

The original Battle of the Atlantic (SRH-009) was released on 21 December 1977. Additional information has become available and Volume I is herewith reissued on 12 January 1989 in a more complete version.

DECLASSIFIED per Part 3, E. O. 12356
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

PC Date: 12 Jan '89

Foreword concerning
The Atlantic Correlation and Dissemination Section
of
USM Communication Intelligence (Op-20-G)

* * *

(Op-20-3-GI-A, hereinafter referred
to as the Atlantic Section.)

1. Organization.

The organization of the Atlantic Section was completed in January 1943 with the appointment of Lt. Comdr. Roeder, USM, as GI-2 (later GI-A). Personnel numbered 12 male officers and 5 enlisted men. The section combined the following functions:

(a) Translation (German U/B traffic).

(b) TIRA, RFP, D/F correlation (U/B).

(Functions (a) and (b) had been brought together as one section in December when current U/B traffic was first read.)

(c) Non-U/B traffic intelligence pertaining to the Atlantic theatre, previously handled in GI (Pacific Intelligence Center).

On 31 December 1943, the Atlantic Section consisted of 15 male officers, 10 Wave officers, 3 male enlisted and 5 Wave enlisted.

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2. Sources of intelligence (decryption).

(a) German Naval traffic. (All translated in GI-A.)

U/B Atlantic circuits

U/B Non-Atlantic circuits

Surface-Ship (Blockade-Runners)

Naval Attache (Berlin-Tokyo).

(b) Japanese Naval Attache traffic (beginning spring 1944).

(c) German Clandestine traffic.

(d) Miscellaneous: Vichy French, Italian,

Naval traffic.

In addition to the above traffic sources decrypted in 20G,
enemy diplomatic traffic was made available by the Army.

3. Dissemination of Ultra intelligence.

(a) To F-21 (COMINCH Combat Intelligence Anti-Submarine)

Copy of every translated German message.

Memoranda on interpretations and problems in
Ultra. (650)

Daily Summaries (Part I - non-U/B Ultra)
(Part II- U/B Ultra)

Special studies and monthly reports (on
compromise of Allied codes and ciphers,
torpedoes, Radar and Search receivers, etc.,
including monthly summary charts of U/B operations.

(b) To IEC.

(Same as for F-21.)

(c) COMINCH Chart Room: Non-U/B Ultra daily summary

(Part I).

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- (d) USN Communications Security and Countermeasures
(Op-20-K and S)

Results of all studies pertaining to respective interests of those sections.

- (e) CinCLant.

Ultra intelligence on surface Blockade-runners.

- (f) OpNav Central Division.

Martinique and other Vichy French possessions in Western hemisphere.

- (g) Army Special Intelligence.

Ultra intelligence on German cargo-carrying submarines in Far East; German Naval Attache traffic.

4. Miscellaneous.

CSP 1774 on Enemy U/B Communications procedure and radio circuits was supplied with current corrections to forces at sea.

Neutral shipping: to Op-16-FT, FX-37, Ottawa.

Neutral call signs were furnished to the Atlantic Fleet.

Translations of captured U-505 (NE40) documents.

5. Interpretation and Research.

The Atlantic Section's primary responsibility was to furnish COMINCH Combat Intelligence (F-21) with a correct interpretation of each German message. Chief among the problems of interpretation was that presented by the German

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practice of enciphering U/B positions. The decrypted text of the message gave the U/B's position not directly in terms of the German Naval grid, but in terms of a changing system of arbitrary bigram equivalents and numerical additions or subtractions applied to the naval grid. The decipherment of U/B positions required the closest correlation of all information available from past U/B traffic as well as from D/F fixes and from hints in present traffic as to U/B Command's intentions. The problem was currently and successfully met by the Atlantic Section, but not until a copy of the grid cipher was obtained from the U-505 in June 1944 did it cease to exact constant and special attention.

In addition to maintaining a current plot of the U/B situation, the Atlantic Section conducted research on every aspect of the U/B revealed in traffic.

6. Exchange with GC & CS.

After the summer of 1943, there was considerable exchange of intelligence results with GC & CS through which the Atlantic Section benefited from the larger British background on U/B's and from the British coverage of local German Naval circuits.

7. Qualification.

The Atlantic Section of 20G did not have access to COMINCH Combat Intelligence A/S files during the course of the war.


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The operational use of U/B ultra intelligence was of course the responsibility of COMINCH (F-21). It must be understood throughout the following report that F-21 had his own system for further analysis and study of the ultra intelligence supplied by 20-G, as well as for correlating this intelligence with information from other sources. It was OP-20-3-GI-A's duty to furnish F-21 all available ultra with the least possible delay and to be prepared at all times to follow up with any examinations, correlations, and studies which F-21 might request in the course of his own study. Very close contact was maintained between F-21 and 20-G, resulting in a double check on all traffic processed.

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OP-20-3-GI-A

Atlantic Correlation and Dissemination Section of Op-20-G



- A) All messages received, checked on log of day's intercepts.
 - B) Examination, classification according to priority, etc. TRANS.
 - C) Decipherment of grid position cipher.
 - D) Typing of translated messages. (3 copies). Inclusion of D/F fix.
 - E) Checking, dissemination, plotting and correlation.
 - F) Ditting and filing.
- (USN dispatches, D/F's, and Traffic Analysis (Chatham reports) via tube.)

VOLUME I

ALLIED COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE
AND THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

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by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

PC Date: 12 Jan '89

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The following study presents an account of the U/B War from December 1942 to May 1945 as seen through and as influenced by the decryption of German Naval radio traffic in OP-20-G.

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CHAPTER I.

BRIEF REVIEW OF WAR IN THE ATLANTIC
UP TO READING OF U/B TRAFFIC IN DECEMBER 1942.

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BRIEF REVIEW OF WAR IN THE ATLANTIC
UP TO READING OF U/B TRAFFIC IN DECEMBER 1942.

1.
Before U.S. Entrance.

The chart of monthly M/V losses with comments which appears at the end of this chapter will suffice as a review of the major periods of the U/B war from September 1939 to November 1941. In addition the following comments should be made:

(a) It was a primitive U/B fleet which began the blockade of England on 3 September 1939, in a manner reminiscent of World War I. 250-tonners constituted the majority of a fleet that did not exceed 50 operational subs.

(b) Ocean going types were ready when it became advisable to move out into areas of weaker defense, but the U/B operating fleet remained small.

(c) The introduction of the group-attack ("wolf-pack") against convoys was inevitable once off-shore areas were denied to the individual U/B's.

(d) The marked improvement of the summer of 1941 was due to the combination of evasive routing and the use of Iceland as a base for escorts and A/C. The "evasive routing" presumably represents the results of British decryption of U/B traffic during this period.

(e) On the eve of U.S. entrance into the war U/B successes

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had been throttled down to the lowest monthly figure since May 1940, about 60,000 tons.

(f) A major cipher change cut off British special intelligence shortly after the United States entered the war.

2.

From U.S Entrance to the beginning
of Special Intelligence on U/B's.
December 1941 - December 1942.

When Germany declared war on the U.S., a routine shift to the west brought the U/B into the greenest pasture the war was ever to offer. With the assistance of refueling stations at sea, U/B's pressed the war into the harbors and river mouths of our own shores. It is not the purpose of this report to do more than remind the reader, if such a ^{reminder} is necessary, that the rapid depletion of the Allied merchant fleet at the source of Allied supplies constituted the greatest single threat of defeat ever encountered in our war with Germany. Coming on the high tide of Japanese conquests in the East and German conquests in Europe, Russia, and North Africa, 1942's appalling loss of shipping was a major factor in the tense gloom which awakened the U.S. to the prospect of a long and costly struggle. It is in the province of this history, however, to point out that the German Navy was achieving this victory with an operational fleet still small when compared with the fleet that launched the North Atlantic Offensive of the

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winter of 1942-43. Admiralty has estimated that the sinkings of June 1942 (600,000 tons) were achieved by the efforts of 60 to 65 U/B's in operation. The following winter the German Navy could put 180 U/B's into the Atlantic, 120 of which were operating while 60 were outbound or returning.

- (a) Attack on U.S. - Atlantic Seaboard, Dec. '41 to Summer of '42.

Reaching a new high of success in March 1942 (approximately 535,000 tons), U/B's were temporarily checked in April by U.S. countermeasures. The strengthening of our own defenses with the introduction of the coastal convoy system and the mobilization of every conceivable weapon, merely diverted U/B's once more into areas of weaker defense. With the extension of the U/B campaign to the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico our losses piled up to establish a new record for the U/B fleet in early summer 1942.

- (b) U/B's occupy more distant areas and at the same time return in force to the North Atlantic convoy lanes. From summer '42 to Dec. '42.

U/B's moved in greater numbers into the last outposts of the Atlantic. In addition to the Caribbean and Trinidad, always a point of emphasis, U/B's gathered along the S. American coast, in the St. Paul Rocks area, along the African Coast, and finally in the Cape-town and Madagascar areas. 1,200 ton U-cruisers were now ready to undertake the most distant missions. But only the larger boats could follow this natural movement into areas of weak defenses. The smaller

U/B (the 500 tonner) was built for North Atlantic operations and, as coastal areas within its reach were closed, it had to turn back to the mid Atlantic. At the same time the renewal of interest in North Atlantic convoys had become a necessary condition for German victory. To offset the increased Allied convoy defenses in the North Atlantic, U/B's had to be massed in groups for quick and decisive kills of convoys which could be caught in the mid regions beyond land-based A/C. This necessitated greater numbers of U/B's, a demand which the intense U/B building program seemed adequate to meet. By November the German Navy could maintain an average of 90 U/B's operating in the Atlantic, and the Baltic was full of subs in training.

3.

The critical nature of late fall, early winter 1942. Allied invasion of North Africa and the beginning of the all-out U/E counter-offensive.

The over-all critical nature of the period, Nov. to Dec. 1942 must be borne in mind. While the Russians held in the East, U.S. forces were just beginning the attempt to seize positions from which an offensive could be launched. There was no margin of safety. The U.S. effort in the Solomons, the landing in North Africa, the raising of the siege of Stalingrad, the battle of El Alamein, all formed a picture of one force that had reached

a limit and of an opposing force that was making its first impression. Whether the field was to be stabilized or whether the Axis force was to move forward once more depended on whether the enemy was permitted to rest, re-fit and to take advantage of his conquest.

The invasion of North Africa had taken the U/B arm by surprise and forced an alteration of plans. U/B's had to be sent in large numbers to patrol the landing coast, the Gibraltar approaches, and the N.Y. - Gibraltar lane in the mid-Atlantic. It was really the first occasion on which the hand of the German U/B Navy had been forced. Hitherto it had, in a sense, merely followed the line of least resistance. And this policy had been justified in terms of the sheer number of ships sunk. The U-cruiser attacks off Capetown, although definitely pointed toward assisting a specific German battle front, were still in conformance with this past development.

The invasion of North Africa served to emphasize the principle U/B task, namely, the destruction of the convoys bound for England and Russia, by adding still another major convoy lane - still another artery of final defeat. The enlarged U/B fleet was forced to undertake an intensive campaign against major convoys in the winter of 1942-1943. The importance of this campaign was clearly recognized by German High Command, and U/B captains were sternly reminded of their hard pressed comrades in Tunis and Russia.


It was equally clear to the Allies that the one thing needed at this stage of the war was victory over the U/B. Everything depended on maintaining our sea lanes. Could this be done, it was but a matter of time until the accumulation of materials would overwhelm the Axis. Hopeful as November may have been in view of the North African landing, Rommel's retreat, and Stalingrad, the U/B had met the threat by its greatest single month of overall success. If the German armies seemed stalled on land, the U/B was in a position to wipe out the momentary Allied relief. At this critical moment, the fundamental counter-offensive launched by the Germans may be said to have been the U/B war at sea, for the sea itself was the basic Allied vantage point. It was into this situation that decryption intelligence entered in mid December 1942. The decisive battle of the war had been joined at sea and there was no retreat for either side. Neither could refuse challenge in the bitter exchange of torpedoes and depth charges that followed.

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MONTHLY LOSSES OF BRITISH, ALLIED, AND NEUTRAL SHIPPING BY U/B ACTION

(Compiled from Admiralty U/B Bulletins)
 Figures represent thousands of GRT.



ALLIED NAVAL COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE OF U/B
 Re-umption of Invasion Period; Blockade of England and attempt to resume offensive

U/S entry into War
 Heavy attacks on Convoys

U/S counter measures
 on Eastern Seaboard

U/S coastal convoys effective
 U/S counter measures

U/S AC (total Allied construction power total losses by U/B)
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Schorschel experiments complete. Total underwater warfare under experiment prevent new types of U/Bs from coming to operational readiness. Operating fleet of Schorschel U/Bs increasing steadily; new devices under experiment

U/Bs evacuated from French ports. Deflect greatly reduced after some reverses Allied invasion of France.

U/Bs close in on British Western Approaches. First Schorschel U/B at sea. U/B weather stations at Atlantic established. UK-U/B lane. GAF reconnaissance for convey location. Last group to operate off Newfoundland. Attention turns to U/Bs cannot find convoys. Heavy U/B losses continue.

U/Bs return to N. Atlantic with T-X. U/Bs cannot find convoys. Heavy U/B losses continue. Last group to operate off Newfoundland. Attention turns to UK-U/B lane. GAF reconnaissance for convey location.

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CHAPTER II.

THE U-BOAT AND ALLIED NAVAL COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE.

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THE U-BOAT AND ALLIED NAVAL
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE.

1.

The U/B's Mission.
Nature of the U/B War.

The German Navy defined the U/B as a "torpedo attack underwater boat"; its target, enemy merchant shipping. The continuous and successful use of the U/B against this target is "...in the long run of strategically decisive significance for the outcome of the war, since the destruction of her sea communications means the loss of the war for a nation dependent upon sea-trade".* In theory the U/B's peculiar properties enabled it to carry out this mission despite the enemy's control of the seas. Once well launched under Adm. Doenitz, the U/B Navy was never permitted to forget her basic offensive mission nor its significance for the outcome of the war.

The peculiar nature of the U/B war, or the Battle of the Atlantic, does not lend itself readily to the stirring descriptions which may mark the history of a series of major fleet engagements. It is not an impressive succession of majors but an attrition of minors. To the Allies this battle may have been inglorious, for it was a battle to deliver supplies. When seen as a whole, however, these minor engagements add up to a major battle

*Handbook for U/B Commanders, OSM 1942, p. 71. (Memo document).

upon whose outcome week by week the future prosecution of the war abroad depended. Whether striking or hiding, however the U/B turned to or from attack it always threatened and exacted countless hours of ceaseless watch and patrol. An engagement which goes on so long, is so devoid of spectators and correspondents, and is so far to the rear of the battle lines is apt to recede in memory with the passage of time, for it lacks the classical unities of the drama, being neither one in place nor in time nor in action. To the German Navy, in contrast, it may have borne a rather different, more romantic face. The Battle of the Atlantic was a front, "The U/B Front", and was recognized as the first line of battle, at first in carrying the offensive to the Allies and then in defending the continental fronts. The U/B man was a hero, in name at least, and the conduct of the war by U/B Command made full use of colorful imagination, as in naming U/B groups "Jaguar", "Seawolf", "Searobber", "Eagle", "Lionheart", etc. Mr. Churchill managed to convey something of this in reverse to the Allied public in his description of the Nazi beast of the sea stealing out from its caves on the Biscay Coast or withdrawing to lick its wounds.

2.
The U/B.

(a) Its secret strength: "Invisibility".

In stressing the strategic significance of the U/B weapon itself, viz., to destroy the sea communications of an enemy dependent

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on merchant shipping, the U/B C.O.'s Handbook stressed the following basic principles:

- (i) "...the characteristic property and greatest strength of the U/B is its invisibility." This comes from its ability to submerge. "Invisibility" gives to the U/B its one advantage in combat: surprise. "Invisibility" determines the entire theory of U/B tactics, even in defense, which depends on escape underwater.
- (ii) To keep its secret strength, the U/B must "not be seen, not be heard, not be located (geortet)" before or during an attack. If the U/B is located by the enemy, "...it loses almost all prospect of success." (ibid. p. 10).

The Ultra history of the U/B war is a commentary on this section of the C.O.'s Handbook, ^{As} part of the U/B's strength in surprise, was the intelligence of convoys which guided the wolf-pack to the right place. Insofar as the U/B anticipated the possibility of location before attack it began to add the various counter-location devices which characterized the German U/B in World War II. As the possibility of location turned into a probability, the morale of the C.O. was affected and the entire U/B Navy became engaged in developing one counter-device after another - either to restore "invisibility" and "surprise" or to

enable the U/B to defend itself.

(b) The U/B's weakness.

The U/B lost its strength upon being located because it was an offensive weapon incapable of surviving a defensive role in combat. Extremely vulnerable, its only defense was again its source of strength, viz. invisibility. It could disappear and hide. Going down was a matter of seconds, but once there it was sluggish - and its time submerged limited. For it was not truly an underwater boat.

The German Navy knew the weaknesses of the U/B. The Handbook of 1942 lists and discusses them.

Low speed (principal weakness) which results from the necessity, for sake of "invisibility", of two kinds of propulsion, thus doubling the machine installation and resulting in a corresponding reduction in the performance of either one singly. This comparatively low speed "...is of fundamental significance for the U/B's tactical use."

Limited underwater cruising range.

Limited look-out.

Great vulnerability.

3.
CI and Perspective on U/B War from
beginning of 1943 to End of War.

On the whole, U/B traffic read in 20-G covers the period of U/B weakness. It would be surprising if this were not so. The U/B was at a distinct disadvantage throughout this period because it had lost its "invisibility". Its movements were known, whether by decryption intelligence or D/F, or radar, or sonic devices - or by a combination of all these Allied location devices. It was the U/B that was more and more "surprised". In the fall of 1942, the U/B had already begun the long and involved history of remedies, but not until the decisive defeat of the winter and spring offensive of 1943 did U/B Command's search for counter-devices and restoratives become constant and urgent, finally resulting in a major change in submarine warfare.

Throughout the search for causes of the U/B's loss of 'invisibility' and 'its one advantage in combat: surprise', there was one Allied location measure which remained unknown to the Germans. Behind D/F and radar there was a further locating device, decryption intelligence, whose existence the Germans may have feared on occasions but in which they apparently never really believed. At least those responsible for final decisions never acted as though they believed in it; the changes which might have countered the Allied cryptanalytic attack were never introduced.

Knowing that the U/B had lost its secret strength and had become the hunted instead of the hunter, U/B Command persisted in reducing the mystery of Allied location to radar, i.e. to something which could be seen or could be heard, given adequate C.R.F. and receiver equipment. It was of course considered that the secret might not lie solely in Allied transmissions, but also in U/B radiations. Every kind of U/B radiation was studied: heat and electronic which might be picked up in special Allied receivers, U/B transmitter radiations in tuning, U/B receiver radiations, and their own radio transmissions D/F'd by the Allied intercept net. In truth, the critical radiations were the radio transmissions and the receiver was the Allied intercept net. But the Allies were not simply D/F'ing the unit transmissions, they were reading the messages - U/B Command's as well as those from units. U/B Command's messages were more revealing than those from individual U/B's.

4.

The Contribution of decryption intelligence to the U/B's loss of invisibility.

(a) Record of Decryption.

Well over 115,000 individual German Naval messages were decrypted in OP-20-G and read in the Atlantic Section. (This figure does not include short-signals and WW's). During the first

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9½ months of reading, i. e. from December 1942 to mid September 1943, U/B traffic was not decrypted solidly nor always within the time limit for immediate operational effectiveness. 233 out of the 259 days in this period were read, 127 within 5 days, of which 61 within 2 days. Thereafter, from mid September 1943 to the end of the war, but especially after 1 November, it is no exaggeration to say that U/B traffic was consumed on the spot, continuously, solidly, and currently for 19½ months. After months of effort the German machine cipher had been mastered and the recovery of the daily keys reduced to a minimum delay.

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RECORD OF U/B TRAFFIC DECRYPTION (ATLANTIC):

December 1942 - May 1945

Month	No. Days Not Read	No. Days Read	Total No. Days Read in 5 days or less	No. Days Send in 2 -Days or Less	2 to 5 Days
Dec. '42	12	19	8	5	3
Jan. '43	3	28	17	5	12
Feb.	1	27	23	18	5
Mar.	5	26	19	8	11
Apr.	11	19	19	12	7
May	3	28	14	9	5
June	9	21	7	1	6
July	2	29	3	2	1
Aug.	6	25	10	1	9
Sept. 1-15	<u>4</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTAL to 15 Sept.	56	233	127	61	66

Sept. 15-30	All days read	12	3	9
Oct.	" " "	25	18	7

Average Daily Delay in Hours (OCT)

Nov.	" " "	26.1
Dec.	" " "	26.0
Jan. '44	" " "	23.7
Feb.	" " "	32.6
Mar.	" " "	22.0
Apr.	" " "	18.0
May	" " "	21.1
June	" " "	21.5
July	" " "	18.6
Aug.	" " "	16.2
Sept.	" " "	36.4
Oct.	" " "	45.2
Nov.	" " "	37.0
Dec.	" " "	40.3
Jan. '45	" " "	25.2
Feb.	" " "	28.1
Mar.	" " "	56.7
Apr.	" " "	33.4

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- (b) Weakness of U/B operating system which increased value of decryption intelligence: Operational bookkeeping by radio.

The above statement on the quantity of material made available by decryption is not complete without a statement concerning certain peculiarities of the German operating system which greatly increased the value of U/B special intelligence. The constant and close personal direction of the U/B from shore necessitated complete reliance on radio communications. U/B radio traffic constituted in effect a system of operational bookkeeping which required daily posting if the U/B's were to function as Command intended. The following are some of the major points in the operating system, all dependent upon radio communications, which made available to the Allies Comsub's own entries in his system of accounting for every U/B at sea.

(i) Heading points and operational plans were ordered by radio after the U/B had put to sea. There were few exceptions to this procedure. Occasionally boats sailed with written orders for special tasks, but even they were told by radio to 'Proceed according to Special Task'.

(ii) Passage Reports: U/B's were required to send passage reports after clearing out of Biscay or after crossing 60 N. when outbound from the Baltic or Norway for Atlantic operations.

(iii) Complete control of operations from shore:

U/B's were not only told where to go after they had put to sea but also when they were expected to arrive in their heading area. Patrol lines were formed on the hour. Every U/B C.O. who was to be in the line was addressed by name. They were to 'be in line at 0800/17' at stated intervals between two points defined down to minutes by means of grid squares. There they were to expect an 'eastbound convoy' beginning at dusk. From there on they continued to be told exactly what to do. It is a mistake to think of the "wolf-pack" as a kind of independent task force. There was no senior officer present who directed the operation from a flag-boat. Comsubs decided everything, and thus demanded the most detailed description of the situation from each U/B, transmitted on frequencies that could be heard equally well on this side of the Atlantic. There was a provision for a "group circuit" to be used only when Control could not hear what was going on. If communications were entirely broken off (very rare) and the "Group circuit" ordered, then Comsubs would name other U/B's as radio relays so that he could still keep himself informed. The shadowing U/B had to send homing signals on medium frequencies, but at the same time it had to report to Control on high frequencies.

(iv) Position Reports. If a U/B failed to append his position to a transmission or failed to transmit for several days, he usually received a special request to report position. (U/B sinkings were judged on the basis of these requests.)

(v) No U/B could deviate from orders without permission requested and granted by radio.

(vi) Returning: U/B's could start their return home only after a specific order to do so or after a request with reasons had been submitted and granted - by radio. The decision to return was left up to the C.O. in some cases, such as those involving a damaged U/B, but the damage had to be reported and the return cruise announced. On their way in, U/B's had to transmit their expected time of arrival off escort points and their requests for radio beacons.

(vii) Fuel on hand had to be appended to every transmission. Refueling at sea was handled in the same detailed manner. The refueling station was announced well ahead of time. What U/B's were to be serviced, how much fuel they should have left on arrival, and how much fuel they were to be given were all sent on the air, down to the last cubic meter. And after the job was done, the supply sub had to make his report by radio; telling what subs he refueled, how many cubic meters each received and when, and how much of everything the supply sub still had on board.

(viii) While mechanical details of new equipment were not always available in U/B traffic, the essentials could be put together in short order, because here again either Command could not wait to see how the things were working out or something

would come apart and the U/B would need advice.

(ix) General orders, Estimates, etc., Situation reports.

The German habit of bookkeeping did not stop with the details of U/B movements, but went on to make far more information available to the Allies than was actually necessary, for the U/B's day to day operations. The tempo of the war at sea, ^{and considerations of security.} may have necessitated the custom of giving the U/B his heading orders after he had put to sea. The fact that some U/B's were always at sea may have made it difficult to effect a timely delivery of general orders and estimates of the current situation without reliance on radio. But whatever the German difficulties may have been, their solution by radio kept the Atlantic Section's books posted along with those of the U/B's at sea. When the U-505 was captured, her volume of Current War Orders, for example, was already contained in the Atlantic Section's files and long since in the hands of COMINCH. In fact, U-505's copy was out of date, having been superseded by additions and corrections which she had failed to intercept herself or which had been transmitted after her capture.*

* The Atlantic Section translated 168 corrections to Standing War Orders, 58 current orders (not operational, but estimates on A/S defense, tactics, etc.), and 194 Experience and Admonition messages, not to mention cancellations. In addition there were unnumbered "Situation Reports" for the various operational areas.

(x) Communications: To carry this heavy burden of traffic the German Navy developed an elaborate, complex, flexible, and highly efficient radio service which is probably unique in the history of military communications. Its workings, however, were likewise revealed in U/B traffic. The Atlantic Section translated more than a hundred corrections to "Communications War Orders" in addition to approximately 150 series of messages announcing frequency and circuit changes.

5.

Uses of Decryption Intelligence
in the Battle of the Atlantic.

The effect on the enemy of this wholesale misdirection of his own radio communications is difficult to calculate in detail. In mentioning some of the more obvious uses of this intelligence emphasis should be given to the most general use, background information.

(a) Accumulation of information on U/B Navy.

As will be evident from the items already referred to, the files of processed U/B traffic steadily gathered a vast amount of information, both general and detailed, on every aspect of the U/B, including the edicts of the Grand Admiral and the welfare of the U/B crews, their ailments and proxy marriages. Orders of the day and reports from those at sea could be read against a broad background. Something of the enemy's temper could be determined, his habits and character appreciated. One

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had considerable evidence with which to appraise his intentions and limitations, with which to judge what he could or would do - or not do.

On the basis of traffic U/B's could be identified by number and by commanding officer. The Atlantic Section periodically issued a master list of operational U/B's. Their types could be identified, if not already known, in various ways, as, for example, by reports of fuel on hand.

From a knowledge of the enemy's communications and operating system one could frequently fill in information that had been missed. To mention only one example: if a U/B's passage report had been missed, the order to change from "Coastal" to "Ireland" radio circuit would give the same information in another way. There were also cases in which errors made by the Germans were caught here before they were cleared up by Control.

If this background was invaluable in the interpretation of present and future U/B movements, it was equally important in breaking into the current keys, for one knew the sort of message which should accompany or come out of given situations at sea. One waited for a message of the right length or with a D/F fix in the right area.

(b) The protection of Allied convoys and shipping.

During the first 5 months of 1943, the primary use of RI was in convoy diversion, for at this stage sufficient A/S


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M/V TONNAGE (GRT) SUNK IN ESCORTED CONVOYS BY U-BOATS (AUG. 1941 - MAR. 1945)

BRITISH ULTRA U/B INTELL.

NO ATLANTIC U/B ULTRA

ALLIED NAVAL COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ULTRA OF U/B



COMMENTS IN RED = GERMAN
COMMENTS IN BLACK = OP-20

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and escort forces were not available for an immediate and direct A/S offensive.

(c) Offensive use.

The defensive use of ultra intelligence continued throughout the war, but with the increase of A/S forces the direct offensive use became more and more characteristic. One of the first instances of USN offensive use of Ultra was the attack delivered by the "BOGUE" on U/B Group TRUTZ early in June 1943. From that time on USN CVE forces carried out frequent attacks, giving special attention to U/B refueling rendezvous in the Middle Atlantic. As a result of these attacks USN contributed in a major way to the destruction of the U/B supply fleet. In addition, USN forces practically cut off the Axis supply line to and from the Far East by intercepting the submarine cargo runners, after having played a full part in the sinkings of surface Blockade Runners.* Of the 489 U/B's sunk by Allied action at sea beginning in January 1943 USN forces sank approximately 63 with the direct aid of ultra information plus some 30 more with the indirect aid of ultra.

(d) Allied decryption intelligence as countermeasure.

An important contribution made by the Atlantic Section on the basis of its own correlation of U/B traffic was the detection of German cryptanalytic success with Allied codes and ciphers -

* (See Parts B and E of Volume II).

principally the Anglo - US combined naval cipher.

(e) Technical intelligence.

Communication Intelligence correlated, evaluated and disseminated advance intelligence and currently significant details about devices and techniques under development or in use by the enemy. Such information was extensive both in variety and in volume. A related factor in the constant struggle for technical supremacy, namely enemy knowledge of Allied devices and procedures, was also the subject of continual attention. A review of the nature and history of the more important devices concerning which information was passed leaves no room for doubt that this aspect of the Atlantic Section's activity was of vital significance. The advantage of superior intelligence about the enemy's endeavors in the fields of radar, anti-radar search receivers and deceptive devices, (such as Aphrodite), weapons, under-water diesel propulsion (Schnorchel) and other technical matters helped the Allies to gain and hold the initiative in the battle for superiority in technical devices. (See Volume IV for details).

CHAPTER III.

WINTER-SPRING U/B OFFENSIVE AND THE U/B'S DEFEAT. 1943.

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WINTER-SPRING U/B OFFENSIVE
AND THE U/B'S DEFEAT. 1943.

The U/B was decisively defeated in the spring of 1943. The failure of the German winter-spring offensive can be ascribed in part to Allied Communication Intelligence. Decryption intelligence assisted materially in successful convoy diversion in January and February, when massed assaults might have produced shipping losses comparable to March, or worse. Delays in decryption intelligence on our side plus timely RI on the German side played an important part in such convoy successes as the U/B did achieve, notably in March. In April and May decryption intelligence held its own, but even when the U/B's made contact the strengthened surface-A/C defense attacked with a force the U/B could not withstand. The war was to last for two more years, but the U/B Navy could not regain the initiative. When it returned to the offensive, it was firmly mirrored in Ultra intelligence. Unable to find and strike its main target, it moved cautiously, never freed from the constant fear of surprise attack.

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A. General Considerations on the U/B's Defeat.

1.

Retreat or Strategic Withdrawal.

Retreat from the major Transatlantic convoy lanes was at all times the indication in German U/B traffic itself of the U/B's defeat. Strategic withdrawal will be the term used by the Germans, for unlike World War I, it was the German U/B Navy that alone remained as a fighting unit at the conclusion of World War II. Its tenacity and resilience, its determination to revolutionize submarine warfare despite disasters at home will be the subject of later comment.

