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SRH-012

THE ROLE OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE
in the
AMERICAN - JAPANESE NAVAL WAR

VOLUME I

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THE ROLE OF RADIO INTELLIGENCE

in the

AMERICAN - JAPANESE NAVAL WAR

(August, 1941 - June, 1942)

[Volume I]

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INTRODUCTION

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Introduction

That the Navy would have an important role to play in defending our shores, and carrying the attack to the enemy was a foregone conclusion when the United States went to war in December, 1941. Since the treacherous assault on Pearl Harbor it has become increasingly evident that the past few months mark the greatest naval war of our country's history. Behind the scenes of that war with its vital sea and air battles, its Midway and Coral Sea lies the dramatic story of a unit of the United States Navy - Radio Intelligence. It is a story of enemy messages intercepted and deciphered, enemy plans revealed and interpreted, enemy operations anticipated and forestalled. How this was done is not the province of this report to make known. Some day, perhaps, the account of the labor, resourcefulness, and ingenuity of the anonymous experts of Radio Intelligence will be written. Here the chief concern is with the results, not with the methods of their work.

This brief history will outline the work of the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence organization in the three outstanding events to date of the American-Japanese war - the disaster of Pearl Harbor, the Battle of Coral Sea, and the Battle of Midway.

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It is hoped that as the story of these campaigns is unfolded, the importance of Radio Intelligence, as an adjunct of naval strategy, will be realized. This is the beginning of a new era for Radio Intelligence, the value of which first became evident during World War I. Today this activity has become as vital to naval success as air forces or submarine fleets. The usefulness of Radio Intelligence, naturally, cannot be publicized. The knowledge of its accomplishments would make the Japanese change their system of communications immediately. Months of arduous research would thereby be rendered valueless, and the difficult task of once again decrypting new systems and procedures would be the result. The significance of the lessons learned in this war must never be forgotten. A well organized and efficient radio intelligence service can reduce the risk of surprise assault to a minimum. The story, which follows, will prove this fact to the most critical observer.

As far back as July 22, 1931, in a report concerning the Japanese Fleet maneuvers of 1930, Radio Intelligence gave a comprehensive outline of the Japanese "American" War Plan, and showed that the Japanese had made an excellent estimate of our own Grange War Plan. The detailed information obtained at this

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time as to Japanese scouting procedure, battle alignments, radio procedure, and defense plans was very valuable, and obtained at only slight expense with inadequate facilities. It was another demonstration of the truth of the remark of Colonel Civiège, former Chief of the French Cipher Division, who said after the last war:

"We found in the hostile communications information which was always truthful, obtained without risk of human lives without expense, and with a speed and surety that no other intelligence organization was able to equal."

In 1933 Radio Intelligence conceived the idea of traffic analysis, as a very valuable aid in obtaining information from enemy communications. It was thought that a study of a potential enemy's communication system, and the careful observation of his message traffic would give such information as to the organization, strength, disposition, location and movement of the enemy's forces. Such an assumption was logical, in view of the fact that a naval communication system is generally based on the Operations organization.

An experiment was carried on in connection with the Japanese Grand Maneuvers of 1933, and as a result, it ~~was~~^{was} found possible to obtain strategic information of great importance concerning Japanese war plans. The Japanese habit of evolving detailed procedures, and then prac-

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ting them with great care was pointed to as an indication of the importance of continuing intercept activities in time of peace, so as to prepare for war. The following excerpt from this report in 1934 is most significant in the light of later happenings. (Pg. 7):

"From what is known of Orange (Japanese) policy it is probable that any attack by Orange forces would be made without previous declaration of war or other intentional warning. The preparation of any large force for war could hardly be carried on, however, without some noticeable increase in radio activity or other significant change in the use of communications. These departures from normal practices are clearly to be seen in the material intercepted in connection with these maneuvers. Therefore, the constant and careful study of the daily course of Orange Naval radio activity cannot be over-emphasized in its importance as a barometer of the hostile intentions of that nation."

In April, 1937 a supplementary report on the Japanese maneuvers of 1933, was issued, which stressed the fact that seizure of enemy bases in the Orient was part of their plans, as well as the employment of aircraft on extended operations. Great stress was laid on the use of submarines operating independently on scouting missions, and surprise attacks at a distance from the main force. Widespread operations of aircraft in scouting and bombing were also noted.

We have looked at the activities of Radio Intelligence in times of peace. We may now turn to ~~our~~

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role in the war between America and Japan.

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A Word of Explanation

So that the duties of the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence Organization may be understood, the following is a brief explanation. In a report of June 30, 1937 the mission of Radio Intelligence was defined to be this:

"A. To concentrate efforts in the Pacific for the present, in order to maintain facilities located in that area in a high state of readiness for war, and give priority attention to Pacific Naval Powers in the order of their importance in that area.

B. To obtain from the communications of these powers all information that will enable us to:

1. Comprehend their international policies in peace;
2. Uncover their plans for war;
3. Predict any outbreak of hostilities; and
4. Keep informed of their strength, disposition, movements and possible intentions after war is declared."

The duties outlined above might seem to be overly ambitious, were it not for the fact that they are no longer objectives to be reached, but are accomplishments actually achieved.

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The greatly increased tempo of warfare which has come with the advent of aircraft, together with the vast areas over which hostilities have spread, have imposed upon our intelligence activities difficult problems never before encountered. Not only must the location and disposition of the enemy's forces be determined with great speed, but his inner thoughts must be known to prevent the disastrous results of the surprise attacks which can now be so swiftly launched.

The areas covered are so great that reconnaissance has become inadequate. Although reconnaissance may be effective in locating enemy forces, it can seldom give information as to the enemy's intentions. Radio Intelligence, on the other hand, has demonstrated its ability to cover vast areas with the minimum of personnel, expense, and risk. Not only has it been able to locate accurately the enemy's forces, but it has time and again given vital information as to his future movements and plans. Even as an adjunct to reconnaissance it has proven invaluable in reducing areas to be searched. The speed of action and the great distances now involved in warfare make it imperative for the enemy to utilize rapid means of communications, and upon this fact Radio Intelligence is built.

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During the period covered by this report there were three U.S. Naval Radio Intelligence centers.

These centers functioned as follows: Each center was assigned a specific portion of work, and continuously passed on to the other two centers all technical information, traffic analysis results and decryption recoveries.

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From all the intelligence of operational value received, each center prepared a verbatim daily summary, which was given directly to the commander of operations in its own area, e.g., Opnav (Op-20-3) served ComInch, Comfourteen provided for Cincpac, and Belconmen kept Comsowespac informed.

In addition Comfourteen prepared a daily digest, which included decryption and traffic analysis results. This was known as the Daily Bulletin, and was given to C Cincpac to pass to the Task Force Commanders afloat in his area, who would then disseminate it further to their own commands. Belconmen prepared similar bulletins for Comsowespac to pass to Task Force Commanders in his area. Further dissemination was made to British, Australian and New Zealand commanders in the southwest Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, as well as to U.S. Sea Frontier commands in the Pacific, the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

The chart in Appendix IV will more clearly outline the coordinated activities of Op-20-3, or Radio Intelligence.

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CHAPTER IPRELUDE TO PEARL HARBOR

Whatever the ultimate decision may be as to the state of alertness at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, there is no doubt that the United States Navy knew that war would break out around that time. There was plenty of evidence at hand - instructions from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador had been read for months, and the tone of these messages at the end of November left no doubt as to the intentions of the Togo Cabinet. Ship and plane movements to the southwest area of the Pacific were sure indications of operations in the near future, and intelligence of such activities had been placed in the hands of the proper authorities.

A review of the material known before December 7, 1941, will be valuable for many reasons. It should show just how much the Navy did know in early December, why it did not know more, and what can be done to avoid deficiencies in the future. For the purpose of convenience the data have been arranged in two classifications, Diplomatic Activity and Naval Operations. Both are of great importance since the movements of the Japanese ships

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take on added significance in view of the strained diplomatic relations at the time. The diplomatic background will be reviewed first, though, from a naval viewpoint, fleet movements are, of course, most significant. The summary, which follows, is provided for the busy reader, but it is recommended that Appendix I be scanned at least, so that the most significant dispatches can be read in detail. Important intercepted messages will be given in Appendix I so that, as the data accumulates day by day, the picture of future Japanese operations, which Radio Intelligence was able to provide, will be clearly seen. All important passages have been underlined for emphasis.

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Part 1

Diplomatic Background of Pearl Harbor

Summary*

This cannot be an ambitious attempt to outline the whole complicated story of American - Japanese diplomatic relations for several years before the outbreak of war. Neither can it be a full description of all the activities of the statesmen of both countries during the few months before Pearl Harbor. The limits of time and space, necessarily imposed on this study by various circumstances, make it readily apparent, that all that can be hoped for here is a brief resume of some important highlights. It should be noted, however that in the possession of the United States Navy are documents, which will be priceless to future historians, who will endeavor to come to a decision as to the effectiveness of the negotiations, held for several months before Pearl Harbor.

*For a detailed story, see Appendix I, Part 1.

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Several important diplomatic messages were not decrypted until after December 7. These have been relegated to Section B. In Section A the reader will find only those messages the Navy had deciphered by December 7. It must be remembered that only a few messages, indicating the imminence of war, are included here. Hundreds of other dispatches, giving important details of the talks between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassadors, have been left out of this brief resume. Most of those omitted would be absolutely essential, if this were to be a detailed history of the diplomatic background. Section B contains the dispatches which, though intercepted before Pearl Harbor, were not translated till after the outbreak of war.

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Section AInformation known before December 7, 1941

Fundamental policy of the Japanese. This was based on three important pacts - Treaty A, the secret part of the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936; Treaty B, the strengthening of this pact in 1941; and Treaty C, the Tripartite Treaty. All these will be found in Appendix I, Part 2.

January
1941

Japanese activity in 1941. Japanese - American relations were strained all during the year 1941. The New Year opened with Premier Konoye urging cooperation with the United States, but warning the Japanese people to prepare for international pressure. As early as January 24, 1941 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox sent a letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific to forewarn of possible attacks by the Japanese.

February
1941

As Admiral Nomura was received as Ambassador to the United States, an extraordinary war budget was passed by the Japanese Diet, and Congress approved heavy expenses for Pacific bases for the United States Fleets. Rumors of Cabinet changes were rife, and during the next few months, as Foreign Minister Katsuko continued to rant against the United States and affirm

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support of the Axis, (I, 1, No. 1)*, there was an evident split in the Japanese Government.

July
1941

The move of the United States in seizing Axis ships made the Japanese very anxious about theirs. (I, 1, No. 3). An internal crisis affected Japan for on July 17, 1941 the whole Konoye Cabinet resigned at Premier Konoye's instigation. But on July 19 a new Cabinet was formed by the Premier, and, among other changes, Vice Admiral Toyoda was in charge of Foreign Affairs. Although they reiterated their determination to pursue the policy of the former Cabinet, the firebrand Matsuoaka was out of the way. Nomura continued his talks which were "unofficial, explanatory and without commitments." (I, 1, No. 6). As a result of Japan's seizure of bases in Indo-China, her funds were frozen in the United States as those of the Axis had been some months before. Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister had to deny any plans for a diplomatic break between the United States and Japan. The bombing of the U.S.S. TUTUILA, an American gunboat at Chungking, did nothing to allay the strain.

August
1941

However, tension eased when Japan formally apologized for the TUTUILA incident, but the shoot-

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*(I, 1, No. 1) refers to Appendix I, Part 1, No. 1).

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ing of Vice Premier Hiranuma in Japan showed the opposition there to the conservatives, who were anxious to stay out of war. Meanwhile, Japanese espionage agents were arranging for spy work in America when war would break out. (I, 1, No. 11).

September
1941

September was marked by the failure of a plan for a conference between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye on the high seas. October brought

October
1941

another critical period for the Japanese Government, (I, 1, No. 15), since the Axis powers were displeased with the secret negotiations in progress between Nomura and Hull. (I, 1, No. 16). On October 17, 1941 the Konoye Cabinet resigned over the question of evacuating troops from China, (I, 1, No. 21), and the next day a new Cabinet was formed with Tojo assuming the posts of Premier, War Minister, and Home Minister, with the rest of the members predominantly military in character. Ambassador Nomura now sent an extraordinary letter back home, requesting permission to return. This letter should be read to understand the conflict going on, at the time, in Japanese circles. (I, 1, No. 22). However, his request was denied, (I, 1, No. 24), and peace talks continued between Undersecretary Welles and Minister Wakasugi. (I, 1, No. 25).

November
1941

Japanese naval reconnaissance was reported in U.S. Pacific territorial waters as November opened,

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and U.S. women and children were evacuated from Guam, Midway and Wake Islands. On November 7 Special Ambassador Kurusu left Japan, and Tokyo insisted that the negotiations in Washington be finished by the 25th of November. (I, 1, No. 29). Kurusu was reported as pessimistic as to the outcome of his talks, (I, 1, No. 30), and so was informed opinion in Washington (I, 1, No. 31). U.S. Congress decided to remain in session indefinitely because of the crisis, Panama banned all Japanese commercial firms, and Winston Churchill pledged England's immediate support to the United States, if she went to war with Japan. The crisis was near, and the New York Times said the Japanese were expected to strike in early December. While evacuation plans of the Japanese were completed, (I, 1, Nos. 33-34), instructions for secret broadcast signals to indicate critical relations with the United States, Russia, and Britain, were sent out from Tokyo. (I, 1, Nos. 37-38, 46). An important message from Tokyo to Washington extended the dead line to November 29, and warned the Japanese Ambassadors: "After that, things are automatically going to happen." (I, 1, No. 42). Another code, which identified Secretary Hull as "Miss Funako" and President Roosevelt as "Miss Kimiko", was arranged by the Japanese for telephone conversations. (I, 1, No. 44). Nomura wished to have a real break in the negotiations, if war had been decided upon by

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the Japanese Government, so that the responsibility of the war would not be on them. (I, 1, No. 45). On November 26, 1941, the Japanese Ambassadors were handed a proposal by the United States, which was eventually to be rejected on December 7. A day later, a telephone conversation between Kurusu in Washington and Yamamoto in Japan indicated that a grave crisis was at hand. (I, 1, No. 47). Komura again tried to force a clean break in relations, (I, 1, No. 50); but his government now sent definite instructions to delay the end of the negotiations, as much as possible, though the proposal of the United States could not be accepted. (I, 1, No. 51). Mussolini and Hitler were sent warning that war would break out "quicker than anyone dreams." (I, 1, No. 52).

December
1941

Danger was evidently present, and so President Roosevelt rushed back to Washington to confer with Secretary Hull. The New York Times said the Philippines and the U.S. Pacific Fleet were believed ready for hostilities. A significant message, which indicated ^{Japan's} attempts "to keep the U.S. from becoming unduly suspicious," was sent from Tokyo to the Embassy in Washington. (I, 1, No. 53). American newspapers called the Japanese attempts to continue the negotiations a mere bluff to give them a better time to attack. (I, 1, No. 54). Meanwhile, an important sign of approaching hostilities was the destroying of codes

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in Japanese offices all over the world. (I, 1, No. 56-57). Though Nomura was still anxious for peace (I, 1, No. 59), the Japanese Embassy in Washington was ordered to burn practically all of its codes. (I, 1, No. 60). Word came from von Ribbentrop and Mussolini confirming Japan's stand for war, (I, 1, No. 61-62), but Nomura still worked for peace, (I, 1, No. 63-64). Japanese espionage agents were withdrawn to South America (I, 1, No. 65), and certainly there was no interest in peace in the messages sent by Tojo to his Embassy in Washington. (I, 1, No. 66).

Thus, in Section A ends the diplomatic information concerning the imminence of war, which was known by the United States on December 7. In Section B will be read those messages at hand, but not deciphered and translated, on December 7.

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Section BMessages sent before December 7, but not deciphered until after Pearl HarborNovember
1941

A Japanese message of November 28 stressed the fact that nothing could be done but to break off the negotiations of Hull and Nomura. (I, 1, No. 70).

December
1941

Japanese offices were closing in America, (I, 1, No. 71), and over in the Far East complete preparations for the invasion of Thailand were finished. (I, 1, No. 73).

Plans for the puppet governments of Manchukuo and Nanking in the coming war were made by the Japanese, (I, 1, Nos. 76 to 78). Japanese newspapermen were recalled by Domei, which at that moment was saying in Japan that Hull's terms could not be accepted. (I, 1, No. 79). Intense interest was exhibited in Tokyo concerning President Roosevelt's direct message to Emperor Hirohito, (I, 1, No. 82). A plain Japanese weather broadcast on December 7 indicated that Japanese relations with England and the United States would be broken off. (I, 1, No. 83).

In trying to hasten the official signing by the German Government of the Japanese-German agreement in case of war, Tokyo dropped the hint to its Ambassador "that before the official signing is completed the crash may develop." (I, 1, No. 84).

December 7 brought the request from Tokyo to

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its Ambassadors to deliver the rejection of the United States' proposals at 1 p.m. that day. (I, 1, No. 86). No mention of a declaration of war was made either in this message, or in the text of the rejection. Thanks from Tojo were sent to the Japanese in Washington, (I, 1, No. 87) and also, final orders to destroy secret codes and documents followed, (I, 1, No. 88).

In reviewing Part I of this Chapter, it is obvious that the leaders of the United States knew that war was about to break. Furthermore, the U.S. Navy officials were fully cognizant of this, because they had supplied much of the above information. When Part II, which follows immediately, is read, there will be no doubt that U.S. Navy officials had informed all commanders of fleets that war was possible at any moment, and that a surprise attack was most likely.

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Part 2

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Naval Operations

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Summary*Section AInformation Known Before December 7, 1941May
1941

As early as May the Japanese were exhibiting great interest in the movements of American warships, (I, 2, No.1), and this interest did not abate in the

June
1941

months that followed. A report by Radio Intelligence showed great Japanese aviation activity in the Mandates during this month. (I, 2, No.4). Espionage

August
1941

activity in the Panama Canal produced some good results for the Japanese (I, 2, Nos. 5,6,13), and it can be safely said they had determined to attack Pearl Harbor as early as September 24, if not before. (I, 2, Nos. 8,9). Evidence for this last statement comes from the very detailed plans requested from Japanese agents in Honolulu, and the minute attention paid to every inch of Pearl Harbor in the instructions from Tokyo. (cf. I, 2, No.9). Another official report (I, 2, No.15) noted that the activity of the Japanese ships supplying the Mandates had increased considerably.

October
1941

Japanese espionage was considerably accelerated and expanded in October. Ship movements were to be reported from all their American Consulates, and detailed

*For a detailed story, see Appendix I, Part 2.

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investigations concerning the air strength of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were made. (I, 2, No. 20, 21, 22).

As for Japanese naval forces, a report on October 18 pointed out that a large number of units were gathering in the Sasebo and Kure areas, and that such concentrations always preceded large scale operations of the Japanese Fleet.

November
1941

Reports in minute detail of American air strength in the Philippines went back to Tokyo, (I, 2, No. 26, 27), and investigations by Japanese agents were requested concerning such items as condition of air ports, types and numbers of planes at each field, and the state of the equipment of both land and sea forces. (I, 2, No. 28). Meanwhile, the United States was shipping bombs and ammunition to be prepared for any eventuality, (I, 2, No. 29), and an important naval conference was held in Washington. (I, 2, No. 30). The United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands had decided on a joint defense in Asia, (I, 2, No. 31, 32), though great difficulties in supplying aircraft to the Far East were present. (I, 2, No. 34).

Meanwhile, the Japanese were demonstrating unusual interest in Pearl Harbor. (I, 2, No. 36 to 39). Not only did they want reports of ship movements there, but also they requested information when there were no movements, (I, 2, No. 39). In turn, the U.S. Navy was

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alert in safeguarding the interests of American ships in the Pacific, (I, 2, No. 41), and knew full well that the Japanese had begun an air and surface craft patrol over the shipping routes from the United States to Australia. (I, 2, No. 42). Several Radio Intelligence reports in November stressed the great activity in the Mandates (I, 2, Nos. 50 to 53), and on November 24, 1941, the U.S. Navy Department issued a very important bulletin to all its fleet commanders, which read in part:

"a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility." (I, 2, No. 54).

On November 26, 1941, a report from the 14th Naval District Radio Intelligence unit stated that a strong force of submarines and air groups were in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. This indicated:

"That a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts of the Task Force may operate from the Marshalls and Palao."
 (I, 2, No. 55)

Though agreeing in the main points, the 16th Naval District Radio Intelligence Unit commented on this report next day:

"It is impossible to confirm the supposition of reference report that carriers and submarines are in the Mandates." (I, 2, No. 56).

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At any rate both the U.S. Navy and Army were getting ready for eventualities, and were cooperating in the problem of bringing air strength into the Pacific. (I, 2, Nos. 57 to 60). A very important dispatch was sent out from the Navy Department to all fleet commanders on November 27, 1941, reading in part:

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days." (I, 2, No. 61.)

More Japanese troop transport and warship movements in the Asiatic regions were now reported, (I, 2, Nos. 62, 63), and another warning of war was issued by the Navy Department:

"... Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the U.S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act ..."

Another warning bulletin from the Navy Department on November 30, 1941, read in part:

"There are indications that Japan is about to attack points on the Isthmus by an overseas expedition." (I, 2, No. 66)

December
1941

War was imminent as December opened. Diplomacy had failed, Japanese warships were on the move, and JYW, a radio station in Tokyo, directed all its listeners to tune in at 7 and 7:30 a.m. on December

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1 (E.S.T.) for important news. (I, 2, No. 67). The Japanese changed all their radio calls on December 1, which was another sign of immediate action. (I, 2, No. 68). President Roosevelt directed a reconnaissance patrol to be established in the Asiatic regions, (I, 2, No. 69) and orders were sent by the Navy Department to ensure full cooperation with the British and Dutch. (I, 2, No. 70). Warning that the Japanese had burned all their codes and secret documents in important offices throughout the world was sent to all Pacific commanders of the U.S. Navy (I, 2, No. 71), and, since this was a most significant sign of approaching hostilities, the Navy Department ordered the destruction of its own codes in areas of possible invasion. (I, 2, Nos. 72 to 77). A grave portent of imminent hostilities was the change of the Japanese code on December 4, (I, 2, No. 80). The next message available was the order of the Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy to execute against Japan unrestricted air and submarine warfare, (I, No. 2, 81).

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Section B

Messages sent before December 7,
but not deciphered until after Pearl Harbor

November
1941

A Japanese report of November 24, 1941
 gave minute details of the procedure of the fleet

at Pearl Harbor. Such points as which destroyers or battleships were anchored in certain sections, how long they were anchored, how long they were away on maneuvers, etc. were all given. (I, 2, Nos. 82, 83). The number of Flying Fortresses at Hawaii, the altitude range of anti-aircraft guns, rate of fire of these guns, and positions of anchorages of some ships were other items noted. (I, 2, No. 84). Definite information, that the U.S. warships in Pearl Harbor were always back from maneuvers on weekends, was a significant message of December 1. (I, 2, No. 85). Japanese agents in Panama were put on watch for the passage of U.S. warships, (I, 2, No. 86), and in Honolulu they were ordered to report if there were any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor, or if any were to be sent up. Advice was also requested as to whether or not the warships were provided with anti-mine nets. (I, 2, No. 87). An elaborate signal code of lights, sails on boats, bonfires and newspaper ads was arranged by the Japanese to indicate when carriers and

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battleships left Pearl Harbor. The periods they were interested in were December 1 to 3, and December 4 to 6. (I, 2, No. 88).

Every ship movement at Pearl Harbor was now reported to Tokyo (I, 2, Nos. 89 to 92), and a perfect picture of the scene at Pearl Harbor was relayed each day to Tokyo. (I, 2, No. 94). A most important dispatch from Honolulu on December 6 assured Tokyo that there were at that time no signs of barrage balloon equipment. It went on to say:

"... I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places:

In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. . . ." (I, 2, No. 96)

Another message of December 6 gave a complete report of every warship in Pearl Harbor, and added:

"It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm." (I, 2, No. 97)

The material in possession of the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence ends at this point and so the story of the background of Pearl Harbor must come to a close.

In reviewing Parts I and II of this Chapter, it must be emphasized that, though the Pearl Harbor attack was a surprise, the information given by Radio Intelligence saved the United States from even more dis-

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astrous blows. What might have happened had not the Army and Navy been prepared in Asiatic regions is very easy to visualize.

It should be remembered, also, that much of the information, which caused President Roosevelt to hurry preparations for defense, came from the same source. Had not the proper authorities been kept aware of developments in the Pacific, and elsewhere in the world for many months before the outbreak of war, the United States would have been far less prepared when hostilities began. As a result of the warnings given by U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence, and some other valuable sources of information, the Selective Service Act, the great drive for more shipping, and increases in U.S. Navy warships, planes and personnel were already in operation on December 7, 1941.

The importance of Radio Intelligence, as a national instrument of defense, has never been more clearly demonstrated than in the months of peace before Pearl Harbor. Its great value, as the watchdog of national security, should never be lost sight of in the peace that is to come.

REASONS FOR TIME LAG IN DECRYPTION

OF SECTION B

A question may arise concerning the Japanese messages in Section B, which were intercepted on the date

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of transmission, but not translated till some time later. Undoubtedly these messages, sent just before the first incident of the war, were very important. What explanation is there for the time lag between reception and decryption of Japanese messages and the time of Pearl Harbor?

1. Delays in transmission - In 1941 the intercepted messages were generally sent by air mail from Hawaii and Manila, and delays were frequent. Even teletype transmission from our Pacific Coast met with some interruptions, and those sent by radio were not always given priority. In addition, there were the usual obstacles always found in handling communications - logging, filing, routing, delivery, and much other clerical work.

2. Difficulties of decryption - Though the Japanese codes were being read successfully by Radio Intelligence, there was always a period of waiting till the solution was ready.

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3. Volume of messages - There were so many Japanese messages pouring into Washington the week before Pearl Harbor that the lack of sufficient qualified personnel was very evident. Excellent work was done, but some messages had to be left aside. Priority had to be given to the decryption of certain systems which seemed most important, and since no one could tell what was in a message until it was deciphered, some valuable dispatches were delayed in translation. The diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan were so strained that it seemed absolutely necessary to keep abreast of the traffic between the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and Tokyo. No other decision could be made in view of the circumstances. It seems safe to say, however, that had there been sufficient skilled personnel operating at the time, most of the messages would have been decrypted before December 7th. Whether the information contained therein would have prevented the tragedy of Pearl Harbor is still another question.

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4. Lack of personnel. To demonstrate the personnel difficulties, in December, 1941, it must be remembered that three small units were not only responsible for their own work of Radio Intelligence but also had the duty of producing all the codes and ciphers for the entire Navy, and guarding the security of these codes as well.

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Chapter II

The Battle of Coral Sea

Summary*

N.B. - This summary is provided for the busy reader who may not find time to peruse the detailed account in Appendix II. However, it is very earnestly suggested that the complete story be planned at, since some of the deciphered messages contained therein are very important. The information, summarized here, was known by U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence before the Battle of Coral Sea, and was gathered by decryption and traffic analysis of Japanese messages. The reference (II, No. 1) directs the reader to Appendix II where the messages are given in detail.

Part 1 - Aftermath of Pearl Harbor

December 1941

With the United States at war, U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence began its important task of eliciting information from enemy messages. Documents, from Japanese planes, (shot down at Pearl Harbor, were of slight assistance, (II, Nos. 1 to 3), but by research and analysis it was known, within a week after the war, that the basic code of the Japanese was unchanged.

January 1942

Recoveries of Japanese code values went on

*For a detailed story, see Appendix II.

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gradually, but by January 20, 1942, Radio Intelligence was able to inform the U.S. Fleets of the make-up, speed, destination, and expected time of arrival of enemy convoys. (II, No. 6). A startling fact of great international importance was accomplished, when a deciphered Japanese message divulged that U Saw, the Burmese Premier, was plotting to overthrow British interests in favor of the enemy. Swift action by Winston Churchill, who was then in Washington, put an end to further duplicity by the gentleman from Burma.

February
1942

Problems of security were now experienced by the U.S. Navy, for the Japanese were successfully invading areas where American cryptographic systems had been used. (II, Nos. 7 to 15). However, constant alertness in guarding the radio channels disclosed when the enemy was taking advantage of such captured material, and warning could then be given to our naval forces.

March
1942

To explain a sudden concentration of Japanese forces in home waters, a Memorandum to the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet was issued, which termed the new movements a defensive, rather than an offensive operation. (II, No. 16).

Part 2nd - The Eve of Coral Sea

March 25
1942

A deciphered Japanese dispatch gave the first

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inkling of a campaign against Port Moresby. (II, No. 17). All during April and May Japanese messages were being read, so that enemy plans leading up to the Coral Sea action were well known.

April 3
1942 The augmentation and reorganization of air squadrons in the Rabaul area were indications of future enemy operations. (II, No. 18). A decoded message,

April 7
1942 directing Japanese planes to search a distance of 500 miles in a certain sector, was ample proof of great interest in the Coral Sea. (II, No. 20). Many messages

April 10-24
1942 concerning air personnel were noticed in the Rabaul and Mandates area all during April, (II, Nos. 22 to 32) and, of course, these extraordinary preparations were not ignored.

Important data as to the make-up of the Attack and Occupation Forces of the Moresby Campaign were revealed by several decrypts, (II, Nos. 33-39), and the ever important question of the location of Japanese air carriers was solved by traffic analysis. (II, No. 39). Four enemy carriers were either in or enroute to the Moresby Area, for the Japanese intended

April 23
1942 to push next into Australia. (II, No. 40). The changing of Japanese call signals and codes at this time was of great significance, since this was the usual enemy pro-

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cedure before an engagement. (II, Nos. 41-42). More data on air and submarine activity was gathered,

April 28-29 (II, Nos. 43-44), (II, Nos. 48-53), and deciphered
1942 messages furnished important detailed operational plans of the enemy. (II, No. 45-46, Nos. 54 to 56).

So much information was available from mere April 30 analysis of their traffic, as to Japanese movements
1942 around Moresby, that, even without being successful in deciphering Japanese messages, sufficient warning could have been given U.S. Navy fleets. (II, Nos. 57 to 59).

May 1 However, decryption offered a check on the accuracy of
1942 the predictions of traffic analysis, and important area designators were learned from several messages. (II, Nos. 60 to 62). The attempt of the Japanese to disguise their radio calls, and the use of a new code system were further indications of another campaign. (II, Nos. 63 to 66). The U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence issued, at this time, a resume of conditions in the southwestern Pacific, which outlined the Japanese forces to be used at Port Moresby, and mentioned the prospects of an enemy attack on the Aleutians. (II, No. 67).

May 2 The opening day of operations was not far
1942 away, if the information contained in decrypted Japanese messages was correct. (II, No. 68-69). They mentioned

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the need of plane replacements by May 3rd, which were to be at two supply points by May 7 and May 8. Traffic May 3 1942 analysis indicated that more units were being added to the enemy forces, (II, Nos. 70 to 72), and decryption revealed specific orders for the Moresby Striking Force, which were to be carried out at 0600 on May 5. (II, No. 73).

May 3 1942 Attempts of the Japanese to issue deceptive calls, purporting to be signals from numerous air groups around Japan, were nullified, because the message, which ordered the initiation of this practice had been read. This was a certain indication that the enemy was putting much strength into the Port Moresby Area, and leaving the homeland weakened. (II, No. 74).

Constant efforts were made to clarify the picture of

May 4 1942 Japanese invasion forces. (II, Nos. 75 to 77).

Shortly, the direction of the coming attack by the Striking Force was discovered, (II, No. 78), and also the approximate X-day.

May 5 1942 Detailed instructions to the Japanese Occupation and Striking Forces were read, (II, Nos. 80 to 83), as the enemy's attempts at radio deception proved to be useless.

MAY 6 1942 (II, Nos. 84 - 85). Finally, decryption of a message notified U.S. fleets that the Japanese had sighted them. (II, No. 87). Tremendous radio

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activity on the part of the Japanese, analyzed and
May 7 deciphered, gave further proof that the enemy was
1942 no. fully aware of strong opposition. (II, Nos. 88 to
 91).

May 8 The Japanese announced the sinking of a
1942 U.S. carrier, and the damaging of another in the combat
 raging in the Coral Sea, (II, No. 91), but nothing could

May 10 gainsay the victory achieved by the U.S. Navy, when the
1942 Japanese had to issue orders to "postpone" the occupation
 of Koresby. (II, Nos. 94-95). By the decryption of an
 enemy message, the Japanese admission of the loss of one
 of their principal air carriers, and the damaging of another,
 was reported, (II, No. 96). Thus, ended the part of Radio
 Intelligence in the Battle of Coral Sea.

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MIDWAY

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Chapter IIIThe Battle of MidwaySummary*

N.B. - This summary is provided for the busy reader, who may not find time to peruse the detailed account in Appendix III. However, it is very earnestly suggested that the complete story be glanced at, since some of the deciphered messages contained therein are very important. The information, summarized here, was known by U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence before the Battle of Midway, and was gathered by decryption and traffic analysis of Japanese messages. The reference (III, No. 1) directs the reader to Appendix III, where the messages are given in detail.

May 2
1942

While preparations for Coral Sea were in their final stages, U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence discovered a new Japanese campaign in progress. Having great success in reading enemy codes, Radio Intelligence soon discovered the importance of the movement, which first manifested itself in a message of May 2. (III, No. 6).

May 5-6
1942

Intercepted dispatches of the next few days disclosed that the Japanese were planning operations, which would require extensive fueling at sea (III, No. 7), and that arrangements for large replacements of air personnel were being made (III, No. 9). Further assurance of planned action was given when a lengthy order, outlining the pro-

*For a detailed story, see Appendix III.

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gran for a conference of all Japanese Air Commanders, came to light. The list of subjects to be discussed at the meeting obviously indicated reconnaissance and attack methods for a very important movement.

(III, No. 11).

May 8-11
1942

Operations were to commence about 21 May, when air carriers, accompanied by destroyers, were to move into the Saipan-Guam Area. (III, Nos. 13-16). The shipping of military equipment, bombs and shells

May 12
1942

to Truk for the requirements of the new campaign, did not escape attention (III, No. 17).

The first mention by the Japanese of a definite objective was in a message of May 13. The symbol

May 13
1942

MI was used by the enemy (III, No. 18) and, after several messages had been decoded, which requested

May 14-15
1942

charts of the Hawaiian Area, (III, Nos. 19-20), it was known that MI was Midway. (May 15, May 22).

Much important data as to the organization of the enemy forces, their plan and methods of attack were revealed from other dispatches. (III, Nos. 21-25). Changing the date for the departure of some of their units from Saipan to some time in June was significant. (III, No. 22). Great activity in supplying aerial bombs and fuel, plus the presence of numerous destroyer units in the area, pointed

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to Japanese plans to occupy, equip and use Midway as a base for further operations. (III, Nos. 23-35).

May 16-17
1942

Very important details of the Japanese carriers' part in the project were divulged in a message, which stated that planes of the 1st Air Fleet were going to make attacks from a point, 50 miles northwest of Midway, from H-2 days to H-day. (III, No. 26). More decrypted Japanese messages, which contained requests for air mail delivery of necessary charts, urgent demands for the ammunition destined for Midway, and movements of several units from Yokosuka, only piled up evidence that a tremendous campaign was underway. (III, No. 27-31).

May 18
1942

Mention of the Aleutians as an objective, as well as Midway, was made in another important message, deciphered by Radio Intelligence. The same dispatch disclosed the position to be taken up by Japanese submarines before the attack on Midway, as 150 miles to the eastward of Oahu. (III, No. 32). Since the Japanese were very attentive to their preparations for air activity, much of value was derived from their decrypted messages. Land based fighters were to be used as part of the Midway Striking Force, (III, No. 34), and numerous plane and personnel replacements were made in air units destined for action at Midway. (III, Nos. 35-36). Two ships were detached from

May 19
1942

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the Fourth Fleet, and assigned to the Occupation Force,
(III, No. 37).

May 20
1942

Many secret orders were now being issued to
the Occupation Forces (III, Nos. 38-39), and by this time
a detailed report of the Japanese forces to be used at
Midway could be given, (III, No. 38, Comment; No. 40).

The Occupation Force was to have its own independent
aviation arm, when Midway was taken (III, No. 39),

and the supreme air of confidence, that Midway was already
theirs, is an interesting aspect of these Japanese messages.
(III, Nos. 53-54). However, had their attack on Midway been
as complete a surprise as Pearl Harbor had been, such op-
timism would have been justified.

A message of great importance was inter-
cepted, giving a list of letter symbols to be used
as designators for certain places and areas. These
would help considerably in later identifications (III, No. 41).
Important Japanese warship movements to an appointed ren-
dezvous were noted, (III, No. 42-43), and more supply and fuel
vessels arrived at Saipan, the base of operations, to-
gether with new personnel. (III, Nos. 50-53).

May 21
1942

Data, concerning fuel and supplies, con-
tinued to be intercepted during the rest of
the month of May, but new light was now shed on the

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second phase of the campaign. (III, No. 56). The capture of Midway was to be only the first step in the plans of the Japanese; evidently, the seizure of the rest of Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor, was to follow. All this is apparent, also, from the number of Special Landing Troops and other units which were being added to the Occupation Force. (III, Nos. 58 to 65). The elaborate training exercises, which were now ordered by the Japanese for all of the Midway units, (III, No. 55), was another certain indication of imminent action.

May 22, 1942. A decrypted Japanese call list gave U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence the call signs of the Japanese forces, which were to operate at Midway. (III, No. 68). More units of their striking force were identified, as enemy messages continued to be intercepted. (III, Nos. 66 to 72). An important Japanese conference of naval staff members to May 23, 1942. discuss the coming operations took place at this time, (III, Nos. 73-74), and seven supply ships were assigned for the third phase of the Combined Fleet's Campaign. (III, No. 75). The recovery of more Japanese call signals, and the arrival of several ships at Saipan indicated further strengthening of Japanese forces.

May 24, 1942. Plane and pilot replacements were sent to the AOKI, HIRYU, KAGA, SORTU, and a new unidentified carrier, (III, No. 83). Air fields were made ready, and

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huge supplies of fuel stored at Wake. The Occupation Force received orders to bring with it as large a quantity of air base equipment as possible. (III, No. 84), while another convoy of supply ships arrived at Saipan. (III, Nos. 85 to 89). An intimation, that the Japanese were soon to change their code, was also received on this day. (III, No. 90).

May 25,
1942 Intercepted messages (III, Nos. 92 to 95) unveiled detailed orders for the Occupation Forces, and revealed that reserve pilots were being brought in for the Striking Force, (III, No. 91). Another destroyer group was added to the Second Fleet, which was to attack Midway. (III, No. 96).

May 26,
1942 The schedules and locations of Japanese convoys, enroute to seize Midway, were next discovered, (III, No. 97), and more call signs for the operation areas were found in deciphered Japanese dispatches. (III, No. 94). Additional units were attached to the Midway forces (III, Nos. 100 to 104), and an urgent request went out from Saipan for seaplane replacements by June 3 (III, No. 105). The significance of this date was not lost of U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence.

