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ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

in

SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC

(January, 1943 - October, 1943)

VOLUME VIII

The Contributions of Communication Intelligence
to the Operations of the Commander of the United
States Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

(October, 1943)

28 December 1945

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(October 1943)

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INTRODUCTION

This volume is one of a series of historical studies which will be devoted to an attempt to determine the accuracy and reliability of the operational intelligence, derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to submarine commanders operating under the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. It is hoped that correlation and interpretation of the source material available in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the United States Naval Communication Intelligence organization will produce valuable lessons for the future.

For the sake of convenience the year 1943 was selected as a beginning point for this series since it was an outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. Furthermore, since the records for this period are more complete than those of 1941 and 1942, it was felt that a more accurate appraisal of the worth of communication intelligence could be made.

During this period all American submarines operating below the equator and east of

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longitude 130° were under the command of Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet; all submarine operations above the equator and west of longitude 130° E were the direct responsibility of the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. The relationship of communication intelligence to the operations of submarines under the Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet, will be discussed in a different series, when research in the operational files of the command can be effected.

There were few activities during World War II which received so little attention as the campaign waged so successfully in the Pacific by the submarines of the United States Navy. Co-ordinated attacks by American submarines and air fleets from 1941 to 1945 resulted in the destruction of most of the Japanese merchant fleet, the crippling of Japanese industry by cutting off its source of supply, the hampering of Japanese Army and Navy movements, and the isolation of many Japanese garrisons. The destruction of over six million tons of merchant shipping meant that Japan could not

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effect its ambition of creating an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

As for the part played by American submarines in the elimination of Japan as a military power, statistics indicate that the greater part of Japanese shipping was already destroyed when Allied amphibious forces seized the bases which made possible daily air strikes at Japanese home ports. Although there is no need to enter the current controversy as to whether or not the B-29's won the Japanese war, it suffices to say that the far reaching effects of United States submarine warfare in the Pacific cannot be overlooked by any objective observer. As of August 30, 1945, 1256 Japanese ships had been sunk by American submarines.

During the war submarine operational authorities were in constant communication by a direct telephone line with the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization, and the information made available to them was used to such good advantage that many targets, which otherwise might easily have slipped by the submarine patrols, were sent to the bottom of the sea. This

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does not mean that American submarines were not able to operate independently and efficiently on their own account. On some occasions, when the Japanese had changed their cipher systems and for a short period of time no information could be derived from their communications, American submarines sank almost as many, if not just as many, Japanese ships as when the Japanese messages were being read. Submarine operational authorities have pointed out, however, that the information made available when the Japanese cipher messages were being read currently was of great value in the carry over period till American naval cryptanalysts solved the new Japanese cipher systems. Analysis of previously deciphered messages supplied valuable data as to the favorite routes and procedures of Japanese merchant-ships, and, thus, even when the flow of intelligence decreased temporarily American submarine commanders could be directed to productive areas.

Chart A shows the relationship between the number of Japanese messages translated by American naval cryptanalysts and the tonnage of sunken Japanese shipping.

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Though United States submarines were not always able to sight targets reported to them by communication intelligence sources, submarine authorities have attributed much of their success to information derived from enemy communications. On April 14, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, informed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as follows:

...High percentage of submarine sinkings is based on ULTRA information... (131237 NSR 1231).

On July 3, 1945, the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet sent the following to the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization:

"Commander Submarine Force desires to express his admiration and appreciation to the officers of ComIntOrg for the splendid support and coverage given by you to the recent submarine operation in the Japan Sea. May the great success of this expedition repay you somewhat for your tireless efforts to strike this blow at the heart of the enemy's empire. It could not have been done without your help."

The use of communication intelligence helped revolutionize submarine strategy in the Pacific

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for operational authorities, because of the continuous flow of communication intelligence which they were receiving, were able to station submarines in certain areas which would not normally be considered productive of targets. Though the routes of Japanese convoys were being constantly shifted to avoid reported American submarines, the messages announcing the change of course were deciphered and made available to American submarine commanders. Thus, many otherwise unavailable targets were provided, torpedoes were expended profitably, long patrols in unproductive areas were avoided, and the morale of officers and men was improved.

This volume outlines the relationship of Communication Intelligence to American submarines operating in the Pacific during October, 1943; it is the concluding volume of this series. As in preceding volumes it has an appendix which contains the following material source for each case discussed:

A. Source of Intelligence

Japanese messages deciphered and translated by the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization.

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B. Operational Dispatch

A message containing the information derived from (A), sent by the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet to American submarines.

C. Submarine Action Report

Pertinent data extracted from the action report of the submarine or submarines concerned.

Chart B summarizes the results of action taken by United States Submarines from January through October, 1943, as a result of Communication Intelligence

Another general summary of results will be made in the volumes dealing with November, 1943 to December, 1944.

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CHART B

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

Grand Total - January-October 1945

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 810

I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 445

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 4
2. Submarine not in area..... 100
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 56
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 225
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine.... 3
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 50
7. Information cancelled as incorrect..... 7

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 354

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 120

- (1) Sunk..... 32
- (2) Damaged..... 53
- (3) No perceptible damage..... 13
- (4) Missed..... 15

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked..... 234

- (1) Unfavorable position
of submarine..... 65
- (2) Rough weather-poor
visibility..... 16
- (3) Submarine attacked by
escorts..... 9
- (4) Target showed hospital
ship markings..... 5
- (5) Engaged with other
targets..... 137
- (6) Target not worth torpedo
expenditure..... 4

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to charts, Jan-Oct)

- A. Positive..... 112
- B. Probable..... 11
- C. Possible..... 54

III. Number of Potential Targets for which
the Results Are Unknown..... 11

*The number of potential targets in each case is

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derived from the number in the ComSubPac dispatch. If, however, ComSubPac did not state the number but merely described the target as a convoy, the target is reckoned as one (an escort is not counted unless specified as a destroyer or a larger ship). But if the target was sighted, then the number named in the submarine patrol report is the number computed in the analysis. If ComSubPac was indefinite, stating the target to be "several" ships, the target, if not sighted, is counted as two. For example, in Case 41 of October ComSubPac described the target as "2 AUXILIARY CARRIERS SEVERAL DESTROYERS". The target, which was not sighted, was reckoned as four.

Thus the reckoning is often arbitrary and therefore the figures are only approximate. This applies also to the reasons given for the failure of a submarine to sight, or to attack, an Ultra target assigned to it. If none of the reasons listed in the analysis precisely cover a given case, the case is then reckoned under the most nearly equivalent reason. If two submarines are named as addressees, the reason reckoned in the analysis may be that of the first addressee e.g., Case 23 of July or it may be the reason of the majority if three or more submarines are action addressees (Case 47 of July).

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It should be noted that research in this regard was handicapped seriously by the fact that submarine commanders were under orders to omit all references to Communication Intelligence in their reports as will be seen in the following dispatches:

A. FROM: COMINCH 18/1836 May
TO: CTF 17
CTF 71
CTF 72
INFO: COMSOPAC
CINCPAC
PREC: DEFERRED

SEVERAL SECRET & ULTRA X WAR DIARIES OF SUBMARINES BASED WEST AUSTRALIA FOR MONTHS NOVEMBER DECEMBER JANUARY CONTAIN NUMEROUS REFERENCES COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE & ALL MENTION THIS SOURCE MUST BE ELIMINATED FROM ORIGINAL AND ALL COPIES OF PAST AND FUTURE DIARIES

B. FROM: CINCPAC 18/1836 May
TO: COMSOPAC
PREC: ROUTINE

PASS COMINCH 181836 TO COMSOPAC FOR ACTION

C. FROM: COMSUBPAC 13/0935 July
TO: ALL WUSC COPYING
NEW FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

..... NEITHER ACTUALLY NOR BY IMPLICATION
SHOULD REFERENCE BE MADE TO ULTRA MESSAGES SENT
BY THIS SOURCE & SAME RULE APPLIES FOR WRITING
UP PATROL REPORTS

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ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

October, 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 126

I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 69

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 0
2. Submarine not in area..... 10
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 15
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 24
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarines..... 0
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 0
7. Information cancelled as incorrect..... 4

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 56

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 39

- (1) Sunk..... 5
- (2) Damaged..... 5
- (3) No perceptible damage..... 7
- (4) Missed..... 2

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked... 37

- (1) Unfavorable position of submarine..... 19
- (2) Rough weather-poor visibility..... 1
- (3) Submarine attacked by escorts..... 0
- (4) Target showed Hospital ship markings..... 0
- (5) Engaged with other targets..... 17
- (6) Target not worth Torpedo expenditure..... 0

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to Chart - October)

- A. Positive..... 19
- B. Probable..... 2
- C. Possible..... 1

III. Number of Potential Targets for which the Results are Unknown..... 1

* Convoy of unknown number of ships has been considered as but one target.

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October 19/3

No.	Co Submarine Operational Disturbances (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(s)	Type, No. of Blimps, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
1.	01-0719	U.S.S. <u>Albatross</u>	Unknown type ship. Positions for 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 4 and 5: 13-20N, 161-54E and 10-10N, 164-55E respectively.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Albatross</u> contacted only a small cargo freighter at 10-50N, 160-15E on Oct. 4 but did not consider the target worth the expenditure so no attack was made.
		U.S.S. <u>Albatross</u>	Large ship, possibly a seaplane tender. On Oct. 4 at 0830 (GCT) the ship's position: 8-06N, 157-06E; and at 0330 on Oct. 5: 8-00N, 157-42E.	None	The <u>Albatross</u> was proceeding to its new station east of Iruk on Oct. 4 and on the following day departed for Johnston Island to refuel. No contacts were made on route. ComSubPac serial received.

2.	01-2675	U.S.S. <u>Albatross</u>	The <u>Kazuhaya</u> , a large tanker. At 0330 (GCT) on Oct. 5 the tanker's position would be 10-55N, 173-40E. At the same time on the following day the position would be 9-50N, 173-00E. The	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. Tanker attacked and sunk at 10-26N, 173-20E at 1636 (GCT) on Oct. 5. The tanker was sunk by the <u>Albatross</u> the next day.
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No.	ConSubroc Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Submarine Address(es)	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact (s)
2.	(cont.) same course, 102, was to be pursued for seven hours after the last posi- tion given.			
		<u>U.S.S. HAWKING</u>	Positive	A 10,000-ton tanker previously damaged by the steelhead was sunk at 10-30H, 148-30E at 06:4 (GCT) on Oct. 6. ConSubroc serial received.
	Tanker previously damaged at 10-30I, 146-37E being towed to Truk. (No data or position given.)			

3.	01-0036 U.S.S. <u>HAWKING</u>	Convey or unknown type ship. Departed atoll carried by <u>Haukilus</u> at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 1. positions for the same	None	ConSubroc dispatch received. No contacts were made through the <u>Haukilus</u> was patrolling this area.
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No.	ComSubPac Operational Messages (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
3.	(Cont.)	U.S.S. <u>USS T-101</u>	time on the next day will be 4-16N, 172-05E.	None	Reception and transmission poor due to Jap interference.

4.	01-1003	U.S.S. <u>USS T-101</u>	Convoy. Positions of the convoy will be 10-31N, 134-08E on Oct. 2 and 13-32N, 134-06E on Oct. 3.	Positive.	ComSubPac serial received. A convoy of 5 ships and 2 escorts was sighted at 10-38N, 134-09E at 0510 (GMT) on Oct. 2. An attack was conducted but no precise battle damage was inflicted before the Mustangs lost sight of the target while evading the escorts. A part of the same convoy was sighted again at 12-16N, 133-27E at 2121 (GMT) but no attack was made because of the unfavorable position of the submarine.
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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Reference)	Submarine Assignment(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
4.	(Cont.) U.S.S. T-1003 (Operational Dispatches)		Convoy. Positions for the convoy at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 7, 8, 9 will be: 25-00N, 134-14E, 27-57N, 134-14E, and 30-44N, 133- 02E respectively.	None	ComSubPac serial received. The <u>Tullibee</u> was in a store on Oct. 9 and 10 and no entry was made in the log for Oct. 6-9.
5.	01-001 U.S.S. T-1001 (Operational Dispatches)		Medium tanker. Posi- tions for the tanker at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 2, 3, 4, and 5 will be: 6-57N, 137-38E 6-33N, 141-16E 6-20N, 144-54E and 6-20N, 148-32E	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>How</u> was patrolling the Palau-Nakau shipping route which is at an angle from the direct west-east route taken by the tanker. ComSubPac dispatch received. No entry in log for Oct. 1-5 A tanker sighted on the 4th at 08H, 150E a few degrees away from the position given Attacked but amount of damage unknown.

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No.	ComSubpac Designation	Submarine Address (S)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
6.	02-0526 U.S.C. SANDRAGON		Convoy. To be at 11N, 160E at 0600 (GCT) on 3 Oct. and at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 5 at 09-40N, 165-20E.	Positive	ComSubpac dispatch received. A convoy of one ship with 5 escorts was contacted by radar at 10-50N, 160E at 0650 (GCT) on Oct. 3. The SANDRAGON was unable to close for an attack.

7.	02-1035 U.S.C. SANDRAGON		German cargo-passenger ship. Positions for dates & times (GCT) given will be as follows: 0300/4 26-20N, 130-20E, 0300/5 23-15N, 125-15E, 0300/6 20-20N, 120-40 E and 0300/7 16-45N, 116-50E.	None	ComSubpac serial received. The SANDRAGON was conducting a surface patrol Oct. 4-8 but no contacts were made.
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	U.S.C. SANDRAGON			Positive	A ship was sighted on Oct. 6 at 2315 at 20-12N, 120- 26E but contact was lost while the SANDRAGON was attempting to get in firing position.
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ComSubPac Serials Received	No. (Reference)	Submarine Reference	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
ComSubPac	04-0701	U.S.S. TULLIBON	Sulkenoura Bay and convoy without escorts. Positions for the convoy are given as 26-55N, 136-20W at 0200 (GGT) Oct. 10; 30-50N, 136- 10E at 0300 (GGT) Oct. 11; 34-25N, 139-15W at 0300 (GGT) on Oct. 12.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The steelshead was patrolling traffic lanes west of Truk. A great distance south-east of the convoy position. No contacts were made.
ComSubPac		U.S.S. TULLIBON		None	The Tullibon was repairing storm casualties on Oct. 10. No contacts on Oct. 11 or 12.
ComSubPac		U.S.S. GUENARD		None	ComSubPac serial received. The Guenard was busy trail- ing and attacking a convoy far southeast of this position.
ComSubPac		U.S.S. TARPOON		None	Tarpoon enroute its assigned area. On October 13 position approximately 34N, 136E.

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No.	Submarine (date-time)	Submarine Adversary(B)	Type, No. of Ships, positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
9.	05-1130	<u>U.S.S. POBY</u>	Ship type unknown. 0300 (GCT) positions given for Oct. 5, 6, 7 will be 7-03N, 140-50W, 5-15N, 135-45W and 2- 05N, 130-45W respectively.	Probable	Radio not always satisfec- tory. POBY was patrolling this area and contacted 2 ships at 05-15N, 135-56E on Oct. 6. Fired 4 torpedoes but missed target.

See I, Case 9 on chart.

10.	05-0710	<u>U.S.S. POBY</u>	Convoy of three ships (type unknown) and 2 escorts. Positions for Oct. 5, 6, 7 at 0300 (GCT) will be 03-45N, 138-50W, 02-10N, 141- 30E, and 00-40N, 144- 10E respectively.	None	
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CorSubPac serial received.
Sawfish was patrolling
this area but made no
contacts.

11.	05-0000	<u>U.S.S. POBY</u>	1 ship (type unknown) positions for Oct. 7 at 1100 (GCT) and 2300 (GCT) will be 42-10N, 139-50W and 41-20N, 139-30E.	None	
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Co Subpac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
11. (Cont.)	U.S.S. T-100	1 ship. Being towed at 0230. (GCT) Oct. 4- 46N, 147E. Speed 2 knots.	None	Wahpo report not available; it did not return from this patrol.
12. 05-0747	U.S.S. T-100	1 truck carrier with 1 or 2 destroyers. The carrier will arrive at North Channel (Truk?) at 0230 Oct 10 and en route will pass through 16-36N, 150-00E at 2000 (GCT) Oct. 7 and 08-35N, 152-32E at 0230 Oct. 9.	None	ComSubpac serial received. T-100 was patrolling this area these days but no con- tact was made.
06-1621 (additional information)	U.S.S. STEELHEAD		None	The <u>Steelhead</u> from Oct. 7 to Oct. 12 was patrolling traffic routes west of Truk. No contact with the Ultra was reported.

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ComSubpac
Operational
Dispatches
(P.A.S. Form)

Contacts
Made with
target(s)

Results of Contact(s)

Type, No. of Ships,
Positions Given

Submarine
Address(es)

13. 06-049

U.S.S.
W-100

None

The Sturgeon was patrolling the assigned area but made no contact. Enemy jamming made reception poor.

German ship (type unknown) 0300 (CCT) positions for Oct. 6, 7, 8 are 27-02N, 130-50E, 24N, 126E and 21-20N, 121-10E and a German ship (type unknown) 0200 (CCT) positions for 7, 8, 9, 10 and 10 Oct. are 26-50N, 130-50E; 24-40N, 127-00E; 22-00N, 122-55E and 19N, 119E.

U.S.S.
W-100

Possible

The Curmaid attacked ship on Oct. 9 at 13-50N, 118-55E; damage unknown.

14. 06-1017

U.S.S.
W-100

None

Reception difficult. No contacts were made with a tanker these dates. The Steelhead was patrolling traffic lanes west of Frank till the 12th and then began the trip to its assigned area.

Tanker. 0300 (CCT) positions for Oct. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 will be 3-14N, 130-03E; 3-56N, 135-00E; 4-18N, 140-02E; 6-12N, 144-36E; and 7-30N, 140-27E.

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<u>Warline</u> <u>Message(s)</u>	<u>Type, No. of Ships,</u> <u>Positions Given</u>	<u>Contacts</u> <u>Made with</u> <u>target(s)</u>	<u>Results of Contact(s)</u>
<u>S.S.</u> <u>5-40H</u>	7 ship convoy to be at 5-40H, 131-49E and 7- 23N, 134-27E at 0300 (GCT) on 10 and 11 Oct.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. No contact with the tanker. The <u>Warline</u> was patrolling traffic lanes these dates.
<u>S.S.</u> <u>5-40H</u>	Ship (type unknown) departing main port of Jaluit area at 1900 (GCT) Oct. 6 and arrives at main port of Kwajalein area at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 7	Positive	The <u>Warline</u> sighted 5 ships with 2 escorts at 0909 (I) 10 Oct. at 05-40N, 131-54E but was unable to close for an attack.
<u>S.S.</u> <u>5-40H</u>	None	None	Enemy interference made reception difficult. Patrolling S.E. pass of Jaluit. No contacts made.
<u>S.S.</u> <u>5-40H</u>	None	None	<u>Sanderson</u> - 10° west of Jaluit during this time.

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (date-time)	Submarine Assignment(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
14. (Cont.)	U.S.S. <u>W-383</u>	7 ship convoy to be at 5-40N, 131-49E and 7-23N, 134-27E at 0300 (GCT) on 10 and 11 Oct.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. No contact with the target. The <u>W-383</u> was patrolling traffic lanes these dates.
15. 06-1305	U.S.S. <u>W-383</u>	Ship (type unknown) departing main port of Jaluit area at 1900 (GCT) Oct. 6 and arrives at main port of Kwajalein area at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 7	None	The <u>W-383</u> sighted 5 ships with 2 escorts at 0509 (I) 10 Oct. at 05-40N, 131-54E but was unable to close for an attack.
	U.S.S. <u>W-383</u>		None	Enemy interference made reception difficult. Patrolling S.E. pass of Jaluit. No contacts made.

Longitude - 10° west of Jaluit during this time.

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No.	ComSubpac Serial Number (Ref. Serial)	Submarine Reference(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Sightings Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
16.	06-176	U.S.S. USS-176	5 ship convoy to be at 23-00N, 120-10E at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 7 and at 10-40N, 119-30E at the same time on Oct. 8.	Positive	Attacked 5 ship convoy at 19-30N, 119-10E at 0312 (GCT) October 7; two ships were sunk.
17.	06-072	U.S.S. USS-072	A man-of-war (type un- known) departing main port area 190 (Uvaja- lein) at 2000 (GCT) on Oct. 7 and arrives at 06-00N, 160-30E (Jaluit) at 2000 (GCT) Oct. 8.	None	Reception was difficult due to enemy jamming. The ship <u>was</u> patrolling this area and sighted nests of a ship 7 miles inside lagoon on Oct. 8 at 0011 (GCT). No other contact was made.
18.	00-2102	U.S.S. USS-2102	Ship (type unknown) en route to destination at 22-30N, 170-25E; the ship will pass thru 21-55N, 117-55E at 0200 (GCT) on Oct. 9 and at 3300 (GCT) on Oct. 10 through 23- 10N, 117-00E.	None	ComSubpac serial received. The <u>Gurnard</u> was busy track- ing and attacking a merchant ship at 10N, 118E several degrees southeast.

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ComSubPac Operational Plans (2000-5100)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
19. 20-0303	U.S.S. <u>SALENTINO</u>	7 ship convoy to be at: 26-38N, 126-22E 25-23N, 123-30E 24-37N, 120-25E on Oct. 10, 11 and 12 was actively at 0300 (002) each day.	None	ComSubPac serial received. On Oct. 10 and 11 the <u>Tullileo</u> was reporting status casualties and getting to better seas. No contact was made with the convoy.
20. 10-03'3	U.S.S. <u>SALENTINO</u>	None	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. Narrative for these dates missing.
21. 10-03'3	U.S.S. <u>SALENTINO</u>	The <u>Kirikawa Maru</u> on route to <u>Boy's Strait</u> (46N, 143E) and will pass thru 48-50N, 148-00E at 2100 (002) on Oct. 10 and 46-10E, 146-30E at 0900 (002) on Oct. 11.	None	ComSubPac serial received. The <u>Salmon</u> was patrolling in this area but made no contacts.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
21.	IC-0737	U.S.S. STEELHEAD	2 AXI's and probably several destroyers. Additional destroyers may join at 0300/16 to pass thru 33-12N, 132- 20E at 2115/13; 24-18N, 139-46E at 1245/15; and 20-43N, 146-18E at 1100 Oct. 16. (All times CCT)	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. 2 AXI's sighted at 2471, 136E at 2145 (CCT) on Oct. 13. No attack was made (report gives no reason for this).

U.S.S. STEELHEAD	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Steelhead was patrol- ing in another area. Only a hospital ship was sighted.
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U.S.S. GILLETTE	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The Gillette sighted a convoy of 12 ships at 26N, 121E on Oct. 13. The positions of these ships would be too far west to be the same convoy.
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October 1943

No.	ComSubpac Operational Positions (Reference)	Submarine Assignment (Reference)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
21.	(Cont.) 11-1614 (Reference)		ComSubpac directed that address disregard his 10- 0737 and move on toward their areas.		
22.	10-077 <u>U.S.S. T-11</u>		One ship (type unknown) and an escort to be at 05-20N, 168-00E at 1930 (GCT) on Oct. 9, at 06- 20N, 171-30E at 2130 (GCT) on Oct. 10, and at 06- 17N, 171-48E at 0330 (GCT) on Oct. 11.	Positive	ComSubpac dispatch received. An AK plus an XAM escort and a PC escort were sighted on the 11th at 06-25N, 171- 39E. An attack was made but no apparent damage inflicted.
13-1031	<u>U.S.S. T-11</u>		Same ship leaving vicin- None ity of first attack. Warning of antisubmarine success.		No indication that <u>Scirlack</u> attempted a second contact.

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October 1943

No.	ComSubpac Oranizational Dispatches (Det. 201st)	Submarine Addresser (S)	Type, No. of Ships, Position(s) Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(E)
02.	10-0004	U.S.S. USSALMON	Ship (type unknown) or convey to be at 09- 171, 161-50N at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 11; and at the same time on the following day at 09-22N, 161-55E.	Positive	ComSubpac serial received. An A.P. with a trader as escort sighted at 9-35N, 162-00E on Oct. 11 at 1051 (GCT). The AP was sunk at 1950 (GCT) on Oct. 12.

04.	10-1011	U.S.S. USSALMON	Convey to be at: 22-25N, 144-10E 19-40N, 145-10E 17-00N, 145-30E at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 11, 12, and 13 respect- ively.	None	ComSubpac serial received. No log entry for 11 and 12 Oct. No activity on Oct. 13 as the Muskallunge returned slowly to the east because of a shortage of fuel.
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05.	11-0003	U.S.S. USSALMON	2 cargo ships & two destroyers 2100 (GCT) positions for Oct. 11 and 15 will be 11-10N, 147-20W and 23-15N, 149-10E.	None	Reception difficult. The stealthed was patrolled in traffic lanes west of 17N and proceeding to assigned area. No contact was made with the four ships.
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October 1943

No.	Comdr/Operational Distances	Submarine Positions Given	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
05.	(cont.)		Steelhead to move in the direction given preparatory to inter- cepting another convoy if it cannot get this one.		
06.	U.S. NAVY	09-31W, 142-12N 11-00N, 137-34E 11-00N, 132-08E and 09-05N, 138-05E at 0300 (CEST) on Oct. 12, 13, 14 and 15 respec- tively.	One merchant ship to be None	None	Evening reception difficult due to fading and interfer- ence. The Navy was patrol- ling Truk-Saipan route and en route to Japanese Islands. A contact and a DE were sighted but the Navy was unable to close for an attack. (12N-14E)
07.	U.S. NAVY	Five ships to be at: 10-16N, 147-35E 12-00N, 142-25E and 06-00N, 145-35E	None	None	Patrolling traffic routes west of Truk and en route to assigned area 7-15 Oct.
07.	U.S. NAVY		See Case 26 on chart for Steelhead activity these dates.		

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October 1943

No.	Comsubpac Operational Messages (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
27.	(Cont.)		at 2100 (CCT) on Oct. 11, 12 and 16 respec- tively.	None	Jap interference and atmospherics caused radio difficulties. The island was patrolling in and around the Caroline Islands but made no contact with the COMNAVY.

U.S.S.
USS-10

28.	12-1771	<u>U.S.S. USS-10</u>	Eleven ship convoy to be at: 10-33N, 174-24E 29-27N, 122-33E 26-30N, 171-15E and 23-23N, 119-51E at 0700 (CCT) on Oct. 12, 13, 14 and 15 respectively.	Positive	Comsubpac serial received. 12 ships were sighted at 26-47N, 121-15E at 2200 (CCT) on 13 Oct. Two ships were damaged and one AP was believed to have been sunk.
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ORIGINAL
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October 1943

ComSubpac Operational Reports (Reference)	Submarine Addresses(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
20. 12-2779	<u>None</u>	2 merchant ships and 2 DM's. 2100 (GCT) positions for the ships for Oct. 15 and 16 will be 23-15N, 129-10E and 26-50N, 125-45E. At 0000 on Oct. 18, they are due to arrive at Manchal. 2 merchant ships, 1 light cruiser and one DD. To arrive at Manchal at 0000 (GCT) on 18 Oct. and will pass thru 26-00N, 125-35E at 2100 on Oct. 16 and 30-58N, 123-12E at 2100 on Oct. 17.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The <u>Guard</u> was patrolling to the east of this area.
	<u>U.S.S. Guillard</u>		None	ComSubpac dispatch received. The <u>Steelhead</u> was patrolling southeast of this area.

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October 1943

Caribbean
Operational
Planchettes
(containing)

Contacts
Made with
target(s) Results of Contact(s)

Type, No. Of Ships,
Positions Given

Submarine
Appearance(s)

Information

20. (cont.)

WAC:
H.C.O.
TULLIBEE

Tullibee notified that
Gupnam and Stealheed
would enter its area.

Convoys of 12-07/9 were
rerouted and speeded up
to avoid submarines.
First arrived 21 hours
early and second, 5 hours
early at entrance buoys.
Second convoy to pass
through 27-15N, 124-40E
at 2100 (GCT) Oct. 16.

16-1802
(containing
information)

WAC:
H.C.O.

6 ship convoy and one
escort. 0300 (GCT)
positions for Oct. 13,
14, 15 and 16 will be
37-57N, 127-03E, 30-
36N, 123-17E, 26-40N,
101-06E and 22-39N, 120-
13E respectively.

29. 12-0527

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October 1943

Coastwise Operational Patrols (Date-Time)	Submarine Addresses(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
20. (cont.)	U.S.S. T-10	None	None	See Case 28 on chart for full-time activity these dates.
21. 17-0000	U.S.S. T-10	None	None	See Case 29 on chart for Guard activity these dates.
22. 17-0000	U.S.S. T-10	Convoy. 0300 (ACT) positions for Oct. 14, 15, 16 will be 26-35N, 126-40E; 29-55N, 129- 15E and 33-35N, 129- 50E.	None	See cases 28 and 29 for Monson's full track activity these dates.
23. 17-1700	U.S.S. T-10	Tanker and escort. positions for dates and times given will be:	None	patrolling. No contact with tanker or escort. Some radio difficulty.

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October 1943

CONFIDENTIAL
OPERATIONAL
MEMORANDUM
(Security - S)

Contacts
Made with
Target(s)

Time, No. of Ships,
Positions Given

Results of Contact(s)

0300/13 03-16N, 151-40E,
0300/14 11-50N, 143-55E,
0300/15 15-07N, 145-40E.

U.S.S.
USS-200

Positive

Fading and interference
made evening reception
difficult. A tanker and a
DE were sighted at 0600
(060) on Oct. 14 at 13N-
145E but the DE was unable
to close for an attack.

21. 14-1735

U.S.S.
USS-200

Convey to us at 10-
00N, 154-04W at 0300
(030) on Oct. 15 and
at 13N, 153E at 0300
on Oct. 16.

Positive

See Case 32 For U.S.S.
activity these dates.

U.S.S.
USS-200

Positive

Fading and interference
made evening reception
difficult. A convey of six
ships and one escort was
sighted at 2335 (060) on
Oct. 16 at 13-07N, 153-53E.

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October 1943

No. (Priority)	Consulting Organization	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
33.	(Cont.)				The convoy evidently changed course while the Foxx was submerged for an approach so no attack was made.
34.	15-0950	U.S.S. <u>Barb</u>	1 ship (<u>Hein Horn</u>) and two destroyers. 0900 (GCT) 18, 19, and 20 Oct. positions will be 21-04N, 127-59E; 26-28N, 127-39E and 31-51N, 127-32E.	Positive	ComSubPac dispatch received. At 2333 (GCT) 0-6. 19 a vessel similar to the <u>Hein Horn</u> and two destroyers were sighted at 31-29N, 127-28E course north. The <u>Barb</u> fired four torpedoes but no perceptible damage was inflicted.

U.S.S. Barb

Positive

Barb report not available. Conclusion based on ComSubPac 20-0817. Barb sighted target but was unable to close for attack.

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October 1943

No.	ComSubpac Operational Distances (Route-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
21.	(cont.) 27-2817 27-2802 (Operational Information)	U.S.S. T-37	ComSubpac notified the USS that the <u>Yanb</u> had sighted the target but could not attack.		

35.	15-1760	U.S.S. T-37	Auxiliary carrier and a destroyer to depart the North Channel (Trule) at 1900 (GCT) Oct. 15 and pass thru: 11-00L, 151-20E at 0700/16 16-25N, 177-35E at 0600/17 20-00N, 175-00E at 2100/17 26-45N, 171-45E at 2400/18 32-30N, 139-00E at 2100/19 35-18N, 139-40E at 0700/20 to rendezvous with a DD at 0600 (GCT) on October 17 position 16-25N, 177- 35E.	Positive	ComSubpac dispatch received. A large carrier and a DD were sighted at 11-00N, 151-20E on Oct. 16 at 0600 (GCT). An attack was made but only slight damage inflicted.
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None
In area attacking convoy.
No contact with Ultra.

U.S.S.
T-37

ORIGINAL
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October 1943

ComSubPac Operational Vessels (Date-Status)	Submarine Assignment(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
25. (Cont.)	<u>U.S.S. GUYARD</u>		Positive	An auxiliary carrier and 3 DD were sighted at 1642 (GCT) on Oct. 17 at 19-34N, 175-20E. The XCV was <u>HIT</u> with one torpedo.
	<u>U.S.S. GUYARD</u>		None	For contact and result see directly below.
	Information from: <u>U.S.S. GUYARD</u>		Positive	For en route Johnston Island.
14-2216 (Operational Information)	<u>U.S.S. GUYARD</u>	Tells Texson that carrier of ComSubPac's 15-1559 may have slowed down because of hits from <u>Hines</u> and <u>Flynn Fish</u> .		An XCV and a DD were sighted at 1929 (GCT) on Oct. 19 at 20N, 132E. Four shots were fired but no hit was made.

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ComSubpac Operational Numbers (Contacting)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships; Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
26. 16-0671	<u>U.S.S. TULLIBEE</u>	Convoy on ship to be at 8-08N, 143-13E; 6- 58N, 146-05E and 7-40N, 149-00E at 0300 (GCT) on Oct. 18, 19 and 20 respectively.	None	ComSubpac dispatch received. Reply occurred with two battleships and a DD at 13N, 149E.
	<u>U.S.S. TULLIBEE</u>		Positive	Contacted 3 ships at 7-42N, 149-11E at 0143 (GCT) on Oct. 20. No attack was possible.

Convoy (or ship).
0300 (GCT) positions
for 17, 18, and 19 will
be 27-20N, 129-30E, 29-
55N, 130-00E and 32-25N,
129-15E.

None

The Tullibee was in the
vicinity of 26N, 121E -
several degrees west of
the target.

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October 1942

No. Contact Coordinates Flight Dates (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
37. (Cont.)	U.S.S. GUARD		None	The <u>Guard</u> at 25-25N, 142-50E was over ten degrees to the east.
	U.S.S. GUARD		None	The <u>Starboard</u> was at 8N, 142E over 20 degrees SE of the target.
38. 16-0440	U.S.S. FISH	Ship (type unknown) and 2 escorts to be at 20-00N, 145-05E at 1100 (GCT) on Oct. 16 and at 21-51N, 144-21E at 0300 (GCT) on the following day.	None	Electrical storms made reception poor. The <u>Fishing</u> made no ship contacts on the 16th and there were no entries in the log for the 17th. An auxiliary carrier and one DD were sighted and attached on 18 Oct. southeast of the given position.
	U.S.S. FISH		None	See Cases 35 and 36 on chart for <u>Miarole</u> activities

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ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Ty c, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of contact(s)
19. 17-0059	U.S.S. <u>Wahoo</u>	Convoy (believed by ComSubPac to be the convoy which U.S.S. Bury probably damaged. See X, Case 35, C-4) to be at: 15-54N, 151-55E at 0300/17 18-30N, 150-55E at 0300/18 21-10N, 149-20E at 0300/19 22-40N, 147-55E at 0300/20 26-00N, 146-15E at 0300/21 All times GCT.	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. No ship contacts were reported by Tautog these dates
20. 17-0053	U.S.S. <u>Wahoo</u>	Convoy will pass thru 4-52N, 146-00E and at 1100 on Oct. 20 thru 8-12N, 143-00E; at 1300/21 thru 8-12N, 137-30E;	None	ComSubPac dispatch received. The <u>Seawolf</u> searched the assigned area but no contact was made with the convoy.

ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of contact(s)	
20. 17-0053	U.S.S. <u>Wahoo</u>	Convoy will pass thru 4-52N, 146-00E and at 1100 on Oct. 20 thru 8-12N, 143-00E; at 1300/21 thru 8-12N, 137-30E;	Probable	ComSubPac dispatch received. 2 AIs and a BD were sighted on Oct. 20 at 1318 (GCT) at 03-05N, 142-41E. The <u>Steelhead</u> made two hits on the

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Co-Subpac Operational Matches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addresses(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
40. (Cont.)		at 0330/02 thru 8-02H, 134-29E. All times GCT.		smaller AK. The next day the AK believed to have been damaged was sighted stopped in the water. Contact was lost during escort evasion and never regained.
10-2016 (Additional Information)		The U.S.S. Gato had sunk one ship of this convoy and was chasing another one toward the <u>Steelhead's</u> area.		
41. 18-2970	<u>U.S.S. Mingo</u>	2 auxiliary carriers and several destroyers arriving North Channel of Truk at 2130 (GCT) Oct. 18.	None.	<u>Mingo</u> was in area but did not contact target.

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ComSubPac Operational Messages (Reference)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
12. 27-1675	U.S.S. <u>Haddock</u>	3 cruisers to enter North Channel of Haddock area (Mishima Channel) at 0230 (GCT) on Oct. 28.	None	<u>Haddock</u> near Truk but made no contacts.

13. 29-1671	U.S.S. <u>Haddock</u>	1 DD, 1 merchantman and one ship type un- known to leave the North Channel of Haddock area at 0700 Oct. 30.	None	See Case 42 on chart.
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ORIG: MI
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Chapter X

October 1, 1943

Case 1

From deciphered Japanese dispatches of September 27 and September 30, it was learned that an unidentified ship would leave from Yokosuka en route to Kwajalein, and that a ship, possibly the Kikukawa Maru, would leave Kwajalein, possibly on October 1, en route to Truk.

For the unknown-type ship plying between Yokosuka and Kwajalein, ComSubPac sent recovered positions for October 4 and 5 to the U.S.S. Seadragon. To the U.S.S. Ho ComSubPac sent the questionable positions for October 4 and 5 for the seaplane tender sailing between Kwajalein and Truk.

No contact with either target, however, was made by the Ho or the Seadragon, since the Ho, after patrolling in the Truk area, routed its course for Johnston Island because its reserve

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- 1 - Appendix X, Case 1, No. A-1 and No. A-3,
Hereafter known as X, Case 1, A-1 - A-3.
2 - X, Case 1, B-1.

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fuel supply was running low.³

The U.S.S. Desiraron on its patrol contacted only an enemy freighter with five small escorts in position 10-50 N, 160-15 E on October 4.⁴ This contact was made in a position completely off the course of the Ultra target. However, two positions for October 2 and 3 were not recovered, and the position recovered for October 1 (22-54 N, 152-32 E) and for October 4 (13-20 N, 161-54 E) are approximately two days apart according to the rate of speed at which the ship passed through previously-scheduled positions.

Case 2

The Kasahava, a large Japanese tanker, originating a movement report on September 27, disclosed that it would leave Kure for Truk at 1000 (I) on July 30. At 1900 (I) on July 30 it would reach Seaki, and proceeding on course 156, would reach 11-16 N, 142-12 E at 0330 (I) on October 5. Taking course 102, the ship would proceed to 09-30 N, 150-30 E where it would arrive at 1900 (I) on September 6. Moon positions for the vessel were also listed.⁵

- 3 - X, Case 1, C-2.
- 4 - X, Case 1, C-4.
- 5 - X, Case 2, A-1.

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ComSubPac sent the noon positions for October 5 and 6 to the U.S.S. Tinosa and the U.S.S. Steelhead.⁶

The target was first attacked by the Steelhead at 1433 (GCT) on October 5 in position 10-26 N, 142-29 E when two, and possibly three, hits were obtained.⁷ At 0243 (GCT) on October 6 ComSubPac originated another dispatch to the Tinosa and the Steelhead, informing them that the damaged Kazahaya⁸ was at 10-30 N, 146-37 E en route to Truk; but by this time the Tinosa had already sighted the target in position 10-24 N, 146-52 E. Obtaining six hits in addition to the Steelhead's three, the Tinosa at 0933 (GCT) watched the target sink.⁹ This is a positive contact with the Kazahaya, the Ultra target.

Case 3

On October 1, at 0936 (GCT), ComSubPac sent an Ultra dispatch to the U.S.S. Nautilus and the U.S.S. Skinjack, informing them that an unknown type ship or convoy departed Tarawa bound for Mille. The noon position for October 2 was given as 4-16 N,¹⁰ 172-08 E.