2.

U/B Navy's time-table.

Without more knowledge than is now at hand on the preceding periods of the U/B Navy's history in World War II, it is a matter for question that the U/B was not only so late in starting its all-out offensive against major convoys, but also not really ready even then. The U/B building program indicates that the spring offensive of 1943 was merely the beginning of the all-out offensive, not the real thing. The unexpected invasion of North Africa, the serious situation on the land fronts, and the astonishing productive capacity of the United States apparently forced the U/B

Navy to undertake an offensive before it was really ready. The construction of U/B's reached its peak a year later, in the winter of 1943-44, when U/B's were being commissioned at the rate of 25 per month. But the types being commissioned were the ones that had already shown themselves to be inadequate for the U/B mission. In other words, the German Navy's time-table not only showed what was probably a serious underestimate of US productive capacity but also a slowness in active comprehension of what happened in the Atlantic during the spring of 1943. New high speed underwater types did not reach significant production figures until the winter of 1944-45. Meanwhile the accumulation of old-types had continued to rise, in spite of losses at sea, until the actual number of U/B's, including those in training, had never been larger than it was in the winter of 1943-44. Schnorchel was not ready for all of these boats until the fall of 1944 - after the Allied invasion of France.

At this point the general affect of Decryption Intelligence should probably be taken into account. Part of the German miscalculations, i.e. those continued after Spring '43, may have been due to the impossible situation in which the German Navy was placed without knowing it - viz., that of having its high grade operational radio communications wide open to the enemy. Long after the defeat of spring '43, the German Navy persisted in believing that "invisibility" might be restored to the standard types.

With this restoration the U/B would again be equal to a battle that was recognized as "hard," and "growing harder." The U/B of spring 1943 had not been prepared for the strength and variety of the defenses encountered, but the balance could be restored. At least, the Germans saw no reason why the old types could not still hold their own.

3.
Review in terms of K/V
and U/B losses.

The decisive nature of the U/B's defeat in 1943 can be shown by a breakdown of over-all figures for the war. January 1, 1943 is taken as the point of division, thus giving the U/B the advantage of its all-out offensive.

	<u>K/V's SUNK BY U/B's</u>	<u>U/B's LOST</u>	
		<u>by Direct Allied Action at Sea</u>	<u>by Other Causes</u>
Sept. '39 to Dec. '42	10,625,000 GRT	143	11
Jan. '43 to May '45	<u>3,475,000 GRT</u>	<u>189</u>	<u>100</u>
TOTAL	14,100,000 GRT	632	111
			<u>743</u>

Note: These figures will probably need revision later but are the best that can be brought together at the present time. COMINT's Combat Intelligence (Anti-Submarine) gives 14,000,000 gross tons as the approximate figure for the K/V losses and this agrees with Admiralty A/S Bulletin records. Since the end of the war, however, newspapers have printed figures that are considerably higher.

U/B success had been achieved at a reasonable cost while the U/B fleet was still adolescent -- the greatest success, of course, (over 6,000,000 GRT) off our own coasts in 1942. But before the small-scale weapon which had accomplished so much in 1942 could be really forged as a large-scale weapon, it was already under Allied control.

4.
World War I compared
with World War II.

	<u>M/V's SUNK BY U/B's</u>	<u>U/B's COMMISSIONED</u>	<u>U/B's LOSS</u>	<u>% U/B's LOSS</u>
War I*	12,191,996 GRT	343	173	52%
War II	14,100,000 GRT	1,200	743 (all causes)	61%
			632 (enemy action)	52.7%

If the above figures for M/V losses are correct, there is a very marked contrast between the effectiveness of the U/B in World War I and in World War II. While the percentages of U/B's lost are in line with one another, the much greater U/B effort of World War II did not yield anything like a result comparable to World War I. When these figures are examined together with those given in para.3 above, however, one sees that the U/B's failure

*The figures for World War I are taken from Admiral Doenitz's book, "Die U-Bootschwaffe," v. 69, published in 1942 by Mittler & Sohn, Berlin. The figure on shipping losses, according to Adm. Doenitz, is taken from British statements. It is not clear that the figure 343 should be listed as "U/B's commissioned," but Adm. Doenitz used the phrase normally translated as "commissioned" - "in Dienst gewesen."

in World War II lies in the last 2-1/3 years of the war, precisely during the period when the U/B Navy had reached its greatest potential. Had the U/B been able to continue its earlier success with figures at all proportional to the increased effort the result for the Allies would have been indeed calamitous.

B. Pattern of the winter-spring offensive.

There were two principal types of U/B operations:

Group (wolf-pack) operations against major convoys,

Individual station patrol, primarily in distant coastal areas.

Supplementary to the above, but in itself of unique and great importance was the U-tanker.

1.

Independent U/B's in distant areas.

The U/B attempted to harass the ocean edges simultaneously with the convoy offensive, although the expenditure of effort in distant areas which characterized the fall of 1942 could not be maintained. After some 23 U/B's in these areas during December, the number dropped to 7 in January, but thereafter increased month by month to 18 in May. The active fleet of 740 and 1,200 tonners, however, was too small to maintain a constant pressure comparable to that in the North Atlantic. Furthermore, these distant operations demanded a disproportionate share of U-tanker services.

2.

U-Tankers.

In December 1942 the German Navy had seven 1,600 ton supply subs, upon which the Atlantic offensive was dependent for

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its full effect. By March, 2 more had sailed on their first cruises. Even though these refuelers spent half their time at sea, U/B supply was working on a slender margin, for it was apparently intended to maintain 3 refueling stations: one for US-UK convoy subs, one for US-Gibraltar convoy subs, and one for Trinidad-Caribbean and South Atlantic subs. As a result, US-UK convoy operations suffered during the early part of the winter. Continuous stations could not be maintained. In January, for example, U-459 (Wilamowitz) had to be sent on a long haul into the South Atlantic to service the few Capetown subs, while U/B's in the North Atlantic were being forced to drop out of groups and come home for lack of supply facilities. Not until February were continuous stations maintained off the US-UK and US-Gibraltar lanes, and the situation was still pinched. In March, 3 of the 4 supply subs that delivered fuel serviced US-UK convoy subs. This measure of attention to North Atlantic subs continued for the remainder of the spring offensive.

It was of course recognized at the time that these refueling R/V's constituted a kind of Achilles's heel, but it was months before sufficient A/S forces were available to act on decryption intelligence of these meetings at sea.

3.
Group Pattern for US-Gibraltar
lane. Dec. '42 - April '43.

U/B's operating on the US-Gibraltar lane formed a circuit independent of group operations farther north. There was frequent

exchange with IXC (740 ton) subs bound to or returning from middle and south Atlantic coastal areas, but not with the 500 tonners operating on US-UK lanes. Proceeding from Biscay to the Azores area, U/B's would form for eastbound convoys and sweep out sometimes as far as 40 W. After a period of waiting, the group would turn and cruise back along the lane for westbound convoys. Having arrived in the area east of the Azores and north of Madeira, the group would break up along the Canaries and in the Gibraltar approaches for mixed group and individual station patrol tactics. As their final gesture before putting back into Biscay, the U/B's that had not been refueled for further operations would form once more off Portugal to block the UK-Gibraltar lane. Meanwhile replacements would have formed in the Azores area. It was not a very lucrative run, yet U/B Command gave approximately one-third as many subs to it in the peak months of February and March as he gave to the US-UK lanes. The destruction of oil-tankers in TK-1 in January had apparently impressed High Command with what these operations might achieve for the North African front, but in March Admiral Doenitz admitted that US destroyers could put up very stiff resistance. In April U/B's were withdrawn from the lane.

4.

Group operations against US-UK convoys.

It has already been suggested that the U/B Navy was not really ready to launch the convoy offensive in the winter of

1942-1943. The shift of emphasis to US-UK lanes was not noticeable in December, when independent operations sank more ships than were sunk by North Atlantic groups.

From January through May 1943 the number of U/B's at sea in the Atlantic averaged 166 per month, 179 being the top monthly figure - reached in both March and May. The average number actually operating was 108. The remaining 58 U/B's were either outbound or returning, and, although potentially operative, could not be relied upon for the operating plans at any given moment. Thus only 65% of the subs at sea might be called immediately available. This figure was again cut down by the demands of other areas, with the result that an average of only 72, or 66% of the operating subs, was devoted to US-UK group operations. There was a marked increase of U/B's on the US-UK lanes in January and again in February, but the number stalled in March, fell off in April, and then reached its highest point (81) in May, when the battle was practically over.

(a) Pattern of the US-UK group formations.

The major convoy offensive might be described as a pulsation or rhythm: first the convergence of U/B's from port (both Biscay and the Baltic or Norway) as they made for their waiting areas, then the formation of the patrol line followed by the reconnaissance sweep, and lastly contact and the vortex of operation. In practice, of course, the pulsation was irregular.

the rhythm broken; at any given time there might be several distinct beats in differing degrees of completion. After the operation came disentanglement and division: some heading directly for port, others to refueling stations whence they joined up again with another group or formed the nucleus of a new group or returned home. Forming and reforming, they traced individual patterns and group patterns in a whole whose periodicity was determined by the convoy cycle.

The group formations had to fulfill two basic requirements: maximum reconnaissance and maximum striking power once contacts had been made. Disposition for maximum reconnaissance reflected the work of German Naval Intelligence (largely CI)* on convoy movements, but trial and error method was also used against a background of elementary deductions concerning convoy routes, such as preference for the northerly route which could be covered to a greater extent by land-based A/C. With a sufficient number of U/B's, lines could be set up near the beginning of the ocean route which would cover the major arc of possible diversions. It was practically impossible for a convoy to pass through a line undetected. To obtain maximum striking power the groups had to be arranged in a pattern that would make encirclement possible - without sacrificing other favorable opportunities.

Certain of the more important conditioning factors should be mentioned:

* Communication Intelligence - editor.

(i) Considerations of emphasis as between east-bound and westbound convoys.

(ii) Intelligence: specific convoy intelligence, such as that gained from decryption, which recommended or necessitated changes in plans. Also, of course, the failures of intelligence represented in successful convoy diversions.

(iii) Convoy contacts not planned for, with the resulting changes made for immediate exploitation.

(iv) Allied defense and location devices.

(v) Availability of U/B's, their condition, etc.

(vi) Availability of U-tankers at right time and place.

(vii) Weather: the phenomenally bad winter of 1942-43.

(b) The simple pattern, December 1942 to mid January 1943, consisted of two basic groups, one at either end of the convoy lane, shifting up and down in accordance with anticipated out-bound convoy routes. Attention was divided more or less equally between east and west bound convoys by this arrangement, although, as things worked out, more attention was actually given to west-bound convoys. An effective modification of this simple pattern was the planned encirclement involving a contact group backed up by a support group, an arrangement which led to the successful operation against Convoy ON 154 at the end of December.

(c) Transition, late January. Ultra intelligence was sufficiently current during the first part of January to be of material assistance in the successful diversion of convoys. U/B failure to contact expected convoys at either end of the lane forced the initial pattern into a natural evolution. With its accumulation of fresh U/B's the eastern group was lengthened in an attempt to close all outbound routes. When the convoys continued to evade the patrol lines, the groups were compelled to go in search of the convoys. By the end of January the long line originally intended for westbound convoys had turned into a westerly fan sweep, beginning at about 30 W and covering the area from 55 to 60 N. A few days later, U/B's began to sweep the area between 50 N and 55 N in the same manner.

(d) Revised pattern: for destruction of eastbound convoys.

The transition just described was to end, of course, in the massing of U/B's in the northwestern Atlantic. The revised pattern might be reduced to four primary constituent groups:

Contact group off Newfoundland.

Westerly sweep group north of 55 N.

Westerly sweep group between 50 and 55 N.

Replacement group, the fresh boats from port heading for and forming up in the area of 55 N - 27 W.

This drive against the west was designed for eastbound convoys. From the end of January to the conclusion of the spring offensive U/B group

formations were made with eastbound convoys in mind. Westbound convoys were attacked only as intelligence made these targets irresistible or as opportunity supposedly permitted within the framework of the offensive against eastbound convoys. Whether or not this shift of emphasis can be attributed to the aggressive Admiral Doenitz, who became Cominch at this time, it seems evident that the German Navy could no longer afford to be primarily interested in the sinking of ships as such. It was the cargo of war supplies that had to be destroyed. By January 1943 Allied ship construction had passed total losses by U/B's.

The new pattern was highly flexible and was arranged not only to block every lane north of 50 N. by the staggered sweep groups but also to make certain that once contact had been made every U/B could be brought to bear. An increased number of U/B's was required. As against 12 new U/B's released from the North for Atlantic operations in January, 23 were released in February. U/B losses lagged behind the accessions. To keep the requisite number at sea, continuous refueling stations were necessary, for which U/B's might leave their place in line only when down to the very minimum of fuel. As Comsubs explained to Group HAUDEGAN on 3 February:

"Seizing of the convoys running at this time on very scattered routes is possible only with a large number of subs." (1733/3/2/43).

(e) March 1943: the pattern works.

As a result of unexpected operations in February on westbound convoys the revised pattern for eastbound convoys was not restored until March, when it proved its worth. More ships were sunk in convoy during March than in any other month of the entire war. The difference did not lie in the number of U/B's, for as many had been there in February, but rather in the deployment of U/B's. First, they were in their positions according to the pattern above described. Second, contacts were made on eastbound convoys as planned. The result was total encirclement of the convoys. The groups closed in from every direction; the convoy defense was hopelessly outnumbered. Even so, U/B successes in March - or rather in the first three weeks of March - must be qualified. More than twice as many ships were convoyed in March as in February.

(f). Break.

The policy of massing U/B groups in the Northwestern Atlantic continued through April and May, but something had gone wrong. The precision of March could not be attained. There was evidence of increasing haste and uncertainty on the part of U/B Command. Operations were confused by attempts to exploit contacts on westbound convoys near the end of their run. At the same time U/B's were ordered to pursue all contacts, even the most unfavorable, on eastbound convoys. Command could not concentrate his U/B's

where and when needed. The arrangement of the group lines became more complex and less effective. In short, the pattern was breaking up.

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C. Examination of the U/B's defeat.

1.

Ultra Intelligence and Convoy
diversions.

During the winter and spring offensive of 1942-43 Allied RI was an imperfect instrument. It was of little or no immediate use in December 1942, but by the first part of January decryption was holding its own. By a combination of breaking into the present from time to time and the continual filling in of the past gaps one began to see how the U/B's worked, how their lines were set up, and what patterns were employed. Whether running even with them, a little ahead, or lagging behind, the process of piecing the whole thing together never stopped. It was like trying to watch the U/B's through a condition of changing visibility. At intervals the clouds would open and one could see the present situation, but not completely, for much of the present U/B situation could be seen only in the immediate past. Unlike the analogy of visibility and cloudiness, however, the record of the immediate past was there, waiting to be read. The present might fade out but the past would open up and complete the picture of what had just been seen. And even though the present was blocked from view the past record would contain many elements known to form a part of the new situation. And thus, working back and forth, combining indirect and direct views, even

at worst one had some kind of picture more accurate than any other in Allied possession, particularly when supplemented by D/F and traffic.

Since Ultra intelligence was not available for current use in December, it is of interest to note that every planned group operation met with at least the first condition of success, contact on the expected convoy. On the other hand, the scale of the German effort was small and the weather was bad. The largest number of subs brought to bear on any one convoy was 22. (Groups URGESTUM and SPITZ; ON 154).

Despite the enemy's increased effort in January and February U/B successes on the convoy lanes did not measure up. The winter offensive was not succeeding. Ten U/B groups or wolf-packs operated against US-UK convoys during January and February. Of the 16 convoy "expectations" for which the lines were formed only 4 led to contact, and one of these 4 was probably a case of last minute German CI on the movement of a westbound convoy, ON 156. It was also the heaviest single convoy loss during this period. There were 6 additional contacts, not "expected" in U/B traffic. Of these 6, 4 were to some extent accidental and it is not clear that RI could have prevented them. The remaining two are cases of RI failure, in which attempted evasion of one group sent the convoys to other U/B's whose movements were not currently known.

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In March, the successful U/B month, there were only 4 planned operations. Two of these expectations accounted for the greater part of the losses. Both are cases of RI failure, although it is not certain that one of them could have been prevented under the circumstances. The combined attack on SC 122 and HX 229, like the case of ON 166, was made possible by last minute shifts in U/B dispositions, presumably the result of German CI.

2.
Convoy defenses.

Effective convoy diversion continued in April and May, but even with contact U/B's could not mass for assault or maneuver into attack positions. The increase in convoy defenses which followed the shipping losses of March was the first step in the offensive sweep against U/B's. Joint surface-A/C escort deprived the U/B of his mobility. If he came up on the surface to look around or get ahead - A/C put him down. Once down, the water rumbled with explosions, which U/B Command interpreted as bluff D/C's, part of the Allied propaganda campaign against U/B morale. U/B crews and C.O.'s became frightened and lost their "healthy hunter instincts", despite Adm. Doenitz's exhortations and threats.

3.
Loss of experienced U/B
commanders and crews.

The U/B arm had already lost many of its "ace" commanders.

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The effort to step up the North Atlantic offensive in the spring of 1943 had necessarily brought new and inexperienced men into the most difficult battle areas. It is not possible to weigh the personal factor in the U/B defeat but its importance can be indicated by the following figures :

During 1943, 10% of the operating U/B's accounted for 50% of M/V's sunk; 40% of the operating U/B's accounted for all M/V's sunk.

But even the skilled Commanders were subject to surprise attack from the air.

4.

Surprise attacks from the air.
Visibility and Vulnerability.

As is pointed out in more detail in Chapter IV of Volume II, two things stand out in the course of the U/B's defeat - both of them plainly marked in U/B traffic:

Inability of the U/B to cope with surprise attack from the air;

Increasing intimidation of U/B men as they began to appreciate the visibility and vulnerability of their weapon.

(a) U/B Command's Refusal to admit defeat.

U/B Command did not anticipate the rapid expansion of Allied convoy defenses, hence he did not readily adjust himself to the facts reported from sea. A review of his reactions during the course of the winter-spring offensive shows that his concentration on the one end-attack!-relegated the difficulties encountered by the U/B's to a subordinate place where they could be handled by

expedients or by psychology. In December 1942 U/B's were told to pay no attention to their own radar search receivers. Allied radar was ineffective. U/B's were to rely upon themselves and think only of attack. In January convoy evasion raised the fear of Allied location devices. It was not a combat fear, but a fear that the Allies were escaping combat by means of radar. In February the SC 118 operation gave Command cause for worry. Results were not up to expectations and it was clear that VL/R A/C had been effective. His reaction, however, had been "Further reports about A/C are superfluous". If the U/B persisted it could wear the escort out and then sink the fat merchantmen. Worries were put to one side as U/B's reported their successes against ON 166. The operation was called a "run of the mill success", but that was not true. Contact in the first place had been a matter of good fortune and the convoy had been pursued and attacked for days because it was beyond the range of land-based A/C. The appearance of aircraft carriers with convoys in March seems to have made little impression on Command. By April, however, the combined effect of increased defenses was evident in Command's renewal of the doctrine that the U/B must surprise if it is to succeed. Chances against convoys were narrowed down to the first night's attack. Claiming that the "A/C situation is known here", Command saw no reason why the U/B's could not maneuver outside the range of close A/C escort (30 - 40 miles). If they were caught

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coming in, then they could attack submerged. Encouraged by the brief success against ONS 5 in May, Command tried to dismiss A/C by telling U/B's to stay on the surface and fire their inadequate A/A guns, "...then the plane will soon stop attacking". But trapped and defenseless, subject to surprise visitations in the difficult task of maneuvering, U/B's were less bold in pressing an attack which was sure to reveal their presence.

(b) U/B Command accounts for the defeat.

U/B losses did not become alarming until May and then they went up with a suddenness for which the Germans were totally unprepared. When U/B's began to disappear at the rate of 1 1/3 per day, Command yielded the area in which he had already lost the initiative. He correctly judged (19 May) that "the enemy has once more gained a few lengths on us in his effort to deprive the U/B of its most important attribute, invisibility". Allied successes were attributed to the surprise attacks from the air which radar made possible - on the outbound and returning U/B lanes as well as on the convoy lanes. The time was to be passed in "cunning and caution" until the U/B regained its invisibility.

CHAPTER IV.

U-BOAT RESTORATIVES

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U/B RESTORATIVES.

The history of the U/B War from May 1943 to the fall of 1944 is a repetition of German defeat. The U/B continued to suffer heavy losses without being able to come to attack. Conviction of the U/B's defeat did not come easily. At first it seemed a matter of offsetting a temporary Allied technical advantage by devising suitable countermeasures.

After the briefest treatment of the course of the war down to the invasion of France, this chapter will summarize the background of this period in terms of the major changes started for a new U/B warfare and in terms of the various devices which were used in the attempt to keep the old type U/B alive.

A. Course of the War.

1. Summer 1943. Dispersal and U/B Diversion.

The situation could not have seemed hopeless at first, for it was not believed that the Allies could distribute their advantage so as to cover every ocean area or every individual U/B in the way in which U/B groups had been covered in the North Atlantic during April and May. Meanwhile German technical genius -- undisputed as ever -- would produce the needed countermeasures and the U/B could then return to the major battle.

In leaving the North Atlantic convoy lanes, it was

recognized that the U/B was withdrawing from the one area where victory was absolutely necessary. In one of his last messages to U/B's before the abandonment of the North Atlantic, Admiral Doenitz had made it plain that there were no longer substitute areas where the U/B might fulfill its mission. U/B captains had been warned on 21 May: "...do not fail to understand that you must answer for your actions." (1900/21). The withdrawal three days later admitted a major and decisive defeat, although, at the time, it was presented as a strategic withdrawal.

(a) US-Gibraltar lane. BCGUE and USN RI.

That the US-Gibraltar lane was covered by carrier air power was quickly demonstrated early in June when Command tried to continue group warfare with the U/B's salvaged out of the last North Atlantic operation in May. The BCGUE attacked Group TRUTZ on the basis of USN decryption intelligence before the convoy could arrive which TRUTZ expected on the basis of German decryption intelligence. The combination of superior intelligence with the expansion of USN air power in the Middle Atlantic, which Command did not anticipate, was to cost him dearly.

(b) Weaknesses of the Summer Campaign:
unavoidable U/B concentrations in
passage areas and at refueling R/V's:

The U/B dispersal which became marked after the TRUTZ affair was as natural and customary as it was necessary. Once

dispersed, however, U/B's could find no place in the Atlantic where they might recoup their losses and reestablish their prestige. Instead, the effort led to an intensification of defeat by an alarming reduction of the operating fleet — and by the loss of the U-tankers. There were still two areas of unavoidable U/B concentration: first, the passage areas of Biscay and Iceland-Faeroes; and second, the middle Atlantic refueling R/V's, which were all the more necessary now that 500-tonners were being employed in American waters. Against the first concentration the British waged a highly successful joint surface-A/C sweep. Against the refueling R/V's USN CVE's made a lasting impression on the U/B Navy. (See Chapters VI and VII of Volume II for an overall study of the U-tanker system, the significance of its destruction, and the contribution of USN RI and CVE's to this destruction.)

(c) Results.

If fulfilling the necessary conditions for attack, viz., passage and refueling, was a highly dangerous and nightmarish business for the U/B, once in his operational area he had no escape from the problem of survival. Of those which reached American waters, more than half failed to return home.

2.

Renewal of the North Atlantic
Battle.

During the summer the Navy had, or thought it had, developed

the devices which Admiral Doenitz had promised to the U/B's in May. When U/B groups formed on the US-UK convoy lanes in September the Admiral apparently believed that the U/B was once more equal to its task. The hopes and ground for these hopes are best stated in the Admiral's own words. First of all, there was the acoustic torpedo, "Zaunkoenig."

(a) T-V acoustic torpedo. "Offense is the best defense".

As U/B's sailed from France to await the signal for the first convoy operation, all T-V equipped subs were instructed as follows:

"To be deciphered only by Zaunkoenig subs:

Offizier B

Make use of every opportunity to bring your sharp weapon into play. In Biscay on the way to your operational area, be at all times clear for a defensive or offensive shot against destroyers or corvettes. If the enemy bears down on you, do not blind yourselves by going to great depths, but in the daytime remain at periscope depth and fire. You still have enough time after firing to dive. The same applies at night, first fire, then dive. Offense is the best defense. Act accordingly." (1128/2 Sept. '43)

(b) Non-radiating search receivers will restore the balance "in the main theater of battle".

Unaware of the developments in Allied centimeter radar, the Germans had become convinced in the course of the summer that Allied location successes were due to radiations from the old style search receiver. This leak had supposedly been stopped with the introduction of a new receiver, covering the old band of 120-180 cm. Hence the following general message to T-V U/B's on 13 September:

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"To all Zaunkoenig U-Boats:
Offizier J.

After an interruption of months you will resume the submarine war in the main theater of battle, the North Atlantic. New weapons and equipment are at your disposal for that purpose. Experiences in the Bay of Biscay have shown that the situation has changed fundamentally and in your favor as regards the matter of radio locating ((Funkortung)). The prerequisites for a successful fight have been given. I feel certain that you will take up this battle which is likewise decisive for the future of our race and take it up in the old warlike spirit of the men of the submarine corps. The Fuehrer is following every phase of your fight. Attack. Go to it. Sink them. Cominch and Comsubs." (2056/13 Sept. '43).

(c) "Thoughts on Convoy Fighting": Surprise the convoy.

Since the U/B's invisibility had been restored by the new search receiver, it was permissible to repeat the doctrine of surprise-attack. On 14 September U/B's were sent these instructions:

"To all Zaunkoenig subs:
Offizier O.

Lines of conduct for first operation on a convoy.
1) Approaching ((the attack area)). Remain absolutely out of sight when cruising in formation as well as in ((attack)) strips. However, make the most of favorable opportunities for attack. Contacting the enemy, defense, and successful operation depend on surprising the enemy. During the current offensive in the Mediterranean convoys in the Atlantic may be weakly guarded. An example of this was the Moroccan campaign.
2) Operating: uniform procedure in the different states in accordance with "Thoughts on Convoy Fighting", is the most important requirement. In the initial attempt make the most of the surprise technique, transition to open battle only after sending the short signal." (0537/14).

(d) Sink the escorts. ("Thoughts on Convoy Fighting" continued.)

With the T-V the U/B was now specifically armed against

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surface defense.

"((To all Zaunkoenig subs:))

Offizier Z.

Thus the main goal is to decimate the escort. The destruction of even a few destroyers will have a considerable effect on morale of enemy and will in addition greatly facilitate attack on ships. When advancing on surface do not form groups of more than two subs. The goal must be to surround in even distribution, in order to disperse enemy defense.

3) I expect all commanding officers to make use of every opportunity for shots on destroyers. The sub is now the attacker. Shoot first, submerge afterwards. Cominch." (0905/14 Sept. '43).

It is interesting that no reference was made in these opening messages to the U/B's A/A, on which considerable effort had been expended during the summer. With adequate warning of A/C approach in the search receiver it was more advisable to dive.

(e) Results.

The renewed campaign against major convoys was, of course, a failure. In November U/B groups again evacuated the northwestern Atlantic. Somehow or other the U/B was still being located by "...location methods which in part we have not yet been able to pick up..." (1903/13/11). Shipboard intercept and D/F of convoy voice traffic and special VL/R A/C reconnaissance found a few convoys but to no avail. There was no dispersal this time; U/B's were drawn back to the eastern North Atlantic and concentrated nearer home. The U/B did not give up. It stayed on and worked hard to develop more counterdevices. Insofar as it tied down Allied Naval Forces, it was told, the U/B kept just that much Allied strength away from the homeland. In January U/B's took up the task of reporting weather for invasion forecasts.

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B. Major Changes Underway.

Whatever confidence may have been placed in the U/B's restoration, in August 1943 German High Command decided to build a new fleet.

1. German Diagnosis of U/B Ailment.

German diagnosis concentrated on the surfaced U/B as the occasion for its major weakness. The existing U/B had depended largely on surface cruising for its mobility. To maintain its ability to maneuver as an invisible attacker it had to surface for battery charging. Since the U/B was a visible object on the surface and since there seemed to be observers everywhere -- day and night, the only final solution to the problem of restoring the U/B's power, its invisibility, was to eliminate the necessity for surfacing.

2. Plans for New Types of Submarines.

By September 1943 designs were underway for a U/B that would really be what the name says: an "underwater boat," not visible to the human eye either directly or indirectly by the aid of electronics. It was first hoped to build a turbine propelled submarine combining both underwater endurance and speed. Later a compromise of Diesel-electric propulsion with short bursts of high underwater speed was accepted. The new type

was to depend on Schnorchel. It is not known to what extent the simultaneous development of Schnorchel may have determined the acceptance of the compromise type. Plans for the new types could not be fulfilled before the fall of 1944 at the earliest, even with the use of mass-production technique.

3. Schnorchel.

The Diesel air trunk may have been under consideration for some time, though the revival of the earlier Dutch experiments was not noted in Ultra sources (British) until December, when Schnorchel trials were made in the Baltic. The first Schnorchel-fitted U/B in the Atlantic appeared in January 1944 (U-539, Lauterbach-Emden). Experiments at sea were not completed until after the Allied invasion of France.

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C. U/B Restoratives before Schnorchel.

Thus the continuation of the U/B war -- from the spring of 1943 to the fall of 1944 -- depended largely on shifts and expedients, whose provisional character was at all times apparent. The history of the U/B war during this period is written in the trials and hopes of these contrivances. The U/B war had become a technical war for advantage in counterdevices. How effective in general these devices might have been, under other circumstances, cannot here be judged. It is sufficient to say that decryption intelligence furnished advance and accurate information on these devices -- as well as the U/B's location and plans.

1.
Against A/C: GSR, infra-red
receivers, radar, deception, A/A.

GSR

Probably the most important of these restoratives, both in terms of time and energy expended, were the Radar Search Receivers, which were to give adequate warning for submergence before the A/C could actually locate the U/B. But the Germans were always a step behind, having the disadvantage of being on the defensive, i.e., trying to match an active instrument with a passive instrument after the fact. If they installed a receiver which covered the basic band of Allied radar frequencies, then the Allies changed their transmission tactics or their frequencies.

leaving the U/B in confusion. The Germans could never be sure of what was happening. Matters were not helped by the breakdowns of the receivers and aeri^{al}s. There was never a permanent aerial for the centimeter bands. Reports from sea were incomplete and inconsistent. Again and again U/B's were attacked without warning. They did not know how they had been spotted and U/B Command could only guess at the means: visual, phosphorescence, infra-red search-lights, U/B radiations, new radar frequencies. U/B Command probed and quizzed, exhorted and reprimanded. What exactly had been the state of visibility and the condition of the sea? If any lights had been seen, what was their color? Had the U/B been charging its batteries? Had it been tuning its radio transmitter? Was the receiver on? Was the search receiver in working order? Had nothing peculiar been heard or seen? No crackling noises in the headphones!