May 27,
1942 A very important message indicated that the Occupation Forces were to rendezvous at 27° North, 170° East. (III, No. 106). Another dispatch ordered

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machinery and American engineers, captured at Wake,
 to be sent to construct an air base at Midway. From
May 28 ~~1942~~ on May 28 through the whole Battle of Midway,
1942 very little information could be gathered from
 Japanese messages, because the long expected change in
 enemy codes had finally taken place. Thus, the enemy,
 fleeing from U.S. Navy forces, was more successful in
 escaping, than would have been the case before May 28th.
 However, the fighting forces, returning from Midway,
 generously gave full credit to the work which had been
June done. Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the
1942 Pacific Fleet, said Midway might have turned out
 much differently, if it had not been for the warnings
 he had received, (III, No. 116), and Admiral King, Com-
 mander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, sent the U.S. Navy
 Radio Intelligence his much prized "Well Gona".

Microfilm Serial

Microfilm Serial

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CONCLUSIONS

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CHAPTER IVConclusion

The story of Radio Intelligence in the first eight months of the war has now been told. But its most important role has yet to be played in the future actions of the U.S. Navy. To ensure the victory, which must come, the lessons learned from experience should not be forgotten. And so, to provide a norm for the future, the following points are reemphasized:

(1) The disaster of Pearl Harbor might possibly have been avoided, if Radio Intelligence were working as efficiently on December 7, 1941 as it was in May and June, 1942. It is true there were very few indications of an attack on Hawaii noticed in the messages before December 7th, but had there been sufficient skilled personnel to decipher some of the intercepted material on hand at that time, the outcome might have been far different. The lesson is obvious - never again can the U.S. Navy take a chance on overburdening a few experts. A well grounded Radio Intelligence organization, thoroughly prepared for the research, analysis, decryption, and translation which is so necessary to its work, should be kept constantly

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on the alert for eventualities. Nor should the value of this unit be lost sight of in the peace which will follow the conflict. The United States Navy has a duty to prepare for war in times of peace. No better way of avoiding war, or at least being prepared adequately for war, can be found than in knowing the plans of potential enemies.

(2) It should not be forgotten however, that much was done even before December, 1941. The Navy knew the plans of the Japanese to invade Thailand and the Philippines, and it was definitely aware that war was coming at any moment. Though it was not known that Pearl Harbor would be struck first, warnings of probable surprise attack in any direction had been given, and the Asiatic units were on the alert for danger. Furthermore, the President and the leaders of the United States knew the true nature of the situation in the Far East, because of the secret information supplied to them.

(3) Radio Intelligence organizations are an essential part of every modern fleet, and can no longer be ignored as in the past. To avoid drying up sources of information, the greatest precautions must be taken not to publicize the work, but every U.S.

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naval leader must be made cognizant of the valuable instrument of intelligence he has available for his information. The English were convinced of the importance of such work during the last war, when their Navy profited immeasurably from the knowledge of German warship movements furnished by their radio intelligence. The French wrecked many German plans by the same methods and, in turn, the Germans were able to defeat the Russians badly, because of their success in decrypting enemy codes. For the U.S. Navy, there is no longer any doubt as to its value - Coral Sea and Midway are striking examples.

(4) Much of the success of the United States at Coral Sea and Midway came from errors of the Japanese.

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(5) Security of our own codes must be maintained constantly by the U.S. Navy. To do this requires constant checking on our codes, ciphers and communication practices. Continual inventory of secret documents in the possession of U.S. naval forces is demanded. There must be no slip, for one mistake can give away the whole system. The cooperation of all branches of the U.S. Navy must be had to ensure the necessary secrecy for the Radio Intelligence Organization. The restrictions of its records and working spaces must be observed even by officers. Serious compromises of the entire Radio Intelligence system have taken place, because of the leaks in the U.S. Navy itself. Strangely enough, these leaks have always come from outside the Radio Intelligence unit, and not from the members, who have sworn a special oath of secrecy.

(6) The success of Radio Intelligence units depends on a continuous flow of information, which is being constantly coordinated and interpreted. Any disturbance, or disruption of the necessary research, means a great decline in the output of intelligence.

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It is obvious, then, that success of the U.S. Navy in the future depends on the continued existence of a highly trained, well coordinated unit with sufficient personnel to cope with all the codes of other nations. Realism demands that, in the post-war era, the United States knew exactly what is going on around it. The medium by which this can be accomplished is already in existence, and is being trained daily in the hard school of war. It is obvious that the most significant part of the history of the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence has yet to take place.

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(4)

(5)

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GI files.

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GI files.

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APPENDIX I
PRE-PEARL HARBOR

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Appendix IPart 1Diplomatic Background of Pearl Harbor.

Before the war, as still is the case, the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence and the U.S. Army Signal Intelligence were working in close cooperation in deciphering Japanese messages. The U.S. Navy specialized in Japanese naval messages, and the U.S. Army centered its attention on military dispatches. Diplomatic messages were divided between the two services, with the Army responsible on one day, and the Navy on the next. Thus, some of the messages that follow bear the translation sign of the Army. All messages, however, were the common property of both services.

Section AInformation Known Before December 7, 1941*Fundamental Policy of the Japanese

It can be said that the diplomatic basis of Japanese cooperation with the Axis powers was laid with the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936.

*Though the Navy has complete diplomatic files for years back, research for this Chapter was limited to the period of July - December 1941.

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Especially significant was the secret clause, which
Radio Intelligence was able to furnish the President
of the United States. Notice this clause in the
 following message, which promises strict cooperation
 in war "regardless of circumstances."

Treaty "A"

FROM: Tokyo (Arima) 7 ? Nov. 14, 1936
 TO: Washington

Utterly and strictly secret.

Minister Kushakoji, accredited to Germany, having been vested with the proper authority, has initiated some negotiations with Germany for a Japanese-German pact. There follows the substance of the text which, upon the conclusion of the discussions, will be signed probably near the end of this month. This is for the information of our higher officials.

I. An Anti-Comintern Agreement and a Codicil.

Text of the Agreement:

- (1) To confer on measures for the exchange of information regarding, and defense against, the Comintern.
- (2) To provide for the participation of any third power sharing the same aims; and, as a codicil (so that both powers may effectively cooperate) to provide for measures against persons connected with the Comintern, and the establishment of standing committees.

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This Agreement and the Codicil become effective immediately upon signature, upon which we are agreed with Germany.

II. A secret appended agreement and its official text, as an agreement appended to the Anti-Comintern Agreement.

(1) If one of the contracting powers is attacked or threatened with an attack, regardless of circumstances, the other must uphold her position and take whatever measures are necessary to uphold her position, and both nations will immediately confer on what measures are to be taken for the common good.

(2) Opposition to the spirit of this agreement and its appendices will be politically resisted by contracting with foreign countries.

In connection with the preceding Clause (2), Japan and Germany will exchange the official texts of the pending Japanese-Soviet Agreement, the German-Soviet Rapallo Agreement, and all other agreements involving these countries.

III. Both agreements are effective for five years.

This telegram is addressed to our foreign embassies.

Navy Translation
11-12-37

Five years later this Anti-Comintern Pact was strengthened by another agreement. Its importance was great in view of the very strained relations existing between Japan and the United States:

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Treaty "B"

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2296 Nov. 11, 1941
 TO: Berlin

Protocol.

The Imperial Japanese Government, the German Government and the Italian Government together with the Hungarian Government, and the Imperial Manchurian Government and the Spanish Government, recognizing that the protocol signed by the above governments is a most effective means of combating the activities of the Communist "International" and believing that the common interests of the above governments are best served by close cooperation between them, do hereby agree to extend the effective period of the said protocol. For this purpose the following stipulations are agreed upon.

Article 1.

The agreement in regard to the Communist "International" which was formed on November 25, 1936, and later made into a protocol together with the protocol of November 6, 1937, which was joined by Hungary in February 24, 1939, by Manchuria on February 24, 1939, and by Spain on March 27, 1939, shall be extended for a period of five years beginning November 25, 1941.

Article 2

The agreement regarding the Communist "International" shall be entered into by the three original signatories namely, the Japanese Government, the German Government, and the Italian Government. Other countries desiring to join the agreement shall signify this desire in writing to the German Government and the German Government shall in turn notify the other signatories. Such participation

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shall become effective from the date that Germany receives the document signifying said desire to join.

Article 3.

This protocol shall be drawn up in Japanese, German, and Italian and these three texts shall constitute the official text. This protocol shall become effective from date of signature.

The contracting governments shall have the right to ask for an extension of the protocol above the designated five year period at a suitable time before the said period shall have elapsed.

In witness whereof I do hereby affix my signature having been duly authorized by my government to do so.

The day of November of the 16th year of Showa that is the year 1941 or according to Fascist history the year 20.

Six copies of this protocol will be drawn up in Berlin.

This is my message to Berlin, Hsinking, Nanking. Berlin relay to Rome.

Navy Translation
11-21-41

Furthermore, a Tripartite Pact had been signed by Germany, Italy and Japan in September 1940, which cemented more firmly the ties already established, in that it recognized the right of each power to establish a new order in designated areas. The three powers also

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agreed to help each other in war when attacked by a
power at present not involved in the European War
or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Treaty "C"

FROM: Tokyo (Matuoka) Sept. 25, 1940
TO: Berlin

To be sent in official code.

Part 1 of 4.

Three Power Pact between Japan,
Germany and Italy.

The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.

Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavors along lines similar to their own, in order that their intimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

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Part 2 of 4.

Article I.

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article II.

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article III.

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Part 3 of 4

Article IV.

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy will meet without delay.

Article V.

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

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Article VI.

The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

Part 4 of 4.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed thereto their Seals.

Done in triplicate at _____ the _____ day of the _____ month of the _____ year of Showa, corresponding to the _____.

Army Translation
10-28-40

Japanese Activity in 1941

January,
1941

Beginning the resumé of Japanese Activities in 1941, a rather significant event took place during January in Berlin. A Japanese military mission arrived there to inspect Nazi methods and equipment, and as a mark of its esteem presented a sword to General W. von Brauchitsch (January 19, 1941)*. This act agreed with the spirit of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's New Year message which stressed Japanese-Axis "New Order" aims.

* (Jan. 19, 1941) means New York Times, Jan. 19, 1941, page 19, column 5. All other references are from the New York Times, unless otherwise designated.

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Though Premier Konoye's message had been more conciliatory, in that it urged cooperation with the United States, his warning to the Japanese people to prepare for international pressure was also ominous. (Jan. 1, 6:15).

Back in Japan, twelve hundred United States citizens were reported ready to leave Japan, if a crisis occurred (Jan. 10, 4:2), and emergency conferences were being held by national leaders prior to a session of Parliament, in which Cabinet policies were to be explained by Premier Fuminaro Konoye, War Minister Hiki Tojo, and Navy Minister Admiral Koshire Oikawa. (Jan. 9, 10:16).

Such was the dangerous atmosphere in which 1941 opened, and all throughout the year, equally dangerous and critical movements were continually occurring in Japan, till the final friction period broke out in the explosion of war in December. It will be recalled that as early as this (Jan. 24, 1941) Secretary of the U.S. Navy Frank Knox had sent a letter to CINCPAC, warning of the possibility of attack by the Japanese. Premier Konoye was having Cabinet trouble in January, but the House of Peers followed the House of Representatives

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in agreeing to surrender debate rights, and granted full support to the Cabinet. (Jan.24, 5:4). Thus, by the end of the month Konoye, who had been thinking of resigning, now promised to remain at his post. (Jan.28, 9:1).

February,
1941

Japan won virtual political and economic control in several sections of Asia with the signing of the Thai-Indo China armistice. (Feb.2, 1:2). About the same time these juicy fruits of her war activities were dropping into Japan's lap, the Diet was considering the military and naval budgets approved by the Cabinet. (Feb.2, 2:6). The extraordinary war budget for April 1941 - to January 1942, was already approved, (Feb.7, 5:6), when one week later Secretary Hull presented to President Roosevelt, Admiral Komura's credentials as Japanese Ambassador to the United States. (Feb.15, 1:4). Other important appointments at this time were those of M. Morishima as Consul-General in New York City, S. Iguchi as Counselor to the Washington Embassy (Feb.18, 6:3) and K. Wakasugi as Minister to the United States.

Though the Diet rushed through measures giving the Government wide powers, (Feb.17, 3:1) there were many hints that dissatisfaction with Konoye was felt. (Feb.26, 6:5). Needless to say, there were divided opinions in Japan on important policies, (Feb.25, 6:3) and after the

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House of Representatives adjourned till March 18,
 there were many predictions of Cabinet changes.
 (Feb.28, 5:1).

Some important expressions of public opinion
 were those of Japanese Navy Vice Minister Toyoda, who
 stated the Japanese Navy was not menaced by the Pacific
 power of the United States at that time, and Tokyo's
 Nichi Nichi, which assured everyone that Japan could
 destroy Singapore and Guam with a single blow. (Feb.25,
 1:2,5,6). Tokyo's Asahi warned Britain and the United
 States that a crisis was near, (Feb.28, 15:1) and in
 Italy, Mussolini's mouthpiece, Gayda, predicted a
 Japanese-United States war in the Spring (Feb.28, 3:5).
 Meanwhile, the U.S. House of Representatives approved a
 huge fund bill for Pacific bases for the fleet.

March,
1941

Colonel T. Iwakuro was appointed an aide to
 Ambassador Nomura (Mar.5, 8:7), who was to shortly
 begin secret conversations with Secretary Hull in an
 effort to relieve the tense situation between the United
 States and Japan. Certainly, at this stage of the game,
 with Foreign Minister Matsuoka visiting Berlin, and
 reported to be on his way to Rome (Mar.9, 2:1,3), a great
 deal of tension was present.

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April,
1941

However, a sign of a conservative trend was seen in the Japanese Cabinet when Kusatsume Ogura was appointed Minister Without Portfolio. (Apr.1, 11:1). Two other Cabinet shifts seemed to strengthen this impression of future conservatism, when Vice Admiral T. Koyoda succeeded I. Kobayashi, and Lieutenant General T. Suzuki replaced N. Hoshino. (Apr.5, 4:8). Another important change of personnel occurred as Admiral O. Nagan assumed the duties of Prince H. Tushimi as Japanese Naval General Staff Chief. (Apr.10, 11:1,3).

May,
1941

A proposed visit by Matsuoka to the United States was much discussed in Japan, and the influential Japan Times and Advertiser elaborated on proposed peace plans between Japan and the United States. (May 1, 7:2,3). But very quickly the idea was squelched by Matsuoka, who rejected the alleged proposal, and suggested that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull should visit Japan to study the aims of the Japanese. (May 5, 8:2,5,7). The very day that 21 U.S. Flying Fortresses came to Hawaii on a secret mass flight from California, (May 15, 10:3) Japanese War Minister Tojo was warning his people of a need for army reinforcements. (May 15, 7:1,6). On Navy Day the Navy Minister K. Oikawa

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recalled the glorious victory of Admiral Togo in the Russo-Japanese War, and warned that the Japanese Navy was ready for any emergency. (May 22, 20:4).

Incidentally, students of naval history will recall that this Japanese victory was in essence the same type of treacherous assault, made without warning, which was to ^{SUBJECT} subject Pearl Harbor to terrific punishment. Another Navy spokesman, Captain H. Miraide, warned the United States and Britain of Japanese naval strength, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka was reported as being very gloomy on the international outlook. (May 28, 7:1,5).

June,
1941

Another crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations seemed to be near in early June (Je 6, 7:1,3,5,6), and Foreign Minister Matsuoka's support, in a personal message to the Duce, of Mussolini's warning to the United States of war was not reassuring. Matsuoka went on to reaffirm the close collaboration of the Japanese with the Axis. (Je 15, 6:25). However, just at this moment indications were that the United States was trying to improve American-Japanese relations, since Japan was exempted from an executive order freezing foreign assets in the United States. (Je 15, 26:1). Undoubtedly, this friendly gesture came from the fact that the secret Hull-Komura talks, which had been going on since the arrival of the Japanese

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Ambassador, were having some effect. All was not well in the Japanese Cabinet, for the Tokyo Nichi Nichi was hinting at future Cabinet shifts, and at the same time urging Premier Konoye to control Matsuoka. (Je 17, 5:5). Premier Konoye did seek the amity of the United States a little later, stating that the Japanese-Axis pact was designed to keep Japan and the United States out of the European War. He said its principal aim was to promote Japan's peaceful political and economic program for East Asia. (Je 30, 7:2,14). Though this eased the strained relations slightly, it can be said, that a warning from Admiral H.B. Kimmel to Honolulu naval families on anonymous phone calls, which sought data on ship movements, was more truly indicative of the spirit of the period. (Je 18, 16:4).

July,
1941

Messages from Tokyo to Berlin at this time stressed certain Japanese aims, evidently in an effort to reassure the Axis partners as to Japan's future course.

No. 1

FROM: Tokyo #585 July 2, 1941
 TO: Berlin

Note, to Ribbentrop, in part:

"... Japan is preparing for all possible eventualities regarding Soviet in order join forces with Germany in actively

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combatting Communist menace and destroying Communist system in eastern Siberia x At same time Japan cannot and will not relax efforts in the south to restrain Britain and United States x New Indo-China bases will intensify restraint and be vital contribution to Axis victory ..."

July 1941

No. 2

FROM: Tokyo
 TO: Berlin and Vichy

(Abstract)

Stresses Japanese determination to ret bases by force if necessary.

July 1941

Recent action of the United States in taking over Axis ships made the Japanese wary of a similar fate for their own ships.

No. 3

FROM: Buenos Aires (Tomii) Circular #91
 TO: Caracas July 14, 1941

(Message from Tokyo as Circular #1427 on the 4th) (Part 2 of 2)

... (2) Recently the United States took over German and Italian ships and we are not without fear that similar steps may be taken toward our own vessels. There is much shipping in American harbors and these vessels should, at as early a date as possible, return to Japan, avoiding the Panama Canal insofar as possible.

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1 SEPT 1942

(3) Recently the Philippine Islands have granted permits for the exports of military goods to Japan. Since it is hardly fitting in view of such a pass that Japanese vessels be used for the transportation of military goods between the Philippine Islands and the United States, we have decided to take some of the Japanese vessels off the Philippine-United States run.

(4) For the reasons given above, henceforth, on the basis of my instructions, before their departure, please acquaint the Captains of the Japanese vessels now in American harbors of the steps to be taken. Japanese ships on the west coast run will be increased and such American products as are taken on will be loaded at these ports.

Army Translation
9-18-41

A serious internal crisis now affected Japan, for on July 17, Premier Konoye took the initiative in having his whole Cabinet resign. Emperor Hirohito accepted, but asked Konoye to continue the administration of national affairs temporarily, until he could select a successor. (July 17, 1:5). However, the Emperor asked Konoye to form a new cabinet. (July 17, 1:5). There was thought to be much totalitarian and military influence at work to influence the new Cabinet, and Shigemitsu was mentioned as a possible Foreign Minister. (July 18, 1:4). Next day Konoye formed a new Cabinet; Matsuoka was not included, (July 19, 1:4), and Vice Foreign

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Minister Ohashi and Foreign Officer Admiral T. Saito resigned. Vice Admiral Toyoda was now in charge of Foreign and Overseas Affairs, and K. Yamamoto acted as Foreign Affairs Vice Minister.

Lest there be any apprehension as to Japan's new policies with a different Cabinet, the following message was sent.

No. 4

FROM: Tokyo #1560 July 19, 1941
 TO: Net

States that although Cabinet has changed there will of course be no departure from the principle that tripartite pact forms keystone of Japan's national policy and new cabinet will also pursue policy of former Cabinet in all other matters.

July 1941

That the new Cabinet approved of such messages as the next one is not completely clear, but, at least, they had said that they would absolutely back the former policy.

No. 5

FROM: Tokyo Circular #1518 July 16, 1941
 TO: Saigon and Hanoi

... Formal demands presented to Vichy on fourteenth x Reply asked by the twentieth x Japan intends to carry out plans by force if opposed or if British or United States interferes. ...

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Meanwhile, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States was trying to make his Government understand the nature of his conversations with Secretary Hull.

No. 6

FROM: Washington #529 July 18, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

(Abstract)

Komura explains the "unofficial explanatory and without commitment" nature of the talks. He had avoided the State Department and talked to Hull at his apartment, etc.

Army Translation
 7-22-41

These talks of peace, in themselves peaceful, were going on in a very heated atmosphere, which constantly seemed to be on the point of exploding. On July 23 Tokyo commanded all its ships to stay out of American ports.

No. 7

FROM: Tokyo 23 July 1941
 TO: (General)

High Urgent

All ships in Areas B, C, D and A5 to 12 inclusive will for present defer putting into port and await orders. Outside of personnel involved strictest secrecy will be exercised.

July 1941.

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Next day Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said that the U.S. Navy was prepared for any development (July 24, 1:7), and, shortly thereafter, the U.S. Army reported that all its Hawaiian Department troops were on an alert status. (July 24, 1:7). Komura, anxious about developments, was interested enough in a conversation of his with Admiral Stark to send a report of it back home.

Nb: 8

FROM: Washington July 25, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

(Abstract)

Admiral Stark's excellent opinion of Admirals Kimmel and King, Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, Director of War Plans, and Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.

Navy Translation
 7-29-41

The long expected freezing of Japanese funds finally came on July 25th as a result of Japan's seizure of bases in Indo-China, and newspaper pressure was so intense that Wakasugi, the Japanese Minister to the United States, had to deny that there were any plans to close the Embassy in Washington in anticipation of a Japanese-United States Diplomatic break. (July 26, 4:1, 3, 5, 6, 8).

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No. 9

#5 July 28, 1941

FROM: Tokyo (Navy Ministry)
TO: All Japanese Merchant Vessels.

1. For all vessels proceeding to ports in America (exclusive of Mexico), the Philippines, and British territories, we will, for the time being, watch developments and will designate by name those vessels which are to enter port.

2. Vessels proceeding to above mentioned zones will report their position at 6 pm daily (Japan time), and will await further orders about 50 kilometers outside the territorial waters of the ports of destination.

3. Those vessels which have received orders to enter ports will complete their loading and unloading operations and depart as quickly as possible, and report the fact of their departure at once.

(Signed) Chief of War Preparations Bureau.

Secret Message #163

Navy Translation
7-28-41

There was no doubt as to the seriousness of affairs, when Acting Secretary of State Welles called in Ambassador Nomura on July 30th to explain the bombing by Japanese naval planes of the American gunboat TUTUILA, at Chungking. Nomura emphasized the gravity of Welles's demeanor at the interview, in his message to home, and suggested that the best possible step Japan

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could take in this matter was to stop bombing Chungking for a while, and publish this fact immediately.

Tokyo replied as follows, but the fear of a reaction from the Japanese extremist group should be noted here.

No. 10

FROM: Tokyo #434 July 31, 1941
TO: Washington

(Utmost secrecy, Chief of Office Routing.)

Re your #612.

- In regard to your proposal, please
- tell the President immediately that in view
 - of the general state of relations between Japan and America, bombing of Chungking will be suspended for a time. In view of these relations between Japan and America, this step which you suggested would be a very serious one, indeed, and if it were publicly announced in America, it would give an unnecessary shock to one section of public opinion in Japan. This would defeat the very purpose of the step itself. Please call the attention of America to this point.

Navy Translation
8-1-41

August,
1941

The TUTUILA bombing incident was finally closed by Japan's tendering a formal apology, after conferences between Helles-Komura and Grew-Toyoda. (Aug. 1, 1:3). An interesting aspect of the troubled situation was a report of the Gallup Poll (Aug. 3, 20:1), which indicated that the voters favored a United States

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move to check Japan, even at the risk of war. Though Secretary Hull was non-committal at this time, Ambassador Nomura was quite hopeful of settling the differences between the two countries. (Aug. 3, 20:1).

The shooting of Vice Premier Hiranuma aroused much comment in Japan, for the act was interpreted as a sign of the opposition of the ultra-nationalist Black Dragon Society to Hiranuma's conservative stand. (Aug. 15, 1):2). Rumors from diplomatic quarters indicated that an Axis press man had inquired about the Hiranuma shooting, some ten hours before it had occurred (Aug. 15, 10:2). An important statement of Nomura's views against Japan's entering the war was sent to Tokyo on August 18

Obviously, there was a struggle for power going on in Japan between the usual factions of militarists and conservatives, and Nomura's messages were an attempt to restrain his country from entering what he thought was a foolish enterprise.

Though Nomura might be working for peace, other Japanese agents were preparing for war.

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No. 11FROM: ° Santiago
TO: Buenos Aires

#63 Aug. 22, 1941

(Abstract)

Report of Hidemari Terasaki, head of espionage in U.S. Results of his conferences with Ministers to Brazil, Argentina, Chile. Establishment of spies in the U.S. Directions as to personnel, how to operate, etc.

Army Translation
9-16-41

Another indication of the complex situation was the action of the U.S. Navy in stopping the providing of passage for dependents of men sent to Hawaii. (Aug. 28, 6:3). Ambassador Nomura, at Konoye's request, began conferences with President Roosevelt, and in Secretary of State Hull's presence delivered the note from his Premier, which sought accord. (Aug. 29, 1:5). This, of course, was merely a public gesture, since conversations of an informal and exploratory nature had been going on for months. However, though the Japanese were very anxious to get away from the preliminary stages, and enter actual negotiations, the United States was in no hurry to do this. Back in Japan there were more rumors of a Cabinet crisis, (Aug. 28, 3:1, Aug. 29, 1:8) and, finally, an emergency

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Premier Konoye warned his people that a crisis was growing, yet there was much optimism reported on the part of the Japanese concerning peace with the United States. (Sep.11, 11:1). The return of Minister Wakasugi to the United States was considered to be a sign of Japanese hope for Pacific peace, (Sep.15, 7:2,4), but on September 21, the Japanese-U.S. peace talks were reported to be at a standstill over Secretary Hull's refusal to accept the Japanese status in China. (Sep.21, 1:5).

Indications that the Japanese offices in the United States were getting ready for an emergency were prevalent.

No. 13

FROM: New York Circular #82 Sept. 7 1941
 TO: Buenos Aires, Lisbon

(Message to Tokyo #483)

The documents of this office have been sent by courier Kusa (sailing from San Francisco on September 9 on return to Japan via Shanghai.)

Army Translation
 10-31-41

No. 14

FROM: New York Sept. 24, 1941
 TO: San Francisco
 (Abstract)

Plans for evacuation.

Army Translation
 10-18-41

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October, Japan was experiencing more internal
1941 difficulties as October opened, and predictions were rife that Matsuoka was to re-emerge into public life. There were many indications that a bitter conflict between the Foreign Office and the Japanese Army was in process. (Oct. 1, 10:1). The following decrypted message hinted at the situation.

No. 15

FROM: Tokyo #618 Oct. 1, 1941
TO: Washington

To Counselor Iguti from Terasaki.

... (4) We fear that possibly you are not completely familiar with the exceedingly critical situation at home. It is only through the clear thinking of the military and the superhuman work on the part of all these officials concerned with domestic matters that we have been able to avert the breaking out of any unfortunate incidents subsequent to the 27th. (First anniversary of the Tripartite Act.) The utmost caution shall have to be exercised in the future to preserve this condition. Will you please obtain from Minister Wakasugi at first hand a description of the situation in Japan.

Navy Translation
10-4-41

The Axis partners of Japan were not pleased by the negotiations going on between the United States and Japan. Notice the following message:

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No. 16

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

#1198 Oct. 1, 1941

(Abstract)

Reports the disgust of Germany towards Japanese negotiations with America. Says Germany will not consult with Japan any more unless something is done.

Navy Translation
10-18-41

Similar views of the Italians were sent to Washington by the Japanese Ambassador at Rome. Oct. 9, 1941.

An interesting warning, revealing the tenseness of the diplomatic situation at the time, was this next dispatch. Notice the mention of the United States "Black Chamber."

No. 17

FROM: Bogota
TO: Tokyo

#169 Oct. 1, 1941

Re my #154 (available, not translated, Mated 11 Sept. re: securing permit for export of goods contracted for in Brazil.)

A telegram was sent from New York Mitsui to Sugawara regarding this matter. This wire included many details of this matter and various items connected with this matter.

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1 SEPT 1942

At this time when it is reported that the U. S. "Black Chamber" is greatly developing, it seems a dangerous matter to send wires between Mitsui in New York and Tokyo on this matter, as it might lead to full detection by them.

Please instruct Mitsui to be very careful on this case hereafter.

Navy Translation
11-29-41

A very unusual turn of events took place in the negotiations between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull. Nomura had been sending many messages to Tokyo, which expressed his viewpoint that Japan should stay out of the war, consolidate her gains, and be the strongest force in the Pacific after the European war was finished. Now, Foreign Minister Toyoda rebuked Nomura for not giving him the opinions of American officials, and he told the Ambassador that Tokyo had enough of Nomura's own opinions. Hereafter, Nomura was to take Wakasugi or Iguchi with him in talks with the United States officials. (#650, October 10, 1941)

Arrangements were made by the Japanese for a telephone conference between two of their officials, and the following is an example of the voice code used in such conversations:

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 BY: J. NARA DATE: 12/1/11

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

No. 18

FROM: Tokyo #662 Oct. 13, 1941
 TO: Washington

We have made the necessary arrangements for a telephone connection between Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, Terasaki, and Minister Wakasugi, for noon (Japan time) on the 14th. On this occasion, the following passwords and codes will be used:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| U.S. attitude is reasonable | MARIKO
OTAKU NI ASOBI NI KURUYA
(Is Mariko coming to pay you a social call?) |
| U.S. attitude is unreasonable | MARIKO
ASOBI NI KO NU
(Mariko is not coming to pay a social call.) |
| General outlook of the negotiations | SONO GO NO KOSI NO KENKO
(The health of the Minister since then.) |
| The Four Principles | SITIFUKUJIN NO KAKE MOHO
(Japanese scroll of the Seven Luck Gods.) |
| Will they stick to it? | KI NI IREMASITA KA
(Did it meet with your approval?) |
| Is there some way through it | KI NI IRIMASEN KA
(Did it not meet with your approval?) |

Navy Translation
 10-14-41

DECLASSIFIED
NO. 747622
AUTHORITY
BY J. NARA DATE 12/11

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Admiral Nomura, whose views all throughout the talks was one of peace for Japan, had friendly relations with some of the officials of the U.S. Navy. On September 30, 1941, he had visited Admiral Stark, and they were joined by Admiral Turner, who said that, unless Japanese troops were evacuated from China, no understanding was possible.

The following dispatch sums up another conversation between the same gentlemen.

No. 19

FROM: Washington (Nomura) #943 Oct. 11, 1941
TO: Tokyo

I had an interview with Rear Admiral Turner. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

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1 SEPT 1942

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position, and I take it that this is the view of the Navy ...

Army Translation
10-15-41

The ever present Cabinet difficulties were erupting again in Japan, and on October 15 Emperor Hirohito conferred with War Minister Tojo, Premier Konoye, and Privy Seal Lord Keeper K. Kido (Oct. 15, 10:2). Another private interview of Konoye, with the Emperor on the following day, confirmed the suspicion that grave moments were at hand. (Oct. 16, 1:7). Some of the difficulty, undoubtedly, arose from the demands of the Axis powers that Japan align herself with them.

No. 20

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) #671 Oct. 16, 1941
TO: Washington
(Abstract)

German and Italian Ambassadors demand that Roosevelt be warned that further hostile acts will mean war, and the Tripartite Act will bring Japan into the war. The Japanese are reluctant to do this during the negotiations.

Army Translation
10-17-41

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1 SEPT 1942

To keep Germany and Italy mollified, Japan did send a very polite note to the United States regarding the Tripartite Act.

However, Japan obviously did not want to give offense at this moment, nor was the United States quick to take it. But the very next day, October 17, 1941, the Konoye Cabinet resigned in a split over the policy of the Japanese Government, and it was reported that Tojo, the War Minister, was to be chosen to form a new Cabinet. (Oct. 17, 1:6, 8). The following message, coming from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, reveals the principal reason for the disagreement.

No. 21

FROM: Tokyo #682 Oct. 17, 1941
TO: Washington

The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts you have made.

The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true that one of the main items in which opinion differed was on the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the makeup of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated.

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1 SEPT 1942

There shall be no change in this respect.

Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.

Navy Translation
10-18-41

A new Cabinet was formed on October 18, 1941 and Tojo assumed the posts of Premier, War Minister and Home Minister. S. Togo was named as Foreign Minister, Admiral S. Shimada became Navy Minister, and in the selection of the rest of the members, military interests predominated. However, it was deemed unlikely that the extremist party of Japan would dominate the Cabinet.

Messages now went to Berlin, offering the resignation of various Ambassadors, e.g., Osima at Berlin, but the following dispatch from Nomura is extraordinary, even when his desire for peace between Japan and the United States is known.

No. 22

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

Oct. 22, 1941

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former Cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my conferees here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, Wakasugi can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all will have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

Army Translation
10-23-41

There is no doubt that Nomura was sick at heart, and wanted to go home. On October 20 he spoke of his floundering, because of the changes in the Government. Clearly, the Japanese Ambassador was reluctant to go on in face of difficulties, which he considered insurmountable. He had already considered plans to leave some time before, judging from this message.

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 23

FROM: Washington #981 Oct. 22, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

To Advisor Tashira from Iguchi.

Semi-official Obata will return to Tokyo on the TATSUTA MARU. Since he is carrying a considerable amount of my luggage, etc., with him, I want a member of the staff to be sent to Yokohama to meet him. ...

Army Translation
 10-27-41

But the new Government was reluctant to permit Nomura's leaving, and so, the following request, tantamount to an order, was sent by Tojo:

No. 24

FROM: Tokyo Unnumbered Oct. 23, 1941
 TO: Washington

From your messages I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of these negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an extremely important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reason, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.

Navy Translation
 10-23-41

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ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942

Despite the presence in Washington of Komura, who was trying to influence his home Government to take the path of peace, there was much war talk in the Japanese papers. The United States Navy Department secretly ordered all American merchant ships into friendly ports to await orders, but the fact became known through the sudden return of the motorship PERIDA to Manila. (Oct.18, 1:4,5,8). The promotion of Premier Tojo to full General rank, (Oct.19, 1:6) and the statement of Naval Minister Shimesa that the Japanese Navy was ready for any situation (Oct.20, 3:1,3,4) did nothing to allay the martial atmosphere. However, behind the scenes, important talks between Acting Secretary Welles and Japanese Minister Wakasugi were continuing. (Oct.19, 10:1). The following is an excerpt from one of the reports of Wakasugi, dealing with the matter of speeches by Navy men of both nations.

No. 25

FROM: Washington #995 Oct. 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo

Interview of Wakasugi with Welles:

... Welles first expressed his pleasure of learning that the new Cabinet intends to continue the discussion of this question and proceeded to say that recently men in responsible positions in Japan -

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for example, the Navy spokesman - had made such a war-like statement as "the Japanese Navy is 'itching for action,'" and that the ferocious attacks which the Japanese newspapers have been making on the United States had greatly provoked the American people both in and out of the Government and are injurious to the continuation of discussions.

Wakasugi replied ... that especially the speech made by Secretary of Navy Knox to the effect that Japanese-American war is inevitable and the clash of the two countries is only a few days ahead and other warlike statements are quite provocative to the Japanese Government as well as the people; and that in this respect the two countries are very much alike. To this Welles came back with the argument that the Naval Secretary's speech was not such a provocative one but the newspapers had played up certain parts of it; that as a man responsible for the United States Navy, which is the most powerful influence in the country, he occasionally indulges in strong words with the intention of encouraging the Navy; and he would like Wakasugi to realize that these speeches are nothing other than those made for such purposes.

Army Translation
10-27-41

The statement by Secretary Knox was viewed in Japan as unfortunate, (Oct. 25, 1941) and the following dispatch demonstrates the close attention paid to it by Japanese agents throughout North America.

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No. 26

FROM: Mexico City #422 Oct. 25, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

According to a confidential statement made by an executive of the Excelsior newspaper here, the statement on the 24th by Secretary of the Navy Knox in regard to the near approach of a crisis between Japan and America reached the said newspaper office at noon of the same day, and in it was the assertion that there would be "imminent action" in the Far East within 24 hours. However, about two hours later a follow-up message came through from the Washington Associated Press, based on a request from the Navy Department, that the words "within 24 hours" should be deleted.

Have relayed this to Washington.

Navy Translation
 10-26-41

Though Minister Wakesugi on October 29 sent to Tokyo a request for more moves towards peace by his superiors, precautions for the expected upheaval were being made by the Japanese in Washington.

No. 27

FROM: Washington #988 Oct. 24, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

Sending home (22 boxes ?) of records on KORNWALL MARU, sailed for Japan from Callao, Peru, the 3rd. A wooden box is in (#2 ?) which is to be handed over to the Navy Ministry.

Army Translation
 10-27-41

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

An interesting example of counter-espionage is seen in the next message. By decryption of a Japanese report, an enemy agent was uncovered in a United States naval station.

No. 28

FROM: Shanghai #1909 Oct. 16, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

"WA" report.

I had a secret agent get from the United States naval wireless station here the original text (in plain text) sent on the 11th by Secretary of State Hull to the Consul-General in Shanghai. It is a telegraphic reply to the appeal sent by the American Chamber of Commerce in this city for relaxing the export license system and the control now being exercised over exchange. The gist of it is given in my separate telegram #1910. (not available)

I have transmitted this message together with the separate wire to Hantai.

Army Translation
 10-21-41

November,
1941

November was to begin in as critical a time in American-Japanese relations as any month of 1941. Japanese naval reconnaissance activities in U.S. Pacific territorial waters were reported, (Nov. 2, 3:1) and the S.S. TATUTA MARU left for the United States to pick up a group of evacuees for Japan. (Nov. 3, 7:1). At the same time women and children from the United States were

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evacuating ^{from} Guam, Midway and Wake Islands. (Nov. 4, 4:6).
 There was much heat aroused over the question of three
 United States missionaries, captured by the Japanese
 in Manchukuo. Ambassador Grew issued a formal protest,
 because efforts to gain their release, or learn the
 nature of the charges against them were unavailing.
 (Nov. 4, 7:1-4). Eventually, they were deported because
 of the Japanese desire to keep the diplomatic negotiations
 in progress. (Nov. 13, 8:3).

On November 4th Nomura was advised that
 S. Kurusu was being sent to help him in the talks with
 the United States, and on the 7th the special envoy left
 Japan. The seriousness of the situation can be gathered
 from the following message:

No. 29

FROM: Tokyo #736 Nov. 5, 1941
 TO: Washington

(Of utmost secrecy.)

Because of various circumstances, it
is absolutely necessary that all arrangements
for the signing of this agreement be completed
by the 25th of this month. I realize that
 this is an unavoidable one. Please understand
 this thoroughly and attack the problem of
 saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling
 into a chaotic condition. Do so with great
 determination and with unstinted effort, I beg
 of you.