- 6- X, Case 2, B-1.
- 7- X, Case 2, C-2.
- 8- X, Case 2, A-2 - B-2.
- 9- H, Case 2, C-4 - C-5.
- 10- X, Case 3, B-1.

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Although the U.S.S. Nautilus was patrolling the area approximately one degree south-east of Tarawa on October 1 and its radio reception¹¹ was presumably good, no evidence of a search for the Ultra target was reported. The Nautilus on its Sixth War Patrol had been assigned to periscope reconnaissances of certain atolls in this vicinity and on the first two days of October it continued photographing the coast of Apamama and Bititu.¹²

The U.S.S. Skipjack was several degrees to the west of the unknown type ship which ComSubPac plotted at approximately 6 N, 172 E at 2030 (GST) on October 2. Possibly because of poor radio reception and resulting garbled transmission, the Skipjack may¹³ not have received ComSubPac's dispatch.

Neither submarine made a contact with this Ultra target.

Case 4

Points through which a Japanese convoy would pass en route to Saeki were listed in a Japanese dispatch intercepted by Communications Intelligence on October 1. The translators commented that the convo

11 - X, Case 3, C-1.
12 - X, Case 3, C-2.
13 - X, Case 3, C-3 - C-4.

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probably consisted of five merchantmen. At 1823 (GCT)¹⁴
ComSubPac addressed the U.S.S. Muskallunge, with all-
submarines copying, stating that this convoy would
approach 10-31 N, 134-08 E and 13-32 N, 134-08 E on
October 2 and 3 respectively.¹⁵

At 0510 (GCT) on October 2 the
Muskallunge sighted the convoy with two escorts at
approximately two and one-half degrees NNW of Palau
Island and submerged for attack. Almost four hours
later the submarine surfaced to continue the chase;
for the target was zigzagging as much as 60 degrees
from its base course. After selecting two targets and
approaching to within firing range, the Muskallunge
fired all tubes, directing three torpedoes at each of
the two targets. Smoke was observed. Before the stern
tubes could be fired, the escorting vessels closed in
and the Muskallunge was forced to dive. Seven depth
charges were dropped but none near enough to cause
damage to the submarine.

The Muskallunge made a second contact
with the convoy at dawn of the next day. After
continuing the chase until October 6 without finding
an opportunity for a third attack, the submarine

14 - X, Case 4, A-1.
15 - X, Case 4, B-1.

ORIGINAL

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discontinued the search and headed for Midway because
of fuel limitations and engine trouble.¹⁶

On October 3 ComSubPac sent October 7,
8, and 9 fixes for the same convoy to the U.S.S.
Tullibee.¹⁷ However, during that period the Tullibee was
caught in a typhoon and sighted no vessels.¹⁸

In this case two positive contacts
were made with the Ultra target by the U.S.S. Muskellunge
but the amount of damage inflicted upon the merchantmen
was not ascertained.

Case 5

Radio Intelligence decoded and translated
a Japanese dispatch dated October 1, 1943, which listed
the noon positions from October 2 through October 5 of
a merchantman and its escort leaving Taloa for Truk.¹⁹

In transmitting this information to the U.S.S. Foggy,
U.S.S. Tinoca, and U.S.S. Steelhead, ComSubPac sent the
four noon positions of this medium tanker.²⁰

The Foggy was patrolling the Palau-
Rabaul shipping routes to the south of the Ultra target
so did not contact it.²¹ The Steelhead, noting difficulty

-
- 16 - X, Case 4, C-2 - C-3.
 - 17 - X, Case 4, E-2.
 - 18 - X, Case 4, C-5.
 - 19 - X, Case 5, A-1.
 - 20 - X, Case 5, E-1.
 - 21 - X, Case 5, C-2.

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23 December 1945

in radio reception which may have prevented its
receiving this ComSubPac dispatch, made no entry in
its log from October 1 to 5.

On October 4 the U.S.S. Tinosa
attacked a maru at 08-00 N, 150-19 E which is tenta-
tively identified as similar to the Husisan Maru, a
ship of 9527 tons. Of the four torpedoes which the
submarine fired, two were probable hits although the
amount of damage was unknown. It is doubtful that
this was a contact with the Ultra target as the attacked
merchantman was approximately six degrees east of the
expected noon position of the Ultra ship on October 4.

October 2, 1945

Case 5

The departure of a convoy from Truk
was learned from a Japanese dispatch dated September 30.
U. S. Communications Intelligence commented that one
vessel of this convoy destined for Kiiyo Channel in the
Jaluit Atoll was probably the Yamahiko Maru.
ComSubPac relayed fixes for October 3 at 0600 (GCT) as 11 N-180 E
and for October 5 at 0300 (GCT) as 09-40 N, 165-20 E

22 - X, Case 5, C-3.
23 - X, Case 5, C-4.
24 - X, Case 5, C-6 - C-7.
25 - X, Case 6, A-1.

ORIGINAL

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26

to the U.S.S. Seadragon.

In its Eighth War Patrol report the Seadragon described contacting this convoy at 0638 on October 3. The target was a small, empty freighter of about 1500 tons, with five escorts, two large armed trawlers, two EC boats, and one Chidori class torpedo boat. The Seadragon trailed the convoy for two days, but it was unable to close for an attack. Although this was a positive contact with the Ultra target, nothing resulted.

October 3, 1943

Case 7

On October 3 at 1038 (GCT) ComSubPac sent an Ultra dispatch to the U.S.S. Gurnard and the U.S.S. Sturgeon, giving the positions for a German cargo-passenger vessel headed for Bangkok. Despite the fact that the Sturgeon reported that it had received all ComSubPac serials and that on October 5 it was patrolling on the surface at 23-20 N, 125 E, it did not sight this ship which had been fixed at

- 26 - X, Case 6, B-1.
27 - X, Case 6, C-2.
28 - X, Case 7, E-1.
29 - X, Case 7, C-1.
30 - X, Case 7, C-2.

23-15 N, 125-15 E for that day.³¹

The U.S.S. Gurnard on October 6 at 0015 (GCT) sighted a ship at 20-12 N, 120-26 E but lost the contact because of haze.³² Because the Ultra target was supposed to be at 20-20 N, 120-40 E at 0300 (GCT),³³ it can be logically concluded that the Gurnard did make a positive contact with the German vessel.

October 4, 1943

Case 8

The Shikanoura Maru in a convoy plying between Truk and Yokosuka from October 3 to October 12 was plotted at 26-55 N, 138-20 E; 30-50 N, 136-10 E; and 34-25 N, 139-15 E on October 10, 11, and 12 in an Ultra dispatch sent by ComSubPac to the three "Hansen's Mighty Mariners" and the U.S.S. Terron.³⁴

In patrolling the traffic lanes west of Truk, the U.S.S. Steelhead was many degrees southeast of the convoy during this time.³⁵ The U.S.S. Tullibee on October 10 was repairing damages resulting from a typhoon in which it had been buffeted the previous

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- 31 - X, Case 7, A-1.
 - 32 - X, Case 7, C-4.
 - 33 - X, Case 7, A-1.
 - 34 - X, Case 8, B-1.
 - 35 - X, Case 8, C-2.

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36
day and reported no contacts with any ships. On
October 10 the U.S.S. Gurnard was attacking another
Ultra convoy off the northern coast of Luzon. The
37
U.S.S. Tartan was the only one of these submarines
within striking range of the Shikancura Maru's convoy,
but it was en route to its assigned area and did not
38
approach the coast of Japan until October 13. Conse-
quently, there was no contact with this Ultra target.

Case 9

On October 4 at 1832 the U.S.S. Foxy
learned that an unknown-type ship, reported by Radio
Intelligence as leaving Truk for Soerabaja on October 3,
would pass through the following points at 0300 (GCT)
on October 5, 6 and 7: 07-03 N, 140-50 E; 05-15 N,
135-45 E; and 02-05 N, 130-45 E. ComSubPac pointed out
39
that the second position was not certain.

After patrolling the Palau-Rabaul
shipping routes for several days, the Foxy sighted two
tankers at 05-15 N, 135-56 E at 0233 (GCT) on
October 6. The four torpedoes which were fired at the
medium tanker ran under it and no further attempt was

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- 36 - X, Case 8, C-4.
37 - X, Case 8, C-6.
38 - X, Case 8, C-8.
39 - X, Case 9, A-1 and B-1.

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made to fire a second salvo.

This is a probable contact with the Ultra target despite the fact that Radio Intelligence listed only one ship,⁴¹ because the positions on October 6 were almost identical.

October 5, 1943

Case 10

In ComSubPac's Super dispatch 050719, the U.S.S. Pogy was informed of a three-ship convoy with two escorts which was scheduled to arrive at Rabaul on October 10. Positions for 0300 (GCT) on October 5, 6, and 7 were listed.⁴²

The Pogy, which had been searching the Palau-Rabaul shipping routes from October 2, on October 4 attacked two merchantmen several degrees northwest of this convoy's expected position.⁴³ No contact with this Ultra target was made.

Case 11

Radio Intelligence decoded and translated two Japanese dispatches dated October 3 and

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- 40 - X, Case 9, C-2.
 - 41 - X, Case 9, A-1.
 - 42 - X, Case 10, B-1.
 - 43 - X, Case 10, C-1.

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4. The first listed an escorted ship which left Notan Bay for Hakodate on October 3, instructing the escorts⁴⁴ to leave the ship at an unknown point. The second stated that a ship at 46 N, 147 E was being towed on⁴⁵ course 270 degrees at a speed of two knots. ComSubPac's 050352 informed the U.S.S. Sawfish and the U.S.S. Lahoo⁴⁶ of the positions of these two ships.

On October 7 the Sawfish was in the area in which the first ship was expected but it made no contacts, possibly because several enemy planes forced the submarine to remain submerged.⁴⁷ The Lahoo did not return from its Seventh War Patrol; therefore, no information about its activities on these days is⁴⁸ available. It can be assumed that no contact was made with either of these targets.

Case 12

One auxiliary carrier, the Otake, escorted by one or two destroyers was expected, according to ComSubPac's Super dispatch 050347 to the U.S.S. Tinosa, at 18-36 N, 150-00 E at 2000 (GCT)

44 - X, Case 11, A-1.
45 - X, Case 11, A-2.
46 - X, Case 11, A-1.
47 - X, Case 11, C-2.
48 - X, Case 11, C-3.

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on October 7. Successive positions of this unit were given until 0230 (GCT) October 9.⁴⁹

On October 6 the U.S.S. Tinosa watched another Ultra target, the tanker Yazahaya, sink at 10-24 N, 146-52 E, about seven degrees southwest of the carrier and then proceeded to Alot Island to the south where it was to bombard the island installations the following day.⁵⁰ Apparently there was no contact with this Super target or its escorts.

ComSubPac at 1221 (GCT) on October 6 broadcast over NPM Fox to the Tinosa that the U.S.S. Steelhead was heading toward 13 N, 150 E to assist in working on the auxiliary carrier Otaka, formerly named the Kasuga Maru.⁵¹ The Steelhead, however, according to its Third War Patrol report, was patrolling west of Truk from October 6 to 12. This was approximately five degrees south of the position listed by ComSubPac.⁵²

October 6, 1945

Case 13

Naval Communications Intelligence translated two Japanese messages of October 4 which

49 - X, Case 12, D-1.
50 - X, Case 12, C-2.
51 - X, Case 12, C-2.
52 - X, Case 12, C-5.

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listed the 0300 (GCT) positions of two German ships;
one was to arrive at Bangkok on October 14,⁵³ the other
was scheduled to reach the Horsburg Light area the
following day.⁵⁴ ComSubPac transmitted this information
to the U.S.S. Gurnard and the U.S.S. Sturgeon at 0349
(GCT) on October 6.⁵⁵

Japanese interference made the Sturgeon's
radio unreliable during this period⁵⁶ so it is possible
that it did not receive these bearings because it
continued its patrol without contacting any enemy
shipping.⁵⁷ The Gurnard at 13-50 N, 118-55 E, a few
degrees west of northern Luzon, sighted a merchant ship
at 1425 (GCT) on October 9.⁵⁸ The German ship bound
for Bangkok was plotted at 17-30 N, 117-40 E at 0500 (GCT)
on this date.⁵⁹ The Gurnard identified its contact as a
tanker or cargo vessel of about 6000-10,000 tons with
one stack and little superstructure but admitted that
this identification was not completely reliable.⁶⁰
Although the Ultra target was described by the trans-
lators as a one-stack merchantman of 2700 tons, it is
possible that the Gurnard's contact and the Ultra target

53 - X, Case 13, A-2.
54 - X, Case 13, A-1.
55 - X, Case 13, B-1.
56 - X, Case 13, C-1.
57 - X, Case 13, C-2.
58 - X, Case 13, C-3.
59 - X, Case 13, A-2.
60 - X, Case 13, C-3.

ORIGINAL
20 December 1945

was the same ship. The submarine fired three torpedoes at a range of 3000 yards and a second salvo of three torpedoes at 2600 yards. A weak explosion resulted from the first firing but the second missed completely. After trailing the ship for several hours, the U.S.S. Gurnard concluded that it would not sink despite its damage, and because the Gurnard had expended all of its torpedoes, it was forced to abandon the chase. This was another possible contact with the Ultra target.

Case 14

With instructions to the U.S.S. Tinosa and the U.S.S. Steelhead to attempt interception, ComSubPac at 1017 (GCT) on October 6 transmitted positions of a tanker navigating between Balikpapan and Truk. After patrolling northwest of Truk on October 8, the Tinosa received orders to return to Midway and three days later was south of Wake, approximately twenty degrees northeast of the tanker. Although the Steelhead was in the waters west of Truk from October 7 to 12, it did not contact the target. Poor radio reception might have prevented the submarine's learning of this merchantman.

- 61 - Ibid.
62 - X, Case 14, B-1.
63 - X, Case 14, C-2.
64 - X, Case 14, C-4.
65 - X, Case 14, C-3.

ORIGINAL
26 December 1945

In the same Ultra dispatch ComSubPac pointed out to the U.S.S. Pogy the positions of a seven-ship convoy scheduled to arrive at Palao on October 11.⁶⁶ At 0300 (GCT) on October 10 Radio Intelligence placed this convoy at 05-40 N, 131-49 E.⁶⁷

The Pogy at 0009 (GCT) on October 10 contacted five ships with two escorts at 05-40 N, 131-54 E, a position only a few minutes distant from that of the expected convoy. While the Pogy was attempting to close to a firing position, one of the escorts contacted something about five miles beyond the submarine and dropped a total of thirty-six depth charges. The Pogy was unable to reach a firing position and left the area.⁶⁸ This is a positive contact with ComSubPac's second Ultra target.

Case 15

According to a dispatch from Guard Division #62 intercepted by Radio Intelligence, the #11 Shonan Maru and three unidentified vessels were scheduled to depart from Jaluit on October 7 and to arrive at Kwajalein on October 8, passing through 06-52 N, 169-29 E at 0300 (GCT) on October 7.⁶⁹ ComSubPac

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- 66 - X, Case 14, E-1.
 - 67 - X, Case 14, A-2 and A-5.
 - 68 - X, Case 14, C-5.
 - 69 - X, Case 15, A-1 and A-2.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

advised the U.S.S. Skipjack and the U.S.S. Seadracer that one ship (type unknown) was following this course. ⁷⁰

The Skipjack patrolled off Jaluit from October 7 to 10 but made no contact with this target. ⁷¹
As it reported radio interference caused by enemy jamming, it may not have received complete information from ComSubPac. ⁷² The Seadracer was observing Roi about ten degrees west of Jaluit during this time. ⁷³ There was no contact with the Ultra target.

Case 16

At 1342 (GCT) on October 6 ComSubPac notified the U.S.S. Gurnard of an Ultra mission, a five-ship-convoy travelling at 7.5 knots in the vicinity of 19-48 N, 119-30 E at 0300 (GCT) on October 7. ⁷⁴
According to the deciphered Japanese dispatch, the convoy was to pass through point 20-00 N, 119-32 E; ⁷⁵
and at exactly that point at 0312 (GCT) on October 7 the Gurnard sighted two ships. These were joined by two tankers from the north at 19-30 N, 119-20 E and by a small destroyer escort from the south at 19-00 N, 119-10 E. The Gurnard, aiming at the two largest

70 - X, Case 15, B-1.
71 - X, Case 15, C-2.
72 - X, Case 15, C-1.
73 - X, Case 15, C-5.
74 - X, Case 16, B-1.
75 - X, Case 16, A-1.

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ships in the convoy, fired four torpedoes at the #1 ship from 1900 yards and four torpedoes at the #2 ship from 2100 yards. Two hits amidship on the #1 ship and three hits on the #2 ship resulted in terrific explosions with the first ship breaking in two before sinking and the second ship blowing up and sinking instantly. The activity of the escorting destroyer and the approach of a land-based bomber prevented the U.S.S. Gurnard from attacking the two smaller ships. This positive contact with the Ultra target resulted in the complete loss of two large enemy merchantmen.

October 8, 1943

Case 17

The schedule of an unidentified man-of-war, which had departed Kwajalein at 2000 (GCT) on October 7, was recovered from an intercepted dispatch and relayed to the U.S.S. Skinjack at 0738 (GCT) on October 8 by ComSubPac. At 2000 (GCT) on the 8th the target would reach 06-09 N, 169-38 E in the Jaluit area.

76 - X, Case 16, C-1.
77 - X, Case 17, A-1 and A-2.
78 - X, Case 17, E-1.

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At 0011 (GCT) on October 8 the U.S.S. Skinjack sighted a ship approximately seven miles inside the lagoon off the southwest pass of Jaluit but only the masts were visible. ⁷⁹ The discrepancy in time makes it seem unlikely that this visual contact was the man-of-war, but no other vessel was observed by the submarine although it continued to patrol the Jaluit area. No contact with the Ultra target can be reported.

October 9, 1943

Case 18

Noon positions of a merchantman were ⁸⁰ obtained from an intercepted Japanese dispatch and relayed in ComSubPac's Ultra 090102 to the U.S.S. Gurnard. ⁸¹ The unidentified ship was apparently hugging the coastline of China en route to Takao on Taiwan where it was expected to arrive on October 11. ⁸²

The Gurnard from October 6 to 8 was tracking a convoy about 19° N, 119° E, approximately six degrees southeast of the merchantman; and on October 9 and 10 attacked another merchant ship at

79 - X, Case 17, C-1.
80 - X, Case 18, A-1.
81 - X, Case 18, F-1.
82 - X, Case 18, A-1.

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18 N, 118 E before setting its course for Midway.⁸³
It had no opportunity to look for this Ultra target.

Case 19

The October 9th NFM Fox broadcast carried a ComSubPac message to the U.S.S. Tullibee and the U.S.S. Sturgeon, instructing them to attack a seven-ship convoy arriving at Takao at 2000 (GCT) on October 12.⁸⁴ Radio Intelligence revealed that these ships, travelling at a speed of 8.5 knots, carried both machinery and troops and listed 26-38 N, 126-22 E; 25-23 N, 123-36 E; 24-33 N, 120-35 E as the 0300 (GCT) fixes for October 10, 11, and 12.⁸⁵ To aid in the accomplishment of this mission ComSubPac authorized the Tullibee to enter the Sturgeon's area but warned the submarines to be on the alert for each other.⁸⁶

The Sturgeon continued its Eighth War Patrol in the vicinity of 24 N, 126 E, several degrees southeast of the convoy's course and reported no contacts with enemy shipping during these dates.⁸⁷ The Tullibee was repairing damages received during a typhoon and

- 83 - X, Case 18, C-2.
84 - X, Case 19, E-1.
85 - X, Case 19, A-1.
86 - X, Case 19, E-1.
87 - X, Case 19, C-4.

was inactive through October 11 at which time it was four degrees east of the convoy's position at 0300 (GCT) on that date.⁸⁸ No contact with this Ultra target was made.

October 10, 1943

Case 20

The Kimikawa Maru, a reconverted merchant cruiser, was located at 48-50 N, 148-00 E at 2100 (GCT) on October 10, in an Ultra dispatch from ComSubPac on that date. Twelve hours later it was expected at 46-10 N, 146-30 E en route to Soya Strait.⁸⁹ Radio intelligence had determined that the passenger list included 21 officers and a complement of about 200 enlisted personnel and that the maru would be carrying a large amount of cargo.⁹⁰ The U.S.S. Salmon reported complete radio reception while en route to its area on October 9.⁹¹ By October 12 it was patrolling the Paramushiru-Soya line, but made no contact with enemy shipping.⁹² Although the Kimikawa Maru was expected in this vicinity, there was no contact with the target.

88 - X, Case 19, C-2.
89 - X, Case 20, B-1.
90 - X, Case 20, A-1.
91 - X, Case 20, C-1.
92 - X, Case 20, C-2.

ORIGINAL
25 December 1945

Case 21

The commanding officer of the Hayataka originated a movement report on October 9 which listed the schedule of his auxiliary carrier and another XGV, the Unyo. According to Communication Intelligence these ships, probably accompanied by several destroyers, would leave Saeki on October 15, travelling on course 120 at a speed of 18 knots. By 1245 (GCT) on October 15 they would pass through 24-18 N, 139-46 E, and at 1100 (GCT) on October 16, 20-43 N, 146-18 E. ComSubPac instructed Captain Momsen to keep his submarines, the U.S.S. Gurnard, U.S.S. Steelhead and the U.S.S. Talliban, in position to attack this target, requesting that any results be reported immediately as additional information could be sent to submarines farther south.

The Steelhead, on its Third War Patrol, was several degrees south of Yap and sighted only a hospital ship from October 18 to October 20.

The Gurnard, after having received ComSubPac's dispatch 100737, sighted two merchantships at 24-15 N, 136-10 E at 2145 (GCT) on October 18. This position was only three degrees west of the first fix given for the Ultra target. The U.S.S. Gurnard tracked

93 - X, Case 21, A-1.
94 - X, Case 21, B-1.
95 - X, Case 21, C-4.

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28 December 1945

these vessels to determine course and speed and radioed its report upon surfacing. No attempt was made to attack these vessels.⁹⁶ However, they could not have been the Ultra targets, the two carriers, which were not scheduled to approach the position of this sighting until 1245 (GCT) October 15, more than a day and a half later.

The U.S.S. Tullibee from October 13 to 15 engaged a convoy of 12 ships first sighted at approximately 26 N, 121 E far to the west of the Ultra's scheduled course.⁹⁷

Furthermore, at 1014 (GCT) October 11 ComSubPac dispatched instructions to the Gurnard, Steelhead, and Tullibee to disregard the message concerning these auxiliary carriers because a more important target was expected soon.⁹⁸

Case 22

The U.S.S. Skipjack was directed to attack an unidentified maru and its escort in ComSubPac's Ultra dispatch of 0754 (GCT) on October 10. The⁹⁹

96 - X, Case 21, C-2.

97 - X, Case 21, C-6 and see Case 23 in this volume.

98 - X, Case 21, B-2.

99 - X, Case 22, B-1.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Japanese merchantmen was scheduled to leave Kwajalein on October 9, putting in at Hillo on the 11th and Tarawa on the 16th. ¹⁰⁰ From this information, obtained through Radio Intelligence, ComSubPac plotted the vessel at 08-20 N, 169-00 E at 1930 (GCT) on October 9; 06-20 N, 171-08 E at 2130 (GCT) on October 10; and 06-17 N, 171-48 E at 0330 (GCT) on October 11; and the ¹⁰¹ speed was estimated at 6.7 knots.

At 1957 (GCT) on October 10 the U.S.S. Skipjack sighted the smoke of the target, a vessel similar to the Seikyo Maru with two escorts and screening planes. The submarine closed to 2500 yards and fired a salvo of four torpedoes with no hits. Nineteen depth charges and bombs were dropped during ¹⁰² a ten minute period, but none damaged the Skipjack. Inasmuch as these ships were sighted at 06-25 N, 171-39 E, virtually the same position anticipated by ComSubPac for that date, this was undoubtedly a positive contact with the Ultra target.

On October 13 ComSubPac informed the Skipjack that this merchantman was then leaving the vicinity of the first attack, but to be on guard for

100 - X, Case 22, A-1.
101 - X, Case 22, B-1.
102 - X, Case 22, C-2.

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a daily antisubmarine sweep to a radius of 35 miles
from attack position, 06 N, 171 E. ¹⁰³ Communication
Intelligence had reported this antisubmarine activity
as radiating from Mille, 06 N, 172 E. ¹⁰⁴ There is no
indication in the U.S.S. Skipjack's Eighth War Patrol
report that it attempted a second contact with this
¹⁰⁵ Ultra target.

Case 23

A ship (or convoy) was placed at 09-
17 N, 161-50 E at 0300 (GCT) on October 11 and at
09-22 N, 164-55 E at the same time on the following
day in an intercepted Japanese dispatch. ¹⁰⁶ ComSubPac
notified the U.S.S. Seadragon of this Ultra target on
¹⁰⁷ October 10.

After receiving this message at 1142
(GCT) on October 10, the Seadragon searched the
designated area and at 1857 (GCT) on October 12 fired
four torpedoes at a range of 2200 yards at the target
which was identified as a large cargo-passenger ship
of about 6,000 tons with one large, armed trawler as
an escort. Two of these torpedoes hit and the Seadragon

103 - X, Case 22, B-2.
104 - X, Case 22, A-2.
105 - X, Case 22, C-2.
106 - X, Case 23, A-1.
107 - X, Case 23, B-1.

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reported that the ship sank immediately although the submarine did not see it go down because a depth charge attack had forced the U.S.S. Seadragon to submerge. Approximately thirty minutes later when the Seadragon rose to periscope depth, it observed the escort but there was no sign of the cargo ship, resulting in the conclusion that this Ultra target had been sunk.

Case 24

The Chichi jima Special Base Force originated a movement report on two marus and their escort bound for Saipan, listing noon positions from October 10 through October 13. CcsSubPac directed the U.S.S. Bushallure to work on this convoy obtained by Communications Intelligence if the submarine had enough fuel to permit a search. The Bushallure left the Marianas at a slow speed before the convoy was expected there and headed for Wake Island because of fuel shortage. No contact with the Ultra target was attempted.

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- 107 - X, Case 23, C-2 and C-3.
 - 108 - X, Case 24, A-1.
 - 110 - X, Case 24, B-1.
 - 111 - X, Case 24, C-2.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

October 11, 1945

Case 25

On October 11 the U.S.S. Steelhead was advised by ComSubPac's Ultra dispatch 110023 of the position of two cargo-passenger ships and two destroyers. ¹¹² Communications Intelligence had translated a four-part movement report on these vessels which indicated that the merchantmen were the Hio Maru and the Awata Maru, both carrying troops and cargo and headed for Shanghai. ¹¹³ ComSubPac, in relaying this information, told the Steelhead to move in the direction of 11-10 N, 143-20 E on October 11 and 42-15 N, 129-10 E on October 15 even though they might be too late to intercept this target as another convoy was expected soon in that vicinity. ¹¹⁴ The second position's latitude was probably a transmission error; for Radio Intelligence listed it as 23-15 N. ¹¹⁵

The Steelhead left its patrol west of ¹¹⁶ Truk on October 13 and proceeded to the assigned area. No contact was made with this Ultra target.

112 - X, Case 25, B-1.
113 - X, Case 25, A-1.
114 - X, Case 25, B-1.
115 - X, Case 25, A-1.
116 - X, Case 25, C-2.

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Case 26

The Genyo Maru, a merchantman with a gross tonnage of 10,020 and a normal cruising speed of 17 knots, was identified by Radio Intelligence as the ship which departed Truk for Soerabaja on October 10.¹¹⁷ The day after its departure, ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Pogy that its 0300 (GCT) positions on October 12, 13, 14, and 15 would be 09-31 N, 142-12 E; 11-00 N, 137-24 E; 11-00 N, 132-08 E; and 09-05 N, 128-05 E, adding that the U.S.S. Steelhead¹¹⁸ might assist in interception if possible.

The Pogy on October 11 notified ComSubPac that it was leaving its area and proceeded toward Johnston Island. On October 14 it sighted a tanker at 12 N, 148 E.¹¹⁹ It is not possible that this contact was the Genyo Maru which was fixed approximately 16 degrees west of the contact's position on October 14. The Steelhead, patrolling west of Truk and enroute to its assigned area during these days, did not sight the Genyo Maru.¹²⁰

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- 117 - X, Case 26, A-1.
 - 118 - X, Case 26, F-1.
 - 119 - X, Case 26, C-2.
 - 120 - X, Case 26, C-4.

Case 27

Neither the U.S.S. Steelhead nor the U.S.S. Mingo contacted the five-ship convoy indicated in ComSubPac's 110912. The convoy sailed from Truk at 2000 (GCT) on October 10 and was due at Shanghai 0530 (GCT) on October 18. The intercepted dispatch named the vessels as the Waka and the Isuzu, men of war carrying 350 men each; the Hokoku Maru, carrying 1200 men; the Kiyosumi Maru, carrying 1300 men; and the Yamanuma, a destroyer escort with 50 men aboard.

The convoy was fixed at 10-16 N, 147-35 E at 2100 (GCT) October 11 and at 26-00 N, 125-35 E at 2100 (GCT) October 16. The Mingo was patrolling among the Caroline Islands but did not sight these ships. It is possible that it did not receive the message; for it reported radio difficulties. The Steelhead watched traffic routes west of Truk from October 7 to 12 before traveling south and away from the convoy's course. The Steelhead also reported difficult radio reception. Japanese interference on the radio may have prevented both submarines from

- 121 - X, Case 27, B-1.
122 - X, Case 27, A-1.
123 - X, Case 27, C-2.
124 - X, Case 27, C-1.
125 - X, Case 27, C-3.
126 - X, Case 27, C-4.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

knowing the details concerning this Ultra target's positions.

October 12, 1945

Case 23

From a two-part Japanese dispatch of October 9, it was learned that convoy #105, composed of eleven ships, was en route Takao from Moji, carrying a large number of military personnel.¹²⁷ ComSubPac radiced the 0300 (OCT) positions of this convoy to the U.S.S. Tullibee: 32-32 N, 124-24 E on October 12; 29-27 N, 122-23 E on October 13; 26-30 N, 121-18 E on October 14; and 23-23 N, 119-51 E on October 15.¹²⁸

At 26-47 N, 121-15 E at 2200 (OCT) on October 13 the Tullibee sighted a convoy of nine¹²⁹ marus in three columns with three destroyer escorts. This position, just off the northwest coast of Taiwan, was almost identical with the fix for the Ultra convoy for five hours later.

After chasing the convoy for a full day down Formosa Strait, the Tullibee made its

127 - X, Case 23, A-1.
128 - X, Case 23, B-1.
129 - X, Case 23, C-2.

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attack at 24-35 N, 120-31 E at approximately 1600 (CCT) on October 14. The submarine was detected by the escorts and was thoroughly shaken up by depth charges. As a result of this positive contact with the Ultra target, the U.S.S. Tallibee damaged an 8000 ton transport, sank a 6000 ton transport and possibly damaged a third ship whose type was unknown. 130

Case 29

From a ComSubPac dispatch of October 12, the U.S.S. Steelhead and the U.S.S. Gurnard learned the positions of two convoys. The first, composed of two merchantmen and two destroyers, was fixed at 23-15 N, 129-10 E at 2100 (CCT) on October 15 and at 26-50 N, 125-45 E at the same time on the following day. It was scheduled to arrive at the Hanchai entrance buoys at 0000 (CCT) on October 16. A light cruiser of the Sendai class, two merchantmen of the Yokohu Maru and Honro Maru classes, and one destroyer comprised the second convoy which was expected at the entrance buoys at the same time after passing through points 26-00 N, 125-35 E at 2100 (CCT)

130 - Ibid.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

on October 16 and 30-33 N, 123-12 E at 2100 (GCT)
on October 17. ComSubPac authorized the submarines
to use the U.S.S. Tullibee's area for this task,
informing the Tullibee to keep clear of these points. ¹³¹

At 1822 (GCT) October 16 ComSubPac
sent additional information on these convoys, noting
that they had been rerouted and speeded up to avoid
submarines. The first convoy arrived twentyone hours
early; the second, three hours early at the entrance
buoys. The second convoy was expected to pass through ¹³²
27-15 N, 124-40 E at 2100 (GCT) on October 16.

The U.S.S. Steelhead from October 15
to 16 was en route to its assigned area and on October
17 sighted a hospital ship at 4-51 N, 133-12 E, about ¹³³
20 degrees southeast of these convoys. The U.S.S.
Gurnard patrolled east of the targets during these
days. Although both submarines apparently received ¹³⁴
ComSubPac's ¹³⁵ 120749, neither attempted to contact the
Ultra target.

October 16, 1945

Case 30

Points through which an eight-ship

131 - H, Case 28, I-1.
132 - X, Case 28, I-2.
133 - X, Case 28, C-2.
134 - X, Case 28, C-1.
135 - X, Case 28, C-1 and C-5.

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escorted convoy, laden with troops and cargo and bound for Takao, would pass at 0300 (GCT) from October 13 to October 16 were listed in an intercepted Japanese dispatch and forwarded to the ¹³⁶ U.S.S. Tullibee and the ¹³⁷ U.S.S. Gurnard for action. Both the Tullibee and the Gurnard were involved in other missions during these days and made no effort to contact this Ultra target. The Tullibee on October 15 attacked a twelve-ship convoy at 26-47 N, 121-15 E and by October 16 was near 26-19 N, 122-25 E, ¹³⁸ a point northeast of Taiwan whereas this Ultra target was approximately a degree off the southwestern coast of that island. The Gurnard sighted two tankers at 24-15 N, 136-10 E on October 13 and proceeded to 25-28 N, 142-50 E on ¹³⁹ October 16 which was over twenty degrees northeast of the convoy.

Case 31

ComSubPac in message 150358 advised Captain Momen's trio, the U.S.S. Steelhead, the Gurnard, and the Tullibee, on another Ultra convoy whose 0300 (GCT) positions on October 14, 15, and 16 would be 26-35 N, 120-40 E; 29-55 N, 129-15 E; and

136 - X, Case 30, A-1.
137 - X, Case 30, B-1.
138 - X, Case 30, C-1.
139 - X, Case 30, C-2.

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25 December 1945

140
33-35 N, 129-50 E. The intercepted Japanese dispatch
was badly garbled, but Navy translators commented
that this convoy probably consisted of two vessels. 141

None of these submarines contacted
this Ultra target although radio reception was good
and it can be presumed that all of them received the
information. 142 The U.S.S. Tullibee was several degrees
west of these ships; the U.S.S. Gurnard, east; and 144
the U.S.S. Steelhead, many degrees southeast; all 145
were involved with other targets.

Case 32

The Fujisan Maru, a tanker of 9500
tons, and an escort were en route Palombang via Saipan 146
on October 13 according to Communications Intelligence.
At 1710 (PCT) on the same day ComSubPac forwarded the
0300 (PCT) positions of these vessels for October 13,
14, and 15 to the U.S.S. Kingo and the U.S.S. Poxy
if the latter should be in that vicinity. 147

The Kingo was near position 11 N,
151 E during this time so was in the vicinity of the

140 - X, Case 31, B-1.
141 - X, Case 31, A-1.
142 - X, Case 31, C-1, C-3, C-5.
143 - X, Case 31, C-2.
144 - X, Case 31, C-4.
145 - X, Case 31, C-6.
146 - X, Case 32, A-1.
147 - X, Case 32, B-1.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

target but did not sight it. ¹⁴⁸ As the U.S.S. Mingo
reported radio difficulties, ¹⁴⁹ It is possible that
it did not receive ComSubPac's 131710. At 0625 (GCT)
on October 14 the U.S.S. Pogy contacted the Juilisan
Maru and its destroyer escort at 12 N, 148 E. Although
the Pogy submerged for an attack, it was unable to
close to firing range. ¹⁵⁰ This is a positive contact
with the Ultra target.

October 14, 1945

Case 33

The U.S.S. Mingo and the U.S.S. Pogy were
the action addressees of ComSub Pac Ultra dispatch
141735 which listed the 0600 (GCT) positions of a con-
voy leaving Truk for Yokosuka on October 14 at a speed
of seven knots. ¹⁵¹

The Mingo, patrolling the vicinity of
11 N, 151 E, reported bad radio reception and squalls.
It did not contact the convoy. ¹⁵²

The Pogy, however, did sight a convoy

148 - X, Case 32, C-4.
149 - X, Case 32, C-3.
150 - X, Case 32, C-2.
151 - X, Case 33, B-1.
152 - X, Case 33, C-1, C-2.

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945.

of six ships and one escort at 13-07 N, 152-55 E at
2116 (GCT) October 15. ¹⁵³ This was undoubtedly the
Ultra target. The U.S.S. Pogy submerged for approach,
running at high speed for almost two hours, but was
unable to close to firing position. It was believed
that the convoy changed its base course after the
submarine submerged. On the following day the Pogy
headed for Johnston Island. ¹⁵⁴

October 15, 1945

Case 34

The Heian Maru, escorted by two
destroyers, the Asanagi and the Sanidare, departed
Truk on October 14 bound for Yokosuka where it was
scheduled to arrive at 2100 (GCT) on October 20. ¹⁵⁵
After receiving this information from Radio Intelligence,
ComSubPac relayed the 0900 (GCT) positions on October
18, 19 and 20 to the U.S.S. Barb and U.S.S. Lapon. ¹⁵⁶

The Barb report is not available;
however, verification of the Barb's contacting this
target was given in ComSubPac's Super 200317 in which

-
- 153 - X, Case 35, C-4.
 - 154 - Ibid.
 - 155 - X, Case 34, A-1.
 - 156 - X, Case 34, B-1.

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

it was stated that the U.S.S. Barb had sighted the target but was unable to close for attack. ¹⁵⁷

According to the Second War Patrol report of the U.S.S. Laron, it sighted the Heian Maru, and two destroyers of the Fubuki class at 31-29 N, 137-28 E at 2325 (GCT) on October 19. The Laron fired four torpedoes at the merchantman, none of which hit effectively, before the destroyers started dropping depth charges. ¹⁵⁸ This was a positive contact with the Ultra target.

Case 35

A Japanese dispatch, originated by the captain of the Chuyo, disclosed that his ship, an auxiliary aircraft carrier, would leave Truk at 1900 (GCT) on October 15 and proceed to Yokosuka. At 0600 (GCT) on October 17 ¹⁵⁹ ~~and~~ Chuyo was to be joined by a destroyer which would escort it and rest of the way. In Ultra 151559 ComSubPac addressed the positions of the carrier on October 15 through October 20 to the U.S.S. Mingo, the U.S.S. Seury, the U.S.S. Flying Fish, and the U.S.S. Terron for action and

157 - X, Case 34, D-1.
158 - X, Case 34, C-2.
159 - X, Case 35, A-1.

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28 December 1945

160
and the U.S.S. Pogy for information.

At 0600 (GCT) on October 16 the U.S.S. Mingo sighted a large aircraft carrier escorted by a new class "Un-1" destroyer on course 355° true and traveling at approximately nineteen knots. One hour after sighting the target the Mingo fired six torpedoes from a distance of 6500 yards. Two hits on the port bow were observed, resulting in a port list which the carrier quickly corrected before moving out of sight to the north at about eighteen knots. The destroyer dropped twentyone depth charges, none of which damaged the submarine. The Mingo did not attempt to chase the Ultra target as it was maintaining too high a speed to make the chase feasible.

The U.S.S. Saury was in the general area of the Chugo from October 16 to 19 but did not sight it, possibly because of two other contacts. On October 16 the Saury was engaged in attacking a seven-ship convoy and on October 19 contacted two battleships and a destroyer.

