

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET ULTRA

OP-20-G/1ga
(SC) A7-3(1)
Serial 00017P20

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List, R.I.P. 340.
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JOSEPH R. REDMAN
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TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

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TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Report for:

Rear Admiral Joseph R. Redman, U.S.N.
Director of Naval Communications.

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

in

SUBMARINE WARFARE IN THE PACIFIC

(January, 1943 - October, 1943)

VOLUME I

The Contributions of Communication Intelligence
to the Operations of the Commander of the United
States Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

(January, 1943)

19 November 1945

Op-20-G-7

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INTRODUCTION

This volume (R.I.P. 340) is the first of a series of historical studies which will be devoted to an attempt to determine the accuracy and reliability of the operational intelligence, derived from enemy communications, which was furnished to submarine commanders operating under the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. It is hoped that correlation and interpretation of the source material available in the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet and the United States Naval Communication Intelligence organization will produce valuable lessons for the future.

For the sake of convenience the year 1943 was selected as a beginning point for this series since it was an outstanding period in American submarine warfare in the Pacific. Furthermore, since the records for this period are more complete than those of 1941 and 1942, it was felt that a more accurate appraisal of the worth of communication intelligence could be made.

During this period all American submarines operating below the equator and east of

longitude 130° E were under the command of Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet; all submarine operations above the equator and west of longitude 130° E were the direct responsibility of the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet. The relationship of communication intelligence to the operations of submarines under the Commander, Submarine Force, Southwest Pacific Fleet, will be discussed in a different series, when research in the operational files of the command can be effected.

There were few activities during World War II which received so little attention as the campaign waged so successfully in the Pacific by the submarines of the United States Navy. Co-ordinated attacks by American submarines and air fleets from 1941 to 1945 resulted in the destruction of most of the Japanese merchant fleet, the crippling of Japanese industry by cutting off its source of supply, the hampering of Japanese Army and Navy movements, and the isolation of many Japanese garrisons. The destruction of over six million tons of merchant shipping meant that Japan could not

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
achieve its ambition of creating an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

As for the part played by American submarines in the elimination of Japan as a military power, statistics indicate that the greater part of Japanese shipping was already destroyed when Allied amphibious forces seized the bases which made possible daily air strikes at Japanese home ports. Although there is no need to enter the current controversy as to whether or not the B-29's won the Japanese war, it suffices to say that the far reaching effects of United States submarine warfare in the Pacific cannot be overlooked by any objective observer. As of August 30, 1945, 1256 Japanese ships had been sunk by American submarines.

During the war submarine operational authorities were in constant communication by a direct telephone line with the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization, and the information made available to them was used to such good advantage that many targets, which otherwise might easily have slipped by the submarine patrols, were sent to the bottom of the sea. This

Red line - tonnage sunk
 Black line - GZ translations

CHART A



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for operational authorities, because of the continuous flow of communication intelligence which they were receiving, were able to station submarines in certain areas which would not normally be considered productive targets. Though the routes of Japanese convoys were being constantly shifted to avoid reported American submarines, the messages announcing the change of course were deciphered and made available to American submarine commanders. Thus, many otherwise^{UN} available targets were provided, torpedoes were expended profitably, long patrols in unproductive areas were avoided, and the morale of officers and men was improved.

This volume (Chapter I - R.I.P. 340) outlines the relationship of Communication Intelligence to American submarines operating in the Pacific during January, 1943. Subsequent volumes will continue the story. Each volume has an appendix which contains the following material source for each case discussed:

A. Source of Intelligence

Japanese messages deciphered and translated by the United States Naval Communication Intelligence Organization.

B. Operational Dispatch

A message containing the information derived from (A), sent by the Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet to American submarines.

C. Submarine Action Report

Pertinent data extracted from the action report of the submarine or submarines concerned.

Chart B summarizes the results of action taken by United States submarines from January through October, 1943, as a result of Communication Intelligence. Another general summary of results will be made in the volumes dealing with November, 1943 to December, 1944.

derived from the number in the ComSubPac Ultra dispatch. If, however, ComSubPac did not state the number but merely described the target as a convoy, the target is reckoned as one (an escort is not counted unless specified as a destroyer or a larger ship). But if the target was sighted, then the number named in the submarine patrol report is the number computed in the analysis. If ComSubPac was indefinite, stating the target to be "several" ships, the target, if not sighted is counted as two. For example, in Case 41 of October (Chap. X, R.I.P. 347) ComSubPac described the target as "2 AUXILIARY CARRIERS SEVERAL DESTROYERS". The target, which was not sighted, was reckoned as four.

Thus the reckoning is often arbitrary and therefore the figures are only approximate. This applies also to the reasons given for the failure of a submarine to sight, or to attack, an Ultra target assigned to it. If none of the reasons listed in the analysis precisely cover a given case, the case is then reckoned under the most nearly equivalent reason. If two submarines are named as addressees, the reason reckoned in the analysis may be that of the first addressee (e.g., Case 23 of July-Chap.VII, R.I.P. 345) or it may be the reason of the majority if three or more submarines are action addressees (Case 47 of July).

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R.I.P. 340ORIGINAL
15 January 1946CHART B

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

Grand Total - January-October 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 810I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 445

1. ComSubPac message not received..... 4
2. Submarine not in area..... 100
3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 86
4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 223
5. Mechanical difficulties of submarine..... 5
6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 20
7. Information cancelled as incorrect... 7

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 354

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 120

- (1) Sunk..... 33
- (2) Damaged..... 56
- (3) No perceptible damage.... 16
- (4) Missed..... 15

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked.. 234

- (1) Unfavorable position
of submarine..... 65
- (2) Rough weather-poor
visibility..... 16
- (3) Submarine attacked by
escorts..... 9
- (4) Target showed hospital
ship markings..... 3
- (5) Engaged with other
targets..... 137
- (6) Target not worth torpedo
expenditure..... 4

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to charts, Jan-Oct)

- A. Positive..... 112
- B. Probable..... 11
- C. Possible..... 24

III. Number of Potential Targets for which
the Results Are Unknown..... 11

*The number of potential targets in each Case is

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It should be noted that research in this regard was handicapped seriously by the fact that submarine commanders were under orders to omit all references to Communication Intelligence in their reports as will be seen in the following dispatches:

A. FROM: COMINCH 18/1836 May
TO: CTF 17
CTF 71
CTF 72
INFO: COMSOWESPAC
CINCPAC
PREC: DEFERRED

SUPER SECRET X ULTRA X WAR DIARIES OF SUBMARINES
BASING WEST AUSTRALIA FOR MONTHS NOVEMBER
DECEMBER JANUARY CONTAIN NUMEROUS REFERENCES
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE X ALL MENTION THIS
SOURCE MUST BE ELIMINATED FROM ORIGINAL AND ALL
COPIES OF PAST AND FUTURE DIARIES

B. FROM: CINCPAC 18/1836 May
TO: COMSOPAC
PREC: ROUTINE

PASS COMINCH 181836 TO COMSOPAC FOR ACTION

C. FROM: COMSUBPAC 13/0935 July
TO: ALL SUBS COPYING NPM FCX
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

.....
..... NEITHER ACTUALLY NOR BY IMPLICATION
SHOULD REFERENCE BE MADE TO ULTRA MESSAGES SENT
BY THIS COMMAND X SAME RULE APPLIES FOR WRITING
UP PATROL REPORTS

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS DERIVED FROM ULTRA INTELLIGENCE

January, 1943

Total Number of Potential Targets*..... 57

I. Number of Potential Targets Not Sighted..... 40

- 1. ComSubPac message not received..... 2
- 2. Submarine not in area..... 4
- 3. Submarine pursuing other targets..... 3
- 4. Submarine in area-no contact..... 25
- 5. Mechanical difficulties of submarines... 1
- 6. Rough weather-poor visibility..... 1
- 7. Information cancelled as incorrect..... 1

II. Number of Potential Targets Sighted..... 15

1. Results of the Contact

A. Targets Sighted and Attacked..... 11

- (1) Sunk..... 4
- (2) Damaged..... 7
- (3) No perceptible damage..... 0
- (4) Missed..... 0

B. Targets Sighted but not Attacked.... 4

- (1) Unfavorable position
of submarine..... 0
- (2) Rough weather-poor
visibility..... 3
- (3) Submarine attacked by
escorts..... 0
- (4) Target showed hospital
ship markings..... 0
- (5) Engaged with other
targets..... 1
- (6) Target not worth torpedo
expenditure..... 0

2. Quality of the Contact

(according to chart-January)

- A. Positive..... 3
- B. Probable..... 0
- C. Possible..... 1

III. Number of Potential Targets for which
the Results Are Unknown..... 2

*Convoy of unknown number of ships has been
considered as but one target.

January 1943

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
1.	03-1146	<u>U.S.S. Trigger</u>	2 submarines "5 miles north east your south west corner area" (Tokyo Bay) at 0800 (GCT) 3 January.	None	ComSubPac dispatch re- ceived. The <u>Trigger</u> was in the area but did not sight the 2 enemy sub- marines.
2.	03-1915	<u>U.S.S. Guardfish</u>	1 Carrier To arrive at position 07-42N, 151-47E at 0530 (GCT) on 4 Janu- ary 1943.	None	ComSubPac message not received.
3.	05-0112	<u>U.S.S. Silversides</u>	1 Freighter To arrive at 07-04N, 151-12E on 4 January 1943 approaching from position 8-01N, 149- 29E--speed 10 knots.	None	ComSubPac message re- ceived. Sighted hospi- tal ship on 4 January 1943 sighted sub at 0605 (GCT), 6 January 1943 at position 7-06N, 151-17E off Truk. No contact with vessel reported in Ultra.

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January 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
4.	08-0208	<u>U.S.S. Sailfish</u>	<u>Tokyo Maru</u> Leaving position 6N, 169-40E on 9 January 1943 en route to po- sition 9-25N, 170E.	None	ComSubPac message possibly not received.
5.	08-0238	<u>U.S.S. Kingfish</u>	1 Freighter En route from Fais to Miyako at position 25-23N, 144-42E at 0300 (GCT) on 11 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message received. Patrolled area with no success.
6.	08-0245	<u>U.S.S. Finback</u>	1 Freighter Would be at position 29-48N, 135E at 0300 (GCT) on 11 January 1943 en route to po- sition 34N, 135E.	None	ComSubPac message received <u>U.S.S. Finback</u> - No con- tacts possibly because of heavy weather. Search was abandoned.

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January 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
6.	(Cont.)	<u>Info-U.S.S. Pike</u>		None	<u>U.S.S. Pike</u> - Radio reception generally satisfactory; however difficulty in contacting WPM from near Japan's coast; therefore, it is doubtful if the ComSubPac message was received. The <u>Pike</u> , was patrolling the vicinity but sighted no ships.
7.	09-0738	<u>U.S.S. Sailfish</u>	#2 <u>Hishin Maru</u> Departed position 6-10N, 172E for Tokyo on 9 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message possibly not received. <u>U.S.S. Sailfish</u> not in area on 9 January 1943. Stayed south and east of given position.
8.	11-0512	<u>U.S.S. Drum</u>	1 large freighter Would be at position 3-52S, 4-08E of Point Mike at 0300 (GCT) 13 January 1943; 4-20S, 1-30E at Point George on 14 January 1943.	Unknown	ComSubPac message received Sighted 4,000 ton AK. Attacked at 31-26N, 142-39E at 2155 (GCT) on 12 January 1943. The submarine was unable to determine the result of the attack. Nothing sighted on 14 January 1943.

January 1943

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
9.	12-2350	<u>U.S.S. Finback</u>	1 Tanker En route from 28-21N, 132-51E at 0305 on 15 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message re- ceived. Arrived at designated position 15 January 1943, at 0645 (I time). Abandoned un- successful search at 0600 (I time) on 16 January 19.
		<u>U.S.S. Haddock</u>	Destination: 34-30N, 137E.	None	ComSubPac message received <u>U.S.S. Haddock</u> was patrol- ing between Oshima 30N, 125-30 and 33-41N, 136-32E on 15 January 1943, passing near the destination point of the maru reported in Ultra. Nothing was sighted
10.	14-0215	<u>U.S.S. Searaven</u>	Convoy with 2 escorts To arrive at position 08-50N, 133-45E at 1600 (GCT) on 15 January 1943. To arrive at position 07-50N, 134E at 2200, 15 January 1943.	None	Three ComSubPac messages not received but no in- dication which ones. Sighted convoy at 7-38N, 1 15E on 13 January 1943 at 0050 (GCT) before message was received. Continued pursuit 14 January. Attack 0337 (GCT) but lost convoy Nothing sighted 15 January 1943.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact
11.	15-0216	<u>U.S.S. Whale</u>	1 Carrier 2 Destroyers Departed 07-42N, 151-47E at 1200 on 15 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message received. Searched at No contact.
			<u>Heiyo Maru</u> to arrive at 08-42N, 152-59E on 15 January 1943 en route to 07-54N, 153-06E between 15 and 17 January 1943.	Positive	ComSubPac message received. Ship sighted at 10-13N, 151-25E. Eight torpedoes fired and <u>Heiyo Maru</u> sunk on 17 January 1943 0809 (GCT).
	16-1559 (additional information)		15 January 1943-- 17-30N, 144-32E 16 January 1943-- 13-43N, 147-47E or 57E 17 January 1943-- 10-15N, 151-25E. (above all noon positions). Arrival at North door of Truk scheduled 0900, 18 January. All times minus 9.		

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
11. (a)	16-0537	<u>U.S.S. Whale</u>	#18 <u>Mikasa Maru</u> Headed for position 7-54N, 153-06E located 10 miles east 08-42N, 152-59E present location. Time unknown "but should be soon".	None	CincPac message received. Engaged with <u>Heiyo Maru</u> on 17 January. On 16 January searched area and sighted only patrol cutter.
12.	16-1052	<u>U.S.S.</u> <u>Silversides</u>	<u>Toei Maru</u> and possi- ble escort. To arrive at 4-54N, 149-22E at 1630 (I time-possibly an error for 1400 I time) on 17 January 1943 and at 6-35N, 150-5E at 0400 on 18 January, 1943. Will arrive South Gate Truk at 1000 on 18 January 1943, travel- ing 13 knots.	Positive	ComSubPac message received On 17 January 1943 at 1403 (GCT) at 6-21N, 150-23E sighted <u>Genyo Maru</u> class vessel and made 3 hits. 18 January, nothing sighted. Positive con- tact of Ultra information. Possible sinking indicated Proceeded to newly assigned position.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
13.	17-1901	<u>U.S.S. Silersides</u>	"B" Convoy composed of 4 ships and escort. En route from Truk to Shortland. Will arrive at 3-18N, 152-40E at 0300 (GCT) on 18 January 1943 and at 0300 (GCT) on 19 January 1943, will arrive at 1-10N, 153-40E.	None	ComSubPac message received 18 January 1943 nothing sighted. At 0145 (GCT) on 19 January 1943, 3 destroyers sighted. Search abandoned because of poor visibility. See Case 15-- <u>Silersides</u> dispatch 201425--convoy searched for but not sighted.
14.	17-2340	<u>U.S.S. Flying Fish</u>	200 ton maru Will arrive at 7-20 N, 146-04E at 0300 (GCT) on 19 January 1943 and at 7-20N, 143-45E at 0300 (GCT) on 20 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message received Traveled from Equator north to Truk from 18 January to 21 January. Passed 325 W of Truk near position of 200 ton maru and unidentified maru on 21 January en route to Guam. Apparently nothing sighted.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
14.	(Cont.)		Unidentified maru without escort. Will arrive at 7-13N, 145-55E at 0300 (GCT) on 20 January 1943 at 10-13N, 144-48E at 0300 (GCT) on 21 January 1943; at 13-30N, 144-13E at 0300 (GCT) on 22 Janu- ary 1943.	Possible	At 1710 on 26 January 1943 attacked and damaged badly the <u>Sakito Maru</u> on Calahan Banks on Guam at 14-45N, 144-45E.
15.	19-1332	<u>U.S.S. Silverides</u>	"C" Convoy-4 ships and 2 escorts. To arrive at 4-12N, 153-45E at 0300 (GCT) on 20 January 1943 and at 1-25N, 155-15E at 0300 (GCT) on 21 January 1943.	Positive	ComSubPac message received. At 3-52N, 153-56E sighted 4 freighters and 2 escorts at 0150 (GCT) on 20 Janu- ary 1943. 5 torpedo hits in 3 leading vessels. Freighters possibly <u>Seiwa, Dainiti, Panama</u> or <u>Belgium Maru</u> . This was possibly the "C" convoy.

January 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
16	20-0157	<u>U.S.S. Haddock</u>	<u>Asama Maru</u> No patrol boat To arrive at 23-42N, 144-00E at 0300 (GCT) on 22 January, 1943 and at 29-35N, 140- 50E at 0300 (GCT) on 23 January 1943.	Unknown	ComSubPac message received. Sighted DD or patrol boat on 21 January 1943 at 1317 (GCT), on Tokyo- Oshima traffic lanes. Bright moonlight made attac impracticable. Narrative for events following in secret letter.
7.	20-1842	<u>U.S.S.</u> <u>Silverides</u>	"D" Convoy com- posed of 7 marus. Headed for 03-44N, 153-10E at 0300 (GCT) on 21 January 1943.	None	CincPac message received. Forced to leave area be- cause of damage to sub- marine.
8.	21-0247	<u>U.S.S.</u> <u>Silverides</u>	Convoy composed of 6 marus. Departed Truk 20 January 1943, to arrive at Rabaul 2300 (GCT) 23 January 1943 via Steffen Strait.	None	CincPac message received. 5 hits on "C" convoy at 0150 (GCT) on 20 January 1943. (See Case 15). Ship damaged by depth charge. En route to Pearl Harbor 23 January 1943.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
17.	22-0827	<u>U.S.S. Whale</u>	Focal point for important shipping at 07-55N, 153-07E. Warning message for <u>Whale</u> to get clear of area 07-55N, 153-07E. where <u>Heiyo Maru</u> had been sunk.	None	Patrolled Truk area but did not contact Ultra target from January 22-24.
20.	22-0831	<u>U.S.S. Flying Fish</u>	Group of cargo ships To meet at 0300 (GCT) on 23 January 1943 at position 15-10N, 141-40E.	None	ComSubPac message received Not in vicinity. Patrol 11 Guam-Formosa region (See Case 14).
21.	21-0334	<u>U.S.S. Tunny</u>	1 Freighter 0300 (GCT) 24 January at 21-25N, 142-55E. 0300 (GCT) 25 January at 23-35N, 142-43E. 2100 (GCT) 26 January 1943 24-40N, 142-20E. 2100 (GCT) 27 January at 28-00N, 141-35E.	None	ComSubPac message received Trawlers and sampans sighted 25 January 1943. On 26 January 1943, 400 ton trawler fired upon but no hits. <u>Tunny</u> patrolled this area without results. 27 January 1943, nothing sighted. 30 January 1943 nothing sighted; patrolling off Takao.

January 1943

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Position Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
22.	23-0311	<u>U.S.S. Stinson</u>	Warning submarine operating near Jaluit. None	None	ComSubPac message received Enemy plane sighted but no activity. Submerged patrol conducted north of Mille Atoll.
23.	24-0305	<u>U.S.S. Whale</u>	1 Tanker To arrive at 8-40N, 158-57E at 0830 (GCT) on 26 January 1943. Speed not over 10 knots.	Positive	ComSubPac message received Ship identified as <u>Syoyo Maru</u> class damaged with one hit. 8-30N, 156-40E at 1312 (GCT) on 25 Janu- ary 1943.
	25-0146	<u>U.S.S. Whale</u> <u>U.S.S.</u> <u>Stinson</u>	Tanker (Additional infor- mation) To arrive at 08-40N, 158-57E at 0830 (GCT) on 26 January 1943. 08-30N, 161-30E at 0600 (GCT) on 27 January 1943. 6-23N, 169-25E at 2100 (GCT) on 29 January 1943.		Positive contact on <u>Shiretaka Maru</u> . Verified by intercepted Japanese dispatch following attack. (See Appendix I, Case 23, D.)

January 1943

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Position Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
23. (Cont.)	25-1522	<u>U.S.S. Whale</u> <u>U.S.S.</u> <u>Stiagray</u>	Message correcting position for 27 January 1943 to 15 miles farther south.		
24.	25-0730 (See 25- 0830 Case 25)	<u>U.S.S. Whale</u>	<u>Syoan Maru</u> At 0300 (GCT). No position, location or point of origin or destination is given in the ComSubPac operational dispatch.	Positive	ComSubPac message received. Ship sighted at 12-10N, 155-15E at 0634 (GCT) on 26 January 1943. Badly damaged by three separate attacks. Probable contact since vessel attacked was of same class as <u>Syoan Maru</u> .
25.	25-0830	<u>U.S.S. Runner</u>	<u>Syoan Maru</u> To arrive at 31-00N, 142-27E at 1800 (GCT) on 25 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message received. Dispatch cancelled by 28-0105.
26.	25-1215	<u>U.S.S. Pollack</u>	1 Destroyer Arriving at position 42-21N, 140-57E at 0100 (GCT), on 26 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message received. Area patrolled but no activity. Weather bad.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
27.	25-1541	<u>U.S.S. Flying Fish</u>	2 Freighters 1 Escort Will arrive at po- sition 09-58N, 147- 12E at 0300 (GCT) on 26 January 1943. Will arrive at po- sition 13-52N, 145- 00E at 0300 (GCT) on 27 January 1943. Will arrive at po- sition 17-25N, 142- 37E, at 0300 (GCT) on 28 January 1943. Will arrive at po- sition 21-02N, 140- 06E at 0300 (GCT) on 29 January 1943.	Positive	ComSubPac message received Patrolled Guam harbor. Freighter sighted, fired at and damaged but not sunk. Convoy of 2 freighters and 1 escort sighted at 1403 (GCT) 27 January 1943 at position 15-19N, 144-04E. Convoy was lost due to decreasing visibility.

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
28.	25-2315	<u>U.S.S. Whale</u>	<u>Takasago Maru</u> and patrol boat Passing through ION, 151E and entering Truk via North Channel at position 7-41N, 151-47E before dawn on 28 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message received <u>U.S.S. Whale</u> -engaged with Meiyo class maru 26 January 1943. Returning to Midway 1145 (GCT), 27 January 1943.
29.	27-0011	<u>U.S.S. Haddock</u>	Convoy Taking refuge from U.S. submarines at position 34-05N, 136-15E at time message was dispatched.	None	ComSubPac message received Convoy of four small freighters with air escort sighted at 2139 (GCT) 25 January, 1943. Seas too rough for submerged attack. Again at 1230 (GCT) on 26 January 1943 at position 34 04N, 137-35.5E radar contact with convoy at 14500 yards. Forced to let target pass a before. 27 January 1943-- patrolled line between Tokyo and Shiono Misaki.

January 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
29. (Cont.)					28 January 1943-- nothing sighted. 29 January 1943--sighted large ship and destroyer at 1616 (GCT), at positio 33-36N, 137-02E. Forced to abandon search because of destroyer escort.
30.	27-0148	<u>U.S.S. Flying Fish</u>	2 Freighters 1 Escort Will arrive at po- sition 11-54N, 146- 33E at 0300 (GCT) on 28 January 1943. Traveling about 11 knots.	None	ComSubPac message receive Convoy of two ships and escort sighted at positio 15-19-20N, 144-04-20E on 27 January 1943 at 1403 (GCT), but lost because c escort activity, poor visibility and bad weathe However, a Convoy sighted was 7N, 3W of position of marus reported in ComSub- Pac Ultra, 270148. Evide indicates this is not the same convoy. (See Case 2

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January 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
31.	28-0411 29-0150 31-0652	<u>U.S.S. Stingray</u>	1 large tanker carrying high octane gasoline Time of departure un- known. Departed at position 09-24N, 167- 20E and will pass thru 01N, 167E and arrive at 01-31S, 166-54E at 2000 (GCT) on 30 Janu- ary 1943. Position of unloading changed to 00-31S, 166-54E in next 24 hours.	None	ComSubPac message received 27 through 31 of January, Kwajalein and Jaluit area patrolled but no contact other than enemy anti-sub- marine patrol sighting. Tanker not sighted. Com- SubPac serial 22 not re- ceived but serial numbers were up only as far as 6 on this date.
32.	28-0512	<u>U.S.S. Tunny</u>	<u>Tatekawa Maru</u> Departed at 0800 (I) on 27 January 1943. Will arrive at 29N, 124 E 0300 (GCT), 30 Janu- ary and at 24-42N, 120 E at 0300 (GCT) on 31 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message received At 2130, 2 February tanker sighted in position off Hongkong. All torpedoes fired but no hits. Doubtful if this were Ultra target.

January 1943

No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Addressee(s)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
33.	28-1800 29-0146	<u>U.S.S. Pompano</u>	<u>Kenyo Maru</u> Will arrive at position 10N, 146-35E at 0300 (GCT) on 29 January 1943 and at 8-20N, 149-30E at 0300 (GCT) on 30 January 1943. Added information: meets escort in position given for 30 January 1943.	Positive	ComSubPac message received Tanker sighted at position 8-24N, 149-19-30E at 0337 (GCT) on 30 January 1943. Sank with two hits.
34.	30-0830	<u>U.S.S. Flying Fish</u>	Crippled freighter Will be towed from position 15N, 147-12E on 30 January 1943.	None	ComSubPac message received Patrolled area but no activity. High seas.

January 1943

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No.	ComSubPac Operational Dispatches (Date-Time)	Submarine Address(es)	Type, No. of Ships, Positions Given	Contacts Made with Target(s)	Results of Contact(s)
35.	31-0748	<u>U.S.S. Pompano</u>	Unidentified ships Will arrive at 07- 41N, 151-47E at 0300 (GCT) on 31 January 1943 en route to 05- 00S, 161-19E.	None	ComSubPac message received Area patrolled. 2 destroyers sighted but not in a position to attack.
36.	31-1556	<u>U.S.S. Runner</u>	Tankers to meet patrol boat. Will arrive at po- sition 20N, 142E at 0300 (GCT) on 2 February 1943 en route to 15-15N, 145-05E.	Positive	ComSubPac message received <u>U.S.S. Runner</u> sighted convoy at position 20N, 142E at 2334 (GCT) on 1 February 1943. Two lead ships attacked at 2343 (GCT) on 1 February 1943 20N, 142E, one was sunk & one was damaged.
		<u>U.S.S. Flying Fish</u>	Attempt to intercept south of 19N.	None	ComSubPac message received <u>Flying Fish</u> patrolled area but no activity.

Chapter I

January 3, 1943

Case 1

Following a translation of an intercepted Japanese dispatch of January 3, 1943, which stated that two Japanese submarines had departed from Tokyo Bay on that day and would proceed south of the Cape of Nojima,¹ the Commander of the United States Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, hereafter known as ComSubPac,² notified the U.S.S. Trigger of their presence.