This information is to be kept strictly
 to yourself only.

Navy Translation
 11-5-41

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ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

Newspaper reports concerning Kurusu's own pessimism (Nov. 9, 1:4) as to the success of his last minute endeavors, caused the next dispatch:

No. 30

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #188 Nov. 10, 1941
 TO: San Francisco

To Ambassador Kurusu.

The AP issued a dispatch from Manila, said to be from authoritative sources, that Your Excellency has told an old friend there, "I am going to Washington but I have no great hopes for a successful conclusion to the negotiations." This was printed in large headlines of the first page of the "New York Times." Editorial comment gave out that there would be no new compromises by the Japanese which would satisfy the United States.

We have not permitted the publication of this dispatch in papers here in Japan. This is for your information.

Army Translation
 11-18-41

Washington opinion, as to the probable success of Mr. Kurusu, can be summed up in the following:

No. 31

FROM: Washington (Nomura) #1066 Nov. 10, 1941
 TO: Tokyo Part 1 of 2

1. I sent Moore (Frederick Moore - Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington) to contact Senator Thomas of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Hull. His report reads as follows:

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1 SEPT 1942

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is ready and prepared for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, disregarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. Kurusu will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese - American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes these reports and so does the Secretary of State."

Army Translation
11-12-41

Ambassador Kurusu had his own theories as to the origin of pessimistic reports emanating from Japan.

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1 SEPT 1942

No. 32

FROM: Honolulu # 9 Nov. 13, 1941
 TO: Washington

(Honolulu to Tokyo #217)

From Kurusu.

Hozuituk, who was one of the "Cooper" party during its Far Eastern tour, was among the passengers on the Clipper.

During conversation with him he mentioned that he thought it was already too late to try and arrive at a peaceful negotiation between Japan and the United States, and I gathered from the conversation that the "Cooper" party are hoping that negotiations for a peaceful settlement will not be successful.

I am also wondering if the pessimistic outlook on my mission by U.S. radio announcers, etc., of which both Tokyo and Washington cables addressed to me here mention, is not also influenced by this party. Perhaps this will be of some value for you to know.

Navy Translation
 11-25-41

Though a special Ambassador was on the way to work for peace, the United States Congress had already decided to remain in session indefinitely in view of the crisis. (Nov. 6, 6:3). The Tokyo Kichi Kichi issued an attack on the United States, warning that peace talks were merely an effort of the United States to gain time for military preparations. (Nov. 6, 1:4, 8). An important

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move of Panama against Japan took place, when all Japanese commercial firms in Panama were banned. (Nov.7, 2:6). Great significance was attached to the speech of Winston Churchill at the lunch of the Lord Mayor of London, where the Prime Minister stated that Great Britain would declare war on Japan immediately, if war broke out between the United States and Japan. (Nov.11, 1:1,2). There was little disguising that a crisis was near, (Nov.11, 4:13), and the New York Times said that the Japanese were expected to strike in early December. (Nov.12, 7:1,4). Evacuation plans were being completed by Tokyo:

No. 33

FROM: Washington #1091 Nov.15, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

(Abstract)

Discusses evacuation plans.

Army Translation
 11-19-41

No. 34

FROM: Tokyo #788 Nov.15, 1941
 TO: Washington

(Abstract)

Plan to evacuate from U.S.

Army Translation
 11-19-41

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Very significantly, a warning was sent to all Embassies to be prepared for emergencies, and instructions were issued for destroying their code machines.

No. 35

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2330 Nov. 15, 1941
TO: Washington

(Abstract)

Detailed instructions on how to destroy the code machines sent to all Embassies.

Navy Translation
11-25-41

On November 10 Admiral Nomura reopened negotiations, which had been adjourned for three weeks after the fall of the Konoye Government.

He was preparing the ground for the coming of Kurusu, and on November 17 the formalities of introducing the special Ambassador were undergone.

Kurusu already had denied that he was going to succeed Nomura as Ambassador to the United States (Nov. 15, 5:11), and so the talks began.

Tokyo sent an unusual message at this time, which indicated that certain operations had been planned

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to take place after the time limit (November 25th)
had been reached.

No. 36

FROM: Tokyo #499 Nov. 15, 1941
TO: Hanking

Re your #818. (Not available)

To Naval authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer ?) for a while.

Navy Translation
11-27-41

Secret codes for emergency messages in the regular short wave broadcasts from Tokyo were now issued by the Japanese. All of them dealt with the rupture of relations between Japan and other countries.

No. 37

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2353 Nov. 19, 1941
TO: Washington

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

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- (1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger - HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East wind rain).
- (2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI - (North wind cloudy.)
- (3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE - (West wind clear.)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Navy Translation
 11-28-41

No. 38

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2354 Nov. 19, 1941
 TO: Washington

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

- (1) If it is Japan-U.S. relations, "HIGASHI".
- (2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
- (3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya, and K.E.I.) - "NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Navy Translation
 11-26-41

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Little optimism was felt by Tokyo as to the outcome of the Kurusu talks as early as November 20.

No. 39

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2364 Nov. 20, 1941
TO: Ankara

1. Since the formation of the Cabinet, the Government has been in conference for successive days with the Imperial General Headquarters. They have given due consideration to the development of a fundamental national policy which will correspond to the urgent exigencies of the situation. Insofar as this is concerned, in the conference which took place on the morning of the 5th, decisions were reached covering fundamental policies having to do with the adjustments of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States.

2. Insofar as Japanese-American negotiations are concerned, in proceeding upon these negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations on a just basis, conferences have been in progress since the 7th. However, there is a great disparity between their opinions and our own. In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is considerable doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations. However, the situation not permitting any further conciliation by us, an optimistic view for the future is not permitted. In the event that negotiations are broken off, we expect that the situation in which Japan will find herself will be extremely critical.

Army Translation
11-28-41

The Japanese were not neglecting the activities of the British, and they were very much interested in

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1 SEPT 1942

deciphering the British codes. Obviously, their "Black Chamber" had achieved much success in the past, judging from the following message.

No. 40

FROM: Peking # 7 Nov. 21, 1941
TO: Tsingtao

Clues have been obtained here regarding telegraphic codes used at present by the British Embassy. These codes apparently are used for communication between Shanghai, Chungking, Hongkong, and London. It is possible that these have already been decoded by the North Army, however, they may have some value. The codes are

1. Diplomatic code
2. Plain language, abbreviation
3. Numbers code.

Please wire immediately.

Navy Translation
11-25-41

No. 41

FROM: Tokyo #644 Nov. 22, 1941
TO: Peking

Re your #741. (Not available)

Since there is a great deal of British code material coming in now which we cannot read, please investigate. Even though your investigation is cautious, please make it complete and thorough.

Army Translation
11-25-41

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

While the American newspapers were reporting
 * that the diplomatic talks had hit a snag, and that the
 Japanese envoys had failed to see Secretary Hull, the
 following very important dispatches came from Tokyo:

No. 42

FROM: Tokyo #812 Nov. 22, 1941
 TO: Washington

To both your Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider
 changing the date we set in my #736 (25th
 of November, #24373). You should know this,
 however, I know you are working hard. Stick
 to your fixed policy and do your very best.
 Spare no efforts and try to bring about the
 solution we desire. There are reasons beyond
your ability to guess why we wanted to settle
Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but
if within the next three or four days you
can finish your conversations with the
Americans; if the signing can be completed
by the 29th, (let me write it out for you -
twenty-ninth), if the pertinent notes can be
exchanged, if we can get an understanding
with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and
in short if everything can be finished, we
have decided to wait until that date. This
time we near it, that the deadline absolutely
cannot be changed. After that things are
automatically going to happen. Please take
 this into your careful consideration and work
 harder than you ever have before. This, for
 the present, is for the information of you
 two Ambassadors alone.

Army Translation
 11-22-41

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 43

FROM: Tokyo #823 Nov. 24, 1941
 TO: Washington

For both Ambassadors.

The time limit set in my message #012 (#25138 in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th) is in Tokyo time.

Army Translation
 11-24-41

The Tokyo Nichi Nichi was calling the Kurusu mission a failure, and Domei was stating that optimism was unwarranted, (Nov. 25, 1:5), when the following despatch reached Washington. It was another indication that the crisis was not far away.

No. 44

FROM: Tokyo #836 Nov. 26, 1941
 TO: Washington

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, you will cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief Yamamoto of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

<u>Japanese</u>	<u>English</u>
SANGOKU JOYAKU MONDAI (Three power treaty)	NYUU YOOKU (New York)
MUSABETSU TAIGUU MONDAI (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)	SHIKAGO (Chicago)
SHIKA MONDAI (The China question)	SANFURANSHISUKO (San Francisco)

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1 SEPT 1942

<u>Japanese</u>	<u>English</u>
SOKRI (Premier)	ITOO KUN (Mr. Itoo)
GAIMUDAIJIN (Foreign Minister)	DATE KUN (Mr. Date)
RIKUGUN (The Army)	TOKUGAWA KUN (Mr. Tokugawa)
ENSICUN (The Navy)	MAEDA KUN (Mr. Maeda)
NICHI-BEI KOOSHO (Japan-American negotiations)	ENDAN (Marriage proposal)
DAITOOHYOO (President)	KIMIKO SAN (Miss Kimiko)
HARU (Hull)	FUMAKO SAN (Miss Fumeko)
KOKUNAIJOOSEI (Internal situation)	SHOOKAI (Trade)
JOCHO SURU (To yield)	YAMA WO URU (To sell the mountain)
JOCHO SESU (Not to yield)	YAMA WO URENA (Not to sell the mountain.)
KEISEI KYUNTAN SURU (Situation taking critical turn)	KODAN GAUMAREBU (The child is born)

Phone numbers of several Japanese officials followed.

Army Translation
 11-26-41

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Nomura sent word to Tokyo that definite action should be taken in breaking off diplomatic relations, if war was to be waged by Japan. This is one of the most important messages in all the hundreds, which went to and from Tokyo. There is foreboding on Nomura's part concerning the future.

No. 45

FROM: Washington (Nomura) #1190 Nov. 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo

... The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent, of course, on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement

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to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Army Translation
 11-29-41

On this day of November 26, the United States Government handed to Ambassador Nomura the details of their proposals, which were sent immediately to Tokyo.

The interview with President Roosevelt, which Nomura requested when receiving the proposals, was also reported by Nomura in detail as was their conversation with Hull at 4:45 p.m.

American newspapers quoted the State Department as saying that the plan given to the Japanese Ambassadors adhered to the United States basic principles of peace and non-aggression. The United States was reported to have demanded, in exchange for any concessions, the Japanese withdrawal from China and Indo-China, the restoration of the Open Door policy, and peaceful negotiations in place of military force. The Japanese press was very pessimistic on the Washington talks.

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having no hope unless the United States was to reverse its stand. (Nov. 27, 1:8).

November,
1941

An interesting dispatch, which contained much valuable information for the decryption purposes of U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence was the subsequent one.

Note the tone of finality in all the special messages.

No. 46

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2409 Nov. 27, 1941
TO: Washington (In 4 parts - complete)

(Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as
Circular #324)

(Washington sent to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

(Part 1)

Handle as Chief of Office Routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following Ingo Denpo (hidden words, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right the corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

Example. A message meaning:

"Japan and U.S.S.R. military have clashed",

will read "HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, Clerks, have been both ordered to your embassy on 15th (begin spell) STOP (end spell.)"

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In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word STOP will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used.)

(Part 2)

<u>Code Word</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
ARIMURA	Code communications prohibited.
ASAI	Communications will be by radio broadcasts.
ASAKURA	Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.
ASIKAGA	Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.
ASUMA	Pressure on Japan increasing continually.
EDOGUTI	Prepare for evacuation
HANABUSA	Preparations for evacuation have been completed.
HANAZONO (?)	Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or Consul) there.
HATAKEYAMA	Relations between Japan and ----- have been severed.
HATTORI	Relations between Japan and ----- are not in accordance with expectations.

(Part 3)

HIZIKATA	Japan's and -----'s military forces have clashed.
HOSINO	Japan and ----- are entering a full fledged general war.
IBARAGI	Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.
INAGAKI	Have you ? the ----- matter ?
ISHIKAWA	I have ? the ----- matter.
KASHIWAGI	We are commencing <u>military action</u> ? against -----
KOBAYAKAWA	Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan, to persons of ----- nationality.

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<u>Code Word</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
KODAMA	Japan
KOMIYAMA	China
KOYANAGI	England
KUBOTA	U.S.S.R.
KURIBARA	France ?
KUSONOKI	Germany
KATSUTANI	Italy
MINAMI	U.S.A.
MIWATA	Canada
KIYAZAKI	Mexico
MOROKOSI	Brazil
MOTIZUKI	Panama
HAGAMINE	Argentina
MAKAZATO	Thailand
HANGO	French Indo-China
NEGI (?)	Netherlands East Indies
OGAWA	Burma
OKAMOTO	Malaya
OKUMURA	Australia
ONIZOKA	Union of <u>South Africa (?)</u>
ONODERA	Enemy country
OTANI	? (Possibly: friendly or allied country ?)
ONISI	Year
SIMANAKA	Day (?)
SAKAKIBARA	(Tsuki) Month
SIGENOI	(KO) Paragraph
SANEYO	(Toki) Time
ITIRO	1
NISAKU	2
SANTARO	3
YOZI	4
GORO	5
MASAROKU	6
SIBETARO	7
YASOKITI	8
HISAMATSU	9
ATUMI	0

Navy Translation
 12-2-41

DECLASSIFIED
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 AUTHORITY
 BY J. NARA DATE: 12/11

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

The next message was of great significance. According to the voice code to be used in phone conversations, mention of a child being born was to convey the meaning that the situation was taking a critical turn. "A strong healthy boy" must have referred to an attack on the United States.

No. 47

FROM: Washington
 TO: Tokyo
 Telephone Code

Nov. 27, 1941
 (1724-1738 EST).

Trans-Pacific Telephone Conversation
between Kurusu and Yamamoto, Chief of
Japanese Foreign Office, American Division.

... Kurusu: How are things there?
 Does it seem as if a
 crisis is at hand?

Yamamoto: Yes, it does. (In a
 very definite tone.)

Kurusu: (In a somewhat surprised
 tone: It does. In
 which direction....
 (stopped himself very
 abruptly, and apparently
 covering up the slip,
 continued) Does it seem
 to be a boy or girl?
 (This refers to the voice
 code being used.)

Yamamoto: (Laughing embarrassedly):
It seems as if it will be
a strong healthy boy ..

Navy Translation
 11-28-41

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942 |

November
28, 1941

There were other indications that the crisis was now at hand. Certainly, the subsequent messages leave little to be hoped for as regards peace:

No. 48

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #93 Nov. 28, 1941
TO: Hanoi

Re your #118 (advice requested whether status quo of French Indo-China will be maintained.

The trend of Japan-American negotiations is as I told you in my circular #2414 (not available). The current outlook is as I delineated in my circular #2416. Even though the worst possible situation developed, and it will in all likelihood, the Imperial Government has made no decision with regard to changing the position of the French Indo-China Government. ...

Army Translation
12-1-41

No. 49

FROM: Hsinking #781 Nov. 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo

Deals with policy of treating British and American nationals in Manchukuo in event of war.

... I. Policy. On the outbreak of war with England and the United States, after you have at the appropriate time gathered all these nationals together, they are to be returned each to his own homeland at as early a date as possible. However, until this return can be arranged, they are to be interned in places of concentration in Manchukuo. ...

Army Translation
12-2-41

DECLASSIFIED
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 BY J. NARA DATE 12/1/11

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Ambassador Nomura was trying to extricate his country from any possible position, in which the burden of causing the war would be thrust on the Japanese. This is another attempt:

No. 50

FROM: Washington (Nomura) #1214 Nov. 28, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

Re my #1190 (SIS #25444 and #25480 in which Nomura expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.)

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers. "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese" and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

Army Translation
 12-1-41

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But the Japanese Government refused to break off diplomatic relations at once, though it knew all was finished. The definite instructions to the Ambassador to delay the final rupture for a few days should be noted here, as well as the complete rejection of Nomura's pleas on an honorable declaration of war.

No. 51

FROM: Tokyo #344 Nov. 28, 1941
 TO: Washington

Re your #1189. (#25441, 25442)

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the view of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180

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(#25435, #25436) and he said that under the present circumstance what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

Army Translation
11-28-41

November
30, 1941

The Japanese were now moving swiftly to prepare their allies for the outbreak of the war. Hitler and Mussolini were to be informed immediately of their plans, though the utmost secrecy was besought by the Japanese Government. The next message will give some of the details of these preparations.

No. 52

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

#985 Nov. 30, 1941

(Part 1 of 3)

Re my Circular #2387.

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former Cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government now stands ruptured - broken. I am sending you an outline of developments separately in #986

Army Translation
12-1-41. In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in

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East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

(Part 2 - not available)

(Part 3 of 3)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about your attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This directive is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano. As soon as a date is set for a conference with Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Army Translation
12-1-41

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ORIGINAL

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December,
1941 There were definite signs that the crisis had reached its most dangerous period, and action was expected momentarily. President Roosevelt, who was away from Washington at the time, rushed back to the White House to confer with Secretary Hull. The Philippine Islands and the U.S. Pacific Fleet were believed ready for hostilities. (Dec.1, 1:8). Premier Tojo made a speech as November ended, which breathed defiance of America and stressed Japan's determination to create a New Order for itself. Newspaper opinion, in America, was very hostile, and, the Japanese were very interested in the public reaction as the next message indicates. Notice also the definite instructions to continue the beguiling of the United States.

December
1, 1941

No. 53

FROM: Tokyo #865 Dec.1, 1941
 TO: Washington

Re my #857. Nov.29th, re:
 new proposals to the U.S.

1. The date set in my message #812 (November 29th for the absolute deadline to complete negotiations) has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United

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States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for your information only.)

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124 (not available). Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

Navy Translation
 12-1-41

Excuse lost no time in sending back this report on Tojo's speech:

No. 54

FROM: Washington #1226 Dec.1, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

Re my #1222 (not available).

(Speaks of unfavorable U.S. reaction to Tojo's speech.)

Within governmental circles, although decisive comments were withheld, the general opinion seems to be that Tojo's speech indicates the refusal of the Japanese Government to accept the proposals submitted to it by the U.S. on the 26th. These circles also seem to feel that the speech indicated Japan's

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decision to give up hope for the talks and resort to stronger measures.

The press on the 1st carried a UP dispatch from Tokyo reporting that though Japan was not satisfied with the U.S. reply, Japan is desirous of having the discussions continue for at least two more weeks. In view of the reports of the Premier's speech, this report has an ominous tone about it.

Some of the newspapers comment that since Japan's invasion of China has already been definitely mapped out, the above is merely a means of stalling for time so as to give the Japanese a chance to seize the most opportune moment with respect to developments in Europe, to launch this attack.

Navy Translation
12-4-41

Meanwhile, the Japanese diplomats were having some difficulty in preparing the papers for the carrying out of the war. The items show how close was to be the connection between the Axis and Japan in the war on America.

No. 55

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

#1396 Dec. 1, 1941

Re your #985.

In parenthesis at the end of paragraph 2 of your message referred to in the heading you make reference to a note from the German Ambassador in Tokyo

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concerning what is to be done in the event of an Anglo-Japanese and an American-Japanese war.

Of the various notes exchanged between Japan and Germany at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, I have copies of three notes on hand. They are:

(1) The note from the German Ambassador regarding the meaning of Article 3 of the Pact;

(2) The note from the (Japanese) Foreign Minister regarding what to do in the event of an Anglo-Japanese War; and

(3) The note from the (Japanese) Foreign Minister regarding status of former German colonies in the South Seas area.

I shall be able to encode these three and take them with me. However, I am not able to locate anything like a copy of a note from the German Ambassador in Tokyo pertaining to what to do in the event of an Anglo-Japanese and an American-Japanese war, referred to by you. Will you please send a copy of it to us immediately.

Navy Translation
12-3-41

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1 SEPT 1942 |

The destroying of codes is always a sign of diplomatic breaks. The subsequent messages indicate the seriousness of the moment.

No. 56

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2444 Dec.1, 1941
TO: Washington

The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my Circular message #2447 (not available), the U.S. (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

Navy Translation
12-1-41

December
2, 1941

No. 57

FROM: Berne (Mitani) Dec.2, 1941
TO: Ankara

(Tokyo Circular #2447)

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Sea (including Timor), Singora, Chiennai, and to allow officials in British (including our Embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me

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immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except one copy of

Army Translation
12-6-41

Another message indicating action in the near future. Notice the estimate of the U.S. Navy.

No. 55

Yet despite all these signs of coming hostilities, Nomura was still anxious to achieve a peaceful end of the talks.

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No. 59

FROM: Washington (Nomura) #1232 Dec. 2, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

... Judging by my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my conversation of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233 (not available).

Army Translation
 12-3-41

But on the very day Nomura sent the above plea for peace, orders came through to destroy mostly all the codes in the Washington office.

No. 60

FROM: Tokyo #867 Dec. 2, 1941
 TO: Washington

1. Please destroy by burning all of the codes you have in your office, with the exception of one copy each of the codes

(This includes other Ministries' codes which you may have in your office.

2. Also in the case of the code machine itself, one set is to be destroyed.

3. Upon completing the above, transmit the one word HARMONA.

4. Use your discretion in disposing of all text of messages to and from your office, as well as other secret papers.

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5. Destroy by burning all of the codes brought to your office by telegraphic courier (Consequently, you need not pursue the instructions contained in my message #260 (Dec. 1, 1941 regarding getting in touch with Mexico.)

Navy Translation
 12-3-41

There was very little hope of peace in Washington, as President Roosevelt conferred with Secretary Hull, Admiral Stark, Mr. Harry Hopkins, and Mr. Sumner Welles. (Dec. 2, 1:8). On the next day the reports of the Japanese Ambassadors at Berlin and Rome came into Tokyo. These messages are very important.

December 3
1941

No. 61

FROM: Berlin #1407 Dec. 3, 1941.
 TO : Tokyo

Re my #1405.

Called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 3rd. Hitler was away. He further said that he did not like to use the long distance telephone, and, because of snow, planes could not be utilized. Delay regrettable, but unavoidable.

Ribbentrop: 'As I have told you before, we cannot make an official reply until the Fuehrer has given his approval. The Japanese Government is undoubtedly very anxious to have our reply as soon as possible. I, myself, am in agreement with it and I have no objections to your advising your home government

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of this fact. Moreover, I am of the opinion that the Fuehrer will be in agreement too, but we cannot say so definitely until the Fuehrer's return.*

I told him that the situation is more critical than is imagined, and therefore, we are very anxious to have the formal reply as soon as possible.

From my past experience with Ribbentrop I feel fairly confident when I say that you will not be mistaken if you assume that there will be no objections

Navy Translation
 12-6-41

No. 62

FROM: Rome #985 Dec. 3, 1941
 TO : Tokyo

Re your message #985 to Berlin (in which Tokyo warns Japanese-U.S. negotiations are now ruptured, and that war in the south Pacific may break out momentarily).

On this day, at 11 o'clock in the morning, I, accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini. (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present.) I described the developments in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #985 to Berlin.

Mussolini: 'I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U.S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddling nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the

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United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan's loyal and sincere nature.

As Your Excellency and Your Excellency's predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan's policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area.

I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, I said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop.)

With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i.e., that she would make every effort to keep the British Navy checked in the Mediterranean.

Mussolini: "Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now."

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately?

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Mussolini replied: 'Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Act. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point'.

Navy Translation
 12-6-41

Ambassador Nomura now sent the following warning to his government.

No. 63

FROM: Washington #1243 Dec. 3, 1941
 TO : Tokyo

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the U.S. with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

Navy Translation
 12-5-41

December 5 Since Nomura was still trying to find a working
1941 agreement, which his country would accept, the following dispatch was sent:

No. 64

FROM: Washington # ? Dec. 5, 1941
 TO : Tokyo

Re your #667.

From Councillor of Embassy, Isechi to the Chief of the Communication Section:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the United States-Japanese negotiations are still continuing, I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

Navy Translation 12-6-41

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A significant sign of war was the withdrawal of the Japanese espionage agents, who would be useless in the United States in time of war.

No. 65

FROM: Tokyo #896 Dec. 5, 1941
 TO : Washington

Re your #1245.

Will you please have Terasaki*, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto, and others leave by plane within the next couple of days.

*Note: Terasaki, 2nd Secretary, is head of Japanese espionage in Western Hemisphere. He and his assistants are to be sent to South America.

Navy Translation
 12-6-41

That matters of peace were no longer of interest to the Japanese Government can be seen in the following dispatch:

No. 66

FROM: Tokyo #901 Dec. 6, 1941
 TO : Washington

Re my #844 (#25445 in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal, and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.)

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained

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in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in four parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

Army Translation
12-6-41

All the foregoing messages and reports, etc., were known and read by the United States on or before December 7. Section B contains those messages which were not ready for use, that is, deciphered and translated, until after Pearl Harbor.

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Section B

Messages sent before December 7,
but not deciphered until after Pearl Harbor.

Plans for the evacuation of Japanese nationals went on apace, but the schedule of the evacuation ship leaves several questions unanswered. In the light of what has been read in Komura's messages, there is no doubt that offensive operations were scheduled to begin in the near future. Watching the activity of the Japanese Navy around this time (cf. II, Fleet Movements) can bring only certitude, as we read history backwards, that plans were being made ready for an early attack. Yet the schedule of the evacuation ship did not have it leave Los Angeles till December 16. Of course, if this were done to mislead United States authorities, this becomes intelligible. Notice the following dispatches:

No. 67

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #244 Nov. 26, 1941
TO : New York

As no plans have been set up to dispatch any other vessel than the TATSUTA MARU, please see to it that as many persons desirous of returning to Japan are advised to return by this ship. Wire me immediately as to the number who can be already to leave.

With regard to their evacuation
please make your contacts with these
persons in as safe a manner as possible.

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12-13-41

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But on November 24, 1941, in #819, Tokyo to Washington, mention was made of the Foreign Office officials, who had established an understanding between Japan and the United States regarding the dispatch of a second ship.

".... 3. In connection with the latter part of your caption wire in view of the fact that the Home Office too is giving consideration to the dispatching of a second ship because of the ever worsening state of affairs."

No. 68

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #116 Nov. 26, 1941
 TO : Panama Priority

Re your #322.

The fact that we are having the TATSUTA MARU dock at Hiloa does not mean that we are carrying out a general evacuation. It means we are giving our citizens, who cannot stay in Panama and who cannot move into other countries, a chance to return to Japan. We are not, by any means, changing our policy of having these people move elsewhere wherever they can in Latin America, so please note and guide our people accordingly.

To all our Ambassadors and Ministers in Central and South America.

Army Translation
 12-11-41

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 NUM 947622
 AUTHORITY
 BY J. NARA DATE 12/11/13

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 69

FROM: Panama (Akigawa) Circ. #34 Nov. 26, 1941
 TO : Havana

(Message from Tokyo to Washington #837)

Re my message #819.

The schedule for the TATSUTA MARU,
 as given in my #838 (Nov. 26):

Yokohama		Dec. 2
Los Angeles arrive		Dec. 14
	leave	Dec. 16
Balboa	arrive	Dec. 24

is to leave Balboa on the 26th arriving in
 Yokohama January 15th. On the basis of
 conditions at the time, it may stop at
 Los Angeles again on the way home, but try
 to have the passengers from the United
 States board it on the outward trip. As
 far as possible, have all those who wish
 to sail from South America also come on the
 TATSUTA. . . .

Army Translation
 12-13-41

November 28 Definite indications of a coaling break
1941
 were seen in this message:

No. 70

FROM: Rio de Janeiro Circular #326 Nov. 28, 1941
 TO : Santiago

(Message from Tokyo, Circular #2416)

(To be handled in Government code)

Concerning Japanese-American
 negotiations, the counter proposal presented
 to us by the United States on the 27th,
 overlooks all we stand for; therefore, of
 course, we disregard it. There is nothing

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AUTHORITY
BY: J. NARA DATE: 12/11/

ORIGINAL

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to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with Japan and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn. The above is for your information only.

Army Translation
12-9-42

December 1 • Japanese offices in America were planning to
1941
close their doors.

No. 71

FROM: New Orleans (Ito) #046 Dec. 1, 1941
TO : Tokyo

(New Orleans to Washington #032)

Two persons employed in our Consulate here are both dual nationality holders, but are reported to the State Department as only U.S. citizens. Both do not wish to remain in the United States at the time of closing this office.

Navy Translation
12-10-41

December 2 Codes and coding machines were being destroyed,
1941
as was noticed in Section A.

No. 72

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) Circular #2445 Dec. 2, 1941.
TO : Havana

Strictly secret.

Take great pains that this does not leak out.

You are to take the following measures immediately:

(1) With the exception of one copy of the 0 and I codes, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the code

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ORIGINAL

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book for communication between the three departments and the code books for Army and Navy communication.

(2) As soon as you have completed this operation, wire the one word Haruna.

(3) Burn all secret documents and the work sheets on this message.

(4) Be especially careful not to arouse the suspicion of those on the outside. Confidential documents are all to be given the same handling.

The above is preparatory to an emergency situation and is for your information alone. Remain calm - - -

Also sent to Ottawa, Vancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Seattle, and Portland.

Army Translation
 12-8-41

Preparations were completed for the invasion of Thailand by December 2.

No. 73

FROM: Canton #512 Dec. 2, 1941
 TO : Tokyo

If hostilities are to begin here we are all prepared. The army has completed all preparations to move immediately upon Thai. Should the British resist to the bitter end, it is understood that the Army is prepared to go so far as to militarily occupy the country.

Army Translation
 12-11-41

This next dispatch refers to the hurried

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arrangements made between the Germans and the Japanese.

Hitler was away, and this held up the final word.

No. 74

FROM: Berlin #1405 Dec. 2, 1941
TO : Tokyo (Priority)

Re my #1401. (Not available)

1. In an interview held at 7 pm on the 1st with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop at his invitation (Gauss sat in), von Ribbentrop said, 'It is extremely unfortunate that Chancellor Hitler is not in the city, which makes it impossible to contact him. Though I believe I will confer with him some time on the 4th, it may not be until the 5th that I actually get to talk to him. As far as the German authorities are concerned, we understand Japan's desire for haste. Therefore, I will do my best to secure as early an interview as possible.'

2. Just then Gauss said 'with regard to the question of immediate participation in the war against the United States, it seems to me more advisable that we do so jointly.'

Army Translation

December 4
1941

Many messages were passing to and from Tokyo, concerning the evacuation of the Japanese in various parts of American possessions. This one to Honolulu is an example.

No. 75

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) Circular #2466 Dec. 4, 1941
TO : Honolulu

We here are giving a great deal of thought to the question of the return to Japan of your staff and their families. Therefore, wait where you are until I wire

125

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: J. NARA DATE: 12/11/11

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942 1

you at a later date. This message addressed to -----.

Army Translation
 12-12-41

There could be little hope of peace in view of the subsequent dispatches:

No. 76

FROM: Tokyo #909 Dec. 4, 1941
 TO : Hsinking

(Strictly secret.)

Re my #892. (Not available).

On the fourth, in a joint conference with the Government Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns critical. Differing from what I said in my #873 (not available) our policy was changed as follows:

'When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time being Manchukuo will not participate'

Army Translation
 12-11-41

December 4, 1941 Japan was arranging the affairs of the puppet governments under its control in preparation for war.

No. 77

FROM: Tokyo #2467 Dec. 4, 1941
 TO : Hst

Departmental secret to be handled in Government code.

Strictly secret outside the department.

On the 4th, the Government held a conference for control and liaison and decided on the policy which Manchukuo must follow in

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 BY J NARA DATE 12/11/1

ORIGINAL

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case of a sudden change in the international relations. It is as follows:

Policy. When Japan enters a war, Manchukuo for the time being shall not enter it because of Manchukuo's relation to Japan and her policy. Manchukuo shall treat Great Britain, the United States, and Netherland Indies as enemy countries, and shall take measures to that end. . . .

Army Translation
 12-9-41

December 5
1941

No. 73

FROM: Peking Circular #625 Dec. 5, 1941
 TO : Tokyo

To be handled in government code.

Re my secret military communication #262 (Not available) of November 30th.

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her Consulates and prohibited all communication between them and enemy countries.

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland Consulates.

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.

Navy Translation
 12-11-41

Japanese newspaper men were now recalled,

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AUTHORITY
BY: J. NARA DATE: 12/11/

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

which was significant in view of the semi-official nature of Japanese newspapers, and, especially, since Donci was reporting that Japan was unable to accept Hull's statements as a basis for further talks. (Dec. 5, 1:8).

No. 79

FROM: Tokyo 2275 Dec. 5, 1941
TO : New York

From Furumoto, managing director of Donci News to New York, office of Donci News.

Yasuwo, Kinosita, Teranishi and Taguti are recalled to Japan. Have them make unnoticeable preparations to leave on TATUTA MANU.

If passage is not available on TATUTA will have to arrange for their going to South America so please keep this in mind. At the last moment Inamoto is to do as the Consul-General does.

Navy Translation
12-7-41

December 6 1941 More war preparations are noticeable in these:

No. 80

FROM: Tokyo 2225 Dec. 6, 1941
TO : Canton

Re your 2516. (Not available).

1.

2. The evacuation of the Consular Staffs and resident nationals of hostile nations will have to parallel and coincide with measures concerning the departure of our Consular Staffs and our resident nationals, so when you receive orders from

DECLASSIFIED
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BY J. NARA DATE 12/11/

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

headquarters you may proceed to handle
this matter.

3. Public property of hostile
nations, consulates and buildings will be
seized or commandeered and after being
sealed they will be in our custody.

Army Translation
12-9-41

No. 81

FROM: Ottawa #264 Dec. 6, 1941
TO : Tokyo

We surmise that the gist of your current instructions is that, fearing if the worst comes it may mean war, we should cut our staff to the last possible man, but it goes without saying that we are already working on a so-called 'skeleton staff' leaving no further room for reduction

Army Translation
12-16-41

December 6
1941

The announcement by the U.S. State Department that President Roosevelt had sent a personal message to Emperor Hirohito aroused great interest on the part of the Tokyo Government.

No. 82

FROM: Tokyo #905 Dec. 6, 1941
TO : Washington (Urgent)

(- - - -)

According to AP and UP reports the State Department has announced that the President had wired a personal message to His Majesty the Emperor. Please wire me the facts.

Army Translation
12-7-41

DECLASSIFIED
NUM 947622
AUTHORITY
BY J. NARA DATE 12/11/83

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

December 7
1941

The fateful day of December 7 brought the following dispatches. The first one was in plain Japanese, but used the weather code of Appendix I, 1, No. 36, which signified the breaking off of diplomatic relationships. Though this refers to England, other references were made to the United States in texts not available now.

No. 83

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2494 Dec. 7, 1941
TO : (Circular telegram)

(Plain Japanese language using code names)

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

Navy Translation
12-7-41

Warning was sent to the allies of the Japanese that hostilities would begin very soon. It must be remembered that December 7 in America was December 6 in Tokyo.

No. 84

FROM: Tokyo #1004 Dec. 7, 1941
TO : Berlin

We agree completely with the idea presented by Germany, and we will immediately pass on it here and there is no objection to signing it officially as soon as this is done. However, developments are taking a fast turn and it might even be before the official signing is completed the crash may develop. It might be that the wording of the agreement as worded now by Germany would not fit the circumstances at the time of signing. (For example, the first item would not be necessary if Italy and Germany joined the war immediately.)

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 AUTHORITY
 BY 20 NARA DATE 12/4/1

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

So will you call on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and tell him confidentially, and also make it very clear that Japan is expecting Italy and Germany to go to war against Britain and America before this agreement is officially signed.

Navy Translation
 12-9-41

Some idea of the independence of the Nanking Government in China can be gathered from the following message.

No. 85

FROM: Tokyo Circ. #2495 Dec. 7, 1941
 TO : Net

It has been directed not to have the Nanking Government to participate in war.

Navy Translation
 12-24-41

The next dispatch was the one, which ordered the delivery of the Japanese rejection of the note of November 26:

No. 86

FROM: Tokyo #907 Dec. 7, 1941
 TO : WASHINGTON (Urgent - very important)

Re my #902, (Japanese reply)
 - very long Japanese refusal to accept.)

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

Army Translation
 12-7-41

DECLASSIFIED
 947622
 AUTHORITY
 BY J. NARA DATE 12/1/12

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 19427

The Japanese Ambassadors were sent the thanks
 of their superiors:

No. 87

FROM: Tokyo #908 Dec. 7, 1941
 TO : Washington (Urgent)

(To be handled in Government Code).

All concerned regret very much that
 due to failure in adjusting Japanese-
 American relations; matters have come to
 what they are now, despite all the efforts
 you two Ambassadors have been making. I
 wish to take this opportunity to offer my
 deepest thanks to you both for your
 endeavors and hard work as well as for what
 all the members of the Embassy have done.

Army Translation
 12-7-41

One of the last messages sent to the Embassy
 in Washington by Tokyo was the following order to destroy
 their codes:

No. 88

FROM: Tokyo #910 Dec. 7, 1941
 TO : Washington (Extremely urgent)

After deciphering part 4 of my
 #902, and also #907, #908, and #909,
 please destroy at once the remaining
 cipher machines and all machine codes.
 Dispose in like manner all secret
 documents.

Army translation
 12-7-41

The next message reports that the Japanese
 codes in Washington have been destroyed.

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DECLASSIFIED
 NUM 947622
 AUTHORITY
 BY J. NARA DATE 12/11/11

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942]

No. 89

FROM: Washington #1278 Dec. 7, 1941
 TO : Tokyo

Re your #910. () - directs
 destruction of remaining cipher machine and
 machine codes.)

Your instructions and your #911
 (not available) have been duly received
 and decoded, and as soon as we have
 composed and dispatched this telegram
 we will commence the demolition and
 destruction by fire.

Also we have destroyed the codes
 brought by _____

Furthermore, the key of your
 #881 - Instructions for
 disposing of codes) and your Circular
 #2400 - re new keying method
 for cipher machine), should have been
 burned but because the mails to Mexico
 are not safe it has not yet been sent.

Navy Translation
 12-10-41

Meanwhile, out in the Pacific the Japanese
 attacked Pearl Harbor at 7:55 a.m., Honolulu time
 (1:25 p.m. E.S.T.). The formal reply which the Japanese
 made to the proposal of November 26, was planned to be
 given at 1 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, 7:30 a.m., Honolulu
 time, to Secretary Hull. (Roberts Commission Report,
 January 23, 1942, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 30-31). Incidentally,
 the message contained no hint of attack. However, there
 were some delays in the procedure. Secretary Hull's own
 statement follows:

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 AUTHORITY
 BY J. NARA DATE 12/11/83

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

" ... At 1 p.m. today (Dec. 7), the Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment for the Japanese representatives to see the Secretary of State. The appointment was made for 1:45 p.m. The Japanese representatives arrived at the office of Secretary of State at 2:05 p.m. They were received by the Secretary at 2:30 p.m. ..."