After making a radar contact with the

160 - X, Case 35, E-1.
161 - X, Case 35, C-2.
162 - X, Case 35, C-4.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Chuyo and its escort at 1642 (GCT) on October 17 at 19-31 N, 145-20 E, the U.S.S. Flying Fish fired six torpedoes at the Ultra target. Only one of these was a definite hit, causing an explosion on the carrier. The submarine was unable to determine the amount of damage inflicted; but upon surfacing an hour later it noted a strong, definite odor of fuel oil which was not the submarine's, leading to the supposition that the Chuyo had suffered considerable damage from the explosion.
163

ComSubPac radioed the U.S.S. Tarpon at 0818 (GCT) on October 18 that the U.S.S. Mingo and the Flying Fish had attacked this carrier and may have reduced its speed.
164

On October 19 at 1929 (GCT) the Tarpon sighted an XCV escorted by one destroyer at 32 N, 132 E, almost the precise point at which the Chuyo was expected on that day. The Tarpon fired four torpedoes at the Ultra target which was travelling at twenty knots, forcing the 'submarine' to attack from extreme range. All four torpedoes missed, and the Tarpon

163 - X, Case 35, C-7.
164 - X, Case 35, B-2.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

165
made no attempt to follow the fast-moving Chuyo.

The U.S.S. Pony, which was only an information addressee on ComSubPac's 151559, was en route to Johnston Island during this period. 166

Of the five submarines notified of the Chuyo's course, three - the U.S.S. Kingo, U.S.S. Flying Fish, and U.S.S. Tarpon - made positive contacts with the Ultra target and inflicted an unknown amount of damage on it.

October 16, 1943

Case 36

Through Radio Intelligence ComSubPac learned that a convoy was leaving Palao (bound presumably for Truk although the destination was not given in the Japanese dispatch) and would pass through the Carolines from October 16 to 20, 1943. This information was radiced to the U.S.S. Saury and the U.S.S. Kingo at 0651 (007) on October 16; the positions given by ComSubPac to these submarines were 02-08 N, 143-13 E; 06-58 N, 146-05 E; and 07-49 N, 149-00 E. 167

165 - X, Case 33, C-9.
166 - X, Case 33, C-10.
167 - X, Case 33, A-1.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

168
for 0500 (GCT) on October 18, 19, and 20 respectively.

The U.S.S. Saury was several degrees north of the route of the Ultra target during this time, attacking a seven-ship convoy on October 16 at 14-34 N, 152-07 E and two battleships and a destroyer at 13-35 N, 149-55 E on October 19. Consequently, it made no contact with ComSubPac's 160651 Ultra target.

On October 20 at 0143 (GCT) the U.S.S. Mingo sighted one tanker, one small freighter, and one PC boat at 07-49 N, 149-11 E. This was within a few minutes of the 0500 (GCT) position for the target on that day, and undoubtedly it was the Ultra target.

Although the submarine trailed the convoy for approximately eighteen hours, it was unable to attack it inasmuch as the convoy in turn sighted the submarine.

October 16, 1945

Case 57

ComSubPac notified the U.S.S. Steelhead, the U.S.S. Curnard, and the U.S.S. Tullibee of the 0500 (GCT) positions for October 17 to 19, 1945, of a

168 - X, Case 36, D-1.
169 - X, Case 36, C-4.
170 - X, Case 36, C-2, C-3.
171 - X, Case 36, D-1.
172 - X, Case 36, C-2.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

convoy or ship proceeding on a MNW course, presumably
toward Nagasaki. ¹⁷³ The Japanese dispatch upon which this
information was based was only partly deciphered,
making a clear estimate of the ports of departure and
arrival impossible. ¹⁷⁴

The U.S.S. Steelhead was operating in
and near Area 10A, many degrees southeast of the
target's course so made no contact. ¹⁷⁵ The U.S.S. Gurnard
on October 17 sighted a convoy of four medium-sized ¹⁷⁶
marus at 25-28N, 142-50E, a position near to Ito Shima,
much too far to the east to have been the Ultra target
of ComSubPac's 100724. The remaining submarines, the
Tullibee, gave its position as north of Formosa on
October 17. ¹⁷⁷ There was no contact with this Ultra
target because none of the three submarines were in
its area.

Case 38

An unknown-type ship with two escorts
departed from Saipan and was scheduled to arrive at
Chichijima at 2100 (GST) on October 18, 1945. The

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- 173 - X, Case 37, B-1.
 - 174 - X, Case 37, A-1.
 - 175 - X, Case 37, C-1. (See map of Pacific for area
location)
 - 176 - X, Case 37, C-2.
 - 177 - X, Case 37, C-4.

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23 December 1945

Japanese message originated by the Fifth Base Force at Saipan was intercepted and translated and its contents made available to ComSubPac on October 15.¹⁷³ At 0342 (GCT) on October 16 ComSubPac relayed two positions of this Ultra target (1100 GCT) October 16: 20-00 N, 145-05 E; 0300 (GCT) October 17: 21-51 N, 144-21 E to the U.S.S. Flying Fish and the U.S.S. Wingo.¹⁷³

Neither submarine made a contact with this target. The Flying Fish was in the area on October 16 but reported no contacts with any enemy shipping; on October 18 it was at 19-51 N, 145-20 E¹⁸⁰ where it attacked an auxiliary aircraft carrier. Inasmuch as electrical storms interfered with its radio reception,¹⁸¹ it is possible that the Flying Fish did not receive the information.

From October 16 to 20 the Wingo was several degrees southeast of this target. The Wingo also attacked an auxiliary aircraft carrier (see Case 35) at 11 N, 151 E on October 16.¹⁸²

173 - X, Case 38, A-1.
173 - X, Case 38, B-1.
180 - X, Case 38, C-2.
181 - X, Case 38, C-1.
182 - X, Case 38, C-3.

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October 17, 1943

Case 39

In a Super dispatch to the U.S.S.
Tautog and the U.S.S. Seawolf ComSubPac directed them
at 0359 (GCT) on October 17 to attempt to intercept
a convoy which would be at 15-55 N, 151-55 E; 18-
50 N, 150-55 E; and 21-10 N, 149-20 E. at 0300 (GCT)
on October 17, 18, and 19 respectively. The 0300
(GCT) positions were listed through October 21, and
ComSubPac commented that this was probably the convoy
which the U.S.S. Saury had attacked and damaged at an
earlier date.

From the original Japanese message
dated October 14 it was learned that this convoy
departed from Truk on that day and was scheduled to
arrive at Yokosuka at 0300 (GCT) on October 25. Naval
Radio Intelligence deciphered and translated this
message only a few hours after it was originated by
the Japanese Eighth Fleet or Surface Escort Force
and the information contained in it was relayed to
ComSubPac at 1320 (GCT) on October 14. Although

183 - X, Case 39, B-1.
184 - X, Case 39, A-1.
185 - X, Case 39, A-2.

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there is at present no record available of a ComSubPac dispatch to the U.S.S. Saury with any information regarding this convoy, it seems logical that one was sent inasmuch as the Saury reported an attack upon the Ultra target at 14-34 N, 152-07 E on course 345⁰⁷ at 0920 (GCT) on October 16. Two explosions were heard by the Saury, which concluded that an unknown amount of damage had been inflicted upon a 7500 ton transport in the convoy. (See X, Case 35, C-3 to C-5 for a more detailed account.)

Neither the U.S.S. Tautog nor the U.S.S. Seawolf contacted the target. The former was proceeding ¹⁸⁶ SW whereas the target was headed NNW. The latter was in the vicinity of the convoy on October 18 and 19 and reported that it had searched the area but ¹⁸⁷ sighted nothing.

Case 40

A Japanese dispatch originated at Rabaul on October 15, 1945, stated that a convoy escorted by a destroyer would leave Rabaul at 0000 (GCT) on October 16, and arrive at Palao at 0000 (GCT)

186 - X, Case 35, C-2.
187 - X, Case 35, C-4.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

on October 22.¹⁸⁸ The middle of the Japanese message was garbled,¹⁸⁹ leading ComSubPac to notify the U.S.S. Steelhead at 0953 (GCT) on October 17 that a convoy including one or more tankers and one destroyer would pass through the given positions.¹⁹⁰ The plotted route of the convoy led it through the western part of the Carolines rather than directly to its ultimate destination.¹⁹¹ This, when considered with the results of the submarine contacts, makes it appear that the convoy was met by another ship while en route.

ComSubPac at 0916 (GCT) on October 19 radioed the Steelhead that the U.S.S. Gato, operating out of Australia, had attacked this convoy and had sunk one of the tankers. The Gato was chasing the remaining tanker toward the Steelhead's area.¹⁹²

According to the Gato's Sixth War Patrol Report, it had sighted two merchantmen escorted by a destroyer at 02-45N, 151-30E. This convoy was proceeding on a 300°T course at approximately 12.5 knots.¹⁹³ This was undoubtedly the Ultra target; for

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- 188 - X, Case 40, A-1.
 - 189 - Ibid.
 - 190 - X, Case 40, B-1.
 - 191 - X, Case 40, A-1.
 - 192 - X, Case 40, B-2.
 - 193 - X, Case 40, C-4, C-5.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

it, too, was traveling at 12.5 knots on approximately a 3000T course and should have been near that position¹⁹⁴ by the time of the sighting (0700 (GCT) on October 19). The U.S.S. Gato fired at both merchantmen, damaging¹⁹⁵ one and sinking the other.

Two days later the U.S.S. Steelhead sighted two merchantmen escorted by a destroyer at¹⁹⁶ 03-25 N, 141-50 E. The Ultra target was to have been¹⁹⁷ moving due west at 03-13 N, 143 E, eight hours before the Steelhead's contact. Judging from the time and position of the contact, this was the Ultra target.

However, the discrepancy in that conclusion is apparent for the Gato had sunk one of the merchantmen, leaving only one to be at that position on October 20. The previously advanced theory that the convoy was joined by another ship at some unknown point between the two contacts is possible, further explained by the unusual route taken by the convoy and by the missing part of the Japanese dispatch. On the other hand, the Gato did not see the ship actually sink and might have been mistaken about the amount of damage which it had inflicted upon the

194 - X, Case 40, A-1.
195 - X, Case 40, C-4.
196 - X, Case 40, C-1.
197 - X, Case 40, A-1.

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Japanese vessel. Since neither of these possibilities can be proven by the evidence now available, it can be concluded only that the U.S.S. Gato's was a positive contact with the Ultra target and the U.S.S. Steelhead's only a probable contact.

October 13, 1943

Case 41

Two auxiliary carriers and several destroyers were expected to arrive at the North Channel of Truk at 2130 (CCT) on October 13, 1943, according to an intercepted Japanese dispatch from the Truk Base Force #4. ¹⁹⁸ ComSubPac transmitted this information to the U.S.S. Mingo for information at 0920 (CCT) on October 13. ¹⁹⁹

The Mingo's radio reception was reported as satisfactory; ²⁰⁰ therefore, it can be assumed that it received ComSubPac's Super 180020. Although the Mingo conducted a surface patrol on the northwest approaches to Truk, it sighted only an unidentified trawler. ²⁰¹ There was no contact with the Ultra target.

198 - X, Case 41, A-1.
199 - X, Case 41, B-1.
200 - X, Case 41, C-1.
201 - Ibid.

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October 27, 1945

Case 42

ComSubPac addressed the Ultra dispatch time-dated 271625 to the U.S.S. Haddock, informing that submarine of three cruisers which were to enter the North Channel of Truk on course 224° at 0230 (GCT) on October 28. The Haddock in its Seventh War Patrol Report noted that it had patrolled the Truk-Saipan shipping route on October 28. No shipping was sighted on this date.

October 29, 1945

Case 43

Radio Intelligence intercepted and deciphered another Japanese message listing the times of ships arriving and departing from Truk; this dispatch gave the schedule for October 30. The U.S.S. Haddock was notified at 1851 (GCT) on October 29 by ComSubPac that one unidentified ship, one destroyer, and the Hippon Maru were to depart from the North Channel of Truk at 0700 (GCT) on October 30 and

202 - X, Case 42, D-1.
203 - X, Case 42, C-2.
204 - X, Case 43, A-1.

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23 December 1945

would head due west, following this course for
205
approximately fifty to one hundred miles.

The U.S.S. Haddock, after patrolling
the Truk-Saipan route on October 29, set its course
at 0930 (ZCT) on October 30 to patrol in the vicinity
of 03-05 N, 150-50 E, a position just northwest of
Truk. No contacts with enemy shipping were reported. 206

205 - X, Case 43, 1-1.
206 - X, Case 43, 0-1.

ORIGINAL
29 December 1945

APPENDIX X

Intelligence, Operational Dispatches, Submarine
Action Reports and Verifications - October, 1945

Case 1

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 27/1501 September
TO: CSI 4

" - unident ship) departed NAA for PQ at 1500 on the 27th. Noon positions 28th through 5th:
32-23 N, 142-28E.
29-21 N, 145-53E.
25-04 N, 149-15 E.
22-54 N, 152-32 E.
15-20 N, 161-54 E.
10-10 N, 1647-35 E.

NEGAT COMMENT: Believe that positions for 2nd and 3rd are missing and that above are for following in order given: 28th, 29th, 30th, 1st, 4th, and 5th.

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0830 (I) 28th. NAA is Yokosuka (CD); PQ is Kwajalein (CD).

No. A-2

FROM: WEMERI 27/1501 September
TO: CSI 4. (OE 7)

" - unident) departed Yokosuka for Kwajalein at 1500 Sept. 27. Noon posits (28 Sept - 5 October):

32-23 N, 142-28 E.
29-13 N, 145-53 E.
25-04 N, 149-15 E.
22-54 N, 152-32 E.

(Comment: Posits for 2nd and 3rd missing)

15-20 N, 161-54 E.
10-10 N, 164-55 E."

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28 December 1945

Case 1, No. A-2 (Cont.)

HYPO COMMENT: This is our version of Negat 271952.

LOCAL COMMENT: Negats had blank for 15 minutes
in 2nd posit.

No. A-3

FROM: _____ 30/0943 September
TO: _____ (#2 Surface
Escort Unit) (C)
INFO: _____ (4th Fleet) (C)
_____ (Air Group 802) (C)
_____ (Air Group 952) (C)
_____ (Air Group 802) (B)
_____ ((Kikukawa Maru) (C)
_____ (Vessel) (B)

"Blanks at 0400 (?) (Oct. 1) depart Kwajalein.
Arrive Truk South Entrance 1300, Oct. 5, Speed
10 knots.

1. Points of course change as follows. From
Kiyo Channel, northwesterly course.

03-16 North, 166-43 East, course 275.
09-20 North, 165-54 East, course 294.
09-50 North, 164-50 East, course 287.
09-12 North, 162-02 East, course 233.
02-23 North, 160-50 East, course 272.
08-32 North, 158-27 East, course 252.
03-03 North, 157-05 East, course 266.
00-00 North, 154-42 East, course 232.

2. At 0800 blank date () leave 6th Comm.
Zone and enter Truk Comm. Zone. Subchaser 29
will act as radio guard vessel."

Translator's Note: This undoubtedly concerns
Kikukawa Maru. (See NEGATS 241251
and note heading this msg.). Courses
largely obtained by plot. Speed made
good 9.2 knots.

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at
2345(-9), 30th.

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26 December 1945

Case 1, (Cont.)

No. A-4

FROM: _____ (Base Force #6) 30/0943 September
TO: _____ (Surface Escort Unit #2)
INFO: _____ (4th Fleet)
_____ (Air Group #802)
_____ (Air Group #952)
_____ (Air Group #902)
_____ (Kikukawa Maru)
_____ (vessel)

"Blank departed PQ at 0400 on September 30. Arrive Truk South Channel at 1300 on the 5th. Speed 10 knots
1. Course (points for changing course) from Eiyo Channel:

Position	Course
09-18 N, 166-48 E.	276 degrees
09-20 N, 165-54 E.	293 degrees
09-50 N, 164-50 E.	257 degrees
09-12 N, 162-02 E.	238 degrees
08-28 N, 160-50 E.	272 degrees
09-52 N, 158-27 E.	252 degrees
08-23 N, 157-05 E.	261 degrees
08-00 N, 154-42 E.	252 degrees

2. At 0800 on _____ (October 2?) depart #6 Communication Zone and enter #4 Communication Zone. Radio Guard Ship, Subchaser #29."

NEGAT COMMENT: All courses are questionable.

LOCAL COMMENT: Hypo version, sent at 301654, has departure date as October 1; 1st course 275 degrees; 2nd course 294 degrees; 7th position on 08-00N, 157-05 E; and 7th course 256 degrees. PQ is Kwajalein (CD).

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28 December 1945

Case 1 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

01/0819 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUPER COMSUBPAC SERIAL 97 X SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN)
X BLANK X BLANK X TIME 0500 X DATE 4TH 15-20 NORTH
161-54 EAST POSITION AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING
DAY IS AS FOLLOWS: 10-10 NORTH 164-55 EAST X ABOVE
FOR SEADRAGON X HOE MIGHT WORK FOLLOWING ON WAY HOME
IF ANY FISH REMAINING X LARGE SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN)
WHICH MAY BE SEAPLANE TENDER X

BLANK X BLANK X 0830 DATE 4TH 8-06 NORTH 157-03
EAST X SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS AT TIME AND DATES
INDICATED: TIME 0830 X DATE 5TH X 8-00 NORTH
154-42 EAST X SEADRAGON WAS GIVEN THIS 1 FARTHER
EAST X LET US KNOW IF YOU GOT HIM RUTTER SO WE
CAN TELL MCCRAE X AREA 15 NORTH IS VACANT AT PRESENT

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Hoe

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: No defects.

No. C-2

October 4

Proceeding to new station east of TRUK

ORIGINAL

23 December 1945

Case 1, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0000 (K) Changed course to 090° true.
0520 (K) Submerged for morning dive.
0633 (K) Surfaced. Resumed course and speed.
Detected radar interference on Sail Dog radar; assumed this to be caused by THOSA. Interference very strong during morning and decreased to only noticeable amount during remainder of day.
2000 (K) Changed course to 118° true.

October 5

- 0600 (K) Experienced same strong radar interference as previous morning. Suspected presence of enemy plane but none sighted. Passed through numerous rain squalls for about one hour and at 0750 (K) about five minutes after passing through last rain squall port lookout sighted large reconnaissance plane in the sun heading towards us. Range about four miles. Submerged.
0900 (K) Came to radar depth and discovered same strong radar interference I was certain plane had sighted us although bombs were not dropped, and that any expected contact at next point of search would be routed clear of us. At this time only 5000 gallons of reserve fuel remained so I decided to leave the area.
1332 (K) Surfaced. Only light radar interference. Set course for JOHNSON at 15½ knots.

October 6-7

Enroute JOHNSON

U.S.S. Scadron

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Reception Good.

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Case 2, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Noon positions: 1st, 29-05 N, 133-50 E.
2nd, 24-00 N, 133-20 E.
3rd, 18-55 N, 133-45 E.
4th, 13-55 N, 140(?) -00 E.
5th, 10-55 N, 143-40 E.
6th, 09-50 N, 149-00 E."

LOCAL COMMENT: Also sent in HYPO'S 280516, 280532.

PT - Truk (CD).
Kazahaya is a 13,100 tons XAO.

Called to Subs at 1413(-9) 28th.

No. A-2

FROM: IU 8 (1st Flt.) (B) 06/0845 October
TO: SITIMI (Kazahaya) (A)
ROUTE 7
INFO: KUU 7
ROMI 3
OKU 3

- (1st Fleet?) SigDesOpOrd #6. ✓
1. (Kazahaya hit by torpedoes?) and now enroute Truk (being towed). Position 10-50 North, 146-37 East.
2. Commander Raiding Force (YUJIKI BUTAI) despatch one destroyer to assist Kazahaya with the utmost possible despatch, and escort her to Truk.
3. Commander of Special Service Vessel Kazahaya keep blank informed."

No. A-3

FROM: (1st Fleet) 06/0845 October
TO: (Kazahaya)
INFO: (Combined Fleet)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 2, No. A-3 (Cont.)

Sigdesopord #6.

1. Kazahaya was hit by one torpedo in position 10-30N, 146-57 E. She is now heading for Truk.
2. Commander Diversion Attack Force have one destroyer join Kazahaya and escort her to Truk.
3. Captain of Kazahaya report condition (?) blanks.

LOCAL COMMENT: Hypos 060743 had same message.

No. A-4

FROM: _____ (Kazahaya) (A) 06/1410 October
TO: _____
INFO: _____ (1st Sect. Nav.
Gen. Staff) (B)
_____ (Combined Fleet)(C)

"Our posit (9, 10, 11) blank North. (near 150)
blank East. Course blank. Speed blank."

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 01/0845 October
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM PGX
INFO: CINCOPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X COMSUBPAC NUMBER 08 X LARGE NEW TANKER X
COURSE 102 X SPEED 14.5 X TIME 0300 X DATE 5TH X
10-55 NORTH 143-40 EAST POSITION AT SAME TIME ON
FOLLOWING DAY IS AS FOLLOWS: 9-50 NORTH 149-00 EAST
AND CONTINUES ON SAME COURSE FOR ABOUT 7 MORE HOURS
X TINGSA AND STEELHEAD BOTH MORE ON THE ABOVE USING
450 KCS TO EXCHANGE ANY INFO OF VALUE AFTER CONTACT

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 2 (Cont.)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: TINCSEA, STEELHEAD
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

06/0845 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA SERIAL 18 X TANKER WHICH WAS HIT PRIOR
042545 AT 10-30 NORTH 146-57 EAST NOW ENROUTE
TRUK AND PROBABLY BEING TOWED

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Difficult.

No. C-2

October 6

Lat. 10°-26.5' N., Long. 142°-29.55'E.

0033 (K) Made SF contact at range 15,000 yards
130° T. Commenced tracking. Made visual
contact on large tanker at 9,000 yards.
Sky lightly overcast with large low cumulus
clouds covering about 50% of sky and most
of the horizon; no moon. Tracked target
for one hour and 37 minutes. Determined
base course as 025° T., speed 15 knots. At
0224 (K) Target apparently sighted us and turned
directly towards us. She was evidently
expecting to contact an escort in the
vicinity. Conducted attack, and at

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0236 (K) Fired four torpedoes from stern tubes
(Attack #1)
- 0237 (K) Saw and heard two hits, one directly
amidships and one on the quarter. A
third torpedo appeared to strike the target
at the forecastle where a column of water
ten feet high was seen by the J.O.C.D. but
this torpedo did not explode. At
- 0238 (K) Target opened fire with bow gun and turned
towards us. Three shells passed close
overhead before we at
- 0238-30 Dove to 80 feet.
(K) At
- 0240 (K) While leveling off at 80 feet preparatory
to coming to periscope depth, sound reports
light fast screws astern and at
- 0241 (K) Heard and felt one depth charge fairly
close. Although no escort had been sighted
it could have been present and since the
target by her actions prior to firing in-
dicated we had been mistaken for a friendly
vessel, we believed the fast screws reports
were those of an escort and at
- 0246 (K) Went deep. Sound continued to report light
screws for several minutes and then the
heavier screws of the target running
irregularly. When no further depth charge
attacks developed, at
- 0300 (K) Started to periscope depth. At
- 0310 (K) Reached periscope depth and could see nothing
through the periscope. SJ Radar was
reported out of order but could be fixed in
a short time. Waited for repairs to be
made and at
- 0338 (K) Surfaced and proceeded north on the last
bearing of the tanker.
- 0344 (K) Broadcast our 051945 on low frequency in
hopes TIMCSA would pick it up. At
- 0412 (K) Ran into heavy oil slick, started trying
to work around oil slick to northeast on
assumption that if target could move he would
head southeast trailing oil.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0501 (K) Reached eastern limit of oil slick and changed course to northwest to skirt northern edge of slick.
- 0548 (K) Having run back went as far as we had come east from the point of attack, and having made no contact by SJ, assumed target retired on a westerly course and would later resume course to destination. Took up search course toward target's destination.
- 2013 (K) Conducting search to north of Ulol Island on an easterly course. Sent our 030923 reporting attack. During intervals throughout Oct. 6, interference was gotten on SD radar indicating possibility of TIMOSA being in vicinity. (later received word damaged target was sunk by TIMOSA)

October 7

- 0803 (K) Continuing search, heavy squalls, overcast with low cumulus clouds. Sighted two oil drums about 2,000 yards ahead.
- 0805 (K) Sighted plane (4 motor bomber) 090° T., about four miles abeam flying low and heading for STEELHEAD. (Contact #1a) Made quick dive.
- 0819 (K) Depth charge far away.
- 0922 (K) Second depth charge far away.
- 0923 (K) Third depth charge far away.

October 7 to

October 12 Conducting patrol on traffic routes west of Truk.

U.S.S. Tinosa

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: All serials received.

ORIGINAL

25 December 1945

Case 2 (Cont.)

No. C-4

October 6

- 0422 (K) Changed course to 310° T, slowed to 15 knots.
0524 (K) Picked up target by sight, distance 15000 yards angle on bow about 45° starboard. Put target astern. We were in poor position, silhouetted by light horizon. Target was a tanker of at least 10,000 tons, loaded.
- 0539 (K) Submerged. Angle on bow zero. Shortly thereafter target zigged away, giving 90° starboard angle on bow. After tracking a short time opened out to surface.
- 0622 (K) Surfaced; began end run.
1110 (K) Submerged to begin approach. During this end run target had averaged 14.7 knots over the ground from point of first sighting to the position when we submerged. She was zig-zagging during this period. We had to run at full power to gain appreciably.
- 1155 (K) Sound reported target slowing down. We had been tracking her at 16 knots.
- 1201 (K) Fired six torpedoes from bow tubes.
1202 (K) Momentarily ducked. Heard three loud explosions plus a metallic click as of a dud between first and second explosions. Explosions clearly heard through hull.
- 1204 (K) Target began taking starboard list and was down by bow. We were turning to make stern tubes bear. Depth charges and gun fire from target.
- 1207 (K) Target changed course to head for periscope, we were still turning to get stern tubes to bear.
- 1208 (F) With target too close to shoot down the throat increased depth to 150 feet, rigged for depth charge and turned 90° to left at full speed.
- 1209 (K) Four depth charges, all close. Bridge speaker diaphragms broken, various lockers opened, men knocked off feet in after torpedo room.

Case 2, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- 1210 (K) Fire in motor room.
1212 (K) Fire in port revolution counter under control.
1215 (K) Periscope depth. Target had slowed, tracking about nine knots, and was headed southwest. Set course south and followed in hopes she would slow up or turn east and resume her course. Then began opening out to surface.
1430 (K) Surfaced. Began end run.
1644 (K) Submerged for approach. During this run the target had averaged 6.5 knots from her position when we fired to her position when we fired again. She started off at about nine knots zigzagging and decreased to about six knots, not zigzagging, when we fired.
1813 (K) Fired four torpedoes, stern tubes. Two hits.
1821 (K) Target began dropping and throwing depth charges and firing with both guns. Eight depth charges in all were used. Target began turn to her right as if to ram as she had done during morning attack. We were swinging to bring bow tubes to bear. Target swung past ramming course and was making about five knots.
1825 (K) Fired two bow tubes. No indication of hits or explosions but shortly thereafter target stopped. List had increased slightly but there was no evidence of sinking. Gun fire continued.
1834 (K) After maneuvering to obtain position desired fired one stern tube using 180 gyro angle, spindle disengaged and 180 periscope angle. Mark XIV torpedo ran straight at target but no splash was seen. Target opened fire as soon as wake of torpedo was visible and explosions of shells were numerous. Growing darker.
1839 (K) Boats had been lowered by target and were heard in water but occasional gun fire continued. After maneuvering for position fired stern tube, using 180 gyro, spindle disengaged. Torpedo ran straight to target and sound reported an explosion at proper time interval. None seen or heard by officer at periscope.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- 1910 (K) With gun fire still occasionally occurring and no evidence of sinking maneuvered and fired bow tube, zero gyro, spindle disengaged. Sound tracked torpedo running straight for target but heard no explosion. None seen.
- 1913 (K) Fired second bow tube, same conditions. Heard to run straight for target but no explosion and none seen. These two torpedoes were not even heard to hit. Target still seemed to have lots of buoyancy.
- 1923 (K) After maneuvering to obtain position prepared to fire stern tubes again. It was getting very dark and I had used speed to change position, not having observed target since 1913. Target now showed first evidence of sinking, the stern being down and settling fast.
- 1933 (K) Target disappeared, sinking by the stern. STEELHEAD had made three hits on this target. We had at least six effective hits, i.e. torpedoes which detonated.
- 1934 (K) Surfaced. Set course north, speed 15 knots.
- 2048 (K) Changed course to 155⁰T. Decided to bombard installation on Alet Island of Paluwat group at sunset next day.

No. C-5

Description of Contacts

No: 5
Date: October 6
Time: 0520 (K)
Lat: 10-24 N
Long: 146-52E
Type: Tanker; 10,000 (plus) tons
Course: 85
Speed: 16K
Remarks: Loaded

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 2, No. C-5 (Cont.)

No: 5
Date: October 6
Time: 1644 (K)
Lat: 10-00N
Long: 148-36E
Type: Tanker, 10,000 (plus) tons
Course: 85
Speed: 15K
Remarks: Loaded

Case 3

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ 30/1717 September
TO: _____ (Base
Force #6, Kwajalein)
(B)
_____ (4th Fleet)
(B)
_____ (Air Flot #22)(B)
_____ (Base Force #3,
Tarawa) (B)
INFO: _____
_____ (12th Air Fleet) (C)

" (escort #21 Special duty Sub Chaser, #11
Shonan Maru _____, and #7 _____ schedule as
follows:

1st-1200 - depart RYB (Tarawa) course (342?) degrees
3rd - 0530 - arrive FEN (Millo).

• Noon posit for 2nd - 4-16 N, (172?)-08 E.

HYPO COMMENT: Course and degrees longitude derived
by plotting.

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 011040 (-3)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 3, (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

01/0936 October

COMSUBPAC SERIAL 1 TELLS SKIPJACK AND NAUTILUS
ABOUT 4 OR 5 OCTOBER STINGRAY AND 8 DAYS LATER
GROUPE WILL BE PASSING BETWEEN AREAS 22 AND 23
ENROUTE PEARL X FOLLOWING IS ULTRA FOR NAUTILUS
X SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN) OR CONVOY DEPARTED YOUR ATOLL
X TIME 0300 X DATE 1ST X POSITION AT SAME TIME ON
FOLLOWING DAY IS AS FOLLOWS: 4-16 NORTH 172-03
EAST X IN CASE SHE GETS BY NAUTILUS THEN SKIPJACK
NOTE SHE WILL ARRIVE VICINITY 6 NORTH 172 EAST AT
0230 X DATE 2ND

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Nautilus

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception:

Radio reception was good except for
occasional interference between
1300-1700 CCT, on 8250 kcs.

First message received - 170057 Sept

Last message received - 170953 Oct.

(Serial 47 L of 11 October was not
received. - Ed. Note).

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 3, (Cont.)

No. C-2

October 1

Worked the remaining coast of Apaman. Light conditions were still excellent for picture taking. The chart of this island furnished is perfect as to shape and detail. The north point however must be rotated counter clockwise 10° , or rotate the island 10° clockwise. Retired toward TARAWA.

October 2

During early morning went in to within 4000 yards of BINIEU to ensure a good PFI phot and to determine whether the numerous installation on this island would make a distinctive radar target. They did not.....Set course for MAKIM.....

October 3

Worked south coast of KUMA ISLAND.....

U.S.S. Skipjack

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Reception and transmission badly garbled due to Japanese interference. Ser. 80 not received.

No. C-4

October 1

Patrolled off S.E. PASS, JALUIT

ORIGINAL
22 December 1945

Case 3, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- 0811 (L) Sighted pursuit plane over JALUIT anchorage
(Para. C-4)
- 0843 (L) Sighted float type monoplane off S.E. PASS.
Observed following ships in JALUIT HARBOR:
(a) Merchantman moored at JABOR DOCKS.
(b) Merchantman at anchor off JABOR.
(c) Man-of-war - similar to old minelayer
of the TOKIMA type.
- 1259 (L) Sighted sampan patrolling off S.E. PASS.
Spent next three hours evading at periscope
depth. Believe he suspected our presence.
He made four sweeps, varying speed and
lying to, but not echo ranging.

October 2

Patrolled off N.E. PASS, JALUIT. Spent a
good portion of the day avoiding a patrol
boat between 2 and 4 miles off entrance.

Case 4

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Fujo) 01/1235 October
TO: (Mille Guard) 45109
Division #66)
(Kure or Saeki
Defense Force)

INFO: (Unident)
(4th Fleet)
(Sasebo Chief of Staff)
(1st Section Naval
General Staff)
(Escort Unit #1

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 4, No. A-1 (Cont.)

"Convoy FU blank composed of blanks speed 8.5 knots departed West Channel at 1200 on 1st. Will pass through following points (all north and east) and arrive Sasaki at 0600 on 10th.

- A. 10-31 North, 154-03 East.
- B. 13-32 North, 134-03 East.
- C. 16-32 North, 134-03 East.
- D. 19-32 North, 154-03 East.
- E. 22-17 North, 132-49 East.
- F. 25-00 North, 154-14 East.
- G. 27-56 North, 134-14 East.
- H. 30-44 North, 133-03 East.

Course change points also show noon positions."

NEGAT COMMENT: Looks like about 5 marus. Must be something wrong with location of point Easy, but that's all we can get out of it. Believe all of the above points are supposed to be noon positions even though no course changes are made at many of them.

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0220 (-9) Oct. 2nd.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: MUSKALUNGE (SS 262)
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX

01/1823 October

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X 5 CONVOY X ~~SS~~ X BLANK X 0300 X 02 OCTOBER X
QKFD (10-31 NORTH 134-03 EAST) ALGARONA LVRD 13-32
NORTH 134-03 EAST)

INTERCEPT

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 4, (Cont.)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: TULLIBEE (SS 284)
INFO: CINCPAC

05/0823 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SERIAL 6R X ULTRA X IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT EXCESS FUEL
EXPENDITURE ATTEMPT INTERCEPT FOLLOWING X CONVOY X
BLANK X BLANK X 0300 GCT X 7TH X 25-00 NORTH 134-14
EAST X POSITIONS AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAYS ARE
AS FOLLOWS X 27-57 NORTH 134-14 EAST X 30-44 NORTH
133-05 EAST X MUSKALLUNGE MAY HAVE WORKED ON THIS
DOWN SOUTH

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Muskallunge

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Of highest standard.

No. C-2

October 2

- 1410 (I) Sighted convoy bearing 170°T distance 9 mile
Estimated we were within 6,000 yards of the
base course so submerged for attack. We
evidently sighted the convoy at the extreme
end of his left zig since we were never able
to close any targets closer than 6500 yards.
Target was zigzagging as much as 60° from
the base course.
- 1747 (I) Surfaced and continued chase for night attac
Contact was never lost with the targets.
- 2055 (I) Commenced approach for firing having selecte

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 4, No. C-2 (Cont.)

two targets. Started firing at 2124 all forward tubes with 15 second firing interval. All was progressing nicely until the torpedo fired from #5 tube exploded prematurely about two (2) seconds after firing, shaking up the ship very considerably and knocking some of the crew down in the forward torpedo room. All tubes were fired, three torpedoes directed at each of two targets. After firing swung hard left to bring stern tubes to bear on a third target but the premature had called in the escorts who closed at twenty knots or more. The target was lost keeping tabs on the escort so stern tubes were not fired. Evasion at 18 knots was attempted but at 2153 (I) was forced to dive. A total of 7 depth charges were dropped, none close, but echo ranging and search continued until 0100 (I) 3 October.

October 3

- 0157 (I) Surfaced and commenced chase to get in submerged attack in the afternoon.
- 0621 (I) Sighted smoke of three ships bearing west (same convoy) At
- 0906 (I) Sighted masts of large ship bearing to the eastward on converging course with convoy. We were in a pincers, being unable to get ahead of either the convoy or the tanker and a
- 1016 (I) were forced to dive to evade detection and the possibility of an attack became remote.
- 1700 (I) Surfaced and continued chase. Should be in position for night attack about 0100 I the 4th. Failed to locate convoy during the night and when estimated to be 30 miles ahead continued search to west and northeast. Seas built up during early morning with wind force 7 and visibility during the day ranged from 100 yards to three miles. Did not locate convoy so at

October 4

- 1800 (I) Commenced retiring towards our area searching

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 4, No. C-2 (Cont.)

the Empire-Palau lane. All four main engines now smoke heavy black at 80% load. Sufficient fuel remains for about three more days on station.

October 6

- 0902 (I) Submerged to routine torpedoes. Surfaced at 1235 I and continued surface patrol.
2000 (I) Discontinued search and departed for Midway due to fuel limitations and unsatisfactory operation of #1 and #2 main engines. At present these engines are limited to approximately 70% power. The engineering force have worked constantly during the patrol on the engines. Abnormal piston ring wear and breakage is the major cause of trouble.

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

No:	5
Date:	October 2
Time:	1410(I)
Lat:	10-38N
Long:	134-09E
Type:	5 ship convoy 2 escorts
Init. Range:	9 mi.
Est. Course:	Zig-zag
Speed:	10.000°
How contact:	Smoke
Remarks:	Escorts were one CHIDORI torpedo boat & 1 PC type

No:	6
Date:	October 3
Time:	0621(I)
Lat:	12-16N
Long:	133-27E
Type:	Smoke
Init. Range:	15 mi.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 4, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Est. Course: North
How contact: Smoke
Remarks: At least part of same
convoy as #5 contact

U.S.S. Tullibee

Second War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: Satisfactory

No. C-5

(The Tullibee was in a typhoon on the 9th,
10th. No detection of any vessel 6th
through 9th. Ed. Note)

Case 5

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ (Fujo) 01/1630 October
TO: _____ (3rd Fleet) 22037
INFO: _____
(1st Section Naval
General Staff)
(alternate SETUTI)

"Convoy #8011, consisting of "B" vessel Tennan (?),
Maru escorted by blank, speed 9.5 knots, departed for
PT at 1450 on the 1st. Scheduled to arrive at 1200
on the 6th. Noon positions:

2nd, 06-57 North, 157-38 East.
3rd, 06-53 North, 141-13 East.
4th, 06-20 North, 144-54 East.
5th, 06-20 North, 148-32 East.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 5, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Have on board 4300 tons of fuel oil. At 1200 on the 3rd, will leave #3 Communication Zone and enter #4 Comm. Zone."

NEGAT COMMENT: See NEGAT's 01144 in which time of departure should be 1430 instead of 1530.

LOCAL COMMENT: Correction made. Phoned to subs at 020415 (I) October. Departure point is Palao. PT is Truk (CD).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO:
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

01/2001 October

SERIAL 2 UERRA X MEDIUM TANKER X BLANK X BLANK X 0300
GCT OCT 2 X 6-57 N 157-38 E ALGEROBA 6-33 N 141-16 E
6-20 N 144-54 E 6-20 N 148-32 E X POGY TINOSA AID
STEELHEAD CAN ALL WORK ON ABOVE IF IN POSITION TO DO

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. POBY

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Good except low frequency Fox could not be heard.

No. C-2

October 1

Patrolling south of Sorol Island.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 5, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 2-6

Patrolling Palau-Rabaul shipping routes.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Difficult

No. C-4

(No entry was made in its log for October 1-5.
For the Steelhead's activity on October 6,
see X, Case 2, C-2. - Ed. Note)

U.S.S. Tinosa

Third War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: All serials received.

No. C-6

October 1

2200 (L) Changed course to 252° T & pgc. Continued at
two engine speed. Long 162E.

October 2

Uneventful. Drills.

October 3

On test dive discovered leak in supply
ventilation system outside hull. System had

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 5, No. C-3 (Cont.)

been tight on previous dives. Unable to locate leak without undue risk at this time.