Although the Trigger mentioned no difficulties in radio reception during this period,³ and although it stated in its report that on January 4, 1943, it patrolled off the north-south line from the Cape of Nojima, the Trigger did not sight the target.⁴

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- 1 - Appendix I, Case 1, No. A-1, hereafter referred to as I, Case 1, A-1.
2 - I, Case 1, B-1.
3 - I, Case 1, C-1.
4 - I, Case 1, C-2.

January 3, 1943

Case 2

It was learned from a second intercepted Japanese dispatch of January 3, 1943, that the Japanese carrier, the Zuikaku, would enter Truk harbor by the North Channel at 1430 (I time zone) on January 4, 1943. This information was sent by ComSubPac to the U.S.S. Guardfish which was patrolling this area. According to the Third War Patrol Report of the U.S.S. Guardfish, this ComSubPac dispatch was not received. Consequently, the submarine took no action. The difficulty in the radio reception of this dispatch was further shown by the fact that it had been received but was unintelligible to ComSoPac.

January 5, 1943

Case 3

The #18 Shinsei Maru en route to Truk on January 5, 1943, was due to arrive there on January 6 via the North Channel, according to a deciphered Japanese dispatch of January 4. The

5 - I, Case 2, A-1.
6 - I, Case 2, B-1.
7 - I, Case 2, C-1.
8 - I, Case 2, B-2.

vessel's speed and position at noon, at 1600 and
at midnight (I time zone) on January 5, as well as
its scheduled time of entry at Truk, were listed.
This information was sent to the U.S.S. Silversides
for action in a ComSubPac dispatch transmitted at
0112 (GCT) January 5.¹⁰

Although the Silversides received the
operational message,¹¹ the Fourth War Patrol Report
of the U.S.S. Silversides disclosed that only one
ship had been sighted while the submarine was
closing the south coast of Truk. Since the #18
Shinsei Maru was approaching from the northwest,
it is doubtful if this vessel were the Japanese
freighter.¹²

January 8, 1943.

Case 4

On January 7, 1943, the Tokyo Maru
transmitted its schedule to Yokosuka. Arriving at
Imieji on January 7, the maru would leave that port
on January 9 for Wotje.¹³

At 0208 (GCT) on January 8, ComSubPac

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- 9 - I, Case 3, A-1 - A-3.
 - 10 - I, Case 3, B-1.
 - 11 - I, Case 3, C-1.
 - 12 - I, Case 3, C-2.
 - 13 - I, Case 4, A-1.

sent a dispatch to the U.S.S. Sailfish, giving the
positions and the destination of the Tokyo Maru.¹⁴
This dispatch might not have been received since,¹⁵
according to the action report of the Sailfish,
radio reception of dispatches was difficult due
to frequent dives, radio interference, and improperly
coded or transmitted messages, resulting in garbled
indicators. The Sailfish on January 5 radioed that
it was leaving the area and no contact with the
Ultra target was recorded.¹⁶

Case 5

An intercepted Japanese dispatch listed
all the noon positions of the freighter, the #2 Eiko
Maru, which had left Fais on January 5 and would
arrive at Miyako on January 16, 1943.¹⁷

At 0238 (GCT) on January 8, 1943,
ComSubPac notified the U.S.S. Kingfish of the position
of the enemy freighter for January 11. It would pass
through points just east of the Kazan Islands.¹⁸

Although the Kingfish received the in-
formation, since radio reception during this period

14 - I, Case 4, B-1.
15 - I, Case 4, C-1.
16 - I, Case 4, C-2.
17 - I, Case 5, A-1.
18 - I, Case 5, B-1.

19
was satisfactory, it reported no contacts in the
special area, and departed for another area on the
night of January 11.²⁰

Case 6

On January 8, 1943, ComSubPac sent a
dispatch to the U.S.S. Finback with the U.S.S. Pike
as information addressee concerning the anticipated
position on January 11 of a Japanese freighter moving
due south of Kobe.²¹

Possibly because of inclement weather
and high seas, the Finback reported no contact with
the target on January 11, 1943, although on January
10, 1943, the submarine was "proceeding in accordance
with orders", and on January 11, 1943, stated that
it had "reached position". A surface patrol was
conducted but no results were achieved and on
January 12, the Finback abandoned search.²²

From January 10 to January 14 the U.S.S.
Pike was patrolling from Shio Misaki (32-41 N, 129-55 E)
to Ichie Saki (33-34 N, 135-24 E).²³ Although it is not
known that the Pike received the ComSubPac 080245

19 - I, Case 5, C-1.
20 - I, Case 5, C-2.
21 - I, Case 6, B-1.
22 - I, Case 6, C-2.
23 - I, Case 6, C-4.

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informational dispatch, since the submarine reported
NPM reception as good when 2300 miles from Midway,²⁴
whereas the special area patrolled was more than 2500
miles from Midway, the Pike on January 13 at 2246
(CCT) near Ichyie Saki sighted a patrol vessel which
appeared to be similar to our mine sweepers. Two
hours later three large ships escorted by three
destroyers were contacted two and a half miles from
Ichyie Saki. One of the vessels was similar to the
Yasino Maru, a vessel of 8,990 tons. No attack was
made on the convoy because the escorting destroyers²⁵
began a depth charge attack.

January 9, 1943

Case 7

Learning from a deciphered Japanese
dispatch that the #2 Nisshin Maru had arrived at
Miri on January 7,²⁶ ComSubPac informed the U.S.S.
Sailfish at 090738 that the Nisshin Maru might depart
from Miri on the afternoon of January 9. Though the
Sailfish was authorized to search for the freighter²⁷
"if in vicinity", it had previously received in-

24 - I, Case 6, C-3.
25 - I, Case 6, C-4.
26 - I, Case 7, A-1.
27 - I, Case 7, B-1.

19 November 1945

formation concerning another enemy freighter.²⁸
It was not in the specified vicinity, therefore, on
January 9, 1943.²⁹ It should be pointed out that
since radio reception was particularly difficult
on this patrol of the U.S.S. Sailfish, it is possible
that this dispatch of ComSubPac was not received.³⁰

January 11, 1943

Case 8

The information that a large freighter
would be at a given position in the area patrolled
by the U.S.S. Drum on January 13 and 14 was sent to
that submarine for action at 0512 (GCT) on January 11.³¹
Since records of the exact locations of points Mike
and George had been destroyed by the time present
research was initiated, it can only be assumed that
the Drum was patrolling in this area. At 2155 (GCT)
on January 12, 1943, a vessel was sighted at 31-26 N,
142-39 E. The crew of the Drum, however, was unable
to determine results of the attack, although two loud
explosions were heard following the firing of two
torpedoes. Fast screws reported by the sound apparatus

28 - I, Case 4, B-1.
29 - I, Case 7, C-2.
30 - I, Case 7, C-1.
31 - I, Case 8, B-1.

appeared to be those of a destroyer, and the Drum
abandoned its attack.³² On January 14 the U.S.S.
Drum reported no merchant shipping contacts. It
is impossible to determine whether or not the
vessel sighted on January 12 was the freighter
reported in the Ultra ComSubPac dispatch, which
was received by the Drum.³³

January 12, 1943

Case 9

ComSubPac sent the schedule of the
Omurosan Maru which would sail from Singapore to
Yokkaichi, according to an intercepted Japanese
dispatch,³⁴ to the Finback and to the U.S.S. Haddock
for information.³⁵ Although the Finback conducted
a surface patrol on January 15 at the assigned
position (28-21 N, 132-51 E); no contact was
reported. The search was abandoned at 0600 (I)
January 16.³⁶

32 - I, Case 8, C-2.
33 - I, Case 8, C-1.
34 - I, Case 9, A-1.
35 - I, Case 9, B-1.
36 - I, Case 9, C-2.

The U.S.S. Haddock had been instructed to note the destination of the tanker (34-30 N, 137 E). The submarine engaged two destroyers at 33-41 N, 136-32 E on January 16, 1943. On January 17 the U.S.S. Haddock sighted and attacked a 6520 ton freighter, similar to the Manzyu Maru, at position 34-31 N, 137-48 E. Since this ship was part of a convoy of three ships, it is doubtful that it was the vessel reported in ComSubPac's 122550.³⁷

January 14, 1943

Case 10

A deciphered Japanese dispatch of January 12-1242 contained information concerning a Japanese army convoy proceeding to Manila. Two marus, acting as escorts, would accompany the convoy as far as 9-10 N, 130-00 E and would then return toward Palau escorting another convoy scheduled to pass through 8-50 N, 133-45 E at 1600 (GCT) January 15 and 7-50 N, 134-00 E six hours later.³⁸

At 0215 January 14 ComSubPac sent to the U.S.S. Searaven the two positions of the second convoy approaching Palau January 15.³⁹

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- 37 - I, Case 9, C-4.
 - 38 - I, Case 10, A-1.
 - 39 - I, Case 10, B-1.

The Searaven may not have intercepted the C215 operational dispatch, since three unspecified⁴⁰ serials were not received on this patrol. Two days earlier, on January 13, the Searaven had sighted and attacked a convoy leaving Palau at 7-38 N, 134 E. This may well have been the army convoy bound for Manila mentioned in the Japanese message of 12-1242 since it was on a westerly course. The submarine pursued the convoy through January 14. It then headed back toward Palau but did not sight the Ultra target, the convoy⁴¹ scheduled to approach Palau January 15.

January 15, 1943

Case 11

From an intercepted message originated by an unidentified Japanese command on January 14, 1943, the schedules of the carrier, the Chuyo, and of the destroyers, Murasame and Uranami, were learned. According to the dispatch, the carrier would enter Truk via the South Channel on January 14 and depart⁴² via the North Channel. The #18 Mikage Maru and the

40 - I, Case 10, C-1.
41 - I, Case 10, C-2.
42 - I, Case 11, A-1 - A-2.

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#3 Kyokai Maru were scheduled to enter North Channel.⁴³

Acting on these messages, ComSubPac informed the U.S.S. Whale of the departure of the carrier from Truk on January 15. However, should the Whale be unable to reach this position by noon when the exact position (07-42 N, 151-47 E) was given, the Whale was directed to try for the Heiyo Maru during the next two days at 08-42N, 152-59E heading toward 07-54N, 153-06E.⁴⁴ On January 16, ComSubPac sent the additional information that the #18 Mikage Maru would be ten miles east of the first position cited for the Heiyo Maru, but would also be traveling toward 07-54N, 153-06E.⁴⁵ It should be noted that the positions given for the carrier, the destroyers and the two marus on the respective days were approximately the same.⁴⁶

According to the Second War Patrol Report of the Whale, the submarine entered the area and began closing on Truk Atoll on January 15 at 1500 (X).⁴⁷

At position 10-13N, 151-25E, firing eight torpedo shots, the Whale was able to sink a vessel,

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- 43 - I, Case 11, A-3.
44 - I, Case 11, B-1. (See I, Case 11, A-4 for intelligence dispatch concerning the Heiyo Maru.)
45 - I, Case 11, B-2.
46 - I, Case 11, B-1 - B-3.
47 - I, Case 11, C-2

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which was later identified as the Heiyo Maru.⁴⁸ Passing close to the same position on January 19, the crew of the Whale noted considerable floating debris and oil slick.⁴⁹

A dispatch from the Torishima Maru mentioned search for survivors. The vessel was escorting the Takasago Maru from Saipan to Truk and while enroute was searching for survivors of the Heiyo Maru.⁵⁰

Case 12

On January 15, 1943, a Fourth Base Force order directed the Minesweeper #8 to rendezvous with the Toei Maru at 1630 (I time zone) on January 17 at 4-54 N, 149-22 E on course 30, and to act as an escort. On January 18 at 0400 (I time zone) the maru was scheduled to be at point F (6-53 N, 150-30 E). At 1000 (I time zone) the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the South Channel of Truk. A comment by United States radio intelligence on this dispatch points out that this is either bad plotting or a transmission error and suggests that the rendezvous would take place at 171400 rather than 171630.⁵¹

48 - I, Case 11, C-2.

49 - Ibid.

50 - I, Case 11, D-1 - D-2.

51 - I, Case 12, A-1.

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At 1052 (GCT) on January 16, 1943, ComSubPac, using the rendezvous date-time given in the Japanese message, transmitted this information to the U.S.S. Silversides, with the warning that the Toei Maru might have an escort.

The Toei Maru was located by the Silversides at 0103 (L time zone) on January 18 in position 6-21 N, 150-23 E, with escort, a small destroyer or minesweeper, astern of the maru. Firing three shots, the Silversides reported that the first shot hit the target in the bow; the second hit was heard but could not be seen because of the spray; and the third torpedo hit the target under the stack aft. Although the screws of the target stopped immediately, and noises were heard as if the vessel were breaking up, the escort cut across the maru's stern toward the Silversides and dropped eight depth charges. The barrage blew the gasket off the safety valve and knocked out 3 depth gauges in the Silversides. Two other barrages were sustained before the destroyer

52 - I, Case 12, B-1.

left the area. At 1102 (L time zone) a Zero plane circled the submarine's position and dropped a depth charge which caused additional damage to the ⁵³
Silversides.

January 17, 1943

Case 13

Under the command of the #3 Convoy Control Commander, "B" convoy, composed of the Oikawa, Kenkow, Kyokusei, and Panama Marus, and the escort destroyer, the Shirayuki, would leave Truk for Shortland Island at 1400 (I time zone) on January 17, according to a Japanese dispatch of January 17 from an unidentified originator. Noon positions of the convoy for January 18, 19, 20 and 21 were given; and it was learned that the "B" convoy would arrive at the northern entrance to Shortland ⁵⁴
Island at 0500 (I) on January 21.

Using this dispatch as its source of intelligence, ComSubPac's operational message 171901 was sent to the U.S.S. Silversides. Positions for January 18 (3-18 N, 152-40 E) and for January 19,

53 - I, Case 12, C-2.

54 - I, Case 13, A-1.

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(1-10 N, 153-40 E), were given.⁵⁵ A one-degree difference may be noted in the transmission of the ComSubPac operational dispatch, since the scheduled position of the convoy was to be 4-18 N, 152-40 E rather than 3-18 N, 152-40 E. The Silversides, in this general area on January 18, sighted and attacked the tanker and escort reported in ComSubPac's 161052.⁵⁶ On January 19 in this area only three Japanese destroyers were contacted. Although the Silversides began tracking, the chase of the destroyers was abandoned due to poor visibility. Furthermore, the search would take the Silversides into the area patrolled by the U.S.S. Guardfish and possibly into that patrolled by the U.S.S. Greenling.⁵⁷ On January 20, the Silversides sighted a convoy at position 3-52 N, 153-56 E which was identified as "C" Convoy.⁵⁸

Case 14

The noon positions for January 18 through January 22 of the #3 Kyoei Maru departing from Truk enroute to Palao were listed in an intercepted Japanese dispatch of January 16.⁵⁹ The positions of

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- 55 - I, Case 13, B-1.
 - 56 - I, Case 12, B-1 - C-2.
 - 57 - I, Case 13, C-2.
 - 58 - I, Case 15, C-2.
 - 59 - I, Case 14, A-1 - A-2.

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another unidentified maru, departing from Kavieng at 0430 (I time zone) on January 17 and en route to Yokosuka, were given in a Japanese message of
60
January 17.

The noon positions of both Ultra targets were sent in ComSubPac's 172340 to the U.S.S. Flying Fish for action.
61

Between January 18 and January 21 the Flying Fish passed through the Caroline Islands, leaving Truk 325 miles abeam to starboard. Entering the assigned area south of Guam on January 22, the Flying Fish moved to Apra Harbor at Guam. On January 23 the submarine patrolled the Formosa-Guam route; and on the following day returned to Apra Harbor where it sighted a ship resembling the Sakito Maru. On January 26 it fired two torpedoes at this freighter; and although damage was inflicted, it is doubtful that
62
the ship was sunk.

There is a slight possibility that the ship fired upon in the harbor was the unidentified maru of ComSubPac's 172340. However, the position

60 - I, Case 14, A-3.

61 - I, Case 14, B-1.

62 - I, Case 14, C-2.

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given was west of Guam on January 22 and the freighter was sighted in the harbor on January 24.

January 19, 1945

Case 15

On January 19, 1943, a Japanese dispatch directed to the Solomons Defense Force and one other unidentified unit revealed that "C" convoy, composed of the Meiu, Sometono, Surabaya, and Sinai Maru, was en route to Shortland Island. Giving the noon positions for January 19 through January 23, the dispatch added that the ships would arrive at Shortland Island at 0500 (I time zone) on January 24. A sub-chaser and the #2 Choan Maru were detailed to escort the convoy as far as D1-00 S, 156-00 E.⁶³

ComSubPac at 0910 (GCT) on January 19 sent an operational message to the U.S.S. Silversides enumerating the noon positions of the "C" convoy for January 20 and 21. The position given for January 20 was 4-12 N, 153-45 E.⁶⁴

At 1250 (L) on January 20, the Silver -

63 - I, Case 15, A-1.
64 - I, Case 15, B-1.

sides sighted four freighters with two escorts at 3-52 N, 153-56 E. Later attempts at identification suggested that these ships were similar to the Seiwa Maru, the Dainiti Maru, and the Panama or Belguin Maru. Although the position given for "B" convoy on January 19 was 01-10 N, 153-40 E, the scheduled position of the "C" convoy was very close. In spite of the fact that one of the ships, the Panama Maru of the "B" convoy, was tentatively identified, the convoy contacted by the Silversides included two escorts, whereas the "B" convoy was to have only one escort.

The Silversides fired five torpedo hits into the three leading freighters; and after diving, the submarine heard only one merchant ship set of screws, although all four were clearly audible before firing. Following a depth charge attack by the escort vessels, the Silversides withdrew. From the evidence, this group appears to be the "C" convoy. An operational dispatch from the Silversides on January 20 reported the hits on the convoy mentioned in ComSubPac's operational dispatch. The hits were

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- 65 - I, Case 13, B-1.
66 - I, Case 15, C-2 - C-3.
67 - I, Case 15, D-1.

also verified by Cincpac's 210247.⁶⁸

January 20, 1943

Case 16

From a decoded Japanese message of January 19, it was learned that the Asama Maru, plying between Truk and Yokosuka, had sailed at noon on that day and was scheduled to arrive in Yokosuka at 1000 (I time zone) on January 24. The vessel would be escorted by the destroyer Yagunagi until 0600 (I time zone) of January 21. The noon positions for the Asama Maru, which would transport 408 military passengers and 1115 others, were given.⁶⁹

At 0157 (GCT) on January 20 ComSubPac granted the U.S.S. Haddock permission to leave its assigned area to search for the Asama Maru. The scheduled positions of the vessel on January 22 and 23 were provided for the Haddock, as well as the information that no patrol boat would accompany the ship on these days.⁷⁰

The action taken by the Haddock from 2340 (I) January 21 until 2130 January 25 is contained

68 - I, Case 15, D-2.
69 - I, Case 16, A-1.
70 - I, Case 16, B-1.

in a separate secret letter. It was known, however, that the Haddock was patrolling the Tokyo-Oshima traffic lane on January 21.⁷¹ Whether or not this Ultra target was sighted cannot be determined on the basis of the available evidence.

Case 17

On January 20, 1943, operational headquarters learned through a Japanese dispatch that the sixth "D" convoy composed of the Taihei Maru, the Kamo Maru, the Shinryu Maru, the Makassar Maru, the Waura Maru, the Miike Maru and another maru, had departed Truk at 1800 (I time zone) January 19 for Rabaul. With the information that the Miike Maru would proceed alone from a certain point, noon positions for this vessel as well as for the "D" convoy were given.⁷²

ComSubPac sent the U.S.S. Silversides⁷³ the noon position of convoy "D" for January 21 (which was the same position, varying only in minutes at which Convoy "C" was attacked on January 20: 03-44 N,⁷⁴ 153-10 E.

-
- 71 - I, Case 16, C-2.
 - 72 - I, Case 17, A-1 - A-4.
 - 73 - I, Case 17, B-1.
 - 74 - I, Case 15, C-3.

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On January 21, however, the Silversides found that a torpedo with the war head attached was stuck in the #6 tube, that the depth charges on January 20 had resulted in a fuel and air leak, an explosion in the main generator, and an obstruction in the main induction. Because of the limited supply of fuel, the Silversides set its course for the designated departure point from the area. ⁷⁵

January 21, 1943

Case 18

At 0247 (GCT) on January 21, 1943, CinCPac originated a dispatch containing the information that the U.S.S. Silversides claimed five hits on three ships of a convoy bound south out of Truk. It was added that this was believed to be the convoy scheduled to arrive at Shortland Island on the morning of January 24, which was the "C" convoy. Another convoy of six marus was reported to have left Truk on January 20 for Rabaul and was scheduled to arrive at 1000 (L) on January 24 by way of Steffen Strait. ⁷⁶ Although the CinCPac dispatch ⁷⁷ was received by the Silversides, no action was taken

75 - I, Case 15, C-2.
Case 17, C-2.
76 - I, Case 18, B-1.
77 - I, Case 18, C-1.

on this information as the damaged submarine departed
its assigned area for Pearl Harbor. ⁷⁸

January 22, 1943

Case 19

It was learned from Japanese dispatches of January 21 and 22 that the Musashi, a battleship, the Zuikaku and Zuiho, both carriers, accompanied by the Nagara, a cruiser and flagship of Destroyer Division 10, and the cruiser Atago as well as the destroyer Yukikaze, and #7 or #8 Kiku Maru would enter Truk by the North Channel on January 23, 1943, and that the ⁷⁹ #2 Unyo Maru was departing Truk on this day.

ComSubPac, in an operational dispatch to the U.S.S. Whale, warned the submarine that it was believed that a search was being conducted for it in ⁸⁰ the position where the Heiyo Maru had been sunk. The Whale was directed to clear that area as ComSubPac pointed out that the Japanese appeared to be using ⁸¹ Truk as a focal point for important shipping. The Whale, patrolling the Truk-Empire lane, did not make ⁸² contact with any of the shipping indicated in this case.

78 - I, Case 18, C-2.
79 - I, Case 19, A-1 - A-2.
80 - I, Case 19, B-1.
81 - Ibid.
82 - I, Case 19, C-2.

Case 20

A deciphered dispatch of January 21, 1943, from an unidentified command to a transport convoy inquired whether or not the convoy commander could arrive at a rendezvous point at 1200 (I) on January 23. The rendezvous position named was 15-10 N, 141-40 E.⁸³

ComSubPac transmitted to the U.S.S. Flying Fish for action the information that a group of cargo ships was to rendezvous with escort at the above-mentioned position.⁸⁴

Although the Flying Fish received this dispatch,⁸⁵ the submarine was near Guam and on January 23 was patrolling the Guam-Formosa route. On January 24 it submerged near Apra Harbor where it attacked the Sakito Maru. Apparently no action was taken on the information in ComSubPac's 220831.⁸⁶

Case 21

The noon positions for the Kihawa Maru from January 18 to January 29 when it would arrive at Yokosuka were given in an intercepted Japanese dispatch.⁸⁷ ComSubPac relayed the positions of the vessel on

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- 83 - I, Case 20, A-1.
 - 84 - I, Case 20, B-1.
 - 85 - I, Case 20, C-1.
 - 86 - I, Case 20, C-2.
 - 87 - I, Case 21, A-1 - A-2.

88
January 25 and 26 to the U.S.S. Tunney. In a dispatch sent by ComSubPac on January 22 a correction was made and positions were then given for the freighter for January 25, 26, and 27.⁸⁹

Although the U.S.S. Tunney presumably⁹⁰ received these dispatches as it patrolled in this area,⁹¹ it sighted only sampans or trawlers.

January 23, 1943

Case 22

On January 23 ComSubPac warned the U.S.S. Stingray that an Ultra target, a submarine, was possibly operating in the vicinity of area 22.⁹² The Stingray according to its Sixth Patrol report entered the area at 1530 (GCT) on January 23, 1943. Although a submerged patrol was conducted north of Mille Atoll,⁹³ no activity of any kind was noted.

Case 23

From intercepted dispatches transmitted on January 23, 1943, it was learned that the Shiretoko Maru would leave Truk at 0700 (I) on January 24 and

88 - I, Case 21, B-1.
89 - I, Case 21, B-2.
90 - I, Case 21, C-1.
91 - I, Case 21, C-2.
92 - I, Case 22, B-1.
93 - I, Case 22, C-2.

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arrive at the northeast channel of Jaluit 0900 (I) on January 30. It was estimated that point "A" would be passed at 0130 (I) on January 26, point "B" at 1500 (I) on January 27 and point "C" at 0600 (I) on January 30. The #10 Subchaser was detailed to provide escort from Truk to Point "B".⁹⁴

On January 24, the January 26 position of the tanker (8-40 N, 158-57 E) was sent to the U.S.S. Whale.⁹⁵ On January 26 two more dispatches were sent to the U.S.S. Whale, the U.S.S. Stingray, and the U.S.S. Runner, the latter as information addressee, with additional information on the same ship.⁹⁶ The later intelligence was based on an intercepted Japanese message of January 24.⁹⁷

The Whale patrolling in this area obtained one torpedo hit on a Japanese vessel, tentatively identified as the Syoyo Maru, in position 8-30 N, 156-40 E. The contact was made at 2212 (K) on January 25.⁹⁸

A Japanese message reported that a submarine attacked the Shiretoko at 2305, January 25,

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- 94 - I, Case 23, A-1 - A-2.
 - 95 - I, Case 23, B-1.
 - 96 - I, Case 23, B-2 - B-3.
 - 97 - I, Case 23, A-3.
 - 98 - I, Case 23, C-2 - C-3.

99
in position 8-03 N, 156-17 E.

It is possible that the submarine incorrectly identified the tanker, and that the vessel damaged was the Shiretoko Maru, the target of ComSubPac's 240305.

January 25, 1943

Case 24

According to a Japanese dispatch of January 25, 1943, the Syoan Maru had sailed from Ponape at 0430 (I time zone) that morning and was scheduled to arrive at Yokohama at 1200 (I time zone) on February 4. Its cargo consisted of 4 urns, 136 personnel, 1,800 tons of wood and 2,240 cubic meters of other miscellaneous wood. Noon positions (I time zone) for this vessel were listed for January 26, 28, 30, 31 and February 1 and 3.¹⁰⁰

Acting on this information ComSubPac relayed the course and speed of the Syoan Maru for January 26 to the U.S.S. Whale for action and the U.S.S. Runner for information.¹⁰¹

At 0634 (GCT) on January 26, in position 12-10 N, 155-15 E the U.S.S. Whale sighted a vessel later identified as one of the Meiwo Maru class which is the

99 - I, Case 23, D-1.
100 - I, Case 24, A-1 - A-2.
101 - I, Case 24, B-1.

same class as the Syoan Maru. This vessel was damaged by three separate attacks launched by the U.S.S. Whale on January 26, and January 27.¹⁰²

This contact was possibly that reported in ComSubPac's 250730 Ultra as the Syoan Maru was scheduled to be at 10-50 N, 155-50 E, 0300 (GCT) on January 26,¹⁰³ and the contact was made three hours and thirty-four minutes later at a position 1-20N and 35 E of the scheduled position of the maru at 0300 (GCT).¹⁰⁴ This was verified by a Japanese dispatch at 2223 (I) on January 27.¹⁰⁵

Case 25

An operational dispatch of January 25 gave positions for a vessel which could be one of three, the Syoei Maru, the Syoan Maru or the Meivo Maru.¹⁰⁶

Although positions of the vessel had been sent by ComSubPac to the U.S.S. Runner and the U.S.S. Tarpon at 0830 on January 25,¹⁰⁷ instructions were sent to the two submarines on January 28 to disregard the previous dispatch, since the schedule of the maru

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- 102 - I, Case 24, C-2.
103 - I, Case 24, A-1.
104 - I, Case 24, C-2 - C-5.
105 - I, Case 24, D-1.
106 - I, Case 25, B-1. (Japanese Merchant Ships, Recognition Manual O.I.I. 20021)

108
had been changed. A change of orders was given priority
109
in instructions to the Runner.