Thus, the Japanese Ambassadors were talking to Hull one hour (8:50 a.m., Honolulu time) after the attack on Pearl Harbor had begun.

Further information, as to the well laid plans of the Japanese, can be gathered from this:

No. 90

FROM: Hsinking Circular #239 Dec. 9, 1941
 TO : Peking
 Hanking
 Shanghai

(Hsinking to Tokyo #814)

Immediately subsequent to the opening of hostilities, the steps taken against nationals of our enemy countries and semi-enemy countries, in this country and in Kwantung, were as follows:

During the morning of the 8th, in accordance with prearranged plans, the telegraph wires of the U.S., British, and semi-enemy country consulates in Harbin, Pukouen, and Dairen were cut, and their radios and automobiles were disposed of in the manner previously proscribed.

Navy Translation
 12-10-41

In reading the next dispatch we may surmise that either the Japanese changed their minds as to the

Dear Patron:

We regret that the enclosed photocopies are the best we were able to obtain using our normal reproduction process. This is caused primarily by the age and faded conditions of some of the documents from which these copies were made.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY.



DECLASSIFIED
REF ID: A66222
AUTHORITY
BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

SRH-012 The Role of Radio Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War VOLUME I

(282)

DECLASSIFIED
REF ID: A66222
AUTHORITY
BY: [initials] NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL

1. SEPT 1942]

date of the attack, which they seemed to have done more than once, or they simply wanted to make sure that the actual date would not be divulged.

No. 91

FROM: Tokyo #940 Dec. 13, 1941
TO : Sinking

(Ankara to Tokyo #242)

... 1. Foreign Minister SARADOCURU told the German Counselor here on the 8th that he had received word from the Ambassador in Tokyo that we were going to commence the war on the 10th. He received a great shock from the announcement that came at this time ...

Navy Translation
12-20-41

And so the diplomatic messages, which made the United States Navy aware of the approach of war, came to an end. Though the United States Navy continued to read Japanese diplomatic traffic after the war began, and still does so, that information is outside the scope of this Chapter. In Part II of this Chapter I, an analysis has been made of the Fleet Movements of the Japanese, and some of the evidence therein has been taken from messages of the diplomats. At any rate, after reviewing the data in Part I, there can be no doubt that the leaders of the U.S. Navy were well aware of the approach of war.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A697822
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Appendix I

Part 2

Naval Operations Before Pearl Harbor.

Several vitally important messages referring to Pearl Harbor were not deciphered and translated until after the disastrous 7th. These have been relegated to Section B. In Section A the reader will find only those messages the Navy had deciphered by December 7th. Section B contains the dispatches which, though intercepted before Pearl Harbor, were not translated till after the outbreak of war.

Section A

Information known prior to December 7, 1941

MAY, 1941

Though the Japanese were trying to win a diplomatic victory at Washington for many months before December 7, it is obvious that they were preparing for future action all during the negotiations. As early as May 16 a message was sent:

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: [initials] NARA DATE: 1/1/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 1

FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) #120 May 16
 TO: Singapore

According to a telegram from our Consul in Colombo, a New York Reuters dispatch states that it is reported that the United States has already stationed a fleet in the Indian Ocean. Please pay great attention to the movements of American warships. (Strictly Secret.)

JUNE, 1941

This interest in American ships did not abate as time progressed, for in June more emphasis was placed on obtaining such information.

No. 2

FROM: Washington #386 June 10, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

(To San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle - Circular #1121)

Because of the suppression exercised against our Naval representatives (language officers) by the U.S. authorities in a series of recent incidents, our Navy has, for the time being, stopped stationing these officials by limiting the personnel. Inasmuch as in the light of the relations at present prevailing between Japan and the United States, observations of the movements of the American Navy is one of the most important matters, will you observe the movements of ships and gather other information that may be of interest to our Navy and wire us the required information as it comes to you.

Army Translation
 6-25-41

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

About this time Japan was also evincing a great interest in the Russian forces.

No. 3

FROM: Tokyo #164 June 24, 1941
 TO: Moscow

Please send telegraphic reports from time to time in as much detail as possible concerning the movements of Russian Army, Navy, and Air Forces around Vladivostock and its harbor.

Army Translation
 6-27-41

In a Summary of Important Events in Japanese Southern and Mandated Islands for June, 1941, the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence reported to the Office of Naval Intelligence the following items:

No. 4

June 3rd - The routing of a dispatch addressed to 47 transport and supply vessels now moving to and from the Mandates indicates that 27 of these vessels are now present in the Mandated Islands.

June 17th - An approximate tabulation shows a total of 51 vessels now acting as supply and transport vessels for the Mandates, 42 of these vessels are known to be in the Mandates at present, while the remaining 19 are in the Empire area or enroute. The total number does not include Marus or tenders attached to aviation activities, Marus attached to the 4th Fleet, or commercial vessels using International Radio Calls. Supply and transport vessels continue to average a round trip a month. A greatly increased number of these vessels are

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: J. NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

moving to and from the Marshall Islands, some by way of Marcus, apparently in connection with the increased activity of Fleet and Aviation activities in that area.

June 18th - Line up of air squadrons, locations, commanders, etc. (Details omitted here).

June 30th - Traffic routing during the past few days indicates that almost all units and commanders of the Combined Air Force have returned to the Empire from the Mandated Islands. The known exception is the 24th Air Squadron which remains in the Marshalls.

AUGUST, 1941

The Panama Canal was a matter of great concern to the Japanese in August.

No. 5

FROM: Tokyo #63 Aug. 2, 1941
 TO: Panama

If possible, I would like you to telegraph me concerning the transit of the canal by English and American merchant ships.

Army Translation
 10-15-41

The activities of the Japanese representatives scarcely needed such stimulation as above, if the following dispatch is any indication.

DECLASSIFIED
BY: <u>997622</u>
AUTHORITY
BY: <u>D</u> NARA DATE: <u>1/1/2020</u>

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 6

FROM: Panama (Akiyama) #122 Aug. 21, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

We encountered considerable difficulty in finding a person to whom we could entrust the diagrams for delivery. We did give a copy of the explanatory note only to Colonel Yamamoto (Assistant Attache in Washington) who passed through here enroute home during the middle of last month. By the end of this month, we plan to have it, together with the findings of subsequent investigations and the diagrams taken out of here. They will be transferred to the Legation in Peru, undoubtedly.

(Translator's note: Last sentence garbled - contents guessed at.)

Navy Translation
 9-10-41

On August 28, 1941 the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence issued a report on the Japanese military organization on 40 islands in the Southern and Mandated Islands of the Pacific as of June 30, 1941. (Serial 1-41, No.901-300). This provided the names, ranks and duties of the Japanese personnel.

SEPTEMBER, 1941

Great activity was noted on the part of the Japanese in September. Reading history backwards, it can be said that by this time the enemy had made the decision to attack Pearl Harbor at a strategic moment. The

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ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942

messages which follow will make this point very clear:

No. 7

FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

#520 Sept. 2, 1941

The Naval authorities have made the following request of us. They would like to have you insist at this time upon a member of your staff going to Hawaii in the capacity of a courier. Now as to the most opportune moment, in the light of Japan-American relations, they would like to have this matter left up to your Excellency's discretion.

Army Translation
9-4-41

This message becomes highly significant in view of messages from Matsuoka some time before, directing that courier mail be used for communications, the disclosure of which might arouse another nation. If the Japanese Navy demanded a special courier to and from Hawaii at this time, and insisted that it be a diplomatic agent rather than a Naval officer for better security, there could be only one objective in mind - Pearl Harbor.

A cryptic message from Honolulu might have referred to the courier himself, or to some business

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 AUTHORITY
 BY 10 NARA DATE 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

demanding his presence. At any rate the Japanese Naval General Staff was involved in it:

No. 8

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) #161 Sept. 4, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

To Captain Ogawa of the Naval General Staff.

The matter in question should be (carried out ?) no later than the end of September. Please advise me.

Army Translation
 9-26-41

The next message, in view of subsequent events, was of vital importance.

No. 9

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) #83 Sept. 24, 1941
 TO: Washington

Strictly Secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible;

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.)

Area A - Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

Area B - Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)

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AUTHORITY BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942

Area C - East Lock

Area D - Middle Lock

Area E - West Lock and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you mention the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)

Army Translation
10-9-41

The Japanese pictures of the attack on Pearl Harbor show the American warships lined up two by two, as suggested in this message. Clearly, on September 24th the Japanese were trying to discover the pattern of anchorage procedure in Hawaii. They were to profit on December 7th from this knowledge. A reply was soon forthcoming from Honolulu:

No. 10

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) Circular #041
TO: Washington / Sept. 29, 1941

(Honolulu to Tokyo #178)

Re your (Tokyo's) #083:

(Strictly secret)

14
143

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 BY: D NARA DATE: 1/11/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location of vessels:

1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (the repair basin referred to in my message to Washington #48 (available, dated 21 Aug.): KS
2. Navy dock in the Navy Yard (the Ten Ten Pier): KI
3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV
4. Alongside in Ford Island: FC (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.)

Relayed to Washington, San Francisco.

Navy Translation
 10-10-41

With all this attention to Hawaii, the Japanese still kept their eyes on other places. Admiral Hart's flagship, the HOUSTON, and other American ships were kept under close surveillance.

No. 11

FROM: Tokyo #279(?) Sept. 1, 1941
 TO: Manila

(Strictly confidential.)

In regard to the points you were to note, from now on in case there is no special change, report once a week, but report each change of the following as they occur:

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AUTHORITY
BY D NARA DATE 1/11/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942 1

1. Arrival and departure of the HOUSTON.
2. Arrival and departure of more than 5 or 6 destroyers or submarines.
3. Arrival and departure of naval ships other than American; (report in detail the particulars and relationships involved.)

Navy Translation
9-11-41

The Russian Military Commission, visiting the United States at this time, was also a source of worry for the Japanese.

No. 12

- FROM: Washington (Nomura) Circular #263
- TO: San Francisco Sept. 4, 1941
- Los Angeles, (Message to Tokyo #780)
- Seattle.

Possibly the United States is preparing now for the eventuality when a considerable bombing force will have to be transferred to the (Siberian ?) area. Please secure intelligences on this matter.

1. Please investigate the state of affairs and the possibility of the Russian Military Commission, now in the United States, flying American planes via Alaska when they return home. (They have given their greatest consideration to large sized Consolidated military planes and amphibians.)

Army Translation
9-29-41

DECLASSIFIED REF 997622
AUTHORITY BY [] NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

The Japanese interest in the Panama Canal continued unabated, and they fell heir to some excellent spy work by their fellow sympathizers, the Italians.

No. 13

FROM: Buenos Aires Circular #146
TO: Panama Sept. 23, 1941

(Buenos Aires to Tokyo #416)

Strictly secret, C.C.R.

When Minister Yamagata (Minister to Chile) was in Panama he was asked by the Italian Minister there to deliver some maps. Since then, we had Usui go to Chile to take charge of these maps and upon their arrival here they were delivered to the Italian Ambassador. At the same time, we requested that we be given copies of them.

Recently, those copies were delivered to us. (At the time of this delivery, Assistant Attache Kameda and Usui were present to ascertain that they were exact copies of the originals) and we entrusted them to our Navy's courier Tatum who is returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru.

The Italian Ambassador here requests that upon the arrival of these papers in Tokyo, we notify the Italian Government to that effect through (our Embassy in Rome?).

Minister Yamagata has already advised Chief of Bureau Terosaki regarding this matter. The Navy has also sent a report.

Navy Translation
10-22-41

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In addition to those intercepted and deciphered messages of the Japanese, U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence issued the following reports to the Office of Naval Intelligence:

Japanese Naval Operations

<u>Date of Operations</u>	<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>
<u>No. 14</u> August 1-14, 1941	2-41, <u>No. 900</u>	Sept. 2, 1941
<u>No. 15</u> August 15-26, 1941	3-41, <u>No. 907-100</u>	Sept. 9, 1941
<u>No. 16</u> August 27 - Sept. 1, 1941	5-41, <u>No. 907-100</u>	Sept. 25, 1941
<u>No. 17</u> Sept. 2-14, 1941	6-41, <u>No. 907-100</u>	Sept. 29, 1941

It will be noted that these summaries were issued approximately two weeks after the period involved. This lag will be of significance in December, 1941. In No. 15 of these reports it was remarked that on August 26th:

"An unidentified Maru makes initial appearance in Mandate Transport/Supply Group. In addition to several new units joining this Transport/Supply Group it is noted that the tempo of units previously observed has greatly increased."

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No. 18

A complete resume of all Japanese ships and stations as of July 1, 1941 was issued on September 10, 1941 (Serial 4-41, No. 901-200). It was compiled from information obtained from the Office of Naval Intelligence, amplified and checked by Radio Intelligence.

OCTOBER, 1941

As the months wore on, the espionage activities of the Japanese were accelerated, and they were considerably extended in October.

No. 19

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2187 Oct. 13, 1941
 TO: Seattle

Henceforth, I would like to have you refer in your reports to the movement of warships as follows:

1. As long as there are no great changes in the movement and basing of warships, report on them at least once every ten days. In the event of priority intelligence report on each occasion.

- a. The arrival or departure of American flagships of the fleet or scouting force.
- b. Should more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time.
- c. The arrival or departure of warships of countries other than the United States (give as detailed a report as possible on the class of -----).

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2. Should patrolling be insured by naval planes, report it at once.

Army Translation
 10-29-41

The Japanese hoped that Malaya and the Dutch East Indies were to be future prizes, and their agents were set to work to investigate air defences there.

No. 20

FROM: Tokyo #316 Oct. 22, 1941
 TO: Singapore

Strictly Secret.

From the Vice Chief of General Staff.

Through Chancellor TAHIRA please report the following two things concerning the air force now stationed in the Federated Malay States:

1. Their drills and battle maneuvers (aerial formations.)
2. Investigate their organization.

Army Translation
 10-24-41

No. 21

FROM: Tokyo #659 Oct. 22, 1941
 TO: Batavia

To Major Kuriya from the Assistant Chief of Staff.

Will you please inspect and report on the air force in the Dutch Indies in regard to

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1. Training, formation, and aerial combat methods.
2. Organization, types, number and location of planes.
3. Types and number of planes being sent from England and the United States.

Army Translation
 10-24-41

No. 22

In answer to this request for specific information, secret reports, most minute in detail, on the Netherlands Air Forces, went back to Tokyo.

Navy Translation, 10-30-41

In September the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence issued detailed reports as to the location of Japanese ships in definite areas as follows:

Disposition of Japanese Naval Forces

<u>Week Ending</u>	<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>
<u>No. 23</u>		
Sept. 17, 1941	7-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Oct. 1, 1941
<u>No. 24</u>		
Sept. 25, 1941	9-41, No. <u>997-100</u>	Oct. 17, 1941
<u>No. 25</u>		
Oct. 3, 1941	10-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Oct. 25, 1941

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In No. 24, September 25, it was remarked that

"D/F bearings indicate that the aircraft carriers and a large unidentified portion of the Submarine Force are holding exercises off the coast of Japan between Kure and Yokosuka. Bearings on the NOTORO on September 24 indicates that this vessel is enroute to the Empire, or probably joining the other aircraft carriers in these exercises."

Japanese exercises are always significant, since they invariably practice every planned operation.

In No. 25, October 3, it was noted

"Units of Submarine Forces are apparently still engaged in exercises."

All this activity was summarized in a report of Japanese Naval Operations (Sept. 15 - Oct. 3, 1941).

Serial 11-41, No. 907-100, which was issued on October 18 -

"Traffic headings seem to indicate that a large number of units are gathering in the Sasebo and Kure areas."

It had been observed by Radio Intelligence in the past that such concentrations always preceded large scale operations of the Japanese Fleet.

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NOVEMBER, 1941

Japan demonstrated her usual interest in Manila during November, but her minute inquiries into details of Hawaiian defences and organization were noteworthy.

No. 26

FROM: Manila #722 Nov. 1, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

Ship movements, warships.

(3) According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands is as follows:

(a) Military Planes

Large bombers	29
Scout planes	324
The same, B type	62
Fighters	317
The same, B type	131
Pursuit planes	302
The same, B type	69
Training planes	49
Total	1283

(b) Naval Planes

Large flying boats 26

Navy Translation
 11-8-41

So important was this information of air strength considered that Tokyo demanded immediate confirmation, and requested even more information.

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No. 27

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #349 Nov. 5, 1941
TO: Manila

Re your #722 (reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine Islands.)

Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in paragraph 3.

Navy Translation
11-12-41

No. 28

FROM: Tokyo #355 Nov. 5, 1941
TO: Manila

For Secretary Yuki.

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same.

These items in regard to each port of call.

- (1) Conditions at air ports on land.
- (2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes.
- (3) Marsh lips; also machinery belonging to land forces.
- (4) State of progress being made on all equipment and franchises.

Navy Translation
11-13-41

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The United States Navy was preparing itself for any eventuality at this time. Necessary supplies were being shipped to the Asiatic Fleet.

No. 29

FROM: OPNAV 062354
 TO: CINCAF Nov. 7, 1941
 INFO: COM 16

Shipments of ammunition, torpedoes, bombs, etc., being arranged in near future to establish on station minimum of 2 allowances including that now on board fleet units your 290430. Following receipt of detailed information from EUORD regarding shipments desire your recommendation regarding first further distribution this material to Dutch or British bases; second additional supplies required and proposed stowages.

Back in Washington, a rather important meeting of United States Navy leaders gave the Japanese diplomats something to wonder about.

No. 30

FROM: Washington #1065 Nov. 8, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

On the 7th, President Roosevelt called for secret consultation the Secretary of Navy Knox, Admiral Stark, Chief of the Naval Operations, and other leaders of the Navy. I suppose they met to discuss our proposals as well as the question of withdrawing the Marines from China.

Army Translation
 11-12-41

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The United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands had decided to draw up new plans for joint defence in the Asiatic regions, as the following indicate.

No. 31

FROM: OPNAV 110032
 TO: CINCAF Nov. 11, 1941

CNO and British CNS have agreed ADB1 and ADB2 are dead and a complete new approach will be required, your 050255. In general it will consist of a Joint Naval Operating Plan drawn up by you and CinC British Far Eastern Fleet who is now enroute that station and who will probably be directed to visit Manila secretly to establish personal contact with you and Army High Command. This Naval plan would be integrated with Dutch Naval plans and Army and air plans to be worked out by US, UK and NEI commands in the Far East area. Letter now enroute to you by air mail on this subject, additional instructions will be sent later.

No. 32

FROM: OPNAV 121841
 TO: CINCAF Nov. 12, 1941

Your 271150 of October has been answered in an airmail letter which is now enroute. Decisions as to basing surface forces in the Philippines must be made by you and must be related to increased Army air strength and the early arrival of important British Naval reinforcements. Additional information and procedure proposed to London will be sent to you by airmail within a few days. While your boiler fuel is a problem, your responsibility during war for supplying Army with

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gasoline particularly 100 octane for planes is an even greater problem. Army stowage problem cannot be solved satisfactorily for several months and it is doubtful if sufficient 100 octane gasoline can be obtained in the Far East area. CNO is trying to furnish you with one additional tanker for fuel oil and two small gasoline tankers together with additional tankage on shore. Solution of this problem is being pushed as it affects the British forces which may seek to operate from the Philippines as well as the United States forces. Your advice will be appreciated.

The U.S. Navy was interested in the air strength of the Mandates, and asked for a check of the Japanese planes.

No. 33

FROM: OPNAV 132120
 TO: CINCAF Nov. 13, 1941
 INFO: CINCPAC
 COM 16

It is requested that you estimate the strength Orange aircraft permanently based Mandated Islands area and any possible recent additions.

Serious difficulties as to the supplying of aircraft for the Asiatic Fleet are apparent in this message.

No. 34

FROM: CNO 132253
 TO: CINCAF Nov. 13, 1941
 INFO: COM 16
 COMPATWING 16

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As you planned, 24, OS2U seaplanes will be sent. Regarding your 160510 of October, no Navy dive bombers available for Asiatic Fleet. For air defense against enemy expeditionary forces attacking the Philippines, the principle reliance must be placed on the Army. 44 operating dive bombers will be included in Army reinforcements.

There was ample evidence, that the gravity of the Asiatic problem was well recognized by the U.S. Navy, in the next dispatch.

No. 35

FROM: OPNAV 132338
TO: CINCAF Nov. 13, 1941
INFO: CINCPAC

In view of present situation request despatch recommendation regarding return to Pacific Fleet of five submarines of Subdivs 202 and 203, refer Opnav serial 0112712. CNO believes they could be more usefully employed in the Asiatic Fleet than in the Pacific if these 5 vessels can be satisfactorily maintained by your facilities. So that the Department can ship you the necessary material, should you consider they can be retained advise by airmail which of the approved alterations can be made.

Through all the moves in the southwest Pacific and the diplomatic negotiations in Washington can be seen the fact that the Japanese were extraordinarily interested in Pearl Harbor. Note the stress on great secrecy, which ordinarily need not be told to espionage agents.

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No. 36

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #111 Nov. 15, 1941
TO: Honolulu (Riyoji)

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

Navy Translation
12-3-41

No. 37

FROM: Tokyo #113 Nov. 18, 1941
TO: Honolulu

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Honolulu Harbor, and the areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy.

Army Translation
12-5-41

Note: There is no mention of Area N in the code message which designated certain areas in Hawaii. (Cf. I, 2, No. 9)

No. 38

FROM: Tokyo #111 Nov. 20, 1941
TO: Honolulu

(Strictly Secret)

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet ----- bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

Army Translation
12-4-41

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No. 39

FROM: Tokyo #122 Nov. 29, 1941
 TO: Honolulu

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

Navy Translation
 12-5-41

Evidently, the Japanese wished to take no chances of any slip up. They wanted constant supervision over their future target. This is an important despatch from Honolulu, translated on December 6.

No. 40

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) #222 Nov. 18, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

1. The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 on that day.

Area A (waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal) - a battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C (East Lock) - 3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the SARATOGA was not in the harbor. The carrier, ENTERPRISE, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the CHICAGO class, one of the PENNSACOLA class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D (Middle Lock).

3. At 10:00 a.m., on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart

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at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

Army Translation
 12-6-41

The U.S. Navy was on the alert for the safety of American ships in the Pacific at this time.

No. 41

FROM: OPNAV 181705
 TO: CINCPAC Nov. 18, 1941
 CINCAF
 COM 12
 COM 14

The placing of the BLOEMFONTEIN in a convoy with American Flag vessels is authorized. However until international conditions on and subsequent to November 25th become defined and clarified, any further direct or Great Circle routing between Hawaii and Philippines should not repeat not be used. Until further advised by the Department, routes south of Mandates should be prescribed.

That the Japanese were maintaining extensive patrols was well known:

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No. 42

FROM: OPNAV 211755
 TO: CINCPAC Nov. 21, 1941
 CINCAP

It has been indicated by reliable reports, of the recent establishment by Japan of a combined Air and Surface Craft Patrol, covering shipping routes from the U.S. to Australasia. Daily aircraft patrols have been observed extending to the Gilbert Islands from Base at Jaluit. Surface craft believed to cover area reaching Ellice Islands. Japanese East Indies fishing fleet also reported coordinated in patrol operations. Present indications this fleet divided into three groups now in areas vicinity Bathurst Island, Arnhem and Thursday Island in Torres Strait. They are expected round Dutch New Guinea operating from base in Palau and are equipped with long range radio sets.

Threats to the Dutch forces by the Japanese were also a matter of common knowledge to Navy leaders.

No. 43

FROM: OPNAV 211833
 TO: CINCAP Nov. 21, 1941
 CINCPAC

Information given us by the Dutch Legation to the effect that they have received a dispatch which is herein quoted "Info received by Governor General of Dutch East Indies that a Jap expeditionary force has arrived near Palau. This force is strong enough to constitute a threat to the Dutch East Indies or Portuguese Timor, and should it move beyond a line between the following points, Davao-Waigea-Equator, it will be regarded by the Governor General as

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an act of aggression and will be considered by him as having opened hostilities, and he will act accordingly."

Army authorities should be informed of the foregoing.

Your evaluation of the foregoing is requested, and request also any info you may have concerning the development of this Jap threat against the Netherlands East Indies.

A detailed Japanese report on air scouting in Manila is indicative of their careful planning.

No. 44

FROM: Manila #799 Nov. 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and wind less, squalls come once a day.

Army Translation
12-5-41

The Japanese desired to know the location of every British and American ship in the seas adjacent to them.

No. 45

FROM: Tokyo Circular #2431 Nov. 29, 1941
TO: San Francisco

Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:

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Ships nationality, name, port from which it departed, (or at which it arrived), port of destination, date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and warships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

Navy Translation
 12-4-41

U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence gave the location of the Japanese fleets in the following documents issued in November:

Disposition of Japanese Naval Forces

<u>Week ending</u>	<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>
<u>No. 46</u>		
Oct. 9, 1941	13-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Nov. 10, 1941
<u>No. 47</u>		
Oct. 16, 1941	14-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Nov. 10, 1941
<u>No. 48</u>		
Oct. 23, 1941	15-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Nov. 11, 1941
<u>No. 49</u>		
Oct. 30, 1941	18-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Nov. 17, 1941

Beginning with the report of October 16, (No. 47) important scenes of activity were marked by an asterisk. Those noticed in No. 47 were Saipan and Guam Area, Marianas, Truk and Ponape Island Area. In No. 48, October 23, Saipan, Truk and Jaluit were marked, and in No. 49, October 30, Truk, Ponape Island Area, and Eastern Carolines were noted.

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Some important summaries of Japanese Naval Operations were released by U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence as follows:

No. 50

Japanese Naval Operations

<u>Date of Operations</u>	<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>
October 4-12, 1941	12-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Nov. 7, 1941

Noteworthy items of information were these:

- Oct. 7 - "Commander Yokohama Air moves from the Empire to Saipan via plane."
- Oct. 8 - "The RO 65(?) (Subdiv 27, Subron 7) with Comsubdiv 27 aboard, apparently is enroute to the Mandates from the Empire. It arrived Saipan this date."
 - "Commander Yokohama Air moves from Saipan to Truk during the day. It is expected that other Airron 24 units and possibly other Combined Air Force activities will soon move to the Mandates."
- Oct. 10 - "Traffic routing indicates planes of Chitose Air Corps to be moving from Kisaratsu to Saipan."
- Oct. 11 - "Comairron 24 arrives at Truk from the Empire. Commander Yokohama Air Corps moves from Truk to Notje via plane. Part of Chitose Air Corps remains at Saipan."

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No. 51

Japanese Naval Operations

<u>Date of Operations</u>	<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>
October 13-22, 1941	16-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Nov. 12, 1941

Significant items were the following:

Oct. 13 - "Air Squadron 24 units continue activity in the Mandates. Commander Chitose Air Corps is now at Saipan arriving there from Kisaratsu Air Station by plane during the afternoon. (Returned on 15th; goes back to Saipan on 18)."

Oct. 14 - "Traffic indicates that the Commander 17th Air Corps (?) made a flight from Yokosuka to Truk via Saipan."

Oct. 17 - "Numerous new calls are now appearing in Mandate traffic which indicate a decided increase in the Mandate Force."

Oct. 18 - "It has been noted with interest during past few days that the Mandate Islands of Truk, Palau, Jaluit, and Saipan have been included in dispatch headings which ordinarily do not concern them." (Marked by asterisk.)

"The Commander Sixth Base Force originates a dispatch addressed to four unidentified units now at Yokosuka, and information to 6th Base Force. All of the above action addresses are evidently new units scheduled for assignment to the 6th Base Force in Jaluit area."

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No. 52

Japanese Naval Operations

<u>Date of Operations</u>	<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>
October 23-29, 1941	19-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Nov. 18, 1941

These were the important points:

Oct. 23 - "Shinto Maru #2 who has been previously serving the South China Fleet will probably move into the Mandates in the near future."

"Comairron 24 and Commander Yokohama Air Group are in Wotje vicinity. Commander Chitose Air Group is at Saipan. Commander Combined Air Force is appearing more frequently in traffic concerning the 24th Airron and with the Fourth Base Force Air Group."

Oct. 24 - "During the evening two unidentified Marus (air tenders) were heard working KONGO MARU (tender?). Direction-finder bearings indicate these units are probably enroute to the Mandates."
(Marked by asterisk to denote important).

Oct. 25 - "The following units originated movement reports today - Commander #1 Base Force, Cinc Third Fleet, Commander Northern Blockade Force, Commander Airron 6 and Commander Airrons Combined Fleet. This may be an indication of a large scale movement or possibly only a few ships in each group. Traffic routing and direction-finder bearings indicate no change in general direction."

"Shinto Maru #2 is now enroute to the Mandates apparently having Saipan as a destination."

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"A new division is now being formed in the 4th Base Force at Truk. The Commander is now aboard an unidentified vessel enroute to Saipan from Truk. Two Maru units are apparently now enroute from the Empire to the Mandates to join this command."

Oct. 26 - "NAGAURA (?) (salvage vessel) has now departed Yokosuka enroute to the Mandates."

"Considerable confusion now exists on all Mandate circuits, due largely to the extensive use of secret calls. Airron 24 units are continuously active on aircraft frequencies and traffic shows indication of the presence of a part of the Staff of the Combined Air Force command in the Mandates. Air Group Commanders make frequent changes in location, principally between Saipan, Truk, Jaluit and Wotje. Fourth Fleet units are concentrated in Truk area. Traffic indicates an increase in size on the 4th, 5th and 6th Base Force, particularly the 6th. Several additional itinerant Marus are now moving toward the Mandates, some of which have previously been active in China waters. Traffic headings have indicated a possible connection between some Third and Fifth Fleet Units with Base Force units in Jaluit area. Occasional dispatches are originated by major units of the First and Second Fleets addressed to Mandate Base Force activities. As a result of the general appearance of traffic the following major units are being watched for a possible move into Mandate area: First Fleet, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Fifth Fleet, Submarine Force, Combined Air Forces or Air Squadrons, Combined Fleet." (All marked by asterisk to denote important.)

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"MATSUEI MARU - Fourth Fleet repair ship is now at Truk having recently arrived there from Palao area."

Oct. 28 - "Commander Yokohama Air Group is at Wotje (Marshall Islands)."

"Increased radio activity between Mandated Islands and various units of the Combined and Third Fleets has been noted for the past two days possibly indicating movements of additional units to the Mandated area." (Marked by an asterisk to denote important.)

"Commander Third Base Force - Palao Area and a part of the Third Base Force staff is now aboard the KASHIMA, flagship Fourth Fleet in Truk area."

Oct. 29 - "The KOMOBASHI is now on a course for Ponape having completed a large irregular circuit around the Marshall Islands."

The U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence, in the next report, gave warning of unusual activity in the Mandates on the part of the Japanese:

No. 53

Japan Mandated Islands

<u>Topic</u>	<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>
Coast Defenses- Communications	20-41, No. <u>603-700</u>	Nov. 24, 1941

"In the past few months it has become known that stations temporarily classified as Coast Batteries, Lookout Stations and Landing Forces, have been active at certain Mandate Islands. During late April the Coast Batteries and Lookout Stations on Saipan were identified. In early July the Coast Batteries, Lookout stations and Landing Forces at Truk were identified."

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"Since such defense activities are known to be established at Saipan, Truk and perhaps Ponape, it is reasonable to assume that similar defense preparations are being made at islands in the Jaluit and Palao vicinities where bases, supplies, etc., are located."

The following very significant message was sent out by the U.S. Navy Department on November 24, 1941.

No. 54

FROM: OPNAV 242005
 TO: CINCPAC Nov. 24, 1941
 CINCPCAF
 COMS 11 12 13 15
 INFO: SPENAVO LONDON
 CINCLANT

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action Adec to inform senior Army officers their areas x Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action x Guam will be informed separately."

Late in November the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence sent out reports on the organization of the Japanese fleets. These are most valuable in estimating the opinion of the Navy before the war as to where the Japanese would make

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their first attack. Southeastern Asia was known as an area of future Japanese operations, but Pearl Harbor was not mentioned. Note also the difference in opinion between the 14th and 16th Naval District concerning the location of carriers and submarines.

No. 55

Japanese Navy - Organization of Fleets

<u>Date of Issue</u>	<u>Serial</u>
November 26, 1941	22-41, No. <u>901-200</u>

"Submitted by the 14th Naval District
 Communication Intelligence Unit:

Since the latter part of October, the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Fleet has been forming a Task Force consisting of:

- Second Fleet
- Third Fleet, (including First and Second Base Forces, and First Defense Division)
- Destroyer Squadron Three
- Submarine Squadron Five
- Combined Air Force
- Air Squadron Seven,

and possibly vessels of the Third Battleship Division in the First Fleet.

Third Fleet units are believed to be moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

It appears that the Seventh Cruiser Division, and the Third Destroyer Squadron are an advance unit, and may be enroute South China.

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The Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao, and indications are that some of it has already moved on to Hainan Island.

It seems that the Second Base Force is transporting equipment of the Air Force to Taiwan.

Radio calls for the South China Fleet, the French Indo-China Force, and the Naval Stations at Sams, Bako and Takao appear also in headings of dispatches concerning this task force.

The Resident Naval Officer Palao, and the Third Base Force at Palao have communicated extensively with the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet.

It is thought that a strong force of submarines and air groups are in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. This force includes the 24th Air Squadron, at least one aircraft carrier, and probably one-third of the submarine fleet. (Note: This may mean one-third of the fleet submarines.)

The 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit evaluates the foregoing information to indicate that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts of the Task Force may operate from the Marshalls and Palao."

Comd 260110 of November 1941 to OPNAV
Info: CIRCNAV, CIRCRAF, CU 16.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66997682
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942]

The 16th Naval District commented on the above report as follows:

No. 56

Japanese Navy - Organization of Fleets

<u>Date of Issue</u>	<u>Serial</u>
November 27, 1941	23-41, No. <u>901-200</u>

"Following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, referring to and commenting on yesterday's information from the 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, contained in the above reference.

*During the past few days traffic analysis indicates that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, is directing units of the First, Second, and Third Fleets, and Submarine Force in a loose knit Task Force organization that apparently will be divided into two sections. For purposes of clarity the units expected to operate in South China Area will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in the Mandates will be referred to as Second Section. The estimated units in First Section are Cruiser Division Seven, Air Squadron Six, Defense Division One, Destroyer Squadron Three, and Submarine Squadron Six. The Second Section consists of Cruiser Division Five, Carrier Division Three (RYUJO and one Maru), Destroyer Squadrons Two and Four, Submarine Squadron Five, Destroyer Division Twenty-three, First Base Force of Third Fleet, Third Base Force at Palao, Fifth Base Force at Saipan, and lesser units unidentified. Cruiser Division Six and Battleship Division Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively, but status cannot be clarified yet.

DECLASSIFIED	
REF 997622	
AUTHORITY	
BY: J. NARA	DATE: 1/1/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

There are slight indications today that Destroyer Squadron Three, Cruiser Division Seven, and Submarine Squadron Six are in the Takao Area. The balance of Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assumed that these vessels including Destroyer Squadron 5 will take stations in the Straits of Formosa or further south. Combined Air Force units from the Empire proper are at Paidoh.

It is impossible to confirm the supposition of reference report that carriers and submarines are in the Mandates. The best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet Carriers are still in Sasebo-Kure Area.

. . . Directives to the above Task Forces, if such, are directed to individual units, and not to complete groups. Special calls usually precede formation of Task Force used in area operations.

Commanders-in-Chief, Second, Third, and Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles.

Traffic from the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of Naval General Staff to Commanders-in-Chief of the Fleet appears normal.

This evaluation is considered reliable.

CG 16 261331, Nov. 1941 to CINCPAC, COM14 OPRV, CINCPAC."

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REF ID: A66997	
AUTHORITY	DATE: 1/11/2000
BY: [signature]	NARA

ORIGINAL

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Undoubtedly, the Roberts Commission Report on Pearl Harbor referred to the above evaluation when it said:

"The Naval Intelligence service in Hawaii, due to lack of information indicating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, concluded they were in some ports." (N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 30-31)

Cooperation of the U.S. Army and Navy in preparing for the expected trouble will be noted in the next messages.

No. 57

FROM: CHG
TO: CINCPAC

270038
Nov. 26, 1941

Provided you consider this feasible and desirable and in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use CINAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier x Essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels and planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats x Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents x Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies x Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers in Philippines x

DECLASSIFIED REF 997822
AUTHORITY BY <u>D</u> NARA DATE <u>11/20/80</u>

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

If necessary, additional parking areas should be laid promptly x Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations x As soon as practicable, confer with Commanding General and advise x

No. 58

FROM: CNO 270040
TO: CINCPAC Nov. 26, 1941

If you consider this desirable, Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station x For advance bases which you may occupy, Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units x Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable the recommended armament and number of troops desired x

The U.S. Forces in Asiatic waters were prepared for war by specific instructions, as the following indicates:

No. 59

FROM: OPNAV 271442
TO: CINCPAC Nov. 26, 1941

For the purpose of remedying the unintentional omission of CINCPAC, in the forthcoming revision of WPL 46 para 3744 will be amended. If formal war eventuates between US and Japan "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare May 1941" will be placed in effect. This will however be supplemented by additional instructions including authority to CINCPAC to conduct unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping within that part of

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AND 997822

AUTHORITY

BY: NARA DATE: 11/20/80

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the Far East area lying south and west of a line joining lat 30 N Long 122 E and lat 7 N Long 140 E. You will declare this as a strategical area. You will warn all friendly, enemy and neutral merchant ships and aircraft to refrain from entering this strategical area - except under certain specified conditions - in your proclamation. You will state that this step is necessary to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft from supporting hostile action and to prevent them from obtaining info which if transmitted to the enemy would be seriously detrimental to armed forces of the U. S. The only conditions under which friendly and neutral merchant vessels may enter the strategical area will be through certain prescribed lanes that lead to Naval control stations. You are requested to take up the matter of defining and establishing these lanes and control stations with the Dutch and British Naval authorities, but take care not to disclose for the present these instructions to wage unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare. The situation will be far more complex if hostilities ensue without a formal declaration of war, but it appears probable that very nearly the same procedure will be followed. However, further advice must be received from CNO before this done.

In like manner, the Army Chief of Staff desired to have his forces apprised of the contents of the above.

No. 60

FROM: OPNAV
TO: CINCPAC

271912
Nov. 28, 1941

Request from the Army Chief of Staff that you inform General MacArthur of the contents of my 271442 so that Army air forces may make appropriate plans.