October 4

- 0330 (K) Radar contact bearing 119⁰T. Range 8800 yards. Own course 180⁰T. Tracked target on course north and identified as probable patrol vessel. Avoided. Lat. 08-01 N Long. 150-19.5E.
- 0420 (K) Radar contact bearing 310⁰T, range 12500 yards. Own course 000⁰T. Radar reported two targets of comparable size nearly in line.
- 0449 (K) Submerged to radar depth. One target, tanker similar to HUZISAN MARU, 9527 tons, picked up by periscope. Sound reported two sets of reciprocating engine screws.
- 0455 (K) Fired four torpedoes from bow tubes. Lat. 08-02N Long. 150-19E. Submerged to periscope depth.
- 0456 (K) Lost depth control. Poppet of first tube fired stuck in open position. It was secured immediately after firing all tubes. This water, plus the flooding of the ventilation supply piping made ship too heavy to control.
- 0457 (K) Heard one metallic hit and one loud explosion at proper time intervals for hits by two torpedoes. Run was accurately known from radar ranges. Sound reported one set of screws stopped and then reported one set of high speed screws. Dept 90ft. going down slowly.
- 0458 (K) Went to 300 feet. Rigged for depth charge.
- 0500 (K) One depth charge. Distant.
- 0501 (K) Two depth charges. Distant.
- 0502 (K) Two depth charges. Closer but well clear. We were at 350 feet, running at standard speed, using both trim and drain pumps, and reloading forward tubes, but AS measures were very ineffective. Temperature inversion 250 to 280 feet.
- 0548 (K) Slight explosion felt. Very distant. Not similar to depth charge.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 5, No. C-6 (Cont.)

0556 (K) Regained trim, bilges dry, tubes reloaded.
Started up to periscope depth. Necessary
to pump to pass layer.
0611 (K) Nothing in sight. Sun had risen.
0616 (K) Sighted single float seaplane bearing 2300T,
distant two miles, searching area. Went to
120 feet, set course for area.
1608 (K) Surfaced. Enroute our area.

No. C-7

Description of Contacts

No: 2
Time: 0420 (K)
Date: October 4
Lat: 08-00-30N
Long: 150-19E
Type and
Description: Tanker similar to HUZISAN MARU 3527 tons.
Course: 100
Speed: 11.6K
Remarks: Loaded

Case 6

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Surface 30/1045 September
Escort Unit #2)
TO:
INFO: (Air Group 552)

Convoy blanks escorted by [redacted] departed PT for
blank at 0300 30th expecting to arrive Iiiyo Channel
at 0300 8th. Speed 7 knots. Take course 04 degrees

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 6, No. A-1 (Cont.)

from Kimishima? Channel and change to
courses as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>NEW COURSE</u>
3rd	1500	11-00N, 160 E	104
5th	1200	09-40N, 165-20 E	110

(Remainder unreadable, appears to be entrance
routing and communications)

NEGAT COMMENT: Message in very bad shape due to
missing groups in the intercept
but positions and courses are
good. In addition to escort,
convoy seems to consist of 2
marus (one of which is tentatively
recovered as Yamahiko
Maru?). Kiiyo Channel is located
in 08-49N, 167-36 E. placing
destination in Jaluit Atoll.

LOCAL COMMENT: Comdr. Voge will be notified
personally. PT is Truk (GD).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
MEM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

02/0826 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SEADRAGON MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE A DOUBLE PLAY
USING THIS ULTRA SERIAL 4 X CONVOY X BLANK X
0600 OCT X OCT 3RD X 11 DEG NORTH 160 DEG EAST
AND EXACTLY 45 HOURS LATER 09-40 NORTH 165-20 EAST

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Seadrakon

Eighth War Patrol

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 6, (Cont.)

No. C-1

Radio Reception: No casualties

No. C-2

October 5

1738 (L) Sighted smoke bearing 356° T. Contact #1
1750 (L) Dived, closing contact. Contact developed
into one ship accompanied by at least two
escorts. Because of darkness unable to see
escorts or identify ship. Heard pinging
from two ships, and screws of two ships.
2008 (L) Surfaced and commenced chasing contact.
2205 (L) Contact on SJ radar, distance 8,000 yards.
Contact developed into three pips, two almost
same size and larger than the other.
Commenced tracking on starboard side of
contact. Contact appeared to be one ship with
two escorts. A fourth pip shows up every now
and then indicating that there may be a
third escort. One escort appeared to change
position keeping between us and the target
as we made a complete circle of the formation
(10-50 N, 160-15 E position of this contact.-
Ed. Note)

October 4

0312 (L) Started in for attack on port side of formation
Target making 7 knots with small zig on
base course 110° T. Believed there were only
two large escorts, one on either bow of
target. Intended to fire four torpedoes
on a 95° port track at range of 1,500 yards.
0352 (L) Radar contact 1,800 yards broad on starboard
bow.
0354 (L) Range had decreased to 1,500 yards and closing
fast, bearing steady.
0355 (L) Dived. As we passed 70 ft. fast screws went
over the top of us. For the next forty-five
minutes heard two sets of fast screws mill-
ing around over the top of us, both ships
pinging.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 6, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0507 (L) As screws were fading out, surfaced. Opened out and commenced working around to get ahead of target assuming he was still on same base course.
- 1520 (L) Sighted smoke bearing 290° T. Commenced to close.
- 1539 (L) Dived. When smoke cleared away showed we were too close to target and too far off his track, may have been sighted.
- 1611 (L) Broke off attack at 3,000 yards. Target was a small empty freighter of about 1,500 tons or less, with five escorts consisting of two large armed trawlers, two P.C. boats similar to our type and one CHIDORI class torpedo boat. The CHIDORI and one P.C. boat were equipped with radar. Unable to account for the large number of escorts for such a small ship. The freighter was so empty that the forefoot was showing. The estimated depth was seven feet and it was believed the odds were against our getting a hit on such a shallow draft target.
- 1918 (L) Surfaced. Started trailing contact. Thought probably more ships would join the formation since there were so many escorts and new comers would offer a better target.

(For report of October 5, 1945, see X, Case 1, C-4.)

Case 7

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Kobe address) 02/1535 October
TO: (Souwest Fleet) 29290
(sic)
(Singapore Base Force 10)

Case 7, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: _____) (Makassar Base
Force 25)
_____) (Batavia Resident
Naval Officer)
_____) (Surabaya Base Force
21)
_____) (2nd SoEx Fleet)
_____) (Balikpapan Base
Force 22)
_____) (Combined Fleet)
_____) (Saigon Base Force
11)
_____) (3rd SoEx Fleet)
_____) (Singapore Resident
Naval Officer)
_____) (Bangkok Resident
Naval Officer)
_____) (1st Naval General Staff)
_____) (Bureau Military
Preparations Tokyo)
_____) (1st SoEx Fleet)
_____) (Escort Force 1)
_____) (Sasebo CofS)
_____) (Singapore Communication
Unit)
_____) (Takao Guard District)
_____) (Kure CofS)

*Reference Serial # blank.

German ship Osorno (_____) 7651 tons, single stack
blank) departed Kobe _____ the 2nd. Clears
Kii Channel _____ at 1300 and expects arrive 1.6
miles North of North (Park?) at 1000 the 11th.

Noon positions: 3rd - 30-30 N, 135-40 E.
4th - 26-20 N, 130-20 E.
5th - 23-15 N, 125-15 E.
6th - 20-20 N, 120-40 E.
7th - 16-45 N, 116-50 E.
8th - 13-45 N, 113-30 E.
9th - 03-40 N, 110-00 E.
10th - 04-40 N, 106-40 E.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 7, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Parts 1 and 2 of 2) (Page 2 of 2)

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 051755 (-9).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: STURGEON OR GURNARD
INFO: CINCPAC
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX

03/1038 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA SERIAL 9T X SOMETHING DIFFERENT X GERMAN CARGO-PASSENGER AT 0300 4 OCTOBER POSITION 26-20 NORTH 130-20 EAST X POSITIONS AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAY ARE AS FOLLOWS: 23-15 NORTH 125-15 EAST X 20-20 NORTH 120-40 EAST X 16-45 NORTH 116-50 EAST

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: All serials received.

No. C-2

October 4

Patrolling on surface in Lat. 22-50 N.,
Long. 124 E.

October 5

Patrolling on surface in Lat. 23-20N.,
Long. 125E.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 7, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 6

Patrolling submerged. Lat. 24N, Long 126-20E.
Seas very rough.

October 7

Patrolling on surface at Lat. 24-20N; Long
126-20E. Weather continues unfavorable with
poor visibility.

October 8

Patrolling on surface in Lat. 24-30N, Long
126-40E.

U.S.S. Gurnard

Third War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Reception complete except during
a weather disturbance on 17 September.

No. C-4

October
4 & 5

Patrolling on surface on easterly courses
across traffic lanes north and south via
Formosa Straits. Heavy seas.

October 6

Patrolling on surface. Horizon hazy. Seas
moderating.

0815 (H) 20-12N, 120-20E Sighted ship bearing 115° T,
distant 8. (Ship Contact #12) While track-
ing and making end around run lost visual con-
tact of masts in haze. Searched along
target's probable tracks at positions of 11
to 15 knots until 2100 but was unable to

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 7, No. C-4 (Cont.)

regain contact. Several times during day noted interference on SD and pips at 10-14 miles, no planes sighted.

Case 8

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ 03/1035 October
TO: _____

"Convoy #4003 consisting of () and X 64701 - unidents) and Shikanoura Maru escorted by () - Ikazuki) (- unident) departed Truk for Yokosuka at 0415 Oct. 3. Scheduled arrive 1700 October 12.

(Part 1). Moon posits (3-12 October).

Blank-40 North, 150-55 East.
Blank-30 North, 147-20 East.
Blank-40 North, 144-20 East.
11-55 North, 142-20 East.
15-35 North, 141-00 East.
Blank-00 North, 139-40 East.
23-00 North, 138-50 East.
26-55 North, 138-blank East.
30-50 North, 138-10 East.
34-25 North, 139-15 East.

(Part 2). Until 1200 October 5, Truk Comm. Zone (TU 105 and TU blank).

Until 1200 October 10th, 5th Special Base Force Communication Zone (NA 51).

Then Yokosuka Comm. Zone (YO 22). Radio guard vessel blank."

LOCAL

LOCAL COMMENT: Variations from NEGAT 031459 are:
(1) Longitude of posit for October 7 (NEGAT had same as 6th). (2) Recovery of Ikazuki vor X 33522.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 8, (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: (Surface Escort Unit #2) 03/1035 October

TO:

"Convoy #4003 consisting of [blank and Shikanoura Maru, escorted by [and ?] departed PT for NAA 0415, the 3rd. Expect to arrive 1700, the 12th.

1. Noon position for 3rd through 12th: Following positions all North and East respectively.

3rd, 04-40, 150-55
4th, 06-30, 147-20
5th, blank-40, 144-20
6th, 11-55, 142-20
7th, 15-35, 142-20
8th, 19-00, 139-40
9th, 23-00, 138-50
10th, 28-55, 133-20
11th, 30-50, 138-10
12th, 34-25, 139-15

Communication Zones: Until 1200 on the 5th: #4 Comm. Unit (TU 103). Until 1200 on the 10th: 5th Base Force (KA 51), thence Yokosuka (YO 22)."

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 0300 (-9) October 4th. PT - TRUEK (CD).
NAA - Yokosuka (CD).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 04/0621 October
TO: TG 17.14
INFO: CINCPAC

FREQ: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOLLOWING ULTRA FOR TASK GROUP 17.14 COMSENS NIGHTLY MARINERS X SERIAL 10U FROM COMSUBPAC X CONVOY WITH

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 8, No. E-1 (Cont.)

NO ESCORTS X TIME 0300 X SPEED 5 KNOTS X POSITIONS,
26-55 NORTH 138-20 EAST ALGARCEA 30-50 NORTH 138-10
EAST X 34-25 NORTH 139-15 EAST X TARPON NOTE LAST
POSIT IN CASE THEY GET BY THE TERRIBLE TRIO

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: No material casualties were experienced. Radio reception proved to be difficult in the entire area covered by this vessel. This was especially true in the vicinity of Yap and Palau Islands.....

No. C-2

September 25
to October 1

0700 (W) Underway from Johnston Island enroute assigned patrol and following perscribed route. Dropped one day on September 27th on crossing 180th meridian. Conducted training exercises daily enroute area.

October 5

Lat. 10°-31'N, Long. 146°-00'E.

October 7
to October 12

Conducting patrol on traffic routes west of Truk.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 8, (Cont.)

U.S.S. Tullibee

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: While in the patrol area the Japs jamming activity was quite effective..

No. C-4

October 3

- 1130 (L) Radar contact on plane at 18 miles, not sighted.
2330 (L) Sighted flashing white lights bearing 345° and 030° relative. Could obtain no radar contact with lights well inside horizon so avoided.

October 6

- 1313 (L) Radar contact on plane at 20 miles. Closed t 19 miles, faded at 21 miles. Not sighted.

October 9

- 1400 (K) Entered assigned area accompanied by a rising typhoon. Seas made up all afternoon and at
1818 (K) We started taking plenty of water down the hatch which caused numerous electrical casualties and put the gyros out of commission. The magnetic compass, swung so wildly that they were useless. Attempted to outguess the waves by conning the steersman from the bridge. The futility of this soon became apparent so at
1900 (K) Put on 5° right rudder, made turns for 7 knots and gave the TULLIBEE the bit in her teeth. This procedure proved correct as she rode easily with the seas near the port beam and the wind flowing from around the port quarter. The seas encountered were the worst ever seen by anyone on board. Average

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-4 (Cont.)

trough to crest height being 35 feet with frequent "mountains" towering over 50 feet. The barometer dropped so fast that you could see the needle move. Average wind velocity estimated to be between 60-70 knots with gusts up to 80.

October 10

Repairing storm casualties. (No ship contacts October 11, 12, and 13 - Ed. Note).

U.S.S. Gurnard

Third War Patrol

No. C-5

(See X, Case 7, C-5 and C-4 for radio reception and report of submarine's activities for October 4-6.)

No. C-6

October 7

- 1112 (H) 20-00N, 119-32E Patrolling on surface. Sighted smoke on horizon bearing 330° T. This developed to be two ships. Commenced tracking and taking position for submerged approach. In same general vicinity as during yesterday's tracking, noted interference on SD and pips at 10-14 miles, no planes sighted.
- 1547 (H) Submerged. Subsequent to our diving targets changed base course away from us though still in sight. We were unable to close for a submerged attack. These two ships maneuvered on various courses at various speeds and at
- 1700 (H) Were joined at Lat 19-30N, Long 119-20 E by two other AK's which stood down from the north. (All 4 - ship contact #15).

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-6 (Cont.)

- This position is apparently today's convoy meeting place.
- 1800 (H) Have been unable to close convoy submerged.
1833 (H) Surfaced and continued tracking convoy with intentions of making a night surface attack after moonset. Conditions of moon phase and scattered clouds are not favorable for a night submerged approach. Yet there is too much light for a surface attack.
- 1959 (H) Lat 19-00N, Long 119-10 E Small DD escort stood up from south and fell in with convoy (Ship contact #14)

October 8

- 0103 (H) Commenced surface approach on zig zagging convoy which is headed south. Approaching from west which has poorest horizon. Convoy is in column distance between ships about 700 yards, largest ships in position #1 and #2, escort patrolling near stern of #4 ship in column. At
- 0139 (H) Fired tubes 1, 2, 4 and 6 at ship #1; range 1900 yards, mean track 89 starboard, mean gyro 353°, immediately swung ship to right and at
- 0142 (H) Fired tubes 10, 9, 8, and 7 at #2 ship in column, range 2100 yards, mean gyro 16° (Used torpedoes in low power, see remarks paragraph (H). As to be expected, sometime while firing at #1 we were sighted in large silhouette by #2, also at about this time the escort decided to make a tour up the starboard flank. In view of the probability of #2 sighting us I intended to accept whatever track would permit firing stern tubes at #2 with small gyro angles and to fire immediately after swinging and pointing our stern towards her. #2 ship swung towards us while we were turning and her angle on bow changed from 40° starboard to about 10° port while we were firing stern tubes. This change of #2's course was admirably handled by the

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-6 (Cont.)

control party, course changes were CRANKED INTO T.D.C. during firing. Results 2 hits amidship on #1 and 3 hits on #2. (Attacks #2 and #3) Spreads used on #1, 2 torpedoes at 0°, 1-2° left, 1-2° right, divergent. Same for #2. Torpedoes at 0° spread were fired first and last (see remarks paragraph (H)) All hits as seen were definitely good high order terrific explosions. #1 ship broke in two and when last sighted only the stern was in sight with a down angle of about 35°. #2 blew up and her bow sank instantaneously, several loud explosions were heard and felt very soon after the three hits. When last seen about 25 feet of the stern was all that remained above water. Large columns of water were seen as the stern faded out. These arose at the same time as explosions were heard, probably her depth charges going off. About one minute after #2 blew up while very close overhead, some foreign matter falling on the bridge and streaks of tracers going by indicated that some one, probably the escort who could be seen hurrying down the side lines, had a fair bead on us. We ran for cover at full speed towards a dark horizon to NW. For a while we managed to avoid the escort and still keep radar contact with ships #3 and #4. When the escort was out of sight we would change course to keep radar contact with #3 and #4 but on three different occasions found ourselves closing the escort, and in the end lost radar contact with #3 and #4. On losing contact headed east to original convoy track then south down convoy track with hopes of finding a prisoner and eventually overtaking #3 and #4. While passing vicinity of attack noted an escort vessel searching at very slow speeds on various courses. Went ahead at full speed searching along probable convoy track but did not regain contact with #3 and #4.

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-6 (Cont.)

Ship #1 filled more than 3/4's of 7x 50 binocular field at radar range 1900 yards, she was very large, her silhouette and masts were unlike any ship in O.N.I. 208J. She appeared similar to Dutch Ship TUBESAR, 10,800 gross tons (#306 Talbot Booth, 1942). This is considered to be a very conservative estimate of her size. Ship #2 was similar to DAKAR HARU, 7160 gross tons.

0626 (H) Lat 17-38N, Long 119-15E While still searching for ships #3 and #4 sighted large land based bomber (Plane contact #9) headed our way. No pip on SD radar. Submerged. As all hands are not up to the usual alertness after yesterday's and last night's tracking and action and as this vicinity will probably be alive with planes today decided to remain submerged.

October 9

2225 (H) Lat 18-50N, Long 118-55E. Patrolling on surface. Radar pip 14500 yards bearing 090° True. This developed to be a merchant ship. Tracked and maneuvered for approach. Target zig zagging on base course about 230° T. Decided to conduct submerged approach as visibility in moonlight is fair and it is about 3 to 4 hours before visibility dark enough for a surface attack can be expected.

October 10

0130 (H) Submerged, conducting approach with radar and periscope, target zig zagging.

0150 (H) Fired tubes 10, 7, 8 and 9, torpedoes in low power, average track 84 P. gyro 1930, range about 1400 yards. Through periscope observed two hits on target. Neither of the explosion were as terrific as those of the early morning of 8 October. The noise was less, flash was less, and the amount of water blown up was less. Target swung around a circle, dropped

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-6 (Cont.)

- 3 or 4 depth charges, fired her stern gun, stopped for awhile and then headed to the east.
- 0206 (H) Surfaced and pursued target which is now a little lower in the water. She is headed towards the direction of nearest land, her speed is no less than it was before our attack. Tracking and closing for surface attack, moon has set; target has ceased zig-zagging.
- 0400 (H) Fired tubes 1, 2, and 3, torpedoes in low power, range about 3000 yards, average track 106 P, gyro 359°. The third torpedo fired was a premature about 400 yards ahead of us. The torpedo had been activated on board ship. A weak explosion was heard; the flash and disturbance of water at target was hardly noticeable. Very soon after the premature, fired tubes 6, 5 and 4, range 2600 yards, torpedoes in low power, average track 112P, gyro 357°. The premature advertised our firing thus target had over two minutes to maneuver before the three torpedoes of the second salvo reached her track. Target swung away from us, she dropped a few depth charges and fired her stern gun aimlessly. We trailed, her speed had not been reduced, she still headed in the general direction of land apparently none the worse as a result of our second attack. All torpedoes being expended and seas being too rough to use a deck gun, we observed target until certain she wasn't sinking and then set course for Midway.

Target was never definitely identified. Changing radar ranges against binocular field subtended she was seen to be at least 500 feet long; had a low squat stack and not much superstructure. She may have been a tanker or a cargo ship, size 8000 to 10000 tons.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-6 (Cont.)

In preparation for firing on this attack, all six bow tubes were made ready as ordered, though I intended to use only three torpedoes. Target had been tracked for nearly an hour on a steady course and speed. I assumed that a salvo of three yard spread on each of the others would finish her and leave us with 3 torpedoes for another target. I now feel that I erred in taking the optimistic attitude that three torpedoes would suffice. Having already experienced failures of warheads on 50% of my attacks on this patrol, I should have fired at least four torpedoes in the first salvo with two aimed to hit without a spread. Submerged during daylight.

October 11

- 1225 (H) Lat 20-16N, Long 122-33E. Sighted plane bearing 030° T, distant about 10 miles and submerged to avoid detection. Plane was low, no indication on SD radar.
- 1349 (H) Surfaced.

October 15

- 0645 (I) Lat 24-15N, Long 136-10E. While submerged during early morning sighted 2 AK's bearing 098° T, distant 6 miles. Tracked to determine course and speed. Sent contact report on surfacing.
- 1825 (I) 24-40N, 137-52E. Sighted lighted plane (darkness) bearing 055° T, distant 5 miles, plane headed south, no indication that it knew of our presence.

U.S.S. Tarpon

Ninth War Patrol

No. C-7

Radio Reception: Fair on high frequency but with several stations interfering at night. Dawn and dusk reception poor.

No. C-8

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 8, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 8

2035 (K) Sighted small patrol boat, range 2600 yards. Definitely identified as enemy patrol boat. Tracked him for one-half hour. Seas rough, visibility poor. He did not see us. Avoided, continued as before. Lat. 34°-50"N., Long. 153°-50"E.

(The entries in the Tarpon's log for October 8-12 were deleted from the War Patrol Report; however, judging from the contact reports for these days, the Tarpon sighted nothing larger than patrol craft. - Ed. Note)

October 13

While approaching coast in early morning with bright full moon encountered several lighted fishermen and several unlighted small craft, either fishermen or patrols. Avoided. Periscope patrol off IRO SAMI. During day sighted 2 small boats, one small auxiliary schooner, and 3 patrol boats. After surfacing, while proceeding southwest, encountered at least 12 small boats, some lighted, some darkened. Most of them were fishermen returning to coast from vicinity of ZENI SU.

During night ran south and east covering southeastern approaches.

Case 9

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Surface Escort Force #2) 03/1030 October 53353

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28 December 1945

Case 9, No. A-1 (Cont.)

TO: (garbled)

(Second Southern
Expeditionary Fleet)

(Soerabaja Base

Force #21)

(Balikpapan Base

Force #22)

INFO: (4th Fleet)

(Southwest Area Fleet)

(Balikpapan Detachment of

#102 Munitions Sect.)

(Southwest Area Fleet)

(Naval General Staff

1st Section)

#(1). Blank departs PT for JN at 0400 the 3rd.
Scheduled to arrive at 1730 the 11th. Moon
positions from 3rd to 11th as follows:

3rd, 05-55 North, 151-15 East.

4th, 06-45 North, 146-10 East.

5th, 07-30 North, 140-50 East.

6th, 05-15 North, 130-10 East.

7th, 02-50 North, 150-45 East.

8th, 02-10 North, 125-50 East.

9th, 01-20 North, 120-35 East.

10th, 02-15 South, 110-45 East.

11th at 0500 in position 04-57 South,

114-31 East.

(2). Communication zones as follows:

Until the 6th in #4 Communication Zone.

Until 1200 the 7th in 3rd Communication Zone (NA 31).

Until 1200 the 9th in 32nd Base Force Comm. Zone.

Until 0500 the 11th in 22nd Base Force Comm. Zone (SE

Thereafter in 21st Communication Zone."

NEGAT COMMENT: Longitude for 5th is plainly in error
but encoder says "150".
Believe "135" is correct.

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 9, No. A-1 (Cont.)

LOCAL COMMENT: PT IS Truk (CD). JN is Soerabaja (CD).
Phoned ComSubPac at 041155 October (-9).

CIC NOTE: should read "6th".

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS ON
NPM FOX

04/1832 October

INFO:

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR POBY X 1 SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN) X 0300 X
5TH X 7-03 NORTH 140-50 EAST X POSITION AT SAME
TIME ON FOLLOWING DAY IS AS FOLLOWS X 5-15 NORTH
135-45 EAST X 2-05 NORTH 150-45 EAST X LONGITUDE OF
2ND POSIT GIVEN IS NOT TOO CERTAIN

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. POBY

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Not always satisfactory.

No. C-2

October 2-6

Patrolling Palau - Rabaul shipping routes.

October 6

1133 (I)

Sighted two ships (at 05-15N, 135-50E
according to contact report. - Ed Note).
Started approach on 4 engines on surface
working into position on target's track.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 9, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1636 (I) In position ahead of target and submerged for attack.
1737 (I) Fired 4 torpedoes at medium tanker; missed. Believe torpedoes ran under target. The two tankers were overlapping when we fired.
1842 (I) Surfaced.

October 7

Patrolling off Angaur Island. Sighted smoke of patrol vessel in morning and afternoon.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 10

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ 04/1806 October
TO: _____ (Southeast Area Fleet) 01505
_____ (Rabaul Base Force #8)
INFO: _____ (unidentified)
_____ (4th Fleet)
_____ (Rabaul Seaplane Force)
_____ (Kavieng Seaplane Unit)
_____ (Tokyo Naval General Staff, 1st Section)
_____ (Rabaul Sea Defense Force Commander)
_____ (Subchaser #37)
_____ (Mitakesan Maru)

"SO" # blank convoy, consisting of "B" ship
_____-Maru?), "A" ships, blank, _____, and
, escorted by _____ and _____ Speed

8.5 knots.

Departed offing at 1530, 3 October and is scheduled to arrive Rabaul at 1600, 10 October via Point "A" (03 North, 140 East), point "B" (02-35 South, 150 East) and thereafter blanks. Positions as follows:

- 4th 05-40 North, 136-40 East.
- 5th 03-48 North, 138-54 East.
- 6th 02-10 North, 141-30 East.
- 7th 00-40 North, 144(?) -10 East.
- 8th 00-58 South, 147(?) -29 (?) East.
- 9th 02-20 South, 149(?) -30 East.
- 10th 03-40 South, 152(?) -10 East.

Depart 3rd Communication Zone at 0000, 7 October and enter 8th Communication Zone. Commander of Convoy will be the naval commander aboard the _____-Maru?).

NEGAT COMMENT: Numbers indicated as questionable are unconfirmed, but appear to be fairly close.

LOCAL COMMENT: Phoned to COMSUBPAC at 051430 October (

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 10 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: PCGY
INFO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

05/0719 October

SUPER FOR PCGY IF IN VICINITY X 3 SHIPS (TYPE UNKNOWN) ESCORTED BY 2 ESCORT VESSELS X BLANK X SPEED 8.5 KNOTS X TIME 0300 X 5 OCTOBER X 03-48 NORTH 138-54 EAST X SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS OF THIS UNIT AT TIMES AND DATES INDICATED WILL BE AS FOLLOWS X 02-10 NORTH 141-30 EAST X 00-40 N & S 144-10 EAST X LOOK OUT FOR PETO MAY JOIN IN X CHANGE FIRST STATION MY 041832 TO 07-30 NORTH 140-50 EAST

REF: 041832X 1 SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN) X 0300 X 5TH X 7-03 NORTH 140-50 EAST X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Poey

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: (See X, Case 9, C-1 and C-2 for radio reception and log entries for the U.S.S. Poey on October 1-7.)

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 11

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ (#6 Kaiyo Maru)
 TO: _____ (Combined Fleet)
 _____ (5th Fleet)
 INFO: _____ (Tokyo Hydrographic Office)

03/1230 October
00424

1. "Will depart Rotten Bay for Hakodate at 1700 on the 3rd escorting blank. At 1800 blank will cease escort of blank and proceed to Katakaka Bay.
2. Schedule as follows:
 - At 1700, on 3rd, 47-55 North, 151-50 East.
 - At 0600, on 4th, 47-55 North, 149-15 East.
 - At 1800, on 5th, 45-00 North, 145-48 East.
 - At 1000, on 6th, pass through Soya Strait.
 - At 2000, on 7th, 42-10 North, 139-50 East.
 - At 0800, on 8th, 41-20 North, 139-50 East.

LOCAL COMMENT: COMBUEPACFOR informed at 0350 (-9), 4th.

No. A-2

FROM: _____
 TO: _____ (Defense Force Unit
 Kuriles) (C)
 INFO: _____ (CrdDiv #22) (B)
 _____ (Defense Force Unit
 Kuriles) (C)

04/1130 October
SLS #057

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 11, No. A-2 (Cont.)

"Towing (started?).
Position 46-01 (?) North, 147-00 East. Course 270 degrees
speed about 2 knots."

LOCAL COMMENT: Above phoned to subs at 051150 October (I).
HEGAT 041401 gave "35?-10 North, 146?-54
East" for above position. HIFC's figures,
though unconfirmed, appear better.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: SAMPISH
WAIHO
INFO: CINCPAC

05/0832 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUEPAC ULTRA SERIAL 12M X 1 SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN) X
1100 7TH X 42-10 NORTH 139-50 EAST X AND 12 HOURS LATER
X 41-20 NORTH 139-50 EAST X ALSO NOTE 1 SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN)
BEING TOWED X COURSE 270 DEG X 2 KNOTS X 0250 4TH X 46 NORTH
147 EAST

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Sawfish
Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Normal.

No. C-2

October 7

0250 (I) Sighted CHUS-IMI SHIMA bearing 041°T distance
25 miles.
0445 (I) Submerged, bearing 270° T distance 20 miles
from CHUS IMI SHIMA.
0612 (I) Surfaced and resumed run to North.
0944 (I) Lat 42-02N Long 139-30E. Lookout sighted single
float plane bearing 008°T distance about 2 miles,
altitude about 1000 feet, crossing bow from
starboard to port. Dove to 150 feet.

ORIGINAL

28 December 194

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 7

- 0950 (I) Plane dropped one aerial bomb on starboard quarter - not close. Changed course to westward.
- 1145 (I) Lat 42-02N Long 139-13E. Light bomber (MILLIE) sighted through periscope - crossing stern at distance of about 3 miles. Plane turned and headed for periscope, went to 150 feet. No bombs this time.
- 1500 (I) Lat 42-02N Long 139-02E. Came to periscope depth for look around.
- 1502 (I) Sighted light bomber (MILLIE) on starboard beam circling low over water at a distance of about 6 miles.
- 1500 (I) Went to 100 feet.
- 1511 (I) Heard 6 explosions - sounded like more aerial bombs not close.
- 1512 (I) Heard another explosion farther away.
- 1547 (I) Heard another explosion not close.
- 1850 (I) Surfaced and opened out to west before resuming run to north.
- 2113 (I) Picked up weak radar sweep on SJ radar. Soon faded out.
- 2350 (I) Picked up weak radar sweep on SJ radar intermittent for about 15 minutes.

October 8

- 0415 (I) Lat 45-22N Long 139-12E sighted white and red lights bearing 092⁰T unidentified.
- 0428 (I) Submerged in Lat 45-25N Long 139-12E. Went to 100 feet.
- 1152 (I) Came to periscope depth for look around. No contacts.
- 1755 (I) Came to periscope depth - no contacts.
- 1844 (I) Surfaced in Lat 45-44N Long 140-10E. Set course for L. PEARCE STRAIT.

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 8

- 2105 (I) Lat 45-50N Long 140-37E sighted white lights of vessel bearing -086^{OT}. Maneuvered to avoid. Vessel identified as Russian.
- 2215 (I) Sighted KAIWA TO bearing 016^{OT} distance 20 miles.
- 2216 (I) Sighted REBUN SHIMA bearing 186^{OT} distance 32 miles.

U.S.S. Wahoo

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-3

(The U.S.S. Wahoo was lost during this patrol; therefore, its report is unavailable. Ed. Note.)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 13, No. A-1 (Cont.)

NEGAT COMMENT: This confirms suspicion aroused by message partially translated in NEGAT's 230556 that it was Chuyo not Otaka who was damaged in recent attack. Reason that Otaka was so prominent in traffic concerning attack must have been due to seniority of captain or to breakdown of Chuyo transmitter. Questionable times in foregoing translation may be in error by as much as 2 hours.

LOCAL COMMENT: Reference (NEGAT 230536) is report of torpedo attack by Captain of Chuyo

No. A-2

FROM: (Concealed Identity) 02/1257 October
TO: 44712.
(11th Air Fleet)
(Naval Minister and Chief Naval Gen. Sta.
(4th Fleet)
(Yokosuka Naval District Chief of Staff)
(Chichijima Special Base Force)
(Yokosuka Defense Squadron Flagship)
INFO: (Air Base or activity)

"From Captain of Otaka ()
Departure from Yokosuka scheduled in Otaka
SMB 011242 is delayed one day in order to blanks."

NEGAT COMMENT: See NEGAT's 012150 and 022205.

LOCAL COMMENT: Phoned to SubPac at 0220 (I) 5rd
October. References gave details of
Otaka (DD) and
(Bazanami?) scheduled trip to
Truk from Yokosuka leaving 0700 October
3rd, arriving about 1530 the 8th.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1943

Case 12. (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: TIMOSA
INFO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
CINCPAC

05/0847 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUPER X SERIAL 15 GIVES THIS BEAUTY TO TIMOSA X
1 AUXILIARY CARRIER WITH 1 OR 2 DESTROYERS X BLANK
X BLANK X 2000 X OCT 7TH X 16-36 N 150-00 E X
SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS OF THIS UNIT AT TIME AND DATE
INDICATED X 1030 7 OCT 16-36 NORTH 150-00 EAST X
0250 9TH OCT 08-35 NORTH 152-32 EAST AND FOUR HOURS
LATER ARRIVES NORTH CHANNEL X TIMES ARE NOT TOO
CERTAIN SO ALLOW YOUR SELF PLENTY OF LEeway AND
NOTE THAT AREA 15 NORTH WILL BE VACANT UNTIL KINGO
ENTERS ABOUT 10 OCTOBER

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
CINCPAC
INFO:

06/1821 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUEPAC TELLS TIMOSA X ULTRA X DETAILHEAD REPORTS HE
IS LEAVING FOR 13 DEG NORTH 150 DEG WEST TO ASSIST YOU
IN WORKING ON THE AUXILIARY CARRIER

Case 12, (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tinosa

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: All serials received.

No. C-2

(On October 6, 1943, the Tinosa was at 10-00 N, 143-36 E, attacking another target, a tanker. See X, 2, C-4 and C-5 for details. - Ed. Note)

October 7

- 0725 (K) Sighted large airplane, headed at us, distance eight miles. Submerged.... Lat. 07-44 N, Lon 149-15 E.
- 0903 (K) Surfaced; resumed course and speed.
- 1023 (K) Sighted light on Alet Island.
- 1034 (K) Submerged. Approached island, examined, took pictures, and showed targets to gun crew. Primary target radio station. Secondary barracks. Planned to surface just before sunset, so that enemy could be looking into setting sun and on bearing such that all targets would be in line.
- 1753 (K) Sunset. Sun obscured by clouds. Decided to wait a little longer. Fishing canoe with sail distant about 5000 yards.
- 1803 (K) Surfaced. Fired 41 rounds at target, range 5000 yards. Dust clouds as evidence of hits visible. Estimate about two thirds of rounds hit target area. No opposition.....

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 12, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 8

1200 (K) Began patrolling route to Saipan.
1528 (K) Sighted airplane bearing 020° relative.
No radar indication. Submerged.
Lat. 09-42 N, Long. 150-13 E.
1700 (K) Surfaced.
2135 (K) Changed course to 073°T to patrol route
Truk to Empire.

October 9

0755 (K) Began patrol of route.
1700 (K) Changed course to 250°T to return to area.
2202 (K) Received orders to return to Midway. Set
course, speed three engines at 80/90.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

(See X, VIII, C-1 and C-2 for radio re-
ception and report of the Steelhead's
activities for October 5-10, 1943.)

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 13

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

04/1325 October

(Kobe Address)
(Sasebo CoFS) 49716
(Takao Guard District)
(#1 Surface Escort Unit)
(3rd SoEx Fleet)

(1st SoEx Fleet)
(Saigon Base Force 11)
(Singapore Base Force 10)
(1st Section NGS)

"From blank

German ship blank LAND will depart at 0000/5th October and is scheduled to arrive Horsburgh Light about 1500, 15th October.

Noon positions: 5th - 33-10 N, 137-48 E.
6th - 30 N, 134-01 E.
7th - 26-50 N, 130-50 E.
8th - 24-40 N, 127 E.
9th - 22 N, 122-55 E.
10th - 19-blank N, 119-25 E.
11th - 16 N, 116 E.
12th - 12-30 N, 113 E.
13th - 9-blank N, blank-25 E.
14th - blanks
15th - 2 N, 105 E."

NEGAT COMMENT:

Although text says positions are for 15th inclusive only 10 points are given, last one of which must be noon position for 15th. Only assumption we can make is that noon position for 14th was omitted in drafting.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 13, No. A-1 (Cont.)

LOCAL COMMENT: Hypo version gives 19-05 N, 119-25 E for position on the 10th; and 108 (?) -25 E for Longitude on the 13th, although 110 degrees looks better by plot.

No. A-2

FROM: _____ (Kobe address) 04/1603 October
TO: _____ (Southwest
Area Fleet) 50559

(Bangkok Resident
Naval Officer)
INFO: _____

(#1 Southern Expeditionary
Fleet)

(#2 Southern Expeditionary
Fleet)

(Sasebo Chief of Staff)

(Takao Guard District)

(Base Force 11, Saigon)

(Soerabaya Special
Base Force 21)

(Balikpapan Base Force 22)

(Makassar Base Force 23)

(Davao Base Force 32)

(Batavia Resident Naval
Officer)

(Singapore Resident Naval
Officer)

(1st Section Naval General
Staff)

(Tokyo Bureau Military
Preparations)

(Kure Chief of Staff)

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 15, No. A-2 (Cont.)

"German vessel blank 2700 tons, 2 masts (?) 1 funnel (?) blanks speed 13 knots BLANKS left blank for Bangkok blanks scheduled to arrive at 0700 14th. Noon positions 5th through 15th. All positions North and East.

5th 51-00, 134-27
6th 27-00, 130-50
7th 24-00, 126-00
8th 21-20, 121-10
9th 17-30, 117-40
10th 15-40, 114-10
11th 10-40, 111-00
12th 08-20, 105-40
13th 10-00, 102-00

LOCAL COMMENT: This info given to subs at 05/1433 October (I).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1.

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FCX
INFO: CINCPAC

06/0849 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

FOR SURVEILLANCE AND GUARD ONLY X SERIAL 18 7 ULTRA
X SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN) 0300 COG X 6TH 27-00 NORTH
130-50 EAST

POSITIONS AT SAID TIME ON FOLLOWING DAYS ARE AS
FOLLOWS 24 NORTH 126 EAST X 21-20 NORTH 121-10
E X ANOTHER SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN) 0300 COG X 7TH
26-50 NORTH 130-50 EAST POSITIONS AT SAID TIME
ON FOLLOWING DAYS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 24-40 NORTH
127-00 EAST X 22-00 NORTH 123-55 EAST X 19
NORTH 119 EAST X BOTH THE ABOVE ARE GERMAN

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 13

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Sturgeon

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Enemy interference made reception poor.

No. C-2

October 6-10

Patrolling, no contacts.

U.S.S. Gurnard

Third War Patrol

No. C-5

(See X, Case 7, C-3 and C-4 for radio reception and report of submarine activities for October 4-6. See X, Case 8, C-6 for October 7-15.)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 14, No. A-2 (Cont.)

"Originator: Blank convoy commander Captain

1. #2608 convoy - 7 ships departs blank 5th 0930. Scheduled to arrive Palao 11th 1500. Speed 9 blank knots.
2. carrying 8000 tons fuel oil. A ships. Asuka Maru carrying 8000 tons fuel oil. (Tajima Maru?) "B ship Kasado Maru(?) each carrying 1 blank tons aviation gas. carrying blank engines and 7 passengers for (Menado?).
3. Blanks.
4. Noon posits. (6th - 11th)
 - 0-15N, 119-43 E.
 - 1-11N, 122-27 E.
 - 2-16N, 125-36 E.
 - 3-52N, 128-47 E.
 - 5-40N, 131-49 E.
 - 7-32N, 134-27 E.
5. Please arrange for escort for and scheduled to depart for Truk about the 13th."