On January 29 the Runner changed its course
in accordance with ComSubPac's 280100. On February 1
it attacked two freighters of the Yamabiko Maru class
at 20 N, 142 E, sinking one and damaging the other. The
next day it cleared that area and proceeded southwest
110
according to its orders toward area 10. This was a
positive contact with the Ultra target of Case 36 in this
volume. There was no contact with the target of this
Case.

On February 1 the Tarpon attacked a 9000
ton, unescorted freighter in position 34-10 N, 138-25 E.
111
The ship was hit three times and left sinking. On
January 25 ComSubPac had given the Tarpon the position
112
of a ship of the Meiyo Maru class. A later dispatch
113
indicated a change of schedule for the target. No
detailed information is available on the change of
schedule. Therefore, although the sinking occurred in
the vicinity of the first position given, it cannot be
said definitely that the freighter was the Ultra target.

108 - I, Case 25, B-2.
109 - I, Case 25, B-2.
110 - I, Case 25, C-2 - C-3. (See also Case 36).
111 - I, Case 25, C-6 - C-7.
112 - I, Case 25, B-1.
113 - I, Case 25, B-2.

Case 26

According to an enemy dispatch of January 25, a destroyer, the Kamikaze, was scheduled to enter harbor at Muroran at 1000 (I) January 26 to load 300 tons of oil.¹¹⁴

Giving the destroyer's position at 0100 (GCT) on January 25, 42-21 N, 140-57 E, ComSubPac originated a dispatch containing information for action by the U.S.S. Pollack.¹¹⁵

At 0745 (K), the Pollack, six miles off the beach just south of Tsugaru Strait, sighted a small freighter, and at 1025 (K), another very small freighter was sighted. The action report of the Pollack stated that radio reception was complete, but no contact with the Kamikaze was reported.¹¹⁶

Case 27

Two marus, the Soyo Maru and the Maniwa Maru, were en route from Truk to Kure where they would arrive February 3. In ComSubPac's dispatch of January 25 for action to the¹¹⁷

-
- 114 - I, Case 26, A-1.
 - 115 - I, Case 26, B-1.
 - 116 - I, Case 26, C-1 - C-2.
 - 117 - I, Case 27, A-1 - A-2 - A-3.

U.S.S. Flying Fish, positions of these two marus at 0300 (GCT) for January 26 to 29 were transmitted. It was added that the escort, the Mochizuki, would separate from the ¹¹⁸convoy at Saipan.

On January 26, according to the action report of the Flying Fish, the submarine was patrolling off the coast of Guam, and on January 26 and 27 planned to cover the Empire-Guam-Truk traffic route. On January 27 at 1403 (GCT), the Flying Fish sighted two large ships and one small ship in convoy at 15-19 N, 144-04 E. In maneuvering to get in position to fire, the submarine was forced to dive since the Japanese destroyer was closing dead astern. Thirty minutes later it surfaced, but due to ¹¹⁹the decreasing visibility, the convoy was lost. This was a probable contact with vessel reported in ComSubPac's Ultra-dispatch.

Case 23

On January 24, a Japanese dispatch directed that the Torishima Maru, accompanied by the Takasago Maru, a patrol boat, en route to Truk from Saipan, would cooperate in searching for survivors of the Heiyo Maru.

118 - I, Case 27, B-1.
119 - I, Case 27, C-2 - C-3.

The Torishima Maru was scheduled to pass through position ¹²⁰
10 N, 151 E, entering Truk by way of North Channel.

A ComSubPac dispatch of January 25 listed this information
for the U.S.S. Whale, giving the 10 N, 151 E position and
the position of arrival at Truk (7-41 N, 151-47 E) before
¹²¹
dawn of January 28.

The Whale, however, having damaged a
freighter of the Meiyo Maru Class on January 27, set its
course for Midway Island, thus leaving the area. ¹²²

January 27, 1943

Case 29

Orders for a Japanese convoy to put into
harbor near Owashu and await orders were sent by Naval
officials in Yokohama on January 26, 1943, since one of
our submarines had been reported 5 miles south of the
entrance to Hamanako. The Taikai (or Kokai or Tokai)
¹²³
Maru was also directed to put into Yokohama Harbor.

The U.S.S. Haddock learned from a ComSubPac
dispatch of 0011 January 27 that a convoy might still be
¹²⁴
at 34-05 N, 136-15 E. The convoy of four freighters had been

-
- 120 - I, Case 28, A-1 - A-2 - A-3.
 - 121 - I, Case 28, B-1.
 - 122 - I, Case 24, C-2.
 - 123 - I, Case 29, A-1 - A-2 - A-3 - A-4.
 - 124 - I, Case 29, B-1.

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found by the Haddock at 34-04 N, 137-35.5 E at 2130 (I) on January 26. In beginning the approach for attack, the submarine was sighted by the crew of a trawler who warned the convoy of its approach. The Haddock broke off the attack, and at 1115 (I) depth charging commenced. Bright moonlight made a surface attack out of the question, and the seas were too rough for a night submerged attack. The Haddock was forced to let the target pass. The target was sighted near the position given in ComSubPac's 270011 (34-05 N, 136-15 E), but the submarine sighted the convoy at 2130 (I) on January 26 and the Ultra dispatch was dated 270011.

Case 30

On January 24, 1943, the Kaihei Maru originated a movement report, disclosing that it had arrived at 1000 January 24 at Truk, and would depart at 0600, January 26 for Saipan where it would arrive at 1000 on January 29. Two days later, the commander of the Fifth Base Force at Saipan informed an unidentified maru that the Asayama Maru and the Kaihei Maru had left

125 - I, Case 29, C-2.

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Truk and were scheduled to arrive at Saipan. Giving noon positions of the convoy, it also revealed that subchaser #12 would act as escort until 1500 January 27. On January 28, the Subchaser would effect a rendezvous with the two vessels and escort them to Saipan. ¹²⁶

With a warning that the U.S.S. Searaven might yet be in the vicinity and that the U.S.S. Tahoo might pass through that area, ComSubPac sent the position for January 28 of the three ship convoy to the U.S.S. Flying Fish. ¹²⁷

At 0003 (K) on January 28 the Flying Fish sighted three ships, two large and one small, when the submarine was patrolling near 15-19-20 N, 144-04-20 E. Upon commencing the approach for attack, the submarine incorrectly estimated the position of the subchaser escort. Although the Flying Fish put it astern and attempted to lose it, its speed was greater, and the Flying Fish was forced to submerge. Back on the surface thirty minutes later the submarine again sighted the convoy. Its position made attack impossible. Eventually ¹²⁸ the convoy was lost in the reduced visibility.

126 - I, Case 30, A-1 - A-2.
127 - I, Case 30, B-1.
128 - I, Case 30, C-2.

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The description of the convoy is similar to that of the ConSubPac Ultra 270148; but the 0300 (GCT) position of the convoy was given as 11-54 N, 146-33 E, while the submarine contact was made at 0003 (A) ¹²⁹ in position 15-19-20 N, 144-04-20 E.

January 28, 1943

Case 31

On January 28, 1943, a large maru attached to the Eleventh Air Fleet originated a movement report from which it was learned that the maru would depart Ruotto at 0330 (I) January 28 and arrive at Nauru at 0500 (I) January 31. En route, it would pass through position 1 N, 167 E. ¹³⁰ Fifteen hours later, the Chief of Staff of the Second Fleet ordered an unidentified maru to proceed to Truk and to load 250 kiloliters of type 91 special gasoline and as much of type 87 gasoline as was possible. United States Communication Intelligence noted that this vessel might possibly be the Okitsu Maru, ¹³¹ an auxiliary aircraft carrier.

Following the interception of the original

129 - I, Case 30, C-3.
130 - I, Case 31, A-1.
131 - I, Case 31, A-2.

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Japanese dispatch giving the schedule of the maru, ComSubPac originated a dispatch to the U.S.S. Stingray, giving the sailing position, mid position point (01 N 167 E) and the place and estimated time of arrival, and the estimated speed of 11.5 knots. Although this maru was not large, it was important since it was believed to be the vessel carrying high octane gasoline, the Stingray was informed on January 31. In case the submarine missed the maru while it was en route, ComSubPac directed that the Stingray torpedo the ship while it was unloading at Nauru (00-31 S, 166-54 E).

According to the action report of the U.S.S. Stingray, an uneventful patrol was conducted east, north, and northwest of Jaluit, covering the route scheduled to be taken by the maru on January 28 and 29. On January 30 and 31, the Stingray moved further north rather than southwest toward Nauru, and patrolled south and west of Kwajalein Atoll on February 1, 2, 3 and 4. The maru was

132 - I, Case 31, B-1.
133 - I, Case 31, B-2.
134 - I, Case 31, B-3.

135
not intercepted.

Case 32

The noon positions and speed of the Tatekawa Maru, en route from Genzan to Palembang River in the Netherlands East Indies, were listed in a Japanese dispatch of January 27, 1943. The positions which were given for January 29 through February 5 were believed by United States cryptanalysts to be given in Greenwich Civil Time rather than in (I) zone time as usual.
136

ComSubPac gave the positions for January 30 and February 1 to the U.S.S. Tunney, adding that these positions were either for noon in "I" (-9) time zone, or in "Z" (GCT) time.
137

At 2130 on February 2, 1943, the U.S.S. Tunney sighted a loaded tanker off the coast of Hongkong. The February 2 position given for the Tatekawa Maru in the intercepted Japanese dispatch was 15-00 N, 115-16 E (I or Z); the February 1 position of the Tatekawa Maru was to be 20 N, 118 E.

Commencing a radar approach, the Tunney

135 - I, Case 31, C-2.
136 - I, Case 32, A-1.
137 - I, Case 32, B-1.

opened fire. The first torpedo exploded prematurely and the second passed under the stern of the vessel but did not explode. Warned prematurely by the two torpedoes, the tanker maneuvered radically and began firing. Although the range and bearings were checked at each shot, and torpedoes aimed at bow, midships and stern, the third torpedo hit the ship's side but did not explode. Before the target reached the passage into Hongkong, all remaining torpedoes were fired but the vessel successfully evaded all shots. The Tunney hastily retreated, and the expected planes arrived about two hours later. ¹³⁸

In this case there is a discrepancy in time and position. It is very doubtful, therefore, if the tanker was the Ultra target.

Case 33

The Japanese Second Sea Escort Force on January 28, 1943, transmitted the schedule of the Kenyo Maru, giving noon positions for the vessel for January 29 and January 30, and its estimated time of arrival at Truk, 0600 (I) on January 31. At noon on January 30, the

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Heiyo Maru was scheduled to take up escort duties
for the Kenyo Maru at 08-20 N, 149-30 E. ¹³⁹

A ComSubPac dispatch of January 28
giving these two positions was sent to the U.S.S.
¹⁴⁰ Pompano with the information that there would
probably be no escort until later. In a ComSubPac
dispatch sent the next day, however, the Pompano was
informed that the maru would meet its escort in the
¹⁴¹ position given for January 30.

On January 30, at 0817 (K), the Pompano was
patrolling in latitude 08-21 N, 149-20 E when it sighted
a small trawler which may have been en route to escort a
larger ship. At 1337 (K) on the same day, a tanker with
escort was contacted, and it was believed that the tanker
was sunk with two hits. ¹⁴² This is a positive contact.

January 30, 1943

Case 34

On January 30, a ComSubPac dispatch reported
to the U.S.S. Flying Fish that a damaged freighter would
be picked up for tow at 15 N, 147-12 E. ¹⁴³ The Flying Fish

139 - I, Case 33, A-1 - A-2 - A-3.
140 - I, Case 33, B-1.
141 - I, Case 33, B-2.
142 - I, Case 33, C-2 - C-3.
143 - I, Case 34, B-1.

on this date was patrolling east of Saipan and Tenian Islands. An armed trawler was seen in Saipan channel but no other contacts were reported. ¹⁴⁴

January 31, 1943

Case 35

Several marus were reported in a ComSubPac dispatch to the U.S.S. Pompano to be in position 07-41 N, 151-47 E on January 31, and possibly to be headed for 05 S, 161-19 E. Instructions were included to intercept this group of ships if possible. ¹⁴⁵

According to the Fourth War Patrol Report of the U.S.S. Pompano this ComSubPac serial was apparently received, since radio reception was reported good. However, in spite of the fact that at 0621 (K), the Pompano was patrolling at latitude 7-30 N, 150-40 E, only one small patrol vessel was sighted. The ship set course for Otta Pass at 0914 (K), February 1. Another small patrol vessel plying a southwest course was sighted. Later the Pompano returned to 7-7 N, 151-43-30 E. The ¹⁴⁶ convoy reported in ComSubPac's 310748 was not sighted.

-
- 144 - I, Case 34, C-2.
 - 145 - I, Case 35, B-1.
 - 146 - I, Case 35, C-1 - C-2.

Case 36

Originated by the Staff of the Fifth Base Force at Saipan, a Japanese dispatch of January 31 ordered the Nishun Maru to join the "X" convoy at position 20 N, 142 E at noon on February 2 and proceed¹⁴⁷ in company to Saipan.

A ComSubPac message relayed this information to the U.S.S. Runner for action north of 19 N and to the U.S.S. Flying Fish south of 19 N. The Flying Fish was instructed to keep clear of the fixed position but to attempt to intercept the convoy any place south of¹⁴⁸ 19 N.

According to the patrol report of the Runner, a convoy of two single stack freighters (Yamabiko Maru class) and three escorts was sighted in position 20 N, 142 E, at 2343 (GCT) February 1. The Runner fired three torpedoes at the leading ship, two of which were heard to hit. The attack was then shifted to the second ship and three more torpedoes fired, two hitting. The ships were heard breaking up, and though they were not seen to sink, the Runner was credited with sinking one and¹⁴⁹ damaging the other. This is a positive contact with

147 - I, Case 36, A-1. -
148 - I, Case 36, B-1.
149 - I, Case 36, C-2 - C-3. (See also I, Case 25,
C-2 - C-4.)

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the Ultra target.

The U.S.S. Flying Fish patrolling the route of this convoy south of 19 N, reported sighting only trawlers and planes during this time. ¹⁵⁰

150 - I, Case 36, C-5.

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APPENDIX I

Intelligence, Operational Dispatches, Submarine
Action Reports and Verifications - January, 1943

Case 1

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

MAM Broadcast

03/0910 January

FROM: Yokosuka Naval Station

Two friendly Submarines will depart Tokyo Bay at 1330/3rd passing east of Nosimazaki Southern Islands and proceeding South.

GI: This taken to mean that either after reaching southern entrance to gulf, Subs will head east till Nojima is abeam and then south, skirting to eastward of Mansei Shoto - or to head south after Nojima is bearing east. Phoned to SUBPAC D/O.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: COMDR TF 7

03/1146 January

TO: TU 7.1.10

INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TWO SPRUCE LEFT POSITION 10 FIVE MILES NORTH AND EAST YOUR SOUTH WEST CORNER AREA X ULTRA FOR TRIGGER X 1230 X BLACK X MINUS 4 X MINUS 12 X ROGER X CINCPAC HAS IX

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Case 1 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Trigger

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Excellent. No difficulties were experienced.

No. C-2

January 3

Station patrol off IRO SAKI. Have a persistent 120 volt battery ground in the after battery. On surfacing this date charged only the forward battery and sought deep and unconfined water to the east of IZU SHOTO to clear up this battery trouble. We have had this difficulty repeatedly during this patrol.

January 4

Patrol off the north-south line from NOGIWA SAKI. On surfacing heavy seas caused flooding difficulties. Proceeding to the area to the south of INUBO SAKI. Battery grounds have been cleared.

Case 2

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

Commander Truk Address
Commander #3 Tanasene
Maru

03/1645 January

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

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Case 2, No. A-1 (Cont.)

"Tomorrow the 4th the following vessels will enter port (Truk) 0600 I-31, course 312 via south channel. 1430 Zukaku, course 226 north channel. 0730 Asahi Maru through Katashima (Pis Il.) (Channel) 1400 Akitsu Maru same as for Asahi Maru. 1433 ships Buko Maru, #2 Kyuyo Maru and Kirishima Maru on course 255 via south channel.

(NSS*-031651-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.**
1-3-43, (p.37)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: COMSUBPAC
TO: TU 7.2.11
INFO: ---

03/1915 January

PREC: URGENT

ONE ASH (CARRIER) ARRIVES POSIT 07-42 NORTH
151-47 EAST X ULTRA FOR GUARDFISH X COURSE 226
SPEED BLANK TIME 0530 DATE FOURTH X GAUDY

No. B-2

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: CTF 7
INFO: ---

04/2345 January

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

-
- * Radio Station, Washington, D. C.
** Frupac Daily Traffic Book. This book is issued by GI, the intelligence section of the Fleet Radio Unit, Pacific, located at Pearl Harbor, and contains both deciphered dispatches and traffic analysis reports.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
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Case 2, No. B-2 (Cont.)

ULTRA YOUR 031915 CANNOT BE UNDERSTOOD X WHAT
IS ASH AND MEANING LAST HALF OF TEXT X COMSOPAC
TALKS

REF: UTMOST SECRET

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Guardfish

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: "Serial 'GAUDY' was not
received and was so reported."

Case 3

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: CofS Yokosuka 29/1222 December
(MITIME) JN 40
TO: Unident KITIYO 8 Ser. 748
INFO: 2 garbled addressees

"Reference your serial 2807. The #18 Shinsei
Maru has 3000 drums of cargo to unload.
Since, because of the shipping shortage and
the problems of escorting, the unloading
point has been changed to Saipan. We request
supplies for her."

(NSS-041500-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.
1-4-43, (p.50)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 3 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: SUHI 2 (Unident) 03/1030 January
TO: OHIRA 1 (#18 Shinsei JN40
Maru) Serial 406

2nd Sea Escort Force Order No. 1.

The following points ? are assigned for the route of No. 18 Shinsei Maru.

- (a) 8-50 North 149-00 East
- (b) 8-00 North 149-30 East
- (c) North Channel Inform me anew of your schedule.

By previous reading this vessel due Truk 1600 6th.

(T2W*-040213-Jan/DI)

Frumel D.T.B.**
1-4-43, (p.63)

No. A-3

FROM: MEMO-2 04/1052 January
TO: WIOMO-7 (#10 Takanan JN 20F
Maru)-?
INFO: OHIRU-5 (#18 SHINSEI Maru)
HATU-4 (Combined)
KEKO-0 (2nd Fleet)
KESE-6

"#2 Surface Escort Force Opord #6".

* Radio Station, Belconnen, Australia.
** Frumel Daily Traffic Book. This book is issued by GI, the intelligence section of the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne, Australia.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 3, No. A-3 (Cont.)

#18 Shinsei Maru (speed 8.5) Blanks passing thru following points:

5th noon 8-55N. 148-22E.
1600 8-50N. 149-00E.
Midnight 8-01N. 149-30E.
6th 1530 North Channel.

#10 Takunan Maru will depart her patrol area to rendezvous at 1400/05 with #18 Shinsei Maru in posit 8-32N, 148-39E. and escort her as far as blank (Truk-?).

(T2W-050618-Jan/DI)¢

Frumel D.T.B.
1-5-43, (p.48)

No. A-4

FROM: MEMO-2
TO: WIOMO-7
INFO: HATU-49
KEKU-09
OHIRU-5
HESE-69

04/2120 January
JN 40

#2 Sea Escort Force Operation Order #6.

1) The #18 Shinsei Maru, speed 8.5 knots, is scheduled to enter _____ port passing through the following points:

5th January 1200 8-55 N. 148-22 E.
1600 8-50 N. 149-00 E.
2330 8-00 N. 149-30 E.

(NPM-050716-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.
1-5-43, (p.47)

B - Operational Dispatch

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 3 (Cont.)

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: SILVERSIDES
INFO: CINCPAC

05/0112 January

PREC: PRIORITY

1 BEECH (FREIGHTER) X DCMF 0412 (07-04 NORTH
151-12 EAST)X (COURSE) BLANK X (SPEED) 10
KNOTS X (TIME) BLANK X (DATE) 4TH X APPROACHING
FROM SMKY 0129 (8-01 NORTH 149-29 EAST) X ULTRA
X THIS FOR SILVERSIDES X HAVE WORK REQUESTS
READY FOR 6 WEEKS NAVY YARD OVERHAUL UPON RETURN
TO PEARL X LEGEND.

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Silversides

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Was reception complete? Yes.
Last consecutive serial sent 272235.
Last consecutive serial received
300140. (p.16)

No. C-2

January 4

Southwest of OTTA. At 1009 sighted small patrol
boat on southeasterly course close into ROYALIST
Reef. At 1128 sighted large ship coming out of
OTTA Pass on southwesterly course closed and
identified as hospital ship, properly marked.
Took photographs; course 195° for KAVIENG. At
1600 patrol returned along ROYALIST Reef. Not
searching. At 1648 heard several distant depth
charges.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 3, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 5

While closing south coast of TRUK at 0520 sighted ship on starboard beam, distance about 7000 yards at limit of visibility circle, course north, speed about 25 knots. Attempted to close range on 4 engines but target passed out of sight in about 10 minutes. 10 minutes later searchlights from DUBLON Island opened up sweeping to south. At 0902 sighted patrol plane on southerly course.(p.4)

Case 4

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: AKUMJ 2 (Tokyo Maru) 07/1200 January
TO: MITIME (Yokosuka Cofs) JN 40
INFO: NI - ? Ser. #002

Arrive at Imieji January 7th. Will depart January 9th for Wotje.

(NFM-072156-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.
1-7-43, (p.13)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 08/0208 January
TO: SAILFISH
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS IS ULTRA FOR ACTION SAILFISH IF IN VICINITY X TOKYO MARU DEPARTING 9 JAN FROM MVBRO040 (6 NORTH 169-40 EAST) ENROUTE TO CBKL2500 (9-25 N 170-00 E) X WHALE ENROUTE PEARL TO TRUK PASSES THROUGH XLKL (10 N 170 E) ABOUT JAN 11 X KEEP CLEAR OF HIS TRACK X SOUTHPAW

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 4 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Sailfish

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: (No Radio Reception section in this report. But in view of the following comment on January 5, the 080208 might not have been received.-Ed. Note)

No. C-2

January 5

Sent dispatch to CTF42 notifying him we were leaving area and of serials we were missing. The reason for missing serials are:

1. Frequent dives during night. (1)
2. Interference from Japs or from material causes. (1)
3. Improperly coded or transmitted messages resulting in garbled indicators.
4. Some of Bellconen operators are not very good.

Some system such as used by T.F. 7 would help in that it would keep a boat from worrying about a missing serial that did not concern him. (p.6)

Case 5

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 5, No. A-1 (Cont.)

FROM: SIHI 2 (4th Fleet)
TO: KUYA 12 (Yokosuka Navy
Yard)
MAHI 02
INFO: HINO 1
KIRE 4
KIMUKO 3
HOE 6 (8th Fleet)
MEE 3
HAE 2
TONA 5

06/0848 January
JN 40
SMS 348

The #2 Eiko Maru departed from Fais for Miyako at 1700/5th and is due to arrive at 1500/16th.

Noon posits from 6th to 16th as follows:

6th	11-50N, 141-08 E.	11th	25-23N, 144-42 E.
7th	14-35N, 141-55 E.	12th	28-10N, 144-45 E.
8th	17-18N, 142-40 E.	13th	30-53N, 144-08 E.
9th	19-55N, 143-25 E.	14th	33-40N, 143-30 E.
10th	22-40N, 144-09 E.	15th	36-27N, 142-48 E.
		16th	39-08N, 142-10 E.

Frupac D.T.B.
1-?-43, (p.36)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: KINGFISH
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: PRIORITY

08/0238 January

22 MIN NORTH AND 4 DEG 42 MIN E of POINT NN X
LARGE BEECH (FREIGHTER) X 1201.5 (COURSE 009)
X MINUS 3 (SPEED 7) X MINUS 900 (0300 GCT) X

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 5, No. B-1 (Cont.)

MINUS 4 (JAN 11) X THIS IS ULTRA FOR
KINGFISH IF NEAR THIS POSITION X INANE

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Kingfish

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete except during the period 1900 to 2100 GCT, when much static and jamming of the frequencies was observed. At other times no trouble was experienced in copying the schedule. (p.22)

No. C-2

January 10-11

Surface patrol in special area. No contacts.
Left special area at dark, night of January 11.

Case 6

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: SIKINE 7 (In Rabaul Area) 07/0900 January
TO: HITISE (Tokyo Trans.) JN 40
NSOTE (Comdt. Kure) 037 - Part 2
RISUKE
INFO: NSENI (Kure Supply)
SOHITE (4th Civil Engineers)
TEKISU 2 (2nd Surface Escort
Force)
WEWE (42nd Guard Force)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 6, No. A-1 (Cont.)

8th January N 13-35 E 134-15
9th January N 19-00 E 134-30
10th January N 24-24 E 134-40
11th January N 20-50 E 135-00

(NPM-070624-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.
1-7-43 (p.32)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: FINBACK
INFO: CINCPAC
PIKE

08/0245 January

PREC: PRIORITY

1 BEECH (FREIGHTER) ENROUTE FQKU (34 NORTH 135
EAST) POSITION HCKU 4800 (29-48 N 135-00 E) X
1201 (COURSE 000 '?') X PLUS 3.5 (SPEED 8.5)
X MINUS 900 (0300 GCT) X MINUS 4 (JAN 11) X
THIS IS ULTRA X CASPER X KERNEL

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Finback

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: (a) Last serial sent SubPac Ser 15.
(FINBACK KNACK.) Last serial received
FINBACK INGRAM.

(b) Radio reception was complete
and no trouble was experienced in
copying the NPM submarine Fox
schedules. (p.17)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 6 (Cont.)

No. C-2

January 10

0122 (I) Proceeding in accordance with orders.
Sighted searchlight glow beyond horizon
and in direction of ARIAKE WAN, bearing
260° T. Believed to be from the shore,
estimated distance thirty miles.

January 11

0510 (I) Reached position. At
0607 (I) Commenced submerged patrol.
1435 (I) Surfaced and conducted surface patrol
at estimated 1600 position. Heavy
weather encountered. (p.4)

January 12

0000 (I) Abandoned search. Proceeding to assigned
area. One broken arm when man thrown out
of high bunk due to heavy seas. At
2200 (I) Entered area.