The state of affairs in the winter of 1943-44 is well illustrated by the following incident in which an experienced U/B captain apparently thought he had been flown at by a planet in her lawful orbit.

From Bugs (U-629):

"Radar and light location continuously from 0400 to 0800. Thus ((location of patrol)) line continues to be known." (2131/9/12/43)

From Control:

"Bugs: before the night is over give more detailed account of light location." (0425/10/12/43)

From Bugs:

"White, yellow to red disc, then out. Approached abeam flying from horizon. Not preceded by radar. Diving was possible during and after light location." (0540/10/12/43).

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From Blauert (U-734):

"Reference light location reported by Bugs.
Similar observations. On the 8th, A/C alarm
three times. The disc, however, always turned
out to be planet Venus..." (2043/10/12/43).

In addition to receivers for possible Allied trans-
missions, both radar and infra-red, and the many experiments
conducted at sea in an effort to identify the locating beam,
deception measures became standard procedure, particularly in
the form of "Aphrodite."

U/B radar

The use of U/B radar offers a significant commentary
on the U/B's predicament. For many months C.O.'s were reluctant
to use it at all, for they were naturally very receiver-conscious.
Knowing that a receiver's range was greater than radar range,
they were afraid of giving themselves away by transmitting.
After Command became reasonably sure that A/S A/C did not carry
receivers, he had to wage a campaign to get his men to use their
radar -- not as a target locating device, but as an additional
A/C detection measure.

A/A Guns

Emphasis on the policy of staying up and fighting A/C
tended to fluctuate with the rise and fall of confidence in
search receivers. Tower alterations for increased A/A were
noted in U/B traffic in the winter of 1942-43, but orders to
stay up and fight did not become pronounced until the inadequacy
of the Metox GSR had been underscored by U/B losses. None of the

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attempts to give the U/B effective A/A fire succeeded. The quadruple A/A mount did not solve the problem. Flak-U/B's failed. Much was expected of the 37 mm. automatic late in 1944, but it too failed. For one thing, the Allied practice of strafing before bombing tended to nullify the A/A crew. For another, the permanently installed guns (e.g. the 37 mm.) were subject to too many breakdowns as a result of long immersion. Furthermore, tower alterations for extra gun mountings increased crash diving time and added one more worry for the C.O. in his problem of deciding when to dive and when not to dive. Command's advice was not to dive if the C.O. felt himself "surprised."

2.
Against DD's.

T-V

The search receivers and deception devices mentioned above were employed against surface forces as well as against A/C, but the principal counterdevice against surface forces was, in a sense, the acoustic torpedo. It is noteworthy that the only new addition to the U/B's proper armament after the spring of 1943, the T-V, should have been in effect a counterdevice. If the U/B could not get at its real target, the M/V, without being first discovered and held down or hunted down, then it had to have a torpedo designed for destroyers. Thus T-V was to Allied surface defense what increased A/A was to A/C defense. It was

more effective probably than A/A, for A/C did not move in the U/B's medium.

Sound

There was an interesting parallel between the use of passive and active instruments against A/C and against surface forces. U/B's did not use Asdic but relied on hydrophones in their preference for stealth and listening. The sound and bubble device ("Bold") offered a further parallel to anti-radar devices such as "Aphrodite" and "Thetis."

3. Tactics.

Against both A/C and destroyers, but mainly against A/C, the U/B was compelled to adopt every conceivable tactic as a countermeasure. It is difficult to imagine changes which might have been tried and were not. For example, there were countless suggestions as to how surface charging of batteries could be done without an attack. Everything from phosphorescence and weather to the habits of A/S patrols was taken into minute consideration.

4. Against the Allied Intercept Net.

Radio silence on the part of the unit was offset by the German operational system. If the U/B kept still, Command did not, but continued to inform the Allies of where the U/B was going, what it was planning to do, and where he thought the U/B

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should be. A U/B could not really observe complete radio silence for Command's personal direction of the war required passage reports, return reports, and situation reports. In the closing weeks of the war, Command demanded such transmissions from reluctant captains because they were of the utmost importance for decisions concerning the future disposition of U/B's.

To enable U/B's to transmit without fear of interception and D/F, elaborate off-frequency systems were set up in the fall of 1943. Without foreknowledge by decryption intelligence, these systems would have presented a serious obstacle to the Allies.

5. Failure of All Countermeasures.

The countermeasures could not correct the fundamental difficulties. First, they did not touch decryption intelligence as a locating device. The reading of U/B traffic, in addition to its negating tendency on German efforts, offered an absorbing study in unsuccessful attempts to work from known effects to unknown causes. Second, once the U/B was deprived of its invisibility, its weakness in a defensive role could not be compensated. A resort to its ability to submerge, its one strength in defense, was as dangerous as staying up when surprised by A/C. The U/B had to be told in the summer of 1943 that "diving is death." There was no way of protecting the vessel at the moment of submerging, when it passed from one medium to another. The dual life complicated the countermeasures and interfered with their effectiveness.

CHAPTER V.

THE NEW U-BOAT FLEET AND SCHNORCHEL.

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THE NEW U-BOAT FLEET AND SCHNORCHEL.

Late in determining the need for a radical change in the Fleet, the German Navy had lost time never to be made up. The issue was to be decided by circumstances beyond its control. As the German land situation went to pieces, the Navy worked with steady and undaunted determination to complete the new types, but was forced into postponement after postponement. To the one end of resuming the offensive at sea, everything was subordinated. In lieu of the fleet of new types, every available old type was fitted with Schnorchel. The Schnorchel fleet did well. It increased in size despite losses and increased its pressure against Allied shipping — to the very day when forced to surrender because there was no longer a Germany to defend.

1.

The Allied Invasion of France.

The Allied Invasion of France on 6 June 1944 confirmed the past failure of the U/B. The men and materials that had not been stopped in the Atlantic were landed on the coast of France, depriving the U/B of its best Atlantic bases and beginning the internal collapse that was to cut the U/B Navy off at its roots. Having refused for so long to yield the Atlantic, the U/B Navy was not prepared for an eleventh-hour stand off the invasion beaches. It could not hope to succeed with an outmoded weapon in its last attempt to prevent invasion — under conditions the

most unfavorable ever yet encountered. Along with the concentration of Allied A/S defense in coastal waters, the Allies were benefiting from the most complete decryption intelligence of the U/B in the entire course of the war, for the sabotage of land-line communications forced all Naval Administrative and High Command traffic into emergency radio channels — and into Allied translations. The Allies knew the war-readiness date for every U/B as well as its operational orders days before the U/B sailed. These orders had to be carried out in shallow water operational areas for which the 500-ton U/B had not been built. Although hastily equipped with Schnorchel, these Channel U/B's lacked experience with their new device and were helpless. Two-thirds of the U/B's that attempted to operate against the invasion armadas were lost. In return for this sacrifice U/B's were told that insofar as they inflicted any damage at all on the landing craft they had fulfilled "their supreme task," had "justified their existence."

2.

The German Navy never lost sight of its one end: Renewal of the Offensive at Sea.

It is remarkable that throughout this period of great trial and confusion and throughout the worse months to come, the U/B Navy did not lose^e sight of its one end: the renewal of the U/B war in the Atlantic. While the Grand Admiral repeatedly

addressed his men at sea with stirring promises of the future, the Navy ashore subordinated everything possible to the installation of Schnorchel and to the mass-production of the new types. Morale and discipline were maintained and the U/B Navy fell back on Norway and the Baltic in good order. From there no time was lost in undertaking once more the blockade of Britain.

3.
The Fleet of Few Submarines did not sail.

The new U/B Navy of high-underwater-speed submarines, from which so much was expected, was not to sail. Admiral Doenitz had apparently planned to release types XXI and XXIII in large numbers during the fall and winter of 1944. They were to strike en masse, throw the Allies into confusion, and thus hold the land fronts where they were until German counterattacks on land and in the air could restore the military balance. Throughout the last winter of the war, the Allies watched the threat anxiously through Japanese Naval Attaché and Baltic U/B traffic. The mass-production system had been decentralized, but the destruction of German land transportation and the aerial bombardment of the assembly yards were effective.

The new types did not reach military strength. Month by month postponement was reported by the Japanese Naval Attaché -- until the Allied land offensives reached the Baltic and North Sea ports. A few type XXIII subs made cruises against England, but the only type XXI to sail was still outbound on the day of surrender.

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It was apparent that a further attempt was underway to achieve the goal of a true underwater craft. As has been stated, the new types XII and XIII were dependent on Schnorchel. Other than bursts of high underwater speed they did not offer the desired radical solution to the U/B problem. In the course of the winter, the Japanese Naval Attache reported the details of still another new type, type XVI, which was to add turbine propulsion to both Diesel and electric. The turbine would give the U/B endurance in underwater cruising at higher speeds.

4.

The Schnorchel Fleet.

Even without the new types, the German Navy made a strong recovery with the Schnorchel-fitted older types. Unquestionably the most successful German counterdevice, Schnorchel came too late to alter the course of the war but it did enable the existing U/B fleet to renew its menace. It was sufficiently successful to warrant being called the remodeler of the fleet. The U/B was still bound to the water's surface, but the area exposed had been reduced to a minimum, and even this minimum could be camouflaged. It was a half-way revolution in submarine warfare, a difference in degree but not in kind, a stage in the transformation of the U/B into something like a true underwater cruiser. Economical and relatively simple, it made possible the salvage of all existing older operational types. In the face of hopeless conditions in Germany,

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Schnorchel enabled the U/B Navy to undertake what it called "Total Underwater Warfare." The one positive contribution of the Allied invasion of France to the U/B Navy was the speed with which it forced the Germans to complete their experiments at sea and to equip all standard types with Schnorchel.

(a) Starting the U/B War all over again.

It is sufficient evidence of the skill and pertinacity of the German Navy that Schnorchel started the U/B war all over again. Deprived of French bases, the Schnorchel fleet sailed from Norway and the Baltic to take up what had been abandoned years before, a close-in blockade of the British Isles. Cruising submerged for as long as 70 days and finding bottoming tactics in shallow water highly favorable to their defense, U/B's entered the channels and inland seas of Great Britain, where they increased in numbers and in effectiveness to the day when they were ordered to cease.

Nor did U/B's neglect distant areas and the open sea. More U/B's were off the U.S. and Canadian coasts in the final weeks of the war than had been there at any one time for the past 2½ years.

An attempt was made to resume group warfare against major convoys in mid-Atlantic with U/B's on passage to our coasts. It was characteristic of the U/B's general plight, however, that USN forces, acting on decryption intelligence, went out to meet

these U/B's and attacked them all the way in. Even with the advantage of decryption intelligence as to the U/B's whereabouts, it was a difficult matter to home attacking craft onto a Schnorchel U/B that was in good working condition and that was handled by a captain who had mastered his more complicated weapon.

(b) Old and new problems.

It is further indication of Schnorchel's significance that U/B captains had to relearn the U/B's functions and Allied A/S forces to relearn the U/B's habits. Every phase of the U/B's life was affected.

U/B seeing and hearing: Schnorchel cruising blinded and deafened the U/B. At the same time it made the U/B more dependent than ever upon periscope and hydrophones. It was necessary to interrupt Schnorcheling for frequent periscope and hydrophone sweeps.

GSR: Since the Schnorchel head could be located by radar, it had to be fitted with a permanent GSR aerial for warning purposes. A permanent aerial ("round-dipole") for meter wavelength radar was available, but not for centimeter radar.

Communications: Reception on VL/F at submerged depths had long been part of regular procedure. It was transmission which constituted a continuing weakness for the Schnorchel U/B. Transmission over the Schnorchel "round-dipole" was tried without success. To communicate with Control, the Schnorchel U/B had to

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surface. Dampness from long submerged cruising tended to short the radio equipment. As the off-frequency procedure was enlarged, the future protection against D/F and interception was being developed in "Kurier" flash transmission.

Underwater navigation: "Avoid surfacing for astronomical fix" became a new rule to whose observance U/B Command devoted much attention. In addition to Elektra-Sonne beacons, U/B's charted their progress by soundings and S/T together with painstaking dead-reckoning and an accurate knowledge of currents and of their own speeds at the various screw revolutions.

(c) Weaknesses not corrected.

Schnorchel had in part restored to the U/B its source of strength, its invisibility in the combat area. The U/B was thus more difficult to locate before attack even though its area was known from decryption intelligence. Certain weaknesses mentioned by the U/B Handbook of 1942, however, remained: low speed, limited lookout, and vulnerability.

5.

Surrender.

The German U/B Navy alone remained when the Wehrmacht disappeared in ruins. It is important to remember that on V^E day the German U/B Navy was still a dangerous combat unit, organized, improved, and willing to continue the war.

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CHAPTER VI.

COMPROMISE OF ALLIED CODES AND CIPHERS
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6. Compromise of Naval Cipher #3 demonstrated, May 1943. Naval Cipher #5 introduced, 10 June 1943.
7. Compromise of Naval Cipher #5 demonstrated. Oct., Nov. 1943.
8. Extent of German success with Naval Cipher #3.
9. The delay in Allied counteraction.
11. Failure with USN Naval Ciphers and British
12. Conclusion: Effectiveness of German Naval Communication Intelligence.

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COMPROMISE OF ALLIED CODES AND CIPHERS
BY GERMAN NAVAL COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

1.

German Naval Intelligence:
"Convoy expected"; its
importance.

From the beginning of the Atlantic Section's reading of current U/B traffic it was apparent that the enemy made good use of intelligence on Allied ship and convoy movements. The "convoy expected" messages soon became a familiar part of the recurring pattern of U/B groups, not only in the messages which formed the groups and ordered their patrol lines but also in the subsequent messages which altered the lines or the course for sweeping. It was not surprising that group tactics should appear in traffic to be dictated throughout by knowledge of convoy movements, for U/B warfare in the open sea was by its nature peculiarly dependent upon convoy intelligence. From their experiences in the first World War certain German Naval authorities had long since come to the conclusion that the combination of group attack with convoy intelligence would provide an ambush in mid-ocean that could defeat the convoy system. Admiral Bauer, World War I Commander of U-Boats until the summer of 1917, wrote in 1931 that:

"The success of the convoys was owing essentially to the fact that they succeeded in reaching their destination for the most part unnoticed, or damaged by single submarines only moderately in proportion to the large number of ships. Here the convoy's unexpected arrival was just as important as its

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guard by warships, which had been the decisive factor for the convoys of earlier times. If it had been possible to determine the presence of convoys and report them early enough so that a fairly large number of submarines could join in the attack, even a strong guard could not have protected the group from heavy losses.

- Reconnaissance and the assembling of as large a number of U-Boats as possible for the attack were the only suitable means of defeating the convoy system with respect to both the element of surprise and the military strength of the convoys." *

As one method of preventing a convoy from entering the "combat area" unnoticed, Admiral Bauer suggested U-cruisers which could lie in wait outside ports of departure and shadow the convoy on its ocean route. He also recognized, in part, the role radio intelligence might play in convoy location, although

"The whole conduct of the war so far as the use of the radio message is concerned was still primitive and harmless." *

Germany had no difficulty, he says, in reading the simple cipher which England used when she began "...to guide commercial and escort vessels by radio, in accordance with the intelligence she gained about German U-boats". *

2. Its Effectiveness.

It was obvious that the U/B groups were being moved with intelligence during the winter of 1942-43. The only questions were

* "Das Unterseeboot", Mittler & Sohn, Berlin 1931, pp. 117-19, selection trans. by OP-20-GI-A.

(a) How accurate and timely was their information, and

(b) What was its extent and source?

These questions could not at first be answered here with any confidence, and if the British could have done so their information was not available to the Atlantic Section. Preliminary surveys undertaken shortly after the Atlantic Section began to read traffic did not permit any specific conclusions which could explain the individual "convoy expected" messages. There were cases in which U/B Command seemed well informed up to the time of convoy diversion. The day of expected meeting with the convoy would arrive - but no sighting reports. Command would stir his boats and urge sharper lookout while ordering a change of course. Then, again there were cases in which everything worked out according to plan.

3.

Sources acknowledged in U/B traffic.
"B-Dienst".

Sources of intelligence disseminated to U/B's were sometimes acknowledged: agents, submarine and A/C reconnaissance, prisoners, and the intercept net. Very little was known about the German C.I. organization, except that its mark appeared occasionally in U/B traffic as "B-Dienst", tagging a repetition of plain language reports which were relevant to U/B's at sea. It was assumed that the Germans were working on our cipher systems, but nothing further was known. Had the Atlantic Section made no

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attempt to correlate the traffic it processed, the suspicion of compromise might have been aroused with difficulty, for the "convoy expected" messages were routine. The U-boat naturally "expected" convoys, and general information such as convoy departures, cycles, and other related matters could scarcely be kept from an industrious enemy. Furthermore, Allied North Atlantic convoys observed no such thing as radio silence. On the other hand, U/B "expectations" were often disappointed, precisely when we began to get a good first decryption hold on U/B traffic. If our R.I. was effective in convoy diversions, then it seemed that the enemy's was not effective in countering these diversions.

4.

Suspicious of Cipher Compromise.

The sudden shifting of the lines for U/B Groups ~~EXPTU~~ RIFTER and the formation of KLAPPEH, all ordered within the space of 30 minutes on the night of 15 February, led not only to a very successful operation against convoy CN 166 but to very definite fears here of Allied cipher compromise. It was another matter, however, to prove the insecurity of the cipher.

5.

Difficulty of proving cipher compromise.

It may be difficult to demonstrate with certainty that one's own ciphers are being broken by the enemy - even when one is

in turn reading part of the enemy's traffic. For, when properly used, special intelligence is sufficiently disguised so that sources other than actual decryption of a specific message can not be eliminated. The enemy is presumed to possess information whose possible sources are so varied as to come under the cognizance not of one but of several different counter-agencies. Without complete knowledge of ones own communications systems (including ciphers), communications habits, actual movements, and plans, it may not be possible to judge the sources of the intelligence appearing in enemy traffic, unless the enemy fails to observe elementary precautions. By such failure he can yield a self-evident proof, as would be furnished by a direct quotation whose origin can be traced solely to one dispatch. Without such indubitable proof that a major cipher is compromised there is a natural reluctance to instigate and authorize the complicated changes and expenditures which would be necessary if a reading enemy is to be forestalled.

6.

Compromise of Naval Cipher #3 demonstrated, May 1943. Naval Cipher #5 introduced, 10 June 1943.

While the weakness of combined Naval Cipher #3 was appreciated in some circles it was not until May 1943 that its compromise was so thoroughly demonstrated that action could be taken.

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In the middle of May 1943 the Germans offered the necessary proof of combined cipher compromise in the form of three Offizier messages to Groups RHEIN, ELBE, and DROSSEL during the course of their patrol and action against convoys BX 237 and SC 129. Convinced that cipher compromise was involved, the Atlantic Section gained access to Com 10th Fleet Convoy and Routing files. The compromised Allied dispatches were identified and the evidence was submitted to COMINCH. The conclusions were accepted. An exchange of signals followed between COMINCH and Admiralty involving proposals for additional security precautions, but the marked increase in similar compromise messages in German traffic towards the end of May led to the introduction of Naval Cipher #5 on 10 June.

7.

Compromise of Naval Cipher #5 demonstrated. Oct., Nov. 1943.

Beginning in September with convoy operations, the familiar signs of convoy intelligence were once more in evidence. After having repeatedly expressed its fears, the Atlantic Section conclusively demonstrated the compromise of Naval Cipher #5 on one occasion in October and on one in November. ⁽¹⁾ COMINCH and the British concurred.

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8.

Extent of German success
with Naval Cipher #3.

(a) Tables "M" and "S".

The demonstration of compromise in May led to a thorough examination of all previously suspected cases in German traffic, an examination which was now possible with access to the convoy files.* (For a full statement of the results see Chapter IV of Volume III.) From these studies, together with conclusions which GC&CS made available at this time, it was evident that during the first half of 1943 German cryptanalysts had read extensively and with usable currency in the world-wide ("M") and North Atlantic area ("S") tables of the combined cipher (Naval Cipher #3). From the interrogation of Italian Naval C.I. officers following the capitulation of Italy it is known that the Germans and Italians cooperated in their attack on the combined cipher. Copies of the basic book had been obtained and were known to the enemy under code word "Frankfurt" or "Francoforte". The reciphering tables were identified. With the aid of the basic book messages were usually readable in part on a depth of 3, sometimes even on a depth of 2. After the introduction of a new basic book five to seven months were necessary before good progress could be made and this depended on luck and Allied mistakes.

*During the course of investigations Com 10th Fleet C & R provided invaluable assistance by opening its past and current files to the Atlantic Section, while MCR, MCR, and Communications Security contributed by identifying the systems of dispatches which were under suspicion. The investigation was the more difficult because its nature could not be revealed for reasons of security.

(b) Weakness of the combined cipher.

The combined cipher was in practice a weak system.

In the first place, it was overburdened, as might be expected, for it was the main link in all dispatches concerning convoys, wherein of course the emphasis in the Atlantic lay. The North Atlantic had been turned into a vast freighting area in which the movement and protection of convoys involved a constant exchange of dispatches by radio. Running through the whole thing was the regular pattern of standard announcements: sailing telegrams, ocean route, ocean meeting point, escort relief, straggler's R/V, convoy pcs reports, etc. If any USE Command was on the address for information, as was normally the case, the combined cipher was used. In the second place, combined cipher involved use of combined callsigns from which the addresses could be determined and the general nature of the content deduced.

9.

The delay in Allied counteraction.

Although the British had recorded cases of combined cipher compromise prior to May 1943, no action was taken until the demonstrations of May. It is worthwhile to list here some of the problems and difficulties which prevented an earlier demonstration on the part of the Atlantic Section.

(a) Cryptanalytic:

The difficulties experienced with the epigma general

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traffic during the first part of 1943 were even greater in the case of Offiziers, or messages sent in a double encipherment. Offizier messages contained the only identifiable cases of compromise.

(b) Lack of Convoy dispatches.

Although the Atlantic Section did receive copies of routine convoy dispatches for information, it had had to fight even for daily convoy position estimates. It did not receive the significant diversion and routing dispatches. Even with access to the convoy files, the problem was not solved, for it appeared doubtful that there was anywhere a complete file of Allied transmissions.

(c) General.

A more fundamental difficulty was the system of combined communications itself. USA-British Naval Communications were so complex, and often repetitions, that no one seemed to know how many times a thing might not be sent and by whom - and in what systems. It is possible that the question of cipher compromise might have been settled earlier than May had the Combined Communications system been less obscure and had there been closer cooperation between the British and the U.S. in such matters.

11.
Failure with USN Naval
Ciphers and British

There is no evidence that the Germans ever had any success with high-grade machine ciphers. If the Japanese Naval Attache's reports can be believed on this point, the German Navy knew very little about USN ciphers and needed assistance from the Japanese as late as summer 1944 in identifying USN traffic.* Italian C.I. officers stated that their organization did little work on USN ciphers since they believed that anything of importance to them in the Mediterranean area would be found in combined cipher.

* Cf. Vol. III, Chapter VI, para. 14-15.

According to Comdr. Porta, neither the Germans nor the Italians had attacked British cipher _____ to any extent up to the time of the Italian armistice. The Germans at that time, however, decided to work on it but as far as is known they had no success.

12.

Conclusion: Effectiveness of
German Naval Communication
Intelligence.

Reliable information on the German Navy's successes in decryption is at present confined for the most part to what has been discovered through reading German Naval traffic itself, i.e. to those messages which contain statements traceable to Allied dispatches. Some good information has been obtained from Italian captured documents and from Italian Naval C.I. officers. The references in Jap. Nav. Attaché traffic to this subject are too general to be of such assistance. It is to be hoped that captured German documents will eventually offer material for a complete and detailed account of German cryptanalytic successes. The importance of a full treatment cannot be overestimated as a future safeguard against complacency and ineffective organization whether at home or among Allies.

According to present information the German Naval C.I. organization achieved only one major success against "high" grade Allied naval ciphers, namely the combined British-USA ciphers using tables "H" (world wide) and "S" (North Atlantic). A successful

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attack on combined cipher gave the German Navy the kind of information they most needed for offensive operations: convoy intelligence for use of U/B's. On the other hand, their success, such as it was, in this kind of intelligence could not compensate for their lack of insight into Allied Naval operational traffic such as was carried by machine cipher. In consequence there is no indication in German traffic that the enemy ever had reliable advance information on any major Allied amphibious undertaking. Apparently dependent on analysis and low-grade traffic, such hints as the German Navy had of these major operational movements came too late - before adequate counteraction could be taken. Nevertheless, within the realm in which it concentrated, its successes undoubtedly increased N/V losses, and thereby contributed to a lengthening of the War.

APPENDIX I TO VOLUME I

- Graph 1: U-Boat Operations, January 1943 to May 1945.
- Graph 2: U-Boat Losses, January 1943 to April 1945.
- Graph 3: M/V Tonnage Sunk by Subs in Atlantic.) Jan. 1943 -
Percentage Lost in Convoy.) May 1944
- Graph 4: Subs in Groups; Subs in Independent) Jan. 1943 -
and Special Operations.) May 1944
Subs Returning and Outbound.)
- Graph 5: Percentage of Subs at Sea Operating)
in Groups.) Jan. 1943 -
Percentage of Subs at Sea on) May 1944
Independent Patrols.)
- Graph 6: New Subs entering Atlantic Operations;)
Subs Sunk in Atlantic.) Jan. 1943 -
Gain or Loss to Atlantic U/B) May 1944
Operational Fleet)


U-BOAT OPERATIONS


JAN. 1943 TO MAY 1945


NORTH & SOUTH ATLANTIC, INDIAN OCEAN

- NO. SUBS AT SEA
- NO. SUBS OPERATING
- NO. SHIPS SUNK
- NO. SUBS SUNK


NOTE: NOV. TO APR. 1944 INCLUDES OUTBOUND U/B'S PICKED UP AT KIEL









TONNAGE SUNK BY SUBS



PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LOST IN CONVOY (NUMBERS)




— SUBS IN GROUPS
 — SUBS INDEPENDENT AND SPECIAL




— SUBS RETURNING
 — SUBS OUTBOUND

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


— PERCENTAGE OF SUBS AT SEA OPERATING IN GROUPS
 — PERCENTAGE OF SUBS AT SEA ON INDEPENDENT PATROLS

[Nothing missing]



JAN 1943 TO JUNE 1944



APPENDIX II TO VOLUME I

GRAND MASTER LIST
OF U-BOATS, SPECIFICATIONS, BUILDERS,
COMMANDING OFFICERS, AND FINAL DISPOSITION

GRAND MASTER LIST
OF U-BOATS, SPECIFICATIONS, BUILDERS,
COMMANDING OFFICERS, AND FINAL DISPOSITION.

* * * * *

ABBREVIATIONS OF U-BOAT BUILDING YARDS.

B & V	Blohm and Voess, Zamburg
De. S.	Deschimag, Bremen
De. S. S.	Deschimag, Seebeck, Wesermünde
F. W. D.	Fähigkeitswerk, Danzig
D. M. H.	Deutsche Werft, Hamburg
D. M. K.	Deutsche Werke, Kiel
F. L.	Flenderwerke, Luebeck
Fl. Sch.	Flensburger, Schiffbau, Flensburg
G. K.	Germannia, Kiel
H. W. E.	Howaldtswerke, Hamburg
H. W. K.	Howaldtswerke, Kiel
K. M. W.	Kriegsmarinewerke, Wilhelmshaven
H. S. E.	Hordtswerke, Lunden
Leip. A.	Leipzigerwerke, Rostock
Sch. D.	Schiffbauwerft, Danzig, and Elbing
S. S. E.	Stettinerwerft, Stettin
V. V.	Vulkan, Vegesack

N. B.

Information in parens is from secondary sources, (mostly P/W), and is not to be completely relied upon.

Information on U-boat types, builders, and commissioning dates is from captured documents (unless in parens). Commissioning dates indicate the projected date of commissioning, unless concerning a captured boat, in which case it may be the actual date of commissioning.

E. S.	Known Sunk
P. S.	Presumed Sunk
COMI.	Date of projected Commissioning
BLDG. YARD	Yard where built
Laun.	Launching date in lieu of commissioning date.

Akira (Jap) = Aquila (Germ).

To be cleared up by Minty. - refers to OIC Serial 1675, dated 8 June 1945, ROR 2835.

Add two years.

1-927
 U.S. National Archives
 RG 226
 7700000

V/B No.	TYPE	BUILD. YEAR	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1	250 T. II A	D.W.K.	('35)	(Heinicke): Deecke	K.S. by unknown sub in S. Norwegian waters, Apr. '40.
2	250 T. IIIA	D.W.K.		(Heinrich Liebe '36/'37; Wlasovitz-Mollendorf, '42)	Broken up in Eastern Baltic, Feb. '45
3	250 T. II A	D.W.K.	(Only '35)	(Winkel, '35; Ernst Guenther Heinicke, '37; Schwabe, '38; Gelder, '41; Geller, '42)	K.S. in 1940
4	250 T. II A	D.W.K.	('35)	(Maritzfeld; Gardner; von Trost)	K.S. by British in 1940.
5	250 T. II A	D.W.K.		(Glatow; Dobbs, '41)	Sunk in diving accident in Baltic Bay, 19 March '45.
6	250 T. II A	D.W.K.	(Loun. Ing. '35)	(Winkler, '36; Heidel, '37; Hatz, '38; Berst, '42)	(School boat) no definite info, to be cleared up by party.
7	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Loun. G.K. '35)	(Kretsch, '35; Kretsch, '40; Heidel)	Sunk in diving accident in Baltic Bay, 13 Feb. '44.
8	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Loun. '35)	(Kell; Heinsch; Kriegshammer)	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven, May '45.
9	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Loun. '35)	(Looft, '36; Winkler, '39; Luth, '40; Joachim Decke '41; Schmidt-Weichert; Klapdor; '42/'44; Peterson-Arcutz, '44)	K.S. 19 Sept. '44 in Black Sea by Russians or scuttled.