NOTE: Names of ships are a little confused.

LOCAL COMMENT: NEGAT's 050620-050631 OCTOBER less complete.

No. A-3

FROM:
TO:

04/2025 October

(#1 Surface
Escort Unit) 17278
(Surface Escort Unit #2)

(Guard Division #43 at Palao)
(Manila Convoy Control Office)
(Palao Comm Unit)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 14, No. A-3 (Cont.)

INFO: (1st Section Naval General Staff)
(Combined Fleet)
(Balikpapan Base Force #22)

	(Tsurumi - AO).
	(Usurii Maru)
	(SubChaser #5)

- "From Commander blank convoy, Captain of ().
- (1). Convoy #2608. composed of 7 ships blanks departs at 0930, 5th scheduled to arrive PP at 1500 11th. Speed 9 knots.
 - (2). (Unreadable details of ships and cargo naming (), "A" vessels Asuka Maru (JPblankD), Ryooyoo Maru "B" Vessels # blank (- Kyoosi Maru ?) (blanks for Menado?).
 - (3). (Totally unreadable mentioning routing).
 - (4). Noon positions:
 - 6th, 00-15 North, 119-43 East.
 - 7th, 01-11 North, 122-27 East.
 - 8th, 02?-15? North, 125-36 East.
 - 9th, 03-52 North, 128-47 East.
 - 10th, blank-40 North, 131-49 East.
 - 11th, 07-32.5 North, 134-27 East.
 - (5). As () and #blank (Kyoosi Maru) expect to leave for PT from PP about the 13th, request escort vessels."

LOCAL COMMENT: PT is Truk (CD).
PP is Palao (CD).
Commander Voge will be informed A.M.
5th Oct.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

06/1017

PREC: OP

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 14, No. E-1 (Cont.)

SERIAL 17 ULTRA X TANKER X 0300 OCT X 8 OCT X
(3-14 NORTH 130-03 EAST) POSITION SAME TIME FOL-
LOWING DAY (3-56 NORTH 135-00 EAST) X (4-18
NORTH 140-02 EAST) X (6-12 NORTH 144-36 EAST) X
(7-30 149-27 EAST) X STEELHEAD AND TINOSA CAN
WORK ON ABOVE X FOLLOWING FOR POGY X 7 SHIP
CONVOY 0300 OCT 10 OCT X (5-40 NORTH 131-49 EAST)
POSITION SAME TIME FOLLOWING DAY (7-32 NORTH
134-27 EAST) X NOTE MUSKALUNGE REPORTED HE WAS
LEAVING AREA 10 NORTHWEST AND HEADING HOME ON 6TH

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tinosa

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: All serials received.

No. C-2

October 8

1200 (K) Began patrolling route Truk to Saipan.
1528 (K) Sighted airplane bearing 020° relative.
No radar indication. Submerged. Lat.
09-42N, Long. 150-13E.
1700 (K) Surfaced.
2135 (K) Changed course to 073°T to patrol route
Truk to Empire.

October 9

0755 (K) Began patrol of route.
1700 (K) Changed course to 250°T to return to area.
2202 (K) Received orders to return to Midway. Set
course, speed three engines at 80/90.

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 14, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 10

Uneventful.

October 11

0007 (L) Sighted plane. Submerged. Radar mast wires unwound from drum due to failure of limit switch.
0810 (L) Radar repaired. Surfaced.
1721 (L) Sighted plane. Submerged.
1748 (L) Surfaced.
2053 (L) Began patrolling Wake-Marshall Island route.
2342 (L) Radar interference on S J radar.
2345 (L) Radar contact. Sighted submarine, range 7000 yards.
2353 (L) Battle stations.

October 13

0005 (L) Exchanged signals with SKATE. Opened to west to patrol west side of track.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: Difficult.

No. C-4

October 7-12

Conducted patrol on traffic routes west of Truk.
1011 (K) Sighted twin engine bombers at great distance flying south.

October 13-15

Enroute assigned area.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 14 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Pogy

Third War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Not always satisfactory.

No. C-6

October 10

0909 (I) Patrolling N.W. of Sonsorol Islands.
Sighted smoke of convoy, 5 ships, 2
escorts. Attempted to close.
1200 (I) Unable to close to firing position.
Escort in meanwhile had contacted some-
thing about 5 miles from us and dropped
a total of 36 depth charges in about 3
hours. 05-40 N, 131-54 E.

October 11

Set course to leave area.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 15

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ (Guard Division 06/1235 October
#62 Unit)(B)
TO: _____ (Base Force #6)(B)
INFO: _____

(Air Group #952)(B)
(Air Flot #22)(B)

(Transportation Section
Kwajalein)(B)

ship), #11 Shonan Maru, blank (#21 Special
Duty Subchaser?) and #7 () - ship) will operate
as follows.

(Part 1). Depart (- Jaluit) at 0400 October
7, and arrive Kwajalein 1330 October 8. Blanks.

From Northeast Channel course 350 degrees.
(Part 3). From posit 08-00 North, (169?) -17 East
at 2130 October 7 to Kiiyo Channel course will be
(294 near) degrees.

(Part 4). Moon position 7 October. 06-52 North,
(169?)-29 East."

LOCAL COMMENT: Phoned this info to ComSubPac
at 0700 (I) October.

No. A-2

FROM: Blank Originator 06/1235 October
TO: (Base Force #6)
INFO: _____

(Air Group #952)

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 15. (Cont.)

_____ | (Air Flot #22)
_____ | (4th Fleet)
_____ | (Kwajalein Transportation Office)
_____ | (Nauru Air Base)
_____ | (Iwojima Air Base)

"Operating schedule of blank, #11 Shonan Maru, and #7 as follows:

- (1). Depart PY 0400 the 7th. Arrive PQ 1330 the 8th.
- (2). Course 350 degrees from Northeast Channel. At 2130 the 7th at 03-00 North, 169-17 East change course to 290 degrees and maintain as far as Iliyo Channel. Noon position the 7th: 03-52 North, 169-29 East."

NEGAT COMMENT: Degrees of longitude of noon positions are from plot. Message has "275".

LOCAL COMMENT: HYPO 061618 had essentially same; second course given as "294-near".
PY is Jaluit (CD).
PQ is Kwajalein (C).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING RPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

06/1805 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSOPAC ULTRA TO SKINJACK AND SEADRAGON X 1 SHIP
(TYPE UNKNOWN) DEPARTING MAIN PORT AREA 21 AT 1900
X 6TH AND ARRIVES MAIN PORT AREA 19 AT 0450 X 8TH AT 0300
X 7TH 6-52 NORTH 169-29 EAST

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 15 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Skipjack
Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Interference by enemy jamming.

No. C-2

October 7

0535 (L) Patrolling off S.E. PASS, JALUIT. Sighted two observation seaplanes bearing 270 (T), distance 4 miles, apparently patrolling. Sighted the same or similar planes periodically for the remainder of the morning (Para. G-11)

1602 (L) Sighted patrol boat bearing 312(T), distance 3 miles - on southerly course (Para. F-10)

October 8

1111 (L) Patrolled off S.W. PASS, JALUIT. Sighted ship bearing 023 (T), distance approximately 7 miles underway inside lagoon. Only masts seen.

October 9-10

Patrolled off S.W. PASS, JALUIT.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No.	11
Time	1111 (L)
Date	8 Oct.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 15, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Lat. Long.	Jaluit lagoon
Types	Unknown
Init. Range	7 mi 023(T)
Cour. Spd.	
How Contacted	Periscope
Rmks.	Only masts seen

U.S.S. Seadragon

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: No casualties.

No. C-5

October 6

0742 (L) Reflection on SD radar 17 miles.
0743 (L) Sighted plane, KAWANISHI 97 flying boat,
headed in our direction.
0744 (L) Dived. Continued to close ROI, submerged.
1820 (L) Surfaced.

October 7

Searchlight on ROI lit up several times during the night.
0513 (L) Dived.
0900 (L) Sighted fifteen zero type fighters over ROI.
1105 (L) Sighted eight MITSUBISHI 96 bombers over ROI.
1604 (L) Sighted KAWANISHI 97 flying boat, distance 2 miles.
1834 (L) Surfaced.

October 8

Searchlights on ROI lit up several times during the night.
0505 (L) Dived.
0820 (L) Sighted MITSUBISHI 96 bomber, distance five m.
1427 (L) Sighted ten zero type fighters over ROI.
1844 (L) Surfaced.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 16

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____
TO: _____

06/0930 October

(#1 Surface
Escort Unit) (C)

INFO: _____

(1st Section Naval
General Staff) (B)
(In Takao Guard
Division) (B)
(Guard Division Takao) (B)
(Takao Comm Unit) (B)
(In Takao Guard Division) (B)
(Manila Comm Unit) (B)
(Supplies and Accounts
Section Makassar) (B)
(3rd Southern Expeditionary
Fleet) (C)
(Command in Philippines
Area) (C)

"(Part 1). Blank Convoy departs _____ - place)
06/1200 and (arrives) 09/1600. Speed blank point
5 knots.

(Part 2). "A" Vessel _____ - Maru) loaded with
blank supplies. "A" Vessel _____ - Maru)
blank blank loaded with 1200 men.

"A" Vessel, blank Maru blank blank with unit
of 2200 men. "A" Vessel _____ - Maru) blank
blank with 500 blank. "A" Vessel _____
Maru) blank blank with blank number of pas-
sengers and 6400 (tons) of coal.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 16, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Part 3). Will pass through following points:

20-00 North, 119-32 East.
16-46 North, 119-05 East.
14-blank North, 119-38? East. Course 115 deg

Noon positions:

(7th) 19-48 North, 119-30 East.
(8th) 16-40 North, 119-05 East.

LOCAL COMMENT: Phoned to subs at 062100 October (I).

B- Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: GURNARD
INFO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

06/1342

ULTRA X SERIAL 19 NABJW FOR GURNARD X

(A) CONVOY 5 SHIPS
(B) BLANK
(C) 7.5 KNOTS
(D) 0300 GCT
(E) 7TH GCT
(F) 23-00 NORTH 120-10 EAST
ALGEROBA
19-48 NORTH 119-30 EAST

ORIGINAL
-23 December 1945

Case 16, (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. GURNARD

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

(See X, Case 7, C-3 and C-4 for radio reception and entries in the U.S.S. Gurnard log for October 4-6, 1945 see X, Case 8, C-5 for log entries for October 7-15 194

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 17

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: _____ 08/0519 October
TO: _____ (4th Fleet) (B) 86228
 _____ (Base Force #4) (C)
 _____ (Base Force #6 Kwajalein) (B)
 _____ (Guard by Kwajalein)
INFO: _____ (Military Stores Section #4 Truk) (A)
 _____ (Military Stores Section #4 Kwajalein) (A)

"This ship (Honkan) departed Kwajalein 0500 October 8 for Jaluit. Scheduled arrive 0500 October 9. (Will pass through Northeast Channel) 7. (Will require 60 units of Type 1 fuel oil and blank)."

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 1600 (-9) October 8th.

No. A-2

FROM: _____ 08/0519 October
TO: _____ (4th Fleet) 86228
 _____ (Truk Base Force #4)
 _____ (Kwajalein Base Force #6)
 _____ (Air Group #252)
INFO: _____

"This ship (Kan) departed from PQ for PY at 0500, 8th and is scheduled to arrive at 0500, 9th (North East Channel direct) #1 heavy oil 60 blanks."

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 17, No. A-2 (Cont.)

LOCAL COMMENT: PQ - Kwajalein (CD).
PY - Jaluit (CD).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 17
TO: ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX
SKIPJACK

08/0738

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR SKIPJACK SERIAL 26 X 1 MAN OF WAR
(TYPE UNKNOWN) DEPARTED MAIN POINT AREA 19 AT
2000 7TH AND AT 2000 8TH REACHES (06-09 NORTH
169-38 EAST)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Skipjack

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

(See X, Case 15, C-1 and C-3 for radio
reception and other entries in the
U.S.S. Skipjack's log for October 7-10,
1943.)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 18 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING RPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

09/0102 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

GURWARD MAY BE ABLE TO USE THIS X SHIP (UNKNOWN TYPE)
X BLANK X 15 KNOTS X 0600 GMT X 9TH X 21-55 NORTH
113-55 EAST X POSITION AT SA E TIME ON FOLLOWING DAY
IS AS FOLLOWS 23-10 NORTH 117-00 EAST X DESTINATION
22-30 NORTH 120-25 EAST X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Gurnard

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See Case 7, C-3.

No. C-2

For action report of U.S.S. Gurnard
from October 9-11 See Case 8, C-3.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 19

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Vessel in Surface Escort Unit #1) 07/1600 Oct.

TO: (Surface Escort Force #1)
(Transportation Office,
San Jacques)

INFO: (Transportation Detachment,
Yulinkan)
(Transportation Section,
Sama)
(Meteorological Authority, Hohow)
(Air Base, Kooryu)
(Naval General Staff, 1st Section)(B)
(Naval Transportation Section, Tokyo)
(Associated Transportation Shanghai
Area)

(Defense Force Keelung)

(Destroyer in Surface Escort Unit #1)(C)
(Navy District Chief of Staff, Kure)
(Dairen Communication Unit)
(Guard District Chief of Staff, Takao)
(China Seas Fleet) (B)
(Vessel

From Commanding Officer, 9th Transportation Force.

Part I.
#104 (Convoy) of 7 ships 2 ships for (Place)
departed (Place) at 07/1600 and will arrive
Takao 13 0500. Speed 8.5 knots.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 19, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Part II

C Vessel, blank Maru J blank blank R, loaded with 9 blank and blank tons of machinery for blank.
C Vessel, Nichida (?) Maru I blank blank S, loaded with 2170 tons of blank for Sama.
C Vessel, _____ (Maru) J blank blank D, loaded with 1723 men for _____ (Saigon) and for _____ (Place between Shanghai and Takao)."

"10th 26-33 126-22
11th 25-25 125-33
12th 24-33 120-35

Blank for _____ (Place) will break off from Convoy at point bearing blank (65-38) degrees and 10 miles from _____ (Place) and arrive at 0500. Blank Kansui (?) Maru and _____ (Ship) will join up at point bearing 90 degrees and 5 miles from _____ (Place)."

HYPO COMMENT: Positions presumed to be noon positions and North and East. This is Hip Part 1 and 5, unfortunately Part 2 not received here.

No. A-2

FROM: _____ 07/1300 Oct.
TO: _____ (Surface Escort Unit #1)
_____ (St. Jacques Trans Office
or Takao area address) 1 of 3 parts
INFO: _____ (Malinkan Trans Section)
_____ (Hitoyama Maru)
_____ (Loihow Air Base)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 19, No. A-2 (Cont.)

INFO: (In Hsuan area Assoc Air Trans)
(Flagship China Fleet)
(Shanghai address)
(Keelung Defense Force)

(Assoc Surface Escort Unit #1)
(Takao Guard District)

(Sasebo CofS)
(1st N.G.S.)
(Tokyo Transportation Section)
(Kure CofS)

From #9 Transportation Control Officer

Convoy #104, 7 ships departed (place) at
1600, Oct. 7. Will arrive Takao at 0500, Oct. 13.
Speed 8.5 knots. "C" vessel blank Rei Maru
(blank RT) #9 Transportation Control Officer on
board. Cargo blank. (SAMA). "C" vessel Hida
Maru (blank S) blank 2170 tons. "C" vessel blank
Maru (blank D) troops 1728 (Saigon?). Above vessels
going to Takao.

BAKER COMMENT: Parts 2 and 3 not yet available.

(BAKER-081544-OCT-P)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
TULLIBEE
STURGEON
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

03/0823

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 19, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA SERIAL 29E X 7 SHIP CONVOY CARRYING MANY
SLANT-EYES X 0300 10TH X (26-38 NORTH 126-22
EAST) X POSITIONS AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING
DAYS ARE AS FOLLOWS (25-23 NORTH 123-38 EAST)
X (24-33 NORTH 120-35 EAST) X TULLIBEE AUTHORIZED
ENTER AREA 11C TO ASSIST STURGEON IN WORKING ON
THIS X WATCHOUT FOR EACH OTHER

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tullibee

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Normal.

No. C-2

(On the 9th the Tullibee was in a typhoon
and on the 10th spent the day leaving
that area and getting to better seas. Ed. F

October 11

- 0603 (I) 25°-14'N, 127°-43'E
Submerged to repair storm casualties and
routine torpedoes with OMIKAMA JIMA bearing
320° distant 15 miles. #10 torpedo tube
out of commission because of torpedo jammed
in tube.
- 1618 (L) Sighted smoke, attempted to close but it
disappeared to the west.
- 1730 (I) Sighted a single stack ship bearing 324°T,
Maneuvered to close. Thought at first we
had a submariners dream - an unescorted
MARU! The contact developed into what
probably was a "Q" ship. A dingy 3 island
freighter of 1000-1500 tons, with high
islands, high stack, false goal posts and a
very tall pole antenna just forward of the
stack. Decided the contact wasn't worth
torpedoes this early in the patrol.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 19, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 11

1857 (I) Surfaced with contact in sight in the brilliant moonlight and set course for the western part of the area. Radar couldn't pick up the contact but did pick up land at 34,000 yards.

U.S.S. Sturgeon
Eighth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: All messages received.

No. C-4

(Narrative for these dates missing -
no ship contacts. Ed. Note.)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 20

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

09/1502 October

FROM:

TO:

(CofS Ominato)(B)

(12th
Air Flce...)(C)

INFO:

(Defense Force)(B)

(Soya Defense
Force)(B)

(Otaru Guard
Force)(B)

(Kuriles Area
Air Base)(C)

"From Commanding Officer Kimikawa Maru

At 10/0600, blank will depart Kataoka Bay for Ominato.

Part 1. Scheduled course.

At 1000 will be 310 degrees and 33 miles from
Shirinko Island). From point bearing
(260-290)degrees and 95 miles from same island,
course will be (near 245) degrees.

At 11/0600, 48-50N, 148E.

At (1800?), 46-10N; 146-30E.

At 12/0400, bearing 158 degrees and 65 miles from
Otamari)

At 0830, (will pass?) - Wakkanai).

At 12/1900, blank at - place in Ishikari Bay)
and at 13/0830, depart, proceeding to
blank.

Remainder sketchy and deals with cargo.

Passengers: 21 Officers,
(about) 200 enlisted,
13 civilian employees."

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 20, No. A-1 (Cont.)

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor has this.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: SALMON
INFO: CINCPAC

10/0343 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA SERIAL 35H X IMPORTANT X 062 PEANUT X TIME
2100 X DATE 10 X QXJQ 5000 (48-50 NORTH 148-00 EAST)
AND 12 HOURS LATER TVZJ 1050 (46-10 NORTH 146-30
EAST) THENCE TO SOYA STRAIT

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Salmon

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception complete.

No. C-2

October 2 - 9

Enroute area. Uneventful except for
rough seas and strong N.W. winds
necessitating reduced speed.

October 10

Entered the area.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 20, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 12

Made passage through Kita Uruppu Suido into the Okhotsk Sea and commenced patrol of Paramushiru-Soya line.

(No entries in log for October 13 and 14, 1945.- Ed. Note).

Case 21

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: Blank Originator 09/1345 October
TO: (3rd Fleet)(C) (Part 1 of 2)
(Combined (Part 2 of 2)
Fleet)(B)
INFO: (Base Force #5,
Saipan)(B)

"From C. G. Hayataka.
(Part 1). Scheduled movements of Hayataka and Unyoo are as follows: Blanks. (10 to 13 October).
Arrive Saeki blank date
Depart Saeki at 14/0615.
At 15/2145 at "C" Point: 24-18 North, 139-46 East.
(course) 120. Speed 18 knots.
At 16/ blank time at "D" Point: 20-43 North, 146-18 East (course) 130.
At 18/02 blank at "E" Point: 15-00 North, 153-24 East (course) 170.
At 19/0630 arrive Truk blank.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 21. No. A-1 (Cont.)

"Part 2). - DesDiv 7) movements changed as follows:

(a). Blank (proceeding) from Yokosuka to Saipan will (join up) with Hayataka at 16/1200 at "J" Point 127-07 North. 145-45 East, 114 miles and 326 blank from blank.

(b). One blank ship blank at Saeki. Will break off at "K" Point: 19-15 North, 148-10 East. After replenishing blank at Saipan will proceed to Truk."

HYPO COMMENT: Point "J" definitely not on track of Hayataka.

HYPO unable to solve inconsistency.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 10/0737 October
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SANTA IS COMING X ULTRA SERIAL 32G X COMSUBPAC
DESIRES CAPTAIN MONSEN KEEP HIS WOLF PACK IN POSITION
TO WORK ON FOLLOWING X 2 AK'S AND PROBABLY SEVERAL
DESTROYERS X COURSE BLANK X SPEED 18 X TIME 2115
X OCT 13 DEPART 53-12 NORTH 132-20 EAST AND COURSE
120 DEGREES X SPEED 18 X TIME 1245 X OCT 15 X 24-18
NORTH 130-46 EAST AND 130 DEGREES X 18 KNOTS X
TIME 1100 X OCT 16 X 20-43 NORTH 146-18 EAST X
EXPECT ADDITIONAL DESTROYERS TO JOIN UP ABOUT 0300
OCT 16 X POSITIONS AND DATES BUT EXACT HOUR FOR EACH
POSIT MAY BE IN ERROR X WATCH OUT FOR STURGEON
SCHEDULED TO LEAVE AREA 11 C ON STANDARD ROUTING
DURING NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS X LET US KNOW ANY RESULTS
AS WE HAVE MORE DOPE FOR BOYS FARTHER SOUTH

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 21 (Cont.)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: WOLF MONSEN
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPN FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

11/1014 October

SUPER SERIAL 46 K X DISREGARD MY SERIAL 32 G
CONCERNING 2 AUXILIARY CARRIERS AND KEEP YOUR
TERRIBLE TRIO MOVING TOWARD YOUR AREAS WHERE WE
HAVE SOME VERY IMPORTANT WORK FOR YOU X MORE DOPE
TOMORROW NITE

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Gurnard
Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception good except during a
weather disturbance on 17 Sept.

No. C-2

October 11

1225 (H) 20-16N, 122-33E. Sighted plane bearing
060⁰T, distant about 10 miles and submerged
to avoid detection. Plane was low, no
indication on SD radar.

1349 (H) Surfaced.

October 14

0645 (I) 24-15N, 130-10E. While submerged during early
morning sighted 2 AK's bearing 095⁰T,
distant 6 miles. Tracked to determine course
and speed. Sent contact report on surfacing.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 21, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 15

1825 (I) 24-40N, 137-52E. Sighted plane bearing 055° T, distant 5 miles, plane headed south, no indication that it knew of our presence.

October 16

0709 (I) 24-58N, 140-11E. Sighted land based bombing plane bearing 122° T, distant about 4 miles. Plane low, no indication on SD radar. Submerged.

0824 (I) Surfaced.

1633 (I) Sighted two 2-engine bombers bearing 010° T, distant 5 miles (first radar indication 6 miles) headed towards us, submerged.

1748 (I) Surfaced.

October 17

0430 (K) 25-28N, 142-50E. Sighted four medium size merchant ships bearing 072° T, distant 5 miles. Tracked and determined course to be 165° T, speed 8. Broadcasted contact report on area frequency and on two different harmonics of NPM frequency during the morning (no signals heard on any frequency)

1025 (K) Sighted large flying boat bearing 270° T, distant 15 miles on northerly course. No indication that plane saw us remaining on surface.

October 20

1044 (K) Sighted 2 engine bomber bearing 053° T, heading towards us, distant about 10 miles, no indication on radar. Submerged.

1051 (K) Heard three explosions far away.

1238 (K) Surfaced.

NOTE: No entry for October 21 or 22.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 21 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See X, Case 8, C-1.

No. C-4

October 13-15

Enroute assigned area.

October 16

Commenced high periscope surface patrol along northern boundary of area.

October 17

0937 (I) 4-51N, 153-12E. Sighted smoke bearing 247T. Commenced tracking on the surface ahead of target.
1305 (I) Made quick dive and commenced approach. Battle stations submerged.
1430 (I) Identified target as hospital ship, medium size.
1445 (I) Took pictures at range 1500 yards to 2000 yards.
1500 (I) Secured from battle stations.
1745 (I) Surfaced, commenced high periscope patrol along reverse course to that of the hospital ship in case it was acting as a lookout or decoy.

October 18-19

Commenced patrolling to north and east of area.

October 20

Lat. 8°-10.5'N., Long 142°-41' E.

ORIGINAL
22 December 1945

Case 21, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- 2218 (I) Made SJ contact; 15,000 yards, 020° T.
2220 (I) Sight contact, two ships. Commenced tracking and maneuvered to obtain position ahead. Determined base course to be 290° T.; targets zigging radically every six minutes, speed 15 knots.

October 21

- 0115 (I) Obtained position 15,000 yards ahead of targets on base course. Made quick dive and conducted radar approach at 40 foot depth.
0153 (I) Went to periscope depth and continued approach by periscope and sound.
0151 (I) Steadied on course for 110 stbd track for expected course of targets on next zig at 0152. Targets were about 1000 yards abeam of each other zigging together. Sighted escort vessel astern and between targets.
0152 (I) Targets zigged to right instead of to left as expected, range about 1500 yards, angle on bow of right hand and largest target - zero.
0154 (I) Lat. 8°-25' N. Long 141°-50' E. Fired 5 torpedoes from stern tubes at left hand target. Immediately went deep to avoid collision with right hand target.
0154 (I) Heard 2 torpedo explosions about 9 seconds apart followed immediately by the click of the first of a pattern of seven depth charges exploding at about five second intervals. Bathythermograph showed a definite layer between 270 feet and 515 feet so went below layer. Depth charging continued at intervals, until at
0234 (I) Heard last depth charge. (Total dropped 22)
0315 (I) Lost sound contact on screws on the two ships, and at
0400 (I) Came to periscope depth.
0414 (I) Surfaced and commenced trailing on base course.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 21, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- 0450 (I) Lat 8° -20.5'N., Long 141° -48'E. Daybreak. Sighted ship dead ahead silhouetted on horizon.
- 0452 (I) Made out escort circling ship. Ship appeared stopped. Received report that torpedoes in tubes #1 and #7 were flooded.
- 0455 (I) Made quick dive to avoid discovery in daylight. Commenced closing at periscope depth. Continued routing torpedoes.
- 0708 (I) Completed routine of torpedoes. Two out of seven were flooded.
- 0720 (I) No periscope contact having been obtained, surfaced and commenced trailing. Sighted debris and a large oil slick running to the west and followed it.
- 0756 (I) Sighted smoke dead ahead.
- 0759 (I) Made out smoke, stack, and masts of freighter. Commenced end around using high periscope to maintain contact. SJ Radar contact could not be maintained at this range. Target speed 8 knots.
- 1309 (I) Obtained position ahead but had lost sight contact; slowed to 1/3.
- 1503 (I) Reversed course and started heading down base course to close and pick up target.
- 1536 (I) Regained periscope contact, target bearing 039°T., on port beam. Started end around again. Tracking indicated base course of target had changed from 275° to 300° and speed about 9 knots.
- 1737 (I) Commenced closing target to gain SJ radar contact prior darkness in anticipation of target changing base course radically as soon as it became dark.
- 1800 (I) SJ contact 16,000 yards.
- 1805 (I) Target and possibly escort opened fire with small calibre as well as with 4" or 5" guns; fire directed toward STEELHEAD. The clouds on horizon in back of the submarine had suddenly opened leaving a bright streak of twilight along the horizon against which the

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 21, No. C-4 (Cont.)

- submarine was silhouetted and this was probable cause of discovery.
- 1807 (I) Splashes were short but turned stern to target to get out of visual range. Shellfire continued at about 1 minute intervals for ten minutes and at
- 1835 (I) Heard two distant depth charge explosions. Shellfire ceased.
- 1849 (I) Reversed course and headed for target's last bearing to regain contact. Horizon now completely dark.
- 1936 (I) No contact obtained. Commenced search to south of position.
- 2145 (I) The target's speed having been reduced to nine knots indicated damage, and as numerous oil slicks had been observed during tracking, while astern of target, it was concluded target was heading toward Yap for fuel and possible repairs. Took up search along target's course to Yap.

October 22

- 1036 (I) Made land fall on Yap Island. Commenced patrol off islands in hope of intercepting damaged freighter.
- 2125 (I) Sent our 221205 to ComSubPac reporting damaged freighter and possible time of arrival off Kayangol Island, in case they get by us to the South and are continuing toward original destination.

U.S.S. Tullibee

Second War Patrol

No. C-5

(See X; Case 19, C-1 and C-2 for radio reception report and log entries for the U.S.S. Tullibee October 9-11, 1943.)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 21 (Cont.)

No. C-6

October 12

0705 (I) Sighted SEKIBI SHO bearing 243^oT, distant 18 miles.
1037 (I) Closing Radar contact on plane, submerged.
1041 (I) One bomb, distant.
1214 (I) Surfaced.
1224 (I) Radar contact on plane, submerged.
1500 (I) Surfaced.

October 14

0626 (I) Submerged. With a full moon the nights are extremely bright.
0700 (I) Sighted smoke, went to battle stations and commenced approach. Contact developed into a convoy of nine MARU's in three columns with three MINEMIZU type DD escorts. Convoy zigging on irregular length less between 120^oT and 210^oT. Ships varied in size from an engine aft AK similar to the KIYOTADA MARU to a very large two stack AP that looked exactly like the old TAIYO MARU but may have been the CONTE VERDE or YAMATO MARU. Attempted to close the convoy but at
0725 (I) The best position that we were able to attain gave us shots at two targets on tracks of 110^o to 125^o port, ranges of 3300 to 3700 yards and torpedo runs of 3600 to 4200 yards. The sea had a light swell but there were no whitecaps so made the decision that to fire under the existing circumstances we would probably just waste torpedoes as at that range the wakes would be sighted and the targets could avoid and further decided that we would let the convoy pull ahead then surface and chase.
0845 (I) Secured from battle stations.
1005 (I) Sighted a 2 engine bomber, apparently air cover for the convoy. Not being able to see smoke during high periscope observation,

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 21, No. C-6 (Cont.)

- 1259 (I) surfaced at
And proceeded to pull in and run at
flank speed.
- 1301 (I) Sighted TAISHAK LINAMO bearing 310° T
distance about 50 miles.
- 1312 (I) sighted TUNGIUNG TMO bearing 252° T distant
about 37 miles. Visibility certainly was
excellent and we all wondered how long we
could run down FORMOSA STRAIT before a
plane or patrol boat put us down.
- 1322 (I) S.D. contact at 22 miles. Closed to 21
and faded at a little over 22 miles.
Probably was the convoy escort making a
sweep. Figured we had gotten sufficiently
ahead of the convoy and at
- 2030 (I) Slowed to one-third speed and commenced
patrolling in and out from KORYU MAKUCHI?
FORMOSA. Our luck certainly was with us
in not being forced to submerge by planes
or patrol boats during the day. Both S.J.
and S.D. Radars were working beautifully
as they were getting land "pips" at 25 miles.
The moon was almost full and the night was
extremely bright but a surface haze
reduced the visibility. Soundings ran
from 25 to 30 fathoms.
- 2530 (I) S.J. contact bearing 012° T, distant 12,000
yards. Commenced tracking.

October 15

First Attack—

Radar picked out 12 separate pips so
establishing the contact as the convoy we
had been chasing. The largest pip had 2

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 21, No. C-6 (Cont.)

- 0053 (I) Targets zigged away and it became apparent that we would have to fire on the largest target at the range of about 3200 yards and not too good a track. Due to the surface haze could just make out the target in the periscope. Took a look around and saw that we had good shots at two ships in the nearer columns and that one ship would be very close. Went to periscope depth. Selected a large MFM, plumb bow, counter stern tall stack, coal burning, laden AP, in the second column as the first target. Could not identify the ship but it was long and it is believed that it displaced 7-8000 tons. It covered three-fourths of the periscope field in high power at a range of 1300 yards. At
- 0057 (I) cranked a setup into the TDC and started firing three torpedoes from the bow tubes with a 105° port track and small gyro angles at 0058-15 (I). One torpedo hit at 0059-15 (I) correctly timed for a run of about 1300 yards.

Second Attack

As soon as firing was completed on the first attack selected a heavily laden, MFM, plumb bow, counter stern, coal burning AP of about 6000 tons that still had the white band around the hull and O.S.K. stack markings, in the near (port hand) column as our second target. Put a new set up in the T.D.C. and swung right rapidly to reduce gyro angles and at range of 600 yards, 30 port track with small gyro angles commenced firing three torpedoes from the bow tubes at 0100-25 (I). Second torpedo hit at 0100-55 (I) and the third torpedo hit at 0101-03 (I) properly timed for a 600 yard run. These torpedo hits at 600 yards shook the ship up considerably. Minor explosions and breaking

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 21, No. C-6 (Cont.)

up noises started immediately. Can't understand how the first torpedo missed at this close range unless it had not come out of its initial dive soon enough but it is believed that it may have hit the ship in the third (starboard hand) column as it hit something at 0102-38 (I) which would correspond to a run of 3400 yards which was about the distance from us to the third column of ships. It is believed that the ship hit with two torpedoes on this attack was about a 6000 tonner as only half its length could be seen in the periscope field at high power at a range of 600 yards. The forward room was too enthusiastic in venting the tubes and depth control was lost after seeing the column of water and smoke from the second torpedo hit. Sound conditions were extremely bad and although pinging was heard at 10,000 yards screws were not heard until 800 yards. In that we would have to run at standard speed to take an observation and that we did not know where the escort was and sound could not pick up anything decided to go deep at

0104 (I)

And evade the inevitable depth charge attack. Knowing that we didn't have much water under us rigged in both sound heads and the Bendix as we went down. This proved fortunate because we bottomed as soon as we slowed down. The breaking up noises were extremely loud through the hull. At

0114 (I)

Received the first of eleven depth charges, the last being at

0210 (I)

Three of the charges were close, shook the ship severely, sent paint chippings raining down on our heads and bounced the ship up and down on the bottom. Heard the last of the breaking up noises at 0121 (I). Felt a little lost without any sound gear but we

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 21, No. C-6 (Cont.)

- could hear the Jap screws through the hull. They passed over us from stern to bow several times but apparently didn't know that we were right under them. Heard a couple of clanks on deck which gave rise to the unpleasant thought that perhaps we would surface with depth charges on deck. The poor sound conditions were definitely on our side. Heard the last screws through the hull at
- 0250 (I) After bumping along the bottom making 50 turns in 170 to 210 feet of water managed to regain a trim at
- 0330 (I) Came up to 150 feet and lowered on sound head. Heard pinging astern but it didn't sound close. Came to radar depth at
- 0355 (I) And when we could pick nothing up on search surfaced at
- 0411 (I) And cleared the vicinity at full speed. Expecting a thorough air search of the vicinity, submerged at
- 0633 (I) About 25 miles northwest of v.....
Summarizing attacks one and two it is believed that we damaged an 8000 ton AP and sank a 6000 ton AP and possibly damaged another ship type unknown.
- 0850 (I) Began hearing a series of distant depth charges or bombs. Searched the skies and the horizon but could see not planes or ships. The charges kept getting closer so at
- 1044 (I) Commenced running at 90 feet between periscope observations. At
- 1153 (I) Two charges exploded close enough to shake the ship. Thought that we might be leaving a trail of air or oil bubbles but could see none through the "scope." These two were the only close bombs and the last ones were heard at
- 1555 (I) Although we saw no planes during periscope observations it was apparent that the Japs were systematically bombing the area. Over 50 bombs were heard during the day.

ORIGINAL
20 December 1945

Case 21, No. C-6 (Cont.)

The surface of the water had been calm for over 12 hours and the slick by our running at high speed probably remained for hours after we had passed and it is believed that the Japs followed our slick up to the point of submergence and then commenced bombing our possible submerged positions.

1856 (I) Surfaced and proceeded to close the FORMOSA coast.

October 16

0038 (I) Radar contact bearing 328°T., distant 6700 yards. Tracked this target for a while and finally saw that it was a patrol craft. He apparently saw us too as he dogged our movements. Maneuvered to avoid and finally got clear at

0310 (I) Went through the area of last night's attack and noted a very large slick.

0603 (I) Sighted a patrol boat bearing 075°T distant 4700 yards. He sighted us at the same time and headed for us. The range closed to 3800 yards before we began to pull away. It was almost daylight and we can't figure out why he didn't shoot at us. Pulled clear at flank speed and submerged at

0712 (I)

1145 (I) Sighted a plane bearing 245°T distant 7 miles.

No. C-7

Description of Contacts

No:	3
Time & Date:	0700 (I) Oct. 14
Lat & Long:	26-47 N, 121-15 E
Types:	9 AK's & AP's, 3 DD's
Initial Range:	8 mi.
Est. Course and Speed:	Zigs between 200° & 210°
How Contacted:	P
Remarks:	MINEHAZE Tp. DD's, MARUS - 3-17,000 tons

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 22, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Course (points for changing course):

- From Kiyō Channel, course 180.
- From 08-20 N, 187-35 E, course 090.
- From 08-20 N, 189-00 E, course 132.
- From 06-20 N, 171-08 E, course 090.

Part 2. #8 blank Maru, #3 Fumi Maru and Special Subchaser #14, under command of the Senior Commander will carry out escort.

Part 3. Blanks."

LOCAL COMMENT: "PQ" is Kwajalein (CD).
"RYB" is Tarawa (CD).
"FXM" is Mille (CD).

14th must be meant for departure from FXM instead of the 4th.

No. A-2

FROM: Blank originator
TO: (Mille Air Base)
INFO: (4th Fleet)
(Kikukawa Maru)
(Vessel)
(Base Force 6, Kwajalein)

11/1945 October

1. Date determined for departure from FXM of Matsutan Maru is October 18.

2. In view of Matsutan Maru departing FXM, Comdr. FXM Defense Force will have the blank of Subchaser # blank and Special Service Subchaser carry out an anti-submarine sweep when convenient between blank date and blank date within area of about 50 kilometers, with Takaiwa Channel as center.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 22, No. A-2 (Cont.)

LOCAL COMMENT: PKM is Mille (CD).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: SKIPJACK
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

10/0754 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN) AND ESCORT VESSEL X 132
DEGREES X 6.7 KNOTS X 1950 X 9TH X 08-20 NORTH
169-00 EAST X SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS OF THIS UNIT AT
TIMES AND DATES INDICATED ARE AS FOLLOWS: 90 DEGREES
X 6.7 KNOTS X 2130 X 10TH X 06-20 NORTH 171-08 EAST
X 0530 X 11TH X 06-17 NORTH 171-48 EAST SPEED AND
TIMES EXCEPT ARRIVAL OBTAINED BY PLOT

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX
SKIPJACK
INFO:

15/1051 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUBPAC SUPER 54 TELLS SKIPJACK SORRY ABOUT YOUR
TOUGH LUCK ON 1ST ATTACK X YOU CAN GET ANOTHER AT THE
SAME BIRD LEAVING VICINITY OF YOUR 1ST ATTACK X BLANK
X BLANK X BLANK X 1500 X IN MEANTIME WATCH OUT FOR
ANTISUBMARINE SWEEP DAILY DURING DAYLIGHT TO RADIUS OF
35 MILES FROM ATTACK POSITION X USE OF MORE OBLIQUE
TRACK MAY BRING BETTER RESULTS ON FUTURE ATTACKS

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 22 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Skipjack

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: (Japanese jamming caused interference,
but all serials except 80 received.
Ed. Note)

No. C-2

October 8

Patrolled off S.W. PASS, JALUIT

1111 (L) Sighted ship bearing 023(T), distance
approximately 7 miles underway inside lagoon.
Only masts seen

October 9

Patrolled off N.E. PASS, JALUIT ATOLL

0837 (L) Sighted patrol boat bearing 180(T), distance
3 miles on northerly course
0844 (L) Sighted single float type observation plane
bearing 180T distance 5 miles
1544 (L) Patrol boat previously sighted still patroll-
ing off N.E. PASS.
1622 (L) Sighted float type seaplane on westerly
course, bearing 158T, distance 6 miles
1703 (L) Plane landed behind EMIDJ ISLAND
1720 (L) Sighted float type OS, bearing 158T,
distance 6 miles.