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DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 BY 10 NARA DATE 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

A very important dispatch is the following
warning of imminent war:

No. 61

FROM: OPNAV 272337
 TO: CINCAF Nov. 27, 1941
 CINCPAC
 INFO: CINCLANT
 SPENAVO

This dispatch is to be considered a
war warning & negotiations with Japan looking
toward stabilization of conditions in the
Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by
Japan is expected within the next few days &
 The number and equipment of Japanese troops
 and the organization of Naval Task Forces
 indicates an amphibious expedition against
 either the Philippines Thai or KRA Peninsula
 or possibly Borneo & Execute an appropriate
 defensive deployment preparatory to carry-
 ing out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 &
 Inform District and Army authorities & A
 similar warning is being sent by War Depart-
 ment & Spenavo inform British & Continental
 Districts Guam Samoa directed take
 appropriate measures against sabotage.

No. 62

Japanese Navy - Organization of Fleets

<u>Date of Issue</u>	<u>Serial</u>
November 28, 1941	26-41, No. <u>901-200</u>

Assistant Naval Attache, Shanghai,
 reported the following movements and
 dispositions:

Tuesday, Nov. 25, 1941 - An unstated number
 of transports on a southwesterly course with
 troops aboard were sighted from a position
 21 N 115 E.

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 REF 997022
 AUTHORITY
 BY D NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Wednesday, Nov. 26 - Eight warships believed to be lead by the cruiser NAKA proceeding south at a good speed.

Many transports sighted during the week 19-26 November between Hongkong and Shanghai heading south. A number of these transports had troops on board.

... Two senior Construction Officers and 4000 men whose status is not known have been ordered to the Mandated Islands.

CINCPAC and COMIL have received the information submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.

No. 63

Japanese Navy - Organization of Fleets

<u>Date of Issue</u>	<u>Serial</u>
November 29, 1941	24-41, No. <u>901-200</u>

Submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.

"... The Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet indicates he will shift communications from the Kure Communication Zone at 0400, 29th; from the Sasebo Communication Zone at 0000, 1st; and later Bako Communication Zone at 0000, 2nd, thus implying a move from Japan proper to the south."

COMIL 291029, November 1941 to CINCPAC, COMIL, CINCAF, OPNAV.

The next message divulges United States air weakness at Hawaii, but does indicate that all concerned were aware of danger.

DECLASSIFIED
BY 997622
AUTHORITY
BY D NARA DATE 1/11/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 64

FROM: CNO 282054
 TO: CINCPAC Nov. 29, 1941

The arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be the best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VAF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via SARATOGA. War Department will instruct COMGE: HAWDEPT to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines. War Dept will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon. Marine Corps will shortly receive sixteen 37 MM AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake? Request air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future.

There can be no mistaking the warning of war contained in the next dispatches:

No. 65

FROM: OKNAV 290110
 TO: COM PENCE Nov. 29, 1941
 COM PENCE
 INFO: CINCPAC
 COM PENCE

Refer to my 272338. Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense Command "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the U.S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not

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REF 997682
AUTHORITY
BY: [initials] NARA DATE: 11/20/00

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be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. A separate message is being sent to G2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in U.S. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

No. 66

FROM: OPNAV 300419
 TO: CINCAF Nov. 30, 1941
 INFO: CINCPAC

There are indications that Japan is about to attack points on KRA Isthmus by an overseas expedition. In order to ascertain destination of this expedition and for security of our position in the Philippines, desire you to cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on 3 days commencing upon receipt this dispatch. Instruct planes to observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked. Understand that the British Air forces will search an arc 180 miles from Teda Bharu and will move troops to line across KRA Isthmus near Singora. Inform MacArthur if expedition is approaching Thailand. British mission here informed.

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 REF ID: A66997
 AUTHORITY
 BY: D NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

DECEMBER, 1941

Impending action was almost certain as December began. The diplomatic negotiations had broken down, and the Japanese fleets were definitely moving to advantageous positions. An indication that the Japanese attack was first planned for December 1, 1941 (E.S.T.) can be seen in the following message:

No. 67

FROM: COM16
 TO: COMINCH
 ALL FORCES
 011422
 December 1, 1941

JVJ (radio station in Tokyo) announced tonight in closing "All listeners be sure and listen in at 0700 and 0730 tomorrow morning, since there may be important news."

The Japanese changed their minds at this time, because some of our ships were out of Pearl Harbor on maneuvers. Another indication of imminent action is found in a report:

No. 68

Japanese Navy - Organization of Fleets

<u>Date of Issue</u>	<u>Serial</u>
December 1, 1941	25-41, No. 201-200

Submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.

Details of ship arrivals in Takeo, all under command of Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet.

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REF ID: A66997		
AUTHORITY		
BY: D	NARA	DATE: 11/1/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942]

Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, in ATAGO shifted from Kure to Sasebo Communication Zone, apparently enroute South China waters.

All Orange service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 0000, December 1, 1941.

CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMIL have received the above information.

Not only was the U.S. Navy alert to the possibility of war, but also, President Roosevelt was anxious about the reconnaissance actions of our forces in Asiatic waters.

No. 69

FROM: OPNAV 012356
TO: CINCAF Dec. 2, 1941

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this despatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a "Defensive Information Patrol" Minimum requirements to establish identity as U.S. Men-of-War are commanded by a Naval Officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. 1 vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indo-China coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of ISABEL authorized by President as one of the three but not other Naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out Presidents views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

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REF ID: A697682
AUTHORITY
BY: D NARA DATE: 1/11/2020

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1 SEPT 1942

No. 70

FROM: CNO 012358
 TO: CINCAF Dec. 2, 1941

In view of existing situation CNO considers it very important that you exchange full military information with the British and Dutch Naval Commanders-in-Chief except in cases where you consider it definitely inadvisable. These exchanges may appropriately be made through Naval Observers Singapore and Batavia provided ciphers are adequate. Suggest reconsideration of the question of establishing a Dutch Liaison Officer at your headquarters in Manila. Make arrangements direct and advise action.

The information already disclosed in Part I, Chapter I, as to the burning of Japanese codes at this time, was sent to all Pacific Commanders of the U.S. Navy.

No. 71

FROM: OPNAV 031850
 TO: COM16 Dec. 3, 1941
 CINCAF
 CINCPAC
 COM14

Highly reliable info has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Jap Diplomatic and Consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Since the situation was deemed so critical, the U.S. Navy Department ordered the destruction of its own codes in dangerous areas.

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 AUTHORITY
 BY D NARA DATE 1/11/2000

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No. 72

FROM: OENAV 040330
 TO: ALUSNA TOKYO Dec. 4, 1941
 ALUSNA BANGKOK
 ASTALUSNA PEIPING
 ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI
 INFO: CINCAF
 ALUSNA CHUNGKING
 COM16

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word JABBERWOCK. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "BOOMERANG".

No. 73

FROM: OENAV 040343
 TO: CO MARDET PEIPING Dec. 4, 1941
 CO MARDET TIEN-TSIN
 INFO: CINCAF
 COM16

Destroy this system at discretion and send word JABBERWOCK when this has been done. All registered publications except this system must be destroyed immediately by MARDETS PEIPING and TIEN-TSIN and reported by word "BOOMERANG" in plain language. Use discretion on all other confidential papers.

No. 74

FROM: OENAV 042017
 TO: NAVSTA GUAM Dec. 4, 1941
 INFO: CINCAF
 CINCPAC
 COMFOURTEEN
 COMSIXTEEN

Action addressee destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter, with the exception of that which is necessary for current purposes

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 REF ID: A69762
 AUTHORITY
 BY: D NARA DATE: 1/11/2020

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and special intelligence. Retain minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with OPNAV, CINCPAC, CINCPAC, COMS 14 and 16. Report which crypto-channels are retained. Be prepared to destroy instantly all classified matter you retain in event of emergency.

No. 75

FROM: OPNAV 042018
 TO: CINCPAC Dec. 4, 1941

Wako should now be stripped of all secret and confidential publications and papers which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the U.S. at your discretion, keep for essential communications a minimum number of cryptographic channels. Advise which ones are retained. Your 120828.

No. 76

FROM: OPNAV 042019
 TO: ALUSNA TOKYO Dec. 4, 1941
 ALUSNA BANGKOK
 ASTALUSNA PEIPING
 ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI
 INFO: CINCPAC

Action addressees also destroy all secret and confidential files with the exception of those which are essential for current purposes. Destroy all other papers which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the U.S. This supplements NY 040330.

No. 77

FROM: OPNAV 061743
 TO: CINCPAC Dec. 7, 1941
 INFO: CINCPAC

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying

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 REF ID: A66997622
 AUTHORITY
 BY: D NARA DATE: 11/13/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Just before the outbreak of war the final resume on the location of Japanese units was this:

No. 78

Disposition of Japanese Naval Forces

<u>Week ending</u>	<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date of Issue</u>
November 13, 1941	28-41, No. <u>907-100</u>	Dec. 4, 1941

It will be observed that this information was three weeks old on December 4.

An interesting point to note is the number of ship movement reports the Japanese made on certain key spots. These have not been given in detail, but a summary of intercepted reports follows:

No. 79

<u>Place</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Number</u>
Seattle	Tokyo	AUG.-NOV.	6
Panama	Tokyo	AUG.-NOV.	18
Manila	Tokyo	July -Nov.	55
Honolulu	Tokyo	1941	68

Occasional reports came from San Francisco, Havana and Singapore. The significant point is that the Japanese Government did not treat the Honolulu and Manila reports

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 REF ID: A66222
 AUTHORITY
 BY: J NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

CRUCIAL

1 SEPT 1942]

as routine matters, but continually kept trying to elicit more information from its representatives. The acceleration of messages from Honolulu and Manila in November was another indication of war preparation.

A change in the Japanese cipher system was noticed on December 4 by Cavite. This was another portent of action.

No. 80

FROM: COM16
 TO: OPNAV
 COM14

041502
 Dec. 4, 1941

All the foregoing messages and reports, etc., were known and read by the U.S. Navy before December 7.

Many men had been engaged in defensive warfare in the Pacific since early morning on the 7th, but the U.S. Navy went into formal action with the dispatch of the next message.

No. 81

FROM: CNO
 TO: CINCPAC
 COM PANAMA
 CINCAF
 PACIFIC NORTHERN
 PACIFIC SOUTHERN
 HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS.

072252
 Dec. 7, 1941

DECLASSIFIED
JWP 99A22
AUTHORITY
BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2020

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Execute against Japan unrestricted air and submarine warfare. CINCAF inform British and Dutch. Inform Army.

Thus, ends the story of Naval Operations before December 7. Section B contains those messages which were not ready for use, that is, deciphered and translated, until after Pearl Harbor.

Section B

Messages sent before December 7, but not deciphered until after Pearl Harbor.

Most of these messages deal with Pearl Harbor and its environs. Once aware of the detailed investigations disclosed in these dispatches, one cannot fail to realize why the Japanese were so well prepared on the morning of December 7.

NOVEMBER, 1941

A detailed analysis of fleet maneuvers, giving time of arrival and departure from Pearl Harbor, duration of practice, period, anchorage places for the various units, and other pertinent information was contained in the following dispatch.

DECLASSIFIED REF 992822
AUTHORITY BY D NARA DATE 1/1/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 82

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) #234 Nov. 24, 1941
 TO: Tokyo (Part 1 of 2)

Re your #114. (Not available)

Strictly Secret.

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

2. Recently the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver area.

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas seaplane tenders operate in concert with another vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

(Part 2 of 2)

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two or three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operation. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

DECLASSIFIED REF 997032
AUTHORITY BY D NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942 1

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Monday, Wednesday, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine Layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of ----- have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five minelayers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila Harbor."

Army Translation
12-16-41

Despite the elaborate analysis of American warship procedure at Hawaii, Tokyo was not yet fully satisfied. Another request for more specific data was sent to Honolulu:

No. 83

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #119 Nov. 28, 1941
TO: Honolulu

Re your message #243.

Intelligence of this kind which are of the major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

1. When battleships move out of the harbor, if we report such movement but once a week, the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have travelled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

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 BY D NARA DATE 1/11/2000

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2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships, and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

Army Translation
 12-8-41

The stream of information continued to flow from Hawaii to Tokyo:

No. 84

FROM: Honolulu #238 Nov. 28, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

Military Report.

1. There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 ?).

2. Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are:- number of shots 12; interval of flight 13 seconds; interval between shots 2 minutes; direct hits none.

3. 12,000 men (mostly Marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

4. There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 ? feet ?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.

Army Translation
 12-8-41

DECEMBER, 1941

A report on fleet maneuvers definitely informed Tokyo that, whether the American battleships left on Tuesday or Friday, they were always back for the weekend of the same or following week.

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 BY [initials] NARA DATE 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

No. 85

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) #241 Dec. 1, 1941
 TO: Tokyo
 (In 2 parts - complete)

Re your #119.

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor.

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles south-east of here.

Direction based on:

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAILI" straits northward.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as an ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official routes.

Distance based on:

(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns cannot be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231 (Available, KEIZEI dated 23 November) were

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 BY: [signature] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

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for the duration of four full days of 144 hours (6 days ?), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 nautical miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 knots) is possible, however, figuring 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

Navy Translation
 12-10-41

The Japanese agents at Panama were put on the alert on December 1.

No. 86

FROM: Washington #40 Dec. 1, 1941
 TO: Panama

Report passage through the Canal of the U.S.S. MISSISSIPPI, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, WASP.

Navy Translation
 12-10-41

Their agents in Honolulu were stirred to further activity by the Japanese home government. Day by day reports were now to be made, and the inquiries reveal details of the Japanese plans of attack.

DECLASSIFIED
 BY: [Signature] 997632
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [Signature] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 87

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #123 Dec. 2, 1941
 TO: Honolulu

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

(Note: This message was received in Washington on December 23.)

Army Translation
 12-30-41

The next message is very important in light of subsequent events. It shows the great interest the Japanese were taking in Pearl Harbor just before the attack. Notice the elaborate signal system to indicate whether or not the battleships and carriers would be at anchor.

No. 88

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) #245 Dec. 3, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

(Military Secret)

From [Signature] to the Chief of #3
 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

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I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Signal</u>
Battleship divisions including scouts and screen units	: Preparing to sortie	: 1
A number of carriers	: Preparing to sortie	: 2
Battleship divisions	: All departed between 1st and 3rd	: 3
Carriers	: Several departed between 1st and 3rd	: 4
Carriers	: All departed between 1st and 3rd	: 5
Battleship divisions	: All departed between 4th and 6th	: 6
Carriers	: Several departed between 4th and 6th	: 7
Carriers	: All departed between 4th and 6th	: 8

2. Signals.

I. Lenikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

	<u>Signal</u>
One light between 8 and 9 pm	1
" " " 9 and 10 pm	2
" " " 10 and 11 pm	3
" " " 11 and 12 pm	4

II.

Two lights " 12 and 1 am	5
" " " 1 and 2 am	6
" " " 2 and 3 am	7
" " " 3 and 4 am	8

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(Part 2)

III. Lanikai^{*} Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7 or 8.

IV. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House ** will indicate the following:

<u>Times</u>	<u>Signal</u>
1900-2000	3
2000-2100	4
2100-2200	5
2200-2300	6
2300-2400	7
0000-0100	8

V. K.G.E.B.*** Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC., CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium*** at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40' N, Longitude 156° 19' W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your KEXX signal is received:

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<u>Time</u>	<u>Signal</u>
From 7 - 8	3 or 6
From 8 - 9	4 or 7
From 9 - 10	5 or 8

- * Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
- ** A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.
- *** A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
- **** At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

Navy Translation
 12-11-41

Every ship movement in Hawaii was now being sent to Japan, giving the Intelligence Officers of the Japanese a perfect picture of the scene at Pearl Harbor.

No. 89

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) #247 Dec. 3, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out towards mainland.

3rd. BARIII ? came into port from San Francisco.

Navy Translation
 12-10-41

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No. 90

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) #248 Dec. 3, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

Ship report.

December 3rd. WYOMING and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movement.

Navy Translation
 12-10-41

No. 91

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) #249 Dec. 4, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 ton class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4-inch gun fore and aft. -----

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.

Army Translation
 12-12-41

No. 92

FROM: Honolulu (Kita) #252 Dec. 5, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

1. During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #239 arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

2. The LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

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3. The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers.

Four ships of the HONOLULU class and ----- were in dock.

Navy Translation
 12-10-41

The Japanese sent an inquiry to Singapore on the 5th, to guard against any upsetting of their plans for the Southwest Pacific.

No. 93

FROM: Tokyo #377 Dec. 5, 1941
 TO: Singapore

(Abstract)

Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships.

Navy Translation
 12-31-41

Ship movements in the Pacific were still the major interest of Japan on December 6:

No. 94

FROM: Tokyo (Togo) #128 Dec. 6, 1941
 TO: Honolulu

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123 (not available) the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

Army Translation
 12-12-41

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No. 95

FROM: Seattle #184 Dec. 6, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

(Urgent Intelligence)

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the WARSPITE (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the COLORADO.

2. The SARATOGA sailed the same day.

Army Translation
 12-8-41

The following messages contained implications of great significance:

No. 96

FROM: Honolulu #253 Dec. 6, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

Re the last part of your #123. (Not available)

1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over

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the water and lava runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigations.

Army Translation
 12-8-41

No. 97

FROM: Honolulu #254 Dec. 6, 1941
 TO: Tokyo

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were ----- and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks. The heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left.

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

Army Translation
 12-8-41

One more message may be of interest since it is a press report by one of the Japanese attackers at Pearl Harbor. Though fragmentary, it gives some pertinent details.

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No. 98

FROM: Tokyo (Weiss) #492 Jan. 2, 1942
 TO: Berlin (Presse Contel Union)

We all hope our ship will not be discovered at the last moment by the enemy. Thus far at least on our trip toward Hawaii which has lasted for days neither a scout nor a merchant ship of any nationality has met us. The airplane carrier increases its speed. All preparations are concluded. At 4:30 before sunrise, the command is given to start. Heavy clouds hang at 1,500 to 2,000 meters over the blue waters of the Pacific, ----- stormy and under normal conditions not a plane would be permitted up in this weather

Army Translation
 1-5-42

And thus ends the material in the possession of U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence on the prelude to Pearl Harbor. On December 7 itself there were no decryption or traffic intelligence messages coming into Washington, and no reports from Radio Intelligence to the Office of Naval Intelligence were issued from December 4 to December 8.

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~~200~~

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APPENDIX II
CORAL SEA

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 BY: J NARA DATE: 1/1/2020

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 1 SEPT 1942

APPENDIX II

The Battle of Coral Sea

Part I

Aftermath of Pearl Harbor

DECEMBER, 1941

After the outbreak of the war, U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence turned to its task of keeping the Chief of Naval Operations informed as to enemy positions. Solution of the Japanese call system and codes, was the key to the problem. Documents, recovered from Japanese planes shot down at Pearl Harbor, helped somewhat, as will be noticed in:

No. 1

FROM: CINCPAC #091915 Dec. 9, 1941
 TO: CIPNAV
 CINCAF
 COM16

Partially burned captured Orange (Japanese) aircraft call system gave many Orange ship calls.

No. 2

FROM: COM 14 #100745 Dec. 10, 1941
 TO: CIPNAV

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 203

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Cipher card taken away from crashed plane referred to Aleutians as well as Hawaiian and Midway Area.

These documents were kept at hand for a long time after Pearl Harbor, and even two months later, they were still giving up valuable pointers, as their significance became apparent.

No. 3

FROM: OPNAV #152105 Feb. 15, 1942
 TO: COM 16

Material recovered from planes at Pearl shows that first air fleet used following radio telephone calls x Cardiv one - YAMATO x Cardiv two - ASAHI x Three - SAKURA x Four - NISIKI x First ship of each cardiv designated by above name plus HYAKUBAN HYAKUBAN second ship NI HYAKUBAN NI HYAKUBAN x . . .

No. 4

FROM: COM 16 (Cavite) #151250 Dec. 15, 1941
 TO: OPNAV

All the units of Radio Intelligence went swiftly to work to complete the process of decipherment.

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ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942 1

No. 5

FROM: OPNAV
TO: COM 16
COM 14
INFO: CINCAF
CINCPAC

#170350 Dec. 16, 1941

JANUARY, 1942

Recoveries of Japanese code values went on gradually, (3000 out of 5366 - Jan. 8) but within a month, the objective was achieved, as will be seen in:

No. 6

FROM: COM 16
TO: OPNAV

#190215 Jan. 20, 1942

The U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence was the medium through which an amazing coup was forestalled in Burma, early in January. Deciphering of a

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942]

message (OPNAV to Cincap, Jan. 1942, 052240 and 07007) from the Japanese Embassy in Lisbon to Tokyo, divulged that U Saw, the Premier of Burma, had visited the Japanese Minister in Lisbon, while en route from London to his home. Ironically enough, he was being protected by the Allies, and was travelling in a British plane. The message revealed that he was planning to betray English interests, and was hoping to negotiate a treaty with the Japanese. The information was given at once to Winston Churchill, who was in Washington at the time, and word was passed to London. U Saw had his journey home rudely interrupted, and he was immediately returned to British custody.

On the other hand, Radio Intelligence had a problem in ensuring the secrecy of its own calls. The successful invasions of the Japanese in several areas, where American cryptographic systems had been available, left much to be desired from the point of security, e.g., the following:

*Sales
 patch*

No. 7

FROM: OPNAV #110129 Jan. 11, 1942
 TO: COM 16
 INFO: CINCAP

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system, 8th June, Tokyo to Hanoi, No.16 "refers to a code book which they have photographed. Wants to know how army got it, and if the ensay knows it to be compromised."

Note: Probably a British or U.S. Diplomatic Code Book.

FEBRUARY, 1942

The problem of security was still present in February.

No. 8

FROM: COM 16 #021345 Feb. 3, 1942
 TO: CINCPAC
 INFO: COMINCH
 OPNAV
 CINCPAC

... Several despatches from Tokyo Intelligence addressed all ships and stations since December 7 giving our calls x ... No information whether results obtained by association, decipher or compromise."

No. 9

FROM: COM 16 #252030 Feb. 25, 1942
 TO: CINCPAC
 COM 14
 OPNAV

... Tokyo Naval Intelligence now able disseminate decipherment our calls to entire fleet within fourteen to fifteen hours on same day their use x Referred to papers taken.

16th Naval District Radio Intelligence

commented:

"Believe papers referred to were seized at Wake."

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MARCH, 1942

Schopf!

Continuing its ever present policy of strict watchfulness in guarding its own communications, Radio Intelligence did not cease its constant supervision of enemy traffic.

No. 10

FROM: COM 16
TO: COM 14
OFNAV

#061609 March 1942

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BY: J NARA DATE: 1/1/2020

ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942

No. 11

FROM: COM 16 #171435 March 1942
TO: COMB.

No. 12

FROM: COM 14 #180922 March 1942
TO: COMB

(2) Enciphered calls as given by Tokyo for 16th indicate he has copy of our CSP 1161.

Radio Intelligence explained:

"CSP 1161 (Radio Call Cipher) was replaced."

No. 13

FROM: COM 14 #222138 March 1942
TO: COMB.

... On 13 March Tokyo Naval Intelligence informs all major commands of

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ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

contents of American publications seized at Singapore. This publication was issued 1 August 1941, by Bureau of Ships and gives status of building program. Probably the mimeographed report.

No. 14

FROM: COM 16 #221615 March 1942
 TO: COMB.

Tokyo Naval Intelligence has detailed information on an American convoy of 20 supply ships and possibly some tankers carrying trucks, bombs, ammunition, aviation gasoline, and 2800 aviation personnel.

*BAMS!
 Chas. Buehler
 AMC Dept.
 in Tokyo*

No. 15

FROM: COM 16 #251236 March 1942
 TO: COMB.

Japanese have recovered more U.S. call signs.

No. 16

Sudden activity of Japanese warships, and a concentration of their forces in Empire waters at this time, prompted the sending of a Memorandum to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Navy, explaining the situation. In a detailed analysis, the new movements were termed a defensive, rather than an offensive operation. It was suggested that the concentration might be the result of deception messages, sent out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific.

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 BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/11/2020

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

Part 2 - The Eve of Coral Sea

MARCH 25, 1942

The first indication of a campaign against Port Moresby as differentiated from the regular air attacks, was noted in a deciphered Japanese dispatch.

No. 17

FROM: Comdr. South Seas Air Force #013 25 March

South Seas Air Force Base, Air Force Operation Order --P--:

All attack forces continue operations in accordance with ----- on 26th. #2 Attack Force continue to support main task and using fighters assist #5 Attack Force in the RZP campaign, and with scouts carry out patrol of your assigned area. #5 Attack Force continue attacks on RZP and -----, and carry out patrol in your assigned area.

At this time RZP was tentatively identified as being in the Port Moresby area. No more definite indication of an advance on Port Moresby appeared, until the latter part of April. From then on, many messages were read, which indicated the scope of the Port Moresby operations, and revealed the plans for its execution. When these messages were first read, RZP and RZQ were believed to be in the Port Moresby area.

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1 SEPT 1942

This was later confirmed by a translation, which stated RZQ was the Port Moresby Seaplane Base, and from other translations and collateral information, RZF was then definitely determined to be Port Moresby. "MC" was soon after recognized as a designator for Port Moresby.

All during April and May, the messages of the Japanese Navy in the code, which had been put into effect on December 4, 1941, were able to be read. Though the enemy made two attempts to effect new arrangements in April and May, distribution of the substitute code was so slow, that a change was not made until May 28. It is interesting to reflect that, though the work of U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence was very effective, the slowness and errors of the Japanese made the frustration of their plans possible.

APRIL 3, 1942

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 18

FROM: COM 14 #030217 April 1942
TO: COMB.

Numerous indications which point to impending offensive from Rabaul base are augmentation and reorganization of air in area, numerous movements of air tenders from Truk to Rabaul, and transfer of air strength from the West to Rabaul.

APRIL 7, 1942

One of the ships to be used in the forthcoming operations was discovered in:

No. 19

FROM: #710 About 7 April

Report on progress of repairs to EAGA. As she is scheduled to participate in RZF Campaign, desire repairs to be completed as soon as possible.

Japanese interest in the Coral Sea was clearly demonstrated by the next dispatch.

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1 SEPT 1942

No. 20

FROM: CP-20-C Memorandum 7-2 April 7, 1942
 TO: COMINCH

FROM: Comdr. Air Group (SU TC 6) (now
 at Rabaul)
 TO: Com. Air Group (MI NA 9) (now in
 Truk-New Guinea Area)
 Serial #208 (4/7/42)

Reports on aerial engagement
 against 10 planes of I type and a
 plane of another type in RZM (Lae,
 New Guinea). Also from (RTM?) the
sector 150 degrees to 200 degrees
was searched a distance of 500 miles.

It was commented:

"RTM is new but the sector
definitely extends into the Coral Sea."

APRIL 10, 1942

U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence continued to
 struggle with new call lists, issued at intervals by
 the Japanese, and progress therein was reported:

No. 21

FROM: COM 14 April 10, 1942
 TO: COMB.

New call lists in effect provide
 many more alternates for increased security.
 Identification of major shore stations
 fairly solid; identifications of major fleet
 and force calls proceeding satisfactorily.

There was no mistaking the purpose of the
 Japanese air activity in the Mandate region all during
 April.

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 1 SEPT 1942

The following messages indicate the importance of these preparations:

APRIL 14, 1942

No. 22

FROM: COM 14 #142048 April 1942
 TO: COMB.

(1) (RYUKAKU), serial 132, This ship will report Yokosuka, 20 April and should arrive Truk on 25th. Planes and equipment on board as follows:
 18 type Zero dive bombers, (9 for Tainan Air), 2 type ----- dive bombers and ----- number of diesel type shipboard bombers.

APRIL 15, 1942

No. 23

FROM: COM 14 #142356 April 15, 1942
 TO: COMB.

Heavy traffic all during April showed much strengthening of air forces in Mandates and Rabaul.

APRIL 17, 1942

No. 24

FROM: COM 14 #170054 April 17, 1942
 TO: COMB.

. . . (2) Activity of Air Units in Rabaul continues. Tainan Air appeared with urgent to 5th Air Attack Force. FUJIKAWA MARU also associated this attack force.

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It was indicated:

Tainan Air Group has been operating in the vicinity of Rabaul since 4-7-42 and will get 9 Zero dive bombers around the 25th of April via the RYUKAKU. 5th Attack Force is believed to be heavy bombers and/or patrol boats operating in Port Moresby area.

(3) Kisaratsu Air busy with flight planes to Marcus.

It was explained:

Kisaratsu has been busy moving planes to Saipan for Marshalls and Rabaul areas.

No. 25

FROM: COM 14 #170056 April, 1942
 TO: COMB.

(1) Several high precedence despatches concerned carrier RYUKAKU, suspected Crudiv 5, and Crudiv 5 cruiser, and Cardiv 3? with 4th fleet. Crudiv 5 in Sasebo radio number serials . . . RYUKAKU and Crudiv 5 may be connected with movement shore based air units into Rabaul area.

No. 26

FROM: COM 14 #171930 April, 1942

(3) (RYUKAKU), serial 138, partly readable says, "-----" if not absolutely necessary for operations, request authority to delay arrival at Truk until 28 April to permit training in Yokosuka area.

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BY: J. NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

14th Naval District Radio Intelligence said:

(COM 14 DI-132201) "The reference is Mandates Force Operation Order #153. 'The primary operations of this vessel after return to Truk will be (training) of personnel for participation in SHIKI repeat SHIKI Campaign. Because of operations other than this campaign, return to Truk will be delayed 5 days.' Comment: No light can be shed on nature of location this so-called campaign."

It was remarked:

Although COM 14 says that 'no light can be shed on nature and location of SHIKI Campaign' references to Truk, Tainan Air, (last mentioned in Rabaul area), indicate this campaign concerns New Britain - Mandates Area. There have been indications for some time that the air strength in this area is being greatly increased. BELCONNEN 171215 gives arrival report of new air group (Taichu Air Group) at Rabaul. COM 14 170056 says RYUAKAKU and Crudiv 5 may be connected with movements of shore based units into Rabaul area."

No. 27

FROM: COM 14 #172343 April, 1942
TO: COMB.

. . . (4) FUJIKAWA MARU addressed Palao Base Force. Believed FUJIKAWA recently on duty in Malaya, is in Palao area en route to Rabaul.

(5) Both carrier RYUAKAKU and carrier are at Yokosuka. These vessels probably with others appear to be preparing for trip to Rabaul area.

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1 SEPT 1942

It was pointed out:

Carrier whose call is is believed to be an air tender, or this may be one of the 2 converted carriers which will ferry planes from Yokosuka to Rabaul in the near future with the HOSHO.

No one could miss seeing that Japanese air preparations were far beyond the ordinary, as warning messages came in.

APRIL 18, 1942

No. 28

FROM: COM 14 #180020 April, 1942
 TO: COMB.

(1) Unidentified command whose flagship is sent urgent to information RYUKAKU, Chief of Staff Combined, 1st Air Fleet, 4th Fleet, and tentatively identified as Crudiv 5.

It was suggested:

Commander 1st Air Fleet has been operating in Bay of Bengal but is reported as moving to the eastward. RYUKAKU, 4th Fleet, and Crudiv 5 appear involved in operations in New Britain-Truk area and the association of 1st Air Fleet with these calls suggests the possibility that this unit will also operate in this area.

APRIL 21, 1942

No. 29

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1 SEPT 1942 1

FROM: COM 14 #210257 April, 1942
 TO: COMB.

(1) DesDiv 34 continues association with the 11th Air Fleet.

Radio Intelligence commented:

"Cinc 11th Air Fleet placed at Tenian (Marianas Islands) after 21 April. A desdiv unit was last placed at Singapore escorting the SHIMOKU MARU; destination unknown, but may be transporting 11th Air Fleet material from the Malay area to the eastward."

"... (3) Commander of Tainan Air Group is in the Rabaul area....."

Comment: Tainan Air Group believed to have arrived Rabaul about 10 April.

"... (4) Commanding Officer of KENJO MARU aboard fleet unit KI SA #."

Comment: KENJO MARU placed at Rabaul.

"... (7) FUJIEANA MARU bound for Rabaul from Palao."

Comment: Expected to arrive on 3 or 4 May.

"... (9) Marshalls Air Force appears to be preparing his command for action."

"... (11) Cardiv 5 and plane guards are preparing for duty with the 4th Fleet." (Also 210421)

Comment: Cardiv 5 arrives Truk about 28 April from Singapore via Bako.

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APRIL 22, 1942No. 30

FROM: COM 14 #222316 April, 1942
TO: COMB.

...(6) Evidence of considerable concentration in Truk area include RYUKAKU, Cardiv 5 less NACHI, Cardiv 5, KAGA and KASUGA MARU may join later. Cardiv at present in Sasebo Com. Zone."

It was remarked:

However, a change in plans after the bombing of Tokyo (April 18), kept RYUKAKU home for a while to search for U.S. forces.

APRIL 29, 1942No. 31

FROM: COM 14 #240046 April, 1942
TO: COMB

(1) Yokohama and Tainan Air are serving in Saipan-Truk Area. 14th Air is still in Marshalls ... Some indications that an air movement is taking place between Manila and Rabaul.

It was commented:

On 16 April, traffic analysis indicated that Yokohama Air was interested in the arrival of 2 seaplanes at Rabaul. On 8 April, Cos Colombo indicated that the Yokohama flying boat squadron was in Truk Area. On 21 April, traffic analysis indicated Commander of Tainan Air was in Rabaul Area. On 14 April he was aboard KENJO MARU, which was hit by enemy bombs while unloading at Rabaul.

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 REF ID: A66222
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 BY: J NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Radio intelligence indicated on 14 April that the RYUKAKU was due Truk about 25 April with 9 type Zero dive bombers for Tainan Air.

No. 32

FROM: COM 14 #242338 April, 1942
 TO: COMB

"Much activity here at Rabaul."

Some very important decrypts of Japanese dispatches, which ordered Naval call lists to be changed, gave much information as to the organization of the enemy's invasion forces. It will be remembered that MO denotes Moresby.

No. 33

FROM: (4th Fleet #185 April 24

"Change #3 Truk (4th Fleet) Communication Section, for Naval call list #117, on 25 April, page 5 between and insert the following in order:

- MO Fleet
- MO Occupation Force
- MO Occupation Force -----
- MO Attack Force
- RZP Occupation Force
- MO Occupation Force
- RKB Occupation Force
- RY Occupation Force

- #----- Force of the 3rd Special Base Force.
- #----- Force of the 5th Special Base Force."

(Note: RKB was later determined to be Tulagi; RY is still not definitely known but believed to be the Gilbert Islands group.) MO is Moresby.

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 34

FROM: (Cinc 4th Fleet) #186 April 24
 TO: CruDiv 5 (among others)

"As of 25 April, ----- (----- organization -----), page 5. From to (7 code groups), fill in the following in the order listed:

- MO Task (Striking ?) Force
- MO Attack -----
- -- Support Force.
- REP Occupation Force
- REP (?) Support Force
- TRY Occupation Force
- RHB Occupation Force

Page 40:

KA Sama Base, Communication Base.

Correct the following:

Page 53:

- / -- ~~f~~----- plane of the "Remaining Force" of the ----- Base Force.
- / -- ~~f~~----- plane of the "Remaining Force" of the #5 Base Force."

As the month of April came to a close, the scheduled Japanese preparations for occupation began to be completed. The organization of their forces was very well known at this time. (Nos. 40-44).

APRIL 25, 1942

No. 35

FROM: CCE 14 #250059 April, 1942

"RYUKAIU is to carry out operations in Rabaul area as scheduled.

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [signature] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

Marshalls and New Britain forces received maximum attention.

Unit in Gunboat Div. 8 (MC SA 8) at Sasebo indicated imminent return to Rabaul area.

Truk Base Force associated with base forces Saipan, Chichijima, and Rabaul probably in connection supply movements southeastward."

No. 36

FROM: COM 14 #250118 April, 1942

...(4) KASUGA MARU will be in Marshalls area en route anticipated destination Rabaul.

It was remarked:

"KASUGA MARU was scheduled to arrive in Yokosuka 20 April from Rabaul and return planes and supplies to Rabaul leaving the 23rd. This is apparently in accordance with previous schedule."

APRIL 26, 1942

No. 37

FROM: COM 14 #260042 April, 1942

(4) Staff Communication Officer addressed urgent to:

CARDIV 5,
 CRUDIV 5,
 RYUGAKU,
 RU MI 1,
 G RC 5,
 KA MI 6

INFO: 5th Air Attack Corps,
 11th Air Fleet.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66997
 AUTHORITY
 BY: D NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

may indicate concentration in Truk area and operations to southeastward.

It was observed:

"Cardiv 5, Cruidiv 5, and the RYUKAKU are believed to form the backbone of the Force arriving at Truk the 25th."

No. 38

FROM: COM 14 #260046 April, 1942

(1) 8th Base Force at Rabaul, and it is suspected Genzan Air (RO U 8) also.

It was stated:

"Genzan Air put out a schedule 4-19-42 en route from Penang to Rabaul to arrive 4-25-42."

The location of Japanese air carriers was an important contribution of Radio Intelligence at this time, for much of the success of the U.S. Navy at Coral Sea came from knowing where these dangerous ships were.

No. 39

FROM: COM 14 #260048 April, 1942

"Estimated Carrier locations:

5 elsewhere, but

KASUGA MARU in Truk or south of Truk
RYUKAKU at Yokosuka, en route Truk
ZUIKYO en route Truk
SHOKAKU en route Truk."

DECLASSIFIED BY: JND 947622
AUTHORITY BY: J NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

The significance of the next message should not be lost sight of, though Coral Sea brought disaster to the Japanese. Had the story been different, Australia might have had its first invasion of the war.

No. 40

FROM: COM 14 #260052 April, 1942
TO: COMB.

(2) serial 126 of 18th, requested 1000 copies of some documents or papers including a complete section on Australia to be sent via transport plane departing Yokohama on 20 or 21 April.

Radio Intelligence emphasized:

is believed to be the 5th Air Attack Force based in the Carolines. The urgency for the transportation of these papers and the section of Australia may indicate his force will be actively engaged in that sector shortly.

APRIL 27, 1942

Indications, that the Japanese were planning to change their codes and call lists, were now observed. This was the usual enemy procedure before an important attack.

No. 41

FROM: COM 14 #270020 April, 1942
TO: COMB.

225

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [initials] NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

"From Tokyo Naval Communications:

'On 27 April discontinue use of number 11 Call List 2 column (variations) and place into effect Call List number 11, 2 column.'

Another message from Navy Minister places Naval Codes (and) into effect and cancels old form (1940 revision).

No. 42

FROM: COM 14 #270134 April, 1942

(2) Tokyo Registered Publication Section addressed many calls which appear to be branch offices.

Comment: Possibly in connection with putting into effect new codes and call lists.

Evidence of submarine and air activity was noticed, and the picture of the ultimate plans of the Japanese became clearer with these details known.

No. 43

FROM: COM 14 #270236 April, 1942

(1) Appears that Subron 7 will operate in Mandates soon. Association appears of this Subron with Subron 8 and both are associated Rabaul.