U.S.S. Pike

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-3

Radio Reception: In general communications were
satisfactory.
Difficulty was experienced in
contacting NPM from near the
Japanese coast. NPG seemed to hear
us better than NPM could and reported
our signal as weak and fading. (p.16)

Case 6 (Cont.)

No. C-4

January 11

- 0001 (I) Secured battery charge and set course for Ichie Saki. No navigational lights or stars, and ended up off Shio Misaki. (32-41N, 129-55E.)
- 0545 (I) Submerged at periscope depth.
- 0850 (I) Sighted sailing trawler with auxiliary engine. Sighted numerous small fishing craft all day.
- 1432 (I) Sighted twin float sea plane.
- 1521 (I) Sighted same plane.
- 1538 (I) Sighted same plane.
- 1659 (I) Sighted same plane apparently patrolling.
- 1810 (I) Surfaced and commenced battery charge. Encountered heavy seas and high winds. (p.4)

January 12

- 1758 (I) Surfaced. No ships or fishing vessels sighted all day. Started battery charge.

January 14

- 0938 (I) Periscope depth, with Ichie Saki bearing 025° T, distant 2 miles. Sighted ship, range 1000 yards, bearing 106° relative, angle on bow 110° port. General quarters.
- 0939 (I) Sighted two destroyers well clear and two additional merchant vessels set up perfectly for torpedo attack. The sky was clear, bright sun, sea smooth, no white caps.
- 0940½(I) Sighted destroyer astern, range less than 200 yards, angle on bow 5° port, ordered 200 feet. Heard loud screws of destroyer passing overhead.
- 0941 (I) 3 depth charges exploded very close. Our depth was 65 feet. Believe charges exploded beneath ship.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 7

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: TAHINU (Singapore Trans. Office) 08/1036 January
TO: HITISE (Tokyo Trans.) JN 40
MOYORE 3 SMS #204
INFO: WIMIN 3 (#2 Nisshin Maru)
MINMI 3
UHIRA (10th Base Force Singapore)

#2 Nisshin Maru arrived at Miri at 1430 Jan 7th.

(NPM-091116-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.
1-9-43, (p.129)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 09/0738 January
TO: TU 7.3.8
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

LARGE NISSIN MARU MAY HAVE DEPARTED AFTERNOON 9
JANUARY FROM MVLZ 1000 (6-10 NORTH 172-00 EAST)
FOR TOKYO X THIS ULTRA FOR SAILFISH IF IN VICINITY
X ASTOR

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Sailfish

Seventh War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: (Incomplete report. Nothing
on radio reception.-Ed. Note)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 7 (Cont.)

No. C-2

January 9

1200 Proceeding as before on surface. Plane contact at 19 miles. Submerged. Think we got down without being sighted this time.
1400 Back at normal cruising.
Noon position - Lat. 4-55 N., Long. 173-19 E.

January 10

Set date back at 2400.
Noon position 6-41 N., Long. 177-09 E. (p.7)

Case 8

A - Source of Intelligence

(The intercepted Japanese dispatch is not available.-Ed. Note)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: TU 7.1.8
INFO: CINCPAC

11/0512 January

PREC: ROUTINE

LARGE BEECH X POSITION 3 DEGREES FIFTY TWO MINUTES SOUTH AND 4 DEGREES 8 MINUTES EAST OF POINT MIKE X 1258 X MINUS 3 X MINUS 900 X MINUS 2 X SAME DOPE FOLLOWING DAY AT 4 DEGREES 20 MINUTES SOUTH AND 1 DEGREE 30 MINUTES EAST OF POINT GEORGE GEORGE X THIS ULTRA FOR DRUM X RAINBOW

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 8 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Drum

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was complete. (p.15)

No. C-2

January 13

- Attack #3. Lat. 31-26. ON, Long. 152-39. 0 E.
- 0755 (K) Sighted smoke on the horizon, closing it rapidly on this course, picked up masts and stack. Turned to course 000° T, converging track about 30°.
- 0815 (K) Target is making about 4-5 knots. Course 330° (T). Submerged and took course to intercept at two thirds speed. Weather is much too rough to permit a periscope attack; particularly with the bow planes in present condition. If we attack, it must be by sound.
- 0943 (K) Sound reports screws, close aboard. Change of bearing indicates he is passing astern of us. Since we had already determined his course and speed, we came to a course for a 90 track and at
- 0948 (K) Fired two (2) torpedoes from 100 feet.
- 0952 (K) Heard one (1) very loud explosion, and forty seconds later another similar explosion. Since we cannot come to periscope depth, we shall never know what these explosions were, although the time interval seems too long to be our torpedoes.
- 0953 (K) Sound reports fast screws, in addition to target ship. New contact sounds like a DD.

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 8, No. C-2 (Cont.)

1015 (K) Where did it come from: -(p.7)
Lost all contact. Decided to remain
submerged till sunset.

January 14

1910 (M) Sighted white flare astern about 10 miles
distant. Unidentified. Posit:
Lat. 32-42. 0 N., Long. 146-30. 0 E .

Case 9

A. Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: KOYOMO (Omurosan Maru) Serial 225

Omurosan Maru will be in posit 29-
20N, 132-50 E at noon on the 15th.

COMMENT: Singapore for Yokkaichi with oil.

(From British NSS-
111931-Jan/DI)

Frupac, D.T.B.
1-11-43, (p.151)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: FINBACK
INFO: HADDOCK
CINCPAC

12/2350 January

PREC: PRIORITY

PAGE 267 BIRCH (TANKER) X RMDZ 2151 (28-21 NORTH
132-51 EAST) X ULTRA FOR FINBACK X BLANK (COURSE)

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 9, No. B-1 (Cont.)

X BLANK (SPEED) X -855 (0305 GCT) X ZERO (15TH) X
HADDOCK NOTE DESTINATION WHICH IS FCHV 3000
(34-30 NORTH 137-00 EAST) X KNACK X DENTINE

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Finback

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: (a) Last serial sent Subpac Ser 15.
(FINBACK KNACK). Last serial
received FINBACK INGRAM.

(b) Radio reception was complete and
no trouble was experienced in
copying the NFM submarine Fox
schedules.

No. C-2

January 15

Proceeding in accordance with orders. At

0645 (I) Arrived at assigned positions. Commenced
surface patrol, changing course at two hour
intervals. Expected set of 2 knots to north-
east did not materialize. Experienced 1
knot set to south.

January 16

Conducting surface patrol. At

0600 (I) Abandoned search.

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19 November 1945

Case 9, No. C-4 (Cont.)

DDs and moon. Decided to try for position ahead of submerged attack. As we swung to take up an intercepting course the DDs sighted our broadside -- the SJ range at this time being 6,500 yards. Radio reported Jap ship close at hand sending out urgent alarm swung hard right and headed directly for HADDOCK -- angle on the bow zero. We were now at flank speed (20.4 knots), and running away in an attempt to discourage him from a prolonged chase. This hope was quickly proven slightly optimistic. The range decreased in leaps and bounds and TDC reported DD speed as 28 knots. When range was 4,000 yards, dove. Turned hard right through 90° on the way down and started to level off at periscope depth to fire stern tubes. Realized that DD making 28 knots would cover the remaining 3,000 yards in a little over 3 minutes. Decided this was shooting too much on the fly and ordered deep depth. (Regretted not firing stern tubes just prior to diving -- zero gyro -- zero attack). As we passed 300 feet the first pattern of depth charges exploded. They seemed to be directly overhead but shallow. Negative tank flood had not been closed promptly after blowing on the way down, and negative had re-flooded to 8,500 lbs. As a result we did not get leveled off until we reached 397 feet. During the next twenty-minutes three more patterns were dropped, a total of fourteen charges. All were close, but shallow, due partly to the fact that we were between 360 and 397 feet during most of the attack. No apparent damage from depth charging or exceeding test depth.

0219 (I) Moonset.

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R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 10

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:	SIYURA	12/1242 January
TO:	REHI 4 Yurane	JN 40 SMS 250
INFO:	UHI 3 (Comb Fleet) NUHI 2 RATUHI MIHI 3 (Cardiv same as TIYA 2)	

The Commanding Officer of the #1 Ganges Maru will take command of the #1 Ganges Maru and the Kiho Maru and escort the army convoy bound for Manila as far as 9-10N, 130-00E. After turning the convoy over to the DI Force (in case rendezvous is not made they will proceed independently) will carry out anti-sub patrol in the path of #3 convoy of 1st Transportation Force. (Juzan Maru Shinkyō Maru and Shikinami. Speed 9 knots. Will pass through following points. At about 0100 Jan. 16 8-50 N, 133-45 E. At about 0700 7-50 N, 134-00 E. Will enter from the West Channel). Reply requested.

GI COMMENT: Note How agrees with NSS on 1st point, disagrees on 2nd. Agrees with T2W on 2nd point, disagrees on 1st.

(Jan-13/DI)/

Frupac D.T.B.
1-13-43 (p.22)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM:	CTF 7	14/0215 January
TO:	SEARAVEN	
INFO:	CINCPAC	
PREC:	OPERATIONAL PRIORITY	

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 10, No. B-1 (Cont.)

CONVOY SPEED 9 KNOTS X TWO ESCORTS BUT NO DD
POSITION 1600 GCT JAN 15 08-50 NORTH 133-45 EAST X
POSITION ABOUT 6 HOURS LATER 07-50 NORTH 134-00
EAST X THIS ULTRA FOR HIRAM CASSIDY X EQUATION

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Searaven

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception for the entire patrol seemed very good, however, three serials from Comsubpac were never received and the reason for this is being investigated upon arrival, Pearl. (p.27)

No. C-2

January 13

- 0340*- Sighted land bearing 075 degrees - 150 degrees, estimate distance 10 miles. After daylight obtained several series of cuts which would place us either seven or seventeen miles off TOAGEL MLUNGUI PASS. Could positively identify only the six hundred foot hill.
- 0850 - Sighted several columns of smoke bearing 141 degrees (T), distant about 10 miles.
- 0907 - Smoke was blowing to southward giving impression of ships on a northerly course. Came to course 056 degrees to close.
- 0918 - Made out masts giving convoy a westerly course. Came to course 200.
- 0929 - Changed to course 220 degrees.
- 0959 - Convoy was dead ahead at 7000 yards range so came to course 270 degrees. Convoy course around 290 degrees at this time. Decided to trail to try to ascertain

Case 10, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- base course and speed. (See Section 5 and 7 for full description of convoy).
- 1049 - Sighted seaplane.
- 1130 - Decided convoy was on base course 300 degrees (T), speed 9-10 knot. Thought over the situation for rest of day. Figured convoy would be 54 miles ahead at the time we could surface. With luck we could be ahead in position for attack at daylight. This would mean considerable time absent from our patrol area but by staying in the area we would have no assurance of other targets in a position for attack. Decided to take a chance and give chase, the success in finding the two ships on the tenth exerted considerable influence in making this decision.
- 1835 - Surfaced and gave chase on course 300 degrees, charging on one engine and running on three. Placed fourth engine on propulsion at end of battery charge.

January 14

- 0210 - Figured we should be within 10 miles of convoy. Changed course to 306 degrees to pass to starboard.
- 0400 - Figured we should be abeam. Visibility very poor due to rain squalls. Came back to course 300 degrees.
- 0612 - Nothing in sight. Convoy position at this time estimated to be 15 miles bearing 161 degrees. Changed course to 251.
- 0707 - When four miles to SW of estimated convoy track came to course 120 degrees. Slowed to 12 knot. Planned to run to the convoy 8 knot position circle then make a run for their 10 knot position circle on track between PALAU and SIARGAO PASSAGE.
- 0740 - Sighted smoke bearing 160 degrees distant about 15 miles. Developed into several columns of smoke.

Case 10, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0745 - Built up to 16 knot. Changed course to 290 degrees. Figured from navigational positions convoy was on base course 298 degrees, speed 9 knot.
- 0800 - Came to course 266 degrees taking position 15 miles ahead.
- 0901 - Changed course to 221 degrees.
- 0907 - With convoy bearing 123 degrees (T), distant 15 miles submerged and commenced approach and attack. Did not continue on until dead ahead as I thought position was good enough and by staying on surface we might be spotted by a plane and spoil the whole affair. (See Sections 5 and 7 for further details).
- 1132 - Fired four torpedoes.
- 1220 - Back to periscope depth. The only thing in sight was a small AS vessel in the vicinity of where the convoy had been. He was cruising around on various courses in a small area. Couldn't tell whether he was looking for us or for survivors.
- 1800 - Decided to move to a spot about twenty miles NE of the PALAU-SAN BERNARDINO track then, head for PALAU, hoping that traffic might be diverted in this direction after the previous two attacks. Considered trying to locate the convoy again but decided the chances of success were too slim.

January 15

- 2000 - Rainy and overcast. No fix since 1100 January 13.

January 16

- 0835 - Sighted two MARUS hull down bearing 030 degrees on course about 120 degrees (See Section 5).

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 10, No. C-2 (Cont.)

2000 - Poor fix indicated a north westerly set.

January 17

- 0520 - Obtained good fix. Started in on course 120 degrees on PALAU-SAN BERNARDINO line.
- 0720 - Sighted transport bearing 290 degrees (T) distant about four miles. (See Section 5 and 7).
- 0740 - Fired three torpedoes. Missed.
- 1000 - Sighted seaplane bearing 330 degrees, distant 4 miles. Moved down toward DAVAO-PALAU line.
- 2049 - Received Task Group Seven 170758 addressed to SEARAVEN for action. Do not hold this code.
- 2045 - Received message giving paraphrase of the above message stating to by-pass GUAM if necessary to leave patrol area early. (pp.6-8)

No. C-3

Description of contacts

Item 7 - Date: 1/13/43 Time: 0850
Position: 7-38N, 134-15 E.
Course: 298 Speed: 9.0
Page Number and Description ONI 208-J:

Convoy of five merchantmen leaving PALAU. They were escorted by a small AS vessel of about 400 tons, stationed on the stbd flank at about 1500 yards. There may have been a second vessel on the other flank but none was seen. The convoy was in two columns of two ships about 1000 yards between columns, about

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 10, No. C-3 (Cont.)

1000 yards between ships, and with a guide stationed 1000 yards ahead on the axis. The axis and base course of the convoy was 298 degrees. The following types composed the convoy. Guide: SYOHO MARU, Page 149. She was by far the smallest of the lot. Right hand Column No. 1 - SYUNKO MARU, page 178. No. 2 TAIBUN-MARU, page 206. Left hand column No. 1 MEIYO MARU, page 195; No. 2 SEIWA MARU, page 161. The A S vessel was probably a converted trawler.

- Item 8 - Date: 1/14/43 Time: 0740
Position: 9-02-N, 130-41 E.
Course 298 Speed 9.0
Description: Same as Item 7.
- Item 9 - Date: 1/16/43 Time: 0835
Position: 8-25 N, 132-27 E.
Course: 120 Speed 10.0
Description: About 7000 ton freighter.
- Item 10- Date: 1/17/43 Time: 0720
Position 7-52 N, 134-02 E.
Course: 116 Speed 18.0
Description: KOBE MARU, Page 28.
(pp. 13-14)

Case 11

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: FUSI 20
TO: NNOSO 9 (Truk Area)
NANOE 5
HASIA 4
HEYU 9 (21st Air Group)

14/0640 January
JN 20F

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 11, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: MUUN 1 (SubChaser Div.
#1)
NUUKO 3 (Ataka Maru)
NOU 4
NOSI 20 (2nd Fleet)
KIOSI 3 (4th Harbor Affairs
Truk)

Today 14 Jan at 1400 the Chuuyoo (Chūyō) Murasame and Uranami will enter through the south channel. On 15 Jan (?) (Several blanks follows). At 1800 course 157⁰, departing via the South Channel. At 2100 the Chuuyoo, Murasame and Uranami expect depart north channel.

Frupac D.T.B.
1-14-43, (p.59)

No. A-2

FROM: FUSI 20 (unident)

14/0640 January
JN 20F

At fourteen hours today, the Chuyo, Murasame, and Uranami will enter port via South Channel. At fifteen hours today, #17 Fukusei (course 195, after eighteen hours fifteen blank) will enter via South Channel. At twenty-one hours today, Chūyō, Murasame, and Uranami are scheduled to depart via North Channel.

(NSS-141121-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.
1-14-43, (p.63)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 11 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM: TEKU 85 14/1930 January
TO: ROMISI 17 (Inspector Serial 378
blank)
SEWIHI (CofS 4th Fleet)

#2 Surface Escort Unit Order #5.
1. Points to be passed by the #18 Mikage Maru
and designated as follows:

- A. 50 miles east of Murilo Islands.
- B. Point A 7-55N, 153-07E.
(garbled may be 150-07)
- C. North Channel.

2. Inform us again regarding your operations
schedule.

(NSS-142331-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.
1-14-43, (p.50)

No. A-4

FROM: NISEU (Heiyoo Maru) 15/1500 January
TO: RATONA (2nd Escort Force) JN 40
INFO: MITIME (CofS Yokosuka) #027
NANONO/ NARONO 29
(4th Base Force)

As designated by 2nd Escort Force's Order #4,
Heiyoo Maru will operate as follows:

1200/15th 17-31N, 144-32 E
1200/16th 13-43N, 147-57' (or 47')
(garbled receipt from T2W)
1200/17th 10-15N, 151-25
0900/18th Arrive North Channel.

(T2W-161015-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.
1-15-43, (p.38)

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 11 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: WHALE
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

15/0216 January

THIS ULTRA FOR WHALE X BELIEVE X 1 ASH (CARRIER)
2 IRONWOOD (DESTROYERS) DEPARTING FROM VICINITY
DCMF 4247 (07-42N) (151-47 E) X BLANK (COURSE) X
BLANK (SPEED) X (1200 GCT) X (15 January) X IF
UNABLE REACH IN TIME TRY SMYS (08-42N) (152-59E)
WHERE YOU MAY SEE 064 POPCORN HEADED TOWARD
DCEA 5406 (07-54 N) (153-06 E) DURING NEXT
2 DAYS X WASHBOARD

No. B-2

FROM: CTF 7
TO: TU 7.2.8
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: PRIORITY

16/0537 January

ANOTHER ULTRA FOR WHALE X 119 POPCORN 10 MILES
EAST OF FIRST POSIT GIVEN FOR 064 POPCORN IN
MY WASHBOARD AND HEADED FOR SAME POINT X TIMES
UNKNOWN BUT SHOULD BE SOON X HAIRPIN

No. B-3

FROM: CTF 7
TO: TU 7.2.8
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

16/1559 January

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 11, No. B-3 (Cont.)

ALDER X THIS IS HOT DOPE FOR SWEDE AZER X ULTRA
X SEE HER TINTYPE ON PAGE 64 OF ONI 208J X
NOON POSITS JAN 15 TO 17 INCLUSIVE 17-30 NORTH
144-32 EAST X 13-43 NORTH 147-47 OR 57 EAST X
10-15 NORTH 151-25 EAST WITH ARRIVAL NORTH DCCR
SCHEDULED FOR 9 HOURS JAN 18TH X ALL TIMES MINUS
NINE X THIS IS POSITIVE

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Whale

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio material was excellent.

No. C-2

January 15

1500 (K) Entered area; commenced closing Truk Atoll.

January 16

- 0416 (K) Commenced surface patrol on Truk Empire shipping lane.
- 1335 (K) Observed peculiar signals on SD radar indicating the close proximity of another radar; submerged. At the time visibility was zero, heavy rain and low clouds.
- 1555 (K) Sighted patrol cutter similar to our PC Boat. He was zigzagging radically at high speed. Manuevered to avoid closing patrol, as we did not want to disclose our presence. It was our belief that he was making a rendezvous with shipping enroute to Truk. The patrol soon passed out of sight in the

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 16 (Cont.)

- 1840 (K) heavy rain on a Northeasterly base course. Surfaced. Continued rectangular patrol in general vicinity.
- 1945 (K) Sighted same patrol cutter dead ahead angle on the bow zero, range about five miles. Submerged. Could not see target through periscope, but after closing, picked up his propellers drawing away in Southerly direction.
- 2001 (K) Surfaced and stood to northward thirteen miles. Here we established a search line clear of the area of operations of the patrol cutter. Kept SD radar secured.

January 17

- 0448 (K) Commenced patrolling along the Truk-Empire Route, proceeding in the direction of the Empire. Kept SD radar secured until 0800 so as to be well clear of any shore based receivers.
The peculiar signals of another radar getting stronger so far from land, and finally putting our SD out of form caused apprehension. Under such conditions we could not have detected presence of planes. Mechanical operation of SD was checked and found normal.
- 1300 (K) Started retiring search on surface, using periscope for greater range of visibility.
- 1400 (K) Sighted passenger-freighter bearing 290° true distance fifteen miles. Submerged and started approach.
- 1459 (K) Fired three torpedo spread at 1500 yards range, 90° port track, depth setting 20 feet. Three hits - one hit aft of the stack; the second blew wreckage up through forward hold; and the third hit aft.

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 17 (Cont.)

- Target started turning toward us slowly from thirteen to eleven knots. Swung hard right and obtained set up for a stern tube shot.
- 1504 (K) Fired single stern shot at range of 600 yards. Hit aft. This was a good hit, stopping the target cold. The target was sinking by the stern, took considerable port list and smoke billowed from after part of ship. Took pictures, firmly convinced this was the graveyard of another Japanese ship. Many of the crew had an opportunity to view the sinking ship through the periscope.
- 1517 (K) Having worked up to windward to observe target better, was astonished to find the fire under control and the list corrected. Water was being pumped over the side through portable hoses. Fired another torpedo from stern tubes, but this missed due to control error. Target was dead in water shooting wildly with deck guns.
- 1532 (K) Crew and passengers abandoned ship although gun crews remained at posts. Target settled about 10 feet overall and then maintained its depth. Closed and fired sixth torpedo from bow tubes set at 30 feet. This hit aft of superstructure deck.
- 1645 (K) Target still floating. Fired 7th torpedo from bow tubes set at 32 feet. This hit with terrific concussion, but did not change trim or draft of ship appreciably.
- 1701 (K) Fired 8th torpedo from stern tubes. This was heard to hit, but very little concussion was felt. It is doubtful if the torpedo exploded.
- 1809 (K) Getting dark. Target sinking slowly on an even keel, but still looked salvageable.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 11, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 17 (Cont.)

There was no sign of life on board, although it was believed the gun crews had not yet abandoned ship. Wishing to dispose of it before arrival of planes or rescue ships, fired ninth torpedo set at twelve feet. This depth setting was used in belief that the second deck was intact and keeping the ship afloat. This hit right under stack and the explosion ripped away both sides of vessel about ten feet below the main deck. Target now settled more rapidly, the main deck being a few feet from swash condition at least observation. This vessel had absorbed seven and possibly eight torpedo hits. The cargo must have been of such a nature as to prevent her from sinking more rapidly. Target was identified as Heiyo Maru (ONI 208-J, page 64).

On retiring we found ourselves in the midst of eight boats full of survivors, approximately fifty men to each boat. These men were dressed in both white and blue uniforms. One boat was passed close aboard and survivors made ready to hit the periscope with their oars.

1854 (K) Surfaced. Shortly after surfacing commenced getting radar signals in SD RADAR similar to those of the previous day. Finally secured SD, as believed that bearings were being taken on our signal. Retired to east to send despatch to Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.

January 19

Patrolling on surface enroute to channel between Fayu and Namonuito Islands, zig-zagging radically. Decided to spend

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 11, No. G-2 (Cont.)

January 19 (Cont.)

some time in that vicinity as full moon and calm seas precluded undetected approach to close vicinity of North Pass. 1300 (K) When in close proximity to where Heiyo Maru had been sunk, passed through area of considerable floating debris and oil slick. (p.4 ff.)

No. G-3

Description of Contacts

Item 3: Time and Date: Jan 17 - 1440 K.
Position: 10-13N, 151-25E.
Type: AP
Initial Range: 24,000
Min. Range: 1,000
Est. Course: 135
Remarks: Sunk. (pl2)

D - Verifications

No. D-1

FROM: HASITO 2 (Torishima Maru) 27/0900 January
TO: NANONO 29 (4th Base Force) JN 20F
INFO: SUTINI 1 (Minesweeper
#136)

At 1800/26 Jan., position 16-00 N., 149-40 E.
(Middle portion of message unreadable but mentions search for survivors, etc.) Expect enter port 1100, 28 Jan.

GI COMMENT: Torishima Maru is escorting Takasago Maru. Enroute Truk from Saipan they had been searching for survivors of the Heiyo Maru.

(NPM-272058-Jan/DI)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 11 (Cont.)

No. D-2

FROM: HA SI TO 2 27/0900 January
(TORISHIMA MARU)
TO: NA NO NO 29
(BASE FORCE #4)
INFO: SU TI NI 1 (MINESWEEPER #136)

At 1800 January 26 in position 16-00 North, 149-40 East. (Middle portion of this message unreadable, but mentions search for survivors etcetera). Expect to enter port at 1100 January 28.
COMMENT BY COM 14: TORISHIMA MARU is escorting TAKASAGO MARU from Saipan to Truk and enroute searched for HEIYO MARU survivors.
(COM 14-272058-DI)

GI COMMENT: BASE FORCE #4 is Truk. SU TI NI is identified here as TAMASONO MARU #3; this is probably the MINESWEEPER #136.
TORISHIMA MARU is MINESWEEPER #131. The TAKASAGO MARU is MINESWEEPER # 132.

R.I.S.* 1-28-43
(0800) - (p.14)

Case 12

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: TINU 9 (4th Base Force) 15/1555 January
TO: RIMEME/RIMEMA 6 JN 40
(Minesweeper #8) Serial #185

* Radio Intelligence Summary for January 28, 1943

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 12, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: AKUMUI (Tokyo Maru)
MAHI 1 (Unident)
TANU 0 (Unident)

#4 Base Operation Order #6.

The Tooei Maru at 1630 17th January will be at 4-54 North 149-22 on course 30 degrees. On the 18th Jan, at 0400 she will be at Point F (6-53 North 150-30 East) at 1000. She is scheduled to arrive South Channel. Speed 13 knots. Minesweeper #8 is to leave port as convenient about 1400 the 17th January and rendezvous with the above vessel at 4-25 North 149-04 East and escort her back.

(T2W-160039-Jan/DI)

Melb. comment: Looks like bad plotting.
G.I. Comment: Probable that rendezvous is at 171400 in said posit.

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: SILVERSIDES 7.2.5
INFO: CINCPAC

16/1052 January

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

HERE IS A HOT ONE FOR CREED AND ROY X ULTRA X
BIG BIRCH ALL SAME PAGE 262 ONI 208-J WITH
TRACK AS FOLLOWS X 1630 ON 17TH JAN 4-54 NORTH
149-22 EAST 0400 ON 18TH JAN 6-53 NORTH
150-5 EAST AND DUE TO ARRIVE SOUTH GATE
1000 18TH MAKING 13 KNOTS X ALL TIMES MINUS
NINE X MAY HAVE AN ESCORT X ELBOW

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 12 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Silversides

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception complete. Last consecutive serial sent 2722st. Last consecutive serial received 300140. Sound conditions excellent.