October 10

Patrolled off N.E. PASS, JALUIT

1712 (L) Patrol boat stood out of N.E. PASS and stood
up coast

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 22, No. C-2 (Cont.)

1724 (L) Patrol boat of sampan type sighted North of East Point. He stood up coast and entered lagoon between two islands about four miles north of PASS. Made a sweep to northward to cover KWAJALEIN-MILLE route.

October 11

Stood down to and patrolled off MILLE ATOLL.

- 0657 (L) Sighted smoke of ship bearing 325T, distance 15 miles. Commenced approach by making a high speed run to intercept between his position and TOKCWA PASS.
- 0729 (L) Sighted two screening planes over target group.
- 0743 (L) Sighted targets. Similar to SEIKYO MARU, escorted by a PC-type patrol boat on starboard bow, and #2 TAMASOMO MARU KAM #164 astern. The sea was flat and glassy.
- 0808 (L) The target made good a more southerly course leaving us to the eastward. We later realized that a heavy easterly drift was the cause of this change in his base course.
- 0832 (L) Final look. Target 2400 yards, angle on bow 95 port. One plane directly over target. Rear screening ship moving up to port of target.
- 0834 (L) With near screen overlapping target, fired first of a salvo of four torpedoes on a 113 track 150° spread, torpedo run 2500 yards. As second torpedo was fired, the near screen (about 1000 yards) had a hoist on the way to the yardarm and was turning towards us. No hits. It is believed that we were sighted on the periscope observation immediately prior to firing. Went deep.
- 0840 (L) First of nineteen depth charges and bombs during a ten minute period. Evaded by a 120 degree change of course, going deep, and by using high speed during explosions. Attacking ships drew aft. Both escorts used echo ranging at 16 KCS. Frequently, one escort would

ORIGINAL
29 December 1945

Case 22. No. C-2 (Cont.)

stop and listen while the other echo-ranged. In spite of a high noise level from an undetermined leak aft and a zero temperature gradient, we were not detected again.

0958 (L) Escorts still searching.

1131 (L) Periscope observation. OS plane sighted bearing 164(T), distance 5 miles, searching area.

1152 (L) Two distant bombs.

1436 (L) Another bomb somewhere in vicinity.

October 12

Patrolled off S.E. PASS, JALUIT. The three ships observed 1 October were moored or anchored in the same positions.

1610 (L) Sighted patrol boat bearing 281(T), distance 4 miles on northeasterly course. (Para. F-16)

1741 (L) Sighted float type OS plane bearing 000T, distance 5 miles.

1728 (L) Sighted same plane patrolling off S.E. PASS.

2100 (L) Sent radio message 121000 of October 1945.

October 13

Patrolled off SOUTH PASS, ALINGIAPALAP. Nothing seen except one sailboat in lagoon and native village on western tip of BIGATJELANG ISLAND.

October 14

Patrolled KWAJALEIN - JALUIT track southwest of ALINGIAPALAP

2115 (L) Sent radio message 140915 of October 1945.

October 15

Patrolled off Southern MAMU

0545 (L) Sighted sampan about 1 mile West of reef standing to southward

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 22, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 16

Patrolled KWAJALEIN - MILE track northeast of ALINGIAPALAP.

2105 (L) Sent radio message 160930 of October 1945.

October 17

Patrolled off S.E. PASS, JALUIT

0550 (L) Sighted large VP bearing 283T distance 5 miles, on southeasterly course.
1224 (L) Sighted inshore patrol boat bearing 317T, distance 4 miles. He made four passes in our direction, on radically different courses. East run was preceded by a short listening period while he lay to. Evaded at periscope depth.
1522 (L) Sighted large VP bearing 336T, distance 6 miles, on westerly course. May have been the same one seen early this morning.
1603 (L) Same or similar plane bearing 345 T, distance 3 miles, heading in our direction.
1712 (L) Sighted twin float OS bearing 335T, distance 4 miles, on westerly course.

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

No: 15a
Date: October 11
Time: 0743L
Lat: 06-25
Long: 171-39
Type: 3000 ton AK
Initial Range: 6 mi 315T
How Contacted: Periscope
Remarks: Similar to SEIKYO MARU

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 22, No. C-3 (Cont.)

No: 15b
Date: October 11
Time: 0743L
Lat: 06-25
Long: 171-39
Type: XAM
Initial Range: 6 mi. 315T
How Contacted: Periscope
Remarks: Escort for above. Similar to TUDANE
MARU, #164 on bow.

No: 15c
Date: October 11
Time: 0743L
Lat: 06-25
Long: 171-39
Type: PC
Initial Range: 6 mi. 315T
How Contacted: Periscope
Remarks: Escort for above.

Case 23

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

CORRECTED COPY -
ORIGINAL REMOVED (sic)

08/1545 October

FROM: (#2 Surface
Escort Unit)

TO:
INFO: (Associated with Guard
Division 64)

Convoy #5081 (unident ship) escorted by #6
Shonan Maru departed PT for PQ at 0500 on the 8th.
Scheduled to arrive at 1200 on the 13th.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 23, No. A-1 (Cont.)

1. Noon positions: 9th 07-20N, 155-43E. 10th 08-25N, 158-52E. 11th 09-17N, 161-50E. 12th 09-22N, 164-55? E.
2. At 1200 on the 11th will depart #4 communication zone and enter #5 communication zone (Northern Zone).
Radio guard ship unident ship).

LOCAL COMMENT: PT is Truk (CD); PQ is Kwajalein (CD);
To subs at 090215 (-9); Convoy
#5081 originally 50 blank blank
(in Negats 002117).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: SEADRAGON
ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FCX
INFO: CINCPAC

10/0904 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN) OR CONVOY X 0500 X 11TH
X 09-17 NORTH 161-50 EAST POSITION AT SAME TIME ON
FOLLOWING DAY IS 09-22 NORTH 164-55 EAST

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Seadragon

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: No casualties

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 23 (Cont.)

No. C-2

October 10

0513 (L) Dived fifty miles from ROI-WAKE line.
1836 (L) Surfaced.
2242 (L) Received CTF-17's 100904. Went standard on all four engines.

October 11

0115 (L) Sighted two patrol vessels on course 130° T., distance 5 miles, changed course to avoid.
2151 (L) Contact #2. Sighted smoke bearing 280° T. Changed course to gain position ahead, and to commence tracking, slowed to five knots. Decided to make a dawn attack as light conditions were not satisfactory for night approach.

October 12

0444 (L) As radar had not picked up target, but target was fairly visible thru glasses, dived believing target was at least 13,000 yards away.
0518 (L) Target picked up in periscopes, only a dark blot and already passed us, distance about 3,500 yards. Sound had not picked up screws and judging by time and distance run, target must have been only 8,000 yards away when we dived.
0530 (L) As light conditions improved target identified as large cargo-passenger ship of about 3,000 tons, with one large armed trawler as escort. Target appeared to be on base course 090° T., at speed estimated as eight knots.
0709 (L) Surfaced. Commenced working around to obtain position ahead.
1247 (L) Obtained position dead ahead of target on his estimated base course, distant 13,000 yards. Dived.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1305 (L) Obtained first good look at target, had a large port angle on the bow. Went to normal approach course at standard speed.
- 1455 (L) Discontinued attack as closest range we could get was 3,800 yards and due to sea conditions did not wish to fire long range shot. Had expected target to go North of UJAE ATOLL, instead he went South. Must have changed his base course just at the time we dived.
- 1631 (L) Surfaced and commenced chasing target. Intended to make a moonlight radar approach about 2300.
- 2015 (L) Lost contact with target. Up to this time contact had been visual as target has been smoking continuously since first contact night before.
- 2100 (L) Unable to regain contact. Believed target had changed course to Northward to go between UJAE ATOLL and DAB ATOLL. Decided to search to the Northwest of IAE.

October 13

- 0304 (L) Sighted our target bearing 160° T., 40° forward of the beam. Went ahead full and on all four main's trying to get ahead before daybreak.
- 0448 (L) Target and escort reversed course. Probably sighted us as we were cutting pretty close trying to get ahead. Our SJ radar is evidently out of commission as we estimated range to target as 7,000 yards and radar still was unable to pick it up.
- 0500 (L) Dived as it was getting light and we were only fifteen miles from KWAJALEIK.
- 0525 (L) Target and escort had reversed course and were heading down our alley, commenced approach.
- 0557 (L) Fired four torpedoes from after tubes, range 2,200 yards, average track 100° port.
- 0559 (L) Heard two torpedoes hit.
- 0600 (L) Target screws stopped.
- 0602 (L) Target dead in the water, broadside to us.
- 0604 (L) Started deep as escort was heading for us, angle on the bow zero and range 1500 yards.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0606 (L) Heard heavy explosion in direction of target.
0618 (L) Three depth charges.
0630 (L) Started for periscope depth. Another depth charge or aerial bomb.
0645 (L) At periscope depth with nine feet of scope exposed. Only thing in sight was escort lying-to where target was last sighted. Two zero type float planes circling overhead. Made a careful search all around, visibility excellent. No sign of the target. Definitely believe target sank, otherwise could have seen his masts or smoke.

Spent the rest of the day dodging patrol boats

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

No: 2
Time: 2151(I)
Date: October 11
Lat: 9-35N
Long: 162-00E
Types: AP
Initial Range: 20,000.
Est. Course & Speed: 090 8
How Contacted: SN
Remarks: Cargo transport similar to TAKATINO MARU accompanied by one armed trawler as escort.

Case 24

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Chichijima Base Force)(B) 09/1752 October 53128
TO: (Surface Escort Unit #2)(C)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 24, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: (Naval District Chief
of Staff Yokosuka)(A)
Base Force #5
Saipan)(B)
Ogasawara Force Air Force)(A)

"Blank Maru and blank SAN ~~Kinkasan?~~ Maru ~~blank~~
ship escorting/deperted Chichijima For Saipan at
09/1700. Blanks. Noon posits from 10th to 13th.
25-00 North, 143-05 East.
22-25 North, 144-10 East.
19-40 North, 145-10 East.
(17)-00 North, 145-30 East.
11/1200 depart Chichijima Communication Zone
and enter Saipan Communication Zone."

HYPO COMMENT: BAKER 091619 gave more concerning
same convoy. Final latitude from
plotting.

LOCAL COMMENT: Phoned to subs at 100400 October (I).
Reference was originated at 091323
October in J 26 from
(Ogasawara Force) and gave preliminary
announcement of departure, course to
Saipan 160 degrees, Speed 7.

No. A-2

FROM: (Chichijima 09/1752 October
Special Base Force) ---
TO: (Yokosuka Chief of Staff)
INFO: Ogasawara Force Air Force)

"Blank Maru and Blank Maru, escorted by depart
NMA for PS at 0700 on the 9th. Scheduled to arrive
at 0500 on the 14th.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 24, No. A-2 (Cont.)

Noon Posits.

10th - 25-00N, 143-05E.
11th - 22-25N, 144-10E.
12th - 19-40N, 145-10E.
13th - 17-00N, 145-30E.

At 1200 on the 11th depart Chichijima Com-
munication Zone and enter #5 Base Force
Communication Zone."

LOCAL COMMENT: Hypo version given departure time
as 091700. 12MA - Chichijima (CD)
PS - Saipan (CD)

B - Operational Dispatch

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: HUSKALLUNGE
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: CINCOPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

10/1011 October

ULTRA X CONVOY X 0300 X 6 KNOTS X LATITUDE
(22-25 NORTH LONGITUDE 144-10 EAST) POSITIONS
AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAYS ARE AS FOLLOWS
LATITUDE (19-40 NORTH LONGITUDE 145-10 EAST) X
LATITUDE (17-00 NORTH LONGITUDE 145-30 EAST) X
MORE ON THIS ONE IF FUEL PERMITS X MORE DOPE
ON WAVE SEARCH LATER

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 24 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Muskallunge

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete.

No. C-2

October 10

- 1225 (K) Submerged for plane contact. Will have to remain down rest of the day to prevent discovery from Agrigan Island.
- 1845 (K) Surfaced and proceeded at two engine speed in accordance with Comsubpac 091832 of October.
- 0930 (L) 13 October. Slowed to one engine speed because of fuel shortage. Heavy weather.

October 15

- 1030 (L) Submerged to avoid plane detection. Surfaced one-half hour later.
- 1200 (L) Commenced search for downed aviators about 95 miles west of Wake Island.

Case 25

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

06/1518 October
50210

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 25, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: (Combined
Fleet)(C)
(Base Force
4. Truk)(B)
(Base Force 5,
Saipan)(B)
(HGS, 1st
Section)(B)
(Shanghai Military
Stores)(C)
(Associated
Air)

*From Commander TEI #4 Transport Force.

#3 Transportation Group - DesDiv 4)
- Nowake), (- Maikaze),
- Hie Maru, (- Awata Maru)
proceed to Shanghai in accordance with
following plan:

1. Movement schedule: (all positions 0600 un-
less otherwise noted):
At 0600, October 8, depart Truk via North Channel.
October 10/0600, 11-10N, 145-20E.
October 14/0600, 23-15N, 128-10E.
October 15/0600, 26-50N, 125-45E.
October 15/0915, entrance (buoy).
1600, arrive Shanghai.

(Hie Maru draft 8 and fraction meters; Awata
Maru draft 7 and fraction meters).

2. 4 blanks, 1 for each ship.

3. Loading capacity; (cargo in cubic meters
shown in parenthesis): (sic)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 25, No. A-1 (Cont.)

- (a) Destroyers: 50 men each (no cargo).
 - (b) Hie Maru: 2100 men (near) 2500 cubic meters).
 - (c) Awata Maru: 1100 men (3400 cubic meters).
 - (d) Embark headquarters and blank on Hie Maru. (57 people blanks; 54 (44?) people blanks).
4. Supplies required Shanghai:
- (a) Each destroyer 100 tons of (fuel?).
 - (b) Hie Maru and Awata Maru, (fuel) 300 tons each.
 - (c) Each destroyer requires 10 days supply of provision for 350 men; blank.
 - (d) Hie Maru and Awata Maru requires certain preparations before loading."

LOCAL COMMENT: This movement was set back 2 days by message originated 091645, as follows:

"From Commander TEI 4 Transportation Force.
Reference CruDiv 14 SMS 061518.
The Schedule of #3 Transportation Unit (DesDiv 4 (Nowake and Maikaze), Awata Maru and Hie Maru) has been set back 2 days Blanks."

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: STEELHEAD
ALL SUBS COPYING
NFI FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

11/0023 October

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 25, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA COMSUBPAC SERIAL 39 X 068 AND 069 POPCORN
PLUS 2 DESTROYERS X TIME 2100 X DATE 11TH X
11-10 NORTH 143-20 EAST SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS
OF THIS UNIT AT 2100 15TH 42-15 NORTH 129-10
EAST X IMPORTANT X

IF UNABLE INTERCEPT MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION
ANYWAY X WE EXPECT ANOTHER OUTFIT EQUALLY
AS IMPORTANT THROUGH SAME VICINITY ABOUT
24 HOURS LATER X MORE DGPE LATER

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception difficult.

No. C-2

October 7 to 12

Conducting patrol on traffic routes
west of Truk.

October 12

1011 (K) Sighted twin engine bombers at great
distance flying south.

October 13 to 15

Enroute assigned area.

October 16

Commenced high periscope surface
patrol along northern boundary of
area.

Case 25, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 17

0937 Lat. 4 -5'N, Long 138 -12'E. Sighted smoke bearing 247 T. Commenced tracking on the surface ahead of target.

1305 Made quick dive and commenced approach. Battle stations submerged.

1430 Identified target as hospital ship, medium size. Contact #4.

1445 Took pictures at range 1500 yards to 2000 yards.

1500 Secured from battle stations.

1745 Surfaced, commenced high periscope patrol along reverse course to that of the hospital ship in case it was acting as a lookout or decoy.

October 18 to October 19

Commenced patrolling to north and east of area.

October 20

I at 8 -10'N., Long. 142 -41'E.

2218 (I) Made SJ contact; 15,000 yards, 020 T

2220 (I) Sighted contact, two ships. Commenced tracking and maneuvering to obtain position ahead. Determined base course to be 290 T., targets zigging radically every six minutes, speed 15 knots.

October 21

Obtained position 15,000 yards ahead of targets on base course

0115 (I) Made quick dive and conducted radar approach at 40 foot depth.

0138 (I) Went to periscope depth and continued approach by periscope and sound.

0151 (I) Steadied on course for 110 stbd track for expected course of targets on

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 25, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 21 (Cont.)

- next zig at 0152. Targets were about 1000 yards abeam of each other zigging together. Sighted escort vessel astern and between targets.
- 0152 (I) Targets zigged to right instead of to left as expected, range about 1500 yards, angle on bow of right hand and largest target - zero.
- 0154 (I) Lat 8 -25'N., Long 141 -50'E. Fired 3 torpedoes from stern tubes at left hand target. Immediately went deep to avoid collision with right hand target.
- 0154 -
45 (I) Heard 2 torpedo explosions about 9 seconds apart followed immediately by the click of the first of a pattern of seven depth charges exploding at about five second intervals. Bathythermograph showed a definite layer between 270 and 315 feet so went below layer. Depth charging continued at intervals, until at
- 0234 (I) Heard last depth charge (Total dropped 22).
- 0315 (I) Lost sound contact on screws on the two ships, and at
- 0500 (I) Came to periscope depth.
- 0414 (I) Surfaced and commenced trailing on base course.
- 0450 (I) Lat 8 -20.5' N., Long 141 -48 E. Day-break. Sighted ship dead ahead silhouetted on horizon.
- 0452 (I) Made out escort circling ship. Ship appeared stopped. Received report that torpedoes in tubes #1 and #7 were flooded.
- 0455 (I) Made quick dive to avoid discovery in daylight. Commenced closing at periscope depth. Continued routing torpedoes.

Case 25, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 21 (Cont.)

- 0708 (I) Completed routine of torpedoes. Two out of seven were flooded.
- 0720 (I) No periscope contact having been obtained, surfaced and commenced trailing. Sighted debris and a large oil slick running to the west and followed it.
- 0756 (I) Sighted smoke dead ahead.
- 0759 (I) Made out smoke, stack, and masts of freighter. Commenced end around using high periscope to maintain contact. SJ Radar contact could not be maintained at this range. Target speed 8 knots.
- 1309 (I) Reversed course and started heading down base course to close and pick up target.
- 1536 (I) Regained periscope contact, target bearing 039 T., on port beam. Started end around again. Tracking indicated base course of target had changed from 275° to 300° and speed about 9 knots.
- 1737 (I) Commenced closing target to gain SJ Radar contact prior darkness in anticipation of target changing base course radically as soon as it became dark.
- 1800 (I) SJ contact 16,000 yards.
- 1805 (I) Target and possibly escort opened fire with small calibre as well as with 4" or 5" guns; fire directed toward STELLHEAD. The clouds on horizon in back of the submarine had suddenly opened leaving a bright streak of twilight along the horizon against which the submarine was silhouetted and this was probable cause of discovery.
- 1807 (I) Splashes were short but turned stern to target to get out of visual range. Shellfire continued at about 1 minute intervals for ten minutes and at

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 25, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1835 (I) Heard two distant depth charge explosions. Shellfire ceased.
- 1849 (I) Reversed course and headed for target's last bearing to regain contact. Horizon now completely dark.
- 1936 (I) No contact obtained. Commenced search to south of position.
- 2145 (I) The target's speed having been reduced to nine knots indicated damage, and as numerous oil slicks had been observed during tracking, while astern of target, it was concluded target was heading toward Yap for fuel and possible repairs. Took up search along target's course to Yap.

October 22

- 1036 (I) Made land fall on Yap Island. Commenced patrol off islands in hope of intercepting damaged freighter.
- 2125 (I) Sent our 221205 to ComSubPac reporting damaged freighter and possible time of arrival off Kayangol Island, in case they got by us to the south and are continuing toward original destination.

October 23

- Continued patrol off Yap Island. Took several pictures at two miles from harbor. No shipping sighted inside harbor.
- 2300 (I) Set course to return to assigned area.

October 25

Entered assigned area and commenced surface patrol

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 26

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Sur- 10/1547 October
face Escort Unit
#1)(B)

TO: (Sur-
face Escort Unit
#2 Palao Det)(C)
(Base
Force #32. Davao)(C)
(Base
Force #22, Balikpapan)(B)
(Base
Force #23, Makassar)(B)
(Base Force
#21, Soerabaja)(C)
(1st
Southern Expeditionary
Fleet)(C)

INFO: (Combined
Fleet)(B) (2nd
Fleet)(B) (4th
Fleet)(B) (1st
Section Naval General
Staff)(B)

- Genyo Maru) (escorted by Urakaze
as far as 200 miles from the reef)
departed Truk at 0730 for Soerabaja.
Scheduled to arrive at 1200/20th."

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 26, No. A-1 (Cont.)

"Noon posits 11th through 19th.
06-42 North, 145-36 East.
09-31 North, 142-12 East.
11-00 North, 137-24 (?) East.
11-00 North, 132-08 East.
09-05 North, 128-05 East.
04-56 North, 125-14 East.
01-48 North, 121-06 East.
02-38 South, 118-47 East.
04-27 South, 114-21 East.

LOCAL COMMENT: This info phoned to subs at
110745 Oct. (I).

No. A-2

10/1547 October

FROM:
TO:

(Palao Detach-
ment Surface Escort
Unit #2)

(Makassar Base
Force #23)
(Soerabaya Base
Force #21)

INFO:

(Combined Fleet)

(4th Fleet)

(1st Naval General
Staff)

(- Kyckuto Maru) escorted by Urakaze
to point 200 miles outside of the
reef (departed Truk for JW at 0730 on the 10th.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 26. No. A-2 (Cont.)

Noon Positions

11th - 06-42 N, 146-20 E.
12th - 09-31 N, 142-12 E.
13th - 11-00 N, 137-24 E.
14th - 11-00 N, 132-08 E.
15th - 09-05 N, 128-05 E.
16th - 04-56 N, 125-14 E.
17th - 01-48 N, 121-06 E.
18th - 02-33 N, 118-47 E.
19th - 04-27 N, 114-21 E.

LOCAL COMMENT: Hypo 102308 and 102316 also gave this translation, but was identified as possible Genyo Maru.

"JN" is Surabaya (CD).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: POGY
INFO: - - -

11/0754 October

FREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUBPAC 41 X SUPER X EMPTY 262 FOCCORN X
TIME 0300 X DATE 12TH X (09-31 NORTH 142-12
EAST) X POSITIONS AT SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING
DAY ARE; (11-00 NORTH 137-24 EAST) X (11-00
NORTH 132-08 EAST) X (09-05 NORTH 128-05
EAST) X

STEELHEAD CAN ASSIST IF IN VICINITY BUT NOT
IN INTERFERE WITH OTHER JOBS

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 26 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Posy

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Good except in evening when fading and interference made reception difficult.

No. C-2

October 11

0800 (I) Set course to leave area.
1900 (I) Sent dispatch to Comsubpac.

October 12 to 13

Enroute Johnston Island.

October 14

Patrolling Truk-Saipan route.
1625 (J) Sighted tanker and destroyer escort. Submerged for approach. After running for over one hour at high speed, could not close to firing range 12N-148E

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See X, Case 2, C-1.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 26, (Cont.)

No. C-4

For action report of U.S.S. Steelhead for
October 11 and 12, see X, Case 2, C-2:
for October 13 - 21, see X, Case 21, C-4.

Case 27

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

10/1325 October
143906

(Base
Force 4, Truk) (B)
(Base
Force 5, Saipan) (B)
(Base
Force 4, Shanghai) (B)
(Takeo Guard
District) (C)

/China
Seas Fleet) (D)

(3RD
Fleet) (C)

(4th
Fleet) (B)

INFO:

(NGS, 1st
Section) (B)

Shanghai Military
Stores) (C)

(Associated
Guadalcanal OPFor)

(Blank Comm.
Unit) (C)

*From Commander TEI (D) #4 Transport Force.

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 27, No. A-1 (Cont.)

#2 Transport Unit (CruDiv 14
Gokoku Maru (garbled), -Kiyosumi
Maru) and Yamagumo will operate
as follows enroute Shanghai:

(Following positions are for 0600):

At 0500, 11th October, depart Truk.

0600, South Channel.

12th - 10-16 N, 147-35 E.

13th - 12-10 N, 142-25 E.

17th - 26-00 N, 125-35 E.

18th - 30-58 N, 123-12 E.

At 0900, at the entrance.

At 1430, arrive Shanghai.

(Draft of the Gokoku Maru and Kiyosumi Maru,
6.8 meters).

Part 2. Blank each ship 1; total 5.

Part 3. Personnel and cargo which can be loaded
on each ship (cargo in cubic meters in parenthesis):

(a) Naka and Isuzu each 350
men (Ø).

(b) Gokoku Maru, 1800 men (2 blank).

(c) Kiyosumi Maru, 1300 men (3500).

(d) Yamagumo, 50 men (Ø).

Part 4. Following supplies required at
Shanghai:

(a) Fuel oil: Each ship in CruDiv 14, 1400
tons; Yamagumo (split), 500 tons.

(b) Coal (?): Gokoku Maru and Kiyosumi Maru,
400 tons each.

(c) Food: Naka and Isuzu rations
for 900 men for 13 days for each ship.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 27, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Yamagumo, Gokoku Maru and Kiyosumi Maru, rations for 300 men for 13 days for each ship.

Blank for Army use to be loaded on Gokoku Maru and Kiyosumi Maru.

Part 5. Communication zone changes: Will remain in Tokyo Communication Zone and on blank (date) at 1800 enter 4th Communication Zone. (blank). At 0600, 17th, enter Shanghai Communication Zone (SI 17). Guard ship, Naka ()

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 111145 (-9) October.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: STEELHEAD
MINGO
ALL SUBS ON NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

11/0912 October

SUPER FOR STEEL HEAD AND POSSIBLY MINGO X
COMSUBPAC 44 X 048 FRANT 043 AND 047
FOPCORN PLUS 1 DD X AT 2100 ON THE 11TH X
10-16 NORTH 147-35 EAST X POSITION AT SAME
TIME THE FOLLOWING DAY X 12-10 NORTH 142-25
EAST AND 4 DAYS LATER 26-00 NORTH 125-35
EAST X

LET US KNOW ANY RESULTS ON THIS ONE

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 27 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Mingo

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Jap interference and atmospherics caused difficulty.

No. C-2

October 11

- 0300 (L) Sighted FOMAPE ISLAND in moonlight.
0527 (L) Submerged. Closed FOMAPE. Noted two towns with considerable smoke from shore activities. No shipping observed. Seas oily calm.
1915 (L) Surfaced. Stood off to northwest towards TRUK area. FOMAPE blackout was absolute.

October 12

Surface patrol enroute area 15 north.

October 13

- In vicinity of HALL ISLANDS, eastern side.
0559 (L) Submerged and closed eastern side of MURILO ISLAND. Saw no activity on these islands. Patrolled this turning point all day. Seas extremely calm and very clear. With 6 feet of periscope exposed, it was possible to see the wood deck slats, marker buoy location, hatchway to torpedo room and the life lines forward, all too clearly!

Case 27, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 13 (Cont.)

1930 (L) Surfaced. Patrolled northwest along the approaches, then west to patrol in vicinity of East Fayu.

October 14

0306 (L) Plane contact on radar, 8 miles closing. (#4) Submerged to avoid detection by moonlight patrol.

0409 (L) Surfaced.

0559 (L) Submerged to patrol northwest approaches to TRUK.

1200 (L) Sighted small Jap observation plane or zero fighter headed north (Plane contact #5).

1245 to

1545 (L) Echo ranging from patrol craft in vicinity cruising back and forth.

1940 (L) Surfaced. Patrol vicinity of EAST FAYU. Bright moonlight. Flat calm seas.

October 15

0604 (L) Submerged to patrol between EAST FAYU and HALL ISLANDS.

0950 (L) Sighted small Jap single float observation seaplane on anti-submarine patrol, course northwest. (Plane contact #6).

1030 (L) Sighted Jap float type zero fighter, headed in our direction. (Plane contact #7) Went to 200 feet for 40 minutes.

1300 (L) Echo ranging from patrol vessels in vicinity continued for some time, but could not see them.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 27, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 15 (Cont.)

1937 (L) Surfaced about 7 miles from EAST FAYU. Sighted large searchlight in direction of island, which swept back and forth in our direction several times then went out. Indicates possibility of our being picked up by surface radar on surfacing. Stood off to the north to search for north-bound traffic.

October 16

Surface patrol on northerly course. Came to southwesterly course at 0300 and patrolled vicinity of latitude 11 -00'N., longitude 151 -20'E. Moderate seas; many heavy rain squalls; visibility not too good.

1700 (L) Sighted masts bearing 131 true, in squall area, and approaching rapidly. (Ship contact #3) Submerged and commenced approach on normal approach course at high speed.

1700 (L) Target was a large aircraft carrier, escorted by new class "UM-1" destroyer (4 streamlined turrets) on course 353 true, speed 19 knots, not zig-zagging. Destroyer was directly ahead of the carrier about 2000 yards. After 45 minutes at high speed on normal approach course, it became apparent that we would not be able to close unless the target zigged toward us. Prepared for a long range shot and at-

1756 (L) Fired six torpedoes, low power, torpedo run 6500 yards, track 120 port, longitudinal spread, depth setting 10 feet, using Mk. 8 angle solver. Seven minutes after first shot (it seemed like a week), two hits (thirteen

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 27. No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 16 (Cont.)

seconds apart) were observed and heard on the carrier's port bow. Other torpedoes continued to run on. The Jap swung left about 100 degrees, stopped and showed a port list. The DD swung around to the opposite side and at -

1808 (L) She commenced counterattack with four depth charges about 9000 yards away. Heard no echo ranging. Carrier got underway again, reversed course to port, and finally came around to course north. The flight deck was visible, when she came bows on, showing considerable trim down by the head. Before she passed out of sight to the north, the port list appeared to be corrected. The destroyer continued to steam back and forth, doing considerable signalling with yardarm blinker. She moved over between the carrier and us, dropping 3 or 4 depth charges at a time. Prepared to fire stern tubes at the DD, but was unable to reduce the range below 5500 yards before she shoved off at high speed to join the carrier steaming north. Total of 21 depth charges dropped from 1808 to 1816. The carrier had the general appearance of the ex-KAGA, with large open spaces under forward and after ends of flight deck. Flight deck extended full length of ship and was supported at ends by heavy frames. She had little or no island structure. At least four stick masts projected high over the flight deck. She carried planes on deck, covering the after half of the flight deck. No stacks were visible. Waited until out of radar range, then at -

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 27, No. G-2 (Cont.)

October 16 (Cont.)

1955 (I) Surfaced and sent contact report, which was very quickly sent and receipted for. Decided chase was impossible as the carrier appeared to be able to maintain 18 knots when last seen.

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

No: 5
Time and Date: 2218 (I) October 20
Lat. and Long: 8 - 10.5 N. 142-41 E.
Type: 2 AK 1 DD
Int Range: 15,000
Course and Speed: c-290 T 15 knots
How Contact: R - (SJ)
Remarks: One medium and one large
AK
2 torpedo hits in
smaller AK

No: 6
Time and Date: 0450 (I)
0759 (I)
1536 (I) October 21
Lat. and Long: 8-20.5N.141-48 E.
8N, 141E.
8N, 140E.
Type: 1 AK 1 Escort
Est. Range: 14,000
Course and Speed: 275 AM 300 PM
8 - 9 knots
How Contact: SD
Remarks: Possibly an escort.
AK identified as COYO MARU.
8,500 T. believed to be AK
damaged in night attack.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 27 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: See X, Case 2, C-1.

No. C-5

For action report of the U.S.S. Steelhead for
October 10-12 See X, Case 2, C-2; for
October 13-21 See X, Case 21, C-4.

Case 28

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

(#1 Surface
Escort Unit)
(#1 Surface
Escort Unit)

10/1700 October

INFO:

(Manila
Transportation)
(Chief
Transportation Section,
Tokyo)

(Singapore
Transportation)
(Surabaya Trans-
portation)

(Shanghai Base
Force)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 28, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Kimijima Maru)
(Kure Chief
of Staff)
(China Seas
Fleet)
(Dairen)
(Takao Guard
District)
(Keelung Defense
Force)
(Takao
Transportation Section)
(Balikpapan Comm.
Unit)

"(1). Convoy #105 composed of 11 ships departed Moji 1600 on the 10th, expect arrive Takao 0000 on the 15th. Speed 9.

(2). "A" blank number military personnel (for Singapore), "B" Nichiei Maru 13500 tons blank (for Balikpapan); "A" 1300 military personnel (for Singapore), "A" 1650 military personnel (for Singapore) "C" Tanagawa Maru 1000 tons blank (for Hachisho), "A" Teikai Maru blank military personnel, 53 trucks?, 800 tons blank, (for Manila), "A" Blank TAN Maru 1025 military personnel and 98 blank (for Singapore). Above vessels are bound for Takao.

(A) 1017 military personnel and 4,000 blank (for Singapore), "B" empty. "C" Biyoo Maru 1400 military personnel (for Saigon), "B" #2 14 torpedo boats and 600 passengers (for Singapore). Above vessels are bound for Bako.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 28, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(3). (Concerns course out of Moji, not readable).

(4). (All positions North and East)

11th, 32-59 North, 128-11 East.

12th, 32-32 North, 124-24 East.

13th, 29-27 North, 122-23 East.

14th, 26-30 North, 121-18 East.

15th, 23-23 North, 119-51 East.

(5). #2 will join convoy on the 11th at 0700 in position 6 miles blanks.

(6). Nichiei Maru will take on 150 tons of blank at Takao."

NEGAT COMMENT: Paragraph 4 assumed to be noon positions.

LOCAL COMMENT: Will be given to subs on October 11(VW).

(CIC Note: Notice arrival time at Takao as 0000/15th and last noon posit on 15th.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: TULLIBEE
INFO: CINCPAC

12/0721 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUPER

11 SHIP CONVOY LOADED WITH SLANTWAYS 0300 X
12TH X 32-32N 123-24 E X 29-27N 122-23E
26-30N 121-18E
23-23N 119-51E

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 28 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tullibee

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Normal

No. C-2

October 12

- 0705 (I) Sighted SEKIDE SHO bearing 243 T, distant 18 miles.
- 1037 (I) closing Radar contact on plane, submerged.
- 1041 (I) One bomb distant,
- 1214 (I) surfaced.
- 1224 (I) Radar contact on plane, submerged
- 1500 (I) Surfaced.

October 14

- 0626 (I) Submerged. With a full moon the nights are extremely bright.
- 0700 (I) Sighted smoke, went to battle stations and commenced approach. Contact developed into a convoy of nine MARU'S in three columns with three MIMIKAZE type DD escorts. Convoy zigged on irregular lengths logs between 120 T and 210 T. Ships varied in size from an engines aft AK similar to the KIYOTADA MARU, to a very large two stack AP that looked exactly like the old TAIYO MARU but may have been the COMTE VERDE or YAMATO MARU. 26-47'N., 121-15'E. Attempted to close the convoy but at -

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 28, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 14 (Cont.)

- 825 (I) the best position that we were able to attain gave us shots at two targets on tracks of 110 to 125° port, ranges 330 to 3700 yards and torpedo runs of 3600 to 4200 yards. The sea had a light swell but there were no whitecaps so made the decision that to fire under the existing circumstances we would probably just waste torpedoes as at that range the wakes would be sighted and the targets could avoid and further decided that we would let the convoy pull ahead then surface and chase.
- 0845 (I) Secured from battle stations.
- 1005 (I) Sighted a 2 engine bomber, apparently air cover for the convoy. Not being able to see smoke during a high periscope observation, surfaced at 1259 (I) and proceeded to pull in "end run" at flank speed.
- 1301 (I) Sighted TAISHAK bearing 310 T distant about 30 miles.
- 1312 (I) Sighted TUNGKUNG TAO bearing 252 T distant about 37 miles. Visibility certainly was excellent and we all wondered how long we could run down FORMOSA STRAIT before plane or patrol boat put us down.
- 1322 (I) S.D. contact at 22 miles. Closed on 21 and faded at a little over 22 miles. Probably was the convoy escort making a sweep. Figured we had gotten sufficiently ahead of the convoy and at
- 2030 (I) slowed to one third speed and commenced patrolling in and out from KORYU HAKUCHI, FORMOSA. Our luck certainly was with us in not being

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 28; No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 14 (Cont.)

forced to submerge by planes or patrol boats during the day. Both S.J. and S.D. Radars were working beautifully as they were getting land "pips" at 25 miles! The moon was almost full and the night was extremely bright but a surface haze reduced the visibility. Soundings ran from 23 to 30 fathoms.

2330 (I) S.J. contact bearing 012 T, distant 12,000 yards. Commenced tracking.

First Attack

October 15

24-35'N., 120-31'E. Radar picked out 12 separate pips so establishing the contact as the convoy we had been chasing. The largest pip had 2 smaller pips close aboard. This apparently was the large ship sighted yesterday morning with two of the escorts in charge. Selected this as our major target. Target was zig-zagging between 200 T and 250 T. At 0037 (I) submerged to radar depth and went to battle stations. The radar personnel did a marvelous job keeping track of the multiple targets. 0053 (I) targets zigged away and it became apparent that we would have to fire on the largest target at a range of about 3200 yards and not too good a track. Due to the surface haze could just make out the target in the periscope. Took a look around and saw that we had good shots at two ships in the nearer columns and that one ship - - - - - garbled - - - - -

Case 26, No. C-2 (Cont.)October 15 (Cont.)

- This proved unfortunate because we bottomed as soon as we slowed down. The breaking up noises were extremely loud through the hull. At
- 0114 (I) received the first of eleven depth charges, the last being at
- 0210 (I). Three of the charges were close, shook the ship severely sent paint chippings raining down on our heads and bounced the ship up and down on the bottom. Heard the last of the breaking up noises at
- 0121 (I) Felt a little lost without any sound gear but we could hear the Jap screws through the hull. They passed over us from stern to bow several times but apparently didn't know that we were right under them. Heard a couple of clanks on deck which gave rise to the unpleasant thought that perhaps we would surface with depth charges on deck. The poor sound conditions were definitely on our side. Heard the last screws through the hull at
- 0250 (I). After bumping along the bottom making 50 turns in 170 to 210 feet of water managed to regain a trim. At
- 0330 (I) came up to 150 feet and lowered one sound head. Heard pinging astern but it didn't sound close. Came to radar depth at 0335 (I) and when we could pick nothing up on search surfaced at
- 0411 (I) and cleared the vicinity at full speed. Expecting a thorough air search of the vicinity, submerged at
- 0633 (I) about 25 miles northwest of --garbled--

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 28, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 15 (Cont.)

Summarizing attacks one and two it is believed that we damaged an 8000 ton AP and sank a 6000 ton AP and possibly damaged another ship type unknown.

0850 (I) Began hearing a series of distant depth charges or bombs. Searched the skies and charges kept getting closer so at 1044 (I) commenced running at 90 feet between periscope observations. At 1153 (I) two charges exploded close enough to shake the ship. Thought that we might be leaving a trail of air or oil bubbles but could see none through the "scope". These two were the only close bombs and the last ones were heard at 1555 (I). Although we saw no planes during periscope observations it was apparent that the Japs were systematically bombing the area. Over 50 bombs were heard during the day. The surface of the water had been calm for over 12 hours and the slick left by our running at high speed probably remained for hours after we had passed and it is believed that the Japs followed our slick up to the point of submergence and then commenced bombing our possible submerged positions.

1856 (I) Surfaced and proceeded to close the FORMOSA coast.