Comment: April 21 COM14 reported Subron 7 appeared ready to operate. This unit associated with Palao 3rd

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/20/00

ORIGINAL

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No. 43 (1) Cont'd.

Base, Crudiv 5, Subron 8, 4th Fleet, 11th Air Fleet and other units April 25th. Subron 8 believed in Truk Area April 22nd.

(2) CinC 4th addressed Cardiv 5, Crudiv 5 less NACHI, Cruiser A KU 3, and Desdiv RI TE 9. These may be part of his new task force.

Comment: RI TE 9 believed a unit of Desron 1; may be plane guard for Cardiv 5.

No. 44

FROM: COM 14 #270242 April, 1942

Following future concentration of Air Attack Forces is indicated:

4th, 5th and 6th in Rabaul, 2nd continues in Indies, 3rd in Malaya; and 1st between Wake and Rabaul. Operations of these major air corps in Rabaul may be supplemented by Cardiv 5, Crudiv 5, and possibly RYUKANU and Crudiv 8.

This deciphered Japanese message gave some valuable hints.

No. 45

FROM: COM 14 #270932 April, 1942
 TO: COMB.

*Japanese message.

*The Mandates force will operate as follows, Comdr ----- (with 4 unidentified units, probably those in the heading) depart Truk and join ----- for operations against enemy in RX area. If

DECLASSIFIED
 REF 997822
 AUTHORITY
 BY NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 45 Cont'd.

no contact is made search with RO as reference point. (This part vague but deals with responsibilities and orders of various units and ships.) With reference to operations of First Air Fleet and ----- these orders remain in effect until cancelled.' "

The 14th Naval District Radio Intelligence

unit suggested:

"RX area is that to eastward of Solomons, and RO is that to westward."

It was wondered:

"Whether this message came out after Blue forces 1 cruiser, 1 carrier, 2 destroyers - 270306) were sighted in the Rabaul area is not known. The suggestions on the TX and RO areas look good."

Japanese airplane movements were constantly under supervision.

No. 46

FROM: COM 14 #272202 April, 1942

(1) Chitose Air Group, located in Wake for the past 9 days, sent many dispatches to Marshalls Air Force units, 11th Air Fleet, 4th Fleet, and Communication activities in the Marshalls; believe this indicates a movement back to Wake, possibly to the home base at Kwajalein.

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: [signature] NARA DATE: 11/20/80

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942 1

It was remarked:

"#4 Air Attack Corps (located in the Marshall Islands with bases at Wake and Makin) Operation Order #6, orders the bomber unit at Wake to return to its base on the 26th, except the ----- remain at Wake; the advance unit move up to Wake."

"(2) Marshalls Air Force is corresponding activity with the 6th Air Attack Corps and 11th Air Fleet; 6th Air Attack Corps appears largely divorced from the Northern Area command, and increasingly associated with the Marshalls Air Force and the Rabaul Air Force.

"(3) Rabaul and Kisoraya Air Stations are exchanging message, indicating the continued southward movement of line reinforcements."

Questions concerning the security of Allied codes came up again, when the following Japanese message was decrypted.

There is no need to point out the danger in using systems, which an enemy can read - Coral Sea and Midway are sufficient reminders.

No. 47

FROM: COM 14 #272234 April, 1942
 TO: COMB.

(1) Tokyo Naval Intelligence, serial #281, 3 parts, gives location and call signs of all airports in the Anzac Area, including Rabaul and Port Moresby. This information was obtained from a 'RAAF handbook,' and all information checks with latest information here.

DECLASSIFIED
REF ID: A66997
AUTHORITY
BY: D NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942 |

The locations of Japanese submarines and
plane carriers were checked carefully.

No. 48

FROM: COM 14 #272244 April, 1942

...(3) Commander Submarine Force
addressed Subrons 7 and 8.

It was observed:

"Commander Submarine Force is placed
in the Caroline Islands, and Subron 8 is
believed to be with him. Subron 7 not
definitely placed, but has recently been
associated with Subron 8, and both have been
associated with Rabaul."

No. 49

FROM: COM 14 #272304 April, 1942

(3) Comcardiv 5 with the ZUIKAKU and
ENOKAKU found using Truk Radio as a
concealed origin, confirming the presence of
Cardiv 5 there.

It was explained:

"Cardiv 5 was expected at Truk
on the 28th."

APRIL 28, 1942No. 50

FROM: COM 14 #282142 April, 1942

...(3) Some association between
Subrons 2, 3, and 8.

Mention was made:

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 BY D NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 [SEPT 1942]

"Subron 8 placed in the Mandates;
 on 23 April. There were indications
 that a division of Subron 2 would soon
 arrive at Truk."

No. 51

FROM: COM 14 #282146 April, 1942

(1) CinC 4th Fleet originated
 urgent dispatch believed may represent
 operation order for offensive operations
 in southeast theater, addresses 4th Fleet,
 CruDiv 5, Cardiv 5, RYUKAKU, KAMIGAWA
 MARU (?), 2 to 3 DesDiv Plane Guards,
 Comsubfor, 4th and 5th Air Attack Corps,
 Genzan and Yokohama Air.

(2) FUJIRAWA MARU appears in
 Rabaul Area.

... (4) Ship whose call is believed
 to be battleship, sends traffic routed Truk
 to Tokyo.

It was said:

"... believed to be a battle-
 ship on 21 April, appeared to be leaving
 Empire for Mandates. On 27 April the
 ship whose call is of 1st Fleet
 was on circuit with Saipan."

(5) Apparent contact report
 intercepted on Mandate frequency addressed
 to 5th Air Attack Corps at 1150 Tokyo time.

It was noted:

"Traffic analysis on April 26 and
 27 indicated that the 5th Air Attack Corps
 was believed to be included in the concentra-
 tion in Truk Area for possible operations to
 the southeastward."

DECLASSIFIED
BY: 99762
AUTHORITY
BY: NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942

APRIL 27, 1942

No. 52

FROM: COM14 #292356 April, 1942
TO: COMB.

"... (5) Cinc 4th Fleet sent more traffic than any other major commander; some sent to Subron 7; some to the 11th Air Fleet and subdivisions thereof, particularly the 4th and 5th Air Attack Corps."

It was indicated:

"Subron 7 is believed operating in the Marshalls. #4 Air Attack Corps is based in the Marshall Islands; most recent operation of this force was apparently the reconnaissance of Nauru, Ocean, Howland, and Baker Islands, and preparation for an attack on the latter two. 5th Air Attack Corps placed in the Rabaul Area."

No. 53

FROM: COM14 #292358 April, 1942
TO : COMB.

(1) KAMIGAWA MARU added to the 4th Fleet forces operating in Rabaul Area, which may indicate the addition of an air squadron.

It was explained:

"The KAMIGAWA MARU was believed to be the flagship of Airron 6, in January."

(3) ASSUME that 4th Fleet flagship and other units are south of Truk.

(4) Call definitely identified as the KUMANO of Cruiv 7; it is likely that this division or part of it has been added to the 4th Fleet forces.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66222
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 BY: J NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

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 1 SEPT 1942

It was pointed out:

"On 22 April, Crudiv 7 was believed to be scheduled for the Navy Yard until 9 May. On 27 April, however, this Crudiv was still very active in radio traffic."

Several Japanese orders to their Occupation Forces, in reference to the projected campaign, provided much important data. These had been intercepted and decoded.

No. 54

FROM: #907 29 April
 (Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet)
 TO : Chief of Staff, 4th Fleet,
 11th Air Fleet,
 Comcrudiv 5,
 Comcardiv 5.

The sense of this message is:

SECRET: With reference to the Mandates Force Operation Order #13, the objective of the MO will be first, to restrict the enemy fleet's movements and will be accomplished by means of attacks on outlying units and various areas along the north coast of Australia. The Imperial Navy will operate to its utmost until this is accomplished. Further, we will continue to operate against all bases used by enemy aircraft (there is also the thought here that advanced bases will be occupied to wipe out enemy shore based aircraft).

Com 14 commented:

"The sense of the above message is that CinC Combined Fleet is exhorting the Task Force on the eve of starting operations, to do its utmost, and reiterating the basic objectives."

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No. 55

FROM: #619 29 April

Occupation Force Operation Order

#1:

FUMI MARU and ----- MARU will depart Rabaul X-7 day and rendezvous off Deboyne Islands with the Saipan Base Force scheduled to arrive Deboyne X-5 day.

No. 56

FROM: (Desron 6) #616 29 April
 TO : A desdiv.

RZP Occupation Force Operation Order #1:

This force having completed arrangements will depart Jaluit at 0600 on 30th, and proceed to Rabaul. Join us there.

The 14th Naval District Radio Intelligence Unit commented:

"The above apparently made Comdesron 6 the Commander of the Occupation Force."

APRIL 30, 1942

Traffic analysis continued to play an extremely important role as the month of April ended. Even without success in decryption of Japanese messages, sufficient warning could have been given our battle forces.

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: J. NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

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1 SEPT 1942

No. 57

FROM: COM 14 #300002 April, 1942
 TO : COMB.

(1) (#2 Bomber Group of #5 Air Attack Corps) in Rabaul, received a lot of traffic.

... (6) In locations are that the Chief of Staff, Submarine Force, is proceeding south from Truk.

It was noticed:

"Comsubfor was placed in the Truk area on the 28th."

No. 58

FROM: COM 14 #302330 April, 1942
 TO : COMB.

(1) Urgent messages increased and general traffic volume was higher; the majority originated in South Seas Area. 4th and 5th Air Attack included in the bulk of this area despatches with 4th Air Attack (by association Green Force and 5th Fleet), apparently designed for defensive mission while 5th Air Attack (New Britain Air Force) is implemented for offensive operations in conjunction with Lt. Fleet Task Force.

No. 59

FROM: COM 14 #302350 April, 1942
 TO : COMB.

... (2) Traffic addressed to Communication Officer, 6th Air Attack is observed going to Rabaul.

(3) 4th Fleet Command sent many (despatches) with same list addressees as past 3 days. Precedence, volume, addressees indicate imminent action in this area.

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 BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2020

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

Decrypted Japanese messages were always an important check on the accuracy of the traffic analysis predictions, as the following will indicate:

No. 60

FROM: (4th Fleet) #247

This despatch contained tactical calls assigned to the MO Force as follows:

<u>Tactical call</u>	<u>Service call</u>	<u>Unit</u>
-----	----- 7	Deboyne Detachment
-----	----- 4	Rodney Detachment
-----		Samarai Detachment

No. 61

FROM: (#5 Air Attack Force) #216 April 30
 Communication Officer)
 TO : Cardiv 5 Communication Officer
 Subron 8 Communication Officer
 INFO: (4th Fleet ---- Officer)

Please send communication orders to be used in the MO Campaign by the regular air service to IT on the 1st.

(Note: PT is identified as Truk).

MAY 1, 1942

No. 62

FROM: (Cinc 4th Fleet) #252
 TO : 4th Fleet
 Crudiv 5,
 #11 Air Fleet,
 #4 Air Attack Force
 #5 Air Attack Force
 Cardiv 5
 KAMEIWA MARU
 RYUKAKU (SHOHO)
 A desdiv

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

An air tender
 Air Force at Rabaul
 Rabaul Radio
 Consuifor
 Yokohama Air Group, and
 2 unidentified calls.

Despatch in 3 parts, partly readable.

Part 1: Mandates Force Operation Order #16, enter following in paragraph 6 of Mandates Force Communication Plan 13.

----- -- Enemy discovered.

(Remainder of part 1 and part 2 deal with organization frequency plan, etc.)

Part 3: Reference point designators changed as follows:

(In Irohani Syllabery)			
(I)	RRE	(TO)	RZF
(RO)	RXE	(TI)	REM
(HA)	RXB	(RI)	Saint George ?
(NI)	Deboyne	(NU)	Gasmata ?
(EC)	South Cape ?	(RU)	Cooktown ?
(HS)	Rodney	(WG)	Townsville.

The 14th Naval District Radio Intelligence Unit remarked:

"These addressees look like the MO Occupation Force. RRE not identified, but believed to be in the Solomons area."

Traffic analysis produced very valuable results before the action at Coral Sea. At this time it was noticed that, for better security of their plans, the Japanese were trying to disguise their radio calls. Changing their codes was another sign of coming action

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on the part of the Japanese.

No. 63

FROM: COM 14 #010233 May, 1942
 TO: COMB.

... (2) Chief of Staff Submarine Force and Combined Fleet, 11th Air Fleet and 4th, 5th, 6th Air Attack are included in Mandate traffic.

It was noted:

"On 30 April, traffic analysis indicated Chief of Staff Subfor was proceeding south from Truk."

No. 64

FROM: COM 14 #012122 May, 1942
 TO: COMB.

... (5) The use of radio station calls to conceal originator increasing daily.
 Comorudiv 5 and ELORAKU using Truk Radio on 30th; Comorudiv 5 using Rabaul Radio.

No. 65

FROM: COM 14 #012124 May, 1942
 TO: COMB.

(1) 4th Fleet Area continued to be the center of activity with traffic worthy of high precedence. Increase noted in 4 Kana tactical system using Kana numeral Kana calls. 2 Kana calls changed at midnight, Jaluit shifted from HI 50 to HO HI.

No. 66

FROM: COM 14 #012126 May, 1942
 TO: COMB.

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: [initials] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

(1) Rabaul Radio originated despatch presumably for another party to CINC 4th, 5th Air Attack Corps, Comerudiv 18 (?) and unidentified info to Subron 7 and 8th Base Force.

Comment was made:

"Comerudiv 18 - this force was believed by traffic analysis in Rabaul Area since March 19 but has not appeared in traffic since April 9th. 8th Base Force is located in Rabaul Area. All others were associated with Rabaul previously."

"...(3) One indication that 6th Air Attack Corps was represented in Saipan."

Warning was given:

"Has been indicated in several different widely separated areas."

At this time, May 1st, the 14th Naval District Combat Section of Radio Intelligence made the following evaluation of the picture in the southwestern Pacific area:

No. 67

FROM: COM 14 #011108 May 1, 1942
 011112
 011132
 011136
 011138

...(c) MC Campaign now underway; involves Southeast New Guinea and Louisiade Archipelago; suggest Moresby for MC. Forces engaged will consist of Comdiv 5; Crudiv 5 less LCI; Crudiv 18 available; Desron 6 available; Gunboat Div. 8 (now called 19th Division); New Britain Air which is known as 15 Air Attack Force and consists of TAINAN Air Group; 4th Air Corps, and Yokohama Air

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 BY: [signature] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
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Group; first two land bombers and fighters,
last one consists of seaplanes. Total strength
of shore based air planes estimated at 65
bombers, 10 VP's and unknown number of
fighters. Air tenders, transports, plus
probably 1 Subron, and HYUNANU also in force.
 Crudiv 5 and Cinc Fourth Fleet in Rabaul
 region tonight. Light forces en route to
 operation area. Despite message giving
Townsville as reference point, do not believe
Australia is involved in near future except
for submarine operations. Cinc 4th Fleet
is in immediate command of this force.

(d) Deleting units in home yards,
 following forces now available for other
 offensive or defensive tasks; Batdiv 1 and
 2, Crudivs 4 and 6, KAGA, SORYU (other
 carriers in yard on a 2 or 3 day sailing
 orders basis) and unknown number of destroyers.

Various Radio Intelligence stations
 have recently exhibited interest in Aleutians.
 Best indicator of future operations is Tokyo
 Office which assigns place name designators.
Last January this office listed places in
Aleutians indicating they were areas of
forthcoming operations. Therefore second
choice for operations of available forces
is raid on Aleutians. This is considered
unlikely at this time, but is certainly
probable at a later date. Cinc 2nd Fleet
will command available forces.

MAY 2, 1942

The date for the opening of the Japanese
 operations was rapidly approaching, as the following
 decrypted Japanese dispatches testify:

No. 68

FROM: #5 Attack Force # ? 2 May

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 BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

Tomorrow the 3rd we will have 10 fighters for use; judging from present expenditures, we will require replenishment of 9 type of fighters which are scheduled to be supplied by ----- for no operations. Please accomplish ferrying of these planes to Hawaii tomorrow.

No. 69

#841 2 May

FROM: (MO Striking Force)

Because of bad weather, the ferrying of 10 aircraft to RR has been postponed until the 3rd. (2) the first supply point (Point A?) has been changed to 4° 0' and -----° 0' East, and the time to 0500 on the 4th. (3) From the first supply point, the ferry planes will proceed between Solomon Islands and 2 other islands (in the same Archipelago), on the 7th, will ----- and the air group at a point about 50 miles or less, ----- direction from RR, and on the 8th will ----- the 2nd supply point. (4) The ----- at the 2nd supply point, and thereafter will be in accordance with the MO Striking Force Serial -----.


MAY 3, 1942

Traffic analysis gave notice that more units were being added to the strength of the attacking force.

No. 70

FROM: COM 14 #030002 May, 1942
 TO: COMB.

... (2) Commander of Dutch Indies Fleet again active. Traffic indications are that his force may be split into two commands for operation with 4th Fleet.



ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

It was observed:

"4th Fleet Commander believed in command of forces in New Britain - Rabaul - Truk Area for MO Campaign."

(3) Again greater part of 4th Fleet traffic has to do with 4th and 5th Air Attack Corps.

(4) Rabaul Radio guard list contains many miscellaneous calls representing several Marus, 82nd Guard Force, a desdiv 34 unit, 5th Air Attack Corps, Tainan Air, and many unidentified calls.

Comment: "These units are forces under the CinC 4th Fleet now placed in New Britain Area and expected to operate in MO Campaign."

No. 71

FROM: COM 14 #030012 May, 1942
TO: COMB.

... (2) A battleship of Batdiv 3, sent priority to his division commander, CinC 4th and First Air Fleet plus 2 unidentified and From this one dispatch it appears that this ship may operate with carriers in Mandate or Rabaul area.

The remark was made:

KONGCO. is either the HIYEI or is in CinC 2nd Fleet."

(3) Another tentative battleship sent several high precedence messages. This is one indication operations in Marshalls and Sixth Base Force, Jaluit was addressed for action, info Chief of Staff Combined, Subfor and 4th Fleet. This vessel may now be in Truk.

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

It was stated:

"The call has been followed through from the old calls in which the stations agreed it was either a cruiser or battleship. So far no positive identification has been received. in his serial #033 indicated he would leave Kure for ----- 20 April, which allows him time enough to arrive in the Truk Area."

No. 72

FROM: CCM 14 #030016 May, 1942
 TO: COMB.

(2) Cardiv 5 is expected to proceed to Rabaul Area soon as indicated by traffic between it and 5th Air Attack.

(4) Submarine traffic high. Subron 7 appears to be enroute Mandates although 3 units are at Kure.

It was indicated:

"Most of Subron 8 went south to Truk Area with Commander Submarine Force, who arrived in Truk area April 22, 1942 and has had recent traffic with both Subron 7 and 8 as sole addressees.

The orders for the Japanese were disclosed in the next message.

No. 73

FROM: #847 about 3 May

If the enemy Striking Force is determined to be in -----, the MO Striking Force will operate as follows:

Pass (north northeast ?) of RA, thence south; at 0600 on 5 May, after arrival at

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1 SEPT 1942

-----, proceed in accordance with further orders. If no further orders received, proceed to RAB. If plane search is required in southern and ----- sectors, Comcardiv 5 will send carrier bombers to RAB at dawn. ----- will proceed to RAB after taking on stores.

It was suggested:

"Believe RX is Bougainville;
 RAB is Tulagi."

In an attempt to protect their homeland, weakened because so much strength was being thrown into the Moresby Campaign, the Japanese began to practice deception measures. Fortunately, Radio Intelligence read the very message, which was to initiate the false calls. Here it is:

No. 74

FROM: Cinc Combined Fleet #964 3 May
 TO : All Major Commands.

Combined Fleet Operation Order #20:

As a defense of another enemy Striking Force attack on Tokyo Area, the (air unit of the 5th Fleet) ----- unit, #6 Air Attack Force, and Naval Radio net will, until ----- date, carry out the following:

Carry out radio deception measures in sectors where no important units are present; address to eastern ----- deceptive messages indicating that we have a large number of planes patrolling. Certain ships (equipped for this work) are hereby assigned to COMR. -----.

May 4,
1942

Constant vigilance in intercepting enemy messages was continued. Even those which could not be read completely, or had little information in

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 BY: [signature] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
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them, were valuable in that they provided associations of units. Thus, the organization of the Japanese Striking Force became known from such traffic analysis.

No. 75

FROM: #040024 May, 1942

(3) (suspected Cardiv call) addressed his command and 4th Fleet Task Force, Info: suffix 12 4th Fleet less 3rd, 5th and 6th Base Forces, 5th Air Attack, 11th Air Fleet.

It was pointed out:

"The 4th Fleet collective call included the following:

- Base Force #3 at Palao
- Base Force #4 at Truk
- Base Force #5 at Saipan
- Base Force #6 at Jaluit
- Base Force #8 at Rabaul"

(4) Gunboat Div. 8 addressed #6 Base Force, Info: unidentified

No. 76

FROM: COM 14 #042304 May, 1942
 TO : COMB.

(1) Commander Submarine Force is in Jaluit area.

It was observed:

"Prior to May 3 he was in Truk area."

No. 77

FROM: COM 14 #042308 May, 1942
 TO : COMB

(1) Comcardiv 5 also used Rabaul

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 BY: [initials] NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

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Radio call in originating traffic, this is taken to mean that these vessels are in New Britain area.

It was explained:

"Cardiv 5 plus KASUGA MARU, RYUKAKU, and KAMIGAWA MARU believed in Mandates. Cardiv 5 has been using Truk Radio since April 27."

(2) Marshalls concentration appears at present constituted of Air and Submarine Units. Suspected battleship looks like submarine unit or flagship.

It was noted:

"April 28, 14th Naval District Radio Intelligence reported believed to be battleship, sends traffic routed Truk to Tokyo. serial #036 -

"This ship is scheduled to depart Truk for PO (Oruluk) at 1200 (-9) May 3. Request as strict a guard as possible be maintained on our arrival."

"This message suggests that is a battleship or some large ship."

Decryption of Japanese messages again brought much of value. Information as to direction of attack, the probable time of attack, and the strength of an important air unit were gleaned from the following:

No. 78

FROM: Rabaul Radio #306 May 4 ?
 Cine 4th Fleet
 TO: Comcrdiv 5
 Comcardiv 5.

From Cine 4th Fleet:

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 AUTHORITY BY: [Signature] NARA DATE: 1/1/2020

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

In order to wipe out enemy air bases in the RZF area, the MO Striking Force will launch attacks from a southeasterly direction (direction not certain, but looks like easterly or southerly in other traffic) on bases in Moresby area on X-3 day and X-2 day. This order is in effect until its successful completion. Commence preparations.

14th Naval District Radio Intelligence commented:

"Best estimate here of X-day is 10 May, based on previous messages saying that Division 19 was leaving Marshalls X-7 day and going to Deboyne X-5."

No. 79

FROM: COM 14 040842 May, 1942
 TO : COMB.

In a very long message detailing battle results for the month of April, 5th Air Attack Force, serial #226 says, toward end, as follows:

"Our losses and planes expended total 34 including crashes of 6 type Zero fighters, 4 bombers (3 accidentally), 1 pilot killed in Zero fighter (remainder of losses were badly or lightly damaged planes).

	<u>On hand (Requirements)</u>	<u>Under Repair</u>	<u>Personnel Required</u>
Fighters	16	6	30
Heavy Bombers	17	11	24
Flying boats	14	2	13
Bombers	0	5	Blank*
		(3 enroute)	

It was observed;

"5th Air Attack Force is operating from Rabaul."

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: D NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

MAY 5
1942

Continuing to intercept and decipher Japanese messages, as the campaign began to get underway, Radio Intelligence learned what follows here:

No. 80

FROM: #5 Air Attack Force #278 5 May

#5 Air Attack Force Battle Report #26 of 5 May:

9 type # fighters patrolled the port of concentration of the RZP invasion force convoy from 0600 to 1100. Nothing occurred. Patrolled sectors D, F, and C, between 166 and 190 degrees, distance 400. No results except hearing 2 submarines. Visibility about 40 miles. Patrolled area around Rabaul and between Rabaul and RZP. No results.

No. 81

FROM: Rabaul Radio #118 5 May
 From: Commander MO Occupation Force.
 To : Cardiv 5 (among others, unidentified)

The gist of this message is that on 5 May at 0600, the MO Occupation Force is to be in the following position:

8° South, 155° East, speed 23 knots, course 300; destroyers and SHOKAKU will do something in connection with the RZP Occupation Force. Cardiv 5 will take position at 1000 on 5th.

May 6,
1942

No. 82

FROM: Rabaul Radio #124
 From: MO Occupation Force.
 To : Crudiv 6.

Operation Order #9.

The RZP Occupation Force will leave

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 BY: [signature] NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

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Emerald at 1600 on 7th for -----. The MO
Occupation Force will rendezvous with the
----- Occupation Force at 1400 on ctn at
09° 30' South, 154° 15' East; speed 16. At
1800 on 7 May, ----- will move south of
Emerald.

No. 83

FROM: Rabaul Radio #129 6 May
 TO :

(Cinc 4th Fleet)

After departure ----- in accordance with secret despatch order #11, you are to search for the enemy force as follows:

(Text is garbled, but indicates that the search is to be made with Rossell Island as a center).

Analysis of Japanese traffic disclosed some interesting information, as the subsequent dispatches indicate:

No. 84

FROM: CCM 14 #060132 May, 1942
 TO : COMB.

Routine message.

It was commented:

"It is apparent that methods of radio deception are being inaugurated throughout the Fleet. Outstanding is increasing use by Commander of calls other than their own when originating despatches."

No. 85

FROM: COM 14 #060202 May, 1942
 TO : COMB.

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 BY: [signature] NARA DATE: 1/11/2020

ORIGINAL
 SEPT 1942

... (5) Cine 4th is in Rabaul and uses that station's numbers. He is believed to be in charge of forthcoming operations.

No. 86

FROM: COM 14 #062248 May, 1942
 TO : COMB

(8) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, RYUKAKU are in southeast, with KASUGA MARU believed enroute.

It was noted:

"The KASUGA MARU will arrive Kuka Island, Queen Carola Harbor, at 1500 (-9) on 7 May."

From the next deciphered message Radio Intelligence was able to inform our fighting forces, that the Japanese had sighted them from the air. Both sides now moved swiftly into action.

No. 87

FROM: COM 14 #062308 May, 1942
 TO : COMB.

(1) Following are apparent plane contacts reports from 0810 (-9) to 0835 (-9) on 6 May:

(plane call) reported in very abbreviated procedure, interspersed with groups (believed to be plane contact code), what appeared to be the sighting of 1 carrier, 1 battleship, (unguessed), (5 destroyers ?), course 190, speed 20 knots.

Traffic analysis also indicated that the Japanese were now completely aware of the fact that their MO Campaign was not to be the surprise they had

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anticipated.

No. 88

FROM: COM 14 4062312 May 6
 TO : COMB.

(4) Contact report produced a heavy volume of urgent despatches from Cinc 4th Fleet and air units in the Marshalls and New Britain Areas, plus heavy submarine traffic addressed to eastern area submarines.

May 7,
1942

No. 89

FROM: COM 14 4070246 May, 1942
 TO : COMB.

Japanese reporting contact with enemy, mentioning enemy speed, Tulagi and Gannata.

No. 90

FROM: 4072302 May, 1942

(1) Intense activity, with large number of plain text despatches. Contact report and tactical system begun at 0558 (-9), decreased after 1730 (-9). This heavy traffic is all connected with sighting U.S. Operating forces in general New Britain-Solomon Islands area. One productive channel was 31.6 megacycles, using plain language between planes and surface ships. Although identification of surface units is not definite, SIKIYU appeared likely as one of them. Aircraft homing channel used by carrier SISO was 7035 kilocycles.

May 8,
1942

Tokyo was issuing bulletins on the progress of the engagement on May 8, and, naturally, picked out

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 REF ID: A66222
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL

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some cheering news for its Japanese listeners:

No. 91

FROM: COM 14 #080524 May, 1942
 TO : COMB.

Tokyo Radio broadcasted plain language dispatches.

(1) 6th Division and an enemy Striking Force are now fighting; originated by at 1045 (-9).

(2) In addition to sinking 1 carrier, we are sure that there were 3 hits on one other, 0920 (-9) position 14° 08' South, 155° 50' approximate speed 16; originated by Commander Striking Force at 1100 (-9).

May 9, 1942

A lull in the Japanese radio activity now occurred, and U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence summarized a few of its observations :

No. 92

FROM: COM 14 #092142 May, 1942
 TO : COMB.

(1) Lack of plain language contact reports from Coral Sea Area believed to be an indication of at least temporary cessation from active operations.

(3) Rabaul Radio was used as cover-up for majority of units involved in southeastern area, with SHOKAKU, appearing under Truk radio call, originating a series of dispatches which may mean her imminent return to Truk Area enroute to Empire ?

It was remarked:

"SHOKAKU is believed to be enroute north with destroyer escort."

(4) No traffic to or from RYUKAKU.

It was observed:

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

"Last reported operating in the Solomon Island area."

No better indication of the need for the constant alertness can be found, than in the next message. The Battle of Coral Sea had barely finished, when Japanese preparations for another campaign were in progress. As a matter of fact, they had been going on for some time.

No. 93

FROM: BELLCOMMEN. #090720 May, 1942
 TO : COMB.

...MARU (aerological ship -)
continues reporting weather from northern area, and indications are that she is gathering weather information, probably for future projected operations.

Radio Intelligence stated:

"This comment probably comes from Cinc 2nd's recent orders for charts of the Aleutian Islands."

The U.S. Navy was already celebrating another of its great victories, when the Japanese decided that they had suffered enough punishment. An official order was issued to "postpone" the planned occupation:

No. 94

FROM: (Combined Fleet) #72 May 10
 Combined Fleet Operation Order No. (near 150), postpone RZP (Moresby) Occupation till ----.

No. 95

FROM: (Rabaul) #450 May 10
 Request urgent dispatch approval

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 2

DECLASSIFIED	
REF ID: A66222	
AUTHORITY	DATE: 11/1/2000
BY: [initials]	NARA

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

of my action in postponing the occupation of RMP (Moresby) because of the necessity of eliminating the enemy forces.

Still more cheering news was discovered in the following decrypted messages. Stopping the Japanese at Coral Sea was marvelous, but getting rid of some of their irreplaceable plane carriers was tremendously important for the success of future U.S. Navy operations.

No. 96

FROM: (Reboul Radio) 2481 May ?

Part 3. Our losses: NYUZAKU, sunk (hit by 7 torpedoes and 13 bombs), 22 aviation personnel made forced landings; eighty of these were injured (6 seriously, 64 minor); others went down with the ship.

SEKIFUKU: ----- hits, 3 and 8; damage to gasoline storage, engine rooms, et cetera; (some blanks here); 94 killed, including 4 officers; 96 seriously injured, ----- number of minor injuries.

Thus, the dispatches of U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence came to a gloss concerning the epic events of Coral Sea. No less an authority than General MacArthur deemed this victory the real safeguard of Australian independence. It takes nothing from the achievements of the fleets of the U.S. Navy at Coral Sea to say that they had been brought to the right spot, at exactly the right time, by the work of Radio Intelligence.

For after all, the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence, as well as the rest of the Navy, had a score to settle with

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AUTHORITY
BY <u>D</u> NARA DATE: <u>1/1/2000</u>

ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942

the Japanese. Only a few days before, from the badly battered station at Cavite, came the messages which follow:

No. 97

FROM: CAVITE #060125 May 6, 1942
TO : CCM 14
OPNAV

Our few remaining ships are being sunk x Now destroying all registered publications and military equipment x 172 officers and 2126 men of the Navy sent last expression of loyalty and devotion to country to families and to friends x Going off the air x Captain Koeffel.

No. 98

FROM: NPO
TO : COM 14
OPNAV

Going off air. Good Luck and Goodbye. Callahan and McCoy.

Coral Sea helped to pay off some of the score, and Midway was to aid further.

But had it not been for some excellent foresight, the whole Radio Intelligence unit at Cavite would have been in the hands of the Japanese. Some of the best men in the organization were there, and their loss would have crippled operations badly. Furthermore, capture by the Japanese might have entailed disclosure of some of the most important methods of Radio Intelligence, and this would have warned the Japanese to change their

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 BY D NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

codes. Had this happened, Coral Sea and Midway would have ended much differently. Thus, as early as January 23, 1942, the question was raised of removing the 76 highly trained members of the Radio Intelligence unit at Corregidor.

No. 99

FROM: COMINCH
 TO : CINFOAF
 INFO: OPNAV
 COMSIXTEEN

Jan. 31, 1942
 011500

communication intelligence organization under your command is of such importance to successful prosecution of war in Far East that special effort should be made to preserve its continuity. Suggest consideration partial evacuation Fort Mills unit to establish new CI Unit at Dutch or Australian base. See OPNAV 111750 confidential. Dept will initiate shipment receivers and other equipment as recommended.

Four officers and 13 men were removed by submarine on February 5, 1942, and after a hazardous journey reached Java, only to be shelled out of there. Eventually they arrived in Australia in another submarine. Many, however, still remained in Cavite. It was essential that this personnel not fall into the hands of the enemy, and for this reason, the next message was dispatched:

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REF ID: A66762	
AUTHORITY	
BY: D	NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

men ate with one eye for food and one for planes, with both ears cocked for shells. During actual shelling they carried the filled plates inside the tunnel, but if the fire was on Hughes, Frank or Drum, it seemed more sporting to stay out and bet on the overs and shorts. On March 24 the Japanese began their big push, and bombing raids twenty-four hours a day were the result, with the power and water supply going out immediately. Everything from then on was improvised, when the Japanese shells and bombs would permit.

Word now came that the unit would be evacuated in the submarine, U.S.S. SNAPPER, which was scheduled to return direct to Fremantle. Preparations were made to leave, the gear stowed away for transportation, when a hurry call came to have all hands ready to leave without any gear in fifteen minutes. Midst the firing of their own batteries and the booming of Japanese guns, the Radio Intelligence group embarked in a small boat, and went looking for the submarine in the dark. Finally, the SEADRAGON instead of the SNAPPER was found, for the fall of Bataan had forced a change in schedule. Then began the eventful journey. The SEADRAGON sighted a Japanese submarine, released three torpedoes, and then dived to three hundred feet. Down came the depth charges,

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REF ID: A66222
AUTHORITY
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ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942

but nothing was damaged. However, the alarm had been given, and so everytime an attempt was made to surface during the night, Japanese destroyers were in the vicinity. Eventually, luck was with them, and they escaped the dragnet to land in Freazantle on April 26. This unit has played a big role in the work of Radio Intelligence since then.

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7ND 997622
AUTHORITY
BY NARA DATE 1/1/2000

100-107100-1000
MIDY

DECLASSIFIED
REF 997622
AUTHORITY
BY <u>D</u> NARA DATE <u>1/1/2020</u>

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Appendix IIIThe Battle of Midway.

The Battle of Coral Sea had not yet begun, when the presence of a new danger in another area was noted. And as the messages continued to be intercepted and read, the importance of the movement manifested itself. Though the Japanese had been planning to change their code for some time, full arrangements had not yet been completed. This delay offered a splendid opportunity, which was used to the utmost advantage till May 28th. Then, the enemy code was finally replaced, and so during the action of Midway, the messages of the Japanese forces could not be read.

To follow the story of the preparations for Midway more easily through the many details, the messages have been arranged in chronological order. Thus, the evidence, which permitted Radio Intelligence officers to outline in such perfect detail the enemy's plans for an attack on Midway,

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may be observed. For sake of reference, the messages will be numbered thus: No. 1, etc. Identifications of Japanese units are placed in parentheses, e.g., (Cardiv 1).

Here are some messages which show the intention of the Japanese to change the code long before May 28:

No. 1

FROM: COM16 #261805 Feb. 1942
 TO: CINCPAC
 COM14
 OPNAV

... Following

From: Tokyo Communication Officer
 To: Chief of Staff all First and Second Class Naval Stations and all flagships.

"Desire naval code Dog One and General Cipher No. 9 or 10(?) should be placed in effect from date"

It was noted:

"Believe date should be twentyeight February or one March x"

No. 2

FROM: COM16 #271522 Feb. 1942
 TO: OPNAV
 CINCAF

In connection with code mentioned in my (#261805) confirmation of date as one March and cipher table as number nine comes

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 BY D NARA DATE 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

in message from 14th Air Group
 who states he does not have subject cipher
 and requests same x

Another message reported the imminent
 change of Japanese aircraft calls:

MARCH, 1942

No. 3

FROM: COM16 #161423 March 1942
 TO: OPNAV
 COMINCH
 CINCPCAC
 COM14
 COMSOWESPAC

... (2) Indications from Tokyo
 Communication Office despatch of 15th
 are that new calls for aircraft activities
 are to go into effect at midnight on date
 questionably recovered as 1 April or 31
 March.

It was noted:

"In the past call changes have been
 placed in effect at ~~0000~~ on the 1st of the
 month."

As early as March 4, 1942, the area "AF"
 in Japanese codes was identified as Midway. Though no
 mention of a Midway campaign was seen till two months
 later, the early identification of this symbol was
 most valuable.

No. 4

FROM: OPNAV March (4) 1942
 TO: COMINCH
 Com14 040919

DECLASSIFIED
 REF 997022
 AUTHORITY
 BY [] NARA DATE 11/20/00

RIP 87Z

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

... This dispatch seems to indicate that areas AF and AFH are in the vicinity of Hawaiian Islands.

A significant message, foretelling future operations of an uncertain nature, was this:

No. 5

FROM: COM16 #091400 Mar. 9, 1942
 TO: COM14
 CINCPAC
 OPNAV
 COMINCH
 COMSOWESPAC

Decryption Intelligence

... (3) 1st Air Attack Force in discussing air operations with 5th Fleet gives impression these two units arranging as yet unknown operations northern sector involving close coordination sea and air activities. Same forces involved in Bali-Java attack. Appear to be replenishments and upkeep schedules 9 to 19 March staying at Kendari and Makassar City areas.

Radio Intelligence remarked:

"If this impression is correct it may indicate possible operations against Aleutian Islands with air and sea forces."

MAY 2, 1942

The first existence of a Japanese Striking Force was noted in a dispatch:

No. 6

#239 2 May
 FROM: Chief of Staff, 2nd Fleet
 TO: #5 Base Force, Saipan
 INFO: Chief of Staff #1 Air Fleet
 Chief of Staff 4th Fleet

DECLASSIFIED
XND 997822
AUTHORITY
BY [] NARA DATE: 11/20/00

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

As the 'A' Force and Striking Force
will be in Truk for a period of about 2
weeks after 20 June, please arrange for
----- and designate the anchorages.

(Note: The originator then mentions the
anchorages to be used, and requests
patrols of destroyers and patrol
boats.)

MAY 4, 1942

On 4 May, a dispatch was intercepted:

No. 7

FROM: # ? May 4
TO: CinC 1st Fleet
Combatdiv 3.