No. C-2

January 18

At 0103 sighted large tanker. Proceeded to position ahead on his base course 030° T and commenced submerged approach at 0219. Sighted escort, an AM or small DD astern of target. At 0255 fired four stern tubes. 46 seconds after first torpedo fired it hit target in bow completely obscuring bow in column of spray. Second hit heard and felt 15 seconds thereafter but could not be seen because of spray. Third hit, 100 seconds after first torpedo was fired hit target under stack aft. Tremendous explosion and pillar of black smoke 200' high, flame and sparks at its base and out stack. Commenced evasive tactics at deep submergence at 0258. Screws of target stopped immediately and he was not heard again. For the next quarter hour noises were heard thru the hull which sounded like the tanker breaking up. Escort came across stern and let go 8 depth charges. This barrage blew gasket off safety vent as we found later and knocked out 3 depth gauges. It became necessary to put a bubble in safety but with the gasket gone this air blew

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 12, No. C-2 (Cont.)

to the surface. The escort came over with the air bubble as a marker and let go a barrage at 0343 which jarred our teeth. He made another run 10 minutes later but was not as close. He then commenced a supersonic search until after we came up at 0700 to periscope depth. He was about 7000 yards to north of us, angle on bow zero but shortly thereafter he reversed course and pulled out of sight. Another barrage at 0817 when he was out of sight. Retired on southerly course. Sighted a zero plane at 1102 circling our position. He followed us until 1145 when he dropped one heavy depth charge about 4000 yards astern. Upon surfacing that night we found an oil leak in #5 FBT which accounted for the plane. Transferred oil to #3 FBT. A piece of the water compartment bulkhead of one of our own torpedoes was found on deck. The bridge loud speakers were wrecked again and the retaining lug on main induction failed to function so that shortly after starting up on 4 main engines the main induction slammed shut. This tore the air lock doors off in the after battery but the engines were stopped before any casualties resulted. Proceeded on four engines toward newly assigned position.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Time: 0103 L
Date: 18 Jan.
Lat: 6-21 North
Long: 150-23 East
Type: Tanker
Description: Genyo Maru Class Pg. 262.
Int. Range: 16,000
Min. Range: 10,000
T. Bear: 150
Course: 030(B)
Speed: 13
Load: Heavy
Attack: Yes
Search: 3 hits

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 13

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:
TO: RAMU 2 (Solomons Def-
ence Force)
NUHA 21 (Combined Fleet)
EFU 41 (2nd Fleet or
3rd Fleet)
KUMA 91 (8th Fleet)
NIWO 01 (11th Air Fleet)
MIKE 61
SIWASO (WE Oikawa Maru
WE)
HITE 85 (1st NGS)
FUNI 68
RIKOSU
WEWE (Transport Comdr.)
RUFU 30 (Rabaul RDO)
WEWE (#2 convoy Comdr.)
MIITORO (Shortland or
Buin RDO) (11th Seaplane
Tender Division)
WEWE (Composite Airwing
#6)
RUFU 8 (Rabaul RDO)
MIU 21 (4th Fleet Cofs)

17/1705 January
JN 40
SMS #374

#6 Transport "B" convoy (Oikawa Maru, Kenkow Maru, Kyokusei Maru, Panama Maru and escort vessel Shirayuki) under command of #3 convoy control commander on the Oikawa Maru (DAL3 Unko Shikikan) departs PT (TRUK) for RXE (Shortland) at 1400 17th January.

Noon Positions:

18th 04 ^o	18'	North 152 ^o	40'	East
19th 01 ^o	10'	North 153 ^o	40'	East
20th 01 ^o	30'	North 155 ^o	50'	East
21st 04 ^o	30'	South 156 ^o	30'	East

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 13, No. A-1 (Cont.)

At 0000 the 22nd in posit: 6° 08' S 156° 30' E
an course 215°, at 0500 arrive Northern entrance
to RXE (Shortland).

(NPM-171916-Jan/DI)

No. A-2

FROM: TONE 46
TO: YUNE 37
INFO: SAHO 10
8th Fleet
KAO 86
YORI 0
REYO 1
HERI 0

21/1202 January
JN 4G

Solomons Area Defense Force Opord 17.

1. For the time being the Akikaze will assist the Mycohoo Maru.
2. Concerning the escort of "B" convoy the Akikaze will cooperate with the Shirayuki. The position of "B" convoy at 1200 on the 21st will be 4-30 South, 156-30 East. At 0000 on 22nd it will be at posit 6-8 South, 156-30 East.

(13-Mar-DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: SILVERSIDES 7.2.5
INFO: CINCPAC
CTF 42

17/1901 January

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR SILVERSIDES X 4 SHIP CONVOY WITH ESCORT

102

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 13, No. B-1 (Cont.)

NOON POSIT MINUS 9 TIME 18th RSYQ 1840 (3-18 N
152-40 E) X FOLLOWING DAY QDEA 1040 (1-10 N 153-40
E) X RAMROD

C- Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Silversides

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete. (See I, Case 12, C-1.)

No. C-2

January 18

(For narrative of U.S.S. Silversides Report of
Fourth War Patrol for this day, see I, Case 12, C-2.)

January 19

Proceeding southeast on four engines. At 1055
dived for half hour on radar indication at three
miles. At 1245 sighted masts ahead and identified
as men of war. Commenced submerged approach. Targets
identified as three destroyers. Minimum range
attained was 7000 yards on westernmost one. They
passed to the east of us on base course 330 for Truk.
No pinging but from their moderate speed they may have
been searching. Gave up chase for main objective
at 1915 when it was evident that we would have little
chance of contact until following morning due to
visibility conditions and excessive distance caused
by dive for plane and approach on destroyers. This
would have put us well down into GUARDFISH'S area,
or possibly thru that into GREENLING'S. Retired
toward TRUK at one engine speed. (p.6)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 14

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: RAKI 8 (Surface Escort Unit #2) 16/1345 January
TO: MOYURA 3 (Comdr. Guard Division #43)
ANOMO (Enderby RDO Station)
INFO: NYA 9 (Garbled)
TUHOYU
AKIYA
REKAHI (Unident Garbled)
SISEA (Unident Garbled)

The #3 Kyosei Maru left Truk via North Channel at 1200 on the 16th in order to blank. At 1200 17th blank. Is scheduled to arrive at Palao at 1200 on the 23rd. Noon posits January: (All North and East)

Jan 18th	730 North 148-40 East
Jan 19th	720 North 146- East
Jan 20th	720 North 143-5 East
Jan 21st	720 North 140-20 East
Jan 22nd	710 North 137-10 East

(NSS-230334-Jan/DI)

No. A-2

FROM: RAKI 8 (4th Base Force) 16/1345 January
JN 20 F
TO: MOYURA 3 (43rd Guard Division)
INFO: 1 Garbled Information
NATOYU/KATOYU (1st Nav. Sect)
KOTIWA 3 (4th Weather Section)
AKIYA (Unident)
NYASO (Unident)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 14, No. A-2 (Cont.)

#3 Blank Maru will depart Truk North Channel at 2200 16th of January and will pass to Blank of Enderby at noon 17th arriving Palao 2200 23rd January to undergo (Repairs to hull)? Noon positions (all North and East) 18th 7-30 and 148-Blank O. 19th 7-20 and 146?-Blank O. 20th 7-20 and 143-05. 21st 7-20 and 140-20. 22nd 7?-20 and 137-10.

(T2W-170518-Jan/DI)

No. A-3

FROM: ROKEWI 1 (At Chichi 17/0400 January
18th to Truk) JN 40
TO: MOYOKO 30 Major SMS #162
Comm. HAS Cofs)
MARUWE 5
SONEKU 3 (5th Base Force
Saipan)
NANONO 8 (4th Base
Force)
INFO: ROHIU 6 (Combined Fleet)
HIKOKA 7 (Rabaul Area
Collect)
TIRETA 2 (8th Base Force)
USAKE 4

At 0430 on the 17th this ship will depart from Kavieng and is scheduled to arrive at Yokosuka at noon on the 29th via following noon positions:

Jan. 18 02-00 N, 150-00 E.
Jan. 19 04-38 N, 148-00 E.
Jan. 20 07-13 N, 145-55 E.
Jan. 21 10-13 N, 144-48 E.
(Remainder unreadable)

(NFM-170842-Jan/DI)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 14 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 17/2340 January
TO: FLYING FISH 7.2.7
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TARGET SERVICES ARRANGED FOR FLYING FISH GUN
PRACTICE X 200 TON WOODEN MARY X NOON POSIT
19TH DCLU 2004 (7-20 N 146-04 E) FOLLOWING
DAY DCYD 2045

(7-20 N 143-45 E) X MAY BE ARMED X ALSO FOLLOWING
ARE NOON POSITIONS FOR UNIDENTIFIED MARU WITH-
OUT ESCORT 20-22 JAN INCLUSIVE DCBZ 1355 (7-13 N

145-55 E) X XLNK 1348 (10-13 N 144-48 E) X KXNK
3013 (13-30 N 144-13 E) ALL TIMES ITEM (-9)
X ULTRA FOR DONAHO X LAMPOON

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: No difficulty copying schedules,
last consecutive serial sent;
250700/Feb. YODEL. Last con-
secutive serial received: 280118
Feb. 62. Sound conditions ap-
peared to be abnormally poor due
possibly to time of year and
seasonal conditions.

Case 14 (Cont.)

No. C-2

January 18-21 Inc.

Surface cruising. Crossed equator 0500 (K), 18th. Passed through Caroline Islands, and left TRUK 325 miles abeam to starboard.

January 22

Took heavy sea down conning tower hatch and main engine air induction valve. Partially flooded and grounded some equipment in Conning Tower, Control and Pump Rooms. Entered assigned area south of GUAM and submerged at dawn with Port Apra bearing 050° (T), distance 35 miles. High seas prohibited effective periscope patrol throughout the day. Broached in attempting to remain at periscope depth. To conserve fuel planned on remaining vicinity GUAM until necessary to vacate area for SEARAVEN, then move north in the area; examine Saipan, Tenian, and other islands in order of importance; and cover probable traffic routes.

January 23

Patrolling FORMOSA - GUAM ROUTE. Maintaining periscope patrol with difficulty. Will close GUAM and reconnoiter when seas moderate.

January 24

Submerged 15 miles from Port Apra. Stood in and observed harbor from 3-4 miles off OROTE Pt. One freighter, (resembling Sakito Maru, 7150 tons) anchored in harbor. An Aero beacon east of the harbor, a smoke stack in vicinity of Agana Bay, prominent mountains, island tangents, and the entrance light at OROTE Pt. make good

Case 14, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 24 (Cont.)

navigational bearings. A heavy sea breaks on the reef at the northern side of entrance. Five oil tanks, three painted aluminum and two red, are off Sumay. No activity noted in the harbor, no patrol off the entrance, and no new construction, air fields, etc. visible from point of observation. Plotted position of freighter while patrolling off entrance to harbor. Island blacked out during darkness.

January 25-26 Inc.

Patrolled off entrance to harbor. Freighter anchored in same position. No additional ships in harbor. Planned to patrol west of Saipan, covering Empire-Guam-Truk traffic route 27th, and decided to fire at freighter before clearing the area. Had plotted target in the same position on three successive days.

January 26

1710 (K) From a predetermined position, 1500 yards outside Calalan Bank, fired two bow tubes, twenty-five second firing interval, slow speed, 0 setting, having selected a position from the chart which showed the greatest amount of water (4 1/2 fathoms) over the reef. -----The run until the explosion confirms the range, definitely known, the amount of water thrown up in front of the target, and the smoke noticeable immediately thereafter indicates damage, although I do not believe freighter sank.

No. C-3

Contact Report:

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 14, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Time Jan 24
Position Port Apra Guam
Course Anchored
Speed 0
Type Similar to Sakito Maru,
7150 Tons.

Case 15

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: TARI blank (garbled) 19/0910 January
TO: NOKI 8 (Solomons Defense Force) JN 40 Serial 396
INFO: MANO 2 (Unident)
TIHE 7 (Rabaul Comm Unit)
TASO 98 (Air Group 19)
RIKOSU (Army Addressees Guadal)
MIHORU (Shortlands)
SIRA 41 (CofS Southwestern Area Fleet)
TIHE 31 (CofS 4th Fleet)
WOWA 31 (CofS 11th Air Fleet)
KATOYU (Nav Section Imperial Headquarters)

Information Comdr. Shipping Group, Comdr. #2
Convoy, CofS #6 Air Division. "C" Convoy Convoy
Meiu Maru, Sometono Maru, Surabaya Maru and Sinai
Maru departed Truk at 0800 19th and is supposed to
arrive Shortlands five hours 24th. Subchaser 11 and
#2 Choan Maru will escort the above named vessels
as far as 01-00 S. 156-00 E (escort relief point).

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 15, No. A-1 (Cont.)

Noon Positions:

19th	152-10 E	7 N.
20th	153-45 E	4-12 N.
21st	155-15 E	1-25 N.
22nd	156-00 E	1-52 S.
23rd	156-00 E	4-56 S.

(NSS-191451-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: SILVERSIDES (7.2.5)
INFO: CINCPAC
CTF 42

19/1332 January

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

SUBURB X ANOTHER FOR CREED X ULTRA THIS X 4 SHIP
CONVOY WITH 2 RUNTS ON GUARD X POSIT AT NOON MINUS
9 TIME 20TH RSEA 1245 (4DEG 12 MIN NORTH 153 DEG
45 MIN EAST) X DAY AFTER QDZD (1 DEG 25 MIN NORTH
155 DEG 15 MIN EAST)

NR 7 FOR SILVERSIDES

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Silversides

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Was reception complete? Yes. Last
consecutive serial sent 272235. Last
consecutive serial received 300140.
(p.16)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 15 (Cont.)

No. C-2

January 20

Ran on surface during day. At 1250 sighted smoke which was closed and identified as four freighters. As glassy sea made undetected daylight attack almost out of the question we took station ahead to attack submerged at dusk. After six hour run we had their zig plan, speed and base course. Submerged at 1818 and commenced approach, keeping to east of convoy to silhouette it in sunset. Two escort vessels sighted one leading, one trailing.

Freighters were in two columns of two ships, the leading ship in the western column looked to be about 7000 tons, and the others 5000. Later attempts at identification suggested largest ship as similar to SEIWA MARU, 7210 tons gross, page 161, the other similar to DAYNITI, PANAMA or BELGUIM MARU, 5800, 5270, 5270 and 5800 tons gross respectively. They could have been considerably larger or considerably smaller, however.

At a range of about 4000 yards they zigged away; we swung left for a straight bow shot as range was great and could not be determined with accuracy. This put us on the port beam of the leading ships and they were so disposed that the leading ship of the closer column had its bow almost at the stern of the leading ship of the far column and the second ship of the far column had its bow at the stern of the leader of the near column thus presenting three ships, bow to stern; straight bow shot gyro angle 358° on all six shots, track angle 86 port. Fired six torpedoes and at 2-20 and 2-30 heard two hits, probably on near ship, three more hits at 2-40 2-50 3-04 probably two on leading ship of far column and one on other ship in far column. We were then dead ahead of one escort so went deep immediately and rigged for depth charge attack. The sound of ships breaking up was clearly heard for next half hour, also sharp cracks which may have been gun fire. Much scurrying about on part of escorts. Sound tracked them without

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.F. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 15, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 20 (Cont.)

trouble and heard only one merchant ship screw after attack. All four clearly audible before firing. There was so much noise from the vicinity of attack however, that sound reception was not good. The five explosions heard were definitely torpedo hits, both from the sound of their explosions, times from firing checking very closely with estimated torpedo runs, the fact that eight knot freighters would not drop depth charges and had the escort dropped charges they would have been much closer and louder since he was at a range of about 1000 yards when the last torpedo explosion was heard. Depth charging commenced at 2018. A supersonic search commenced; six charges were dropped, last one at 2152 none close. It is fortunate that he wasn't close as we had developed an air leak which was very loud in sound gear and #6 tube outer door was jammed open. Surfaced at 2308. Put a man over side to determine cause of outer door jamming with no results. Left area at full power. (pp.6-7)

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

No. 21

Date	19 January
Time	1245 L
Lat	2-26 N
Long	152-46' E
Type	3 Destroyers
Description	In loose column
Int. Range	20,000
Min. Range	7,000
T. Bear	150
Crse	330(b)15
Spd Load	- - -
Attack	No
Remarks	None

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 15, No. C-3 (Cont.)

No. 22

Date	20 January
Time	1250 L
Lat	3-52 N
Long	153-56 E
Type	Convoy
Description	4 freighters 2 DM escorts
Int. Range	20,000
Min. Range	3,000
T. Bear	355
Crse	140 (b)
Spd Load	- - -
Attack	Yes
Remarks	5 torpedo hits in 3 leading freighters

D - Verification

No. D-1

FROM: SILVERSIDES
TO: CTF 7
INFO: CINCPAC

20/1425 January

PREC: PRIORITY

3 HITS INTO BIRCH MENTIONED YOUR ELBOW X LOADED
AND ESCORTED AND 5 HITS INTO 3 BEECHES YOUR SUBURB
X RUNTS PREVENTED OBSERVATION RESULTS X CHASED
RAMROD QD BUT NOT SIGHTED X GOT 1 SPRUCE IN PO-
SITION DESCRIBED LEGENT X RSVN (4 NORTH 254 EAST)

BIRCH - TANKER
BEECH - FREIGHTER
SPRUCE - SUBMARINE

No. D-2

(See I, Case 18, B-1)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 16

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: No originator 19/1405 January
TO: TINO 9 (Unident) JN 40
YAI 51 (COS Yokosuka) Serial 413
INFO: 8 Others

(Part 1)

Asama Maru departed Truk for Yokosuka at 1200
19th scheduled arrive 1000 24th. Destroyer Ygunagi
will escort her until 0600 21st to point N. 16--45
E. 149.

Noon Positions 20-23rd follow:

12-17N, 151-32E.
18-14N, 148-7E.
23-42N, 144-00E.
N. 29-35E. 140-50.

(Part 2)

Passengers military personnel 408, others 1115
865 Cubic meters of cargo.

(T2W-191348-Jan/DI)

Frupac D.T.B.
1-19-43, (p.48)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 20/0157 January
TO: HADDOCK
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 16, No. B-1 (Cont.)

PERMISSION GRANTED HADDOCK TO LEAVE AREA FOR THIS
BEAUTY X ULTRA X OIL POPCORN X BLANK (COURSE X
BLANK (SPEED) X -900 (0300 GCT) X ± 8 (23 JAN)
X HCZY 3550 (29-35 N 140-50 E) X SAME DATA PREVIOUS
DAY AT JRNK 4200 (23-42 N 144-00 E) S NO MAHOGANY
(PATROL BOAT)

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Haddock

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio reception: Complete. (See I, Case 9, C-3
for detailed report.)

No. C-2

January 21

Patrolling along TOKYO-O'SHIMA traffic
lane. Surfaced with full moon -- seas
calm. Set course to clear area and carry
out special mission.

- 1949 (I) Sighted DD or patrol boat on starboard bow --
SJ had not made contact. Dove.
- 2010 (I) Surfaced -- all clear.
- 2217 (I) Sighted DD or patrol boat on port beam
-- SJ had not made contact. Dove.
- 2316 (I) Surfaced -- all clear.
(Extremely bright moonlight made maneuvering
on surface to obtain position ahead for
submerged attack impracticable -- a lesson
learned the hard way on the night of
January 15).
- 2340 (I) Cleared area. Narrative from this time
until 2130 January 25, is subject of
separate secret letter.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 17

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

20/0940 January
JN 40
SMS #422

Information addresses: Comdr. troops embarked;
#2 convoy.

Comdr: CofS #6 Air Division.

The 6th D Convoy (Taihei Maru; Kamo Maru;
Shinryu Maru; Makassar Maru; --- Sei Maru;
Waura Maru and Miike Maru) departed Truk at
1800 19th of January, for Rabaul. The Miike
Maru separates and (proceeds singly (?)) at
posit N. 07-00 E 152-10 and is scheduled to
arrive Rabaul at 1700 22nd January. D Convoy
is scheduled to arrive Rabaul 0800 24th Jan-
uary Commander #31 SubChaser Division in com-
mand of SubChaser #12 and #2 Choko Maru will
escort as far as turning over escort duty
point N 00-23 E 152-10.

Noon Positions as follows:

1. Miike Maru - 20 Jan Point J; 21 Jan 01-10 N,
152-10E. 22 Jan 04-30 S, 151-50E.
2. "D" Convoy - 20 Jan. Point J; 21 Jan 03-44 N,
153-10 E; 22nd Jan. 00-20 N, 153-10 E.
23 Jan. Steffen Strait.

(NPM-201502-Jan/DI)/

(GI POSITS FOR 21ST & 22 Changed to 152-10 E.
by a correction from originator.)
(See pages 140, 141, 142, 144.)

No. A-2

FROM: ROTE 8
TO: TAU 0
TUNI 1 (Solomons
Area Defense Force)

20/0940 January
JN 40
Serial 422

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 17 (Cont.)

No. A-4

FROM: ROTE 8 (#2 Sea Escort Force) 20/0940 January
JN 40
TO: TAU 0 (Rabaul Area Defense Force) Ser 422
TUHO 1 (garbled)
INFO: KATOYU (1st Section NGS, IQH.)
MOSE 2 (CofS Combined Fleet)
RATE 51 (Cos 8th Fleet)
(Enciphered Captain Miike Maru)
YUYASE (#2 Choko Maru)
IROKE 2 (Comdr. #21 Air Group-Truk)
(and several others)

- 1) The Miike Maru will pass through the following positions - May be noon positions -
Jan 20th Point "J"
Jan 21st 01-10 N., 152-10 E.
Jan 22nd 04-30 S., 151-50 E.
- 2) Convoy (D) will pass through the following positions - May be noon positions -
Jan 20th Point "J"
Jan 21st 03-44 N., 153-10 E.
Jan 22nd 00-20 N., 153-10 E.
Jan 23rd Steffen Strait.

(NSS-202251-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 20/1842 January
TO: TU 7.2.5
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ORIGINAL

19 November 1945

Case 17, No. B-1 (Cont.)

CONVOY HEADED SOUTH POSIT LTEA 4410 (LAT 03-44
NORTH LONG 153-10 EAST) NOON 21ST -9 X ULTRA
FOR CREED

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Silversides

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete. (See I, Case 15, C-1)

No. C-2

January 21

At 0056 sighted patrol vessel searching to southward; we ducked into a rain squall and proceeded north. Commence submerged run before sunrise. During day it became evident we had large air leak but unable to find where. Upon surfacing just at sunset put man over side again to look at #6 tube. The torpedo was stuck in the tube, half was out. Tried to pack impellor with grease preparatory to firing but unsuccessful so backed emergency and fired. While lying to it was found we had a good size fuel leak; source of air leak still undetermined. Shortly after starting ahead, an explosion occurred in #1 main generator caused by salt water which had leaked past the compensating water valve gland to #5 FBT and dripping on the terminals to the forward battery cable, causing short circuit. This gland apparently loosened by depth charging. At the same time break down of the main induction operating gear revealed a box of breakfast food under the bell crank lever. Thus with a dangling torpedo with war head attached, a fuel and air leak an explosion in a main generator and Cream of Wheat in the main induction, all within two hours time, it was decided to leave the area two days ahead of schedule unless leaks can be stopped.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 18 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: COMINCH ALL NAVSEAFRONS
OPNAV
COMSOPAC ALL TF COMSPAC
COMNAVEU
INFO: COMS LESS LANT, CARIB, GULF
PREC: PRIORITY
21/0247 January

SILVERSIDES CLAIMS 5 HITS IN 3 SHIPS OF CONVOY
BOUND SOUTH OUT OF TRUK X RESULTS UNKOWN X BELIEVE
THIS TO BE CONVOY SCHEDULED ARRIVE SHORTLAND MORNING
OF 24 JANUARY X ULTRA X CINCPAC BULLETIN 311 X
STILL ANOTHER CONVOY OF 6 MARUS LEFT TRUK 20TH FOR
RABAU WHERE WILL ARRIVE 1000 L 24TH VIA STEFFEN
STRAIT X NOTHING NEW ON CARRIERS NOTED X SUBS
SOUTH AND EAST ACCORDING USUAL METHOD X 12154 X
08156 X 2 OTHERS KNOWN DEPARTED TRUK 19TH ENROUTE
SOUTHWARD X EVIDENCE MANOKWARI IN DUTCH NEW GUINEA
EITHER OCCUPIED BY JAPS OR SOON WILL BE X JAPS
STUDYING DEFENSE OF NETHERLANDS INDIES X EXPECT
FORTIFICATIONS IN BALI? TANIMBAR ISLANDS AND AT
WAINGAPU ON SUMBA ISLAND TO BE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Silversides

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radiø Reception: Complete. (See I, Case 15, C-1.)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 18 (Cont.)

No. C-2

(Note: For January 20, see I, Case 15, C-2;
For January 21, see I, Case 17, C-2.)

January 22

Because of damaged ship, set course for designated departure point.

January 23

Left area en route PEARL.

Case 19

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:

TO:

NOTU 4
WEO 4
NUO 5
TAO 8 (11th Air Fleet
YAFU 9

INFO:

MAME 1
KEMO 2

From: Comdr. Advance Force
Advance Force Opord #125

21/0655 January
JN 25 D 13

C.O. Nagara upon joining up with the Atago and 39090X assume tactical command for the duration of the cruise to Truk only.

(NPM-230502-Jan/DI)

Coincidental with Zuikaku arrival Truk traffic for OinC 3rd Fleet now being routed to Truk

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 19, No. A-1 (Cont.)

indicating that command in Zuikaku.

(T2W-230118-Jan/TI)

No. A-2

FROM: TOE 05 (Staff 2nd Sea Escort Force) 22/1530 January
JN 20 F
TO: KEUHO 2 (Unident)
NUUKO 3 (Ataka Maru)
WANANO 4 (SubChaser Div. #58)
NNOSO 5 (Unident)
INOE 3 (Unident)
RUNU 9 (#19 Air Group)
INFO: HINU 90 (Unident)
KIOSI 3 (4th Harbor Affairs)

Tomorrow 23rd January. Arrivals. Early morning. 7 (or 8) Kiku Maru (course 105). (1300). Musashi, Zuikaku, Zuihoo, DesDiv 10. And Yukikaze (course 180). Departures. 1000. #2 Unyo Maru (course 305).

All entering via North Channel.

(T2W-230035-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 22/0827 January
TO: TU 7.2.8 (WHALE)
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR WHALE X BELIEVE ENEMY MAY BE SENDING
SUBMARINES TO GET YOU IN LOCATION WHERE YOU SUNK
LARGE BANYAN X IF STILL THERE GET CLEAR X DCEA
5507 (07-55 N 153-07 E) APPEARS TO BE FOCAL POINT
FOR IMPORTANT SHIPPING X LARK X

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 19 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Whale

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: RADIO material was excellent.