October 16

He apparently saw us too as he dogged our movements. Maneuvered to avoid and finally got clear at 0310 (I). Went through the area of last night's attack and noted a very large slick.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 28, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 16 (Cont.)

0603 (I) Sighted a patrol boat bearing 075 $\frac{1}{2}$ T distant 4700 yards. He sighted us at the same time and headed for us. The range closed to 3800 yards before we began to pull away. It was almost daylight and we can't figure out why he didn't shoot at us. Pulled clear at flank speed and submerged at

0712 (I).

1145 (I) Sighted a plane bearing 245T distant 7 miles.

October 17

0206 (I) Sighted a patrol boat bearing 185T, distant 5 miles. Turned away from him but he sighted us, started belching smoke and headed for us. Thought he might be a DD, but evidently not because we outdistanced him with flank speed. We certainly have appreciated the Fairbanks-Morse "horses" the last few days. Have noted possible "radar interference" several times on the SD during the past four nights.

1740 (I) Sighted two buoys about 50 yards apart having 5 foot rods clear of the water and tipped by white rags in 26-19 N, 122-25 E.

October 18

1640 (I) Sighted patrol boat. This craft kept us from surfacing until after dusk.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 29

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

06/1518 October

FROM:

TO:

(Combined Fleet) (G)

(Base Force 4,
Truk) (B)

(Base Force 5, Saipan) (B)

INFO:

(NGJ,
1st Section) (B)

(Shanghai Military
Stores) (C)

(Associated Air)

"From Commander TRI #4 Transport Force.

#3 Transportation Group - DesDiv 4)
(Nowake), (Maikaze),

- Hie Maru, (- Awata Maru) proceed to
Shanghai in accordance with following plan:

1. Movement schedule: (all positions 0600
unless otherwise noted):

At 0600, October 8, depart Truk via North
Channel.

October 10/0600, 11-10 N, 143-20 E.

October 14/0600, 23-15 N, 129-10 E.

October 15/0600, 26-50 N, 125-45 E.

October 16/0915, entrance (buoy).

1600, arrive Shanghai.

(Hie Maru draft 8 and fraction meters; Awata
Maru draft 7 and fraction meters).

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 29, No. A-1 (Cont.)

- 2. 4 blanks, 1 for each ship.
- 3. Loading capacity: (cargo in cubic meters shown in parentheses): (sic)
 - (a) Destroyers: 50 men each (no cargo).
 - (b) Hio Maru: 2100 men (near) 2500 cubic meters).
 - (c) Awata Maru: 1100 men (3400 cubic meters).
 - (d) Embark headquarters and blank on Hio Maru. (57 people blanks; 54 (44?) people blanks).
- 4. Supplies required at Shanghai:
 - (a) Each destroyer 100 tons of (fuel?).
 - (b) Hio Maru and Awata Maru, (fuel) 300 tons each.
 - (c) Each destroyer requires 10 days supply of provision for 350 men; blank.
 - (d) Hio Maru and Awata Maru require certain preparations before loading."

LOCAL COMMENT: This movement was set back 2 days by message originated 091845, as follows:

"From Commander Transportation Force.
Reference CrusDiv 14 SMS 091519.
The schedule of #3 Transportation Unit (DesDiv 4 (Nowake and Maikaze), Awata Maru and Hio Maru () has been set back 2 days.
Blanks."

No. A-2

FROM:
TO:

10/1325 October

- (Base Force 4, Truk)(B)
- Base
- Force 5, Saipan)(B)
- (Base Force 4, Shanghai)(B)
- (Takao Guard District)(C)

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 29, No. A-2 (Cont.)

Seas Fleet)(B) (China
(3rd Fleet)(C)
(4th
Fleet)(B)
INFO; (EGS,
1st Section)(B)
(Shanghai
Military Stores)(B)
(Associated Guadalcanal
OpFor)
(Blank Com.
Unit)(C)

"From Commander TEI (D) #4 Transport Force.

#2 Transport Unit (CruDiv 14
Gokoku Maru (garbled), (- Kiyosumi Maru)
and Yamagumo (will operate as follows
enroute Shanghai:

(Following positions are for 0600):
At 0500, 11th October, depart Truk.
0600, South Channel.
12th - 10-16N, 147-35E.
13th - 12-10N, 142-25E.
17th - 26-00N, 125-35E.
18th - 30-38N, 123-12E.
At 0900, at the entrance.
At 1430, arrive Shanghai.
(Draft of the Gokoku Maru and Kiyosumi Maru,
6.8 meters)

Part 2. Blank each ship 1; total 5.

Part 3. Personnel and cargo which can be
loaded on each ship (cargo in cubic meters in
parenthesis):

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 29; No. A-2 (Cont.)

- (a) Naka and Isuzu each
350 men (β).
- (b) Gokoku Maru, 1200 men (2 blank).
- (c) Kiyosumi Maru, 1300 men (3500).
- (d) Yamagumo, 50 men (β).

Part 4. Following supplies required at Shanghai:

- (a) Fuel oil: Each ship in CruDiv 14, 1400 tons; Yamagumo (split), 500 tons.
- (b) Coal (?): Gokoku Maru and Kiyosumi Maru, 400 tons each.
- (c) Food: Naka and Isuzu rations for 900 men for 13 days for each ship.
Yamagumo, Gokoku Maru and Kiyosumi Maru, rations for 300 men for 13 days for each ship.
Blank for Army use to be loaded on Gokoku Maru and Kiyosumi Maru.

Part 5. Communication zone changes: Will remain in Tokyo Communication Zone and on blank (date) at 1200 enter 4th Communication Zone. (blank). At 0600, 17th, enter Shanghai Communication Zone (SI 17). Guard ship, Naka.

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor informed at 111145 (-9) October.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 29 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: WOLF
MOMSEN
ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FCX
INFO: TULLIBEE
CINCPAC

12/0749 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

COMSUBPAC 49N X SUPER X 068 and 069 POPCORN
AND 2 DESTROYERS 2100 15th (23-15N 129-10 E)
ALGAROA (26-50N 125-45E) AND 27 HOURS LATER
ARRIVES HANCHAI ENTRANCE BOUYS X

048 PEANUT X 1 DESTROYER X 043 AND 047 POPCORN X
2100 X 16TH X (26-00N 125-35E) ALGAROA (30-58N
123-12E) AND ARRIVE ENTRANCE BOUYS SAME TIME AS
FIRST GROUP X

MOMSENS GANG AUTHORIZED USE TULLIBEE AREA TO
WORK ON THESE X TULLIBEE KEEP CLEAR AND WORK
ON OTHER JOBS GIVEN YOU X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: For radio reception of
U.S.S. Steelhead for October 15-16.
See X, Case 21, C-3.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 29 (Cont.)

No. C-2

(For action report on U.S.S. Steelhead for
October 15-16 See X, Case 21, C-4.)

U.S.S. Gurnard

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: For radio reception of
U.S.S. Gurnard for October 15-16
See X, Case 21, C-1.

No. C-4

(For action report on U.S.S. Gurnard from
October 15-16 See X, Case 21, C-2.)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 30

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

Defense Force
Yokosuka (B)

12/1710 October

TO:

(Trans.
Force 10 Singapore) (C)
(ATE 1) Surface
Escort Force 1) (B)

INFO:

(Transsect Soerabaya) (B)
(China Fleet) (B)
(Naval Trans. Section
Tokyo)

(Nankai Maru) (B)

(1st Section Naval

General Staff) (B)

(Trans. Section

Singapore) (B)

(Naval District

CofS KURE) (A)

(Comm. Unit Dairen) (C)

(Guard District

CofS Takao) (B)

(Navy Yard Yokosuka) (A)

(Naval District CofS

Sasebo.) (B)

From: Mutsure rendezvous control officer.

Part 1. HI 13 Convoy, 8 blank and (ship)
at 1700 on 12th, departed (unident place).
Will arrive (Takao?) at 1300 on 16th.
Speed 12 knots.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 30. No. A-1 (Cont.)

Part 2. For Takao. B vessel -unident
ship) J blank blank E 400 military personnel
and 7000 tons blank. E vessel (Maru) J
blank blank N 250 unit personnel. A vessel
blank Maru J--J 1253 unit personnel 4500
tons of blank. A vessel Amatsu Maru J--C
Air Group blank. A vessel Sui (Mizu) blank
Maru J--B 2500 unit personnel (?) blank.
Blanks 1020 unit personnel blank. Blank
Maru (not listed) Air Group blank.

Part 3. At point 2 miles, 180 degrees from # 2
blank light-house, change course to 255 degrees
(near). At 52-12N, 124--00E course 201. At
23-02N, blank 09 east course blank. At point
9 miles, 125 degrees from blank San (Yama)
lighthouse course blank. At point 8 miles,
96 degrees from blank, course blank. At
25-07N, 119-53E course 140.

Part 4

13th,	32-57,	127-05.
14th,	30-56,	123-17.
15th,	26-40,	121-06.
16th,	22-39,	120-13.

Presumably noon posits.

Part 5 Amatsu Maru will join up on 15th at
0400 at point 10 miles north of blank.

LOCAL COMMENT: This is same message, in greater
detail as in Negat 122245 October.

ORIGINAL
25 December 1945

Case 30 (Cont.).

No. A-2

FROM: (Yokosuka Defense Force)

12/1710 October

TO:

INFO: (1st Surface Escort Unit)
(Surabaya Transportation Section)
(China Seas Fleet)
(Chief Tokyo Transportation Section)
(Mankai Maru)
(1st Section Naval General Staff)
(Singapore Transportation Section)
(Kure Chief of Staff)
(Dairen)
(Takao Guard District)
(China Fleet #2)
(Shinohira Air Base)
(Kinisima Maru)

From: the Mitsure rendezvous control officer.

(1). Convoy HI # blank, consisting of 3 vessels (one escort) departed Mitsure at 1700 on 12th and will arrive Takao at 1800 on 16th. Speed 12 knots. Blanks.

(4). 15th, 32-57 North, 127-03 East.
14th, 50-53 North, 128-17 East.
15th, 28-40 North, 121-06 East.
16th, 22-59 North, 120-15 East."

NEGAT COMMENT: Paragraphs 2 and 3 deal with ship names and cargoes unreadable in detail, but all ships appear to be large. Total of at least 25,000 tons of cargo and 4,000 men is mentioned.
(NEGAT 125245 October -OP)

LOCAL COMMENT: Phoned subs 12/1130 (-G)

Case 80. (Cont.)

3. THE...
10 December 1944

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

15/0357 October

FROM: COMUSMACV
TO: MAJORITY STAFF PACK FOR
TULLIUMS AND GARRARD JULY
INFO: CINCPAC

PRIO: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA SLP X 08 NOV 57 SHIPS INCORPORATED BY REGIONS
1 REGIONS TULLIUMS X 100 P. 10000 AND TULLIUMS X
OSCO X 15th X 22-57. 127-03 127-03 127-03
(SUBSTITUTES AT SAME TIME ON BULDOZERS AND DIRT)

14 30-20 BUREAU: 128-17 EAST
15 28-40 131-00
16 22-30 130-15
TULIUMS REPORT 11 C WILL BE VACATED UNTIL LATER
REMOVED ABOUT 17th

C - Shipping Action Reports

U.S.S. Tullibee

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

For action report of U.S.S. Tullibee for October
15-16 sec X, Case 81, C-6, C-7.

U.S.S. Gurnard

Third War Patrol

No. C-2

For action report of U.S.S. Gurnard for October
15-16 sec X, Case 81, C-8.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 31.

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: Blank originator
TO: (Base 12/1030 October

Force 5, Saipan) (B) 58021

(Surface

Escort Force 1) (B)

(Yokosuka

INFO: Naval District CofS) (B)

Kure Naval

District) (B)

(NCS; 1st

Fleet) (B)

(Yokosuka

Defense Squadron F/3) (B)

(Takao Guard

District Commander) (A)

(Takao Guard District

Unit) (B)

(China Area address) (B)

"Badly garbled message, but concerns convoy of at least 2 vessels).

Following positions begin 13th October; believed to be noon positions from 13th October through 16th October:

4. 13th October - 24-05 N, 123-00 E.
26-35 N, 126-40 E.
29 (?) -55N, 129-15 E.
33-35 N, 129-50 E.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 31, No. A-1 (Cont.)

5. Nichinan Maru will leave convoy at 16th October noon positions. (Many blanks)."

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor will be informed at 13/0200 (-9).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: ALL SUBS ON NPM FOX
INFO: CENOPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

13/0258 October

ANOTHER ULTRA FOR WOLF LOBEN IN CASE YOU CANNOT RECALL MY PREVIOUS SERIAL WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THIS X COMSUBPAC 520 X CONVOY X CS00 X 9 KNOTS X 25-35 NORTH 129-40 EAST X 29-35 NORTH 129-15 EAST X 35-35 NORTH 129-50 EAST

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Tullibee

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Normal.

No. C-2

For action report for October 15-16 see X, Case 31, C-6, C-7.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 31, (Cont.)

U.S.S. Gurnard

Third War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: See X, Case 21, C-1.

No. C-4

For action report for October 15-16
see X, Case 21, C-2.

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: See X, Case 21, C-5.

No. C-6

For action report for October 15-16
see X, Case 21, C-4.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 52

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

(Saipan Base Force 5)
(Tokyo Communication Unit)
(Truk Communication Unit)
(4th Fleet)
(1st Section Naval General Staff)
(Kure Chief of Staff)
(Combined Fleet)

15/0915 October

"The PT escorted by Gotori departed PT for PS at 0700 the 13th; scheduled to arrive at 1400 the 15th."

1. Noon positions: 13th - 8-16 N, 151-40 E.
14th - 11-30 N, 148-55 E.
15th - 15-05 N, 146-40 E.
2. Communication zones: "Depart 4th Communication Zone (TSU 105) at 0800 the 14th and enter #5 Special Base Force Zone (NA 51) blank."

LOCAL COMMENT: This is the Fujisan Maru, tanker of 9500 tons, enroute Palenbang via Saipan. Noon positions will be given to ComSubPacFor at 0200 (-9) 14th October.

PT is Truk (CD).
PS is Saipan (CD).

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 52, (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM COMBUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

13/1710 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUPER FROM COMBUEPAC FOR BINGO AND POSSIBLY POCY
IF PEBLING TONGAR VICTIMTY X 1 TANKER 1 ESCORT
X 0300 GMT 13th X 08-16 NORTH 151-40 EAST ALGARORA
11-30 NORTH 148-55 EAST X 15-05 NORTH 145-40 EAST

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. POTY

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Fading and interference in evening
made signals difficult to read.

No. C-2

October 12 to 13

Enroute Johnston Island.

October 14

Patrolling Truk-Saipan route.

1625 (J) Sighted tanker and destroyer escort.
Submerged for approach. After running
for over one hour at high speed, could
not close to firing range. 12N-148E.

October 16

Patrolling Truk-Empire route.

0616 (J) Sighted convoy of six ships and one escort.
Went ahead on surface to gain position ahead.

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 32, No. C-2(Cont.)

October 16

0935 (J) In position ahead of convoy, submerged for approach. Ran at high speed for one hour and 45 minutes and could not close to firing position. Believe convoy changed base course after we submerged. 13-07N, 152-55 E.

October 17 to 25 Enroute to Johnston Island.

U.S.S. Mingo

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: See X, Case 27, C-1.

No. C-1

For action report see X, Case 27, C-3.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 33

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (8th Fleet or 14/1150 October
Surface Escort
Force 1)(C)
TO:
INFO: (Naval Transporta-
tion Section Tokyo)(B)

#4014 B convoy (blank Ura Maru
escort Chocun Maru and blank Maru)
departed PT 0430 the 14th for NAA. Scheduled to
arrive 1200 the 25th:

1. Noon posits (14th - 24th) All north and east.

8-00, 152-20.
10-20, 154-04.
13-00, 153-00.
15-35, 151-55.
18-30, 150-55.
21-10, 149-20.
23-40, 147-55.
26-00, 146-15.
28-20, 144-25.
30-35, 143-10.
33-10, 141-40.

2. Communications:

Until 16th, 1200 in 4th Comm. Zone.
Until 21st, 1200 in 5th Base Force Comm. Zone.
After that in Yokosuka Comm. Zone.
Radio guard ship Chocun Maru

LOCAL COMMENT: Hypos copy (local) has 55 minutes
wherever Negat has 50 minutes. Other-
wise message is the same.
(See Negats 14/1543-14/1544 Oct.)

NAA is Yokosuka (CD).
PT is Eruk (CD).

Case 55, (Cont.)

ORIGINAL
25 December 1945

No. A-2

FROM: Blank originator
TO:
INFO: (Surface Escort Unit
2)
(Garbled)

14/1130 October
blanks 30 Oct.

"Convoy #--4B, escorted by Ushio Maru and blank
(?) and Tatsuura Maru
Maru, departed PT for HAA at 0450 on the 14th.
Scheduled to arrive at 1200 on the 25th.

(1) Noon positions 14th through 24th:

14th Oct.	03-00 North,	152-30 East.
15th Oct.	10-20 North,	154-04 East.
16th Oct.	13-00 North,	155-00 East.
17th Oct.	15-30 North,	151-50 East.
18th Oct.	13-50 North,	150-30 East.
19th Oct.	21-10 North,	149-20 East.
20th Oct.	23-40 North,	147-50 East.
21st Oct.	26-00 North,	146-15 East.
22nd Oct.	23-20 North,	144-45 East.
23rd Oct.	50-50 North,	143-10 East.
24th Oct.	33-10 North,	141-40 East.

(2) Communications Zones:

Until 1200 on the 16th in #4 Comm Zone.
Until 1200 on the 21st in #5 Comm Zone.
Thereafter in Yokosuka Comm Zone.
Radio Guard Ship (133767)

NEGAT COMMENT: This appears to be convoy in Part 1
of Negat's 131757

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 35, No. A-2(Cont.)

(NEGAT: 141543/141544: OCT OP:) (Parts 1 & 2 of 2)

LOCAL COMMENT: The 2 messages Negat references above are the arrivals and departures for Oct. 14 at Truk. These are the same Jap message. Given to subs at 0330 (I) 15th Oct. PT is Truk (CD). NAA is Yokosuka (CD).

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSOPAC

TO: HINGO
FOGY

INFO: ALL SUBS COPYING FROM FOX
CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X

- (A) CONVOY
- (B) BLANK
- (C) 7 KNOTS
- (D) 0500 GMT
- (E) 15th
- (F) 10-20 NORTH 154-04 EAST.
POSITION SAME TIME ON FOLLOWING DAY
13 ORTH 153 EAST

14/1735 October

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Hingo

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: See X, Case 27, C-1.

No. C-2

For action report see X, Case 27, C-2.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 55, (Cont.)

U.S.S. Pogy

Third War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: For radio reception see X, Case 52,
C-1.

No. C-4

For action report see X, Case 52, C-2.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 34

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Assoc'd Trans. 14/1345 October
Empire)

TO:

#4014A Convoy (Helan Maru) escort vessels
Asanagi (- unident) departed Truk
at 0850 for Yokosuka scheduled to arrive at 0600,
21st. Moon positions:

15th, 8-27N, 146-12E.
16th, 11-28N, 141-42E.
17th, 15-30N, 139-52E.
18th, 21-04N, 137-38E.
19th, 26-28N, 137-39E.
20th, 31-51N, 137-52E."

HYPO COMMENT: Reference Negats 141543-141544 and
references therein.

LOCAL COMMENT: Negats was convoy movement for convoy
blank blank 4B which Hypo recovered
as 4014 B. The 2 messages Negat
referred to (Negat 131737 and Fournal
131504 are arrivals and departures
report for October 14 at Truk.
Above vessels also included in that
report.

No. A-2

FROM: WAMO 3 (JMI 3)

14/0300 October

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 54, No. A-2 (Cont.)

TO: (Comm. Unit Tokyo) (B)
(Comm. Unit Yokosuka) (B)
(Comm. Unit Truk) (B)
(Comm. Unit Palao) (B)

"Convoy 4014 A (guard ship Heian Maru) Asanagi will enter and leave comm. zones as follows:

Until 1800, 15th, 4th Comm. Zone.
Until 1800, 18th, 5th Comm. Zone.
Thereafter in Yokosuka Comm. Zone (YO 22)"

No. A-5

FROM: (Garbled)
TO: (Garbled) 14/1345 October

Convoy 4014 escorted by Asanagi and (Samidare) departed PT for NA at 0830. Scheduled to arrive 1000, 21st. Noon positions from 15th to 20th inclusive all north and east:

- 03-27, 146-12
- 11-22, 141-42.
- 15-26, 139-22.
- 21-04, 137-58.
- 26-28, 137-59.
- 31-51, 137-05.

LOCAL COMMENT: ComSubPacFor had been informed from NPO copy of this message which is more accurate. PT - 1345 (05). NA - Yokosuka (05).

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 54. (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC

15/0950 October

TO: ALL SUBS COPYING RPM FOX

BARB

LAPON

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X FOR BARB AND LAPON X COMSUBPAC
SERIAL 57T SUPER X BARB CAN WORK ON
FOLLOWING PROVIDED IT DOES NOT REMAIN
100 GREAT DELAY IN ENTERING AREA X OGS
ONE 202T PLUS 2 DESTROYERS E 0900 X 13
KNOTS X 21-04 NORTH 137-58 EAST POSITIONS
SAME TIME FOLLOWING DAYS AS FOLLOWS 26-28N
137-59 E 31-51 N 137-52 E X BARB LET US KNOW
ANY RESULTS X LAPON GET HIM IF HE GETS BY
BARB

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Lapon

Second War Patrol.

No. C-1

Radio Reception: All messages received.

No. C-2

October 13

0449 (I) Dove off Miki Saki and continued
clearing the coast..

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 54, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 13

- 0540 (I) 33-59N, 156-20E. Trawler type patrol boat observed standing out from vicinity of Miki Saki in easterly course. When it got to the northeast of us it changed course and disappeared on course 180°T.
- 0715 (I) Sighted small steamer on southerly course rounding Miki Saki, very close to the beach, bearing 230°T. 54-02N, 156-20E.
- 0908 (I) Two engine monoplane similar to "GALLY" seen patrolling, bearing 150°T. Suspected something might be on its way up the coast.
- 0915 (I) Sighted two steamers bearing 150°T, distance 7 miles. Maneuvered to close the range until it was apparent they were milling around in one small area so he ded at the group. Escorts were at least two large sampans. 53-54.5N. Long. 156-22E.
- 0959 (I) Fired three torpedoes at larger of two steamers. Stack aft cargo ship (GOSHI MARU or TAGA MARU type). Second torpedo hit forward of engine room. When cloud of smoke cleared steamer was sinking rapidly by the stern. The after deck house was going under and forefoot could be seen. Tried to swing to attack other freighter but observed large sampan headed at us and steamer swinging astern. Went deep. Rigged for depth charge..

ORIGINAL

23 December 1945

Case 54, No. C-2. (Cont.)

October 13

- 1006 (I) Two depth charges. Search has been started by at least two patrol vessels. A deliberate search was being made. Passing over us once.
- 1038 (I) Two depth charges closer than first.
- 1300 (I) Could no longer hear screws.
- 1330 (I) Periscope depth. Sighted three trawler type patrol-vessels bearing 190° relative, searching on course 120°T. Formed in line of bearing. Changed course to east to clear area. 54-024, 136-21E.
- 1404 (I) Two SALLY aircraft patrolling east toward Iki Saki.
- 1615 (I) Surfaced and began battery charge.
- 1931 (I) Radar picked up small target on starboard bow, range 5000 yards. Too small to attack with torpedoes, probably an off shore patrol. Avoided.

October 19

- Patrolled intersection of Nasoya-Saipan and Kantori Saki-Iro Saki routes during day while submerged.
- 1210 (I) Heard first of series of eight distant explosions.
- 1340 (I) Sighted formation of ten BBTY bombers, course 100°T altitude about 1500 feet. During night proceeded to southward.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 34, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 20

- 0524 (I) Submerged and commenced patrol.
- 0825 (I) Sighted two destroyers bearing 210° of range 14,000 yards, course about north. Lat. 31-29N, Long. 157-23E.
- 0838 (I) Mast and stack of large vessel bearing 206° T. sighted. Went to battle stations.
- 0854 (I) Began to close track on normal approach course at standard speed. Vessel identified as being of HILARY MANU class. Seas glassy smooth. Destroyers of FUBUMI class patrolling on either bow of steamer.
- 0913 (I) Fired four torpedoes from stern tubes, track angle 150° port range 1700 yards. About one minute and forty-five seconds after firing first torpedo observed large splash alongside target. Considered to be a torpedo hitting that did not explode. Other torpedoes missed.
- 0919 (I) Two explosions, probably torpedoes at end of run. One destroyer stood on with the target while the other was observed searching for us to the southeast. He began dropping depth charges more or less at random until eight had been expended. Set course to east in the hope that it would be possible to get in an attack when the destroyer gave up the chase.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 34. No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 20

1045 (I) Destroyer passed on northerly course at high speed, 16,000 yards to the east of us. Commenced submerged patrol on a northerly course.

REPORT BY BARB REPORT NOT AVAILABLE.

D - Verification

No. D-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC

20/0817 October

TO: LAPON

ALL SUBS RPM FOX

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUPER COMSUBPAC 75 Y REPORT RECEIVED FROM JERRY WATSEMAN IN BARB STATES HE MADE CONTACT WITH LE 150950 BUT UNABLE TO CLOSE FOR ATTACK SO SEE IS ALL YOURS STEAM

REF: 15/0950 ULTRA X FOR BARB AND LAPON X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 57T SUPER X IS HE CAN WORK ON FOLLOWING PROVIDED IT DOES NOT REQUIRE TOO GREAT DELAY IN ENTERING AREA X 068 OH 208-J....

ORIGINAL

18 December 1945

Case 54, (Cont.)

No. D-2

FROM: COMBUEPAC
TO: LAPON (SS260)
ALL SUBS COMING NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

20/1802 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUPER X BARE MADE CONTACT WITH LY 150950
BUT WAS UNABLE TO CLOSE FOR ATTACK SO SHE
IS YOUR BASTY

REF: ULTRA X FOR BARE AND LAPON X COMBUEPAC
SERIAL 57T SUPER X BARE CAN WORK ON
FOLLOWING PROVIDED IT DOES NOT REQUIRE
TOO GREAT DELAY IN ENTERING AREA X 068
OH 208-J PLUS 2 DESTROYERS X 0900 X
13 KNOTS X

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 55

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: 15/1203 October

TO: (Part 2 of 2)

(Naval General
Staff Naval
Minister Chief) (B)
(Combined Fleet) (B)
(Naval District Commandant
Yokosuka) (B)
(Associated 2nd Fleet & Base
Force #6)
(Yokosuka Defense Force
F/S) (B)
(Chichijima Special Base
Force) (B)
(Base Force #4, Truk) (B)
(Base Force #5, Saipan) (B)

INFO:

"Originator: Captain of Chuuyoo

(Part 2.) (- Sazanami) will depart Truk 1500
on the 15th and arrive Saipan 1700 on the
16th. After refueling (blank number tons)
will join Chuuyoo at 1500 on the
17th, posit. 16-23 North, 147-55 East.

(Part 3.) will act with (- Sazanami)
in patrol for Chuuyoo ().

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 85, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(Part 4). Request special arrangements be made for patrol since this is one blank."

No. A-2

CORRECTED COPY ORIGINAL REMOVED.

FROM:

15/1205 October

TO: (Naval Minister and Chief M.G.S.)

- (Yokosuka Chief of Staff)
- (4th Fleet)
- (Yokosuka Defense Squadron Flagship)
- (Chichijima Special Base Force)
- (Truk 4th Base Force)
- (Saipan Base Force #5)
- (Unident)

INFO:

"From Captain, Chuyo

1. The Chuyo and (Sazanami) will proceed to Yokosuka as follows:
The Chuyo will depart Truk at 0400, 16th and its direct course at about 0500 will be blank degrees. 1800 the 17th, 11-00N, 151-20E. 0600 the 18th 20-00N, 145-00E. 0900 the 19th, bearing 250 degrees, distance 30 miles from Chichijima. 0800 the 20th, 37-30N, 159-00E, and 1300 will cross "O" Line ? blank arrive Yokosuka at 1800."

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 35, No. A-2 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM: Captain of Chuyo

2. (- Sazanami ?) will depart Truk at 1300 on 15th and arrive Saipan at 1700 on 16th. After fueling will join up with Chuyo (at 1500 on 17th in 16-28 N, 147-35 E. ✓
3. (- unident ship) blanks will act as screening vessel for Chuyo until Sazanami ?) joins up. ✓
4. (Many blanks (cannot read)."

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 55. No. A-5 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMBUEPAC
TO: ALL SUBS COMING FROM FOX
LINGO, SAURY, FLYING FISH,
TAMPOON
INFO: POGY
CINCPAC
15/1559 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA X SERIAL 59 CIV IS THIS PRIOR TO LINGO WITH
SAURY AND FLYING FISH BACKING UP THE LINE AND TAMPOON
PLAYING SAFETY X

POGY NOTE IF IN VICINITY X 1 AUXILIARY CARRIER 41
POPCORN X BLANK X BLANK X 2000 X 15 X DEPARTS
CANTON X LINGO X 0700 X 16 X 11-00 NORTH 151-20
3:54 X 0800 X 17 X 16-23 NORTH 147-35 EAST X 2100 X
17 X 20-00 NORTH 145-00 EAST X 2400 X 13 X 26-15 NORTH
141-45 EAST X 2100 X 19 X 32-30 NORTH 139-00 EAST X
0700 X 20 X 35-18 NORTH 139-40 EAST X NO HOOKS VESSEL
INDICATED UNTIL REDUCTIONS AT 0600 POSITION 17th WITH
DESTROYER

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 35, (Cont.)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TC: TARPON
INFO: CINCIPAC

18/0318 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUPER COMSUBPAC SERIAL 69 X IN WORKING ON MY
151559 CONSIDER PROBABILITY OF SPEED BEING RE-
DUCED AND SCHEDULE APPRECIABLY DELAYED BY HITS
FROM MINGO AND FLYING FISH X WE WOULD LIKE TO
FINISH THIS ONE OFF
REF:.....1 AUXILIARY CARRIER 41 POPCORN.....
DEPARTS NORTH CHANNEL X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Mingo

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception of NFM Fox was satisfactory
while in the area. HAIKU was
unsatisfactory, due to Jap inter-
ference and atmospheric.

No. C-2

October 16

Surface patrol on northerly course. Came
to southwesterly course at 0800 and
patrolled vicinity of latitude 11 -00'N,
long. 151 -20'E. Moderate seas; many
heavy rain squalls; visibility not good.
1700 (L) Sighted masts bearing 131 true, in squall
area, and approaching rapidly. Submerged
and commenced approach on normal approach
course at high speed. Target was a large
aircraft carrier escorted by new class
"UN-1" destroyer (4 streamlined turrets) on
course 353 true, speed 19 knots-not zig-
zagging. Destroyer was directly ahead of
the carrier about 2000 yards. After 45
minutes at high speed on normal approach
course, it became apparent that we would

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 35. No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1700 (L) not be able to close unless the target zigged toward us. Prepared for a long range shot and at -
- 1756 (L) Fired six torpedoes, low power, torpedo run 6500 yards, track 120° port, longitudinal spread, depth setting 10 feet, using I.K. 8 angle solver. Seven minutes after first shot (it seemed like a week), two hits (thirteen seconds apart) were observed and heard on the carrier's port bow. Other torpedoes continued to run on. The Jap swung left about 100 degrees, stopped and showed a port list. The DD swung around to the opposite side and at-
- 1808 (L) She commenced counterattack with four depth charges about 9000 yards away. Heard no echo ranging. Carrier got underway again, reversed course to port, and finally came around to course north. The flight deck was visible, when she came bows on, showing considerable trim down by the head. Before she passed out of sight to the north, the port list appeared to be corrected. The destroyer continued to steam back and forth, doing considerable signalling with yardarm blinker. She moved over between the carrier and us, dropping 3 or 4 depth charges at a time. Prepared to fire stern-tubes at the DD, but was unable to reduce the range below 5500 yards before she shoved off at high speed to join the carrier steaming north. Total of 21 depth charges dropped from 1808 to 1816. The carrier had the general appearance of the ex-NACA, with large open spaces under forward and after ends of flight deck. Flight deck extended full length of ship and was supported at ends by heavy frames. She had little or no island

Case 55, No. C-2 (Cont.)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

structure. At least four stick masts projected high over the flight deck. She carried planes on deck, covering the after half of the flight deck. No stacks were visible. Waited until out of radar range, then at-
Surfaced and sent contact report, which was very quickly sent and receipted for. Decided chase was impossible as the carrier appeared to be able to maintain 18 knots when last seen.

1955 (L)

U.S.S. Saury

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Good.

No. C-4

(No entry in log for October 15, 1943.
- Ed Note)

October 16

Generator engine lub oil pressure is getting dangerously low.

1028 (K)

Lub oil supply line to starboard reduction gear carried away. Renewal of parts accomplished at 1400.
Radar contact, contact at 1, 1670T distance 15500 yards. Commenced tracking. Convoy appeared to consist of three fairly large ships and four small ones some of which were probably escorts. Base course was 3450T, speed 11 kts.

1920 (Z)

Case 85, No. C-4 (Cont.)

2231 (L) Submerged.
2339 (K) Fired four bow torpedoes, three at right flank ship (about 6,500 ton AK) and one at overlapping ships in far column. Went deep and rigged for silent running since right flank escort was bearing 270 relative, distance about 400 yards, with 0° angle on the bow. At 7:40⁰⁰ and 7:47⁰⁰ heard two explosions which sounded like torpedo hits. It is believed that two hits were obtained in the left flank ship (about 7500 ton transport). The torpedo run to this target would have been about 5300 yards. Eleven depth charges were dropped between 2358 and 0009. All appeared to be distant. Sound heard at high noise level in the general direction of the probable hits.

October 17

0245 (K) Last sound of propeller noises.
0320 (K) Surfaced and proceeded toward patrol station.
0511 (K) Submerged to conduct repairs to generator lub oil suction lines to attempt to find cause of low oil pressure. Work was successful and at
1802 (K) Surfaced.

October 18

Sighted ship bearing 040°T distance about 10000 yards angle on the bow 0°.
0553 (K) Submerged to conduct approach.
0712 (K) Broke off approach since vessel was identified as U.S. submarine. Took pictures.

Case 55, No. C-4 (Cont.)

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

- 0757 (K) Surfaced and established communication with U.S.S. SKATE. Informed SKATE of patrol intentions and at 0827 (K) Left the scene to continue patrol.
- October 19 13-35N, 149-55E.
- 0749 (K) Sighted tops of two battleships, contact #2, bearing 285⁰T distance 25000 yards with angle on the bow 70⁰ port. Came to course 085⁰T and shifted to four engine speed to open range. Under the conditions then existing, to dive would have put us about 25000 yards off the track. Hoped to make an end around and tried to open the range to avoid being sighted.
- 0835 (K) Leading battleship bearing 256⁰T range over 31500 yards (radar had a short time before obtained a range of 31500). During this period angles on the bow appeared to vary from 70 port to 45 port giving a base course around 135-145⁰T, speed 12 Kts.
- 0845 (K) Came to 090⁰T, targets were getting more distant but during this period two observers gave 20⁰ starboard angles indicating base course about 115⁰T.
- 0856 (K) Bearing of a ship was 265T. At the time it was thought it was the leading battleship which indicated a zig in base course to their left but at 0905 (K) There was no doubt that it was a destroyer about 1200 yards distant with a 0⁰ on the bow. There is no doubt that our smoke (a light brown) had been the cause of our being sighted.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 35, No. C-4 (Cont.)

October 19 (Cont.)

- 0906 (K) Submerged and came to 257⁰T. At this time there was considerable doubt as to which way the targets had gone.
- 0925 (K) Sighted HATSUKARI class destroyer bearing 254⁰T distance 11000 yards angle on the bow 120 port (it is interesting to note that the newly installed sonic listening gear - JP equipment was the only one which heard him). From this setup it was believed that the formation had radically zigged to their right and sent the destroyer over to keep us down. Prepared a contact report and surfaced at
- 1115 (K) Sent the message and at
- 1147 (K) Radar contact on plane at 14 miles, plane contact #1. Submerged. Had sent the report out blind before submerging and were about to make a second transmission. Routed torpedoes and at
- 1649 (K) Surfaced and sent contact report.

October 20

- 0500 (K) Entered area 15A.
- 0531 (K) Submerged - constant periscope watch.
- 0917 (K) Surfaced.
- 1013 (K) Submerged. Radar contact at 14 miles (Plane contact #2) SD radar was being keyed and not in constant operation.
- 1110 (K) Surfaced.
- 1113 (K) Submerged. Radar contact at 15 miles. (Plane contact #3) Decided to remain submerged to conduct high periscope watch and make repairs to #2 generator engine which had been damaged while being started in a partially flooded condition.
- 1740 (K) Surfaced.

October 21-24

Conducted surface patrol.

Case 55. (Cont.)

10. C-5

ORIGINAL

18 December 1945

Description of Contacts

Contact No.	Time Date	Position Lat/Long	Course Speed
1	1950 (K) 10/18/45	14-34N 153-07E	545 (T) 11 Kts.
2	0749 (K) 10/19/45	13-55N 149-55E	115 (T) 17 Kts.

Description

1 AK resembling TAIWA MARU (6300 tons).
1 unidentified ship as large or larger than above.

1 ship possibly an AP larger than 6300 tons.
1 AK similar to TAIWA MARU (1500 tons). 5 small ships 1500 tons or smaller at least one of which was an escort. Above ships zigzagging in line of bearing small ships flanking and between large ships. Distance between ships less than 1000 yards. Ships first contacted by radar at 15500 yards.

2 Battleships definitely not KONGO class but otherwise unidentified.
1 MAIBUMARA class Destroyer. Battleship tops were painted white which made initial contact difficult. They were sighted at about 25000 yards from shears. Battleships were in column distance about 300 yards zigzagging radically at from 4 to

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 35, No. C-5 (Cont.)

6 minute intervals with irregular
90° zigs. Radar obtained range at
31500 yards. Sound (JP) heard screws
of Destroyer over 15000 yards.

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-6

Radio Reception: We were 2000 miles from Midway,
returning from station when the new
Submarine frequencies became effective.
It was difficult to copy 9000, 14590
and 17370 kcs. during darkness. 4115
kcs. was guarded within 1500 miles of
LEDWAY. 8350 kcs. gave the best results
on station although frequent electrical
storms in the area made reception poor.

No. C-7

October 18

0242 (K)

Lat. 19-51-00N, Long. 145-20-00E.
Bright moon, calm sea. Radar contact,
25,000 yards, identified as a carrier
at 19,000 yds. by sighting. Went
to 4 engines and closed track on
normal approach course. Target was
zigzagging. Identified one destroyer
escort from the bridge at 14,000
yards (also zigzagging), and had radar
contact at 11,000 yds. Obtained course
and speed of Task Group by Radar, F.B.C.,
and Navigational plot. Auxiliary Carrier
was similar to KASUMA (RU).

ORIGINAL

23 December 1945

Case 55, No. C-7 (Cont.)

October 18

0313 (K)

Submerged to periscope depth 9,000 yds. from the destroyer.

0332 (K)

Fired 6 Mk. 1 torpedoes from the bow tubes, with target making a zig away during the time of firing. Before all torpedoes were fired, sound operators reported two torpedoes to be running erratic and during the time of firing, as well as afterwards, torpedo screws were heard in the Conning tower and in all compartments of the ship, through the hull. Sound eventually reported erratic torpedoes all around the dial, and they could be heard at irregular intervals from the Conning Tower through the hull. (It is believed a total of 5 ran erratic.) Commenced increasing depth to avoid possible contact, but at the correct time interval by stop watch, heard one unmistakable torpedo explosion in the Carrier. Started back to periscope depth, but before raising the periscope a tremendous explosion, apparently close aboard, and believed to be one of our own torpedoes, rocked the boat considerably. Almost immediately afterwards two unidentified, low order explosions were heard in rapid succession. There were no counter-measures taken by the escort.