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
10	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Laun. Aug. '35)	(Weingaertner; Peters, '40; Karpf, '43)	(School Boat) No definite info - to be cleared up by Adnty.
11	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Laun. Aug. '35)	(Schultze; Gossler; Sohler; Liebe; Boesing '36; Sachs, '37; Georg Peters); Dobenecker	(Experimental - School boat). Paid off at Kiel, Feb. '45. - To be cleared up by Adnty.
12	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Laun. Sept. '35)	von der Bopp	K.S. 8 Oct. '39 - mined in English Channel.
13	250 T. II B	D.W.K.	(Nov. '35)	(Hans Gerrit von Stoekhausen, '36; Dumlebsky von Klein, '37; Triebe, '39); Max Schulte	K.S. 31 May '40 by HMS WASSON in 52.27 N.- 02.02 E.
14	250 T. II B	D.W.K.	(Laun. Dec. '35)	(Cohn; Petersen; Wellner to '39); Dierks	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany, May '45.
15	250 T. II B	D.W.K.	(Laun. Feb. '36)	(Ruchholz, '37); Peter Krahn	K.S. Feb. '40; rammed by German torpedo boat.
16	250 T. II B	D.W.K.	(Laun. Apr. '36)	(Repp; Hans Wilhelm Behrens); Wellner	K.S. 25 Oct. '39 by HMS JUBIN & GAYTON. WRMS in 51.09 N.- 01.23 E.
17	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Laun. '35)	(Froemsdorf, '36; von Heiche, '37; Zetsche; Behrens, '40; Wolf, '40; Collmann, '40); Zartsch	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '40

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
18	250 T. II B	G.K.		(Pauchstadt, '36; Bauer, '39; Vogelsang, '41; Kangensen); Fliege, '44; Ahrendt, '44.	K.S. ?Sept. '44 in Black Sea by Russians or scuttled.
19	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Jen. '36)	(Herbert Viktor Schmitze '36; Kessel, '37; Sprentz '40; Hoff- mann, '40; Schonder '40; Gude, '43; Ohlenburg, '43.	K.S. ? Sept. '44 in Black Sea by Russians or scuttled.
20	250 T. II B	G.K.		(Rehmann, '36; Kochle, '37; Klot- Haysenfeldt; Paulsen, '40; Kochke); Grafen, '43/'44.	K.S. ?Sept. '44 in Black Sea by Russians or scuttled.
21	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Lann. '40)	(Krauenheim, '37; Stiebler, '40)	Broken up in Eastern Baltic Feb. '45.
22	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Lann. '36)	Wohlfahrt; Karl Heinz Jenisch	K.S. 8 Apr. '40 in North Sea (West of Ireland)
23	250 T. II B	G.K.	(Lann. '36)	(Driver, '40; Kretschmer); Schwarler, '43; Wohlen, '43/'44; Arendt.	K.S. ?Sept. '44 in Black Sea by Russians or scuttled.
24	250 T. II B	G.K.	('36)	(Mohr, '40/'41; Heilmann); Petersen-Kreutz, '44; Hagen, '44; Hoyen-Landt.	K.S. ?Sept. '44 in Black Sea by Russians or scuttled.
25	740 T. I A	De.B	(May '36)	(Michel; Schuhard; Schutze, '38); Beduhn	K.S. 1 July '40 by HMS VANSHOTT in 48.33 N.- 10.26 W.

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U/B No.	TYPE	SLOG. INFO	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS
26	712 T. I A	De.B	(May '36)	(Werner Hartmann, '36/'37; Oskar Schenck, '37; von Friedeburg, '38/'39; Leuth, '39); Heinz Scherlinger.	K.S. 1 July '40 by HIG GLADSTON & ZLIE in 48.35 N. - 10.55 W.
27	500 T. VII A	De.B		Johannes Franz	K.S. 20 Sept. '39 by HIG FODDERS & FORSTER in 58.30 N. - 09.06 W.
28	500 T. VII A	De.E	(Comm. July '30)	Umbrecht, '36/'37; Kuhnke, '38/'39)	Sunk in accident in Baltic Mar. '44.
29	500 T. VII A	De.B		(Wischer, '36/'37; Guggenberger; Schickel, '39/'40).	Scuttled in Flensburg before surrender of Germany - May '45.
30	500 T. VII A	De.B	(Oct. '30)	(Grunig, '36/'37; Mann, '39/'40; Fabricius; Schimmel.	Scuttled in Flensburg before surrender of Germany - May '45.
31	500 T. VII A	De.B	(Dec. '35)	(Rolf Emil, '37/'39); Hans Ebelkost, '39/'40.	K.S. 11 Nov. '40 in Schilling Is. Baltic. K.S. 2 Nov. '40 by HIG ANTON in 55.26 N. - 10.18 W.
32	500 T. VII A	De.B	(Apr. '37)	(Werner Lott, '37/'38; Emil Daechel, '38/'40); Hans Jenisch	K.S. 30 Oct. '40 by HIG ANTON & HIG ANTON in 55.37 N. - 10.23 W.
33	500 T. VII A	G.K.	(July '35)	(Otto Junker, '36/'38); Hans von Irenky	K.S. 12 Feb. '40 by HIG ANTON in 55.25 N. - 09.07 W.
34	500 T. VII A	G.K.		(Dob, '36/'37; Wilhelm Hoffmann, '39/'42).	Flamed and sunk in Baltic Mar. '45 -

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U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. MARK	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
35	500 T. VII A	G.K.	(Nov. '36)	Werner Lott	K.S. 29 Nov. '39 by HMS HINGSTON in 60.53 N. - 02.47 E.
36	500 T. VII A	G.K.		Wilhelm Froehlich	P.S. 4 Dec. '39 by HMS SALMON in 57.00 N. 05.20 E. H.B. Germans estimate U-36 sunk Feb. '43.
37	750 T. IX A	De.B		(Schmidt, '39; Hartmann, '40; Gehm, '40; Clausen, '41; Janssen, '41; Sailer); von Venden.	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
38	750 T. IX A	De.B		(Coburg, '41; Joachim Wendtke); Heinrich Biese, '41; Peters, '45.	Scrapped, Aug. '45; sold off 17 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admiralty.
39	750 T. IX A	De.B	(Dec. '39)	Gerhard Glattes	K.S. 14 Sept. '39 by HM Ships in 55.32 N. - 11.42 W. - 6th Flot.
40	750 T. IX A	De.B	(Feb. '39)	Wolfgang Barten	K.S. 13 Oct. '39 by mine in English Channel off Dover.
41	750 T. IX A	De.B	('39)	Magler	K.S. 5 Feb. '40 by HMS JAFFROPE in 49.21 N. - 10.14 W.
42	750 T. IX A	De.B	(July '39)	Rolf Rau	K.S. 13 Oct. '39 by HMS INCHON & ILEX in 49.12 N. - 16.00 W.
43	750 T. IX A	De.B	('39)	(Wilhelm Labrosius, '39/'40; Wolfgang Luth, '40/'42); Schwanatke, '42/'43.	P.S. 30 July '43 by A/C-crew HMS GARDIAN in 34.54 N. - 55.07 W.

0000108

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
44	750 T. IXA	De.B	('39)	Ludwig Matthes.	P.S. 10 Apr. '40 by HMS GREENHOUND & HAVOCK in 67.33 N.-12.47 E.
45	512 T. VII B	G.K.	(June '33)	Gelhaar	K.S. 20 Nov. '39 by FS SIBOCO in 45.55 N. - 05.05 W.
46	512 T. VII B	G.K.		(Herbert Schler, 129/140; Wilhelm Peters; Potthammer); Engelbert Adrass.	Scuttled in Flensburg before surrender of Germany - May '45.
47	512 T. VII B	G.K.		Gunther Prien	K.S. 8 Mar. '41 by HMS WOLVERINE in 60.47 N. - 19.13 W.
48	512 T. VII B	G.K.		(Boesing; Bleichrodt; Itas; Schwen); Herbert Schmitz	(School boat) No definite info - to be cleared up by Admir.
49	512 T. VII B	G.K.	(Aug. '39)	Hart von Gossler	K.S. 15 Apr. '40 by HMS THUNDER in 68.53 N. - 16.59 E.
50	512 T. VII B	G.K.		(Grosse); Bauer	K.S. 27 Apr. '40 by HMS HOGG in 62.54 N. - 01.56 W.
51	512 T. VII B	G.K.		Knorr	K.S. 20 Apr. '40 by HMS CHALLENGER in 47.25 N. - 04.15 W.
52	500 T. VII B	G.K.		(Otto Salmann; Freyberg); Rasky	(School boat. Reported lost). No definite info. - To be cleared up by Admir.
53	500 T. VII B	G.K.	(Dec. '39)	(Zutschmann; Hans Jochen Zeinicke to end '39); Grosse	K.S. 29 Jan. '40 by HMS MONTBENI DUNE in 59.10 N. - 05.27 W. H.B. Germans estimate lost Mar. '40.

0000109

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
54	500 T. VII B	G.K.		(Grosze; Max Hermann Bauer); Kutschmann.	K.S. 16 Feb. '40; German estimate: Apr. '40 in North Sea.
55	500 T. VII B	G.K.	(Oct. '39)	Werner Heidel	K.S. 30 Jan. '40 by HMS FOWAY, WHITESMID & EAB in 48.37 N.-07.30
56	250 T. II C	D.W.K.	('39)	(Karas, '33/'40; Schan, '40; Pfeffer; Roener, '41; Frahn).	(School boat. Reported lost). To be cleared up by Admty.
57	250 T. II C	D.W.K.		(Topp; Zaur; Disela, '41); Korth.	(School boat) No definite info - to be cleared up by Admty.
58	250 T. II C	D.W.K.		(Kropisch; Schindler; Kutschmann)	(School boat) No definite info - to be cleared up by Admty.
59	250 T. II C	D.W.K.		(Jusra, '40; Joachim Watz, '40; von Korfner, '40/'41; Reine).	(School boat. Reported lost). To be cleared up by Admty.
60	250 T. II C	D.W.K.	(Aug. '39)	(Lange, '42)	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
61	250 T. II C	D.W.K.	(Aug. '39)	(Gosten, '40; Harms; Horst Geider)	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
62	250 T. II C	D.W.K.	(end '39)	(Wakowski)	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
63	250 T. II C	D.W.K.	(Dec. '39)	Guenther Lorentz	K.S. 25 Feb. '40 by HM Ships in 58.45 N. - 00.10 W. - 20's-
64	750 T. IA A	Da.B	(Sept. '39)	Wilhelm Schulz	K.S. 13 Apr. '40 by A/C from HMS WILSON in 68.32 N. - 17.30 E.
65	750 T. IA A	Da.B	(Early '40)	(von Stockhausen); Loppé	K.S. 28 Apr. '41 by HMS GLADIATOR in 63.00 N. - 0000110

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
66	750 T. IX C	Da.B	Dec. '40	Zapp, '42; Karl Markworth, '43; Gerhard Seehausen, '44.	K.S. 6 May '44 by A/C from USS BLOCK ISLAND and USS ZUGLIZ in 17.17 N. - 32.29 W.
67	750 T. IX C	Da.B	(Jan. '41)	(Heinrich Blochrodt, '40/'41); Gunther Mueller-Stosckheim, '42/'43.	K.S. 16 July '43 by A/C from USS CORB in 30.07 N. - 44.16 W.
68	750 T. IX C	Da.B	Feb. '41	(Gero Eisermann); Norten, '43; Albert Lauremis, '43/'44.	K.S. 10 Apr. '44 by A/C from USS QUADALCANA in 33.31 N. - 18.43 W.
69	512 T. VII B	G.K.		(Josef Metzler, '40/'41; Zehn, '41); Ulrich Groef, '43.	P.S. 17 Feb. '43 by US TU 24.1.4 in approx. 50.26 N. - 41.05 W.
70	512 T. VII B	G.K.	(Dec. '40)	Joachim Matz	K.S. 7 Mar. '41 by H.M. ALCANTUS & COLUMBIA in 60.15 N. - 14.00 W.
71	512 T. VII B	G.K.	(Summer '40)	(Blaschenberg; Rannau); Ledler, '42/'43; Wollschlaeger	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
72	512 T. VII B	G.K.	('40)	(Maer, '41/'42; Neumann); Carrier.	Kiel, Apr. '45 - arrived 20 Jan. '45. No definite info - to be cleared up by Minty.
73	512 T. VII B	V.V.	(Oct. '40)	(Roland Rosenbaum); Forst Deckert, '42/'43.	K.S. 16 Dec. '45 by USS WOLBER & BELFORD in 36.09 N. - 00.50 W.
74	512 T. VII B	V.V.	(Nov. '43)	Kentrat; Karl Friedrich.	K.S. Apr. '42; German estimate: 01 May '42 in Mediterranean.
75	512 T. VII C	V.V.	Nov. '40	(Salmann); Singelmann	K.S. 28 Dec. '41 by L.S. KIRLING in 31.56 N. - 26.48 E.

0000111

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
76	512 T. VII B	V.V.	(Dec. '43)	Friedrich von Hippel	K.S. 5 Apr. '41 by HMS SCARBOROUGH & WOLVERINE in 53.35 N. - 20.20 W.
77	512 T. VII C	V.V.	(Spr. '41)	(Schonder); Otto Hartmann, '42/'43	P.S. 29 Mar. '43 by US A/C near Alicante, Spain.
78	512 B. VII C	V.V.	Jan. '41	(Niesle); Haebsch, '45.	K.S. 16 Apr. '45 in Baltic - Willou, by Russian artillery.
79	512 T. VII C	V.V.	Feb. '41	Wolfgang Kaufmann	K.S. 23 Dec. '41 by HMS HASTY & HODGKIN in 32.15 N. - 29.19 E.
80	512 B. VII C	V.V.	Mar. '41	Koerl	Sunk in diving accident in Bussig Bay, 28 Nov. '41.
81	500 B. VII C	V.V.		Fritz Suggenberger, '42; Johann Krieg, '43/'44	K.S. 9 Jan. '44 in Baltic air raid on Pola, raised and docked, Apr. '44.
82	500 B. VII C	V.V.	Apr. '41	(Salzmann; Freyberg); Bollmann.	K.S. Feb. '42 by nine in No. Atlantic.
83	500 B. VII B	Fl.L.	(Jan. Feb. '41)	(Hans Werner Kraus; Paerzel); Weisshofer, '42/'43.	K.S. 4 Mar. '43 by SAS in 37.10 N. - 00.05 E.
84	500 B. VII B	Fl.L.		Herst Uphoff, '42/'43	P.S. 27 Apr. '43 by A/C from USS GARD in 28.19 N. - 37.53 W.
85	500 B. VII B	Fl.L.	(June '41)	Gregor	K.S. 14 Apr. '42 by USS ROPER in 35.55 N. - 75.13 W.
86	500 B. VII B	Fl.L.		Walter Schug, '42/'43	P.S. 29 Nov. '43 by A/C from USS BROWN in 39.33 N. - 19.01 E.

000112

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG YARD	COMI.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
87	500 T. VII B	Fl.L.		Berger	P.S. 2 Mar. '43 by HMCS ASSINIBOINE in area 43.00 N. - 19.00 W.
88	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.	Mar. '40	Bohmann	K.S. 14 Sept. '42 by HMS ONSLOW in 75.48 N., 20.32 E.
89	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.	July '41	Lohmann, '42/'43	K.S. 12 May '43 by A/C from HMS BIFER with HMS BROADWAY and LOGAN in 46.43 N. - 26.43 W.
90	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		(Kretschmer, '41); Oldorp	P.S. Aug. '42. German estimates: 25 July '42 in North Atlantic.
91	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.	(Jan. '42)	Walkerling, '42/ '43; Heins Bungers- hausen, '43/'44.	K.S. 26 Feb. '44 by HMS AFFLECK & GORD in 49.45 N. - 26.20 W.
92	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		Heins Guenther Jahn; Goelrich, '42/June '43; Horst Chilo (check, to July '44; Brauel	P.S. 4 Oct. '44 in air raid on Bergen.
93	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(June '40)	(Clans Korth); Horst Elfe	K.S. 15 Jan. '42 by HMS HARPUR in 36.40 N. - 15.52 W.
94	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Fall '40)	(Herbert Kunnisch, '41); Otto Ites.	K.S. 27 Aug. '42 by USN PBV in 17.54 N. - 74.36 W., also rammed by HMCS OAKVILLE.
95	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(June '40)	Gerd Schreiber	K.S. 28 Nov. '41 by HNL Sub O 21 in 36.21 N. - 03.27 W.
96	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Sept. '40)	(Lohmann- Willenbrock; Schueler to Dec. '42; Hellriegel; Rix	Sunk in air raid on Wilhelmshaven 30 Mar. '45.

0000113

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
97	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Mid. '40)	(Udo Heilmann, '40/ '42); Trox.	K.S. 16 June '43 by British A/C in 32.20 N. - 34.39 E.
98	500 T. VII C	G.K.		(Gyzae, '41); Eichmann	K.S. Nov. '42, presumed sunk near Gibraltar. German estimate: 20 Nov. '42 in No. Atlantic.
99	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Apr. '40)	Otto Kretschmar	K.S. 17 Mar. '41 by HMS WALKER in 61.16 N.- 12.56 W.
100	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(May '40)	Joachim Schepke	K.S. 17 Mar. '41 by HMS WALKER & VANCE in 61.00 N. - 12.00 W.
101	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Spr. '40)	(Fritz Franzenheim); Mangerson	K.S. by British. To be cleared up by Admty.
102	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Early '40)	von Klot-Meyden- feldt	K.S. 21 June '40 by LNS VIKI II in 46.26 N.- 03.51 W.
103	750 T. IX A	De.B		(Herbert Viktor Schuetze); Werner Winter; Adolf Gustav Janssen, '42/'44; Knecht.	Luebeck, Feb. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
104	750 T. IX A	De.B		Juerst	K.S. 21 Nov. '40 by HMS HULLOCK in 56.25 N.-14.13 W.
105	750 T. IX A	De.B		(Georg Schreese; Volker Sinner- macher); Schuch; Kissen, '42/'45.	P.S. 2 June '43 by Fr. Navy A/C in 14.15 N.- 17.35 W.
106	750 T. IX A	De.B		Juergen Oesten, '41; Busch, '42/ '43; Bamerow	K.S. 2 Aug. '43 by British A/C - 11/461 in 46.35 N.-11.50 W.
107	750 T. IXA	De.B		(Guenther Kessler, '41); Gohlens '42/ May '43; Volker Sinnermacher to Aug. '44; Iritz	K.S. 18 Aug. '44 by RAF Sq. 201 in 46.46 N. - 03.39 W.

0000114

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
108	750 T. IX A	De.B	(Summ. '40)	(Scholz); Wolfram, '42/May '43; Matthias Bruenig, '44.	K.S. Apr. '44 in air raid on Norwegian (?) port.
109	750 T. IXA	De.B		(Hans Fischer); Heinrich Gleich- rodt, '42/Jan '43; Schramm to May '43.	P.S. about 18 May '43 by US Ships SC-1317 or escorts of, in 54 to 51 N., 36 to 34 W.
110	750 T. IX A	De.B.	(Oct. '40)	Writz-Julius Lenz	K.S. 9 May '41 by HMS AMERICA and others in 60.31 N. - 53.10 W.
111	750 T. IX A	De.B.	(Jan. '41)	Wilhelm Kleinschmidt	K.S. 4 Oct. '41 by HMS LADY SHILLEY in 27.15 N. - 20.27 W.
112	(10007.)	(G.K.)		(Neumann)	(Presumed Inactive)
113	(10008)	(G.K.)		(Graf Arco-Vallebenberg)	(Presumed Inactive)
114	(10009)	(G.K.)			(Presumed Inactive)
115	(10009)	(G.K.)			(Presumed Inactive)
116	1600 T. XB	G.K.	(Comp. Fall '41)	(Kuno von Schmidt); Grinne	German estimate: sunk 15 Oct. '42 in No. Atl.
117	1600 T. XB	G.K.		Kona Werner Neumann	P.S. 7 Aug. '43 by A/C from USS GARD in 59.32 N. - 35.21 W.
118	1600 T. XB	G.K.	(Dec. '42)	Werner Crygan	K.S. 12 June '43 by A/C from USS BOSTON in 50.49 N. - 53.49 W.
119	1600 T.	G.K.		Zech to Apr. '43; von Kamecke	K.S. 24 June '43 by HMS STAMMERS & others in 44.30 N. - 10.50 W.
120	750 T. II B	Fl.L.	(Spr. '41)	(Max Hermann Eauy; Pieller; Feldwacker; Gundlach; Sauerbier).	Wesermünde, 27 Apr. '41

0000115

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
121	1000T II B	Fl.L.	(Apr. '41)	(Siegfried Schroeder); Horst.	Wilhelmshave, 27 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
122	750 T. IX C	De.B		Looff	K.S. July '40 by mine in the Atlantic.
123	750 T. IX C	De.B		(Oskar Hoehle); Ferdinand, '41; Horst von Schroeter, '42/'44	Decommissioned Aug. '44. Lorient.
124	750 T. IX C	De.B		(Wilhelm Schulz, '40/'41); Johannes Mohr, '42/'43.	K.S. 2 Apr. '43 by HMS BLACK SWAN & STONEBROT in 41.02 N. - 15.39 W.
125	750 T. IX C	De.B	Feb. '41	(Kuhnke); Ulli Folkers, '42/'43.	K.S. 6 May '43 by HMS PELICAN in 52.27 N. - 45.15 W.
126	750 T. IX C	De.B	Mar. '41	Ernst Bauer to Jan. '43; Biete	F.S. 3 July '43 by USS A/C 1/172 in 48.02 N. - 11.23 W.
127	750 T. IX C	De.B	Mar. '41	Bruno Hansmann	K.S. Dec. '41. German estimate: 17 Dec. '41 in North Atlantic.
128	750 T. IX C	De.B	Mar. '41	Ulrich Hoyer, '42; Emanuel Steinert, '43.	K.S. 17 May '43 by USS PENGUIN in 48.02 N. & SOUTH off Lorient - 11.00 S. - 35.43 W.
129	750 T. IX C	De.B	May '41	(von Schmidt, '39; Werner Hartmann, '40; Oehrn, '40); Eike Glaussen, '41; Hans Witt to May, '43; Richard von Harpe.	Out of Commission, Aug. '44, at Lorient.
130	750 T. IX C	De.B	May '41	Kais to Jan. '43; Siegfried Keller.	K.S. 14 Mar. '43 by possibly USS PELICAN CHICKADEE in approx. 37.00 N. - 40.00 W.

0000116

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
131	750 T. IX C	Da.B	July '41	Arend Baumann	K.S. 17 Dec. '41 by E.S. Ships & A/C in 34.12 N.-13.35 W.
132	500 T. VII C	V.V.	May '41	Ernst Vogelsang	P.S. Oct. '42. German estimate: 4 Nov. '42 in North Atlantic.
133	500 T. VII C	V.V.	July '41	Herrmann Kesse; Lehr	German estimate sunk 14 Mar. '42 in Medit.
134	500 T. VII C	V.V.	July '41	Schandel, '42; Brosin	P.S. 24 Aug. '43 by E.S. A/C - J-179 in 43.00 N. - 09.00 W.
135	500 T. VII C	V.V.	July '41	(Praetorius); Schuett, '42/Mar. '43; Otto Luther	K.S. 15 July '43 by E.S. H.M.S. HICKMATH and ROSEBUD in 23.20 N.-13.17 W.
136	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Aug. '41	Heinrich Simmernann	K.S. Summer '42. German estimate 12 July '42 in No. Atl.
137	300 T. II D	D.W.K.	Comp. June '40	(Gerhard Nassmann; Wohlfarth; Schimmel); Fischer.	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
138	300 T. II D	D.W.K.	(June '40)	(Wolfgang Lueth; Peter Lohneyer); Franz Granitsky.	K.S. 18 June '41 by E.S. H.M.S. FAULKNER in 36.04 N. 07.29 W.
139	300 T. II D	D.W.K.	(July '40)	(Bottcher; Lauenie); Kimmelmann	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
140	300 T. II D	D.W.K.	May '40	(Hinsch, '41; Hollwig; Diessler); Schoerrling	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
141	300 T. II D	D.W.K.	('40)	(Philipp Schueler); Loffmann	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.

0000117

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COM.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
142	300 T. II D	D.W.K.		(Gunter Hoffmann); Schauroth; Baungaertel	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before May '45.
143	300 T. II D	D.W.K.	(May '45)	Kasperek	Wilhelmshaven, Feb. '45; In German port before 7 June, '45.
144	300 T. II D	D.W.K.		(von Himmel; Vogelgang; Graf von Mittelstaedt).	K.S. June '41 in Baltic
145	300 T. II D	D.W.K.		Goesner; Maebach	In German port before June 7, '45.
146	300 T. II D	D.W.K.		(Hilsczits; Wilhelm Grimm; Otto Itoe, '41; Hoffmann, '41); Waldschmidt; Buest.	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany, May '45.
147	300 T. II D	D.W.K.	(May '45)	Weetgen	K.S. 2 June '41 by HMS WANDERER & HMT LANCE in 56.38 N.-10.24 W.
148	300 T. II D	D.W.K.		(Pankart; Radke to Oct. '41)	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
149	300 T. II D	D.W.K.		Plohr	Wilhelmshaven, Feb. '45. In German port before 7 June, '45.
150	300 T. II D	D.W.K.		(Zelling '42); Altefeld; Anschuetz	Wilhelmshaven, Feb. '45. In German port before 7 June, '45.
151	750 T. II D	D.W.K.			Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.
152	750 T. II D	D.W.K.		(Grauer, '41; Gieseler; Mann; Hildebrandt; Petersen)	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven before surrender of Germany - May '45.

0000118

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMAINS.
153	750 T. IX C	De.B	July '41	(Eans Gunther Kuhlmann); Reichmann	K.S. 4 July '42; German estimate: In western Atlantic.
154	750 T. IX C	De.B	July '41	(Kolle); Schuch, '42; Kusch, '43; Gensiner	P.S. 3 July '44 by A/C from USS GORDON and USS INCH and ITOST in 34.02 N. - 19.27 W.
155	750 T. IX C	De.B	Aug. '41	Adolf Piening to Jan. '42; Rudolf to June '44; von Friedeburg to Oct. '44; Witts.	Kiel, Mar. '45. In Danish port at time of surrender-May '45.
156	750 T. IX C	De.B	Aug. '41	Hartenstein	K.S. 8 Mar. '43 by USN A/C in 12.38 N. - 54.49 W.
157	750 T. IX C	De.B	Aug. '41	Wolfgang Henne	Liquidated June '42. German estimate: Sunk 16 June '42 in W. Atl.
158	750 T. IX C	De.B	Sept. '41	Rostin	German estimate sunk 1 July '42 in Eo. Atl.
159	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Sept. '41	(Josef Hauser); Helmut Witte to Apr. '43; Beckmann	K.S. 15 July '45 by US A/C in 15.55 N. - 73.44 W.
160	750 T. IX C	De.B	Sept. '41	Lassen to May '43; von Fommer-Wesche	P.S. 14 July '43 by A/C from USS GORDON in 35.54 N. - 27.13 W.
161	750 T. IX C	De.SW	June '41	Achilles	P.S. 11 Oct. '45 by Brazilian A/C in 18.10 S. - 38.45 W.
162	750 T. IX C	De.SW	Aug. '41	Jurgen Wattenberg	K.S. 3 Sept. '42 by British DPs in 12.21 N. - 59.29 W.
163	750 T. IX C	De.SW	Sept. '41	Engelmann	P.S. Mar. '45 in Bay of Biscay by A/C.

(000119

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
164	750 T. IX C	De. SW	Nov. '41	Fachner	K.S. 6 Jan. '43 by USN PER Sq. 83-P 2 in 01.58 S. - 39.23 W.
165	750 T. IX C	De. SW	Jan. '42	Hoffmann	K.S. Struck mine near Lorient Oct. '42. German estimate: 27 Sept. '42.
166	750 T. IX C	De. SW	Feb. '42	Kuhmann	German estimate: Sunk 3 days '42 in the Caribbean.
167	750 T. IX C	De. SW	Apr. '42	Haubert to Jan. '43; Sturm	K.S. 5 Apr. '43 by US A/C in 27.40 N. - 15.20 W.
168	750 T. IX C	De. SW	June '42	Helmut Pich	K.S. 6 Oct. '44 by USS ZIMMERMAN in 06.20 S. - 111.20 W.
169	750 T. IX C	De. SW	Aug. '42	Sauer	P.S. 25 Mar. '43 by Fortress A/C in 62.12 16.40 W.
170	750 T. IX C	De. SW	Oct. '42	Pfeffer to May '44; Hauber	In Lorient at the of surrender of Germany - May '45.
171	750 T. IX C	De. B	Oct. '41	Gunther Pfeffer	K.S. Oct. or Nov. '42 off Lorient by mine. German estimate: sunk 9 Oct. '42 in Disney.
172	750 T. IX C	De. B	Oct. '41	Carl Zimmermann to Sept. '43; Hermann Hoffmann	K.S. 13 Dec. '45 by A/C from USS HOBBS & US CORVETTE, CHARLES, TAMM, LINDSAY in 26.19 N. - 29.58 W.
173	750 T. IX C	De. B	Oct. '41	(Banche); Schweichel	Sunk during invasion of Africa near Gabon blanca 21 Nov. '42

0000120

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMH.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
174	750 T. IX C	De.B	Nov. '41	Thilo to Jan. '43; Grandefeld.	P.S. 27 Apr. '43 by US A/C in 43.35 N.-56.18 W.
175	750 T. IX C	De.B	Nov. '41	Heinrich Bruns	K.S. 17 Apr. '43 by USCG SPENCER & DWANE in 47.58 N.-21.12 W.
176	750 T. IX C	De.B	Nov. '41	Dierksen	P.S. 15 May '43 by Cuban SC in 23.21 N. - 80.18 W.
177	1200T. IX D1	De.B	Dec. '41	Robert Gysae to Oct. '43; Heinz Buchholz	K.S. 6 Feb. '44 by USN A/C in 10.35 S. - 23.12 W.
178	1200T. IX D1	De.B	Feb. '42	Ibbeken to Jan. '43; Dennee to Nov. '43; Wilhelm Spahr	Decommissioned and blown up by Germans in Bordeaux 25 Aug. '44.
179	1200T. IX D1	De.B	Mar. '42	Ernst Sobbe	K.S. Oct. '42 by HNS ACTIVE. GERMANY estimate: 15 Oct. '42 in So. Atl.
180	1200T. IX D1	De.B	May '42	Musenberg to July '44; Biesen	K.S. after 22 Aug. '44 outbound from Bordeaux for Far East.
181	1200T. IX D1	De.B	Apr. '42	Lueth to Oct. '43; Kurt Freiwald	Seized by Japs in Singapore at time of surrender of Germany. Called 1-501 by Japs.
182	750 T. IX D	De.B	May '42	Hilko Clausen	K.S. 15 May '43 by USN A/C in 31.40 N. - 21.15 W.
183	740 T. IX C	De.B	Mar. '42	Schaefer to Nov. '43; Fritz Schneewind	K.S. 23 Apr. '45 by US sub 320000 in 04.57 S.- 112.52 E.
184	750 T. IX C	De.B	June '42	Dangschatt	P.S. late Nov. '42 in Atlantic. German estimate: sunk 21 Nov. '42 in No. Atlantic.
185	750 T. IX C	De.B	June '42	August Maus	K.S. 24 Aug. '45 by A/C from USS OLRD in 27 N.- 57.05 W.