No. C-2

January 22

Patrolling on surface across Fayu-Namoniuto Islands Channel.

0958 (K) Sighted what was believed to be a periscope and periscope shears of a breaching submarine, range about 6000 yards. The object soon disappeared. Submerged and closed point, but could see nothing. Neither was anything detected on sound gear.

1030 (K) Sighted a fishing vessel of peculiar construction. Although it had no sails furled it was analyzed as having a speed of three knots. Sound could detect no screw noises. Being submarine conscious by now, we let the vessel alone.

January 23

Decided to spend this day patrolling in the same vicinity submerged, hoping enemy submarine would cooperate by running on the surface. No submarines were sighted, however, but at

1710 (K) Sighted destroyer of Fubuki class, angle on bow ten port, range 8000 yards. At range 5000 yards he zigged left 90 and quickly disappeared over the horizon headed toward Truk. Thinking he may have

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 19, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 23 (Cont.)

been making a sweep for some larger vessel, continued patrol in direction from which he came. Nothing was sighted. Made a large sweep of the area after surfacing but found nothing.

January 24

Patrolling submerged along Truk-Empire steamer lane, closing point where we had seen patrol vessel on January 16.

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 20

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: NAI ? 21/2800 January
TO: Transport Convoy Momoha JN 40
Maru (enciphered) SMS #373
INFO: RATONA (2nd Sea Escort
Force)
SONEKU (5th Base Force
Saipan)

This ship to carry out escort of your convoy will depart Saipan Jan. 22. At 1200 Jan. 23 will arrive at rendezvous point 15-10N, 141-40E. Can you arrive at above point at that time.

(NPM-220804-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 22/0831 January
TO: CTG 7.2
INFO: ---

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

YODEL X IF YOU CAN MAKE IT A GROUP OF CARGOES IS TO MEET A COPY AT POSIT GHCT 1040 (15-10 N 141-40 E) NOON -9 23 JANUARY X THIS ANOTHER ULTRA FOR DONAHOO X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete. (See I, Case 14, C-1.)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 20 (Cont.)

No. C-2

January 22-24, inc.

(For detailed report of activity of Flying Fish during these days, see I, Case 14, C-2.)

Case 21

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: ROKEWI 1 (At Chichi 17/ 0400 January
18th to Truk) JN 40
TO: MOYOKO 30 (Major Comm. SMS #162
HAS Cofs)
MARUWE 5
SONEKU 3 (5th Base Force
Saipan)
NANONO 8 (4th Base Force)
INFO: ROHIU 6 (Combined Fleet)
HIKOKA 7 (Rabaul Area Collect)
TIRETA 2 (8th base Force)
USAKE 4

At 0430 on the 17th this ship will depart from Kavieng and is scheduled to arrive at Yokosuka at noon on the 29th via following noon positions:

Jan. 18 02-00N., 150-00E.
Jan. 19 04-38N., 148-00E.
Jan. 20 07-13N., 145-55E.
Jan. 21 10-13N., 144-48E.
(Remainder unreadable)

(NPM-170842-Jan/DI)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 21 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: ROKEWI 1 (Kihawa Maru) 22/1100 January
JN 40
#163

This ships scheduled posits after 22nd noon:

22: 14-50N, 143-50E
23: 18-05N, 143-20E
24: 21-25N, 142-55E
25: 24-40N, 142-20 (40)E
26: 28-00N, 141-35E
27: 31-10N, 140-40E
28: 34-20N, 138(9,-40E.
29: 0900 - arrive Yokosuka

(NPM-221416-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 21/0334 January
TO: TUNNY
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: PRIORITY

1 BEECH (FREIGHTER) NO MAHOGANY (PATROL BOAT)
X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X MINUS 900
(0300 GCT) X PLUS 10 25TH) X JRQR 2542 (23-25
NORTH 142-42 EAST) X SAME DOPE FOLLOWING DAY
AT ZVCT 3058 (26-30 NORTH 141-58 EAST) X ULTRA
FOR TUNNY IF DONAHO DID NOT CONNECT FARTHER SOUTH.

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 21 (Cont.)

No. B-2*

FROM: CFT 7
TO: TUNNY
INFO: CINCPAC

22/2212 January

PREC: PRIORITY

FOLLOWING ULTRA FOR TUNNY IS CORRECTION TO
MY NOURISH X 1 BEECH X BLANK X MINU 900 X
PLUS 9 X WSQR 2555 (21-25 NORTH 142-55 EAST)
X SAME DOPE FOLLOWING DAYS AT PXQR 4020
(24-40 NORTH 142-20 EAST) AND RMCT 0035 (28-00
NORTH 141-35 EAST) X YACHT X

C - Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Tunny

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was good except
the first hour that NPM shifted
to high frequency. Comsubpac
serial number five and twenty-two
were missed. Last serial sent 1.
Last serial received 49. (p.13)

*The similarity between ship position for January
25, 1941 given in these two dispatches leads us to
believe that 222212 is a correction to 210334.
The first however, is not apparently Serial "Nourish",
so that it is possible that 222212 is a correction
to a ComSubPac dispatch not here available.

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 21 (Cont.)

No. C-2

January 25

1630 Sighted several lighted sampans or trawlers in Lat. 25-30N, Long. 140-30E. Dived to avoid detection as the larger ones appeared suspicious.

January 26

0530 Sighted two masts and a stack over the horizon. As the angle was excessive circled around him to gain position ahead and dove. Upon closing target was found to be a trawler of about 400 tons. As it was past sunset did not have an opportunity to reconnoiter submerged so surfaced and opened fire with deck gun. As the trawler was large enough to be armed did not close to automatic weapon range. Fired thirty-two rounds, gun jammed, no hits. As it was growing dark discontinued attack and resumed course toward area. The performance of the flashless powder was very good. (p.1)

January 27

0230 Sighted large sampan or trawler. Lat. 23-05N, Long. 130-40E.
1500 Entered patrol area. (p.2)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 21 (Cont.)

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

Item 1 -- Date & Time: 1630/25 Jan.
Position: 24-30N, 140-30E.
Description: Sampans or trawlers.

Item 2 -- Date & Time: 0530/26 Jan.
Position: 23-45N., 137-10E.
Description: Trawler-(p.9)

Case 22

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

(The intercepted Japanese dispatch is not available.
Ed. Note)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: STINGRAY
INFO: CINCPAC

23/0311 January

PREC: PRIORITY

BELIEVE 1 SPRUCE MAY BE OPERATING VICINITY AREA
22 X ULTRA FOR STINGRAY X SLEEPY X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Stingray

Sixth War Patrol

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 22 (Cont.)

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception was satisfactory. All messages addressed to the Stingray and a complete series of ComSubPac messages, with the exception of ComSubPac serial 22 were received. (p.8)

No. C-2

January 22

1100 (Y) Crossed 180th meridian.

January 24

Sighted enemy plane distance six miles. Made quick dive.

0812 (M) No radar contact. Position: Lat. 08-55N, Long. 175-39E.

1012 (M) Surfaced; all clear.

1032 (M) Sighted enemy plane, believed to be two engine bomber, distance seven miles, bearing 270°R. No Radar contact. Made quick dive when plane headed towards us. Position: Lat. 08-44N Long. 174-23E.

1526 (M) Surfaced; all clear.

0330 (M) Entered area.

January 25-26

Conducted submerged and surface patrol north of Mille Atoll. Submerged patrol conducted within five miles of Tokowa Island. No activity of any sort noted. (p.1)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 23

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: SOFU/SOU 9 23/1520 January
TO: ISASU 3 (Commanding Officer Subchaser #10) JN 20
HIHA 1
RIWO 5
INFO: SOTE 80 (Cofs 2nd Fleet)
KIWO 0 (Cofs Combined Fleet)
TIHA 50 (Cofs 4th Fleet)
HEWO 1 (Base Force #6)
TITUMA 3 (Comdr. Guard Division #62)
AURATO 2 (Comdr. Guard Division #4)

The Caroline Area Defense Force Operations order #27-1) The Shiretoko on January 24 at 0700 will leave PT (Truk), and will arrive at PY (Jaluit) Northeast Channel on January 30th at 0900. The following points will be passed:

TIME	DATE	POINT	PLACE
1 30	26th	A	158 57 E., 08 40 N.
1500	27th	B	161 30 E., 08 30 N.
0600	30th	C	169 25 E., 06 23 N.

2/ #10 Subchaser Captain, under direction of the Shiretoko Captain, will provide close escort from PT (TRUK) to Point B.

(NSS-232326-Jan/DI)

No. A-2

FROM: SOFU 9 23/1520 January
TO: ISASU 3 (Hagoromo Maru) JN 20F
HIHA 1
RIO 5

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 23, No. A-2 (Cont.)

INFO: SOTE 80
KIWO 00
HEWO 1
FURATO 2 (42nd Guard Force)
TITUMA 3 (62nd Defense Force)
TIHA 50

Caroline Area Defense Force Radio Op. Ord. #27
1) The Shiritoko (Shiredoko) departs (PP)-Palau
24 Jan. at 0700 and on the 31st/0900 arrives at
the (Northern?--? Hoppoo?) Channel ---- Positions
1730 January 26 Point A 08 40 N., 158 57 E.
1500 " 27 Point B -- 30 N., 161 30 E.
0600 " 30 Point C 08 23 N., 169 25 E.

Subchaser #10 (will escort?) from P? to Point B.
(January 23 DI)

No. A-3

FROM: NAFUI 6 (6th Base Force) 24/0720 January
TO: TENIU 5 (Shirotori ?) JN 40
INFO: SASIKE 5 (Sheretoko) Serial #511
RUWATO 3 (#42 Guard
Division)
NANONO 4 (4th Base Force)
SEKEHI 3 (CofS 4th Fleet)
ISASU 6 (SubChaser #10)
RITERO 7 (Shosho Maru)
RIRUMA 3 (Unident)
NEUTU 7 (Jaluit Sea Defense Force)

Katsura Maru is to abandon her search for
Iwashiro Maru undertaken in accordance with my
serial 211546. She is to operate as follows:
After completion duty of escorting Nakizan Maru
she is to proceed Ponape and maintain state of
readiness. Leaving Harbor as convenient in order
to meet Shiretoko at 1500 27th in position 8-15
North 161-30 East and take over escort duty
from SubChaser #10. She will escort Shiretoko

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 23, No. A-3 (Cont.)

into Jaluit.

(T2W-250046-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 24/0305 January
TO: WHALE
INFO: POMPANO

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

THIS ONE IS TO AZER FOR ACTION X THOMAS FOR
INFORMATION X ULTRA X 1 SLOW BIRCH (TANKER)
NOT OVER 10 KNOTS EAST BOUND X POSITIONS 1730
JAN 26 -9 TIME SMUG 4057 (8-40 NORTH 158-57 EAST)

No. B-2

FROM: CTF 7 25/0146 January
TO: WHALE
STINGRAY
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

MY 240305 FOLLOWING ULTRA FOR WHALE IS ADDITIONAL
DOPE ON SAME BIRCH (TANKER X BLANK (COURSE) X
BLANK (SPEED) X-330 (0830 GCT) X PLUS 11 (26TH)
X SMUG 4057 (08-40 NORTH 158-57 EAST) X AND
BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X -600 (0600 GCT)
X PLUS 12 (27TH) AT SMTS 3030 (08-30 NORTH
161-30 EAST) WHERE LOCAL COP LEAVES HIM X
FOLLOWING IS FOR OTUS EARLE IF HE GETS BY AZER
X BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X PLUS 900
(2100 GCT) X PLUS 14 (29TH) X MVRB 2325 (6-23
NORTH 169-25 EAST) THENCE TO 0438 (6-04 NORTH
169-38 EAST)

REF: 1 SLOW BIRCH NOT OVER 10 KNOTS

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 23 (Cont.)

No. B-3

FROM: CTF 7
TO: WHALE
SINGRAY
INFO: CINCPAC
RUNNER

25/1522 January

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

IN MY 250146 POSITION FOR 27TH SHOULD BE 15
MILES FARTHER SOUTH X ULTRA X IN MY 250730
WHALE ADD POSIT XLZD 5050 (10-50 NORTH 155-50
EAST)

REF: 250146 MY 240305 FOLLOWING ULTRA FOR WHALE
IS ADDITIONAL DOPE ON SAME BIRCH (TANKER) X
BLANK (COURSE) X BLANK (SPEED) X -330
(0830) GCT X PLUS 11 (26TH) X

REF: 250730 195 POPCORN X 1255 (COURSE 330
DEG) X 0 (SPEED 10) X -900 (0300 GCT) X
PLUS (26TH) X NO POLICE X ULTRA FOR AZER
IF IN VICINITY

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Whale

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio material was excellent.

No. C-2

January 24

Patrolling submerged along Truk-Empire
steamer lane, closing point where we had
seen patrol vessel on January 16.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 25

Patrolling on surface along Truk-Kwajalein steamer lane.

2212(K) Sighted smoke in bright moonlight bearing North, distance 13,000 yards. Made radar track and estimated course of vessel as 083°. Made high speed and run to gain favorable position ahead.

2328(K) Submerged ahead of target, on its track, range 12,000 yards. Commenced radar approach.

January 26

0004(K) When range was reduced to 3000 yards and target was clearly visible in periscope, went to periscope depth. Considered visibility under bright moon too good for an undetected radar approach.

0008(K) Fired 3 torpedo spread from the stern tubes at target tentatively identified as AO, SYOYU MARU (ONI 208-J, page 273), first torpedo hit amidships. A few seconds later the second torpedo exploded prematurely. This would have hit about 75 feet inside the bow had it finished its run. The third torpedo was not seen or heard to explode. The tanker's engine stopped and a red flare was fired. This was the first indication we had that an escort was present, although a periscope sweep at the time failed to reveal the escort.

We were getting a setup for a fourth torpedo when the tanker started engines and turned toward us. Two deck guns commenced firing in our general direction. We went hard left to open the range for the fourth torpedo, but before we could get a TDC set-up that was analyzing correctly, sound picked up fast screws approaching from the port beam. A quick periscope

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 23, No. C-2 (Cont.)

check revealed a PC boat, angle on the bow zero, close aboard and coming in fast. Went ahead full to clear escort's track, but when his bearing did not change appreciably, started deep. We were passing 160 feet when the first depth charge exploded with considerable sobering effect, breaking lights, gauges, sending men reeling from their stations, opening doors that were closed and slamming closed doors that were open. A total of eleven charges were dropped, each at a successively more comfortable distance.

- 0045(K) Propellers of escort faded; commenced coming to periscope depth.
0122(K) At periscope depth. Nothing in sight. Made radar sweep. Nothing detected.
0135(K) Surfaced. Commenced pursuit of target along base course at high speed.
0400(K) Abandoned pursuit. Decided to patrol Ponape-Empire steamer lane. (p.7)

No. C-3

Description of Contacts

Item 8 - Time: 2212 K Date January 25
Position: 8-30N, 156-40E.
Type: OA
Initial Range: 10,000
Min Range: 1100
Est. Course: 083
Remarks: Damaged by one torpedo hit. (p.12)

U.S.S. Stingray

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-4

January 24

Sighted enemy plane distance six miles.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 23, No. C-4 (Cont.)

January 24 (Cont.)

0812(M) Made quick dive. No Radar Contact.
Position: Lat. 08-55N.
Long. 175-39E.

1012(M) Surfaced; all clear.

1032(M) Sighted enemy plane, believed to be
two engine bomber, distance seven
miles, bearing 270°R. No Radar
contact. Made quick dive when plane
headed towards us.
Position: Lat. 08-44N.
Long. 175-23E.

1526(M) Surfaced; all clear.

0330(M) Entered area.

January 25-26

Conducted submerged and surface patrol
north of Mille Atoll. Submerged patrol
conducted within five miles of Tokowa
Island. No activity of any sort noted.

January 27-28-29

Uneventful patrol covering routes East,
North and North West of Jaluit.

January 30-31

Patrolled South and West of Kwajalein
Atoll.

D - Verification

No. D-1

FROM: ISASU 9
TO: NANONO 4
SASIKE 5 (Pioneer Force
#12 (B)
NISIKO 3

26/0200 January
JN 25 D-13285

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 23, No. D-1 (Cont.)

48267/X Engagement Report #2 ?

At 2305 on 25 January in posit 8-03 N, 156-17
Shiretoko (19275X) blanks escort blanks 1500
meters to port observed blanks opened fire
blanks results unknown. Some difficulty blanks.
Continuing cruise standby the Shiretoko.

(NPM-150702-March/DI) -

(Note: WHALE hit this ship at 2309 - 25 Jan)

Case 24

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A -1

FROM: YUMURE 2 (Shoan Maru) 25/0500 January
TO: HITISE (Tokyo Trans. JN 40
Sect.) SMS 094
INFO: NSOTE (Kure Comdt.)
MITIME (Yoko CofS)
ORUTE (Yoko Area Trans.
Sect.)
KOKEA 5
TAKITU 8

Departed Ponape 0430 25th scheduled to arrive
Yokohama 1200 the 4th.

Noon Posits: 26th - 10-50N., 155-50E.
28th - 17-05N., 151-50E.
30th - 23-00N., 147-55E.
1st - 28-45N., 144-20E.
3rd - 33-25N., 140-45E.

Cargo - 132 (or 136) men, 1808 tons of ?

Miscellaneous 240 cubic meters - (last part
concerning cargo in poor shape here).

(NPM-250840-Jan/DI).

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 24 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: YUMURE 2 (SHOAN MARU) 25/0500 January
TO: HITISE (Navy Transport JN 40
Section) Serial 094
NSOTE (Chief of Staff,
Kure)
INFO: MITIME (Cofs Yokosuka)
ORUTE (Yokohama Transport)
TAKITU 8 (Unite in Yokosuka Defense Force)
RATONA 7 (?) (2nd Sea Escort Force)
SIKEKE 3 (4th Fleet)
(and rest garbled)

At 0430 depart Ponape to arrive Yokohama noon
4th. Noon posits. All north and east.

26th	10	50	155	50	Cargo 4 urns.	136 personnel.
28th	17	05	151	50	1,800 tons of wood and other	
30th	23	00	147	55	miscellaneous woods	2240
1st	28	25	144	20	cubic meters.	
3rd	33	25	140	45		

(T2W-250536-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 25/0730 January
TO: WHALE
INFO: RUNNER
CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

195 POPCORN X 1255 (COURSE 330 DEGREES) X (SPEED
10) X -900 (0300 GCT) X 11 (26TH) X NO POLICE
X ULTRA FOR AZER IF IN VICINITY X

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 24 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Whale

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio material was excellent.
(No mention made of any message missed - Ed.) (p.15)

No. C-2

January 26

- 1634 (K) Sighted smoke of steamer about 16 miles on starboard bow. Began end run to gain position ahead. Lost target at dusk.
- 1950 (K) Established radar contact with target. Tracked course, and speed.
- 2148 (K) In position 13,000 yards dead ahead of target. Moon just rising. Submerged for radar approach.
- 2235 (K) Just before firing, target zigged directly toward us. Went to periscope depth and full speed to open track for stern tube shot. Only one torpedo remained aft.
- 2241 (K) Fired one torpedo from after tubes. Had a perfect set-up, echo range 1500 yards and target tracking on TDC. In the time allotted for torpedo run a dull thud was heard throughout the boat. No explosion occurred. Sound heard the torpedo running up to the instand of the thud. The target showed no consternation, whatever, continuing course and speed. Rather than swing for hasty bow shots, decided to wait until daylight for next attack.

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 24, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 26 (Cont.)

2313 (K) Surfaced. Maneuvered aground end to gain position ahead.

January 27

0200 (K) Dead ahead of target; range 12,500 yards.
0534 (K) Submerged. Ran with target to determine zigzag plan.
0620 (K) Commenced approach.
0654 (K) Fired a 3 torpedo spread, first torpedo 2° R gyro, 80° starboard track, range 1250 yards. Spread used 3°, depth setting 12 feet. After hearing no explosions in the allotted time for torpedo run, felt certain torpedoes had run deep and under. Set 10 feet depth on 4th torpedo and fired. This one also failed to explode. Target now became aware of our presence, started shooting at our periscope with the after deck gun with commendatory accuracy, and turned away presenting a 180° angle. Set fifth and sixth torpedoes on 10 feet and fired with zero gyro angle. Fifth torpedo ran slightly to the left and exploded prematurely when about two-third of the way to the target. The sixth torpedo passed right under target's stern and must have run under its full length, but failed to detonate. Target now commenced dropping depth charges and continued to draw away. Now only one torpedo remained. The poor torpedo performance in the attack on the tanker and the negative performance in the two attacks on the present target left little enthusiasm for continuing. Cleared area and when target was out of sight, surfaced. Decided to again maneuver for position ahead.

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 24, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 27 (Cont.)

During this maneuver, removed torpedo from tube and thoroughly checked all final adjustments. No deficiencies were found. The TDC was thoroughly checked and found to be generating properly. The periscope azimuth was checked with the bench mark and no error was noticed. Pit log and compass were also checked and found to be functioning properly.

1312 (X) Reached position ahead of target and submerged. Found the target no longer bothering to zigzag.

1424 (X) Fired last remaining torpedo, death setting 16 feet, 11° left gyro angle, 105° port track, range by echo and periscope 1250 yards. Hit, just abaft stack. Screw beats became irregular, slowed and finally stopped. The target listed to starboard, even though a port track was used. The estimated draft was 18 feet. The torpedo must have run under and exploded on the opposite side, where most of the damage was done. The target's guns cycled up on an imaginary submarine on its starboard head. Also there was a lot of commotion rigging a collision mat over the bow. The target had too much way on and the mat got out of hand, with the result it ended up entangled in the propeller. We circled around watching the show, proceeding up the starboard side. All life boats were manned and some were lowered. The gunners finally spotted our periscope and gave us something to worry about; so, we released a dummy periscope through the signal gun and circled back to target's port side for

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 24, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 27 (Cont.)

a more uninterrupted observation. The gunners continued to blast the dummy until they detected the ruse. The target had gradually settled about 8 feet by the bow and was a similar amount lighter aft. Boiler fires meanwhile had died and the stack stopped smoking. Some of the boats went aft to clear the collision mat. By 1700 all boats were recalled, all men were back on board and the watch was posted. Shortly after, one of the lookouts spotted our periscope to port, and shelling commenced. Later, attempts were being made to get up steam, but all attempts were still unsuccessful by night fall. We considered engaging the target with our 4 inch gun, but the target's gunners had shown too much accuracy firing at our periscope for us to risk damage. Withdrew 8000 yards and surfaced after sunset. The target was identified in all respects as MEIYO MARU class (ONI 208-J, page 195). The position it was damaged is 360 miles from the nearest land (Truk). It is quite certain that it would have to be towed to port. The target undoubtedly got off a distress signal before losing power.

2130 (K) Transmitted information to CTF 7.
2145 (K) Set course for Midway.

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Time and Date: Jan 26-1634 K.
Position: 12-10N, 155-15 E.
Type: AK

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ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 24, No. C-3 (Cont.)

Description of Contact (Cont.)

Initial Range: 30,000
Min. Range: 1,000
Est. Course: 328.2
Remarks: Badly Damaged by three separate attacks.

No. C-4

The following is an extract from paragraph 4 of COMSUBPAC Conf. Ltr. FF12-10/A16-3(5)/ Serial 0196

4. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew congratulated on their aggressive, profitable patrol, during which they are credited with the following:

SUNK

1 Transport (Africa Maru Class) - 9,500
1 Transport (Heiyo Maru Class) - 9,815
TOTAL 19,315

DAMAGED

1 Tanker (Syoyo Maru Class) - 7,500
1 Freighter (Meiyo Maru Class) - 5,600
TOTAL 13,100

D - Verification

No. D-1

FROM: YASO 42 (Staff Major 27/2223 January
Command) Serial 059
TO: AFOU 2 (Unident) JN 40
ERARI 3 (Unident)

From Shoan Maru. Am receiving torpedo attack from enemy sub. Request immediate rescue. Posit 14-24 North, 153-30 East. Radio receiver out of commission.

(NSS-271814-Jan/DI)

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TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 24 (Cont.)

No. D-2

A series of positions given by the Shoan Maru indicates that she was hit but able to proceed for a time as indicated by her position;

at 0603/27th Posit 154-33E., 13-19 N.
at 0610/27th Posit --2-31E., 13-21 N.
at 0710/27th Posit 154-30E., 13-24 N.
at 0741/27th Posit 154-20E., 13-32 N.
at 0745/27th Posit 154-20E., 13-32 N.
at 0835/27th Posit 154-02E., 13-41 N.

Intercepted at 2057/27th Posit 153-30 E., 14-24 N.

After this last she said "Request immediate aid".

(Jan-27/II).

No. D-3

FROM: YA MO 3 (4th FLEET) 28/1930 January
#334
TO: RE TA RU (All Ships Truck
Area)
MO YA HO (All Ships Saipan
Area)
SO TU HI (All Ships Palao
Area)

From Staff 4TH FLEET.

According to D/F bearing the enemy submarine which is assumed to have torpedoed the SHOAN MARU, at 2144, 27th, is moving in a direction Southwest of 152-30 E, 14-00 N. (Speed unknown).
(GZ#823-OPNAV-281705/DI) RIS Jan 28 1400, (p.13)

No. D-4

Series of positions given by SHOAN MARU indicates that she was hit, but able to proceed for a time.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 24, No. D-4 (Cont.)

At 272057 SHOAN MARU position 14-24 N., 153-30 E.
Following this in plain language was "Request
immediate aid".

(COM-14-272008/TT)

GI COMMENT: The SHOAN MARU (5624 tons, built
1937) left Ponape with general
cargo on January 25th for Yokosuka,
and reported being attacked at
13-21 N., 152-31 E. at 0610 on
the 27th. At 2223 this ship also
requested assistance and gave
position as reported by COM 14
above.

RIS Jan 28 0600, (p.14)

Case 25

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

(The intercepted Japanese dispatch is not
available.-Ed. Note)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: RUNNER
INFO: TARPON
CINCPAC

25/0830 January

PREC: ROUTINE

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 25, No. B-1 (Cont.)

SWEDE GETS FIRST CRACK DOWN SOUTH X 195 POPCORN
1254.7 (328) (COURSE) X O (SPEED) X 600 (1800
GCT) X GKQR 0027 (31-00 N 142-27 E) X ULTRA FOR
MIKE FENNO X TARPON MIGHT FIND HIM LATER AT SJZY
4230 (33-42 N 140-30 E) X NAP X OBSOLETE

No. B-2

FROM: CTF 7
TO: RUNNER (7.1.14)
TARPON (7.1.3)
INFO: CINCPAC

28/ 0105 January

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

DISREGARD MY 250830 X SWEDE AZER SERIOUSLY
ALTERED SCHEDULE OF 195 POPCORN X ULTRA FOR
FENNO AND ALSTON X MY 280100 MOST IMPORTANT
TO RUNNER X RATTY X NIMBLE

REF: 280100 - CHANGE OF ORDERS FOR RUNNER X..
CHANGE COURSE PROCEEDINTO
AREA 10.