October 19

0413 (K)

Surfaced. Noted strong and definite odor of fuel oil, and it was not from our ship. Nothing in sight on the horizon, except MAUG Is., 50,000 yds. away. Proceeded toward assigned area.

(No entry in log October 19-23, 1943.
Eg. note.)

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 55, No. C-7 (Cont.)

October 23

0413 (K) Lat. 08-13-00N, Long. 155-56-00E.
Hydrogen explosion, followed by
battery insulation fire in No. 6
torpedo tube. No personnel injured.
Surfaced for 37 minutes to ventilate
boat, and alleviate concentration of
hydrogen sulphide gas.

U.S.S. Tarnon

Ninth War Patrol

No. C-8

Radio Reception: Normal though some difficulties were
experienced because of jamming.

No. C-9

October 15

1503 (I)

No contacts this morning while approach-
ing coast. Periscope patrol off IRO SAKI.
During forenoon sighted 3 planes and one
sampan. By noon sea is glassy, visibility
unlimited. Periscope observation every
10 minutes instead of usual 5.
Two explosions. Aerial bombs estimated
within 1500 yards. Nothing in sight at time.
Undoubtedly a plane had seen the periscope
or propeller swirl which is quite noticeable.
Remained deep for 40 minutes then resumed
periscope patrol.
Nothing further seen or heard while
submerged. During night ran south and
southeast across south west stern approaches.
Sighted lights of fishermen in vicinity of
KAMI SU. Sighted a small boat 15 miles
south of KAMI SU.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 55, No. C-9 (Cont.)

October 16

Periscope patrol west of INABA
SHIMA. Uneventful. During night
patrolled within 10 miles of INABA
SHIMA.

October 17

0045 (I)

Sighted ship bearing 110⁰T. in bright
full moonlight, estimated range about
6 miles. Radar picked him up 3 minutes
later at 15,450 yds. Commenced
approach.

0156 (I)

Fired 4 torpedoes - 2 hits. Target
stopped.

0218 (I) -

0222 (I)

Fired 5 torpedoes at his stern -
1 hit. Target badly damaged.
Fired 1 torpedo - hit same place as
first torpedo. Target sank immediately.
Target was 10,000 ton ship believed to
be a naval auxiliary. Cleared scene
of attack on southwesterly course.
Submerged patrol west of HAKUJO
SHIMA.

0230 (I)

0750 (I)

Sighted 5 small planes. Remainder of
day uneventful. During night passed
between HAKUJO and AOKA SHIMA then
ran north along the old TRUK route to
eastward of the islands.

October 18

1226 (I)

Sighted lights of fisherman 10 miles
east of HAKUJO SHIMA. Periscope
patrol east of HAKUJO SHIMA.

0603 (I)

Sighted large patrol boat. During
night patrolled across the north south
traffic lane to eastward of islands.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 55, No. C-9 (Cont.)

October 19

Periscope patrol south of MIKURA SHIMA.
Uneventful. During night ran south
along north-south traffic lane to west-
ward of islands.

October 20

32-N, 138E.

0439 (I)

Sighted two ships bearing 2000T. range
about 6 miles. Angle on bow estimated
at 45° port. Turned to close track
at full speed. Targets closing rapidly.

0435 (I)

Submerged to radar depth. Bright high
3/4 moon. Morning twilight just beginning.
Targets identified as one aircraft
carrier and one destroyer.

0446 (I)

Angle on bow determined to be starboard,
not port. Target speed 20 knots.

0456 (I)

Turned to fire long range bow shots.
Fired 4 torpedoes at extreme range -
missed. Target was KCV - probably
OTAKA class, escorted by one destroyer.
Uneventful periscope patrol remainder
of day. During night proceeded to
southeastern part of area to transmit.
After transmitting contact report set
course for MIYAKE SHIMA.

U.S.S. POW

Third War Patrol

No. C-10

(See K, Case 33, C-1 and C-2 for
radio reception report and activities
of this ship October 18-20.)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 36

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Assoc'd Escort 15/1115 October
Duty Ambon area) (C)
TO: (Sur-
face Escort Force #2) (B)
INFO: (4th Fleet) (C)
(Military Stores
Section 4 Truk) (B)
(Naval General
Staff 1st Section) (B)

blank 52 convoy, "B" ship #2
-Myocel Maru) escort Subchaser
#33. Speed 9.5 knots. Departed Palao
blank 1100 on the 15th, will pass north
of , and blanks passing "C" Point,
will arrive 1100 on the 21st. Noon
positions from 16th to 20th.

09-03 North, 137-00 East. 16th
08-46 North, 140-10 East. 17th
08-08 North, 143-13 East. 18th
06-58 North, 146-05 East. 19th
07-49 North, 149-00 East. 20th

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC 16/0651 October
TO: ALL SUBS ON NFM
FOK
SAURY, MINGO
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Case 56, No. B-1 (Cont.)

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

COLBUPAC SUPER B HIAL 60 A CONVOY OR SWIP
(TYPE UNKNOWN) X 0300 X 1821 X 8-08 N
145-15 E POSITIONS DATE TIME ON TOL ON NG
DAYS ARE AS FOLLOWS 6-53 N 146-05 E X 7-49 N
149-00 E

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.J. Minco

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception:

NFM Fox satisfactory while in the area.
MANKU unsatisfactory due to Jap inter-
ference and atmospheric. Serials 52
and 74 G were missed during November.

No. C-2

October 18

Surface patrol on northwest approaches
to TRUK.

0300 (L)

Sighted trawler patrol vessel south of
us, about six miles. Submerged and
closed to investigate. Trawler was
typical of the anti-submarine patrol
echo ranging, speed five knots,
gradually working around from north-
west course to north towards our
position. Turned away and finally lost
sight of the trawler by 1500 (L).
Sound contact, echo ranging on bearing
east showed that trawler in sight had a
running mate out here also.
Surfaced in heavy rain squall. Flat
calm seas.

1500 (L)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 36, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 19

Surface patrol near NAMONUTTO ATOLL.

1438 (L)

Submerged south of PISIRAS ISLAND on easterly course.

1327 (L)

Surfaced. Proceeded to vicinity of PULAP ISLAND for tomorrow's patrol.

October 20

0605 (L)

Submerged for morning twilight period. Course south closing PULAP ISLAND.

0932 (L)

Surfaced. Sighted PULAP and FANBIK ISLANDS. Proceeded to position 12 miles northwest of PULAP for surface patrol. Flat oily calm seas, extremely hot, no wind.

1245 (L)

Sighted masts of ships bearing about 270°. Ships appeared to be headed east, so at -

1346 (L)

Submerged and commenced approach. Angle on bow appeared to be small port angle. Continued on normal approach course south at high speed. As targets approached, the angle on the bow was 80 to 90 port and increasing. Three ships, PC escort trailing, tanker with one tripod aft (10,000-ton naval auxiliary), and 2000-ton cargo ship or tanker (stack aft). About

1448 (L)

Had reduced range to where it was possible to fire long range shot, but further zigs away did not help situation. Decided against long range shot because of extremely glassy seas and poor track angle (150° port). It now was apparent that the convoy was headed southeast to pass south of PULAP. Planned to intercept them east of PULAP after dark for radar attack. Broke off approach and headed south to begin chase.

Case 36, No. C-2 (Cont.)

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

October 21

- 0001 (L) Escort fired two shots (estimated to be 3-inch) which were heard to hit, travel through the water an instant, then explode. These were fairly close and apparently fired at our sheers so, we went deeper to get the radar mast out of sight. Gradually lost the escort and echo ranging and at -
- 0118 (L) Surfaced. Headed northwest then north to attempt to regain contact, without success. Moon came out later, very bright and clear.
- 0557 (L) Submerged for patrol across northwest approaches to TRUK.
- 1944 (L) Surfaced. Headed north between EAST FAYU and WANCHEITO ISLANDS.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

No. 6
Time 1243 (L)
Date 20 Oct.
Lat. 70° 49' N
Long. 149° 11' E
Type 1 tanker
1 Frt.
1 P.C.

Initial
Range 14 miles
Course SE.
Speed 8 Kts.
How Contacted Surface Periscope
Remarks Convoy - 1 tanker, 1 small freighter, 1 P.C.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 35, (Cont.)

U.S.S. SAURY
Eighth War Patrol

No. C-4

(See X, Case 35; C-3 to C-5 for radio reception and entries in the log of the U.S.S. SAURY for October 18-20, 1945.)

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ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 37

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

151325 October
88120

(Kiyokawa Maru or
Suresco Force #1)(B)
(Tokyo Transportation
Section)(B)
(1st Section Naval
General Staff)(B)

(Resident Naval Officer,
Keelung)(B)

(Kure Naval District Comd)(C)

(Sasebo Naval District Comd)(C)

(Sasebo Defense Force)(C)

(Takao Guard District)(B)

(Saigon Communication Unit)(C)

(Tarao Air Base)(C)

15th Group Convoy Commander, blanks: Detail regarding
enemy submarine blanks.

Moore positions beginning Oct. 16

16	25-20	127-00
17	27-20	128-20
18	29-35	130-blank
19	32-25	129-15

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 37, No. A-1 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: WOLF MOBSEN
ALL SUBS ON IPN FOX
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

16/0724 October

WOLF MOBSEN GETS SUPER COMSUBPAC SERIAL 61V X
CONVOY ON S IP (UNDECOIN) X 0500 X 12 KNOWS X
27-20 NORTH 129-20 EAST POSITION AT CALL TIME
ON FOLLOWING DATES AND AS FOLLOWS 29-55 NORTH
150-00 EAST X 52-25 NORTH 129-15 EAST X MINUTES
OF LONGITUDE FOR 18TH ARE UNDECOIN

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

(See X, Case 21, C-4 for radio reception and entries
in the log of the Steelhead for October 17-20, 1945.)

U.S.S. Gannard

Third War Patrol

No. C-2

(See X, Case 21, C-1 and C-2 for radio reception and
entries in the log of the Gannard for October 17-20, 1945.)

ORIGINAL

23 December 1945

Case 37, (Cont.)

U.S.S. Tullibee

Second War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: While in the patrol area the Japs jamming activity was quite effective especially during the first submarine schedule broadcast each evening. The jamming obscured several shore station "Go Aheads" for 40 minutes prior to sending the one message while in our area. The S.D. causes a certain amount of interference while operating on the surface during daylight hours. Since the establishment of the 4525 frequency on the HAIKU broadcast, reception of the submarine schedule on this broadcast has been satisfactory. We experienced slight fading while in the patrol area, on several occasions when HAIKU first started operating.

No. C-4

October 17

0206 (I)

Sighted a patrol boat bearing 135° T, distant 5 miles. Turned away from him but he sighted us, started belching smoke and heading for us. Thought he might be a DD, but evidently not because we outdistanced him with flank speed. We certainly have appreciated the Fairbanks-Morse "Horses" the last few days. Have noted possible "radar interference" several times on the SD during the past four nights.

ORIGINAL

28 December 1945

Case 37, No. C-4 (Cont.)

October 17

1740 (I) Sighted two buoys about 50 yards apart having 5 foot rods clear of the water and tipped by white rags in 26-19-45 N, 122-25-15 E.

October 18

1640 (I) Sighted a patrol boat. This craft kept us from surfacing until after dusk.

October 19

2200 (I) Radar contact which faded at 5000 yards.
2208 (I) Sighted loon of Shroud Is. (TUNG..LI YU) light bearing 3550T.

October 21

1002 (I) Sighted a ... Patrol bomber bearing 210⁰T, distant 15 miles. Both periscopes are fogging badly. #1 periscope cannot be used in high power.

Case 33

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (5th Base Force, Saipan)(B)

15/0839 Oct.

TO: (Chichijima Spec. Base Force)(B)
(Yokosuka Defense Force)(B)
(Buin Base Force #1)(B)

INFO: (Comdt. Yokosuka Nav. Dist.)(B)
(Suresco Force #2)(B)
(Rabaul 8th Base Force)(B)
(Yokosuka Mil. Stores)(A)
(Buka Comm. Unit)(B)

(escorted by Hashima and #12 SubChaser)
departed for KMA (Chichijima) at 0800. Scheduled
to arrive 19th, 0800.

Route Points:

15th, 1200 - 15-42 North, 145-33 East.
16th, 1200 - 17-blank North, 145-15 East.
16th, 2000 - 20-00 North, 145-05 East.
17th, 1200 - 21-51 North, 144-21 East.
18th, 1200 - 24-51 North, 143-03 East."

HYPO COMMENT: Noon posit. for 16th plots out
nearer 0400 but reads noon.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 33, (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: ALL BULB CARRYING BPH FOX
FLYING FISH, MINGO
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

16/0842 October

FLYING FISH MAY POSSIBLY BE IN POSITION TO
USE FOLLOWING SUPER SERIAL 62 X K SHIP
(TYPE UNKNOWN) 2 ESCORT VESSELS X 1100 16TH
X 20-00 NORTH 145-05 EAST X LINGO 0600 17TH
X 21-51 NORTH 144-21 EAST

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: (See X, Case 33, C-6.)

No. C-2

October 16

1645 (K) Lat. 20-01-00N, Long. 147-58-00E.
Submerged, took SWT record at 500
feet, surfaced at sunset, and set
course 510° (T) for the night,
cruising on the Auxiliary engine.
Bright moon, 20,000 yards visibility.
Set course for BPH Group, MALDEN
ISLANDS at dawn.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 58, No. C-2 (Cont.)

(No entry in log for October 17, 1945.
See X, Case 55, C-7 for entry for October
18, 1945. Ed. Note.)

U.S.S. Lingo
Second War Patrol

No. C-3

(See X, Case 55, C-1 and C-2 for radio
reception report and entry on the
U.S.S. Lingo's log on October 16, 1945.)

No. C-4

October 17

Surface patrol along SAIPAN-TRUK route....
(See X, Case 55, C-2 for log entries for
October 18-21, 1945.)

Case 59

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:) (8th Fleet or Surface 14/1150 Oct.
Escort Force 1)(C)
TO:)
INFO:) (Naval Transportation
Section Tokyo)(B)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 52, No. A-1. (Cont.)

#4014 B convoy (blank Ura Maru
W escort Chocun Maru and blank
Maru) departed PT 0430 the 14th for NAA.
Scheduled to arrive 1200 the 25th:

1. Noon posits (14th - 24th) All north and east.

14th 8-00, 152-20.
15th 10-20, 154-04.
16th 13-00, 153-00.
17th 15-55, 151-55.
18th 18-30, 150-55.
19th 21-10, 149-20.
20th 23-40, 147-55.
21st 26-00, 146-15.
22nd 28-20, 144-45.
23rd 30-55, 143-10.
24th 33-10, 141-40.

2. Communications:

Until 16th, 1200 in 4th Comm. Zone.
Until 21st, 1200 in 5th Base Force Comm. Zone.
After that in Yokosuka Comm. Zone.
Radio guard ship Chocun Maru

NAA is Yokosuka (CD).
PT is Truk (CD).

No. A-2

FROM: Blank originator
TO:
INFO: (Surface Escort
Unit #2)
(Gurbled)

14/1150 Oct.
blanks 30 Oct. '45

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 39, No. A-2 (Cont.)

"Convoy #--4B,
Maru (?) and Tatsuura
Maru and blank Maru, escorted by Choun
departed PT for NAA at
0430 on the 14th. Scheduled to arrive at
1200 on the 23th.

(1) Noon positions 14th through 24th:

14th Oct.	08-00	North, 152-20	East
15th Oct.	10-20	North, 154-04	East
16th Oct.	13-00	North, 153-00	East
17th Oct.	15-50	North, 151-50	East
18th Oct.	12-50	North, 150-50	East
19th Oct.	21-10	North, 149-20	East
20th Oct.	23-40	North, 147-50	East
21st Oct.	26-00	North, 146-15	East
22nd Oct.	22-20	North, 144-45	East
23rd Oct.	50-50	North, 143-10	East
24th Oct.	53-10	North, 141-40	East

(2) Communications Zones:

Until 1200 on the 16th in #4 Comm Zone.
Until 1200 on the 21st in #5 Comm Zone.
Thereafter in Yokosuka Comm Zone.
Radio Guard Ship

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 39. (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1.

FROM: COMSUSPAC
TO: TAUTOC---SEA WOLF
ALL-SUBS COPYING NPM FCX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUPER FOR TAUTOC AND SEA WOLF IF IN VICINITY
X COMSUSPAC SERIAL 86Y X CONVOY X 0500 OCT
X 17th OCTOBER X 15-55 NORTH
151-55 EAST, X POSITIONS AT THE SAME TIME ON
FOLLOWING DAYS ARE AS FOLLOWS X 18-50 NORTH
150-55 EAST X 21-10 NORTH 149-20 EAST X 23-40
NORTH 147-55 EAST X 26-00 NORTH 146-15 EAST X
BELIEVE THIS IS OUTFIT IN WHICH SAURY REPORTED
TWO PROBABLE HITS

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tautog

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Excellent.

No. C-2

October 17 On course 270⁰T, speed 11.5 kts.

0150(-11) C/C to 250⁰T
1902(-11) C/C to 250⁰T
1200(-11) Posit: 18-54N 163-05E, Distance run-
236.3 miles
Fuel used - 1415 gallons.

ORIGINAL
23 December 1945

Case 59, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 18 - Underway as before.

1412(-11) Submerged to check trim.
1425(-11) Surfaced.
1919(-11) C/C to 252⁰T.
1200(-11) Posit: 16-55.2N 152-21.5E, Distance
run - 290.7 miles.
Fuel used - 250 gallons.

October 19 - Underway on course 252⁰T, speed 11.5 kts.

1029(-10) Submerged to check trim.
1052(-10) Surfaced.
1200(-10) Posit: 15-15N. 153-31.5E. Distance run -
292.5 miles.
Fuel used - 1635 gallons.

October 20 - Proceeding as before.

0952(-10) Submerged to check trim.
1024(-10) Surfaced.
1510(-10) Sighted three planes bearing 071⁰T on
N.W. course. Appeared to be bombers.
Submerged, believe T-500 not sighted.
1631(-10) Surfaced on course 251⁰T.
2330(-10) C/C to 245⁰T.
1200(-10) Posit: 15-138N. 149-04E, Distance run -
278.2 miles.
Fuel used - 1945 gallons.

October 21 - Enroute Fais Islands on course 245⁰T,
speed 11.5 kts.

1140(-10) Sighted 3 planes dead astern. Submerged
undetected.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 52, (Cont.)

U.S.S. Seawolf

Eleventh War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Satisfactory.

No. C-4

October 17

1439 (K) Sighted sampan with sail up bearing 201T at 7 miles. Avoided on surface. MARCUS bears 120T 240 miles.

* 0530 (K) Changed course to south and southeast to investigate area to northeast of the MALJANA. Both day and night search conditions excellent, about three-quarter moon.

October 19

2300 (K) Abandoned search, set course 293(T) to avoid SAUKY area, then west towards south end of TAIWAN.

October 20

0225 (K) Loud clear Jap signal on 450 kcs.

1949 (K) Sighted a clear green rocket or flare dead astern, ascending from horizon and persisting for about 3 seconds. Reversed course to investigate, no contact. Expect it was a shooting star or meteorite.

October 24

1157 (I) Entered our area.

* (This apparent discrepancy in time was on the original submarine report. Inasmuch as there was no entry given for October 13, it seems likely that the 0530 (K) for October 17, was actually for the next day.

- Ed. Note)

ORIGINAL

23 December 1945

Case 59 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Saury

Eighth War Patrol

No. C-5

(See X, Case 55, C-5 to C-5 for description of
the Saury's contact with this target on
October 15, 1943. - Ed. Note)

ORIGINAL

28 December 1944

Case 40

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1.

FROM: (8th Base Force -- 15/1855 October
Rabaul) (B)

TO:

INFO:

(Nav Min.
& Ch. Naval Gen.
Staff) (B)

(1st Sect. Nav.
Gen. Staff) (B)

(4th Fleet) (B)

(Kure Nav.
Dist., CofS) (C)

(Tokyo Transp.
Sect.) (B)

(Palao Transp.
Office) (B)

"#1 Convoy (consisting of Goshu Maru?)
and blank Maru) depart Rabaul at 0900 on 16th
escorted by Tachikaze?. Blanks. Will
arrive at Palao Channel at 1500 blanks."

- "17/___, 02-38 South, 151-00? East.
- 18/0650, 01-10? North, 151-44 East.
- 18/1215, 02-22 North, 152-09 East.
- 19/00?15, 03-38 North, 150-00? East.
- 20/00?--, 04-52 North, 146-00? East.
- 20/1950, 08-13 North, 143-00 East.
- 21/2200, 03-13 North, 137-30 East.
- 22/1235, 08-02 North, 134-29 East.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 40, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Speed 12.5 knots."

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: STEELHEAD
ALL SUBS COPYING
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC

17/0953 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS SUBER GOES TO STEELHEAD IF THE BOYS FROM
BRISBANE DON'T BEAT YOU TO IT X COMSUBPAC
SERIAL 65 X CONVOY INCLUDING 1 OR MORE TANKER
AND 1 DESTROYER X PASSED THROUGH TKLB 5200
(4-52 NORTH 146-00 EAST) AND THEN 1100 X 20 X
KMGW 1300 (8-13 NORTH 143-00 EAST) SUCCESSIVE
POSITIONS OF THIS UNIT AT TIMES AND DATES
INDICATED ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1300 X 21 X KMK 1330
(8-13 NORTH 137-30 EAST X 0330 X 22 KMKC 0229
(8-02 NORTH 134-29 EAST)

No. B-2

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: STEELHEAD
INFO: CINCPAC

19/0916 October

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS IS ULTRA X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 73 FOR STEELHEAD
X IF YOU ARE WORKING ON NY 170953 WATCH FOR GATO
WHO REPORTS ALREADY HAVING SUNK 1 OF THE SHIPS
CONCERNED AND IS CHASING TOWARD YOUR AREA A 2ND
1 WHICH HE DAMAGED

REF: CONVOY INCLUDING 1 OR MORE TANKER AND 1
DESTROYER X PASSED THROUGH TKLB 5200 (04-52 NORTH
146-00 EAST)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 40 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Steelhead

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

(For radio reception report and entries in the U.S.S. Steelhead's log for October 13-22, 1943, See X, Case 21, C-3 and C-4.)

No. C-2

Description of Contact

No: 5
Time and Date: 2218 (I) - October 20
Lat. and Long: 8-10.5 N., 142-41 E.
Type: 2-AK - 1 DD
Init. Range: 15,000
Est. Course and Speed: C-290 T - S-15 knots
How Contacted: R (SJ)
Remarks: Attack #2
One medium and one large AK. Two torpedo hits in smaller AK.

No: 6
Time and Date: 0450 (I)
0759 (I)
1536 (I)
October 21
Lat. and Long: 8-20.5 N., 141-48 E.
8-38 N., 141-28 E.
8-35 N., 140-24.5 E.
Init. Range: 14,000
Est. Course and Speed: 275 and 300 pm 8-9 knots
How Contacted: SD
Remarks: Possibly an escort. AK identified as Goyo Maru 8,500 tons. Believed to be AK damaged in night attack.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 40 (Cont.)

U.S.S. Gato

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: (No report on radio conditions was given in the Gato's report.-Ed. Note)

No. C-4

October 17

- 0607 (L) Submerged.
1901 (L) Surfaced. The range feature of our SJ radar is now inoperative. It picks up pips, but the range has to be estimated.
1945 (L) Radar picked up three objects due south of us (dead ahead). Put them astern and commenced tracking. Went to battle stations. Could never see targets although we closed range to 7,000 yards.
2050 (L) Lost radar contact although range had been closing.
2104 (L) Secured from battle stations and commenced patrolling on two engines athwart the target base course.
2345 (L) Sighted 3 small ships dead ahead. Noted that all were about the size of subchasers. Obviously had to be avoided. Reversed course, opened range, and circled to eastward.
Moon Posit - Lat. 4-36 N., Long. 151-36.5 E. Miles run 113.14. Fuel used 540 gals.

October 18

- 0803 (L) Submerged.
1800 (L) Sighted target, but were just far enough from track so that a high speed approach failed to get us within range.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 40, No. C-4 (Cont.)

October 18 (Cont.)

However, a long tracking exercise gave their course (300 T), speed (12.5), and formation. The two AK's kept a good line of bearing 000 T. One was about 8,500 tons, with four goal posts, one stack, very neat, and about one-fourth loaded. The other, of about 7,000 tons had three goal posts and seemed about half loaded. The destroyer, patrolling across astern of the marus, was identified as of the Fubuki class.

Surfaced for the chase. There had been a short delay for a desperate, but vain, attempt to remedy the radar trouble. Our two material radiomen are working ceaselessly on it. The range feature refuses to function.

Running down the base course, obtained radar contact (leading to visual contact) and commenced run around left end. Because of moonlight, passed 18,000 yards abeam. Even at this range, we had misgivings, since the targets were plainly visible at 23,000 yards. Visual bearings showed that the radar was also erratic in its bearings.

- 2108 (L) Perceived what was thought to be a radar flash, picked up on our own radar. Never seen again.
- 2211 (L) Targets in line bearing 000 T. (Same as this afternoon.)
- 2310 (L) Near target abeam, distant 18,000 yards.

Noon Posit - Lat. 03-00 N., Long. 151-08E. Miles Run 227. Fuel used 3,613 gal.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 40; No. C-4 (Cont.)

October 19

- Chasing convoy of two AK's, escorted by one DD.
- 0100 (L) Targets commenced zig-zagging.
- 0133 (L) Attained a position 2100 yards from base track at a range of 23,300 yards.
- 0158 (L) Battle stations, submerged. Commenced approach.
- 0205 (L) The three ships were plainly visible in #1 periscope.
- 0208 (L) Came up to radar depth to get some ranges.
- 0216 (L) Down to periscope depth because of bright moonlight. Sound bearings were excellent, but was surprised to note that both operators frequently gave "heavy screws" on the destroyer's bearing and "high speed screws" on the bearing of the marus.
- 0231 (L) Commenced firing bow tubes. Fired three torpedoes each at the two AK's, which were overlapping on that bearing. Track 120 degrees, ranges 1800 and 2600. Torpedo tracks not visible. Observed one hit on near target (the smaller). The geyser was nearly amidships and of normal size, and no flash was seen. The larger target received one torpedo close to the stern. This flashed as well as splashed. Three torpedo detonations were heard, but do not know where the third one exploded. The destroyer, when the periscope got to him, had turned to his right, apparently for his regular trip across the formation's stern. This put his broadsides to us. We swung hard left to bring stern tubes on the destroyer. Took another look at the targets. The large one was pointed about on the base

Case 40, No. C-4 (Cont.)

October 19 (Cont.)

course and was settling in the water on an even keel. She had increased her draft about ten or twelve feet, before we swung periscope to the DD. (It is realized that the few seconds he was watched, seemed much longer.) The destroyer was practically stopped and broadside to GATO, distance 2,000 yards (estimated).

The smaller maru was end on to GATO, seemed stationary, although her funnel was smoking very black. No evidence of damage was visible.

The destroyer swung slowly left toward GATO.

- 0238 (L) Fired two after torpedoes at the destroyer, figuring on a zero angle on the bow. But destroyer swung right on past, presenting a 45° starboard angle, then came right, heading for GATO, speeding up. Ordered deep submergence as torpedoes left tubes, and as periscope went under, destroyer was closing rapidly.
- 0241 (L) First of seven depth charges; close, but set too shallow.
- 0253 (L) Destroyer made second pass at GATO, dropping three depth charges. He definitely had good information on everything but our depth. He was not heard thereafter.
- 0350 (L) At periscope depth. Nothing in sight.
- 0355 (L) Surfaced, and ran over to the scene. There was a large patch of oil and at one edge a flashing light. This was investigated and then picked up in hopes of identifying target. It was a carbide can wired to a short bamboo log. It had no markings. Ran at best.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 40, No. C-4 (Cont.)

October 19 (Cont.)

- 0445 (L) speed along targets' base course.
Transmitted report of tonight's
action.
Decided that the possibility of regain-
ing contact justified remaining on
surface after daylight.
- 0600 (L) Decided that targets were not following
base course.
- 0805 (L) Submerged and continued along supposed
base course. No contacts.
- 1911 (L) Surfaced and started back toward center
of area.
- 2202 (L) Directed to come home via specified
route.

Noon Posit - Lat. 04-10 N., Long.
149-49 E. Miles Run 181.32.
Fuel used 2,657 gal.

No. C-5

Description of Contact

Date: October 17
Time: 2345 (L)
Position: 05-12 N., 151-37 E.
Course: 355
Speed: 13 Knots
Remarks: 2 SC, 1 aux. patrol

Date: October 18
Time: 1800 (L)
Position: 02-45 N., 151-30 E.
Course: 300
Speed: 12.5 Knots
Remarks: 2 AK, 1 DD

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 41

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

INFO:

(Truk
Base Force #4)
(Special
Minesweeper #5)
(#2 Noshiro Maru)
(#2 Fukin Maru?)
(garble)

(Matsushima Gun
Battery in Guard
Division 41)
blank
(Truk Harbor
Affairs Section)
Blank W (garbled)

18/1550 October

"October 19, Truk:
1. Arrivals North Channel: 0630, Junyou*,
Unyou, Tamanami, Amatsukaze; course 235 degrees.
2. Arrivals South Channel: 0500, #2 Takunan
Maru towing Subchaser #10 and #30 Subchaser;
course 068 degrees.
3. Departures North Channel: 0600, Muko
Maru; course 321 degrees.
4. Departures South Channel: unreadable."

BAKER COMMENT: *May be in error since name is
spelled as Junyou. (Junyo being the Hayataka
is correct.)

BAKER - 181612 October)

LOCAL COMMENT: Baker 181902 made the following
correction:

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 41, No. C-1 (Cont.)

Changed from

To read

"2. Arrivals South Channel:
0500, #2 Takunan Maru, I-56,
#31 Subchaser; course 068".

"2. Arrivals South
Channel 0500, #2
Takunan Maru towing
Subchaser #10 and
#30 Subchaser; course
068 degrees."

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: MINGO
ALL SUBS COPYING
NPM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

18/0920 October

SUPER X COMSUBPAC SERIAL 70 X 2 AUXILIARY
CARRIERS SEVERAL DESTROYERS ARRIVING NORTH
PASS CT RAMPARTS YOU WATCH PROBABLY APPROACH-
ING FROM NORTHEAST X 2130 GCT X 18th

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Mingo

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

(For radio reception report and entries in the
log of the MINGO from October 18 to 21, 1943,
see X, Case 36, C-1 and C-2.)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 42

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: (Base Force 4) 27/1550 October
TO: (Nosiro Maru
#2 G(*))
(Special
Minesweeper #10)
(Sunan Maru)
(Fuyo Maru #2)
(Air Group 902)
(**) (Natsushima
Gun Battery)

INFO: (Combined, 2nd and
3rd Fleets)
(1st or 4th Fleet)
(6th Fleet)
(4th Harbor Affairs
Section)
(Chief Truk Regional
Transect)

Tomorrow October 28. Arrivals all via South
Channel.
1130, Tatsuta, Hayanami, Suzunami, course
270, passing through Kimishima Channel.
1400, Naka, Isuzu, Yamagumo, Kuyosumi Maru,
Gokoku Maru, course-118.

BAKER COMMENT. *Significance of "G" not known.
**Gun Battery idents are class A
by Baker.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 42 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM:

(Base Force
4 Truk)

27/1550 October

TO:

(Patrol Vessel in
Base Force 4)

(Suna Maru)

(#2 Fukui Maru)

(Air Group 902)

(Guard Division 41

Gun Battery at Mansushima)

(Guard Division 41

Gun Battery at Meshima)

INFO:

(Truk Harbor Affairs
Section 4)

(Truk Transportation
Office)

At 1130, tomorrow, the 28th, Tatsuta, Kayanami,
Suzunami will pass through Kimishima Channel,
course 270 degrees.

At 1400, Naka, Isuzu, Yanagumo, Kiyosumi Maru,
Gokoku Maru will enter port via South Channel,
course 118.

No. A-3

FROM:

(Base Force 4 Truk) (B)

271550 October

TO:

(Hoshiro #2 Maru KAF
in PCP 57) (B)

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 42, No. A-3 (Cont.)

(Special Mine-
sweeper 6) (A)
(Suma Maru XFP) (B)
(Fukeu Maru KAN In
Base Force 4) (B)
(Air Group 902) (A)

INFO: (NONO 3) (Combined, 2nd
and 3rd Fleet) (C)
(1st
Fleet) (C)

(Harbor Affairs
Section 4 Truk) (B)
(Transportation
Office Truk) (A)

"Tomorrow the 28th at 1130, Tatuta, Hayanani,
Suzunami: Course 270 degrees, passing through
Kimishima Channel at 1400. Neka, Isuzu,
Yamagumo, Kiyosumi Maru, Gokoku Maru, course
116 degrees. Scheduled to enter port via
South Channel."

No. A-4

FROM:
TO:

(Noshiro Maru
#2) (B)
(Minesweeper #6) (A)
(Suma Maru) (B)
(Fukue Maru, in Base
Force #4) (B)
(Air Group #902,
Truk) (B)

27/1805 October

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 42, No. A-4

INFO: (Combined
Fleet)(C)
----- (Eastern Area
Force)(C)
----- (Both Fleet)(C)
----- (Harbor Affairs
Section, Truk)(B)
----- (Truk Transportation
Force)(A)

"Addition to our SMS 271550:

CruDiv #7 at 1130. Course 224 degrees.
Scheduled to enter port via North Channel."

LOCAL COMMENT: This is addition to Truk arrival
and departure schedule reported in INFO 271402,
BAKER 271109 and NEGAT 271219. ComSubPacFor
informed at 0115 (-9) 28th.

E-Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC 27/1625 October
TO: HADDOCK
INFO: - - -

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

A QUICK ONE FOR HADDOCK X 3 CRUISERS WILL
ENTER NORTH CHANNEL YOUR ATOLL ON COURSE 224
AT 0230 OCT 28TH X COMSUBPAC ULTRA SERIAL 3

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 42 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception throughout this patrol was consistent with results obtained on previous patrols in this area.

No. C-2

October 27

- Sighted searchlight beam bearing 178 degrees T.....
- 0035 (L) Turned towards light at best speed. Latitude 13N, Longitude 156-27E.
- 0130 (L) Target appeared to be on a westerly course making high speed, so set course of 250 degrees T to overtake him.
- 0234 (L) Nothing was seen at daylight, and during the day a search was made which covered target courses between 240-300 degrees...
- 0721 (K) Submerged,....350 miles, bearing 028 degrees from Truk.
- 0803 (K) Surfaced.
- 1800 (K) Discontinued search, set course to enter area.

October 28

- Entered area, set course for the Truk-Saipan shipping route.
- 0555 (K) Submerged, commenced submerged patrol with high periscope exposures along the Truk-Saipan shipping route.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 42, No. C-2 (Cont.)

October 28 (Cont.)

1830 (K) Surfaced, conducted surface patrol along same shipping lane as when submerged.

October 29

Patrolling Truk-Saipan route in vicinity of Lat. 9-06N, Long. 150-46E.
0507 (K) Submerged, conducting periscope patrol.
1832 (K) Surfaced.

October 30

Submerged, conducting periscope patrol. Swung ship during day for compensation of magnetic compasses.
0508 (K) Surfaced. Set course to patrol in the vicinity of Lat. 8-05N, Long. 150-50E.
1830 (K)

October 31

Patrolling in the vicinity of Lat. 8-15N, Long. 150-35E.

Case 43

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO:

(#2 Moshiro Maru) (A)
(Suna Maru) (A)
(Koosei Maru) (A)
(Special Mine-sweeper #6) (A)

29/1825 October

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 43, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: (Combined
Fleet) (B)
(1st Fleet) (B)
(2nd Fleet) (B)
(Surface Escort
Force #2) (C)
(Dist. Comdr. Truk
Transport Section) (A)
(ComSub Division #9) (A)

"Truk Arrivals and Departures for tomorrow,
the 30th.

- I. Arrivals Via North Channel:
0500 - Fuchuu Maru
Hinoki Maru
Tokuyama Maru
Toyomitu Maru
#'s 34 & 40 Special Subchasers.
Course 151 degrees.
- II. Arrivals Via South Channel:
(A) 1200 - Nitie Maru
Nowake
Maikaze. Course 45 degrees.
(B) 0530 - Kiso. Course 30 degrees.
- III. Departures Via North Channel:
1600 - Nippon Maru
Towa Maru
Shimakaze. Course 275 degrees.
- IV. Departures. (Time and Course will be
given later).
(A) Agano
Hatsukaze
Haganami
Wakazuki

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 43, No. A-1 (Cont.)

(B) (Kanshin or Ten shin) Maru
Yuuzuki."

No. A-2

FROM: (4th Base Force Truk) 29/1825 October

TO: (Suma Maru)
(Kosei Maru)

(Air Group 902)
(Guard Div 41 Gun Battery at Weshima)
(Guard Div 41 Fuyushima Battery)

INFO: (Tokyo Comm Office)
(1st Fleet)
(2nd Fleet)
(Escort Unit 2)
(3rd Fleet)
(Truk Transportation Office)

Arrivals and departures of vessels tomorrow, the 30th as follows:

1. Arrivals via North Channel at 0500.
Fusayu blank Maru, Minoki Maru, Tohuyama Maru, Toyomitsu Maru, Auxillary Subchasers #34 and 40. Course 141 deg.
2. Arrivals via South Channel:
(A) At (1200?), Nichie Maru, Howake, Maikaze. Course 45 degrees.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 43. No. A-2 (Cont.)

(B) At 0530, Kiso.
Course 30.

3. Departures via North Channel at 1600:
Nippon Maru, Tooa Maru, Shimakaze.
Course 275.

4. Departures (time and course will be
given later):
(A) Agano, Hatsukaze, Maganami, Wakasaki.
(B) Elank Shin Maru, Yuzuki.

No. A-3

FROM: = (Base Force 4) 29/1825 October
TO: = (#2G Noshiro
Maru)
(garbled)
(Spec. MineSweep #6)
(Air Group 902)
(Neshima Gun
Battery)
(Fuyushima Gun Battery)
INFO: (Combined Fleet)
(1st Fleet)
(2nd Fleet)
(Guresco Unit #2)
(garbled)
(Chief Truk Regional
Transp. Sect)
(Truk Harbor Affairs
Sect.)

LOCAL COMMENT: Part 1 contains text.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 43, No. A-3 (Cont.)

Truk arrivals and departures for tomorrow,
30 Oct., are as follows:

1. Arriving at North Channel, 0500:
Fuchiyuu Maru
Hinoki Maru
Tokuyama Maru
Toyomitsu Maru
Special subchasers 34 and 40.
Course 141.
2. Arriving at South Channel:
(A). Noon:
Niche Maru
Nowake
Maikaze
Course 045.
(B). 0530:
Kise, course 030.
3. Departures from North Channel; 1600:
Nippon Maru
Keuwa Maru
Shimakaze
Course 275.
4. Other departures (time and course to be
reported later).
(A). Agano?
Hatsukaze
Haganshi
Wakazuki.
(B). Kanshin Maru
Yuuzuki.

ORIGINAL
28 December 1945

Case 43 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUEPAC
TO: HADDOCK
ALL SUBS ON
NFM FOX
INFO: CINCPAC
FREQ: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
29/1851 October

SUPER FOR HADDOCK X DEPARTING NORTH CHANNEL
YOUR ATOLL AT 0700 30TH AND THEN HEADING DUE
WEST X 1 SHIP (TYPE UNKNOWN) 1 DESTROYER AND
263 POFORN X COURSE SPECIFIED WILL PROBABLY
ONLY BE FOLLOWED FOR 50 TO 100 MILES


C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Haddock

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

(For radio reception report and entries in
the Haddock's log from October 27-31, 1943,
see X, Case 42, C-1 and C-2.)



(Z) -10 | (L) -11 | (M) -12 | (Y) +12 | (X) +11