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
186	750 T. IX C	De.B	July '42	Hesemann	P.S. 12 May '43 by HMS HESPERUS in approx. 42 N. - 32 W.
187	740 T. IX C	De.B	July '42	Rolf Kuennich	K.S. 4 Feb. '43 by HMS VINT in 51.29 N.-36.13 W.
188	750 T. IX C	De.B	July '42	Siegfried Luedden	Decommissioned and blown up by Germans at Bordeaux 25 Aug. '44.
189	750 T. IX C	De.B	Aug. '42	Kurrer	P.S. 23 Apr. '43 by RAF in 59.50 N. - 34.43 W.
190	750 T. IX C	De.B	Oct. '42	Max Wintermeyer, to June '44; Born to July '44; Hans Edwin Reith.	Surrendered. Bay Bulls 14 May '45.
191	750 T. IX C	De.B	Nov. '42	Niehn	P.S. 23 Apr. '43 by HMS HESPERUS in 55.55 N. - 34.20 W.
192	750 T. IX C	De.B	Nov. '42	Happe	P.S. 4 May '43 by Canoe A/C in area 56 N.-43 W.
193	750 T. IX C	De.B	Dec. '42	Hans Pauckstadt to Feb. '44; Abel	P.S. 23 Apr. '44 by British A/C - W/612, in 45.45 N.-09.33 W.
194	750 T. IX C	De.B	Jan '43	(Bartels); Hesse	P.S. 24 June '43 by US A/C H/120 in 53.00 N 25.00 W.
195	1200 T. IX BI	De.B	Sept. '42	(Bartels; Friedrich); Suchholz to July, '43; Steinfeld.	Seized by Japs in Surabaja at time of surrender of Germany. Now known as I-576.
196	1200 T. IX BI	De.B	Oct. '42	Sitel-Friedrich Kontrat to Aug. '44.	P.S. 30/31 Nov. '44 in Sunia Strait (Batavia). Possibly mine or Marine casualty?

0000122

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
197	1200T. IX M	Da.B	Oct. '42	Robert Bartels	P.S. 20 Aug. '43 by USN A/C - W/265 in 28.39 S.- 42.48 E.
198	1200T. IX D2	Da.B	Nov. '42	Kartmann to Dec. '43; Housingervon Waldegg	P.S./ 12 Aug. '44 by HMS FINDHORN & HUIS GODAVARI in 03.35 S.- 52.49 E.
199	1200T. IX D2	Da.B	Nov. '42	Emo Werner Kraus	K.S. 31 July '43 by Brazilian A/C - V/74 in 24.10 S. - 43.15 W.
200	1200T. IX D2	Da.B	Dec. '42	Heinrich Schonder	P.S. 24 June '43 by A/C G/84 in 59.00 N. - 26.13 W.
201	500 T. VII C	G.K.		(Schnee, '41); Hosenberg- Gruszczyński	P.S. About 23 Feb. '43 by unident. ships, approx 48 N.-35 W.
202	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Feb. '41)	Hans Linder, '41; Guenter Poser	K.S. 2 June '43 by HMS STARLING in 55.08 N.- 39.53 W.
203	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Feb. '41)	Rolf Muetzelberg; Hermann Nottmann	K.S. 25 Apr. '43 by A/C from HMS BITER & HMS PARSHILL in 55.05 N.- 42.25 W.
204	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Walter Kell	K.S. 19 Oct. '41 by HMS MILLOW & HORNBY in 35.46 N.-06.12 W.
205	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(May '41)	(Reschke); Burgel	K.S. 17 Feb. '43 by HMS PALADIN & A/C in about 33 N. - 23 E.
206	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(May '41)	Herbert Opitz	P.S. German estimates: Sunk 4 Dec. '41 in No. Atl.
207	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Fritz Mayer	K.S. 11 Sept. '41 by HMS LEWIS & CLARK in 63.59 N. - 34.43 W.

0000123

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COHM.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
208	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Alfred Schlieper	P.S. Dec. '41 in Atlantic German estimate: sunk 12 Dec. '41 in No. Atl.
209	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Brodde	P.S. Possibly 24 Apr. '43 in area 57 N.-27 W.
210	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Feb. '42)	Rudolf Lemcke	K.S. 6 Aug. '42 by HMS ASSHEDDINE in 54.25 N. 39.37 W.
211	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Early '42)	Karl Hause	P.S. 19 Nov. '43 by British A/C - W/173 in 40.15 N. - 19.18 W.
212	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Eolmut Vogler	K.S. 21 July '44 by HMS GURZON & BURNS in 59.27 N. - 00.13 W.
213	500 T. VII D	G.K.	(May '42)	van Varendorff	P.S. ²⁶ July '42 off (area German estimate: sunk 1 Aug. '42 in E. Atl.
214	500 T. VII D	G.K.		Reeder to May '43; Ruprecht Stock to July '44; Konrad.	P.S. July '44 by EIS COLE in 49.55 N. 05.31 W.
215	500 T. VII D	G.K.		Hosckner	P.S. June or July '42. German estimate: sunk 8 July '42 in W. Atl.
216	500 T. VII D	G.K.		Schultz	German estimate: Sunk 21 Oct. '42 in No. Atl.
217	500 T. VII D	G.K.		Reichenbach- Klinke	P.S. 5 June '43 by A/C from USS SCOTT in 39.18 N., 42.50 W.
218	500 T. VII D	G.K.		Richard Becker to July '44; Stock.	Arrived Bergen 8 May '45
219	1600T. XB	G.K.	(Nov. '42)	Walter Burghagen	Seized by Japs in Batavia at time of surrender of Germany, May '45. Nov 1-1945

0000124

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
220	1600 T. X B	G.K.		Barber	P.S. 28 Oct. '43 by A/C from USS BLOOM ISLAND in 48.53 N. - 33.30 W.
221	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(May '42)	(Paul Ackermann); Hans Trojer	P.S. 27 Sept. '43 by A/C B/58 in about 47.00 N. - 18.00 W.
222	500 T. VII C	G.K.		(Heinz Biefeld); Schule	K.S. Oct. '42 in Baltic.
223	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(June '42)	(Seaman); Maschter, '43-Mar. '44; Peter Gerlach.	E.S. 30 Mar. '44 by H.M. Ships ELMCATHRA, TUSITA and USS Hambleton in about 38.54 N. - 14.18 E.
224	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(June '42)	Koschadt	K.S. 13 Jan. '43 by H.M. Ships DE WYBRES in 36.28 N. - 00.49 E.
225	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Wolfgang Leimichler	K.S. 15 Feb. '43 by British A/C in 55.45 N. - 30.09 W.
226	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Rolf Borchers to May '43; Gaenge	P.S. 6 Nov. '43 by H.M.S WOODCOCK in 44.46 N. - 41.08 W.
227	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Kurtze	P.S. 30 Apr. '43 by A/C in 64.30 N. - 07.10 W.
228	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Erwin Christ- ophersen to Aug. '44; Regel	P.S. after 20 Sept. '44, presumably in air raid on Bergen.
229	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Schotelig	P.S. 22 Sept. '43 by H.M. Ships & A/C in area 58 N. - 30 W.
230	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Paul Siegmann to Aug. '44; Heinz Ulgen Boerbach, Aug. '44.	K.S. Scuttled off Island of Myrce Group 20 Aug. '44.

0000125

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
231	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Nov. '42)	Wolfgang Wenzel	K.S. 13 Jan. '44 by British A/C - L/172 - in 44.20 N. - 20.45 W.
232	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(June '41)	Ernst Ziehm	P.S. 8 July '43 by US A/C in 40.37 N.-13.41 W.
233	1600T. X B	G.K.	(Sept. '43)	Hans Steen	K.S. 5 July '44 by USS GARD, BAKER & THOMAS in 42.16 N. - 59.49 W.
234	1600T. X B	G.K.	(Mar. '44)	Johann Heinrich Fehler	Surrendered, Fortmouth, N.E., 19 May '45.
235	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Summetz to Feb. '45; Kuesgen	Kiel area middle of April, 1945.
236	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Jan. '43)	(Reimar Ziesner); Mann to Apr. '45; Sinnermacher temp. and Apr. '45; Mann	P.S. 3 May '45 by A/C in 53.33 N. - 10.45 E.
237	500 T. VII C	G.K.		(Koenig; Eordheiner); Harard	K.S. in air raid on Kiel 4 Apr. '45
238	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Eorst Repp	P.S. 9 Feb. '44 by HMS STARLING, WILBOOSE, MAGPIE & KITE in 49.43 N. - 16.23 W.
239	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Ulrich Voege	23/24 July '44, sunk in air raid on Kiel.
240	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Guenther Link	P.S. 16 May '44 by British A/C in area 63.00 N. - 07.00 E.
241	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Arno Werr	P.S. 18 May '44 by USN A/C - S/210 - in 63.36 N. - 01.42 E.
242	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Karl W. Pancke, '44/Jan '45; Biedel	P.S. Overdue from sea, Cause unknown. Apr. '45.

0000126

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
243	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Oct. '43)	Hans Maertens	K.S. 8 July '44 by British A/C in 47.06 N.-06.40 W.
244	500 T. VII C	G.K.	(Oct. '43)	Euprecht Fischer, '45; Mackeprang	Surrendered. Loch Ailsh 15 May '45.
245	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Schumann- Eindenburg.	Bergen May '45
246	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Ernst Raabe	E.S. 29 Mar. '45 by British escorts in 49.58 N. - 05.25 W.
247	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Gerhard Matschulat	K.S. 1 Sept. '44 by HMS ST. JOHN in 49.46 N. - 05.51 W.
248	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Bernhard Ende to Oct. '44; Loos	P.S. 16 Jan. '45 by US SG 22.6 and USS OCEAN in 47.43 N. - 26.37 W.
249	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Eudolf Lindschau; Kock	Surrendered. Weymouth, 9 May '45.
250	500 T. VII C	G.K.		Werner/ ^{K.} Schmidt	Captured 30 July '44 by Russians in Baltic and salvaged.
251	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Sept. '41	Timm I	K.S. 19 Apr. '45 by Br. A/C in 56.33 N. - 11.48 W.
252	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Oct. '41	Lerchen	P.S. Apr. '42. German estimate: 15 Apr. '42 in No. Atlantic.
253	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Oct. '41	Adolf Friedrichs	German estimate: 26 Sept. '42 in No. Atl.
254	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Nov. '41	Gilardone	P.S. Dec. '42 in area 58 N. - 35 W.; German estimate: 8 Dec. '42 in North Atlantic.

C000127

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
255	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Dec. '41	Reche, '43; Erich Karna, Feb. '44/ Nov. '44; Heinrich to Mar. '45; Fiening, Apr. '45; Heinrich.	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 17 May '45
256	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Dec. '41	(Odo Loose); Wilhelm Brauel, '43/Aug. '44; Frischke, Aug. '44; Lohmann-Willenbrock.	P.S. early May '45 in Bergen harbor. Cause unknown.
257	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Jan. '42	Heins Rahe	K.S. 24 Feb. '44 by HMCS WASKESIU & HMS NINE in 47.19 N. - 26.00 W.
258	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Feb. '42	Merten '42; Koch to Mar. '43; von Kloosenhansen	P.S. 20 May '43 by British A/G in area 55.03 N. - 29.15 W.
259	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Feb. '42	Koepke	P.S. by Nov. '42 (off Gibraltar). German estimate: 16 Nov. '42 in Medit.
260	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Mar. '42	Hubertus Parkhold to Aug. '44; Becker	Scuttled after hitting mine on 12 Mar. '45 in 51.15 N. - 09.05 W.
261	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Apr. '42	Lange	P.S. by Nov. '42. German estimate: 19 Sept. '42 in North Atlantic.
262	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Apr. '42	Heins Franke, '42; Feb. '44; Helmut Niedwilt to Mar. '45; Landahn	Kiel, Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
263	500 T. VII C	V.V.	May '42	Kurt Hoelke	P.S. 20 Jan. '44 in area 46.30 N. 03.00 W. Sundered on 20 Police west Route 20.
264	500 T. VII C	V.V.	May '42	Hartwig Lucks	K.S. 19 Feb. '44 by SHIPPING & REPAIRS in 45.21 N. - 22.00 W.

0000128

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMB.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
265	500 T. VII C	V.V.	June '42	Aufhammer	K.S. 7 Feb. '43 by British A/C in area 55.00 N. - 25.00 W.
266	500 T. VII C	V.V.	June '42	von Jessen	P.S. 14 May '43 by British A/C - B/86 - in 47.45 N. - 26.57 W.
267	500 T. VII C	V.V.	July '42	Otto Tinschert to July '43; Witzendorff to Nov. '43; Tinschert to Aug. '44; Larms, Aug. '44; Knieper.	Scuttled in Flensburg before surrender of Germany - early May '45.
268	500 T. VII C	V.V.	July '42	(Helmut Wieduwilt); Heydemann	P.S. 19 Feb. '43 by British A/C in 47.00 N. 05.50 W.
269	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Aug. '42	(Hansen); Karl Heinrich Sperlinger, Nov. '43/Dec. '43; George Uhl.	K.S. 25 June '44 by HMS BIGHORN in 50.00 N. - 03.00 W.
270	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Sept. '42	Paul Otto, Mar. '43/Aug. '44; Heinrich Schreiber	K.S. 12 Aug. '44 by British A/C in 40.19 N. - 02.56 W.
271	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Sept. '42	Kurt Barleben	P.S. 28 Jan. '44 by USN A/C - 7/103- in 53.15 N. - 15.52 W.
272	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Oct. '42		K.S. Mar. '43 in the Baltic.
273	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Oct. '42	(Engel); Roemmann	P.S. 20 May '43 by British A/C - 4/100- in 59.25 N. - 24.35 W.
274	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Nov. '42	Jordan	K.S. 23 Oct. '43 by British support group and A/C - 4/24- in 57.28 N. - 27.22 W.
275	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Nov. '42	Helmut Bork to July '44; Wehrkamp	P.S. 11 Mar. '45 by British ships off Looe Head.

0000129

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OR REMARKS.
276	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Dec. '42	(Thieme); Erschers, Feb. '44/ Aug. '44; Zwarg	Neustadt? Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admt.
277	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Dec. '42	Robert Laebesen	P.S. 2 May '44 by A/C from HMG FENCER in area 63.00 E. - 12.00 W.
278	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Jan. '43	Joachim Franze	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 19 May '45.
279	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Jan. '43	Finks	K.S. 4 Oct. '43 by US A/C - B/123 - in 61.00 E. - 26.53 W.
280	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Feb. '43	Walter Bumgershausen	K.S. 16 Nov. '43 by A/C W/86 in 49.11 E. - 27.32 W.
281	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Feb. '43	Heinrich von Davidson	In Hutton at time of surrender of Germany - May 1945.
282	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Mar. '43	Rudolf Mueller	P.S. 29 Oct. '45 by HMG D/1021 & D/1022 in 55.20 E. - 38.10 W.
283	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Mar. '43	Guenther Hey	P.S. 11 Feb. '44 by HMG D/407 in 60.45 E. - 12.50 W.
284	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Apr. '43	Scholz	Scuttled after "Barr damages" 21 Dec. '43 in 55.00 E. - 30.00 W.
285	500 T. VII C	V.V.	May '43	Walter Otto; Bornhaupt	P.S. 15 Apr. '45 by British escorts, 32-3, in 50.12 E. - 12.49 W.
286	500 T. VII C	V.V.	May '43	Willi Dietrich	P.S. 23 Apr. '45 by British escorts, 11-19, 44 mi. SE of Narvik.

0000130

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
287	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Oct. '43	Meyer IV	Z.S. Scuttled in Kiel Canal 20 May 1945.
288	500 T. VII C	V.V.	June '43	Willi Meyer	K.S. 3 Apr. '44 by A/C from HMS TRACER & ACIVITY in 73.44 N. - 27.12 E.
289	500 T. VII C	V.V.	June '43	Alexander Hellwig	P.S. 30 May '44 by HMS NELOS in 73.28 E. - 00.45 E.
290	500 T. VII C	V.V.	July '43	Edmut Herglots	K.S. early May '45 in Frenshelm harbor. Cause unknown.
291	500 E. VII C	V.V.	July '43	Heumeister	Kiel Mar. '45. In German port before 7 June '45.
292	500 E. VII C	V.V.	Aug. '43	Verner Schmidt	K.S. 27 May '44 by A/C S/59 in 63.77 N. - 00.57 E.
293	500 E. VII C	V.V.	Aug. '43	Leonhard Klingebor	Surrendered, Londonderry May 1945.
294	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Sept. '43	Heinz Schuett	Surrendered, Loch Eriboll, 19 May '45.
295	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Sept. '43	Gaenther Wieboldt	Surrendered, Loch Eriboll, 19 May '45.
296	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Oct. '43	Karl Heinz Masch	P.S. 22 Mar. '45 by A/C M/120 in 55.23 E. - 06.40 W.
297	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Nov. '43	Wolfgang Aldegarnann	K.S. 6 Dec. '44 by British A/C-T/201 in 58.45 N. - 04.55 W.
298	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Nov. '43	Otto Hohmann to July '44; Gehrken.	Reached British port by 7 June '45.

0000131

U./B No.	TYPE	BLDG. (YARD)	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
299	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Dec. '43	Helmut Heinrich; Ende	Kristiansand South at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
300	500 T. VII C	Fl.L	Dec. '43	Fritz Hein	K.S. 22 Feb. '45 by HMS ROBERT & PINCHER in 36.25 N. - 08.06 W.
301	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.	(Early '42)	Willy Koerner	K.S. 21 Jan. '43 by HM Sub P-212 in 41.27 N. - 07.04 E.
302	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		(Achilles); Harbert Sichel	P.S. 6 Apr. '44 by HMS SWALE in 45.05 N. - 35.11 W.
303	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		Karl Franz Meine	K.S. 21 May '43 by HM Sub SICHEL in 42.50 N. - 06.00 E.
304	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		Koch	P.S. 28 May '43 by British A/C - I/120 - in 54.50 N. - 37.15 W.
305	500 T. VII C	Fl.L	(Aug. '42)	Rudolf Bahr	P.S. 17 Jan. '44 by HMS WANDERER in 50.08 N. - 19.01 W.
306	500 T. VII C	Fl.L	(Aug. '42)	Claus von Frotha	P.S. 31 Oct. '43 by HMS WHITEHALL & GERARDIN in 46.27 N. - 20.12 W.
307	500 T. VII C	Fl.L	(Nov. '42)	Friedrich Herrie to Oct. '44; Krueger	P.S. 29 Apr. '45 by HMS LOCK SHIN in Kola Inlet.
308	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		Muehlenport	K.S. poss. 4 June '43 by HMS BRUGGENT in 64.25 03.09 W.
309	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		Kans-Gert Mahrholz to Aug. '44; Loeder	P.S. 16 Feb. '45 by British escorts, 43-9 in 58.09 N. - 02.23 W.
310	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		(Friedland); Wolfgang Ley	Fronzheim at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.

0000132

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CONN.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
311	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		Joachim Eander	P.S. Apr. '44 in area 52:00 N. - 20:00 W.
312	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.	(Apr. '43)	Kurt Heinz Nicolay to Nov. '44; Herrie to Mar. '45; von Gaza.	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 19 May '45.
313	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.	(May '43)	Friedhelm Schweiger	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 19 May '45.
314	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		Georg Wilhelm Easse	P.S. 30 Jan. '44 by British escorts in 73.30 N. - 22.30 W.
315	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		Herbert Zoller	Trondheim at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
316	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		(Stega); Koenig	Kiel? Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Party.
317	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		Peter Rahlff	K.S. 26 June '44 by Br. A/C - W/55 - in 62.03 N. - 01.45 W.
318	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.	(Nov. '43)	Josef Will	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll 19 May '45.
319	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		Johann Clemens	P.S. 15 July '44 by British A/C - W/206 - 57.45 N. - 04.45 W.
320	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		Siegfried Treinlinger; Kemerich	P.S. 7 May '45 by Br. A/C - X/210 in 61.38 N. - 01.58 W.
321	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		Ulrich Dress; Rehrends	P.S. 8 Apr. '45 by HMS CALDER in area 50 N. - 11 W.
322	500 T. VII C	Fl.L.		Wysk	P.S. 25 Nov. '44 by British escorts H-17, in 60.10 N. - 01.58 W. or by mine in Channel.

0000133

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
323	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		(Bokelberg); Pregel; Dobinsky	Possibly scuttled at U/base Wesermünde 26 Apr. '45 by Germans.
324	500 T. VII C	Fl.F		Mielhoff; Sauerbier	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany. British say U-324 paid off by 12 June '45.
325	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		Dohrn	P.S. 30 Apr. '45 by British escorts, E-14, in 55.42 N. - 04.55 W.
326	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		Matthas	Reported 13 Apr. '45 SW of Rockall. Unheard from thereafter. P.S. by June '45.
327	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		Landke	P.S. 25 Feb. '45 by British escorts, Jason Group 2 in 49.46 N. - 05.47 W.
328	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		Scholle	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
329	500 T. VII C	Fl.L			Sunk in air raid on unknown port. Mar. '45.
330	500 T. VII C	Fl.L		Gröner	
331	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	May '41	Froiherr Hans Diedrich von Siewenhausen	P.S. 17 Nov. '42 by mine A/C in 57.00 N. 02.25 E.
332	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	May '41	Johannes Liebe to Dec. '42; Haettmann.	P.S. 4 Nov. '43 by US A/C - W/404 - in 45.50 N. 10.00 W.
333	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Aug. '41	(Karnet 4); Schwaff to P. '43; Erich Gröner to July '44; Fiedler	P.S. 31 Mar. '44 by USS HOGG in 49.50 N. 07.25 W.

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U/B No.	TYPE	HLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
334	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Oct. '41	Siemon; Erich, June '43	P.S. poss. 14 June '43 by HMS PELICAN & JED in 58.15 N. - 28.40 W.
335	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Oct. '41	Felkner	K.S. 3 Aug. '42 by HM sub SARACEN, P/247, in 62.00 N. - 00.30 E.
336	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Feb. '42	(Rudolf Baltz); Hans Hunger.	P.S. 4 Oct. '43 by British A/C - N/120- in 60.51 N. - 29.34 W.
337	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Apr. '42	Subriedel	P.S. Jan. '43 in Atlantic
338	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	May '42	Manfred Kinzel	P.S. 22 Sept. '43 by HM Ship A/C in area 55 N. - 36 W.
339	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Aug. '42	Esse II; Pietsch; Kanus	Wilhelmshaven, Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
340	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Oct. '42	Joachim Hans Klaus	K.S. Scuttled 2 Nov. '43 after attacks by HMS SLEMMING in 35.49 N. - 05.14 W.
341	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Nov. '42	Spa	P.S. about 21 Sept. '43 by HM Ship G A/C in area 55 to 58 N. - 37 to 30 W.
342	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Nov. '42	Albert Essenfelder	P.S. 17 Apr. '44 by RONE in 69.23 N. - 29.20 W.
343	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Feb. '43	Wolfgang Rahn	P.S. 10 Mar. '44 by HMS MULL in 38.09 N. - 09.41 E.
344	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Mar. '43	Ulrich Pietsch	K.S. 24/25 Aug. '44 by A/C from HMS TARDON in 73.00 N. - 05.30 E.
345	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Apr. '43	Knackfuss	Mined off Varnemuende 13 Dec. '45.

0000135

H/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
346	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	May '43		Sunk in diving accident in Baltic, 20 Sept. '43.
347	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	July '43	Johann Debuhr	K.S. 17 July '44 by US A/G - Y/201 - in 68.35 E. - 04.50 E.
348	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Aug. '43	Fans Horbert Schunck	Sunk in air raid on unknown port, possibly Hamburg, Mar. '45.
349	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Sept. '43	Laehne	Scuttled in Göttinger Dicht before surrender of Germany.
350	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Oct. '43	Niester	Sunk in air raid on unknown port, Mar. '45.
351	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		(Hause; Rosenberg '45); Wicks I; Schley; Strehl, '45.	Pillau 26 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
352	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.	(Sept. '41)	Rathke	K.S. 9 May '42 by USS ICARUS in 34.12 N. - 76.35 W.
353	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.	(Mar. '42)	Wolfgang Roemer	K.S. 16 Oct. '42 by USS FAMS in 55.54 N. - 23.30 W.
354	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.	(Apr. '42)	Karl Heinz Herbschleb to Jan. '43; Fans Jurgen Schaner	P.S. 24 Apr. '44 by USS HERRARD & others & A/G from USS VAMPIRE in 72.49 E. - 30.41 E.
355	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Guenther La Baum	P.S. 2 Apr. '44 by USS VAMPIRE in area 75.00 N. - 10.00 E.
356	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.	(Dec. '41)	(Wallas); Ruppelt	P.S. 27 Dec. '42 by USS LANTANA in 45.30 N. - 25.40 W.
357	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.	(June '42)	Adolf Kellner	K.S. 26 Dec. '42 by USS HERRARD & others in 57.43 N. - 11.40 W.

0000136

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
358	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.	(Aug. '42)	Rolf Manke	K.S. 1 Mar. '44 by HMS ATFLECK in 45.47 N. - 23.17 W.
359	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.	(Dec. '42)	Heinz Foerster	P.S. 28 July '43 by USN A/C in 15.57 N.-68.30 W.
360	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Klaus Becker	P.S. about 2 Apr. '44 by HMS KEPPEL in area 73.00 10.00 E.
361	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Hans Seidel	P.S. 17 July '44 by RAF U/86 in 68.36 N. - 08.33 E.
362	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Ludwig Franz	K.S. Sept. '44 by Russians ? in vicinity 75.00 n. - 88.00 E.
363	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Werner Hees	Surrendered. Loch Reiboll, 19 May '45.
364	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Paul Heinrich Sass	P.S. 30/31 Jan. '44 by British A/C 172- in 45.15 N. - 05.25 W.
365	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Reimar Wedeneyer to Nov. '44; Todenhagen	P.S. 13 Dec. '44 by A/C from HMS CHARIOT in 70.43 N. - 08.07 E.
366	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Bruno Langenburg	P.S. 5 Mar. '44 by A/C from HMS CHARIOT in area 72.00 N. - 18.30 E.
367	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Stegemann	Sunk 16 Mar. '45 in the Baltic.
368	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Gieseletter; Schaefer	5 May '45 enroute Flensburg to Helgoland. In German port before 7 June '45.
369	500 T. VII C	Fl. Sch.		Schunck	In Kristianand South at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.

0000137

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CONCL.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
370	500 T. VII C	Pl. Sch.		Karl Nielsen	Luebeck 31 Mar. '45. Probably proceeded to Kiel. To be cleared up by Admty.
371	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(Spr. '41)	Heinrich Driver; Waldemar Mehl to Mar. '44; Horst Fenski	K.S. 4 May '44 by HMS BLANKNEY, USS SUSTAIN, PRIDE & CAMPBELL & FFS SENEGALAIS in 36.50 E.- 05.34 E.
372	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(May '41)	Heins Joachim Neumann	K.S. 4 Aug. '42 by HMS Ships & RAF in 32.00 E.- 34.00 E.
373	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(May '41)	Paul Karl Loeser to Aug. '43; Detlev von Lehsten	K.S. 8 June '44 by RAF Sq. 224 in 45.26 E. - 05.47 W.
374	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(June '41)	(Waldemar Mehl); Uuno von Fischel	K.S. 12 Jan. '42 by HMS FAC UBERMANN in 37.50 N.- 16.00 E.
375	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Jurgen Koenenkamp	P.S. possibly 12 July '44 by HMS's in Straits of Messina.
376	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Marka	P.S. 10/11 Apr. '43 by British units in Bay of Biscay (?)
377	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(Summ. '43)	Koehler; Gerhard Bluth	P.S. 19 Jan. '44 by HMS VIGOR in 50.27 N. - 18.17 W.
378	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(Early '42)	(Koschatt; Lauterbach); Kroeder	P.S. 20 Oct. '43 by A/C from USS CORO in 47.40 N. - 25.27 W.
379	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(Dec. '41)	Rudolf Zettner	K.S. 9 Aug. '42 by HMS DIAMPHUS in 56.30 N. - 32.05 W.
380	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(Dec. '41)	Roether to Nov. '44; Albrecht Brandt	K.S. 11 Mar. '44 in air raid on Boulogne. (Raised).

0000138

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
381	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Graf von Pneckler und Limpurg	P.S. 19? May '43 by US A/C in area 55.00 N. - 36.00 W.
382	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		(Rosenberg); Juli to Mar. '43; Koch to Sept. '43; Rudolf Korn to Jan. '44; Goring to Aug. '44; Wilke to '45; Schimmel.	P.S. Jan. ? '45 by collision
383	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Krenser	P.S. 2 Aug. '43 by Brit. A/C - V/285- in 47.24 N. - 12.10 W.
384	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(Dec. '42)	Guenther von Rosenberg	P.S. 19 Mar. '43 by Fortress A/C in area 54.00 N. - 25.00 W.
385	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(Aug. '42)	Fans Guido Valentiner	N.S. 11 Aug. '44 by A/C P/401, & 11th Squadron in 46.10 N. - 02.45 W.
386	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(Oct. '42)	Händler to July '43; Fritz Albrecht	N.S. 19 Feb. '44 by H-10 10001 & 8817 in 45.31 N. - 22.31 W.
387	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Rudolf Baehler	P.S. 9 Dec. '44 by H-10 10001 & 8817 in 45.31 N. - 22.31 W.
388	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Peter Bues	P.S. 20 June '45 by H-10 A/C in area 57.00 N. - 31.00 W.
389	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Siegfried Weilmann	P.S. possibly 5 Oct. '44 by US A/C P/401 in 42.42 N. - 27.15 W.
390	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.	(May '43)	Heinz Geiseler	N.S. 5 July '44 by H-10 10001 & 8817 in 49.54 N. - 01.23 W.

0000139

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
391	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Dueltgen	P.S. 13 Dec. '43 by US A/C, B/53, in 45.45 N. - 09.38 W.
392	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Hanning Schneemann	P.S. 16 Mar. '44 by US A/C & HMS AFFLOCK in 47.36.00 N. - 05.00 W.
393	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Alfred Bodenmacher, '44; Seeger I; Senker	Scuttled possibly 4 May '45 in Flensburg Fjord or at Wilhelmshaven.
394	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Wolfgang Ronger	P.S. 2 Sept. '44 by HMS VINDY & escorts in 63.12 N. - 06.01 W.
395	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.			
396	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Ernst Unterhorst to Dec. '44; Stemon	P.S. 23 Apr. '45 by US A/C, U/26, near Cape Wrath.
397	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Wirtz Mallinke to Mill '44; Stags.	Scuttled in Gottinger Bucht - May '45.
398	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Johann Beckhoff to Oct. '44; Granz	Left Kristiansund South 17 Mar. '45. No account for. P.S., same as 399.
399	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Hart von Meesteran; Fuhse	P.S. 26 Mar. '45 by US A/C, U/26 in 49.50 N. - 05.01 W.
400	500 T. VII C	H.W.K.		Greutz	P.S. 17 Dec. '44 by US A/C, U/26 in 51.10 N. - 02.05 W.
401	500 T. VII C	H.W.D.	(Apr. '41)	Georg Simmermann	P.S. 3 Aug. '41 by US A/C, U/26 in 50.12 N. - 19.50 W.
402	500 T. VII C	H.W.D.	(May '41)	Giegsfried von Forstner	P.S. 13 Oct. '43 by US A/C, U/26 in 50.12 N. - 29.41 W.

