "Y" inferences, i.e., information derived from enemy communications by methods short of cryptanalysis, shall be stamped "ULTRA" or "SUPER" and treated on the same level as cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence when it is of obvious importance. Other intelligence of this nature, including that derived from enemy plain language, shall be treated as secret.

/s/ E. J. KING

This ends the list of documents which contain details of the agreements discussed in Chapter V.

CHART I

UTIAN ISLANDS



A

ATTU I.

NEAR ISLANDS

AGATTU I.

BULDIR I.

KISKA I

CHUGU  
RAT I

AMCHIIT

PACIFIC OCEAN

BERING SEA

SEGUAM I.

AMUKTA ID

YUNASKA I.

CHUGUL I.

CARLUSEL I.

CHUGINADAK

UKAGAHIL I.

ULIGA I.

UJNA I.

(SEE INSET)