Partially translated as

This ship will be undergoing
repairs during the time of the said
campaign. Work has already been started
on ----- . The date of completion being
(near 21 May), will be unable to accompany
you in the campaign.

This message apparently indicated that the
forces involved in the approaching campaign would be
underway about 21 May. Their moving to Truk, as
suggested in No. 1, would probably be after the
initial phase of the campaign.

MAY 5, 1942

On 5 May, another dispatch revealed more
information:

264

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 8

FROM: CinC Combined Fleet #977 May 5
 TO: Tokyo

For current scheduled operations,
 expedite delivery of fueling hose as
 follows:

<u>For</u>	<u>4½ meter lengths</u>	<u>12 meter lengths</u>
Crudiv 4	0	5
Crudiv 7	0	5
Desron 4	8	5
Desron. or Desdiv 8	8	5

This message was originated by the Imperial
 Headquarters, and fueling at sea is suggested.

MAY 6, 1942

An indication of the forces to be employed
 in the operations was given in the following:

No. 9

FROM: #1 Air Fleet # ? 6 May/1400
 TO:

Cardiv 5

Iwakuni Air Station

Because of the necessity for
 completing preparations for -----
 operations, transfer, replacement person-
 nel for this fleet direct to indicated
 bases at once:

For AKAGI and SHOKAKU to Kagoshima Base
 For KAGA, ZUIKAKA, and SORYU, to ----- Base

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: J NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

CONFIDENTIAL
 1 SEPT 1942

For RYUJO, HIRYU, -----
 For RYUKAKU, as ordered by her commanding officer.

A detail of the plans was revealed in a dispatch:

No. 10

FROM: 2nd Fleet #595 6 May

Correct 2nd Fleet Operation Order #20 as follows:

Change 5 motor boats to 2
 Change date to 8 May.

As early as May 6 there was indication that the Japanese were considering operations in the Hawaiian area, and about a week later Midway was discovered to be the first objective in that area. The next two dispatches, though rather insignificant in themselves, furnished the clue. The frequencies mentioned were unusual for the employment indicated and aroused interest, as did the reference to the second K campaign. The first K campaign had turned out to be a planned bombing raid of a few Japanese planes over Pearl Harbor on March 5. Evidently, then, K referred to Hawaii, and thereafter, the second K campaign was connected with the AF campaign.

No. 10 (a)

FROM: COM 14 #060526 May 6, 1942
 TO : COMINCH
 CINCPAC
 BELLCONNEN
 OPNAV
 COMANZAC
 COM 16

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

#333

Request we be supplied 10 crystals for frequencies 4990 and 8990 kilocycles for use in aircraft in the second "K" campaign. Above to reach this headquarters (Kwajalein) prior to 17th.

It was noted:

"The K campaign concerned offensive operations March 5 against Oahu and possibly other points. Com 14 021120 March, and Com 14 040919 are concerned with this campaign or units that were involved in it. HORO 2 is the 4th Air Attack Force."

The answer to the above request came a few days later, and elicited another comment that K was Hawaii.

No. 10 (b)

FROM: COM 14 #110025 May 11, 1942
 TO : OPNAV
 COMINCH
 CINCPAC
 BELLOONWEE
 COMAFZAS
 COM 16

(4th Air Attack Force) #362 of May 10

Your serial 644 (dear), request that the crystals for use in the K operations be forwarded via plane leaving Yokosuka Air on 12th (delivery to be made at Inieji).

It was observed:

"This is apparently a follow-up of 4th Air Attack Force, Serial 333 (Com 14 060526) ordering 10 crystals for frequencies 4990 and 8990 kcs. for use in 2nd K (Hawaii) campaign to be delivered at Kwajalein prior to 17th."

~~MAY 7, 1942~~

256 (a)

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 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

MAY 7, 1942

The tactics to be employed were revealed

as follows:

No. 11

FROM: Cinc #1 Air Fleet #284 May 7

The program for the aviation conference of Commanders to be held at Kagoshima on 16 May is amended as follows:

- (1) The battle for air superiority;
- (2) The study of organizations for use in dive bombing, torpedo attacks, bombing, and strafing in the battle for wiping out local resistance;
- (3) Method of long range reconnaissance and base reconnaissance;
- (4) Methods of searching for enemy, areas of operations;
- (5) Operational methods;
- (6) Organization of air fleet aviation and fleet air units ashore and their training;
- (7) (Replacements ?);
- (8) Aircraft and equipment attached to men-of-war;
- (9) - - - -;
- (10) Strategy in general.

Order of speakers: Desron 7, Crudiv 8, Batdiv 3, Cardiv 2, and ----- unit.
 Order of Staff (or shore based units):
 Yokosuka Air Station, Bureau of Aeronautics,
 Yokosuka Aircraft Factory, ...

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

MAY 8, 1942

Another hint as to the date of commencement of the operations, involving carriers, appeared in a message:

No. 12

FROM: #599 8 May
TO: #1 Air Fleet

----- Desdiv will be required at Bako until 20 May and will be unable to participate in your forthcoming campaign. Please arrange for some other suitable shift.

Part of the Striking Force organization was learned in this:

No. 13

FROM: #010 8 May
TO : Desron 17
(One other unit less a cruiser)

In accordance with Commander Striking Force Operation Order #6, Screening destroyers are assigned as follows:

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: D. NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

Desdiv ----- to AKAGI; Desdiv ----- to HIEI, KONGC, and HIRYU. AKAGI departs Yokosuka 15 May, HIEI, KINGO, and HIRYU depart Sasebo 21 May. Comdesdiv ----- (Note: Same one that will screen HIRYU) in company with ----- depart Yokosuka 17 May, rendezvous with 3 units. Rendezvous at (place near Yokosuka) and on 18th proceed Sasebo operating offensively against submarines enroute.

MAY 11, 1942

The first dispatch to reveal the movements of the campaign forces was one which read:

No. 14

FROM: CinC 2nd Fleet #618 11 May
 TO: Collective 2nd Fleet
 INFO: CinC 4th Fleet
 CinC 11th Air Fleet
 Saipan
 CinC Combined Fleet
 Comdr. #6 Air Attack Force
 Maru -----
 Captain Misaka at Kure

2nd Fleet Operation Order #22:

1. 2nd Fleet units ----- and -----; the 11th and 12th (Air or Landing Force) of the 2nd Fleet; #2 Occupation Force, will be under command of ----- for ----- May. This force will proceed direct to the Saipan-Guam area and wait for the forthcoming campaign.

2. Comdr. 2nd Air (in 3rd Fleet) will confer with Comdr. 11th (Air or Landing Force), #2 Combined Landing Force, #6 Air Attack Force, and Hitosugi Army Detachment respectively, about communications between Saipan and the mainland. Airron 23, 11th and 12th (Air or Landing Force) will be at ----- after tomorrow.

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

26th Air base facilities will be on -----
 ship. Hitosugi Detachment is in the
 (Mandates).

3. Comdr. 2nd Air will arrange with the
 5th Base Force at Saipan for anchorages for
 the ships of his units. Airron 23 should
 deal with Comdr. Minron 1 for his anchorage."

This did not yet reveal the objective of
 the campaign. Another detailed order was sent on the
 same day:

No. 15

FROM: (Comdesron 1) #40 May 11
 TO: CinC 1st Fleet
 INFO: CofS Combined
 C of S 5th Fleet
 Comcardiv 3
 Unidentified
 2 Desdivs
 Combatdiv 3

Operations schedule for this unit
 (less Desdiv ----- and Desdiv -----) is
 as follows:

1. This unit less units mentioned above
 will depart Sasebo between 18 and 20 May,
 and will be ----- on ----- May where
 Desdiv ----- (less 1 DD) will join up.
 From there we will depart for the scene of
 forthcoming operations.

2. Desdiv ----- will screen Cardiv 3 as
 far as the operations area.

3. Desdiv ----- (less DD) will depart
 Sasebo on ----- May and screen HIEI as far
 as ----- Shima Channel.

4. Departing Sasebo May 26 (discrepancy
 of dates here) and proceed to the operations
 area.

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 BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

The 14th Naval District U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence commented:

"Note inclusion of Combatdiv 3. He has been recently connected with Cardivs 1 and 2 who do not appear. This may be a local movement within the Empire but is believed connected with the projected operations mentioned previously by us. Recent air operations and critique in KYUSKU may have been rehearsal."

A significant message was sent on May 11th.

No. 16

FROM: CinC 2nd Fleet #618 May 11
 TO: Collective 2nd Fleet
 INFO: Cinc 4th Fleet
 Cinc 11th Air Fleet
 Saipan
 Cinc Combined Fleet
 Comdr #6 Air Attack Force
 Maru
 Captain Misaka at Kure Headquarters.

Commander 2nd Air Fleet will arrange with the 5th Base Force at Saipan for anchorages for the ships of his units.

Radio Intelligence commented on May 14th:

"The 14th Naval District Intelligence Unit considered the absence of Cardivs 1 and 2, and Batdivs 1 and 2 as indicated herein important. They suggested the possibility that the message referred to the same campaign mentioned already, because it was not likely the Japanese were merely carrying out a drill in the Saipan area."

MAY 12, 1942

Arrangements for shipping ammunition and

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: O NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

supplies to Truk were made on May 11th, (YA MA, 2nd Fleet, #620), and on the 12th:

No. 17

FROM: (Cinc Combined) #108 May 12
 TO : Cinc 2nd and 4th.

We are now arranging for the military equipment, shells, and bombs which you will require at Truk during the forthcoming campaign

MAY 13, 1942

The first mention by the Japanese of the *intentional* objective of the forthcoming campaign was noted in a message of May 13th.

No. 18

FROM: (unidentified) #412 May 13
 TO : Chiefs of Staff Comb., 2nd, 4th Fleets and 11th Air Fleet.
 INFO: KAITICAMA MARU and unidentified
 and

Says the PS (Saipan) Force which is concerned in the occupation of MI (later identified as Midway) is scheduled to hold an operation conference on the 26th and to depart on the 27th. Therefore, the #5 SHIMA MARU and the ----- should arrive (PS) Saipan by 1200, 26th.

Though Radio Intelligence was not able to comment on this message until May 20th, it was already aware on May 15th what the Japanese objective would be.

The objective (Midway) of the Japanese Striking Force became somewhat clearer after the following messages were deciphered:

DECLASSIFIED
 REF 997022
 AUTHORITY
 BY: J NARA DATE: 1/11/2020

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

No. 19

FROM: #459 May 13
 TO: ?

Request this ship be supplied with the following charts and send them to 4th Fleet at Saipan to hold for us.

- Chart 2002 - (not listed)
- Chart 2011 - (Niikau to Oahu)
- Chart 2012 - (Oahu to Hawaii)
- Chart 2013 - (Hawaii)
- Chart 2015 - (Pearl Harbor)
- Chart 2016 - (Oahu)
- Chart 2018 - (Seward Anchorage and Wells Bay)
- Chart 2020 - (Western Hawaiian Group Chart #2)

No. 20

FROM: #713 May 13
 TO: ?

Only partly readable; says: send following as soon as possible by airmail to headquarters at #5 Base Force, Saipan: 500 copies of northern -----; something about American weather; something about Hawaiian Area Publications.

More details of the campaign were unfolded

in this message:

No. 21

FROM: (4th Air Attack Force) #422 May 13
 TO: 4th Air Attack Corps
 INFO: Cine 11th Air Fleet, Comdr. 4th Air Attack Corps

The following is schedule of GOSHU MARU - -
 Put ashore at Imieji all the freight on board and load air hose equipment and munitions of the IMIEJI (seaplane unit) and proceed to Saipan by Soneka. Inform me later of your contemplated movements with the Occupation Force.

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

The Third Air (a unit) will load its base equipment and ground crews and advance to AF ground crews. Parts and munitions will be loaded on the GOSHU MARU as soon as that vessel arrives. Everything in the way of base equipment and military supplies which will be needed in the K campaign will be included."

Mention of K campaign as connected with AF movement should be noted above. A change of date was also made at this time:

No. 22

FROM: (2nd Fleet) #634 May 13
 TO: (?)

2nd Fleet Operation Order -----.

In Basic Operation Order change date of departure from Saipan of ----- Unit and ----- Unit to (date recovered as in June and also as after 15 May) date.

Additional information as to enemy organization was gathered from the following:

No. 23


FROM: (2nd Fleet) #635 May 13th
 TO: ?

Organization list change 9, revise the ----- of the 4th Squadron (?) as follows making the following entries in regular order:

- A: ----- and Takao, second flight
- G: ATAGO
- D: Takao, effective May 12.

MAY 14, 1942

Messages #283, May 13 and #160, May 14



ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

asked for delivery of 30 aircraft bombs for each ship of Combat Division 3, which indicated future air activity.

MAY 15, 1942

Commenting on a routine message, #384, May 15, U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence reported that Cinc 2nd Fleet had lately been associated with CarDivs 1 and 2, and BatDiv 3, numerous destroyer units, Marus and auxiliaries, and suggested that "these might comprise a Striking Force to the Southward or towards Hawaii." This warning was given three weeks before the Battle of Midway.

A message on May 15th from ME NU 5, (14 Airron ?) #257, which ordered quantities of stores and equipment for AF (Midway) brought the comment from Radio Intelligence (May 22):

"All indications are that the Japanese are making very detailed plans for the occupation of Midway, and also for equipment and use of the island after its occupation."

MAY 16, 1942

Plans for an important Japanese fleet problem were found in another message. Since the Japanese in the past had first practiced all occupying maneuvers, which they intended to make, this detailed organization schedule was of great value in appraising

274

DECLASSIFIED	
7ND 997822	
AUTHORITY	
BY: JS	NARA DATE: 11/20/20

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

the eventual arrangements of the enemy.

No. 24

FROM: (Unidentified) #147 May 16
4 parts

PHASE 1: Beginning 0800 on the 22nd (Emergency Organization) ----- will be used, limiting date for dispositions 20 (?) May, both 'A' and 'B' Fleets will have the mission of destroying the enemy forces on ----- date.

The 'B' Fleet (Cinc Combined Fleet) composed of main body less Cardiv 3 and a part of Base Air Force.

The 'A' Fleet (Cinc 2nd Fleet) Screening Force less (2nd Fleet Unit) and Occupation Force.

Point 'A' (an area within 20 kilometers with the center 30 kilometers bearing 150° from ----- Lighthouse.

Point 'B' (60 kilometers bearing 270° from Point A) these to be occupied not later than 21 May.

PHASE 2: Beginning at 1300 on 20, Fleet 'B' will search for and destroy Fleet 'A'.

Fleet A's mission will be to destroy Fleet B's Occupation Force, on the 22nd 'B' Fleet (Cinc Combined Fleet) main body, Occupation Forces, 'A' Fleet (Cinc 2nd or Cinc 1st Air Fleet) Striking Force less -----

Initial positions 'B' Fleet:
Main body at Point A, screen at Point B and Occupation Force at Point C, B Fleet at Point D (70 kilometers bearing 90° from Point C.)

Organization: Flagship of Batdiv 3 equals 2 ships of MUTSU class, 1 ship of Batdiv 3 equals 2 ships of same class,

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 REF ID: A66762
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 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

all units of Crudiv 8 equals 4 ships of same class, all destroyers of ----- division equals 4 ships of same class.

PHASE 3: All units training (in aerial combat, bombing, etc.), areas to be used (assigns various areas - unimportant.)

1st Air Fleet and 11th Air Fleet will institute anti-submarine patrols as follows: 1st Air Fleet, 20th, 21st and 22nd South of 30° North and East of 135° for approximately 150 kilometers. 11th Air Fleet on 22nd for approximately 100 kilometers from ----- to -----.

The 14th Naval District Radio Intelligence

Unit remarked:

"Note the absence of specific mention of Batdivs 1 and 2, Cardivs 1 and 2 and Crudivs except 8."

Radio Intelligence noted:

"Batdiv 3 just completed overhaul at Sasebo, and Crudiv 8 completed overhaul at Mazuru Navy Yard 15 May. It is believed these exercises will take place in Southern Empire Waters."

Another change in organization was observed on May 16th:

No. 25

FROM: (Combined Fleet) #152 May 16

Changes in organization list. Reference Combined Fleet # -----. In the assignment tables for the coming 'Joint Army-Navy Operations' strike the (tender or large MARU) from the Screening

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 1 SEPT 1942

Force Table and add it to the Detached Forces. The (same ship) task is changed as follows: Depart Kure on 23 May and load 5 torpedo boats at Jaluit and Wake. After (Combined Fleet or Force) and (1st Air Fleet ?) have returned to Japan, load ----- and upon the completion of the occupation of AF (Midway) transport it (or them) to that place.

Important data concerning air carriers was garnered from another May 16th dispatch. It gave the position at which Japanese planes would leave to attack:

No. 26

FROM: (Member of Staff, 1st Air Fleet) #385 May 16

Referring to 6th Communication Units #621, as we plan to make attacks from a general northwesterly direction from N-2 days to N day inclusive, please send weather three hours prior to take-off on the said day. Also, would like to be informed of enemy air activity or anything else which might be of importance. Reference to Combined Fleet #1 on the day of the attack we will endeavor to ----- at a point 50 miles NW of AF and move pilots off as quickly as possible.

MAY 17, 1942

As the Japanese messages to Hydrographic and Supply sections continued, it was evident the force was growing stronger each day.

No. 27

FROM: (unidentified) #775 May 17

Referring to 2nd Fleet #590 about requests Hydrographic Section (charts) for ----- degrees (except ----- and -----) be sent at once by air mail care of

DECLASSIFIED
 REF 947622
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 BY [] NARA DATE 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

5th Base Force (then located at Saipan.)

No. 28

FROM: (14th Airron ?) #277 May 17

Regarding the ammunition which was requested by us in our serial -----, that part which is destined for AF (Midway) should be sent to IMIEJI urgent.

More strength was added to the Japanese forces in the Midway area on May 17th.

No. 29

FROM: (Combined Fleet) #158 May 17

Combined Fleet, serial 148, Crudiv 5 less NACHI and (Desdiv in Desron 1) are detached from South Seas Force and assigned to 2nd Fleet and Northern Force respectively. The Desdiv will be under command of Comcrudiv 5 until departure Crudiv 5 to Japan.

MAY 18, 1942

The Commander of the Japanese 2nd Fleet changed the plans of Crudiv 5 on May 18.

No. 30

FROM: #669 May 18

"From Cinc 2nd Fleet, Crudiv 5 less NACHI and (Desdiv in Desron 1) will put in at Kure enroute to Yokosuka."

Meanwhile several units were moving from Yokosuka. Notice the mention of the objectives, which Radio Intelligence assumed to be Midway and the Aleutians, and the directions for submarines in No. 32.

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

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No. 31

FROM: (2nd Fleet) #665 May 18
 TO : (Combined Fleet)
 (Tokyo Navy Minister)
 (Naval General Staff)
 (Yokosuka Comdt.)
 INFO: 2nd Fleet)

KONGO Crudiv 4 ; ATAGO ; MAYA
 Desron 4 ; Takao ; Batdiv 3 ;
 unit) : c.g. ; BB. HARUNA ;
 ----- less (c.g. ----- ship or
 departed Yokosuka.

No. 32

FROM: (Jaluit Radio) #661 May 18
 To : Submarine Unit ?
 Originator

Please change the directive of the movements of the AF (Midway) and AO (Aleutian) Occupation Forces and related forces in the following manner, in accordance with ----- Operation Orders. The position in which submarines must be prior ----- will be 150 miles more or less to eastward of AI (Oahu area ?).

No. 33

FROM: (KUMANO) #670 May 18
 TO: (Yokosuka)
 INFO: (Unidentified)

Originator - Chief of Staff 2nd Fleet.

As there has been a change in the movements of part of the vessels of this fleet, you will please arrange for new personnel arrivals to proceed to their ports as per the following:

For (ATAGO ?) (and

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(Takeo?): to (place name) (Kure?).
 For (MYOKO?) and HAGURO: to
 Kure area (date and hour will be given
 later).

Radio Intelligence commented (May 22) on
 the above message:

"TAKAO and ATAGO arrived Kure 19th.
 Com 14 said that these two vessels may not
 be ATAGO and TAKAO but were certainly two
 of Crudiv 4. The MYOKO and HAGURO have
 been operating together since the Coral Sea
 engagement, and were ordered, May 17, to
 fuel and provision upon arrival at Yokosuka."

Land based fighters were to be used as part
 of the Midway Striking Force according to this dispatch:

No. 34

FROM: (1st Air Fleet) #434 May 18
 TO: (SORYU)
 (HIRU)
 (Cardiv 2)
 (Cardiv 3)
 (?)
 (JUNYO)
 (?)
 (KAGA)
 INFO: (Combined Fleet)
 (OITA Air?)

Transport land-based fighters of #6
 Air Group to AF (Midway) Area as follows:
 AGAKI and KAGA, 6 each; SORYU and HIRYU,
 3 each ?; ZUIKAKU, -----; JUNYO, 12 (?).
 Planes that are to be loaded on ships of
 Cardiv 1 and Cardiv 2 are to be ferried to
 (?) - Naval Air Station (?) by
 the 22nd and will be flown on board by
 pilots of this fleet.

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 AUTHORITY
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 1 SEPT 1942

No. 34A

On May 18 a dispatch was intercepted (BELL 200326, COM 200704), which spoke of a land route to Port Moresby. Problems of translation made it difficult to establish at that moment whether this road was to be used as an invasion route for the capture of Moresby, because a seaborne invasion was impossible in the face of Allied opposition, or, whether it was to be used for supply purposes after the occupation. However, it was definitely known that the Japanese were about to use this route for some important purpose.

MAY 19, 1942

Further preparations for air activity were noted on May 19th:

No. 35

#174 May 19
 FROM: _____ (Combined Flt Cos)
 TO: _____ (11th Air Flt. Airron 11
 (Comb. Air For.))
 INFO: _____ (1st Air Fleet COFS)
 (Cardiv 5 ?)
 _____ (Nav. Gen. Staff)
 _____ (Tokyo Bur. Aero. ?)

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REF ID: A66822
AUTHORITY
BY: D NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

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As () - Cardiv ?)
is to take part in the ---- operations
desire that
(- carrier) take on board 12*
fighter planes (- Air Unit.)

* This may read "all but 12" or
"more than 12".

Radio Intelligence commented on this
message (May 26):

"This carrier has been reported
as the HISHIKI MARU, and it would appear
that this carrier is operating with the
RYUJO in the Aleutians."

The Occupation Forces for Midway were
assembling at this time.

No. 36

#292 May 19
FROM: (4th Airron ?)
TO: (Yokosuka Mil. Stores
B. (old) ?)

Replying to ---- serial #
----. Change destination of ----
from PYL to AF.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF 997682
 AUTHORITY
 BY [] NARA DATE 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

No. 37

FROM: (Airron 7 ?) #197 May 19

Your ship which will proceed to Saipan, and the -----TA, which will proceed there also this month will be detached from the 4th Fleet and will be assigned to the Occupation Force.

MAY 20, 1942

There were many messages on May 20th in which the completion of some of the preliminary orders was noted. Several secret orders for the occupation force were also read. It is to be observed that in all Japanese messages of this period, the successful occupation of Midway is taken for granted.

No. 38

FROM: (2nd Fleet ?) #683 May 20
 TO : (Unit 2nd Fleet ?)

(Fragmentary)

Occupation Force Secret Order No. 1

The 85th Communication Corps, 85 Submarine Base Force, 13th and 14th Construction (?) Corps, and the ----- shall form the waiting (?) Force ----- reach Truk by June 20th to assist in the next operation.

Radio Intelligence reported on the above

(May 28):

"The following are some of the Forces scheduled to concentrate at Truk prior to June 20.

- (1) NOTORO (AV) with 2 type "Ø" ship-board seaplanes and 6 carrier planes.

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expected to arrive by June 15.

(2) (Unidentified) is expected to go to Truk about 2 June to await next operations.

(3) Various small craft listed in Occupation Force Operations Order #1, but not recovered, are to arrive prior 20 June.

(4) Afirm Force and Striking Force will be in Truk for a period of about 2 weeks, beginning 20 June.

(5) 4 unidentified units, the 85th Communication Corps, the 85th Submarine Base Force, 13th and 14th Construction (?) Corps, will form a waiting (?) Force and reach Truk prior June 20 to assist in next operations."

The Occupation Forces, destined for Midway, had their own air force ready to operate from the subjugated area.

No. 39

FROM:	(2nd Fleet)	#678	May 20
TO :	(Airron 7)		
INFO:	(KAMIKAWA MARU)		
	(MALAY ?)		
	(Crudiv ??)		
	(Unidentified)		
	(Tokyo Nav. Intell.)		
	(Unidentified)		
	(Unidentified)		
	(Combined Fleet)		
	(4th Fleet)		

Occupation Force Secret Despatch Order

No. 2.

The Commands of the Air Force** shall move a part of the remaining forces to PS (Saipan) immediately, and cooperate with the (4th Fleet)(?) in destroying enemy submarines.

**Note: The Air Force of the particular Occupation Force.

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 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

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The position of various Japanese destroyer units was given at this time:

No. 40

FROM: (Combined Fleet) #198 May 20

Concerns stack markings for distinguishing organization, e.g., a white band about 8 feet wide, Desrons 1, 2, 3, 4 and 10 are mentioned.

It was commented:

"The following are believed to be the correct locations of the Desrons mentioned:

- Desron 1 - AOB Force
- " 2 - AF (Midway) Force
- " 3 - Probably in Empire Waters
- " 4 - Probably AF (Midway) Force
- " 10 - Carrier plane guards (with carriers)."

Very important information was gleaned from the next message:

No. 41

FROM: #196 May 20
 TO :

(Comb. Fleet)

INFO:

During the period of the operations, the area designators for the various central points shall be revised as follows:

Place Name

Code

SU
 SHI (SI)
 I
 KI

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Chichijima	HI
(Marcus Is.)	CHI (TI)
Saipan	Z (?)
Omiyajima (?) (Guam) (?)	NA (Kana)
TSU - (Tulagi ?)	---- (SA ?)
Mekin ?)	NO
Ruotto	TSU (TU)
Kwajalein	MA
Truk	RU
Rabaul	KE
Yap	TO
Taroa	RA
	YA
	TA
	TE ?
	KA
	A
	MI
	YU
	FU
AF	
AFG	
AFH	
AGD	

It was remarked:

"It will be noted that wherever possible, the designator is the first Kana for the place name designated; also, there are no areas in the north and none in the Oahu area.

MI for AF (Midway)
 YU for AFG (near Midway)
 FU for AFH (Hermes Reef ?)
 RE for AGD (Laysan ?)"

Japanese warship movements to an appointed rendezvous were numerous on this date. Messages No. 42 to No. 49 indicate the details of Japanese operations, which were carefully scrutinized by U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence. The make-up of the Midway Striking Force was now pretty well known.

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 REF ID: A66997
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
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No. 42

FROM: [] (KONGO ?) #163 May 20

KONGO, HIYEI, ----- and -----
 departed Sasebo for [] - recovered
 as place in Kyushu area).

It was observed:

"Crudiv 8 left Kure while Batdiv 3
 left Sasebo. The units were to rendezvous
 at some point and set course about 140, as
 the following message indicates.

No. 43

FROM: [] (Crudiv 8 ?) #065 May 20
 TO: [] ?

Crudiv 8, plus KONGO, will depart
 Bungo Channel (West Channel) at 0800, 22nd,
 heading for ----- . Course approximately
 140, speed 16. Desdiv 4 will on (date)
 search an area 20 miles between bearings
 090 and 180 from (a lighthouse) and when
 main body departs, form a screen. The
 KIRISHIMA will as soon as possible
 rendezvous with this force. Prior to
 rendezvous, establish anti-submarine
 patrol, informing us of location and time.

No. 44

FROM: [] (Crudiv 8 ?) #064 May 20

During the 21st the KONGO and -----
 will rendezvous with Crudiv 8 in
 place [] anchorage.

It was noted:

"According to Com 14 - 190024-T,
this organization is believed to be in the
Striking Force consisting of Batdiv 3,
Cardivs 1 and 2, Crudiv 8, and Desron 17."

DECLASSIFIED
REF ID: A66222
AUTHORITY
BY: D NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942

No. 45

FROM: (Comdesron 1) #065 May 20
TO:
INFO: (Combined Fleet)
(Desdiv)

... (ship ?) and SHICURE
... will depart Sasebo in company with
KONGO and HARUNA on 21st
at 1300 under order of Captain of KONGO.

No. 46

FROM: (Desron 1) #069 May 20

Ship and Desdiv 6 or 9 under the
direct orders of the Commanding Officer of
the KONGO will arrive in company with the
KONGO and the 46593 (HARUNA or HIBI)
departing Sasebo at 1300 22nd or 23rd.

It was mentioned:

"This is a section of the force
which left Yokosuka at 1400 18 May and
is believed to be part of the force which
is to exercise under CinC Combined and
CinC 2nd going on at this time."

Evidence for important Japanese ship
movements continued to come in on the 20th.

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No. 47

FROM: (Cardiv 1) #957 May 20
 TO: (Comb. Fleet)
 (1st Air Flt)
 (Tokyo)
 (Kure Movt. Rept. Sect.)
 (Sasebo Movt. Rept. Sect.)
 INFO: (Desron 10)
 (Batdiv 3)
 (SORYU)

Cardiv 2 less ----- departing Sasebo
 for 1100.

* This was the current rendezvous.

No. 48

FROM: #162 May 20
 TO: (Ship in Batdiv 3)
 (Combined Fleet CoS)
 (1st Fleet CoS)
 (2nd Fleet CoS)
 (1st Air Fleet CoS)
 (Desdiv 3)
 (Desron 1)
 INFO: (Kure Personnel)

Changes to scheduled operations: The
 SHIGURE - HIEI or KIRISHIMA ?) and the
 ----- leave Sasebo
 on May 21st, 1500. On the 22nd at
 about 0800 the KONGO will
 rendezvous at Point C, the HARUKA
 at about 1300 at Point D. After the Combined
 Fleet participates in the first communication
 test, destroyers (will proceed to (?) Kyushu
 Area

No. 49

FROM: ? #957 May 20
 TO: ?

Cardiv 2 less SORYU, KONGO and
 (Desdiv 17 or Desdiv in Desron 2)
 departed Sasebo for Tosa or (Ariake)
 Bay at 1100.

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ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

It was commented (May 22):

"Ariake Bay is on the southeast coast of Kyushu, and is frequently used as a fleet anchorage since the nearby Gulf of Kagoshima is impracticable on account of the great depth of the water. Comdesron 2 has recently been associated with CinC 2nd Fleet."

Activity in the area near Midway continued to indicate great preparations for an enemy project.

No: 50

#501 May 20

FROM: _____ (4th Air Attack Force)
 TO: _____ (Tokyo Transport. Sec.)
 INFO: _____ (6th Def. Force, Wotje ?)
 _____ (Chitose Air Group ?)
 _____ (Pers. Officer ? Chitose Air Group)

The SEI----- MARU which is at present in PQB shall subsequently proceed to PQ and AA in that order. She will load fuel at PQB and remain about 2 days; is scheduled to arrive AA on ----- date. Because of operations would like to change schedule of SEI----- MARU to call at various points in the PQB, AA, PQ order. Please arrange accordingly.

It was indicated:

"PQB is questionably Ruotto. AA is Wake Island. PQ is believed to be Kwajalien."

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REF ID: A66222
AUTHORITY
BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942

No. 51

#529 May 20
FROM: (Tokyo Intelligence ?)
TO: (Comb. Flt. CoS ?)
INFO: (2nd Flt. CoS ?)
(Unidentified)

In order to supply fuel oil for the fleet, it has been decided to send the ----- MARU loaded with ----- 6000 tons of fuel oil to ----- (- place) from ----- (- date) to the 30th. Due to future operations of this ship -----

It was remarked:

"This may be the KOKUYO MARU, which has recently been associated with 1st Air Fleet and AKAGI. These are believed to be part of the Midway Striking Force."

Another arrival at Saipan appeared to be ready for duty with the Midway Occupation Force.

No. 52

#780 May 20
FROM: (St. Comm. Officer)
TO: (St. Comm. Officer)
INFO: (2nd Flt. St. Comm. Off.)
(St. Comm. Off.)

Fragmentary, but indicates that originator is arriving PS (Saipan) on morning of 24th, wants supplies.

Transfers of Air Corps personnel were noted also, a sure indication of impending action.

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 AUTHORITY
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ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

No. 53

FROM: (14th Air ?) #299 May 20
 TO: (Yokosuka Pers. Bu.)

Make following corrections to transfer orders contained in 14th Air Corps serial # -----.

- (1) Of the three (ratings ?) one is to be sent to PY1 (Imbeji) and one to AF (Midway).
- (2) Add two ratings for PY1 (Imbeji).

It was pointed out:

"The 14th Air Corps also requested its mail to be forwarded to AF (Midway)."

Most of the messages of May 20th indicate the Japanese were very confident of success. A similar impression was conveyed by the next message:

No. 54

FROM: #679 May 20
 TO: (Jaluit Rdo ?)
 INFO: (Sub. For. ?) (Comb. Flt. ?)
 (Sub. Unit ?)
 (Truk)

After the occupation of AF (Midway)
 (Remainder unreadable).

A very important message giving valuable information was the following:

No. 55

FROM: (2nd Fleet) #683 May 20
Imperial Headquarters Secret Radio
Order.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66997
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [initials] NARA DATE: 1/11/2020

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Occupation Force Operation Order #1.
 Ship or Unit, Minesweeper Unit
 , ship or unit, 85th Guard
 Force, 85th Submarine Base Force, #14
 Special Landing (Base) Forces and ship
 will compose this force, under
 direct orders Commander this Force, (Comdr.
 85th Guard Force.) It will start making
preparations and training in the -----
area and will transfer to Truk by 2
(about ?) June where it will await next
operations.

MAY 21, 1942

The messages of May 21st revealed not only the usual details of fuel and ammunition preparations for Midway, but gave new light on the second phase of the campaign. Clearly, the occupation of Midway was to be only the first step in Japanese operations.

No. 56

FROM: (Combined Fleet) #219 May 21
 TO: ?

Orders a Maru to load munitions and supplies for the Occupation Force and Striking Force, and by June 2nd (or 3rd) depart Kure for Truk. After supplying as directed by Unit Commander, ship is to return to Kure. Rest of message deals with similar orders.

It was observed:

"Indications from this and other traffic are that the campaign (second phase ?) starts from Truk about 15 June. After the AF (Midway) operations the Striking Forces involved will retire to Truk and remain there for 2 weeks, beginning a date early in June, at which time

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they will replenish fuel, ammunition, etc., and prepare for some unknown forthcoming operations."

No. 57

#229 May 21
 FROM: (Desdiv in Desron 4 ?)
 TO: (Kure Rdo - Assoc. Mil. Stores ?)
 INFO: (Unidentified)

In answer to your SMS #112 please arrange for this force's 33 reserve -----, ----- (8 for each ship) to be supplied with the torpedoes. so that we can receive them in the ----- (Kyushu area ?) Channel about ----- (- date ?).

It was suggested:

"Desron 4 appears involved in escorting convoys of the AF (Midway) Occupation Force which are scheduled to arrive Midway June 6."

No. 58

#488 May 21
 FROM: (1st Air Fleet)

Tells unknown ship to load up with 11000 (?) tons fuel oil, 60 tons of miscellaneous stores and 1500 tons of ----- fuel and rendezvous at 1200, 28th in position 28-30 N, 138 E.

It was noted:

"This position is near Chichijima."

No. 59

#135 May 21
 FROM: (Ship in Batdiv 3)
 TO: (KIRISHIMA ?)
 (Comcrudiv 8)

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66822
 AUTHORITY
 BY: J NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

This ship's position at 0800 on the 22nd; bearing ----- distant ----- kilometers from Point C. Planning to join your force at (time), SHIGURE and (----- ship) in company.

More units were added, and artillery arrangements were made for the Occupation Forces on May 21. Ironically enough, some of the guns had been seized from the Americans at Wake.

No. 60

FROM: (3rd Fleet ?) #241 May 21
 TO: (3rd Fleet ?)
 INFO: (Comb. Flt. ?)
 (Malay Force ?)
 (Tokyo Nav. Intelligence)
 (Yokosuka Comdt. ?)

East Indies Force Secret Order #16.

Palao - Defence ?) Force and Menado Base Auxiliary Force will be added to Yokosuka #1 Special Landing Force and Yokosuka #3 Special Landing Force, respectively.

No. 61

FROM: (2nd Fleet) #702 May 21
 TO: Chief of Staff Combined Fleet.

Please arrange to have 2 guns of the 8 and 10 (centimeter) type which were seized at Wake and turned over to Yokosuka Combined Landing Force by the 4th Fleet, assigned to ----- and loaded on the ----- tender by 4 June to be transported to AF (Midway).

295/25

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 BY: J NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

The Japanese air forces were preparing for both the first and second phases of the campaign at this time. Particular attention was paid to their planes and anti-submarine operations.

No. 62

FROM: (Unidentified) #525 May 21
 TO: 1st Air Corps,

So that we can prepare orders for the forthcoming campaign, request you complete delivery during May, of the replacement planes for use in the 2nd phase (of the campaign).

The 14th District Radio Intelligence commented:

"Originator and addressees indicate that subject campaign is either AK or AF, or both."

It was remarked:

"1st Air Corps (Group) has been inactive in TI and D.I. since April 9, when Comdr. 1st Air with 6 bombers arrived Kwajalien, Marshall Islands, and was scheduled to depart next day for Tarca."

No. 63

#210 May 21
 FROM: (Com. 6th Air Att. For. ?)
 TO: (Comcardiv 3 ?)
 INFO: (1st Air Flt. CoS ?)

Can you take 6 more fighters of Air on board the _____ today, (time ?) and place for the operation. If so, inform me

DECLASSIFIED
 REF 997682
 AUTHORITY
 BY [] NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

It was observed:

"These three code groups are believed to represent a new carrier possibly TAKASAGO."

No. 64

#311 May 21
 FROM: (China Airron (old call).)
 TO: (Sect.4CE Bur.Tokyo)(old call)

Change destination of personnel for transfer referred to in my serial #270 from AF (Midway) to PY1 (Imejl).

No. 65

FROM: (2nd Fleet) #685 May 21
 TO: ?

Unreadable, but refers to 5th Base Force message, No. between 270 and 300, and involves operations of MI Occupation Force (Midway) in connection with mopping up enemy submarines.

MAY 22, 1942

The messages of May 22nd furnished more clues as to the organization of the Striking Force.

No. 66

FROM: (1st Air Flt.) #497 May 22
 TO: Comcardivs 1 and 2

(6th Air Group)
 (DD in Desron 10)

Will hold conference on board AKAGI at 0830, 26th May, regarding air operations of Striking Force. ----- will attend.

DECLASSIFIED
AMP 997622
AUTHORITY
BY J NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Radio Intelligence added:

"The above action addressees are expected to be a part of the Striking Force that will attack AF (Midway)."