REF: 250830 - SWEDE GETS FIRST CRACK DOWN SOUTH
X 195 POPCORN...

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Runner

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was satisfactory
as no submarine messages were
missed. This was due, however,
mainly to the fact that messages
were repeated. (p.13)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 25 (Cont.)

No. C-2

January 26-28

Very heavy head seas. Slowed to 5 knots at times. One heavy sea came over the bridge and washed one lookout off the lookout platform. He landed on the cigarette deck suffering only minor injuries. Another sea knocked the Officer-of-the-Deck into the lookout platform cutting his head and putting him off the watch list for four days.

January 29

0027 (L) Changed course for Area ___ in accordance with instructions received.

February 1

Sighted fishing or patrol boat distance 6 miles. (Contact #1). Dove and made submerged approach. This was a small fishing boat or subchaser, about 60 feet long, apparently patrolling between Marianas and Bonins. When range closed to 3000 yards decided she was too small for torpedo.

February 2

0634 (K) Patrolling on surface across track of shipping in Area ____.

0934 (K) Sighted ship. (Contact #2). Dove and commenced submerged attack. When range closed sufficiently a second ship was sighted astern of the first. Both ships were single stack freighters with kingposts forward and aft, of Yamabiko Maru

ORIGINAL

19 November 1945

Case 25, No. C-2 (Cont.)

class. They were making frequent radical zigs. Three P.C. escorts were sighted in position along the near side of the convoy. Made ready the bow tubes and at 1054 (K) fired three torpedoes at the leading ship on an 80° track at a range of about 700 yards, using a two degree divergent spread. (Attack #1). After twenty and twenty-five seconds two torpedo hits were heard. Immediately after firing the first three torpedoes, shifted to the second ship and fired three torpedoes at her at 1200 yards range and a sharper track, using a similar spread (Attack #2). Forty seconds after firing four and five respectively, two more torpedo explosions were heard. After the fourth explosion neither freighter's screw could be heard. These may have been internal explosions in targets. Sound reported crackling or rumbling noises which were targets breaking up. We were inside the screen but about 500 yards in front of the second escort at the time of firing. Altered course to evade and went to deep submergence after a quick look at the leading ship showed her settling and much brown smoke in evidence. There is no question in the Commanding Officer's mind but that both ships sank practically at once. First depth charges were heard after the second torpedo went off, none close enough to jar us much. Heard distant charges for an hour and a half, about fifty in all being dropped. Some depth control trouble was experienced and we found ourselves at 390 feet with a 10 degree up angle to hold depth at 1/3 speed. The search lasted for three hours.

1404(X) Planed up to periscope depth and could see nothing. Reloaded tubes and surfaced at 1356 (K) on course to clear area ____.

ORIGINAL

19 November 1945

Case 25, No. C-2 (Cont.)

February 2 (Cont.)

Antenna trunk was flooded on this dive from a leak at the base of the insulator.

February 3

0405(K) Having cleared Area, _____, set course for Area _____. (p.1)

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Date: 2 February 1943
Time: 0943 (K)
Course: 150
Remarks: Yamabiko Maru Cls.
Position: 20 North 142 East.
Type: 2 Freighters, 3 PC escorts
Speed: 9
Attacks: 1 and 2. (p.10)

No. C-4

Paragraph 5 of COMSUEPAC Conf. Ltr. FF12-10/
A16-3(5) / (12) Serial 0345, 3-14-43.

5. The SUMNER is credited with inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

SUNK

1 Freighter (YAMABIKO MARU Class)	-	6,799 tons
1 Freighter (CHICAGO MARU Class)	-	5,866 tons
1 Freighter (NAGARA MARU Class)	-	7,150 tons
		Total 19,815 tons

DAMAGED

1 Freighter (YAMABIKO MARU Class)	-	6,799 tons
1 Freighter (AKAGI MARU Class)	-	7,390 tons
		Total 14,189 tons

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 25, No. C-4 (Cont.)

The freighters attacked on February 2 and 19 respectively were very probably sunk, because of anti-submarine tactics by the enemy, evidence was insufficient to credit sinkings.

U.S.S. Tarnon

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-5

Radio Reception: Complete. Last serial sent 'Norway' SUBPAC serials complete until arrival at Midway.

No. C-6

January 25

During forenoon had to slow to 5 knots on account of weather. By evening we are able to increase speed to 80% on 2 engines, 8.5 kt. During afternoon, dived, held drills.

January 26

Weather improving. Making 10 knots at 80% on 2 engines. 1118 K Radar contact. Plane, 6 miles, closing. Dived. While submerged held drills, routined all torpedoes, repaired limit switch #2 periscope, and ate a meal in comfort (first one since leaving Midway). Contact 470 miles, 090° T. from Nojima Saki.

1640(K) Sighted patrol vessel, converted trawler. Closed on surface then dived to look him over. Not worth torpedo, too heavily armed for gun fight. Avoided, proceed on surface. Contact 430 miles 092° from Nojima Saki.

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 25, No. C-6 (Cont.)

January 27

- Weather good. Making 11 knots. 0632 K dawn dive, held drills, routined torpedoes. 0815(X) Surfaced proceeded at 11 knots. During afternoon a sudden violent NW storm blew up reducing speed to 6 knots, for about 2 hours.

January 28

- 0552(I) Submerged 18 miles from eastern boundary of area, conducting periscope patrol on westerly and northwesterly courses.
0700(I) Sighted patrol plane bearing 240° T distant about 3 miles on southwesterly course. Went deep for 30 minutes then resumed periscope patrol searching every 5 minutes.
1200(I) Entered Area _____.
1802(I) Surfaced closed coast at 7 knots.
1915(I) Routined torpedoes in deck tubes. Repaired leaky firing valve in #7. Completed by 2040.

January 29

- 0050(I) Made landfall on coast between Nojima Saki and Katsuura Wan.
0415(I) Sighted lights of several fishermen along coast, several to seaward. Avoided.
0535(I) Submerged 7 miles east of Iwawada Kaku. Conducted periscope patrol on SW and SSW courses 5-10 miles off shore. Many fishing sampans along this coast. As many as 20 in sight at various times. Worked inshore of main fishing fleet all day.
1912(I) Surfaced. The lights of several fishermen are in sight. During night ran E. and WSW at 7 knots.

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 25, No. C-6 (Cont.)

January 30

- 0353(I) SJ radar contact 3200 yards. Very small patrol boat or fisherman. Seen from bridge after radar contact. Boat lying to; did not see us.
- 0546(I) Submerged NW of Miyake Shima. Conducting periscope patrol.
- 1402(I) Sighted smoke to westward at least 12 miles range very faint. Attempted to close at 6 knots until 1535. Lost smoke resumed periscope patrol on southerly course.
- 1802(I) Surfaced.

During night ran south and west passing through islands just north of Hachijo Shima. Weather is very bad. Seas very rough, strong gales from WNW.

January 31

- 0600(I) Submerged in SW part of area. Riding out typhoon at 120? Depth control impossible at any less depth. Took four looks all day. Saw nothing but mountainous waves, rain, hail, and snow.
- 1810(I) Surfaced. Weather still bad. Headed north to close coast.

February 1

- Conducted periscope patrol across SW entrance to Sagami Nada. Weather improved during early morning. Nothing sighted all day. Beautiful day.
- 1830(I) Surfaced. Patrolling along routes to KII SUIDO and Manila.
- 2130(I) Radar contact. Attacked 9000 ton unescorted freighter, fired four torpedoes, 1 hit. Attacked him again, fired 2 torpedoes, 2 hits.

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 25, No. C-6 (Cont.)

February 1 (Cont.)

2324(I) Left freighter with broken back and sinking. Proceeded to SSW until morning. First attack 27 miles bearing 160° T. from Omai Saki. Second attack 20 miles bearing 171° T. Omai Saki.

February 2

Conducting periscope patrol in SW part of area.
0645(I) Sighted seaplane distant 4-5 miles.
0831(I) Sighted landplane distant 4 miles.
0938(I) Sighted seaplane distant 4 miles.
Went deep for 30 minutes.
Beginning at 1043 (I) and continuing throughout the day a total of 22 explosions were heard and felt. All were rather distant except two at 1134 (I) which were estimated at 1000-1500 yards. These two flooded the main induction necessitating withdrawal from area to effect repairs. These explosions were all aircraft bombs. It is believed that our periscope was seen by planes who spent the rest of the day bombing the general area of contact.

No. C-7

Description of Contact

Time and Date: 2130 I, Feb. 1.
Position: 34-10N, 138-25E.
Course: 230° T.
Speed: 13.25 kt.
Description: Three island well deck freighter, 9000-10,000 tons, loaded, counter stern, 2 stick masts, other cargo handling facilities not observed. Length about 500 feet.
Remarks: Believed enroute Manila. Attacked, left sinking. (p.9)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 26

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: SONINU 5 25/0821 January
TO: MOHIKE JN 40
INFO: MESEKU (Ominato SMS #717
Communication Off.)
RESIHO 3 (Unit in Northern
Patrol Force)

Kamikaze expects enter Muroran 1000/ 26 January.
Request anchorage assignment and 300 tons oil.

(NPM-251314-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 25/1215 January
TO: POLLACK 7.1.12
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

1 IRONWOOD (ENEMY DESTROYER) ARRIVING FPEY
2157 (42-21 N 140-57 E) X BLANK (COURSE) X
BLANK (SPEED) X -1100 (0100CGT) X PLUS 11
(26TH) X ULTRA FOR POLLACK X LIZARD

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Pollack

Fifth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete. (p.28)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 26 (Cont.)

No. C-2

January 26

- 0658(K) Submerged. Very light in east. Six miles from the beach. Would be light enough so that we couldn't possibly miss anyone coming down the coast. Nothing developed so that it appeared that we had been sighting the tops of peaks as the visibility had been variable, changing rapidly from 8,000 yards to unlimited as the moon passed in and out behind clouds. The strange setups on the TDC confirmed our suspicion that all was not what it seemed.
- 0745(K) Sighted a small freighter distant 8000 yards and headed northwest very close to the coast with at least a 90° stbd. angle on the bow. She was an old "well deck" vessel of 1,500-2,000 tons. Lat. 40°-32'N, Long. 141°-38' E.
- 0814(K) Changed course to close coast slightly. It seemed very close and we had difficulty getting cuts - all the peaks looked alike on the chart.
- 0912(K) Cut showed us 4 miles off the beach.
- 1025(K) Sighted a very small freighter at 5,000 yards with a 120° stbd. angle. Black and white background made it almost impossible to see a target until it hit just the right spot which always seemed too late. Lat. 40-25 N., Long. 141-44 E.
- 1038(K) Cut showed us being set toward beach so changed course to 120° T. to parallel it.
- 1832(K) Surfaced.
- 1858(K) Decided to parallel the coast on a 20 mile line for the night hoping we might run into something like we had up north.
(pp.16-17)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 27

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: UWE 9
TO: RINE 20
WOTU/WORU 86
INFO: RITU 84 (Naval General
Staff, 1st Section)
RITU 83
UHO 40
TENE 00 (CofS 2nd Fleet)
NUTO 17 (garble)
KO 0
UNE 5
KUO 90 (CofS 4th Fleet)

25/0834 January
JN 40
Serial 379

The Soyo Maru (together with the Mamiya Maru),
left Truk on the 25th at 0430 headed for Kure
and is to arrive on February 3.

Noon Posits:

From 26th to Feb. 1st.
26th - 9-58N, 157-12E
27th - Midway between Rota and Guam Islands.
28th - 17-25N, 142-37E
29th - 21-02N, 140-06E
30th - 24-37N, 137-30E
31st - 28-03N, 135-00E
1st - 31-30N, 132-20E

Feb. 1st/1200 - Taking course 335 degrees
from 31-20N, 132-20E, will pass off Fukushima
and enter the Bungo Passage. The Mochizuki
is to escort to the vicinity of Saipan.

(NSS-251124-Jan/DI) /

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 27 (Cont.)

No. A-2

FROM: ASE 9 (Activity at Truk) 25/0834 January
TO: RINE 2 (Kure CofS) JN 40
WOTUNI (garbled) SMS 379
INFO: RITU 8 (1st Nav. Gen.
Staff)
TRHE/TENE 0 (2nd Fleet)
KUU 9 (4th Fleet)
NUTOU (Sooyoo Maru)
UNE 5
NONA 5 (garbled)
AOO 0 (garbled)

SOOYOO MARU (proceeding in company with MIMIYA)
left Truk for Kure at 0430, 25th, scheduled
arrive 3 February.

1. Noon positions from 26th to 1 February
(09-58 North, 147-12 East). Latitude and
Longitude follows. (Rota and Guam Islands
center line (Positions all North and East)

27th - 17-25, 142-37
28th - 21-02, 140-06
29th - 24-37, 137-30
30th - 28-33, 135-00
31st - 31-30, 132-20

Feb. 1st - 31-20, 132-20 from which course
335, passing Fukushima enter Bungo Channel.

3. Escort Mochizuki as far as vicinity of Saipan.

(T2W-251504-Jan/TI) t

No. A-3

FROM: UFU 9 25/0834 January
TO: RINE 20 JN 40
WOTU 86 SMS 379
INFO: RITU 84 (Intelligence
Section Naval General
Staff)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 27, No. A-3 (Cont.)

INFO: (Cont.)

UTU 83
UHO 40
TENE 00 (2nd Fleet)
NUTOU 17 (Kokiyo Maru)
AO 0
UNE 5
KUO 90 (4th Fleet)

The Soubi Maru in company with the Mamiya Maru departed Truk 0430/25 January to arrive Kure 3 February.

1. Noon posits follow:

26 Jan - 9-58N, 147-12E
27 Jan - Midway between Rota Island and Guam
28 Jan - 17-25N, 142-37E
29 Jan - 21-02N, 140-06E
30 Jan - 24-37N, 137-30E
31 Jan - 28-03N, 135-00E
1 Feb - 31-30N, 132-20E

2. From noon posit 1 Feb. of 31-20N, 132-20 E, course will be set, passing Fukashima Island and entering Bungo Channel.

3. Escort being provided as far as Saipan.

(HOW COMMENT: The latitude for noon posit 1 Feb. varies 10 minutes.)

(NPM-251634-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: FLYING FISH
INFO: CINCPAC

25/1541 January

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 27, No. B-1 (Cont.)

DONAHU GETS THIS ULTRA X FOLLOWING ARE POSITIONS
AT 3 HOURS GCT OF 2 FREIGHTERS 1 ESCORT FROM
26TH TO 29TH INCLUSIVE CBGJ 5812 (09-58 N.
147-12 E) KXBZ 5200 (13-52 N 145-00 E) TRQR
2537 (17-25 N 142-37 E) WSZY 0206 (21-02 N
140-06 E) X ESCORT DROPS OFF AT SAIPAN X
SEARAVEN NOW ENROUTE PEARL HAS ORDERS OMIT
GUAM AND PASS THROUGH VCGJ (12 N 147 E)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: No difficulty copying schedules. (p.13)

No. C-2

January 25-26 Inc.

Patrolled off entrance to harbor.
Freighter anchored in same position.
No additional ships in harbor. Planned
to patrol west of Saipan covering EMPIRE-
GUAM-TRUK traffic route 27th, and decided
to fire at freighter before clearing
the area. Had plotted target in the same
position on three successive days.

January 26

From a predetermined position, 1500 yards
outside Calalan Bank, fired two bow tubes,
25 second firing interval, slow speed,
0 depth setting, having selected a position
from the chart which showed the greatest
amount of water (4 1/2 fathoms) over the
reef. The distance to the target, by
navigational fixes was 5,000 yards, and

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 27, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 26 (Cont.)

the first torpedo hit in 4 minutes 43 seconds. The second torpedo exploded 1 minute 05 seconds after firing, and before reaching Calalan Bank. It was premature or hit an uncharted reef to the west of the bank. The target was completely obscured by water and spray momentarily and black smoke was visible after the spray subsided. Target replied with gunfire, apparently aimed at random. The run until the explosion confirms the range, definitely known, the amount of water thrown up in front of the target, and the smoke noticeable immediately thereafter indicates damage, although I do not believe freighter sunk.

1750(X) Plane (not sighted) dropped three depth charges or a stick of bombs - no damage.
1815(X) Patrol vessel stood out of harbor, and commenced searching to westward. Surfaced after dusk and stood northward to patrol EMPIRE-TRUK route the following day.

January 27

No entry.

January 28

0003(X) - Lat. 15-19-20N., Long. 144-04-20E.
Sighted 3 ships (two large and one small) on the port beam, distance 10,000 to 12,000 yards, bright moon, with noon streak on our starboard beam. Turned away, went to four engines and commenced opening up to get ahead for a periscope approach. Escort sighted submarine while the latter was taking position ahead of formation, with convoy on the port quarter.

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 27, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 28 (Cont.)

0100(K)

After the rapid decrease in range and the constant zero angle on the bow indicated it was a sighting and not a sweep ahead of the convoy, I put him astern and attempted to lose him but his speed was greater. - Submerged, with escort dead astern (visible to the unaided eye), approximate range 6000 yards, and steadily closing. I was accomplishing nothing on the surface since the bridge watch had already lost the convoy astern. When we submerged I turned normal to the convoy's course, and the escort lost contact. 15 minutes after diving I could not pick him up through the periscope, five minutes later we could not get an echo at 40 ft. with the radar, and 30 minutes after submerging we were back on the surface. The convoy was now visible, again on the beam - too far to submerge and go in for an attack, and impossible to close on the surface from the present position. Therefore, put convoy astern (escort may have rejoined convoy, but rain squalls now forming on the horizon divided our attention so much that no concentrated search was made for him with the ships astern) and opened the range. Opened up sufficiently to commence converging and working in ahead again, with visibility steadily decreasing. Lost convoy in the reduced visibility and commenced patrolling normal to its course, on a 4 mile front, and continued this patrol for one hour with no contact. Got on convoy's track, and proceeded at such speed as would put submarine at dawn; on convoy's dawn position circle using predicted speed of advance. Nothing visible at dawn, hence remained on two

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 27, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 28 (Cont.)

engines and continued present course, at 15 kts. for one hour, then reversed course, at the same speed, for another hour. Morning star fix had shown submarine to be on convoy course line, hence believe convoy changed course when escort picked us up, and I did not note the change in course upon surfacing, or else the course was changed after the reduced visibility set in. Believing further attempts to locate convoy would be futile, and desirous of patrolling southeast of SAIPAN the following night and day, changed course accordingly and proceeded on the surface.

January 29

Submerged, with TENIAN Island bearing 315° (T), distance 11 miles, to patrol SE entrance to SAIPAN Channel. (pp.3-5)

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Time	Position	Course		Speed	Type
			Anchored		
Jan 28 0003(K)	144-04-20E 15-19-20N		315	11	1 large freighter 1 small freighter 1 escort (small DD or Sub-chaser).

Case 28

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: SUWA 1
TO: HISITO 5 (Torishima
Maru)
HAMISA 2
NME 1

24/0815 January
JN 20

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 28, No. A-1 (Cont.)

INFO: NAKI 90 (2nd Fleet)
TURA 50 (Combined Fleet)
YUKI 20 (3rd Fleet)
HOTISO

Blank order #40.

Torishima Maru and Takasago Maru with reference to 4th Base Force SMS #23- will return to Truk carrying out a search for survivors of Heiyoo Maru.

(T2W-241307-Jan/DI)-

No. A-2

FROM: SUWA 1/9 24/0815 January
TO: HASITO 5 JN 20F
(Torishima Maru M.S. #131)
WAMISA 2
INFO: NME 59
NAKI 90/ 38
TURA 30/28
YUKI 20/08 (3rd Fleet)
HOMI 34/28

4th Base Force Radio Order #38.

Referring to 4th Base Force SMS #234, the Torishima Maru and Takasago Maru will, while conducting a search for the survivors of _____ Maru, return to P_____?

(NPM-242056-Jan/DI)

HOW COMMENT: (Search for the survivors Heiyo Maru, return to Truk).

No. A-3

FROM: HASITO 5 (Torishima Maru) 24/1700 January

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 28, No. A-3 (Cont.)

TO: NANONO 2 (4th Base Force) JN 20 F
MOYURA 4 (43rd Guard Division)
INFO: SUTINI 3 (#3 Tamazono Maru)
SIKEKE 30 (4th Fleet)
NETIME 1 (41st Guard Division)
SOKU 29 (5th Base Force)

Torishima Maru accompanying Takasago Maru departs Saipan for Truk at 1-00 arriving prior daybreak 28th. Enroute she will cooperate in search for survivors of Heliyo Maru in accordance with #5 Special Base Force message #23 blank. She will pass through position 10N, 151E and enter by way of north channel. Remainder not readable.

(T2W-241515-Jan)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 25/2315 January
TO: TU 7.2.8
INFO: CINCPAC

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ANOTHER ULTRA HONEY FOR AZER IF ANYWHERE NEAR X
015 POPCORN WITH 1 MAHAGONY (PATROL BOAT) PASSING
THROUGH XLMF (10 NORTH 151 EAST) AND ARRIVING DCMF
4147 (7-41 NORTH 151-47 EAST) BEFORE DAWN 28TH

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Whale

Second War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Excellent. (See I, Case 24, No. C-1.)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 29 (Cont.)

No. A-3

FROM: No originator 26/1500 January
TO: KIINA 1 (Kokai Maru) JN 40
Serial #055
From: R.N.O. Yokohama

As the sailing of the Nisiyuki has been postponed
you are to enter Outer Harbor at Yokohama.

(T2W-270049-Jan/DI)

No. A-4

FROM: Blank originator 26/1500 January
TO: HIINA 5 (Tokai Maru) JN 40
Serial #055
From resident Naval Officer Yokohama.

Since all Westbound departures are held in
abeyance enter Yokohama outer harbor.

(NSS-261914-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 27/0011 January
TO: TU 7.1.11
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR ARTIE TAYLOR X CONVOY TOOK REFUGE AT
(FQPC 0515 (34-05 NORTH 136-15 EAST) THEY MAY
STILL BE THERE X

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 29 (Cont.)

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Haddock

Third War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Incomplete. (See I, Case 9,
No. C-3)

No. C-2

January 26

0639 (I) Just before diving sighted OMAI SAKI light. Dove and ran at 2/3 speed to gain better position closer inshore. While closing coast, the first observation after daylight showed convoy of four small coastal freighters (2000-3000 tons) with air escort westbound and zigging. Attempted to close for one and a half hours but unable to reach favorable position. During approach passed within 800 yards of odd-looking steel-hull "trawler" with square stern and rising sun painted on sides. Two stick masts and crow's nest on foremast; approximately 400 tons. Took particular care not to be sighted but subsequent events indicate that he sighted periscope and signalled convoy. About ten minutes later all four ships headed toward shore, presenting a 180° track. Broke off attack. At 1115 depth charging commenced and lasted until sunset. A total of 18 charges were dropped--none close. After surfacing

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 29, No. C-2 (Cont.)

2130 (I) stood to the south. (See A/S measures).
Lat. 34-04N., Long. 137-35.5 E., SJ
Radar made contact at 14,500 yards.
Bright moonlight made surface attack out
of the question and seas were too rough
for night submerged attack. Forced to
let target pass. Presence of escort
not determined.

January 27

In the short time spent in the area to
date, have sighted two large destroyers
and one large ship on the track from
TOKYO to SHIONO MISAKI. In view of
this decided to spend the next four or
five days patrolling this line in hopes
of getting some larger and more important
shipping than that which follows the
coast. A rubbing and bumping noise has
developed in the bow plane tilting
mechanism. Investigation indicates the
trouble is outside the boat.

1630 (I) Three distant depth charges -- nothing
in sight.

January 28

Five distant depth charges during day--
nothing in sight.

January 30

0216 (I) With moon about 45° high lookout sighted
ship broad on starboard bow. Coached
SJ on bearing-- range 14,200 yards. Bearing
changing rapidly. Went to battle stations
and full speed. Same lookout sighted DD
escort to the right (ahead) of target.

Case 29, No. C-2 (Cont.)

0644 (I)

After solving and checking target speed as 18 knots, forced to abandon chase since bright moonlight precluded surface attack and target speed of 18 knots prevented HADDOCK from gaining position ahead for periscope attack. Target course (250°T.) indicated TOKYO as port of departure.

Shortly after diving sighted Momi class DD bearing 100°(R) on parallel course--range 6,000 yards. Turn count gave speed of 17-20 knots. Course 050°(T), indicated TOKYO as destination. Attack not possible. DD believed to be last night's escort returning to TOKYO -- having turned her ship over to a new "zone escort". After surfacing set course to close coast for operations off MIKI SAKI light tomorrow. Barometer falling rapidly -- wind and sea making up out of the west. (pp.4-5)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
 19 November 1945

Case 30

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: KASUHO 3 (Kaihei Maru) 24/January
 MITIME (CofS Yokosuka) JN 40
 NIHIMU (Yokosuka Trans- SMS 016
 portation)
 SIKEKE 30 (4th Fleet)
 SONEKU (5th Base Force,
 Saipan)
 INFO: NSEN (Bureau of Medi-
 cine)
 HAMINO (4th Civil Eng.,
 Truk)

At 1000, 24th, arrived Truk. Depart 0600, 26th
 for Saipan. Scheduled arrive 1000, 29th.

(T2W-260402/Jan.DI)tt

No. A-2

FROM: SONEKU 2 (Comdr Saipan 26/2111 January
 5th Base Force) JN 40
 TO: SOKATE 2 (Maru) Serial 058
 INFO: CofS 4th Fleet
 Comdr Surface Escort Unit
 #2.
 SubChaser #12
 Asayama Maru
 Kaihei Maru
 1st Naval Section
 Imperial Headquarters.

#5 Special Base Order #179

The Asayama Maru and the Kaihei Maru left PT (Truk)
 and are scheduled to arrive PS (Saipan) at 1000
 Jan 29.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 30, No. A-2 (Cont.)

Noon Positions:

Jan 27 at 8-18 N, 147-26 E. (May be 147-20 E)
Jan 28 at 11-54 N, 146-33 E.

Subchaser #12 will escort these ships until 1500
on the 27th and rendezvous with both these ships
about 0800 on the 28th and escort them to PS (Saipan)

(NSS-262115-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: FLYING FISH 7.2.7
INFO: CINCPAC

27/0148 January

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

DON DONAHO GETS THIS ULTRA X 2 FREIGHTERS ENROUTE
SAIPAN WITH 1 ESCORT X SPEED ABOUT 11 KNOTS X 0300
GCT POSITION JANUARY 28 WILL BE 11-54 NORTH
146-33 EAST X SEARAVEN WITH ONLY 1 FISH LEFT MAY
BE IN VICINITY SHOULD BE FARTHER EAST BY NOW X
WAHOO MAY PASS THROUGH 11 NORTH 147 EAST WITHIN
NEXT FEW DAYS X NAPOLEON

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete. (See I, Case 27, No. C-1).