0000140

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
403	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.	(Sept. '41)	Karl Clausen to May '43; Keins	P.S. 17/18 Aug. '43 by British A/C in 13.42 N. - 17.36 W.
404	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Buelow to May '43; Schoenberg	P.S. 28 July '43 by Liberator A/C W/4 and W/224 in area 45.30 N. - 10.00 W.
405	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Kopmann	P.S. 30 Oct. '43 by A/C from USS GARD in 48.43 N. - 32.19 W.
406	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.	(Oct. '41)	Herst Dietrichs	E.S. 18 Feb. '44 by USS LOBBIE & SPY in 48.32 N. - 23.36 W.
407	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.	(Dec. '41)	Ernst Ulrich Bruehler-Burne to Jan. '44; Hubertus Kern-decker to Aug. '44; Hans Kollme.	E.S. 19 Sept. '44 by U.S. PATROLBIRD, WINGSPAN and GARDIAN in 36.27 N. - 24.33 E.
408	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		von Kymmen-	German estimate: Sunk 23 Nov. '42 in Arctic.
409	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.	(Jan. '42)	Hans Ferdinand Kasmann	E.S. 12 July '43 by USS INDEPENDENT in 37.17 N. - 03.55 E.
410	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.	(Mar. '42)	Sturm to Jan. '43; Herst-Arno Fenzki.	E.S. 11 Mar. '44 in air raid on Zealand.
411	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Litterscheid; Spindlegger	German estimate: Sunk 20 Nov. '42 in No. Atlantic.
412	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Jahrmecker	German estimate: Sunk 27 Oct. '42 in No. Atlantic.
413	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Gustav Noel to July '44; Dietrich Sacke	E.S. 20 Aug. '44 by USS WINDWARD, WINGSPAN & WINDWARD in 50.09 N. - 00.09 W.

0000141

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
414	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Euth	P.S. 25 May '43 by EMS TUNCH in 36.31 N. - 00.40 E.
415	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Kurt Heide to Apr. '44; Herbert Werner.	K.S. 13 July '44; mined off Brost.
416	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Seiger; Zorn	K.S. 12 Dec. '44 in collision with mine- sweeper in 55.00 N. - 19.40 E.
417	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Schreiner	P.S. 11? June '43 in Rosengarten area by A/C
418	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Lange	Possibly withdrawn from service at Brost. Not mentioned after May '43.
419	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Giersberg	P.S. 8 Oct. '43 by Dr. A/C 2/36 in 50.15 N. - 27.05 E.
420	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Juergen Resse	P.S. 26 Oct. '43 by RCAF A/10 in 50.45 N. - 41.01 W.
421	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Hans Kolbus	K.S. 23 Apr. '44 in air raid on Guelen.
422	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Hans Wolfgang Feschel	P.S. 4 Oct. '43 by A/C from 515 04.0 in 45.20 N. - 21.55 W.
423	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Klaus Macklaender	K.S. 17 June '44 by Portugian A/C, 2/100 in 63.05 N. - 01.05 E.
424	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		(Muller); Guenther Madsen	P.S. 11 Feb. '44 by A/C from 515 04.0 in 45.20 N. - 21.55 W.
425	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.	(Apr. '45)	Heinz Bentzien	K.S. 17 Feb. '45 by A/C from 515 04.0 in 45.20 N. - 21.55 W.

0000142

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CONTR.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
426	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Christian Reich	P.S. 8 Jan. '44 by RAAF U/10 in 46.47 N. - 10.42 W.
427	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.	(June '43)	Karl Gabriel Gudenus	Surrendered. Loch Ziboll 19 May '45.
428	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Ranitsch; Brasack	Scuttled in Kiel Canal 5 May '45.
429	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		(Ernst Hacky); Futtkat	K.S. 30 Mar. '45 in air raid on Wilhelmshaven.
430	500 T. VII C	D.W.D.		Hammer	Sunk in air raid on unknown port, Mar. '45.
431	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Apr. '41)	(Hans Martin Schoibel); Farnesey; Dietrich Schoeneboom	P.S. 30 Oct. '43 by K.S. UZIMATUM off Soolon.
432	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Apr. '41)	Otto Schultze to Jan. '43; Hermann Schlarat	K.S. 11 Mar. '43 by K.S. SCHWITZ in 51.35 N. - 28.30 W.
433	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(May '41)	Hans Zy	K.S. 16 Nov. '41 by K.S. HANSCOLD in 56.15 N. - 04.42 W.
434	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(June '41)	Wolfgang Heyda	K.S. 18 Dec. '41 by K.S. SCHWITZ & SCHWITZ in 36.08 N. - 16.02 W.
435	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(41)	Siegfried Strelow	P.S. 9 July '43 by US 4/8, 2/175, in 59.08 N. - 14.58 W.
436	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Seibicke	P.S. 26 May '45 by K.S. TROP & KIP in 45.51 N. - 15.57 W.
437	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		(Herman Schults); Hermann Lemby	K.S. 4 Oct. '45 in air raid on Bergen.
438	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Jan. '43)	Francius to Feb. '43; Weinsohn	P.S. about 6 May '45 by US Ships in 52.30 N. - 43.00 W.

0000143

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CONSI.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
439	500 T. VII C	Sch. D	(Dec. '42)	Sporn to Feb. '43; von Fippelskirch.	K.S. 4 May '43 in collision with U-659 in 43.32 N. - 13.30 W.
440	500 T. VII C	Sch. D	(Jan. '42)	Johannes Geissler	P.S. Possibly July '43 off Nazaire?
441	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Klaus Hartmann	P.S. 21 June '44 by Br. A/C, A/304, in 50.13 N. - 03.18 W.
442	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Apr. '42)	(Hartmann); Besse	P.S. mid Feb. '43 in Atlantic by U199 A/C.
443	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Konstantin von Puttkammer	P.S. 23 Feb. '43 by U19 BICKSTER & D'0's in area 36.55 N. - 02.23 W.
444	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(May '42)	Josef Langfeld	K.S. 11 Mar. '43 by U19 HAWES & HUGS ACCIDENT in 51.20 N. - 21.25 W.
445	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Sporn to Jan. '44; Konrad von Treuberg.	P.S. 24 Apr. '43 by Br. A/C-15 in 47.21 N. - 05.50 W.
446	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Richard	K.S. mined 26 Dec. '42 at Salsmunde.
447	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Boths	P.S. 7 May '43 by U19 HAWES in area 35.00 N. 13.00 W.
448	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Feb. '42)	Helmut Kantor	K.S. 14 Apr. '43 by U19 HAWES & HUGS ACCIDENT in 46.32 E. - 19.57 W.
449	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Zernann Otto	P.S. 24 June '43 by U19 HAWES, HUGS & others others in area 44.30 N. 11.00 W.
450	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(May '43)	Eurt Boehne	K.S. 10 Mar. '43 by U19 HAWES & HUGS ACCIDENT in area 40.53 N. - 21.25 W.

000144

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
451	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(May '41)	Eberhard Hoffmann	K.S. 21 Dec. '41 by RAC in 35.55 N. - 06.03 W.
452	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(May '41)	Juergen March	K.S. 25 Aug. '41 by RAC & HMS VAGUOLA in 61.30 N. 15.30 W.
453	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Early '41)	(Weter Gerlach); Schliessenbach to Dec. '43; Dierk Juchts.	K.S. 20/21 May '44 by H.M. PERACIOUS, W. MASANI & LINDESDALE in 33.13 N. 16.36 E.
454	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(July '41)	Rudolf Hoeselaender	K.S. 1 Aug. '43 by Sr. A/S, B/19, in 45.39 N. - 10.17 W.
455	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Aug. '41)	(K. Weiseler); Hans Martin Scheibe.	K.S. Apr. '44 in Iceland area. Cause unknown.
456	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(May '42)	Teichert	P.S. 12 May '43 by S/S BROADBENT & S/S B/19 & A/S from 100 miles in area 47.00 N. - 25.35 W.
457	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.	(Nov. '41)	Brandenburg	German estimate: sunk 16 Sept. '42 in Arctic.
458	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.	(Dec. '41)	Ziggins	K.S. 22 Aug. '43 by S/S BROWN & S/S WINDS in 36.25 N. - 12.39 E.
459	1600T. XIV	D.W.K.	(Nov. '41)	von Wilamowitz-Hollendorf	K.S. 24 July '43 by Sr. A/S, V/547, in 45.47 N. - 10.33 W.
460	1600T. XIV	D.W.K.	(Early '42)	(Schneffer); Schneer	P.S. 4 Oct. '43 by A/S Sr. USCGC in 43.23 N. 25.53 W.
461	1600T. XIV	D.W.K.	(Jan. '42)	Wolf-Harve Stiebler	K.S. 30 Dec. '43 by Sr. A/S, B/19, in 49.25 N. 10.47 W.

0000145

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMH.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
462	1600Z. XIV	D.W.K.	(Feb. '42)	Bruno Vowe	K.S. 30 July '43 by Dr. EG-2 2/59. 502 & 461 in 45.09 N. - 10.58 W.
463	1600T. XIV	D.W.K.	(Mar. '42)	Wolfbauer	P.S. 15/16 May '43 by Dr. A/C in area 45.00 N. - 10.00 W.
464	1600 T. XIV	D.W.K.	(Apr. '42)	Otto Farns	K.S. 20 Aug. '42 by USN A/C, 73rd Pat. Sq., in 61.25 N. - 14.40 W.
465	500 F. VII C	D.W.K.	(Comm. '42)	Wolf	P.S. 2 May '43 by Dr. A/C in area 45.00 N. - 09.00 W.
466	500 F. VII C	D.W.K.	(June '42)	Gerhard Thaefer	P.S. (Scuttled about 25 Aug. '44 in Boulon).
467	500 F. VII C	D.W.K.		Kammer	P.S. 25 May '43 by USN A/C, 2/54 in 60.25 N. - 14.52 W.
468	500 F. VII C	D.W.K.	(Aug. '42)	Clemens Schenong	K.S. 11 Aug. '43 by RCAF in 12.20 N. - 20.07 W.
469	500 F. VII C	D.W.K.		(Steinhaus); Hilf Clausen	P.S. 27 Mar. '43 by Fortress A/C in 60.43 N. - 15.25 W.
470	500 F. VII C	D.W.K.	(Jan. '43)	Gunther Grava	K.S. 16 Oct. '43 by Liberator, 4/120 & 3/59. in 58.20 N. - 29.20 W.
471	500 F. VII C	D.W.K.	(May '43)	Friedrich Eleckhorn	(Decommissioned) after being damaged in air raid on Boulon 6 Aug. '43.
472	500 F. VII C	D.W.K.	(May '43)	Freiherr Wolfgang von Forstner	K.S. 4 Mar. '44 by A/C from HMS GARDIA & CHAMBLE in 73.05 N. - 26.40 W.

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U/B No.	TYPE	REG. YARD	COIN.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
473	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.	(June '43)	Heinz Sternberg	K.S. 6 May '44 by EMB STARLING, WRECK & WILDCOASE in 49.29 N. - 21.22 W.
474	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.			
475	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Otto Stoeffler	Possibly Kiel, 1 Apr. '45 To be cleared up by ADM
476	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Otto Hietmann	K.S. 25 May '44 by U-999 after being damaged by A/C, 7/210, in 54.45 N. - 05.58 W.
477	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Karl Jenssen	K.S. 3 June '44 by Br. A/C, 5/162 in 63.59 N. - 01.37 W.
478	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Rudolf Rademacher	Sunk 30 June '44 by RCM A/C Sq. 83 & 162 in 63.51 N. - 01.22 W.
479	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Friedrich Sons	P.S. early Dec. '44. Probably by Russian mine field in Gulf of Finland.
480	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Hans Joachim Scarster	P.S. 24 Feb. '45 by Br. M-3 in 49.55 N. - 06.07 W.
481	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.	(Nov. '43)	Herald Pick; Andersen	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll 19 May '45.
482	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Graf Harmut von Matuschka	P.S. 16 Jan. '45 by Br. M-22 in 53.30 N. - 05.53 W. or mined in approaches.
483	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Hans von Horstein.	In Tromsheim 28 Apr. '45. Presumably there at time of surrender of Germany.

0000147

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
484	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Wolf-Axel Schafer	K.S. 9 or 11 Sept. '44 by HMS HESPERIA or Da. A/C, D/423, in 55 to 57 N. - 07 to 08 W.
485	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Lutz	Surrendered. Gibraltar 12 May '45.
486	500 T. VII C	D.W.K.		Gerhard Moyer	P.S. 12 Apr. '45 by HM Sub TAPIE in 60.44 N. - 04.39 E.
487	1600T. XIV	D.W.K.	(Dec. '42)	Helmut Metz	K.S. 13 July '43 by A/C from USS CORB in 27.15 34.18 W.
488	1600T. XIV	D.W.K.	(Lawn. Oct. '41)	Partke to Dec. '43; Bruno Stuit	P.S. 26 Apr. '44 by USS FROST, HUSS & others in 17.52 N. - 38.04 E.
489	1600T. XIV	D.W.K.	(Mar. '43)	Adalbert Schmitt	K.S. 4 Aug. '43 by Br. A/C in 61.18 N. - 14.36 W.
490	1600T. XIV	D.W.K.	(Mar. '43)	(Erichsdorf); Wihelm Gerlach.	K.S. 12 June '44 by A/C from USS STRATON & USS FROST, INCH & HUSS in 43.47 N. - 10.03 W.
491 through 500					491 - 500, originally allocated to D.W.K. for series of Type VII C boats.
501	750 T. IX C	D.W.R.	Mar. '41	Hugo Foerster	K.S. 11 Sept. '41 by HMS CANNIBY & LOSSMAY in 62.55 N. - 37.50 W.
502	750 T. IX C	D.W.R.	Apr. '41	(Stoelhausen) Hansmann); Jaergun Rosentiel.	German estimate: sunk 7 July '42 in North Atlantic.
503	750 T. IX C	D.W.R.	July '41	Gericke	German estimate: sunk 14 Mar. '42 in No. Atl.

0000148

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMB.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
504	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	July '41	Poeka to Dec. '42; Wilhelm Luis	K.S. 30 July '43 by IIS HIR, WRIH, WCOMPONER & WILGOOSE in 45.33 N. - 10.47 W.
505	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Aug. '41	(Axel Loose); Seebach to Nov. '43; Harald Langa	Captured 5 June '44 by USS GUADALCANAAL & TG in 21.30 N. - 19.29 W. Governed USS HHO.
506	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Sept. '41	Erich Wuerdemann	K.S. 12 July '43 by US A/C in 42.20 N. - 13.51
507	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Oct. '41	Schacht	P.S. 13 Jan. '43 by A/C from US 23.6.1 in 01.52 S. - 39.52 W.
508	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Oct. '41	(Erinnes); Georg Adams	P.S. 12 Nov. '43 by US A/C, 0/103 in area 45 N. - 07.37 W.
509	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Nov. '41	(Schaefer); Werner Witte	P.S. 15 July '43 by A/C from US 34.02 N. - 25.02 W.
510	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Nov. '41	Heitzel to June '43; Alfred Wick.	In custody at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
511	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Dec. '41	Steinhoff to Dec. '42; Schneewind.	Presented to US Navy Aug. '43. Became 10-500.
512	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Dec. '41	Wolfgang Schultze.	K.S. 2 Oct. '42 by US A/C in 09.50 N. - 52.25 W.
513	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Jan. '42	Zugmberg to Jan. '42; Gumpenberger	K.S. 19 July '43 by US A/C in 27.30 S. - 47.55 W.
514	750 T. IK C	D.W.H.	Jan. '42	(Fischer); Hans Kuffermann	P.S. 6 July '43 by A/C 7/224 in 43.37 N. - 08.59 W.

0000149

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
515	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Feb. '42	Werner Zanke	K.S. 9 Apr. '44 by A/C from USS GUNNERSHIP, USS POPE & Others in 34.31 N. - 19.29 W.
516	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Mar. '42	(H. Liebo); Liebo to June '43; Hans Willmann to Oct. '44; Astran.	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll 14 May '45.
517	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Mar. '42	Paul Hartwig	K.S. 21 Nov. '42 by A/C from HMS VICTORIOUS in 46.16 N. - 17.09 W.
518	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Apr. '42	Wissmann to Dec. '43; Hans Geffermann	P.S. 22 Apr. '45 by USS GARDNER & Others in 43.26 N. - 18.23 W.
519	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	May '42	Appen	P.S. 10 Feb. '43 by U.S. A/C in 47.05 N. - 17.25 W.
520	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	May '42	Wolfgang Schneider; Volkmar Schindler	German captured; Sunk 1 Nov. '42 in West Atl.
521	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	June '42	(Hansen); Sargsten	K.S. 2 June '43 by USS SARGSTEN in 37.40 N. - 73.16 W.
522	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	June '42	Herbert Schnieder	P.S. about 24 Feb. '45 in vicinity of US-1 in area 39.40 N.-17.00 W.
523	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	June '42	Werner Pletsch	K.S. 25 Aug. '43 by H.M.S. VINDICATOR in 42.03 N. - 10.02 W.
524	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	July '42	von Steinacker.	P.S. 22 Mar. '43 by U.S. A/C in 30.15 N.-20.15 W.
525	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	July '42	Hans Joachim Frobits	P.S. 11 Apr. '43 by A/C from USS GARDNER in 41.29 N.-38.05 W.
526	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Aug. '42	(Hansen); Hans Langlich	K.S. 14 Apr. '43 by USS off Lorient.

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U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
527	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Sept. '42	Herbert Uhlig	K.S. 23 July '43 by A/C from USS BOQUE in 35.25 N. - 27.56 W.
528	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Sept. '42	(Fuchs); Georg von Zabennu	K.S. 11 May '43 by H13 FLEETWOOD & A/C in 47.08 N. - 14.30 W.
529	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Sept. '42	Fraats	P.S. Mar. '43 in No. Atl. Cause unknown.
530	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Oct. '42	Kurt Lange to Nov. '44; Otto Wehrnuth	Surrendered at Mar Del Plata, Argentina, 10 July '45.
531	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Oct. '42	Herbert Weckel	P.S. 5 May '43 by Br. escort in area 53 N. - 45 W.
532	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Nov. '42	Otto Junker	Surrendered. Loch Milobell, 13 May '45.
533	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Nov. '42	Sennig	K.S. 16 Oct. '43 by A/C in 25.28 N. - 58.50 W.
534	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Dec. '42	Herbert Mollau	P.S. 5 May '45 by Br. A/ 2/547 in 58.40 N. - 11.40 W.
535	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Dec. '42	Mannenreich	P.S. 5 July '43 by A/C 0/53 in 43.38 N. - 09.13 W.
536	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Jan. '43	Helf Schauenburg.	K.S. 20 Nov. '43 by H108 HANS, CALGARY & STONESTRAT in 43.50 N. - 19.39 W.
537	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Jan. '43	(Mollau); Peter Schrowe	P.S. 10 Nov. '44 by US sub THUNDER in 07.13 S. - 115.17 E.
538	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Feb. '43	(Schrowe); Cossler	P.S. 21 Nov. '43 by H105 FOLEY, CHINA & A/C in 45.33 N. - 19.25 W.
539	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Feb. '43	Lauterbach-Maden	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.

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U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMB.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
540	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Feb. '43	Kasch	P.S. 17 Oct. '43 by RCAF D/59 & R/120 in 58.55 N. - 31.00 W.
541	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Mar. '43	Kurt Petersen	Surrendered. Gibraltar 13 May '45.
542	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Mar. '43	Christian Brandt Coester	P.S. 27/28 Nov. '43 by USS DANIELA in vicinity 39.00 N. - 17.00 W.
543	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Apr. '43	Hans Hellriegel	P.S. 2 July '44 by A/C V098 from USS LARZ ISLAND in 25.34 N. - 21.36 W.
544	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Apr. '43	Willi Matzke	K.S. 16 Jan. '44 by A/C from USS COMBATTANT in 40.30 N. - 37.20 W.
545	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	May '43	Gert Wenneemann	K.S. 11 Feb. '44 by U-714 after having been damaged by A/C 47612. in approx. 50.17 N. - 13.22 W.
546	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	May '43	Paul Just	K.S. 24 Apr. '45 by TU 22.7.1 in 43.94 N. - 40.22 W.
547	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	June '43	Kurt Sturm to Mar. '44; Widenyer.	P.S. 30 Mar. '45 in air raid on Bremen.
548	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	June '43	Richard Bimmer- mann to Aug. '44; Ffeffer to Oct. '44; Krenzel	P.S. 19 Apr. '45 by USS DUCKLEY in 42.19 N. - 61.45 W.
549	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	July '43	Botler Frankenhagen.	K.S. 29 May '44 by USS SHIBBO in 51.13 N. - 23.05 W.
550	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	July '43	Klaus Kachert	K.S. 16 Apr. '44 by USS JOYCE, FINCHER & GARDNER in 40.67 N. - 09.20 W.

0000152

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
551	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '40	Robert Schrott	K.S. 23 Mar. '41 by HMS VISKADA in 62.37 N. - 16.47 W.
552	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec/ '40	Erich Sepp; Klaus Fopp to Brunner '44; Lubs, '45.	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven Bay '45.
553	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '40	Sturmann	P.S. possibly 27 Jan. '43 by HMS ADMIRAL (?) in area of 50.52 N. - 24.25 W.
554	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '41	(Groth; Lorrer or Lorenz); Stalenzburg; (Stein; Lohmann); Lave; Lams.	Hamburg, 1 May '45. Scuttled? To be cleared up by Army.
555	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '41	(Dietrich Lohmann; Dieter Lehmann).	Hamburg, 1 May '45. Scuttled? To be cleared up by Army.
556	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '41	Herbert Wohlfahrt	K.S. 27 June '41 by HMS LEWIS & others in 60.24 N. - 09.00 W.
557	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '41	Otto Paulsen	German estimate: Sunk 16 Dec. '41 in Baltic.
558	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '41	Gunther Kroch	K.S. 20 July '45 by US 1/G, 7/19 in 45.32 N. - 09.26 W.
559	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '41	Hans Heidtmann	K.S. 30 Oct. '42 by Tr. 20 & 1/G in 32.30 N. 33.00 E.
560	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '41	Rappard; Jacobs	Brunsbüttel, about 27 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Army.
561	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '41	(Bartels); Heinz Schönburg to June '45; Manning	K.S. 12 July '45 by HMS GI in vicinity of Messina.

0000153

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. USED	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
552	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '41	(Collmann); Horst Korn	P.S. 19 Feb. '43 by HNS ISIS, HURLEY & A/C in area 32.00 N. - 21.00 W.
563	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '41	Klaus Kargsten to Feb. '43; Reichardt; Goetz Kartmann to Apr. '45.	P.S. 31 May '43 by Br. A/C, P/58 in 46.57 N. - 10.05 W.
564	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '41	Reinhard Sahran; Fiedler	P.S. 14 June '43 by Br. & A/C in 44.17 N. - 10.25 W.
565	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '41	(Johson); Wilhelm Frisson to May '43; Fritz Manning.	K.S. Sept. '44? Scuttled in Salamis.
566	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '41	(Ushoff; Dietrich Borchert); Bonus to Dec. '42; Kornmann.	K.S. 24 Oct. '43 by Br. A/C, A/179 in 40.51 N. - 03.10 W.
567	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '41	(Dahl); Strauss.	K.S. 21 Dec. '41 by HNS SILVER in 44.02 N. - 20.10 W.
568	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '41	Jonathan Preuss	K.S. 23 May '42 by HNS Alice in 34.42 N. - 24.53 W.
569	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '41	Fans Peter Hirsch to Jan. '43; Hans Friedrich Johannsen	K.S. 22 May '43 by A/C from USS LOGAN in 50.50 N. 35.25 W.
570	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '41	Fans Reimlowe	Captured by Br. 27 Aug. '41, in 62.15 N. - 18.35 W. Now HNS GRACK.
571	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '41	Holmut Hochmann to May '43; Victor Broselow	P.S. 26 Jan. '44 by Br. A/C, P/461 in 52.41 N. - 14.27 W.
572	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '41	Friedrich to Dec. '42; Kummstat	P.S. 3 Aug. '43 by UHM A/C in 11.33 N. - 54.04 W.

0000154

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. MARK	CONSTR.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS
573	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '41	Reinsohn	Sold to Spain 12 Aug. '42 after putting into Cartagena damaged. Called C.7 by Spanish.
574	500 B. VII C	B & V	June '41	Gangelbach	U.S. 19 Dec. '41 by USS STONE in 38.12 N. - 17.23 W.
575	500 B. VII C	B & V	June '41	Guenther Heydemann to July '43; Wolfgang Becker	U.S. 13 Mar. '44 by A/O from USS MANTA & MARS Ship in 46.10 N.-27.57 W.
576	500 B. VII C	B & V	June '41	Ernst Guenther Fritzsche	German estimate: sunk 18 July '42 in No. Atl.
577	500 B. VII C	B & V	July '41	Helf Schauenburg	German estimate: sunk 2-Jan. '42 in Mediterranean
578	500 B. VII C	B & V	July '41	Schwinke	German estimate: Sunk 12 Aug. '42 in No. Atl.
579	500 B. VII C	B & V	July '41	(Heinrich Katsch); Linnar; Schwarzenburg	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven 13 May '45.
580	500 B. VII C	B & V	July '41	Hans Kuhlmann	U.S. Nov. '42 by German ships in Baltic.
581	500 B. VII C	B & V	July '41	Werner Pfeifer	U.S. 2 Feb. '42 by USS MANTON in 39.00 N. - 30.00 W.
582	500 B. VII C	B & V	Aug. '41	Schulte	German estimate: sunk 7 Oct. '42 in No. Atl.
583	500 B. VII C	B & V	Aug. '41	(Klaus Gerlach); Gross	U.S. 15 Oct. '42 in the Baltic.
584	500 B. VII C	B & V	Aug. '41	Hocke to Mar. '45; Johann Hocke	U.S. 21 Oct. '43 by A/O from USS MANTA in 39.12 N. - 31.55 W.

0000155

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COIN.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
597	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '41	Bopst	German estimate: Sunk 15 Oct. '42 in No. Atlantic.
598	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '41	Gottfried Holtorf	K.S. 23 July '43 by US A/C Bomron 197 in 04.55 S. - 33.30 W.
599	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '41	Breitkamp; Breithaupt	German estimate: sunk 26 Oct. '42 in No. Atl.
600	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '41	Garmuehlen	P.S. 25 Nov. '43 by HMS BARTON in 41.45 N. - 22.30 W.
601	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '41	Peter Ottner Grau; Otto Hansen.	P.S. 24 Feb. '44 by HMS HULL in 69.00 N. - 05.00 E.
602	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '41	(Kabitaky); Philipp Schueler.	P.S. Apr. '43 in the Mediterranean.
603	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '42	H. Joachim Bortelmann to Apr. '43; Salts to Dec. '43; Bortelmann.	P.S. 1 Mar. '44 by USS LST-1021, 11.45 S. - 30.10 W. in 18.30 N. - 25.30 W.
604	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '42	Ernst Kueltring	K.S. 11 Aug. '43. Scuttled in 05.00 S. - 20.00 W. after being damaged by U.S.
605	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '42	Herbert Viktor Schuetze	German estimate: sunk 21 Nov. '42 in the Atlantic.
606	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '42	(von der Wech; Hans Matt); Hans Doehler.	K.S. 22 Feb. '43 by US A/C 100 in 47.00 N. - 34.07 W.
607	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '42	Krist Høeghøien to Apr. '43; Wolf Jeschmann.	K.S. 15 July '43 by US A/C 100 in 49.00 N. - 09.14 W.

0000157

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
608	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '42	Rolf Struckmeier to Dec. '43; Wolfgang Reissner	K.S. 9 Aug. '44 by HMS WREN & A/C, G/53, in 46.30 N. - 03.08 W.
609	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '42	Rudloff	P.S. 7 Feb. '43 by Br. A/C in area 55.00 N. - 25.00 W.
610	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '42	Freyberg- Hilgersen- Mittelsingen	P.S. 8 Oct. '43 by Br. A/C, J/423, in 55.47 N. - 24.30 W.
611	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '42	von Jakobs	P.S. Dec. '42 in area 45.00 N. - 39.00 W. German estimate: 11 Dec. '42.
612	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '42	Petersen III; Dich; Heymann.	In Kiel area, Feb. '45. To be cleared up by -
613	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '42	Kaeppe	K.S. 23 July '43 by USS DARTER in 55.15 N. - 25.00 W.
614	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '42	Streeter	P.S. 29 July '43 by Br. A/C, G/172, in 46.44 N. - 11.03 W.
615	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '42	Rolf Kapitzy	K.S. 7 Aug. '43 by USS A/C in 12.34 N. - 04.34
616	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '42	(Johann Spind- lagger); Hilgersen Hilgersen	K.S. 17 May '44 by USS MIDN, 3000 & others & Br. A/C, P/172, in 37.47 N. - 10.16 W.
617	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '42	Hurt Brandt	K.S. 12 Sept. '45 by Br. A/C, P/173 & HMS in 55.35 N. - 13.27 W.
618	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '42	Hurt Peberg to May '44; Ulrich Jaust	K.S. 14 Jan. '44 by Br. A/C, G/52, in WORTH & in 47.22 N. - 04.35 W.

0000158

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMH.	CONVICTING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REPAIRS.
619	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '42	Makowski	German estimate: sunk 6 Oct. '42 in No. Atl.
620	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '42	Stein	P.S. 12 Feb. '43 by DD's in area 37.00 N. - 16.00 W.
621	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '42	Max Kruschka to May '42; Hermann Stuckmann	K.S. 18 Aug. '44 by Br. E0-11 in 45.52 N. - 02.36 W.
622	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '42	Quack	K.S. 24 July '43 by US A/C in Frenkheim
623	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '42	Schroeder	P.S. 10 Feb. '43 by USA A/C in area 49.00 N. - 18.00 W.
624	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '42	von Soden	P.S. 7 Feb. '43 by Br. A/C in area 55.00 N. - 25.00 W.
625	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '42	Reuter to Feb. '44; Siegfried Straub	K.S. 10 Mar. '44 by E045, U/422 in 52.45 N. - 21.25 W.
626	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '42	Bade	German estimate: sunk 18 Dec. '42 in No. Atlantic
627	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '42	Kindelbacher	German estimate: sunk 23 Oct. '42 in No. Atl.
628	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '42	Heinrich Rasenschar	P.S. 7 July '45 by US A/C in 37.40 N. - 15.30 W.
629	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '42	Holmat Duge	K.S. 3 June '44 by Br. A/C, E/204 in 45.46 N. - 06.15 W.
630	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '42	Winkler	P.S. 5 May '44 by US Ship & A/C, E/204, in area 55.00 N. - 24.00 W.