No. 67

The British

sent a message to U.S. Navy

on this date, outlining Japanese plans.

Note that they had not confirmed the Japanese objective, nor seen the indications of interest in the Aleutians.

"1. The forces under CinC 2nd Fleet.

A. Crudiv 7, Cardiv 7, Desron 2, Special Base establishing units of Naval Landing Party, and Transports are concentrating at Saipan in near future, date unknown.

B. Flagship of Crudiv 4 (CinC 2nd Fleet in Japanese Cruiser CHOKAI), HIEI (BB of Batdiv 3), and Desron 4 are together in fleet anchorage Kyushu.

C. Crudiv 5 was ordered on May 17 to leave 4th Fleet and join a force of which paragraph A forms a part.

2. The remainder of Batdiv 3 (KONGO, HARUNA, KIRISHIMA) with Crudiv 8 and escort of destroyers of anti-destroyer squadron are carrying out a communication exercise at sea and are probably joining CinC 2nd Fleet. Cardiv 1 and 2 are also concerned with this exercise. The force in paragraph 1A is possibly the force ordered to carry out invasion of AF (thought to be Midway but not confirmed.) No evidence to show of any other objective or that of Northern Force."

298

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66902
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

Intelligence replied to this:

"Do not have a Cardiv 7 but according to our information Cardivs 1 and 2 are to be in the Saipan concentration. Do not understand just what carriers the British include in the so-called Cardiv 7. The fleet anchorage in Kyushu referred to in paragraph B is believed to be Ariake Bay. Believe HIEI and KIRISHIMA are the BB's involved in paragraph 2 and then are to join this force mentioned paragraph B, after completion of a Combined Fleet exercise. Believe KONGO and HARUKA are the BB's for the force mentioned in paragraph B. The 'destroyers of anti-destroyer squadron' mentioned in paragraph 2 are not understood."

The radio calls to be used by the Japanese units at Midway were recovered from another message of importance. Though not very interesting to a layman, they were of the utmost value to Radio Intelligence.

No. 68

#226 May 22
 FROM: (Combined Fleet)
 TO: ?

"A" Call List, 1 June:

Task Force (Revise) -
 Occupation Force -
 Occupation Force ----- Force -----
 Occupation Force flagship -
 Occupation Force Escort Force - - - -
 Force -
 Occupation Force Air Force - SE
 Occupation Force _____ and

The next part is not clear, but probably means to enter the following units in regular order from _____ to --
 Unit; Fleet; Carrier Division; 1st Supply Force; 2nd Supply Force; 19th -----

DECLASSIFIED
RND 997622
AUTHORITY
BY [] NARA DATE 11/1/2020

ORIGINAL
11 SEPT 1942

#2, #3, or #7 CHOUN or CHOKI MARU

MARU and #2 MARU

Note: The following (are all
from the Special Table
)ship, MARU, or activity,
)ship, MARU, or activity,
)ship, MARU, or activity,

14th Naval District Radio Intelligence reported
on these call recoveries above as follows:

- *Occupation Force -
- Unit of Occupation Force -
- Flagship - -----
- Escort -
- Force -
- Occupation Air Force -
- Invasion Force (?) -

Japanese ship movements to Saipan continued to
be noted in the messages of May 22nd:

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66997
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

No. 69

FROM: [] #028 May 22
 TO: CinC 2nd Fleet

Says the unit will arrive in Saipan on 24th; then something about some aerial pictures of II (Midway).

It was remarked:

unidentified, but has been associated with CinC 2nd Fleet since it first appeared on May 15."

No. 70

FROM: [] (4th Fleet ?) #716 May 22
 TO: [] (Malay ?)
 INFO: [] (Comb. Fleet ?)
 [] (Desron 2 ?)
 [] (Assoc. with forces in SE area ?)
 [] (2nd Fleet ?)

[] #4 leaves PT (Truk) at --- today the 22nd and plans to arrive in PS (Saipan) at 1500 on the 25th and immediately take on 300 fuel, 250 water, 200 ----, and supplies for 200 persons for one month.

Radio Intelligence said:

"This appears to concern a unit involved in the attempt to occupy Midway."

No. 71

FROM: [] (Airon 7) #200 May 22

When ---- unit less the KAMIGAWA MARU and a destroyer (1st Fleet or Screen Force) arrive at Saipan about 0900(-9) on the 26th, please arrange to fuel the ---- tons fuel oil. (Rest unreadable.)

DECLASSIFIED
REF ID: A66997
AUTHORITY
BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/20/00

ORIGINAL
1 SEPT 1942]

No. 72

FROM: (Unidentified) #026 May 22

Message mostly garbled, but states five unidentified ships or units including (one very questionable group recovered as CHIYODA) arrived Omiga Shima (Guam).

It was noted:

"The CHIYODA is a part of Airron 7, which has been in the Saipan area recently, with indications that it would go to Truk."

MAY 23, 1942

Traffic on May 23 brought additional information of the type recovered all during the previous week. Mention was made of a third phase of the coming operations as well as an important naval conference.

No. 73

FROM: (4th Fleet) #728 May 23
TO: (Comb.Flt.)

In order to discuss details of coming operations with your staff and (NSG), am sending 7 senior members of my staff to Yokohama on 25th. Conferences are desired from 26th to 7th. Advise.

It was suggested:

"Believe NSG should be NCS (Naval General Staff.)"

No. 74

A reply to the above message followed:

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66997
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

FROM: (Comb. Flt.) #238 May 23
 TO: (4th Fleet)

Your serial 728: Members of my Staff will meet your staff afternoon of 26th after arrival Tokyo.

No. 75

#554 May 23
 FROM: (Tokyo Intelligence)
 TO: ?

Lists the KOTOKU MARU and six unidentified vessels and says that on (date ?) they are assigned to CinC 2nd Fleet as supply ships for the third phase of the Combined Fleet's campaign. Under command of (MARU Captain) they will return to Yokosuka, put in at Sasebo and receive orders from the Commandant.

Japanese supplies continued to move towards the scene of future action as the following messages, Nos. 76 to 81 point out.

No. 76

#786 May 23
 FROM: (KANIKAWA MARU)
 TO: (CoS 2nd Fleet)

This ship plans to arrive Saipan 0800 on 24th. Inform me what my anchorage is.

No. 77

#737 May 23
 FROM: (Yokosuka CoS)
 TO: ?

The MARU departed Yokosuka at 1000 on the 23rd, and ... plans to arrive at Oterishima (wake) on the 31st.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66822
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

It was surmised:

"Cargo apparently diesel, fuel, and other oils."

No. 78

FROM: [] (2nd Fleet) #718 May 23
 TO: ?

The ----- ship (with boats and captured automatic weapons loaded on board) will depart Wake on negat minus 3 days for Midway. Keep that vessel informed of movements of your unit.

It was observed:

"If these are the same weapons referred to in #702, 21 May, 2nd Fleet, which were to be loaded on the ----- tender by June 4th for transportation to AF, N-3 days is at the earliest June 4."

No. 79

FROM: [] #032 May 23
 TO: [] (Comb. Flt.)
 [] (2nd Flt.)
 [] (Desron 2)
 [] (Malay ?)
 [] (Naval General Staff)
 [] (Tokyo Navy Minister)
 INFO: [] (Yokosuka COS)
 [] (4th Fleet)

From Commander of []

Left Miyajima* for PS (in ?) BRAZIL MARU with [] - ship ?) (ship ?) #1, #2, #34 and #35 ([])

* - Guam ?

** - These appear to be small craft - may be torpedo boats or small NS vessels, but could also be some type of harbor craft.

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [Signature] NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 80

FROM: (Saipan ?) #009 May 23
 TO: (Saipan ?)
 (Unidentified)
 INFO: (6th Def. For. Wotje ?)
 (4th Air Attack Force)

Furnished First Air Group with 15
 type-96 fighter planes on _____ (- date).

It was commented (May 31):

"The 1st Air Group is believed in the
 Marshall Islands area and has been connected
 with Comsubfor and air units that are
 expected to participate in the K and Midway
 campaigns."

More call signals of great value to Radio

Intelligence were recovered in this dispatch:

No. 81

FROM: (KORYU ?) #530 May 23
 TO: (2nd Fleet)
 INFO: (All Major Commands
 Staff Comm. Off.)
 (All 2nd Class Naval
 Stations (Staff).)
 (Tokyo Naval Comm. Sect.)
 (All 1st Class Naval
 Stations (Staff).)

Add following call signs to the call
 list:

Page 94: " _____ - Kana digraph":
 ZUIKAKU Fighter Group; " _____ - Kana
 digraph): ZUIKAKU Bomber Group. From
 to _____ Fighter Group - 1st to 6th
 Sections; from _____ to _____ Bomber
 Group - 4th to 6th Sections.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66822
 AUTHORITY
 BY: J NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 82

A new Japanese frequency of 6500 kilocycles was picked up by Midway on this date. Both submarines and the base at Jaluit used it.

MAY 24, 1942

On May 24th data on Japanese activity became available from the following intercepted dispatches:

No. 83

#512 May 24
 FROM: (1st Air Fleet - Staff
 Comm. Off.)
 TO: (11th Air Flt. CoS)
 (Comdr. 6th Air Attack
 Force Group)
 (CoS Combined Flt.)

From Commander of (blank): re Airron
 26 SMS # between 234 and 247):

The following deliveries of type Zero fighters have been made to vessels as indicated:

6 to the AKAGI (9 pilots)
 3 to the HIRYU
 12 to the

9 to the KAGA
 3 to the SORYU

Makes a total of 33 planes of which 3 were returned to (- Naval Air Station ?).

Translator's note: ** This is a combination which frequently appears, and is being translated by the field units as a tentative HISHIN MARU. There is, however, something very strange about this particular combination and it appears

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [Signature] NARA DATE: 11/20/80

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

quite probable that if, and when, we solve the mystery, it will have no connection whatever with a HISHIN MARU, if there is such a ship.

No. 84

FROM: _____ (Combined Fleet) #243 May 24
 TO: CinC 4th Fleet
 CinC 2nd Fleet

It is the desire of the CinC Combined Fleet that as large a quantity of air base equipment as possible be transported in connection with the Occupation Force. Inform me at once of the amount which can be carried for the ---- and second phases. In the first phase, use the ---- MARU and handle directly with the Occupation Force.

It was commented:

"This message was previously reported in Com14 - 242344 as follows:

* Referring to the 11th Air Fleet serial -----: The preparation of air fields and the storing of as much fuel as possible is underway at Ootorishima (Wake). It is desired that during the first phase all that can be transported be loaded on the -----.
 Inform me at once the amounts.*"

A convoy arrived at Saipan on May 24, including the KAMIKAWA MARU and GOSUO MARU (Nos. 85-89).

No. 85

FROM: _____ #858 May 24
 (Convoy escorted by
 Desron 2)
 TO: _____ (2nd Fleet)
 _____ (4th Fleet)
 _____ (6th Defence Force, Kotje)
 INFO: _____ (Malay ?)

DECLASSIFIED
REF 997622
AUTHORITY
BY [] NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Arrived PS (Saipan) at 0840, in
- ship in 6th Base Force).

It was noted:

"PS' is Saipan. The 6th Base
Force is believed at Jaluit."

No. 86

FROM: [] #737 May 24
TO: [] (KAMIKAWA MARU)
INFO: [] (Airron 7 ?)
(4th Fleet)

Arriving Saipan today, the 24th.
Conduct anti-submarine patrols in
accordance ----- Air Corps Operations
Order #1.

No. 87

FROM: [] #720 May 24
TO: [] (2nd Flt. Staff Comm.
Officer)
INFO: [] (KAMIKAWA MARU)
(Airron 7)

In accordance with (orders) Desron
2 anchorage for your ships bears -----
distant 800 meters from the shoal buoy.

It was indicated:

"The KAMIKAWA MARU has recently
been operating in Rabaul and RME (Bougain-
ville ?) and has just arrived in Saipan
from Truk."

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66222
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

No. 88

FROM: [] #475 May 24
 (COSHU MARU)
 TO: [] (11th Air Fleet)
 INFO: [] (Desron 2)
 [] (4th Air Attack Force)
 [] (Malay ?)
 [] (6th Defense Force, Wotje)

Arrived PS (Saipan) at 0710.

No. 89

FROM: [] #237 May 24
 (Unidentified)
 TO: [] (Desdiv ?)
 [] (KORYU ?)
 [] (Desron 4 ?)
 INFO: [] (2nd Fleet CoB ?)

Sending destroyers to
 in accordance with Comdesron SMS # (450-460).

An intimation of a change in the Japanese code system came also on this date. Such an event would greatly restrict the information of the U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence for some time.

No. 90

FROM: [] #248 May 24
 (Combined Fleet)
 TO: [] ?

The effective date of the new combined fleet communication organization list will be ----- June

MAY 25, 1942

May 25th brought more messages concerning changes in air personnel. The Japanese were making

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66997
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

minute preparations for the occupation of Midway.

(Nos. 91-96)

No. 91

FROM: [] (Crudiv 6 ?) #196 May 25
 TO: [] (Tokyo Bu. Pers. ?)
 INFO: [] (Unit in Crudiv 6 ?)
 [] (5th Fleet ?)
 [] (Pers. Station, Kure)

Regarding 6th Crudiv serial # -----:

The reserve pilots of the [] shall be temporarily transferred to the [] (- ship in Crudiv 6). Please arrange to have them proceed to said vessel at Kure. Please have ----- transferred to the [] (ship in Crudiv 6) and notify the First Fleet Headquarters to that effect.

It was observed:

"Part of Crudiv 6 is believed in Empire for overhaul and is expected at Truk 15 June. Another part of Crudiv 6 has appeared associated with units involved in the Midway Operation."

No. 92

FROM: [] (2nd Fleet) #708 May 25

Occupation Force Operations Order

No. 4:

After 1200 24 May - Comdesron 4 will assign ----- DD to the -----KAKU. After operations of the -----KAKU on the 24th DD will operate as directed by the -----KAKU. (Desdiv in Desron 4) after above date will come under command of (SATA) at Kure and is assigned duty of screening SATA and TSURUMI.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66782
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

On ----- date (this date is important) depart Kure. On negat minus 5 days be in position 26° 48' ----- (this group hopelessly garbled) 15 East. Thence proceed to join main body of Occupation Force.

It was commented:

----- The date is placed only as sometime after 15 May."

No. 93

FROM: ----- (2nd Fleet) #741 May 25
 TO: 2nd Fleet

Occupation Force Operations Order

No. 8:

Commander 1st ----- Occupation Force utilizing part of 2nd ----- will occupy Midway period ----- Sutan Island.

Radio Intelligence said:

"----- Sutan is Japanese Kana Jon? Sutan or Johnston but Com14 does not believe this is correct. So far in the Midway Campaign Johnston Island has not been mentioned as an objective. Suggest Eastern Island (in Midway group). Blank group is garbled therefore unable prove or disprove definitely Johnston. This was in typical operation order form and is first one of this type received on this campaign."

No. 94

FROM: ----- (Saipan) #4 May 25

From Commander 11th Pioneer Battalion:
 We require as much supplies as can be taken including the following:

Wheelbarrows
 Rollers

Bulldozers
 Dragline

DECLASSIFIED
REF ID: A66222
AUTHORITY
BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Request that those be transported with the first phase.

It was indicated:

"It is believed these supplies have reference to the Midway Occupation Force which starts from Saipan."

No. 95

FROM: _____ (4th Fleet) #758 May 25
TO: ?

For KAMAGUCHI (or DAGUCHI) 4th Fleet Staff.

In case this Fleet is assigned the mission of supply after the occupation of AF (Midway) request you arrange for the MO (Port Moresby) forces to be used as a unit for the maintenance of supply lines.

It was mentioned:

"This message probably was sent to part of 4th Fleet Staff now in Tokyo for conferences with big staff as previously reported."

No. 96

FROM: _____ (Desdiv 15 ?) # ? May 25
TO: _____ (2nd Fleet)
_____ (Tokyo Radio)
_____ (Sasebo Radio)
_____ (Saipan Radio)
_____ (2nd Fleet)
_____ (Combined Fleet)

At 2000 on 25 May I will discontinue communication with Palseo Radio and establish communication with 2nd Fleet."

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66822
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 DEPT 1942

It was reported (May 26):

"Indications that (Desdiv 15 ?) may operate with Desron 2 is noted in the Communication Zone shift from Saipan to Desron 2 on the 26th."

MAY 26, 1942

The interceptions of May 26th traffic divulged the dates of convoy movements to Midway, and exposed the Japanese identification signs for certain operation areas.

No. 97

FROM: _____ (Saipan ?) #429 May 26
 TO: _____ (Comb. Fleet ?)
 _____ (1st Air Flt ?)
 _____ (2nd Fleet)
 _____ (11th Air Fleet)
 _____ (2nd Fleet ?)
 _____ (Subfor ?)
 _____ (4th Fleet)
 INFO: _____ (Wake Base ?)
 _____ (Sub Fleet ?)

From Comdesron 2:

Escort movement schedule:

(1) Depart 1700, 28 May * speed 11 and pass to the south of PST (Tenien); following ----- route, arrive Yafuru at 1200, 1 June * . Arrive AF (Midway) about 1900 6 June * .

(2) ----- ship in 6th Base Force) ----- and 2 supply vessels departing 1400, 26 May * and take on supplies at AA (Wake). On 30 May * or 31 May * after -----, will rendezvous with the escort force at 1200, 6 June * . ----- depart ----- 1900, 27th * speed 9. This has been passed to Desron 2.

313

213

DECLASSIFIED
 AUTHORITY BY [] NARA DATE: 1/11/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

Translator's Note: * This garbled value probably serves to indicate the zone in which the given hour and date is calculated. Yafuru is not located.

No. 98

FROM: [] #735 May 26
 (2nd Flt. CoS)
 TO: [] (4th Flt. CoS)
 (6th Defense Force)
 INFO: []

As it is necessary for this Force's operations inform us by [] - date) the position(s) at which the buoy(s) designating the shoal which according to [] - unit) SMS [] is to be used as a bearing point for the anchorage in PT. Also please place buoy(s) bearing 223° 3300 meters from []

No. 99

FROM: [] #195 May 26

Promulgates the following areas for [] operations:

FI - Chichijima	SA ? - Saipan
RU - Ruotto	AF ? - Midway Is.
KE - Kwajalein	TU ? - Cocos Is.
TO - Truk	YU - Unidentified
RA - Rabaul	HU - "
WO? - Guem	MA - "
YA - Yap Is.	AFG - "
TA - Taran	APH - "
MI - Midway	

Radio Intelligence pointed out:

"Opnav and Com-14 related several of the above as follows: AF is MI; AFG is YU; APH is HU."

DECLASSIFIED
 REF ID: A66992
 AUTHORITY
 BY: [] NARA DATE: 11/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

In Nos. 100-105 it will be noticed that more and more strength was added to the Midway Occupation Force, resulting in some changes in the Japanese plans.

No. 100

FROM: _____ #273 May 26
 TO: _____ (Combined Fleet ?)
 _____ (Unidentified)
 _____ (Unidentified)
 _____ (Assoc. with forces in S.E. area ?)
 _____ (K.G.S. Tokyo)

The Third Phase Organization Plans will be changed as follows:
 ship) is to be detached from ----- and attached to the Occupation Force.

No. 101

FROM: _____ (4th Fleet ?) #763 May 26
 TO: _____ (Comb. Flt. ?)
 INFO: _____ (Desron 2 ?)
 _____ (Assoc. with forces in S.E. area ?)
 _____ (2nd Fleet ?)
 _____ (Midway Occ. Force ?)

Reference (c.g. 01269 - Unit) SMS 14:

Desire to attach that vessel to Occupation Force.

It was indicated:

"The Occupation Force referred to here is probably the Midway Occupation Force."

DECLASSIFIED
 AND 997622
 AUTHORITY
 BY [] NARA DATE: 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

No. 102

FROM: [] #325 May 26
 (TSURUMI)
 TO: ?

Says that TSURUMI left Kure Communication Zone and entered 2nd Fleet Flagship Zone.

It was explained:

"It will be noted this was one of the tankers ordered to rendezvous. The SAGA and TSURUMI are to be in a position 26° 48' N 15° E on N-5 days and then to proceed to join the main body of the Occupation Force (Midway).

No. 103

FROM: [] (2nd Fleet) #741 May 26

Occupation Force Operation Order #8: Orders For Commander Army "KAZUKI" Detachment.

The Commander Kazuki Detachment will be included in and will command the 2nd Combined Landing Force which comes under the command of Commander Landing Forces of the Occupation Force, and will occupy Midway, Eastern Island.

The 14th Naval District Radio Intelligence Unit reported:

"There is still no positive check on the first Kana character of "Eastern," but a study of the context indicates a strong likelihood of Eastern rather than Johnston." (Washington had already come to this conclusion.)

DECLASSIFIED
 REF 997622
 AUTHORITY
 BY [] NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL

1 SEPT 1942

Ironically enough, the Japanese were having difficulty in sending their messages to their own commanders. These messages were being read by U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence at the time.

No. 104

FROM: [] (2nd Fleet) #740 May 26
 TO: []
 INFO: [] ?

Occupation Force's Secret Despatch Order #2 has not as yet been received by the Commander of the IKKI Detachment. Will your Force look into the matter and meanwhile arrange to inform the above detachment commander of the order ?

No. 105

FROM: [] #563 May 26
 (4th Air Attack Force)

When will the replacements of 14th Air Patrol seaplanes arrive Saipan. For operations require them by June 3. If you cannot meet this date (rest unreadable.)

It was stated:

"The 14th Air appeared in Iriomote April 3 and since the 18th of May have actively indicated in a number of messages that they expect to be based at Midway in the near future. This message apparently expects 14th Airron to be unavailable after 2 June."

MAY 27, 1942

On May 27th very important details of the Japanese operational plans were collected.

DECLASSIFIED
 REF 997822
 AUTHORITY
 BY D NARA DATE 1/1/2000

ORIGINAL
 1 SEPT 1942

No. 106

FROM: (2nd Fleet) #743 May 27

The ----- MARU will, as soon as ready, proceed from Sasebo to Point Cast (27° North 170° East) for operations with this force. Inform us as to time of arrival at Point Cast.

Radio Intelligence pointed out (May 28):

"A message from -----, #147, May 16 says in part: The following has been decided upon regarding the Combined Fleet problem number -----: Phase 1: ----- The 'A' Fleet (Cinc 2nd Fleet), Screening Force less ----- and Occupation Force ----- Phase 2: ----- Initial positions 'B' Fleet: Main Body at Point Afirm, Screen at Point Baker, and Occupation Force at Point Cast; 'B' Fleet at Point Dog (70 kilometers bearing 90° from Point Cast) -----."

No. 107

FROM: (Cinc 2nd Fleet) #742 May 27

Occupation Force Operation Order #9:

----- is hereby attached to the Occupation Force.

It was observed:

"The code group is a unit whose call on 1 April was ----- believed to be connected with the Saipan Base Force, and having a complement of 5463 personnel."

MAY 28, 1942

Just one message was intercepted on May 28th.

It must be remembered that the Japanese changed

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their code system at ~~0000~~ on this date, and very little could be gathered from Japanese messages about the actual battle of Midway, which followed shortly.

No. 108

#890 (Part 1 of 2) May 28
 FROM: (11th Air Fleet ?)
 TO: ?

Reference the enemy engineering equipment now on Wake (there is also some on George), request the machinery and Reserve Construction Officer be put at my disposal for the construction of an air base at Midway. In connection with this, request that the enemy engineers (now on Wake), about 60, be sent also. Fuel also needed. The required equipment is as follows: amount of freight space is about 1200 cubic meters: (There then follows a list of equipment.)

MAY 29, 1942

Little of importance was intercepted for the next few days.

No. 109

#115 May 29
 FROM: (MARU tanker)
 TO: (CinC 2nd Fleet)

Will arrive at
 Point Cast ?) at 0500 on 6th.

MAY 30, 1942

A serious break occurred in the flow of intelligence from Japanese messages when their code was changed on May 28, ~~0000~~. From May 30th to June 5th,

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there were but 4 messages deciphered, and they had little value. However, the important work of the Radio Intelligence was already done by that time. It was all over but the shooting!

No. 110

FROM: [] (Unidentified) #30 May 30

This ship will depart from Kure at 0600 on 31 May and picking up its escort at noon at ---- will arrive Midway the morning of the 9th.

JUNE 5, 1942

The messages intercepted on June 5, 6, and 7 were worthless, (Nos. 111-115). The Battle of Midway had already begun, and though Radio Intelligence could not read the current Japanese dispatches, bulletins from U.S. Naval Forces at Hawaii were confirming the validity of Radio Intelligence reports, issued some weeks before the action began.

No. 111

FROM: [] #298 June 5
 (Combined Fleet)
 TO: All Major Commands less Malay Force.

Only fragmentary, but is apparently a radio order directing occupation of an area.

- Part 1 - directs carriers probably to clean up enemy.
- Part 2 - directs a unit to occupy.
- Part 3 - directs Occupation Force, Striking Force, and submarines to expedite some action.

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It was commented:

"Suggest Midway as the objective, or possibly the Aleutian Area, although no Striking Force has been noted heretofore in the Aleutian Area except in one reference of assigning a radio call to #2 Striking Force.

No. 112

? June 5

FROM: Chief of Staff, Second Fleet.
TO: Airron 7
INFO: Chief of Staff Combined Fleet
Chief of Staff 11th Air Fleet
Comcrudiv 7
Comdesron 2
Combined Special Landing Force

(Fragmentary - Translator's best guess):

Occupation Force Radio Order #11

----- Force supporting (?) Midway
Occupation (changed to ?) -----

No. 113

#551 June 5
(1st Air Fleet flag)

FROM: [redacted]
TO: Same
INFO: [redacted]

(Fragmentary - translator's best guess):

----- Striking Force attack (?)
enemy scouting (?) Force, and # -----
Striking Force -----

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No. 114

#154 June 6

FROM: (Unidentified)
TO: (Unidentified)
INFO: Comcrudiv 7
CinC 2nd
Consubfor

(Very fragmentary) but says:

Will (join your ?) on 7 June. Inform me of your movements up to (blank) time. Then something at 1730 and this unit's movements -----.

No. 115

#76 June 7

FROM: (11th Air Fleet ?)
TO: 4th Air Attack Force
6th Air Attack Force
Wake
MISAWA Air Group
INFO: CoS Combined Fleet
CoS 2nd Fleet.

Fragmentary mentions "tomorrow eight," something to be done or to take place at Wake and Marcus.

It was noted:

"6th Air Attack Force is believed to have been operating in the Boning-Empire Area, but some units have shifted to Wake-Marcus Area. The Misawa Air Group is a part of the 6th Air Attack Force and is believed to be in the Marshalls. The 4th Air Attack Force and Misawa Air Group are land based air forces which are believed rushing to Wake-Marshall Area to furnish air support for the Midway Forces."

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Thus, ended the Radio Intelligence dispatches leading up to the Battle of Midway. Had the Japanese not changed their code just before the engagement, the search of the U.S. Navy for the fleeing foe might have been more successful. One lesson, learned from this campaign, has not been forgotten by U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence, and that is - codes must be changed frequently for the sake of security and, in particular, prior to the beginning of any preparations for a major campaign. The errors of the Japanese brought the victories of Coral Sea and Midway.

In the final report of the Battle of Midway by the various commanders, who had participated in the fighting, several tributes were paid to the value of Radio Intelligence. The statement of Admiral Nimitz is very significant:

No. 116

CINCPAC to COMINCH, A16, Ser. 01849, June 28, 1942
Page 24, paragraph 69:

"Had we lacked early information of the Japanese movement, and had we been caught with Carrier Task Forces dispersed, possibly as far away as the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway would have ended far differently."

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Other remarks concerning Radio Intelligence reports were these:

No. 117

COMCRUPAC to CINCPAC, June 14, 1942
Page 2, paragraph 5:

"Radio intelligence indicated that the enemy had sighted our carriers."

No. 118

C.O. HORNET to CINCPAC, CV8/A16-3, Ser.0018
June 13, 1942
Page 1, paragraph 2:

"On the night of May 30 a CINCPAC intelligence report, giving an accurate estimate of the Japanese Midway force organization, was received."

No. 119

AIR OPERATIONS OFFICER to C.O. HORNET, CV8/A16,
OP29-AS, June 12, 1942.
Page 7, paragraph 5:

"Through superb intelligence work we were given the advantage; however, we cannot expect such advantages on every occasion in the future."

No. 120

COMDR. L.C. RAMSEY to CINCPAC, A16-3/A1-3/
V-7(0027), June 15, 1942.
Page 2, paragraph 6:

"The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, ordered that, if practicable, the expected enemy rendezvous, 700 miles to the westward (of Midway) be investigated by B-17's on May 31st and June 1st at about 1500 YOKE each day."

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The final touch was added when on June 23, 1942, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Navy, Admiral Ernest King, U.S.N., transmitted to the Radio Intelligence section the Navy's traditional, but not easily won, recognition of "WELL DONE."

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Appendix V

Japanese War Ministry Circular

On the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese War Ministry issued a circular to all its military attaches throughout the world. Apparently it was the Japanese Army's explanation for the entrance of Japan into the war. Reviewing the negotiations carried on between the United States and Japan from April to December, 1941, it indicated that during the summer and fall of 1941 Japan had been making progressively more definite decisions for war.¹

Several facts were disclosed by this message:²

a. In April Japan decided to go ahead with the negotiations in Washington, believing that it would enable her "to make preparations for the restoration of her national strength," and in the hope that the negotiations would enable her "to close the China incident."

1 - cf. "Magic Summary", No. 609, 25 November 1943, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Pp. 10 to A-11.

2 - Ibid, Excerpts from P. 10-12.

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b. While Japan recognized that her move into French Indo-China in late July would have an adverse effect on the course of the negotiations, her "policy in regard to French Indo-China was fixed, irrespective of any negotiations with the United States."

c. After the occupation of Indo-China, Japan decided "to complete her war preparations by the end of September at the very latest, and at the same time to exert every effort through diplomatic channels to see her demands fulfilled. If her demands were not met by early October, an Imperial decree would be issued deciding upon war against England and the United States."

d. As long as he was in office Premier Konoye disagreed with the Army's conclusion that further negotiations were useless, but "the establishment of Tojo's Cabinet [on 16 October] brought about cooperation between the Government and the High Command." On 5 November the decision was made to open hostilities early in

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December. "Thereafter, Japan went ahead with plans for war, while on the other hand she sent Ambassador Kurusu in a last endeavor to reach a settlement."

e. Upon receipt of the United States proposals of 26 November, "the Supreme War Command immediately decided upon war, and on 1 December the Imperial decree was issued." The document in its entirety reads as follows:

Circular sent out by Japanese War Ministry on 9 December 1941

A. Early Negotiations: April-July

In April Ambassador Nomura in Washington wired home for instructions regarding a "Proposal for an Understanding" between Japan and the United States, which had just about been agreed upon between him and the United States authorities. (He had received no instructions whatsoever from the Home Office.)³

3 - Throughout this document, material in parentheses is as set forth in the original Japanese circular; the material in brackets and the footnotes were supplied by the Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

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
The Proposal covered the following points:

- (1) The international feeling of the United States and Japan.
- (2) The attitude of the United States and Japan toward the European war.
- (3) China-Japan peace.
- (4) United States-Japan trade.
- (5) Economic and maritime problems in these areas.⁴

Now the purpose of the United States in this was, by taking advantage of Japan's weak points, to make us stop our southern advance. Meanwhile, she planned to build up her armaments and increase her aid to England at the same time.

The Japanese Government decided to take advantage of this occasion (foreseeing what would be brought up) to settle the China incident (the United States proposed to act as mediator between Japan and China), and to

4 - The "Proposal for an Understanding" which Nomura communicated to Tokyo on 17 April actually contained provisions under 7 headings. The first 3 were approximately as given above. The remainder were as follows: "(4) air and naval strength and navigation in the Pacific; (5) commercial and financial cooperation between the two countries; (6) economic activities of the two countries in the Southwest Pacific; (7) the policies of the two countries regarding political stability in the Pacific."



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make preparations for the restoration of her national strength. Because of this, she did not violate the spirit of the agreement.⁵

We decided to continue the negotiations as long as Japan did not lose her independent position in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and in order to close the China incident.

B. Preliminary Decision for War

However, America's sincere attitude, once war broke out between Germany and Russia [22 June] was gone; and furthermore Japan's advance into southern French Indo-China [late July] had an adverse effect on trade negotiations with the United States. (Our policy in regard to French Indo-China was fixed, irrespective of any negotiations with the United States.)

Subsequently, up to the time of the mass resignation of the Konoye Cabinet,⁶ England and the United States increased and strengthened their own armaments

5 - The meaning of this statement is not clear. It may refer to the fact that Japan made no further move southward until July.

6 - This apparently refers to Konoye's final fall on 16 October. He had resigned once before--on 16 July--but had remained as Premier with a new cabinet.

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and military preparations in the south, in contrast to Japan whose national defense was lagging because of a break-off trade [i.e., embargo] by England and the United States.

Japan decided therefore to complete her war preparations by the end of September at the very latest, and at the same time to exert every effort through diplomatic channels to see her demands fulfilled. If her demands were not met by early October, an Imperial decree would be issued deciding upon war against England and the United States.

These were Japan's minimum demands:

(1) The United States and England not to meddle in Japan's disposition of the China incident and not to present any obstacles [i.e., to discontinue aid to Chungking].

(2) England and the United States not to do anything in the Far East which would present a threat to Japanese security.

(3) England and the United States to cooperate in the procurement of goods needed by Japan [from the Southwestern Pacific].

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If these demands were met, Japan was prepared to make these promises:

(1) Japan would not use French Indo-China as a base for striking at any of the neighboring territories except China.

(2) Japan would withdraw from French Indo-China once lasting peace was established.

(3) Japan would guarantee Philippine neutrality.⁷

7 - The above version of Japan's position at this stage of the negotiations is based partly on the proposals of 6 August and partly on those of 6 September. "Minimum demand" number (1) and "promise" number (1) are both taken from the 6 September proposal; the other points paraphrase parts of the 6 August proposal, except for demand number (2) which is a very rough paraphrase of a clause in both documents.

The net effect of this curious jumble is to make Japan's position appear more uncompromising than it actually was. The message conceals the fact that, as late as 6 August, Japan was still asking the United States to use its good offices to initiate peace negotiations between Japan and the Chungking Government and that, in the 6 September proposal, Japan offered a vague promise to "withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China."

Moreover, the outline suggests that Japan had presented its "minimum demands" to England, as well as to the United States. That of course was not the case. By 6 September Japan had withdrawn her proposal suggesting that the United States use its good offices to persuade England to negotiate a similar agreement.

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The answers which we had received to this proposal of neutrality up to 2 October were very highhanded indeed. They demanded the unconditional acceptance of four basic principles:

- a. Complete respect for national territorial integrity.
- b. No interference in the internal problems of other nations.
- c. Equality in commercial opportunity and general economic equality.
- d. No disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except by peaceful means.⁸

Subsequently, the United States demanded not only immediate withdrawal of our forces from French Indo-China, but complete evacuation of China as well, and also the giving up of the special close economic ties between Japan and China.

⁸ - The above represents a fairly accurate paraphrase of the "four fundamental principles" first enunciated by President Roosevelt in a statement handed to Ambassador Nomura on 3 September and reiterated in a statement handed to Nomura by Mr. Hull on 2 October. According to a 6 September report from Ambassador Grew, on that day Premier Konoye expressed his "whole-hearted agreement" with the four basic principles.

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At this point we felt that it was useless to continue negotiations with the United States, and we urged this upon the Government. However, Premier Konoye did not agree.

C. The Final Decisions

The establishment of Tojo's Cabinet [after Konoye's fall on 16 October] brought about cooperation between the Government and the High Command.

The whole matter was reviewed once again, and finally, on 5 November, war was decided on against England and the United States. An Imperial decree was issued, setting the commencement of hostilities at the beginning of December, and ordering the completion of military preparations while carrying out last minute diplomatic negotiations.

Thereafter, Japan went ahead with plans for war, while on the other hand she sent Ambassador Kurusu in a last endeavor to reach a settlement.

However, the United States showed that her idea of reaching a settlement was to supply us with a little oil

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in return for the immediate withdrawal of our troops from French Indo-China. The United States refused to recognize the peculiar nature of the Chinese problem and the need for preservation of Japan's special position in East Asia, and demanded the scrapping of the Tripartite Pact.

Therefore, the Japanese Imperial Government dropped its former policy and on 20 November presented its requests and demanded a yes or no answer.

These last ditch proposals were as follows:

(1) Except for French Indo-China, Japan will make no further armed advances in East Asia and the South Pacific.

(2) The United States and Japan shall cooperate in insuring [to both countries] the necessary supply of goods from the Netherlands East Indies.

(3) The United States and Japan shall restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets. The United States will agree to supply Japan with the oil she needs.

(4) The United States will not present any obstacle to efforts for bringing about a peace between Japan and China.

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(5) Japan promises that a Chinese-Japanese peace will be concluded, that she will establish a just peace in the Pacific, and that once these are settled, she will withdraw the forces which have been sent to French Indo-China. Also Japan will move the troops which she has stationed in southern French Indo-China to the northern part when the present agreement is signed.⁹

However, the United States had already been negotiating secretly with England, Holland and China, and as soon as she received the new Japanese proposals, she made clear her intention of forming a close union between these four powers. In a note of 26 November, she laid down the four so-called fundamental principles to be accepted as the basis of future negotiations, and then proposed the following specific measures to be carried out by both countries:

(1) Both countries are to contract a multi-lateral non-aggression pact with England, Russia, Holland, China and Thailand.

9 - The foregoing is an accurate paraphrase of Japan's 20 November proposal.

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(2) Both countries will arrange an agreement between Japan, the United States, England, China, Holland and Thailand in regard to respecting the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China.

(3) Japan will withdraw all her troops from China and French Indo-China (army, navy and air force).

(4) neither country will give political, military or economic recognition to any Chinese governmental authority other than Chungking. (Repudiation of the Nanking Government.)

(5) The two countries will negotiate a commercial treaty based on the principles of reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment, and the lowering of trade barriers.

(6) Each country will remove the freezing restrictions on the other's assets.

(7) Even though Japan and the United States may have concluded treaties with third powers, this agreement is fundamental.¹⁰

¹⁰ - Except for the omission of three clauses, the foregoing represents a fairly accurate paraphrase of the U.S. proposals of 26 November.

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In short, the United States proposals agreed with everything that we regarded as inconsistent with the preservation of peace in the Pacific areas. (They also would have made the Tripartite Pact a dead letter.) This United States answer at one fell swoop showed us how utterly ridiculous and useless had been the conferences which had been held since April, and completely swept away all understandings reached. We saw now that future negotiations would be to no purpose, but could only fit in with the delaying policy of the United States.

Consequently, the Supreme War Command immediately decided upon war. On 1 December the Imperial decree was issued. 11

11 - Op. cit., Pg. A-1 to A-11.