No. C-2

January 28

Case 30, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 0003 (K) Lat. 15-19-20N., Long. 144-04-20E. Sighted 3 ships (two large and one small) on the port beam, distance 10,000 to 12,000 yards, bright moon, with moon streak on our starboard beam. Turned away, went to four engines and commenced opening up to get ahead of formation, with convoy on the port quarter. After the rapid decrease in range and the constant zero angle on the bow indicated it was a sighting and not a sweep ahead of the convoy, I put him astern and attempted to lose him but his speed was greater.
- 0100 (K) Submerged, with escort dead astern (visible to the unaided eye), approximately range 6000 yards, and steadily closing. I was accomplishing nothing on the surface since the bridge watch had already lost the convoy astern. When we submerged I turned normal to the convoy's course, and the escort lost contact. 15 minutes after diving I could not pick him up through the periscope, five minutes later we could not get an echo at 40 ft. with the radar, and 30 minutes after submerging we were back on the surface. The convoy was now visible, again on the beam - too far to submerge and go in for an attack, and impossible to close on the surface from the present position. Therefore, put convoy astern (escort may have re-joined convoy, but rain squalls now forming on the horizon divided our attention so much that no concentrated search was made for him with the ships astern) and opened the range. Opened up sufficiently to commence converging and working in ahead again, with visibility steadily decreasing. Lost convoy in the reduced visibility and commenced patrolling normal

Case 30, No. C-2 (Cont.)

to its course, on a four mile front, and continued this patrol for one hour with no contact. Got on convoy's track, and proceeded at such speed as would put submarine at dawn, on convoy's dawn position circle using predicted speed of advance. Nothing visible at dawn, hence remained on two engines and continued present course, at 15 kts. for one hour, then reversed course, at the same speed, for another hour. Morning star fix had shown submarine to be on convoy course line, hence believe convoy changed course when escort picked us up, and I did not note the change in course upon surfacing, or else the course was changed after the reduced visibility set in. Believing further attempts to locate convoy would be futile, and desirous of patrolling southeast of SAIPAN the following night and day, changed course accordingly and proceeded on the surface.(p.4)

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Time	Jan. 28 0003 (K)
Position	144-04-20 E 14-19-20 N
Course	315
Speed	11
Type	1 large freighter 1 small freighter 1 escort (small DD or Subchaser.)

TOP SECRET-ULTRA

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case No. 31

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: NUMAYU 1 (Maru attached 28/0450 January
11th Air Fleet) JN 40
TO: 755 Air Group Nauru SMS #143
Detached Force Comdr.
(enciphered).
INFO: RATAYO 29 (11th Air Fleet)

At 0330 Jan 28 departed PQB (Ruotto). Will pass through 1-00 North 167-00 East. Scheduled to arrive Nauru at 0500 Jan 31.

(NPM-280626-Jan/DI)

No. A-2

FROM: ?
TO: ? YARA 28/1935 January
INFO: NAYANA (Tokuyama Fuel JN 40
Depot) SMS 057
MAHO 6 (N.G.S.)
IYO 4 (Tokyo Trans)
SAO 92 (C. Tokyo Military
Stores)
HEWE 57 (Cos Combined Fleet)

From Chief of Staff, 2nd Fleet.

Desire expedite service of supply in area as much as possible. Desire you to proceed Truk immediately and that you advise scheduled movements by dispatch. Furthermore pursuant to Advance Force SMS #63 types of fuel to be loaded are changed as follows: In addition to about 250 kiloliters of type 91 special gasoline load as much type 87 gasoline as possible. GI: This ship may possibly be Okitsu Maru (XAV)

(NPM-282128-Jan/DI)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

HIM ENROUTE AND IF ABLE TO REACH HIM IN 24 HOURS
ATTEMPT TO GET HIM WHILE UNLOADING PROBABLY AT
CWPV 2954 (00 31 SOUTH 166 54 EAST) X IMPORTANT
X WATCH OUT FOR PLANES X

RIDICULE NR 6 TO STINGRAY
BIRCH IS TANKER

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Stingray

Sixth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception was satisfactory. All
messages addressed to the Stingray
and a complete series of ComSubPac
messages, with the exception of
ComSubPac serial 22 were received. (p.8)

No. C-2

January 27-28-29

Uneventful patrol covering routes East, North
and North West of Jaluit.

January 30-31

Patrolled South and West of Kwajalein Atoll.

February 1-2-3-4

Conducted submerged patrol four to seven miles from
entrance North Pass, Kwajalein. Enemy maintains a
continuous anti-submarine patrol approximately 120
miles off North Pass with small trawler-type patrol
vessels. Large hangers, towers and buildings noted
on Roi Island. (p.2)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.F. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
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19 November 1945

Case 32

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: ANEWA 2 #120

CINC Eastern Fleet
27/0808 January

Tatekawa Maru departed Genzan 0800, 27th Jan.,
speed 14 knots, Noon Positions 29th to 5 February,
inclusive, all North and East:

29th - 33-29 - 128-00
30th - 29-00 - 124-00
31st - 24-45 - 120-00
1st - 20-00 - 118-00
2nd - 15-00 - 115-16
3rd - 11-00 - 111-32
4th - 06-50 - 107-56
5th - 01-50 - 105-30

Due Palembang River entrance 0600, 5th February,

NSS COMMENT: Believe these noon positions are
Greenwich Time, other times and
dates are I Time.

(NSS-271704/Jan/DI)t

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: TUNNY (7.1.4)
INFO: CINCPAC

28/0512 January

PREC: PRIORITY

NICE ULTRA FOR TUNNY X 263 POPCORN X BLANK (COURSE)
X PLUS 4 (1600) X BLANK (SPEED) X BLANK (DATE) X
NOON POSITS 30 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY INCLUSIVE X
HGES (29 DEG NORTH 124 DEG EAST) X PXWW 4500 (24
DEG 45 MIN NORTH 120 DEG EAST) X QWMM (20 DEG NORTH

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 32, No. B-1 (Cont.)

118 DEG EAST) X NCON IS EITHER 1 (-9) OR Z (GCT)
X TACOMA

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Tunny

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio reception was good except the first hour that NFM shifted to high frequency. Comsubpac serial number five and twenty-two were missed. Last serial sent 1. Last serial received 49.

No. C-2

February 2

0310 "SD" Radar plane contact, six miles, dove.
2130 "SJ" Radar contact 9,500 yards. At this time we were approaching Hong Kong, expecting to make a landfall on Tamken Island at daybreak. A light rain was falling and visibility was poor. Commenced tracking with radar and determined course and speed. It was about a half hour before morning twilight and an ideal set-up for drawing ahead and diving except our position was a little doubtful, we knew we had land on at least two sides with the SD giving ranges of less than 13,000 yards and also the depth of water was less than twenty fathoms and shoaling rapidly as we approached land.

19 November 1945

Case 32, No. C-2 (Cont.)February 2 (Cont.)

We commenced a radar approach. The target sighted our wake at 2200 yards due to extreme phosphorescence of the water and commenced signalling with a blinker gun. We presented a zero angle on the bow so he could not recognize us as a submarine and continued in. At a range of 1000 yards with zero gyro commenced firing bow tubes. First torpedo circled sharply to the right and exploded prematurely after a run of 300 yards. Second was seen to pass under the stern but did not explode. Due to this unfortunate warning the target, which was now identified as a loaded tanker, commenced firing and maneuvered radically. The third torpedo missed astern. We dove enough to cover the pressure hull as we were not sure of the depth, except there wasn't much of it, and to expose less target to his gunfire. Swinging ship to bring the stern tubes to bear, a three torpedo salvo was fired with a 3° spread. These were fired with a track of 90 to 100 and a gyro angle ranging from 14 to 18 degrees, the range was checked by radar and the bearing by periscope before each shot. One was heard to hit the ship's side by JK and a small column of water observed thru periscope just forward of bridge, it did not explode. This is born out by people on the tanker dashing over and examining the side with flashlights. At this time the ship was swung again and a three fish salvo fired from the bow tubes at a range of 1400 yards, 130 to 140 track and zero gyro. Again range and bearing were checked at each shot and the torpedoes were aimed at bow, midships and stern. The target successfully evaded all torpedoes. One of these was heard

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 32, No. C-2 (Cont.)

circling to the right. Although land was now very close and we were continuously under fire from the tanker we had managed to keep within firing range by traveling at full speed, so fired the remaining torpedo at 1600 yards, 2° gyro, 150 track. This torpedo also missed. The target now successfully reached the passage into HongKong and we hastily retreated to find a hundred feet of water before the planes arrived. The expected plane arrived about two hours later. Planes continued to search throughout the day. (pp.2-3)

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Item 5 Date & Time: 2130/2 Feb.
 Position: Off Hongkong
 Description: Tanker
 Remarks: Loaded. (p.9)

Case 33

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM:	TATONA 2 (2nd Sea Escort Force)	28/0950 January JN 40
TO:	TEMUHI 9 (Tetsuzan Maru)	SMS #426
INFO:	TITOHA 4 MASUHA 30 (2nd Fleet) ROMIMI 7 KISIMA 30 (Sasebo Naval YD) (Ord. Dept) SIKKEKE 30 (4th Fleet) IROKE 6 (21st Air Group Truk)	

Case 33, No. A-1 (Cont.)

2nd Sea Escort Force Dispatch Order #47:

Kenyo Maru (6470 tons) at 1200 January 29th at 10-10 North 146-35 East. At 1200 January 30th at 08-20 North 149-30 East. At 0600 January 31st arrive Truk. The Heijo Maru after completion of escort of the Tsurumi will return and take up escort of the Kenyo Maru at about 1200 January 30th in the vicinity of the above posit.

(NPM-281058-Jan/DI)

No. A-2

FROM: Blank originator 28/0950 January
TO: TEMUHI 9 (Commander JN 40
Tetsuzan Maru) Serial 426
INFO: TITOHA 4 (Commander Maru)
MASUHA 30 (CofS 2nd Fleet)
ROMIMI 7
KIMOPA 30 (garbled)
SIKEKE 30 (CofS 4th Fleet)
ITEKE 30 (garbled)
HARATO (garbled)

From Heijo Maru. #2 Surface Escort Unit

Dispatch Operation Order #47.

KENYO MARU schedule as follows:
1200/29th position 10-00N, 146-35E.
1200/30th position 08-20N, 149-30E.
Arrives PT (Truk) 0600 31st.

(NSS-281545-Jan/DI)

No. A-3

FROM: Blank originator 28/0950 January
TO: TEMUHI 9 (Comdr. JN 40
Tetsuzan Maru)
INFO: TITOHA 4 (Comdr. Maru)
MASUHA 30 (CofS 2nd Fleet)
ROMIMI 7 (Unident)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 33, No. A-3 (Cont.)

KIMOPA 30 (Garbled)
SIKKE 30 (CofS 4th Fleet)
ITEKE 30 (Garbled)
HARATO (Garbled)

FROM: Heijo Maru:

#2 Surface Escort Unit despatch Opord #47.
Kenyo Maru schedule as follows:

1200, 29th, position 10-00 N., 146-35 E.

1200, 30th, 08-20 N., 149-30 E.

Arrives PT (Truk) 0600, 31st.

After the Heijo Maru finishes escorting the
Tsurumi it will meet the Kenyo Maru about 1200
Jan. 30th near the above position and will
escort her in.

(NSS-281545-Jan/DI)

(NSS-282213-Jan/DI)

B - Operational Dispatches

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 28/1800 January
TO: POMPANO 7.2.2
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ULTRA FOR POMPANO X 262 POPCORN X PROBABLY NO
LEMON UNTIL LATER X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900
X PLUS 14 X XLLU 0035 (10 00 NORTH 146 35 EAST)
X ALGAROA X SMKY 2030 (8 20 NORTH 149 30 EAST)
X AWARD X

No. B-2

FROM: CTF 7 29/0146 January
TO: POMPANO
INFO: CINCPAC

Case 13, No. B-2 (Cont.)

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ADDITIONAL INFO FOR POMPANO X ULTRA X 262
POPCO^{AN} MEETS LEMON IN POSIT GIVEN FOR 30TH
IN MY AWARD X SUGGEST YOU MEET HIM FIRST X NEPHEW

- Submarine Action Reports

U.S.S. Pompano

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Reception of NFM on the surface
was good throughout the patrol.(p.13)

No. C-2

January 30

- 0705 (K) Submerged 8 miles beyond desired point
on desired course line.
- 0817 (K) Lat. 08-21 N Long. 149-20 E sighted
small Trawler at 6000 yards. Set course
N.W. parallel to him as he may be enroute
to rendezvous with larger ship. Inter-
mittent rain squalls obscure visibility
and interfere with sound. SAIJO BANK ahead
limits submerged operations. At 1100
reversed course conducting high periscope
patrol back along course to point believed
to be focal point of courses to TRUK.
- 1337 (K) Lat. 8-24 N Long. 149-19-30 E sighted
smoke of Tanker with escort on S.E. course.
Conducted attack and believe sank tanker
with 2 hits. Encountered short, mild
depth charge attack, suffered no damage.
Closed attack position when possible
nothing sighted. Upon surfacing came to
122°, Tankers most probable course to
TRUK, to overtake him if still afloat.

Case 33, No. C-2 (Cont.)

January 30 (Cont.)

1213 (K) Sighted ship ahead, tracked by Radar speed 8.5 kts., course 122°. Came upon dark quarter to 4000 yards and identified him as same Trawler escort with Tanker this morning. Tanker not in company, conclude he has sunk. Trawler armament unknown, too small to expend torpedoes on and not worth risk of night gun battle this early in patrol. Set a diverging course to run around him enroute to TRUK. (p.2)

No. C-3

Description of Contact

Item 2 (SHIPS SIGHTED)

Date: Jan. 30 Position: 08-21N. 149-20E.
Time: 0817 (K) Type: Patrol
Course: 300 Speed: 8
Remarks: Trawler similar to SEAGULL.

Item 3

Date: Jan. 30 Position: 08-24N. 149-19-30E.
Time: 1337 (K) Type: Tanker & Patrol
Course: 100 Speed: 10
Remarks: Attack #1 Tanker similar to pg 262/ONI 208-J, loaded Trawler same as Item 2.

D - Verification

No. D-1

FROM: MAM

31/0830 January
JN 40
SMS 360 Part 1

At 1400 Jan 30 torpedo track at 08-33 North
149-23 East.

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 33, No. D-1 (Cont.)

(Jan 30 DI)

Note: Kenyo Maru?
Pompano ?

Case 34

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: NA 7	30/0646 January
TO: MIN Ø (4th Fleet)	JN 40
INFO: KETI 6 (SubForce Escort)	SMS 067
SUA 7	
RERA 1 (19th Air Group)	
FURATO	
KARA 49	
AFUU	
MITIME (Yokosuka CofS)	

Following received from Coast Lookout Station,
originated by Matsuan Maru.

Suffered torpedo attack 1330/27 January. My 0600
position, 30 Jan: 15-00N, 147-25E., heading directly
for Saipan, making 6 knots speed. Judging from
what can be seen of the hull damage, our situation
appears critical. Request dispatch of an escort
vessel at once.

(NPM-301612-Jan/DI)t

No. A-2

FROM: NA 7 (Unident)	30/0646 January
TO: MIN Ø (4th Fleet)	JN 40
INFO: KETI 6 (2nd Surface Escort Unit)	Serial 062

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

ORIGINAL
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Case 34, No. A-2 (Cont.)

RERA 1 (Air Group 19)
FURATO (Guard Division 2)
MITIME (Yokosuka CofS)
SUA 7 (Unident)
ORA 4 (Unident)
AFUU (Unident)

Message garbled, elements as follows. To blank office from Matusan Maru. Received Torpedo attack at 1330 on Jan 27. At 6 hours Jan 30 position 15-00 North 147-25 East. Am proceeding to Saipan at 6 knots. Damage to the hull. Dangerous condition. Request immediate dispatch of escort ships and blank Maru.

(NSS-300522-Jan/DI)

No. A-3

FROM:	NA 7	30/0646 January
TO:	MON \emptyset / (4th Fleet)	JN 40
INFO:	KETI 6 (SubForce?)	Serial 62
	RERAREI (Air Group 19)	
	FURATO (Guard Div 42)	
	MITIME (Yokosuka CofS)	
	SUA 9 (Unident)	
	KARA 49 (Unident)	
	AFUU (Unident)	

Dispatch received by coast station. Matuan Maru received a torpedo attack at 1330 the 27th. From posit 15-00 North 147-25 East at 0600 on 30th, she is proceeding directly to Saipan at 6 knots. Signs of danger are in sight. Urgently request escort. Wish you to arrange for the Ido Maru to proceed immediately.

(T2W-300538-Jan/DI)

TOP SECRET ULTRA
R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET
ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 34 (Cont.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: CTU 7.2.7
INFO: CINCPAC

30/0830 January

PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

WOUNDED BEECH WILL BE PICKED UP BY UNKNOWN FOR
TOW AT POINT GHGJ 0012 (15 DEG 00 MIN N 147 12 E)
X 1246.7 X BLANK X MINUS 4 PLUS 15 X ULTRA FOR
DONAHO X IF AVAILABLE YOU MIGHT POLISH OFF THIS
LOADED DUCK X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio Reception complete.

No. C-2

January 30 Patrolling east of Saipan and Tenian
Islands. Reconnoitered LAULAU Bay from
1500 yards off coast line. No activity
in the harbor, and no building observed
at northern end of bay to indicate that
a naval Base was in that vicinity. All
high peaks on both Tenian and Saipan
have prominent markers, either as lookout
posts, or aircraft beacons. A probable
Radar is located on top of NAFUTAN Mt.,
near NAFUTAN Pt., Saipan.

Case 34, No. C-2 (Cont.)

- 1124 (K) Unidentified land plane approached from a southerly direction and landed on southern end of Saipan.
- 1210 (K) 750-1000 ton armed Trawler, apparently patrolling, stood out of Saipan channel and proceeded on an easterly course, at 6 kts.
- 1824 (K) Armed Trawler previously seen stood in toward Saipan channel. While patrolling east of Saipan during the night, signalling between the northern and southern ends of the island was noticeable until about midnight. Otherwise the islands were blacked out.

February 1

- Reconnoitered Tanapag Harbor from 4 miles off reef. High seas and haze throughout the day, and visibility poor. Nothing visible in GARAPAN anchorage.
- 1700 (K) 250 ton patrol vessel stood in toward Saipan on course 135° (T).

Case 35

A - Source of Intelligence

(Note: The intercepted Japanese dispatch is not available.)

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7
TO: TU 7.2.2
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

31/0748 January

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 35 No. B-1 (Cont.)

ULTRA TO POMPANO X OLYMPIA X WHOLE LOT OF
PEANUTS X BLANK (COURSE) PLUS 5 (SPEED 15)
X MINUS 11 (TIME 0300 GCT) X PLUS 16 (31ST)
X DCMF 4147 (07-41 NORTH 151-47 EAST) PROBABLY
HEADED FOR DJTS 0019 (05-00 SOUTH 161-19 EAST)
INTERCEPT IF POSSIBLE

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Pompano

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Complete. (See I, Case 33,
No. C-1.)

No. C-2

January 30

(For report of this day, see I, Case 33, No. C-2.)

January 31

0621 (K) Lat. 7-30 N Long. 150-40-30 E sighted
small patrol vessel crossing astern at
6000 yards. At 1200 heard distant echo
ringing, nothing sighted. Enroute to
OTTA PASS.

February 1

0914 (K) Lat. 7-04 N Long. 151-35 E sighted
small patrol vessel on S.W. course.
1201 (K) Lat. 7-07 N Long. 151-43-30 E sighted
smoke, closed and identified small
patrol vessel on N.E. course. Saw
same patrol vessel three hours later on
S.W. course.

Case 35 No. C-2 (Cont.)

1920 (K) Saw what appeared to be blinker signals on OLLAN IS. Saw light flashes to S.E. Closed for 8 miles, nothing sighted, probably lightning. Patrolling 5 to 7 miles to W of OTTA PASS during day.

February 2

0720 (K) Lat. 7-05 N Long. 151-40 E sighted small patrol vessel on S.W. course.

0810 (K) Sighted single wing patrol plane. Remained in sight for next 20 minutes.

0840 (K) At 90 feet for 10 minutes to let plane get clear when sound heard distant high speed heavy screws.

0850 (K) Lat. 7-06 N Long. 151-45 E sighted 2 large Destroyers at 9000 yards astern to E in column on a course to enter OTTA PASS. Came about at high speed for attack. On the beam of the rear DD unable to close to less than 6000 or 7000 yards. Secured approach. We are too far to N and W to intercept traffic to S through OTTA PASS so changed patrol position to an E.W. Line to 6 to 8 miles W of SOUTH IS. KUO ATOLL. This line lies across densest portion of all past sightings and attacks in S TRUK area and crosses lanes to S. During night will patrol down and across these lanes for possible night attacks.

0928 (K) Lat. 7-05 N Long. 151-47 E sighted smoke, closed it and identified small patrol vessel. Made another approach on this same vessel for hours later.

1316 (K) Lat. 7-00 N Long. 151-46 E sighted double wing, single float plane.

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R.I.P. 340

TOP SECRET-ULTRA
ORIGINAL
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Case 36

A - Source of Intelligence

No. A-1

FROM: SONEKU 29 (Staff 5th Base Force, Saipan) 31/1756 January
TO: TIYOHI 1 JN 40
INFO: FUTUSU 1 (Sinkoo Maru) SMS ?
RIMU 9 (garbled)
RATONA 29 (2nd Escort Force)

Nisshun Maru will join up with "X" Convoy at 1200, 2 February in position N, 20-00; E. 142-00, and with it proceed to Saipan.

(T2W-311412-Jan/DI)t

No. A-2

FROM: SONEKU 29 (5th Base Force Saipan) 31/1755 January
TO: TIYOHI (Maru attached to 11th Air Flt.) JN 40
INFO: RIMUYO 29 (4th Fleet) SMS 068
RATONA 29 (2nd Escort Force)
FUTUSU 1

Desire the Nisshun Maru join up with the "X" Convoy at position 20 North, 142 East, at 1200/2 February, and proceed in company to Saipan.

(NPM-311834-Jan/DI)t

B - Operational Dispatch

No. B-1

FROM: CTF 7 31/1556 January
TO: RUNNER
FLYING FISH
INFO: CINCPAC
PREC: OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Case 36, No. B-1 (Cont.)

FOR RUNNER X ULTRA X SEVERAL BEECHES MEETING MARCGANY
X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 XX MINUS 13 X 20 DEGREES
NORTH 142 DEGREES EAST X ENROUTE 15 DEGREES 15 MINUTES
NORTH 145 DEGREES 50 MINUTES EAST X FLYING FISH KEEP
CLEAR OF 1ST POSITION FOR RUNNER BUT ATTEMPT INTERCEPT
ANYWHERE SOUTH OF 19 DEGREES NORTH X RESQUE X GNCME X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Runner

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio Reception was satisfactory.

No. C-2

February 2

- 0634 (K) Patrolling on surface across track of shipping
in Area _____.
- 0934 (K) Sighted Ship. (Contact #2). Dove and commenced
submerged attack. When range closed sufficient
a second ship was sighted astern of the first.
Both ships were single stack freighters with
kingposts forward and aft, of Yamabiko Maru cla:
They were making frequent radical zigs. Three
P.C. escorts were sighted in position along the
side of the convoy. Made ready the bow tubes
and at
- 1054 (K) Fired three torpedoes at the leading ship, on
an 80° track at a range of about 700 yards,
using a two degree divergent spread. (Attack #
After twenty and twenty-five seconds two
torpedo hits were heard. Immediately after
firing the first three torpedoes, shifted to the
second ship and fired three torpedoes at her at
1200 yards range and a sharper track, using a
similar spread. (Attack #2)
(See also I, Case 25, C-2 - C-4, where this patn
report is more fully quoted, pages 150-152 of
this volume.-Ed. note)

ORIGINAL
19 November 1945

Case 36, No. B-1 (Cont.)

FOR RUNNER X ULTRA X SEVERAL BEECHES MEETING MARCGANY
X BLANK X BLANK X MINUS 900 XX MINUS 13 X 20 DEGREES
NORTH 142 DEGREES EAST X ENROUTE 15 DEGREES 15 MINUTES
NORTH 145 DEGREES 50 MINUTES EAST X FLYING FISH KEEP
CLEAR OF 1ST POSITION FOR RUNNER BUT ATTEMPT INTERCEPT
ANYWHERE SOUTH OF 19 DEGREES NORTH X RESQUE X GNCME X

C - Submarine Action Report

U.S.S. Runner

First War Patrol

No. C-1

Radio Reception: Radio Reception was satisfactory.

No. C-2

February 2

- 0634 (X) Patrolling on surface across track of shipping
in Area _____.
- 0934 (X) Sighted Ship. (Contact #2). Dove and commenced
submerged attack. When range closed sufficiently
a second ship was sighted astern of the first.
Both ships were single stack freighters with
kingposts forward and aft, of Yamabiko Maru class
They were making frequent radical zigs. Three
P.C. escorts were sighted in position along the
side of the convoy. Made ready the bow tubes
and at
- 1054 (X) Fired three torpedoes at the leading ship, on
an 80° track at a range of about 700 yards,
using a two degree divergent spread. (Attack #1)
After twenty and twenty-five seconds two
torpedo hits were heard. Immediately after
firing the first three torpedoes, shifted to the
second ship and fired three torpedoes at her at
1200 yards range and a sharper track, using a
similar spread. (Attack #2)
(See also I, Case 25, C-2 - C-4, where this patro
report is more fully quoted, pages 150-152 of
this volume.-Ed. note)

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Case 36 (Cont.)No. C-3Description of Contact

No.	2
Date and time	2-2 0943K
Lat. and Long.	20N 142 E
Type	2 Freighters 3 PC escorts
Course	150
Speed	9
Remarks	Yamabiko Maru Cls. Attack 1 and 2

U.S.S. Flying Fish

Fourth War Patrol

No. C-4

Radio Reception: Radio reception complete. Last consecutive serial sent 250700/Feb YODEL. Last consecutive serial received: 280118 Feb. 62

No. C-5February 1

Reconnoitered Tanapag Harbor from 4 miles off reef. High seas and haze throughout the day, and visibility poor. Nothing visible in GARAPAN anchorage.

1700 (K)

250 ton patrol vessel stood in toward Saipan on course 135° (T)

19 November 1945

Case 36 No. C-5 (Cont.)February 2

Reconnoitered TANAPAG HARBOR from position 3 miles north of reef. Only one small freighter at anchor. No additional information can be added to that already available in "Report of PICKEREL's Fifth War Patrol". An unidentified plane was sighted over the island on a northerly course in the early morning; a Corvette or large sub-chaser stood out of harbor during the middle of the morning and disappeared on course 320° (T); and two unidentified float planes were seen in the area during the afternoon.

1900 (K)

13 miles, bearing 315° (T) from Tanapag harbor. S.J. radar received echo, bearing 175° relative, distance 370° yards. Subsequently sighted target by bridge watch, which appeared to be high speed trawler or sub-chaser. Evaded on the surface, and patrol disappeared on course 320° (T) speed 20 kts.

February 3-4 Inc.

Patrolling SAIPAN-EMPIRE route.

EXPLANATION