0000159

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. INFO	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
631	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '42	Kraeger	P.S. 17 Oct. '43 by EMS SUNFLOWER in 58.46 N. - 33.14 W.
632	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '42	von Karpf	P.S. 6 Apr. '43 by Br. A/C in 57.45 N. - 27.55 W.
633	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '42	Mueller II	P.S. 7 Mar. '43 by US A/C in area 57.00 N. - 27.00 W.
634	500 T. VII C	B & V	Aug. '42	Dahlhaus	P.S. 30 Apr. '43 by EMS SUNNY & SUNSHINE in 42.30 N. - 19.30 W.
635	500 T. VII C	B & V	Aug. '42	Dohmann	P.S. 6 Apr. '43 by EMS SUN in area 58.00 N. - 31.00(?) W.
636	500 T. VII C	B & V	Aug. '42	Hans Wildbrandt to Mar. '43; Berhard Schandl	P.S. 21 Apr. '45 by EMS SUNNY & SUNNY in area 57.00 N. - 18.00 W.
637	500 T. VII C	B & V	Aug. '42	Guenther Sedelius to July? '43; Fabricius; Micksberg, Apr. '45.	In Stavanger 7 May '45.
638	500 T. VII C	B & V	Sept. '42	Dornbeck to Apr. '45; Lauvinger	P.S. 5 May '43 by EMS SUN in area 58.00 N. - 40.00 W.
639	500 T. VII C	B & V	Sept. '42	Wichmann	P.S. Aug. 7 '45 in Barn Sea by Russian sub 2-171.
640	500 T. VII C	B & V	Sept. '42	Hagel	P.S. 17 May '45 by EMS SUN in 59.50 N. - 41.05 W.
641	500 T. VII C	B & V	Sept. '42	Horst Bonittel	P.S. 17 Jan. '44 by EMS WANDERER & GARDEN in area 50.00 N. - 19.00 W.

0000160

U/B No.	TYPE	REGG. YARD	CONTR.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
642	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '42	Herbert Bruenning	P.S. 6 Aug. '44 by air raid on Toulon.
643	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '42	Eans Speidel	K.S. 8 Oct. '43 by US A/C, Z/86 & T/120 in 56.18 N. - 26.30 W.
644	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '42	Jensen	P.S. probably before Apr. '43
645	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '42	Otto Ferro	P.S. 24 Dec. '43 by USS SCHMIDT in 45.14 N. - 21.27 W.
646	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '42	Wulff	P.S. 17 May '43 by Dr. A/C in area 62 N.-14 W.
647	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '42	Willy Hertin	P.S. late July(?) '43 possibly in Saereos area.
648	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '42	Albert Stahl	P.S. 22 Nov. '43 by USS BARRY in 43.00 N. - 21.00 W.
649	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '42	Reinund Wiesler	Sunk 23 Feb. '43 in Medit.
650	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '42	Ernst von Witsen- dorff to July '44; Zorn II	K.S. 25 Dec. '44 by Dr. A/C in 51.20 N. - 09.45 W.
651	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Feb. '41	(Ineth); Peter Lohmeier	K.S. 29 June '41 by Dr. Zacorts in 52.52 N. - 13.36 W.
652	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Apr. '41	Frantz	German estimate: Sunk 2 June '42 in Medit.
653	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	June '41	Gerhart Feiler to Oct. '43; Hans Albrecht Handler.	P.S. 15 Mar. '44 by US from USS DE WITT & USS SHEPARD in 54.56 N. - 24.35 W.

0000161

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMI.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OR REMARKS.
654	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	July '41	Foerster	German estimate: sunk 31 Aug. '42 in Caribbean.
655	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Aug. '41	Dunrea	German estimate: sunk 23 Mar. '42 in Arctic.
656	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Sept. '41	Kroening	German estimate: sunk 3 Mar. '42 in No. Atlantic.
657	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Oct. '41	(Diedle, '41); Heinrich Goellnitz	P.S. 14 May '43 by Br. A/C, G/84 in 60.10 N.- 31.52 W.
658	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Nov. '41	Kans Senkel	German estimate: sunk 3 Nov. '42 in No. Atlantic.
659	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Dec. '41	Kans Stock	K.S. 4 May '43 in collision with U-439 in 45.32 N. - 13.30 W.
660	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Jan. '42	Goetz Raur	K.S. 12 Nov. '42 by HMS SHAMWART & LOSSIE in 37.11 N. - 00.10 W.
661	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Feb. '42	von Lilienfeld	German estimate: sunk 17 Oct. '42 in No. Atl.
662	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Apr. '42	Hermann to Mar. '43; Heinrich Kuehler	K.S. 21 July '43 by USN A/C, 72 94 Sq. in 05.56 N. - 48.46 W.
663	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	May '42	Schmid	P.S. 8 May '43 by Br. A/C in approx. 47.00 N.- 10.00 W.
664	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	June '42	Adolf Graef	K.S. 9 Aug. '43 by A/C from 393 USS in 40.12 N. 37.20 W.
665	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	July '42	Kans Jurgem Kaupt	P.S. 22 Mar. '43 by Br. A/C in area 45.00 N.- 12.00 W.

U/B No.	TYPE	REGD. MARK	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
666	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	Aug. '42	Engel to Nov. '43; Ernst Wilberg.	P.S. 10 Feb. '44 By A/C from H45 PLOGER in 53.53 N. - 17.25 W.
667	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	Oct. '42	Heinrich Schroeteler to Aug. '44; Range IV	K.S. 25-27 Aug. '44 by mine off Fallice.
668	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	Nov. '42	Wolfgang von Lichtstedt	Surrendered. Loch Eritoll, 13 May '45.
669	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	Dec. '42	Koch	P.S. 6 Sept. '43 by Br. A/C in 53.30 N. - 03.00 W.
670	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	Jan. '43	(Myronimus)	P.S. 21 Aug. '43 in a collision in Baltic.
671	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	Feb. '43	(Karl Wilhelm Kocher); Wolfgang Kocher.	K.S. 1/5 Apr. '44 by H 3 Sunderland in 59.03 N. - 00.00 W.
672	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	Mar. '43	Ulf Lautetz	K.S. 18 Feb. '44. Identified after being stranded by mine Sunderland in 59.03 N. - 02.30 W.
673	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	Apr. '43	(Waelbich); Heinz Gauer to Aug. '44; Gauke II	K.S. 24 Oct. '44. Sighted by H-252 in 59.17 N. - 03.07 W.
674	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	June '43	Harald Fuhs or Fuss	P.S. possibly 2 May '44 by A/C in 59.03 N. - in 07.30 W. - 12.30 W.
675	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	July '43	Karl Heinz Gauker	P.S. 24 May '44 by H 3 Sunderland in 59.03 N. - 03.04 W.
676	500 F. VII C	H.W.H.	Aug. '43	Werner Gass	K.S. 7-19 Feb. '45. present 27 Feb. in East Baltic area.

0000163

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or RETURNS.
677	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Sept. '43	Faul Weber; and 2/or Ady	Ranburg, Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
678	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Sept. '43	Guido Kyronimus	K.S. 6 July '44 by HIS SERVICE & MISS ORTONA & KOOTEMAY in 50.32 N. - 09.23 W.
679	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Oct. '43	Friedrich Ereck- woldt, Jan. '45; Kist	K.S. early Jan. '45. Possibly by Russian mine in West Baltic.
680	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Nov. '43	Max Ulber	Approx Kiel from Wesermünde, 7 May '45. Danish port by 7 June '45
681	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Dec. '43	^I Erich; Werner Gebauer	K.S. 11 Mar. '45 by USN A/C, H/103 in 49.53 N. - 06.31 W.
682	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Jan. '44	Thienemann	P.S. Mar. '45 in air port on unidentified port.
683	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Feb. '44	Guenther Keller	P.S. 12 Mar. '45 by Br. M-2 in 49.52 N. - 06.52 W.
684	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Mar. '44		
685	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Apr. '44		
686	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Aug. '44		
687	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Sept. '44		W/O and horse names of U-607 - 610 given to U-1271 - 1272.
688	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Oct. '44		
689	500 T. VII C	H.W.H.	Nov. '44		

0000164

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
690	500 T. VII C	R.W.H.	Jan. '45		
691	500 T. VII C	R.W.H.	Feb. '45		
692	500 T. VII C	H.W.E.	Mar. '45		
693 through 700					Allocation, if any, of 693 - 700 unknown.
701	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	June '41	Korst Degen	K.S. 7 July '42 by USA A/C in 34.50 N. - 74.55 W.
702	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Aug. '41	Goetz Friedrich von Rabenau	German estimate: sunk 4 Apr. '42 in North Sea.
703	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Sept. '41	Dialofeld; Johann Bruenner.	P.S. Sept. '44 near Seydisfjord, probably by mine.
704	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Nov. '41	(Christiansen); Kessler to May '43; Nolte	Probably at Westermanna. Apr. '45, arrived after 8 Feb. '45. To be cleared up by Minty.
705	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Dec. '41	Korn	German estimate: sunk 5 Sept. '42 in Bay of Biscay.
706	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Feb. '42	Alexander von Sitzewitz	K.S. 2 Aug. '45 by USA A/C, 24 2/10 in 46.27 N. - 09.59 W.
707	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Mar. '42	Guenther Grosschel	P.S. 9 Nov. '43 by US A/C, 5/20 in 43.51 N. - 20.17 W.
708	500 T. VII C	S.W.Z.	May '42	(Niels Andersen); Kusin	P.S. May '45. Scuttled in Wilhelmsfjord.

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CONM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
709	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	June '42	Horst Weber to Dec. '43; Rudolf Ites	P.S. 29 Feb. '44 by USS BRONSTEIN in 48.00 N. - 25.30 W.
710	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Aug. '42	Freiherr von Carlowitz	P.S. 24 Apr. '43 by A/C D/206 in 61.25 N. - 19.48 W.
711	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Sept. '42	Kans-Guenther Lange	Sunk 4 May '45 by CBI A/C at Harstedt.
712	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Nov. '42	(Wagner); Wiesemann to Jan. '43; Fehlmann.	In Kristiansand South 7 May '45. Br. port by 7 June '45.
713	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Dec. '42	Harti Gosejakob	P.S. 25 Feb. '44 by CBI A/C, 17/210 in 70.25 N. - 12.40 W.
714	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Feb. '43	Kans J. Schaefer	P.S. 14 Mar. '45 by USS BRONSTEIN in 55.53 N. - 01.50 W.
715	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Mar. '43	Helmut Voettger	P.S. 13 June '44 by USS BRONSTEIN in 60.45 N. - 02.01 W.
716	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Apr. '43	Johannes Dunkelberg to Jan. '45; Grens to Feb. '45; Thieme.	Surrendered. Loch Arbill, 19 May '45.
717	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	May '43	Sigfried von Potkirch und Pankow.	P.S. early May '45 (17). Scuttled in Flensburg.
718	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	June '43	Helmut Wickwilt	Sunk Oct. '43 in the Baltic.
719	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	July '43	Klaus-Dietrich Steffens	P.S. 26 June '44 by USS BRONSTEIN and A/C in 55.33 N. - 11.02 W.
720	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Aug. '43	Schulder I; Kornelberg	In German port by 7 June '45.

0000166

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
721	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Oct. '43	(Wolfschlaeger); Fabricius	P.S. May '45. Scuttled in Gettinger Ducht.
722	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Nov. '43	Eans Heinrich Reiners.	P.S. 29 Mar. '45 by HMS BEEHILL in 57.09 N.- 06.45 W.
723	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Dec. '43		W/T and Morse names of U-723 - 730 given to U-1301 - 1303
724	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Feb. '44		
725	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Mar. '44		
726	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Apr. '44		
727	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	May '44		
728	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	July '44		
729	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Aug. '44		
730	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Sept. '44		
731	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		(Bunk); Werner Seckand to Dec. '43; Graf Alexander Keller	K.S. 15 May '44 by USS DARTMOUTH & USS 39.58 N. - 09.45 W.
732	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Oct. '42)	(Werner Seckand); Almas Peter Carlson	K.S. 11 Oct. '43 by USS 39.58 N. - 05.58 W.
733	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		(Vize von Frotha); Hollmann, '45; Zimmer.	P.S. May (1) '45. Scuttled at Sonderbucht.

0000167

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
734	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Hansjörg Blauert	P.S. 9 Feb. '44 by HMS STARLING, MAGPIE & KISS in 49.44 N. - 16.07 W.
735	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Hans Joachim Boerner	P.S. 28 Dec. '44 in air raid on Eorten.
736	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Jan. '43)	Reinhard Reff	K.S. 6 Aug. '44 by HMS LOCH KILMIN & STARLING in 47.19 N. - 04.16 W.
737	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Paul Brasack to Dec. '44; Greus	P.S. 19 Dec. '44 by collision with minesweeper or in 68.10 N.-15.28 W.
738	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Erich Hoffmann	P.S. 14 Feb. '44 by a collision in Gotenburg.
739	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Ernst Kengold to Apr. '45; Losenick.	Surrendered. Allied port, 16 May '45.
740	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Guenther Stark	K.S. 9 June '44 by Dr. A/C, F/120 in 49.09 N. - 03.37 W.
741	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Mar. '43)	Gerhard Palmgren	K.S. 15 Aug. '44 by HMS CAMEL in 50.02 N. - 00.35 W.
742	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Reinz Schwassmann	P.S. 18 July '44 by ZEP 7/210 in 63.24 N. - 09.51 W.
743	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Helmut Mandstorf	P.S. 9 Sept. '44 by HMS SANDHURST & CASTLE in 55.46 N. - 11.41 W.
744	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(June '43)	Reinz Blieschke	K.S. 6 Mar. '44 by HMS TOWNS in 52.01 N. - 22.37 W.
745	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Wilhelm von Brotke	P.S. early Feb. '45 by mine in Gulf of Finland.

(000168

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
746	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Lottner	Probably at Hamburg, Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
747	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(July '43)	Zahnw	P.S. May '45. Sunk in air raid on Hamburg.
748	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Fuschmann; Both	K.S. 5 May '45. Scuttled in Kiel Canal.
749	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Mischer III; Kaeagen	K.S. 4 Apr. '45 in air raid on Kiel.
750	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Dittler I; Grawert	P.S. May '45. Scuttled in Flensburg.
751	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Jan. '41	Digalk	K.S. Sept. '42 near Iceland
752	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	May '41	Ernst Karl Schroeter	K.S. 23 May '43 by A/C from HMS ARDOR in 51.55 N. - 23.00 W.
753	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	June '41	Mannstein	P.S. 14 May '43 by US A/C in area 48.00 N. - 23.00 W.
754	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Aug. '41	Oestermann	Sunk off U.S. early '42. German estimate: sunk 7 Aug. '42 in N. Atlantic.
755	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Nov. '41	Salter Goeing	P.S. 23 May '43 by US A/C, Sq. 608 in 39.55 N. 01.41 E.
756	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Dec. '41	Klaus Harney	German estimate. Sunk 7 Sept. '42 in So. Atl.
757	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Feb. '42	Friedrich Destr	P.S. 8 Jan. '44 by US A/C, Sq. 608 in 50.00 N. - 10.00 W.

0000169

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
758	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	May '42	Helmut Manseck to Apr. '44; Feindt	Probably in Kiel, Apr. '45. Arrived after 30 Jan. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
759	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Aug. '42	Rudolf Friedrich	P.S. 26 July '43 by USN A/C in 18.06 H. - 75.00 W.
760	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Oct. '42	Otto Blum	Interned in Vigo, Spain-Sept. '43. Incorporated in Spanish Navy under No. C.7.
761	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Nov. '42	Herst Geider	K.S. 24 Feb. '44 by USN A/C, Sq. 63 & HNS ALBRO & WISHARD in 35.57 N. - 05.54 W.
762	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Jan. '43	Wolfgang Hille to Dec. '43; Walter Pietschmann.	P.S. 9 Feb. '44 by HNS WILCOCK & COO in 49.04 N. - 17.01 W.
763	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Mar. '43	Ernst Cordes to Aug. '44; Braun to Nov. '44; Schroeter IV	Possibly at Loozigoor, Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
764	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	May '43	Kurt von Branch	Surrendered. Loch Hüllin, c. 15 May '45.
765	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	June '43	(Stornberg); Werner Wandt	H.S. 6 May '44 by A/C from HNS WILCOCK & COO in 54.50 N. - 23.23 W.
766	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	July '43	Dietrich Wilke	Discovered by USN in 54.50 N. - 23.23 W. '44 in 2.11.45.

0000170

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
767	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Sept. '43	Walter Dankleff	K.S. 18 June '44 by HMS FAME, INCONSTANT & others in 49.03 N. - 03.13 W.
763	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Oct. '43		K.S. 20 Nov. '43. Ramm'd enroute Hela from Kiel by unident. ships.
769	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	(Mar. '42)		U-769 and U-770 built later than '42.
770	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	(Apr. '42)		In Baltic 26 Apr. '45.
771	500 T. VII C	K.M.	Nov. '43	Helmut Block	P.S. 11 Nov. '44 by H.M. Sub VENTURER in 69.14 N. 16.22 E.
772	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Dec. '43	(Reinews); Ewald Faschmacher	P.S. 20 Dec. '44 by Br. A/S, I/407 in 58.53 N. - 02.30 W. or in channel by mine.
773	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Jan. '44	Richard Jange; Salina	In Bronshain, 17 Apr. '45 British port by 7 June '45.
774	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Feb. '44	Büttger; Sausnikat.	P.S. 8 Apr. '45 by Br. I/404 in 49.45 N. - 11.51 W.
775	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Mar. '44	Faschmacher	In Bronshain at time of surrender of Germany.
776	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	Apr. '44	Martin	Surrendered Weymouth, 16 May '45.
777	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	July '44	Supporti	P.S. Oct. '44 by air raid on unknown port.
778	500 T. VII C	K.M.W.	(Apr. '42)*	Juergs	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.

0000171

U/B No.	TYPE	REG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
779	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.	(Aug. 1942)	Stegmann	In German port by 7 June 1945.
780	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.	(Sept. 1942)		
781	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.	(Sept. 1942)		
782	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.	(Oct. 1942)		
783	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.	(Oct. 1942)		
784	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.	(Nov. 1942)		
785	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.	(Nov. 1942)	Schoeneboom	Presumably arrived London 25 May '43; un- heard from since.
786	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.	(Dec. 1942)		
787	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.	(Dec. 1942)		
788	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.			
789	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.			
790	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.			
791	500 E. VII C	K.M.W.			
792	201	B & F	Sept. 1943	Kerst Hatten; Wais	Walter Dant. Arrived 25 Mar. '43 to stay out. To be cleared up by Ainty.

0000172

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
793	WA 201	B & V	Oct. '43		Arrived Kiel, 19 Mar. '45 To pay off. To be cleared up by Adnty.
794				Werner Klug; Becker III	Left Warnemuende 26 Mar. '45 for Kiel. To be cleared up by Adnty.
795					Possibly in Flensburg, Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
796 through 800					Allocation, if any, of 796 - 800 not known.
801	750 T. IX C	DeSf	Mar. '43	Fans-Joachim Erans	R.S. 17 Mar. '44 by USS CORY & BRONSTEIN in 16.42 H. - 30.28 W.
802	750 T. IX C	DeSW	June '43	(Steinhaus); Raimut Schmoeckel	Surrendered. Lonsantery, c. 15 May '44
803	750 T. IX C	DeSW	Sept. '43	Karl Schimpf	Sunk 27 Apr. '44 in the Baltic in accident.
804	750 T. IX C	DeSW	Dec. '43	Herbert Meyer	P.S. 9 Apr. '45 by Br. A/C in 53.05 N. - 11.10 E.
805	750 T. IX C	DeSW	Feb. '44	Richard Bernardelli	Surrendered. Ports- mouth, E.M., 15 May '45.
806	750 T. IX C	DeSW	Apr. '44	Hornbostel	Bombed 5 May '45 in air raid on Kiel area. Re- ported in Denmark June '45. Salvaged.
807	750 T. IX C	DeSW	Sept. '44		
808	750 T. IX C	DeSW	Dec. '44		

0000173

U/B No.	TYPE	RELE. YARD	COMH.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
809	750 T. IX C	DoSW	Mar. '45		
810	750 T. IX C	DoSW	June '45		
811	750 T. IX C	DoSW	Aug. '45		
812	750 T. IX C	DoSW	Dec. '45		
813 through 820					Allocation, if any, of 813 - 820, unknown.
821	500 T. VII C			Ulrich Knackfuss	E.S. 10 June '44 by Br. A/C, Sq. 256 & 246 in 48.33 N. - 05.15 W.
822	500 T. VII C			Elsinghorst; Fregel	Arrived Vagosack 24 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
823					Allocation, if any, unknown.
824					Allocation, if any, unknown.
825	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	May '44	Stoelker	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll 13 May '45.
826	500 T. VII C	(Sch. D.)		Laebala	Surrendered. Londonderry 17 May '45.
827	500 T. VII C	(Sch. D.)		Hark	Arrived Kiel 10 Feb. '45. To be cleared by Adnty.
828	500 T. VII C	(Sch. D.)		John	Arrived Vagosack 24 Mar. '45. To be cleared by Adnty.
829 through 840					Allocation of 829 - 840, if any, unknown.

0000174

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. INFO	COIN.	COMMANDING OFFICER,	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
841	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Feb. '43	Werner Bender	K.S. 17 Oct. '43 by EIS RAYARD in 59.08 N. - 32.20 W.
842	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Feb. '43	Wolfgang Heller	P.S. 6 Nov. '43 by EIS WIDEGOODS in 43.42 N. - 42.08 W.
843	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Mar. '43	Oskar Romants	E.S. 9 Apr. '45 by Dr. A/S in 57.30 N. - 11.20 E.
844	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Apr. '43	Moeller	P.S. 16 Oct. '43 by US A/S in 55.22 N. - 27.10 W.
845	750 T. IX C	De.B.	May '43	(Udo Lehrens; Reichmann); Werner Weber	E.S. 10 Mar. '44 by EIS REICHMANN, in 55.00 N. 20.00, 20.00 & 22. EAST in 48.17 N. - 21.00 W.
846	750 T. IX C	De.B.	May '43	Reinhold Mackayen	E.S. 4 May '43 by EIS A/S in 48.00 N. - 09.00 W.
847	1000 T. IX D2	De.B.	Jan. '43	(Josef Metzler; Gur. (unborn); Robert Kerschich	P.S. 27 Apr. '45 by A/S EIS USS GARD in 28.44 N. 37.55 W.
848	1000 T. IX D2	De.B.	Feb. '43	Wilhelm Bollmann	E.S. 5 Nov. '43 by EIS A/S in 49.55 N. - 13.05 W.
849	1000 T. IX D2	De.B.	Mar. '43	R. O. Schultze	E.S. 25 Nov. '43 by US A/S, 17-18, in 08.10 N. - 05.10 W.
850	1000 T. IX D2	De.B.	Apr. '43	(Kurt Gertner); Gertner	E.S. 20 Dec. '43 by US A/S in 47.00 N. - 37.01 W.
851	1000 T. IX D2	De.B.	May '43	Johann Klingertner	E.S. possibly 20 Dec. '43 in area 47.00 N. - 47.00 W.

0000175

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CONDI.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
852	1200T. IX B2	De.B.	June '43	Heinz Eck	K.S. 2 May '44 by RAF Sq. 621 in 49.32 N. - 50.59 E. Scuttled.
853	750 T. IX C	De.B.	June '43	Helmut Sommer to Aug. '44; Froemsdorf in Aug. '44; Kuhnke to Nov. '44; Froemsdorf	K.S. 6 May '45 by USS AMBERON in 41.20 N. - 71.25 W.
854	750 T. IX C	De.B.	July '43	Horst Weither	Wined at Swinecruende 24 Feb. '44.
855	750 T. IX C	De.B.	July '43	Albert Suerenhagen; Chilean	P.S. 24 Sept. '44 by Br. A/C, A/214 in 61.00N 04.40 E.
856	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Aug. '43	Friedrich Wittenburg	K.S. 7 Apr. '44 by TG 21.15 & TU 27.6.2. in 40.19 E. - 62.55 W.
857	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Sept. '45	Rudolf Krenauer	P.S. 6 Apr. '45 by USS OBERBACH in 42.20 N. - 69.52 W.
858	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Sept. '43	Thilo Bode	Surrendered. Cape May, N.J., 14 May '45.
859	1200T. IX B2	De.B.	June '43	Johann Jabsen	K.S. 23 Sept. '44 by E5 Sub 15000000 in 05.46 N 100.04 E.
860	1200T. IX B2	De.B.	Aug. '43	Paul Jaechel	E.S. 15 June '44 by A/C from USS AMBERON in 25.27 S. - 65.50 W.
861	1200T. IX B2	De.B.	Aug. '43	Jurgen Gostch	In Trenchheim at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
862	1200T. IX B2	De.B.	Sept. '43	Heinrich Ginn	In Singapore at time of surrender of Germany. Seized by Japs and C.I. I-502.

0000176

U/B No.	TYPE	REG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
863	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Oct. '43	Dietrich von der Esch	K.S. 29 Sept. '44 by USS A/C, VB/107 in 10.45 S. - 25.30 W.
864	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Nov. '43	Rolf Reimar Wolfran	P.S. 9 Feb. '45 by HM Sub VENTURER in 60.45 N. - 04.31 E.
865	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Oct. '43	Dietrich Stellmacher	P.S. 19 Sept. '44 by Dr. A/C, S/206 in 62.20 N. - 02.30 E.
866	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Nov. '43	Walter Fommersbach; Rogovsky	P.S. 18 Mar. '45 by USS LONE in 43.18 N. - 61.03 W.
867	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Nov. '43	von Anshlundahl	P.S. 19 Sept. '44 by USS Sq. 284 in 62.15 N. - 01.50 E.
868	750 B. IX C	De.B.	Dec. '43	Dietrich Rauch; Turro	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
869	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Jan. '44	(Hauerburg); Heinrich Hauerberg.	P.S. 26 Feb. '45 by USS O'BODEN in 35.26 N. - 15.07 E.
870	750 B. IX C	De.B.	Jan. '44	(Jurgen Gesten); Rechler	Probably at Roserlucke, Apr. '45. To be cleared up by AMTY.
871	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Dec. '43	(Ruechel); Erwin Ganser	P.S. Jan. 7 '45 by Dr. A/C in Gulf of Aden
872	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Feb. '44	Gran I	Sunk 29 July '44 in air raid on Bremen.
873	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Feb. '44	Steinhoff	Surrendered. Reported in N.M., about 15 May '45.
874	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Mar. '44	Peterson IV	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.

0000177

U/S No.	TYPE	BDDY. YARD	COMB.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
875	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Apr. 1944	Frcuss	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45. Out of commission.
876	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	June 1944	(Kurt Petersen); Rahn	Possibly in Kiel area at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
877	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Feb. 1944	Alphard Winkelmann	P.S. 27 Dec. '44 by USS ST. THOMAS & HANNOVER in 46.25 N. - 36.35 W.
878	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Mar. 1944	Rodig	P.S. 10 Apr. '45 by USS VERMILION & HANNOVER in 47.35 N. - 10.30 W.
879	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Mar. 1944	Rudchen	P.S. 25 Apr. '45 by USS CHERRY in 44.30 N. - 52.27 W.
880	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Apr. 1944	Schoetzma	P.S. 16 Apr. '45 by USS CHERRY, ST. THOMAS & HANNOVER in 47.55 N. - 30.25 W.
881	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Apr. 1944	Frischke	P.S. 6 May '45 by USS HANNOVER in 45.15 N. - 47.44 W.
882	750 T. IX C	De.B.			
883	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	July 1944	Uebel	In German port by 7 Dec. '45.
884	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Apr. 1944		
885	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Sept. 1944		
886	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Oct. 1944		Poss. sunk 30 Mar. '45 by air raid on Bremen.

0000178

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. TAG	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
887	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Nov. '44		
888	1200T. IX D2	De.B.	Dec. '44		
889	750 T. IX C	De.B.	Aug. '44	Friederich Braschker	Surrendered. Cape Sable, N.S., 13 May '45.
890	750 T. IX C	De.B.			
891	750 T. IX C	De.B.			
892	750 T. IX C	De.B.			
893	750 T. IX C	De.B.			
894	750 T. IX C	De.B.			
895	1200T. IX D2	De.B.			
896	1200 T. IX D2	De.B.			
897	1200T. IX D2	De.B.			
898	1200T. IX D2	De.B.			
899	1200T. IX D2	De.B.			
900	1200T. IX D 2	De.B.			

0000179

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
901	500 T. VII C 7	V.S.	Apr. '44	Schrenk	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 14 May '45.
902	500 T. VII C 7	V.S.			
903	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.		Franzol	Arrived Messermünde after 5 Feb. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
904	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.		Irdmann	Arrived Sassnitz 28 Feb. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
905	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Dec. '45	Schwarting	P.S. 20 Mar. '45 by Dr. A/C, 9/05 in 59.42 N. - 04.55 W.
906	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Jan. '45	Pick	Ranburg? Apr. '45
907	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Feb. '44	Gabelot	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 18 May '45.
908	500 T. VII C	S.W.H.	Apr. '44		
909 through 920					Allocation, if any, of 909 - 920, unknown.
921	500 T. VII C	Rep. R		Wolfgang Leu to June '44; Werner II	P.S. 30 Sept. '44. by Dr. escorts of RA 10 in area 74.09 N.-12.00 E.
922	500 T. VII C	Rep. R		Kasselan	Arrived Messermünde after 5 Feb. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
923	500 T. VII C	Rep. R		Froemer	Sunk 13 Feb. '45 in West Baltic.
924	500 T. VII C	Rep. R		Schild	Arrived Messermünde 25 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.

0000180

U/B No.	TYPE	REG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
925	500 T. VII C	Hep. R.		Helmut Knoke	Possibly mined before reaching UK approaches, Sept. '44.
926	500 T. VII C	Hep. R.		(Wenden); Roost; Rehren	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
927	500 T. VII C	Hep. R.		(Gerhard Schaar); Juergen Ebert	P.S. 24 Feb. '45 by Br. A/C, Z/179 in 49.54 N. - 04.43 W.
928	500 T. VII C	Hep. R.	June '44	Stachler	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
929	500 T. VII C	Hep. R.		Werner Schulz	Possibly ^{sunk} off Cronheim, 6 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Army.
930	500 T. VII C	Hep. R.	Dec. '44	Mohr	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
931 through 950					Allocation, if any, of 931 - 950, unknown.
951	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '42	Kurt Pressel	P.S. 7 July '43 by Br. A/C, Z/488 in 37.40 N. - 13.30 W.
952	500 T. VII C	B. & V	Dec. '42	Oscar Curio	P.S. 6 Aug. '44 in air raid on London.
953	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '42	Karl Heinz Marbach to Aug. '44; Werner III; Steinbrinck.	In Cronheim at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
954	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '42	Geo Loewe	P.S. 19 May '43 by A/C Z/120 in 55.09 N. - 35.10 W.

0000181

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMH.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
955	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '42	Hans Baden	P.S. 7 June '44 by Br. A/C, S/201 in 45.13 N. - 08.30 W.
956	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '43	Heinz Dietrich Mohs	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 13 May '45.
957	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '43	Gerd Schaar	P.S. 19 Oct. '44 between Bodoe & Samsund by own shore battery.
958	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '43	Gerd Groth	Arrived Flensburg 29 Mar '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
959	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '43	(Herbert Loedork) Friedrich Weitz	P.S. 2 May '44 by A/C from KIS FINOER in 69.20 00.20 W.
960	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '43	Guenther Heinrich	K.S. 19 May '44 by USG VINDAOK & LINDOR & F. 19 sq. 36 & 38 in 37.20 N. 01.35 E.
961	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '43	Klaus Fischer	P.S. 29 Mar. '44 by His SHALING in 66.30 N. - 02.30 W.
962	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '43	Ernst Liesberg	P.S. 8 Apr. '44 by Br. II-7 in 45.43 N. - 19.57 W.
963	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '43	Karl Roddenburg to Aug. '44; Kneller III in Aug. '44; Rodden- burg to Jan. '45; Wentz.	K.S. Scuttled 20 May '44 off Nazaire.
964	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '43	Kammerjchann	K.S. 16 Oct. '43 by US A/C, Y/66 in 57.31 N. - 28.25 W.

000182

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMB.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
965	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '43	Klaus Ohling to June '44; Gunther Unverzagt	P.S. 27 or 30 Mar. '45 by Br. 13-21 off Cape Wrath.
966	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '43	Richard Wolf	P.S. possibly 10 Nov. '44 by A/C near Cape Finisterre, Spain.
967	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '43	Herbert Loeder to Apr. '44; Albrecht Brandt to July '44; Hans Arjen Aberbach.	E.S. c. 23 Aug. '44. (Scuttled at St. Manrier, Boulogne), after being damaged in air raid.
968	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '43	Otto Westphalen	Surrendered. Koch Kriboll, 19 May '45.
969	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '43	Max Dobbert	P.S. 6 Aug. '44 in air raid on Boulogne.
970	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '43	Hans Heinrich Ketsch	E.S. 7 June '44 by RAF P/228 in 49.15 N. - 04.10 W.
971	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '43	Walter Zeplien	E.S. 24 June '44 by HMS SANDAUSKI & CORBY Sq. 511 in 48.50 N. - 05.42 W.
972	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '43	Klaus-Dietrich Koenig	P.S. 19 Jan. '44, poss. in area 60.00 N. - 20.00 W. Surrendered.
973	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '43	Klaus Pappemoeller	E.S. 6 Mar. '44 by A/C from HMS SANDUSKI in 69.47 N. - 05.15 W.
974	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '43	Heinz Wolff; Kambitzer	E.S. 19 Apr. '44 by H.M.S. 105 UTA in 59.05 N. - 05.25 W.
975	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '43	(Aberbach); Paul Frank; Jeschke, '44; Koch I; Brauel.	In Herten at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.

0000183

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICER	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
976	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '43	Raimund Tiessler	P.S. 25 Mar. '44 by US A/C, I/248 in area 47.00 N. - 02.50 W.
977	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '43	Hans Lellich to Apr. '45; Schaeffer	Surrendered. Mar Del Plata, Argentina, 17 Aug. '45.
978	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '43	Guenther Pulst	In Trondheim at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
979	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '43	Johannes Maerneyer	K.S. 25 May '45. Scuttled off Anrun Island.
980	500 T. VII C	B & V	May '43	Hermann Dahms	K.S. 11 June '44 by ICOM Sq. 162 in 63.07 N. - 00.26 E.
981	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '43	Walter Sitch to Aug. '44; Keller	K.S. 12 Aug. '44 by mine followed by A/C, I/248 attacks in 45.35 N. - 01.28 W.
982	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '43	Werner Schwirley to Aug. '44; Hartmann	Probably arrived Hamburg 26 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Masty.
983	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '43	Weiners	K.S. Rammled in the Baltic 8 Sept. '43.
984	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '43	Hans Sieder	K.S. 20 Aug. '44 by Dr. II-11 in 48.16 N. - 05.35 W.
985	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '43	Horst Wilhelm Tiessler to Apr. '44; works to mid-Apr. '44; Wolff.	Kristiansund South 23 Oct. '44. To be cleared up by Admiralty.
986	500 T. VII C	B & V	June '43	Karl Ernst Kaiser	K.S. 17 Apr. '44 by USS HOULETT & others in 50.05 N. - 12.31 W.

0000184

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMARKS.
987	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '43	Hilmar Schreyer	P.S. 15 June '44 by HM sub SAEYR in 68.01 N. - 05.08 E.
988	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '43	Erich Dobberstein	P.S. 29/30 June '44 by A/C, L/224 & HMS BRISTOL in 49.35 N. - 03.44 W.
989	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '43	Rodler von Zoithberg	K.S. 14 Feb. '45 by Br. EB-10 in 61.36 N. - 01.35 W.
990	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '43	Hubert Nordheimer	K.S. 25 May '44 by Br. A/C, S/59 in 64.39 N. - 07.08 E.
991	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '43	Diethelm Falke	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
992	500 T. VII C	B & V	July '43	Hans Falke	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 19 May '45
993	500 T. VII C	B & V	Aug. '43	Kurt Hilbig to mid-Aug. '44; Steinmetz	P.S. 4 Oct. '44 by RAF in air raid on Bergen, 60.29 N. - 05.19 E.
994	500 T. VII C	B & V	Aug. '43	Wolfgang Ackermann; Helzer	In Trondheim at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
995	500 T. VII C	B & V	Aug. '43	Walter Kochtopp to Oct. '44; Hess	In Narvik at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
996	500 T. VII C	B & V	Aug. '43		
997	500 T. VII C	B & V	Aug. '43	Hans Lehmann	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 19 May '45.
998	500 T. VII C	B & V	Sept. '43	Hans Fiedler	P.S. May '45 in Bergen. Cause unknown.

0000185

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
999	500 T. VII C	B & V	Sept. '43	Hermann Hansen to Aug. '44; Peters	In Norwegian port by 7 June '45.
1000	500 T. VII C	B & V	Sept. '43	(Viktor Reventlow-Criminil); Willy Mueller	P.S. Mar. '45. Broken up at Stettin on or before 19 Mar.
1001	500 T. VII C	B & V	Sept. '43	Ernst Ulrich Blandow	P.S. 8 Apr. '45 by HMS FITZROY & BRON in 49.12 N. - 10.15 W.
1002	500 T. VII C	B & V	Sept. '43	Albrecht Schubart; Boos I	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
1003	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '43	Werner Straebing	K.S. 20 Mar. '45 after being rammed by HMS GLASGOW in 53.25 N. - 07.13 W.
1004	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '43	Schmelpfaanig to Nov. '44; Hinz	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
1005	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '43	Jochim Methner; Leuth	Arrived Bergen after surrender of Germany. In Br. port by 7 June '45.
1006	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '43	Horst Voigt	K.S. 16 Oct. '44 by HMS ANMAN in 61.09 N. - 04.53 W.
1007	500 T. VII C	B & V	Oct. '43	Kans Hornkohl to Feb. '45; Wicke II to Apr. '45; Raabe; Witzendorf.	P.S. 2 May '45 by A/C caroute Norway from Kiel.
1008	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '43	(Gedonhagen); Gessner; Schulz	P.S. 6 May '45 by Br. A/C, GAGE in 57.52 N. - 10.49 E.
1009	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '43	Milgendorf to Dec. '44; Schile to Mar. '45; Milgendorf.	Surrendered. Loch Kriboll about 10 May '45.
1010	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '43	Bitter II; Strauch	Surrendered. Loch Kriboll, 14 May '45.

0000186

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
1011	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '43		(Sunk on Slips in air raid)
1012	500 T. VII C	B & V	Nov. '43		(Sunk on Slips in air raid)
1013	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '43	(Gerhard Link)	Rammed U-286. Sunk 17 Mar. '44 E. of Kolberg. Taken to Swinemunde.
1014	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '43	Wolfgang Glaser	P.S. 4 Feb. '45 by HMS ICGH SAVAIG in 55.19 N. - 06.46 W.
1015	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '43	Boos II	P.S. 19 May '44 by collision in Danzig
1016	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '43	Barhardt	Arrived Lubeck, Flandersenne, 18 Mar. '45 To be cleared up by ...
1017	500 T. VII C	B & V	Dec. '43	(Reventlow); Biedten	Left Trondheim 14 Apr. '45. Unheard from ... after. Poss. sunk ...
1018	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '44	(Faber); Burmester	P.S. 27 Feb. '45 by HMS ICGH SAVAIG in 49.56 N. - 05.21 W.
1019	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '44	Rinck	Trondheim Apr. '45, Reached Br. port by 7 June '45.
1020	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '44	Berlein	P.S. by Jan. '45 - date and cause unknown - in Moray Firth.
1021	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '44	Holbert	P.S. 30 Mar. '45 by Dr. T-21 in 53.19 N. - 05.32 W.
1022	500 T. VII C	B & V	Jan. '44	Ernst	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.

0000187

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMI.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
1023	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '44	Strenger to beg. Mar. '45; Schroeteler.	Surrendered. Weymouth about 10 May, '45.
1024	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '44	Joachim Gutteck	K.S. 12 Apr. '45 by EMB LOCH GLENORU in 53.40 N. 05.02 W.
1025	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '44	Pick II	Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
1026	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '44		Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
1027	500 T. VII C	B & V	Feb. '44		
1028	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '44		
1029	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '44		Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
1030	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '44		Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
1031	500 T. VII C	B & V	Mar. '44		
1032	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '44		
1033	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '44		
1034	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '44		
1035	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '44		
1036	500 T. VII C	B & V	Apr. '44		Reported sunk near Bergen 15 Apr. '45 on experimental trial

0000188

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CONTR.	COMMANDING OFFICERS.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1037	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1038	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1039	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1040	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1041	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1042	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1043	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1044	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1045	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1046	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1047	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1048	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1049	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1050	500 T. VII C	B & V			
1051	500 T. VII C	C.K.		Von Hollahan	P.S. 27/28 J. n. 145 by THIS BLDG. WAS DESTROYED IN 52.20 N. - 05.44

0000189

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COFM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1052	500 T. VII C7	G.K.		Fritz Weidner	In Br. port by 7 June '45
1053	500 T. VII C7	G.K.		Lange VII	P.S. 15 Feb. '45 in accident in Bergen harbor.
1054	500 T. VII C7	G.K.		Rieckeberg II	Last mentioned on 18 Aug. '44. To be cleared up by Admty.
1055	500 T. VII C7	G.K.		Rudolf Meyer	P.S. 30 Apr. '45 by USS A/C, R/53 in 48.00 N. - 06.30 W.
1056	500 T. VII C7	G.K.		Schwarz I; Schroeder	Arrived Kiel, 31 Jan. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1057	500 T. VII C7	G.K.		Lueth	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
1058	500 T. VII C7	G.K.		Bruder	Surrendered. Londonderry by 17 May '45.
1059	1100T. VII F	G.K.	(May '43)	(Herbert Bruchinghaus); Guenther Leopold	K.S. 19 Mar. '44 by A/C from USS BLOOM ISLAND in 13.03 N. - 33.33 W.
1060	1100T. VII F	G.K.	('43)	Herbert Branner	K.S. 27 Oct. '44 after attacks by A/C from USS BLOOM ISLAND & Green in 65.23 N. - 12.03 W.
1061	1100T. VII F	G.K.	('43)	Otto Minrichs to Mar. '45; Jaeger	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
1062	1100T. VII F	G.K.	('43)	Karl Albrecht	P.S. 4 Oct. '44 by A/C from USS BLOOM ISLAND in 11.35 N. - 34.00 W.
1063	500 T. VII C7	G.K.	(July '43)	Stephan	K.S. 15 Apr. '45 by USS LOCH HILMAN in 58.03 N. - 03.53 W.

0000190

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1064	500 T. VII C7	G.K.		Schneidewind	In Trondheim 9 Apr. '45 Br. port by 7 June '45.
1065	500 T. VII C7	G.K.		Panitz	P.S. 10 Apr. '45 by Br. A/C in 58.05 N.-11.10 E.
1066 through 1100					Allocation of 1066 - 1100, if any, unknown.
1101	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Nov. '43	Duebler	1 May '45 to be towed to Markweerder harbor and scuttled. To be cleared up by Minty.
1102	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Dec. '43	Bell	In German port by 7 June '45
1103	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Feb. '44	Schmidt; Hans Margarita; Aversen; Riscio	20 Apr. '45 left Hamburg for Kiel. In German port by 7 June '45.
1104	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Mar. '44	Herleberg	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
1105	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Apr. '44	Schwarz	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll about 11 May '45
1106	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	July '44	Bartke	P.S. 29 Mar. '45 by Br. A/C, D/204 in 61.45 N. - 02.16 W.
1107	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Sept. '44	Farduhn	P.S. 25 Apr. '45 by Br. A/C, H/103 in 48.12 N. - 05.42 W.
1108	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Oct. '44	Wigand	In Herten at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
1109	500 T. VII C	N.W.E.	Nov. '44	von Biesen	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 11 May '45.

0000191

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1110	500 T. VII C	H. N. E.	Jan. '45	Each II	Surrendered. Loch Eridoll about 18 May '45
1111 through 1130					Allocation of 1111 - 1130, if any, unknown.
1131				Piebig	30 Mar. '45 capsized in Hamburg. 5 Apr. '45, 31 U-Plot requested U/B to be paid off. To be cleared up by Admty.
1132				Each II	Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
1133 through 1139					Allocation of 1133 - 1139, if any, unknown.
1140					26 Apr. '45 left Flies for -runsbuettel.
1141 through 1155					Allocation of 1141 - 1155, if any, unknown.
1156					Single mention 27 Jan. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1157					Possibly at Cuxhaven or Erunsbuettel. Apr. '45. Single mention 27 Jan. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1158					Single mention 27 Jan. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1159					Single mention 27 Jan. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.

C000192

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION OF R MARKS.
1160					Allocation, if any, of 1160, unknown.
1161	500 T. VII C7	(B & V)		Guenther Raabe; Curio	Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
1162	500 T. VII C7			Kramp; Eiler	Scuttled May '45 in Gettinger Bucht
1163	500 T. VII C7	(D.W.D.)	(Oct. '43)	Ernst. L. Balshahn	Reached Br. port from Norway by 7 June '45.
1164	500 T. VII C7			Esko Schloemer	K.S. 23/24 July '44 in air raid on Kiel.
1165	500 T. VII C7	(D.W.D.)	(Nov. '43)	Hans Hohmann	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 19 May '45.
1166	500 T. VII C7			Herbert Wagner; Ballert	Sunk in accident in Baltic July '44.
1167	500 T. VII C7			Hans Roeder- Pesch; Bortfeldt	Sunk in air raid on unknown port, possibly Rönneburg, Mar. '45.
1168	500 T. VII C7			Martin Grasse; Unlauf	Scuttled May (?) '45 in Flensburg.
1169	500 T. VII C7			Goldbeck	P.S. 5 Apr. '45 in Tuskar minefield in 52.03 N. - 05.53 W.
1170	500 T. VII C7			Justi	Arrived Warnemünde, before 24 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Army.
1171	500 T. VII C7	(D.W.D.)	(Apr. '43)	Nachtigall; Koopmann	In Stavanger at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
1172	500 T. VII C7			Huhlmann	P.S. 26 Jan. '45 by U.S. AVIATOR GARDNER, and others in 53.39 N. - 05.25 W.

0000193

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. TARD	CONEL.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1173 through 1190					Allocation, if any, of 1173 - 1190, with following exception, unknown. 1175 - (?) Mentioned 6 and 11 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1191	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Peter Grau	P.S. 25 June '44 by Dr. ES-1 in 50.03 N. - 02.59 W.
1192	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Herbert Geissler to Mar. '45; Meenen	21 Apr. '45, 51st U-Flot. at Hamburg announced U-1192 not worth repairing. To be cleared up by Admty.
1193	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Guse	Arrived Kiel, 7 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1194	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Moltz; Geissler	Surrendered. Cuxhaven, 9 May '45.
1195	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Schroeter II; Ernst Cordes	K.S. 6 Apr. '45 by I.C. 10.85 in area 50.38 N. 02.57 W.
1196	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Ballert	Arrived Warnemuende, 28 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1197	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		(Geissler); Lau	26 Apr. '45, possibly scuttled in Warnemuende.
1198	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Gerhard Peters	Prob. in Helgoland at time of surrender of Germany, in German port by 7 June '45.
1199	500 T. VII C	Sch. D	(Dec. '45)	Rolf Wellmann	K.S. 21 Jan. '45 by I.C. 10.85 & I.C. 10.86 in 49.57 N. - 02.57 W.

0000194

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMA.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1200	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Heinrich Mangels	P.S. 11 Nov. '44 by Br. EG-30 in 50.26 N. - 09.10 W.
1201	500 T. VII C	Sch. D		Eberhard Ebert	Arrived Kiel after 26 Jan. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1202	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Rolf Thomsen	In Bergen 7 May '45. Paid off.
1203	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Seeger II	In Trondheim 13 Apr. '45. Br. port by 7 June '45.
1204	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Jestel	Arrived Warnemuende after 22 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1205	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Sander	Arrived Warnemuende 26 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1206	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Witzke; Karl Adolf Schlitt	K.S. 14 Apr. '45 as result of damage due to grounding in 57.22 N. - 01.46 W.
1207	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Lindemann	To put out of Hamburg as transport boat 21 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1208	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Hagene	P.S. 20 Feb. '45 by HLB ANTHONYSE and PERROUX in 51.47 N. - 07.00 W.
1209	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.	(Capt. '44)	Wald Eicklenbeck	K.S. 13 Dec. '44. Struck Wolf Rock and sank in 49.57 N. - 09.47 W.
1210	500 T. VII C	Sch. D.		Gabert	Possibly at Heustadt 1 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.

0000195

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDED OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1211 through 1220					Allocation of 1211 - 1220, with following exception, unknown. 1213 - entering Pillau 30 Jan. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1221	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Aug. '43	Koelzer; Paul Ackermann	K.S. 4 Apr. '45 in air raid on Kiel.
1222	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Aug. '43	Heinz Biefeld	K.S. 11 July '44 by RBF, Sq. 201 in 46.31 N.- 05.29 W.
1223	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Sept. '43	Harold Bosuener; Kneip	Being towed to Kiel from Travemuende, 1 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
1224	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Sept. '43	Georg Preuss	As Satsuki II turned over to Jap crew in Baltic, Mar. '44. Called RC-501 by Japs. K.S. 13 May '44 by USS ROBINSON in 18.06 N. - 33.13 W.
1225	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Sept. '43	Ernst Sauerberg	P.S. before 24 June '44 Br. L/C, P/162 in 62.55 N. - 08.00 E.
1226	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Oct. '43	August Wilhelm Clausen	P.S. 23-31 Oct. '44, mine causes in vicinity 59.33 N. - 20.24 W.
1227	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Oct. '43	Fritz Altmeier	P.S. Apr. '45 in air raid on unknown port.
1228	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Nov. '43	Friedrich Wilhelm Marionfeld	Surrendered. Portsmouth N.H., 17 May '45.
1229	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Nov. '43	Armin Sinke	K.S. 20 Aug. '44 by L/C from USS DEWEE in 42.22 51.39 W.

0000196

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1230	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Dec. '43	Hans Hilbig	In Flensburg at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
1231	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Dec. '43	Lessing to Apr. '45; Wicke	Surrendered. Loch Eriboll, 14 May '45.
1232	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Jan. '44	Dobrats to Apr. '45; Roth	26? Apr. '45; possibly scuttled in Wesermünde. To be cleared up by Adat.
1233	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Jan. '44	Euhn to Apr. '45; Niencier	In Danish port by 7 June '45.
1234	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Feb. '44	Wreden	Scuttled May '45 Wilhelmshaven.
1235	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Feb. '44	Barsch	P.S. 16 Apr. '45 by USS STANTON in 47.55 N. - 30.25 W.
1236	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Mar. '44		
1237	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Mar. '44		
1238	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Mar. '44		
1239	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Apr. '44		
1240	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Apr. '44		
1241	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	June '44		
1242	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	June '44		
1243	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	July '44		

C000197

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMB.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
1244	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	July '44		
1245	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Aug. '44		
1246	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Aug. '44		
1247	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Sept. '44		
1248	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Sept. '44		
1249	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Oct. '44		
1250	750 T. IX C	D.W.H.	Oct. '44		
1251 through 1270					Allocation of 1251 - 1270, if any, unknown.
1271	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Jan. '44	Wain Knipping to Apr. '45; Reichmann	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
1272	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Jan. '44	Bernhard Leantzen; Schattenburg	Arrived Bergen by 15 May '45 from War Cruise.
1273	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Feb. '44	(Karl Heinz Voeswinkel); Anollmann.	P.S. 17 Feb. '45. Minced near Eorten.
1274	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Feb. '44	(Stenzel); Pitting	P.S. 16 Apr. '45 by EMB VICEROY in 55.30 L. - 01.25 H.
1275	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Mar. '44	Miss; Froberg	Arrived Kiel about 26 Feb. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.

000198

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS.	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
1276	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Mar. 1944	Karl Heinz Wendt	P.S. 3 Apr. '45 by Br. A/C, U/224 in 61.42 N. - 00.24 W.
1277	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Apr. 1944	Stever	K.S. 2 June '45. Scuttled off Leixoes (Oporto).
1278	500 T. VII C	V.V.	Apr. 1944	Mueller-Bethke	P.S. 17 Feb. '45 by Br. 20-10 in 61.33 N. - 00.53 W.
1279	500 T. VII C	V.V.	May 1944	Falke	P.S. 3 Feb. '45 by Br. 20/10 in 61.20 N. - 02.15 W.
1280 through 1291					Allocation, if any, of 1280 - 1291, unknown.
1292	500 T. VII C	V.V.			
1293	500 T. VII C	V.V.			
1294	500 T. VII C	V.V.			
1295	500 T. VII C	V.V.			
1296	500 T. VII C	V.V.			
1297	500 T. VII C	V.V.			
1298 through 1300					Allocation, if any, of 1298 - 1300, unknown.
1301				Feufel; Lankeit	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.

0000199

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
1302				Wolfgang Herwarts	K.S. 7 Mar. '45 by Br. EG-25 in 52.18 N. - 05.29 W.
1303				Baum	Arrived Rendsburg (?) 24 Feb. '45.
1304				Suess	Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
1305				Helmut Christiansen	Surrendered. Loch Wiboll, 10 May '45.
1306				Kiessling	Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
1307				Fischer	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
1308				Besold	Arrived Roenne 31 Mar. '45
1309 through 1400					Allocation, if any, of 1309 - 1400, unknown.
1401	500 T. VII C		B & T		
1402	500 T. VII C		B & T		
1403	500 T. VII C		B & T		
1404	500 T. VII C		B & T		Unheard of since Apr. '45
1405	Walter XVII B		B & T	Apr. '45 Rex; Mayen	Scuttled May '45 in Kiel Canal.
1406	Walter XVII B		B & T		Scuttled May '45 in Kiel Canal.

0000200

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or RETIRED
1407	Walter XVII B	B & V		Heitz	Scuttled May '45 in Kiel Canal.
1408	Walter XVII B	B & V			
1409	Walter XVII B	B & V			
1410	Walter XVII B	B & V			
1411	Walter XVII B	B & V			
1412	Walter XVII B	B & V			
1413	Walter XVII B	B & V			
1414	Walter XVII B	B & V			
1415	Walter XVII B	B & V			
1416	Walter XVII B	B & V			
1417 through 1500					Allocation, if any, of 1417 - 1500, unknown.
1501	750 T. IX C	De.B.			
1502	750 T. IX C	De.B.			
1503	750 T. IX C	De.B.			
1504	750 T. IX C	De.B.			

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
1505	750 T. IX C	Da.B.			
1506	750 T. IX C	Da.B.			
1507 through 1999					Allocation, if any, of 1507 - 1999, unknown. Numbers above 2000 probably allocated for type XXI and XXIII boats.
2058	XXI ?				Sank 3 Nov. '44 due to constructional defects. Later salvaged and towed to Flensburg.
2318	XXIII ?				Whereabouts not known as of 7 May '45. Discussed to be in Kiel area.
2321	228 T. XXIII	(DAB)		Borchdies	In Kristiansund South at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
2322	228 T. XXIII	(DAB)		Hackel	In Stavanger at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
2323	228 T. XXIII	(DAB)		Angermann	Possibly sunk in Baltic Sept. '44 by Ar. To be cleared up by Minty.
2324	228 T. XXIII	(DAB)		Hase to Har. '45; von Kapoard	Arrived in Bergen after surrender of Germany, May '45.
2325	228 T. XXIII	(DAB)		Schneider	In Kristiansund South at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.

0000202

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
2326	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)	Aug. '44	Schlachthof; Jobst	Surrendered. Dundee, 14 May '45.
2327	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Mueller IV to Apr. '45; Pahl	Hamburg, 29 Apr. '45. Paid off? To be cleared up by Admty.
2328	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)	Aug. '44	Lawrence	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
2329	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Schlott	In Stavanger at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
2330	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Beckmann	In Kiel area, 22 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
2331	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Pahl?	P.S. Oct. '44 in diving accident in Baltic.
2332	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Bornkessel	Hamburg? Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
2333	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Baumann	Scuttled, early May '45 in Lauenburg.
2334	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		(Pahl); Angermann	In Kristiansand South at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
2335	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Benthin	In Kristiansand South at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
2336	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Vockel to Apr. '45; Klummeier I.	German port by 7 June '45.
2337	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Behneack	In Kristian sand South time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
2338	228 T. XXIII	(DWH)		Kaiser I	P.S. 4 May '45 by Sr. ... W/236 in 59.33 N. - 09.50 E.

0000203

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
2339	223 T. IXIII	(DWH)		Wormann	To be cleared up by Adnty.
2340	223 T. IXIII	(DWH)		Klukmeier II	K.S. 30 Mar. '45 in air raid on Hamburg.
2341	223 T. IXIII	(DWH)		Boehm	In German port before 7 June '45.
2342	223 T. IXIII	(DWH)		Fuchschen; von Schad	Lost in Baltic, possibly Swinsmunde, prior to 29 Apr. '45.
2343	223 T. IXIII	(DWH)		Falkendorff	Scuttled early May '45 in Gottinger Bucht.
2344	223 T. IXIII	(DWH)		Allerlage	Rammed and sunk on 13 Feb. '45 by U-2356 in 54.17 N. - 11.45 E.
2345	223 T. IXIII	(DWH)		Steffen	In Stavanger at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2346	223 T. IXIII	(DWH)		von der Hoeck to Apr. '45; Hungen	Arrived Eocna, 3 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
2347	223 T. IXIII	(DWH)		Ulting	Scuttled in Gottinger Bucht early May '45.
2348	(223 T.) (IXIII)	(DWH)		Goschzik	In Stavanger at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2349	(223 T.) (IXIII)	(DWH)		Mueller II	Arrived Hamburg 1 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
2350	(223 T.) (IXIII)	(DWH)		Schauer	In Kristiansund South at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2351	(223 T.) (IXIII)	(DWH)		Bruckner	Left Hamburg for Kiel about 21 Apr. '45. In German port by 7 June '45.

0000204

U/S No.	TYPE	REG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
2352	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Budzyn	In Rostock, 24 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
2353	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Hillmann	In Kristiansand South at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2354	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Wex	In Kristiansand South at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2355	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Franke	To be cleared up by Adnty.
2356	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Kartel	In German port by 7 June '45.
2357	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Heinrich II	Scuttled early May '45 i. Flensburg.
2358	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Brown	Scuttled early May '45 in Gettinger Bucht.
2359	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Bischoff	P.S. 2 May '45 by Br. 2/3 in 57.29 N. - 11.24 E.
2360	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Schroback	Rostock 24 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
2361	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		von Kennig; Kanting	In Kristiansand South at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2362	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Czekowski	Scuttled early May '45 in Gettinger Bucht.
2363	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Frahn	In Kristiansand South at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2364	(228T) (XXIII)	(DWH)		Heesen; Kungen	Scuttled early May '45 in Gettinger Bucht.

0000205

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COIN.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
2365	(2267) (23111)	(DWH)		Korfmann	P.S. 5 May '45 by Br. A/C, L/311 in 57.27 E. - 10.38 E.
2366	(2267) (23111)	(DWH)			Hamburg? Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
2367	(2267) (23111)	(DWH)		Schroeder	Hamburg? Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
2368	(2267) (23111)	(DWH)			Scuttled early May '45 in Gettinger Nacht.
2369	(2267) (23111)	(DWH)			Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg
2370 through 2500					Allocation, if any, of 2370 - 2500, not known, with following exceptions: 2370 and 2372 to be cleared up by Adnty.
2501	16007 XXI	B & V		Enebechen	Working up in Baltic out of Kiel July '45. Hamburg? Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
2502	16007 XXI	B & V		Lannemann to Apr. '45; Franke	Arrived Br. port from Horton after surrender of Germany.
2503	1600 T. XXI	B & V		Tiesler; Waechter	P.S. Scuttled 5 May '45 in 55.11 E. - 11.11 E.
2504	16007. XXI	B & V		Christiansen	Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven May '45.
2505	1600 T. XXI	B & V		(Christiansen); Diess	To be towed to German harbor and scuttled 1 May '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
2506	1600 T. XXI	B & V		von Schroeter III	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2507	16007. XXI	B & V		Siegmund	Scuttled early May '45 in Gettinger Nacht.

0000206

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS.
2508	1600T XMI	B & V		Christiansen?	Nov. '44 towed after salvage to Muervik base. Flensburg, Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
2509	1600 T. XMI	B & V		Schendel II	K.S. 8 Apr. '45 in air raid on Hamburg.
2510	1600 T. XMI	B & V		Herrmann	Possibly scuttled 26 Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Admty.
2511	1600 T. XMI	B & V		Schnae	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2512	1600 T. XMI	B & V		Hordheiner II	In German port at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2513	1600 T. XMI	B & V		Hungards; Topp	In Horten at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
2514	1600 T. XMI	B & V		Wahlen	K.S. 8 Apr. '45 in air raid on Hamburg.
2515	1600T. XMI	B & V			British say sunk 11 Mar. '45 in air raid on Hamburg yet in Horten 7 May '45 according to traffic.
2516	1600T. XMI	B & V		Kallipka	P.S. Apr. '45 in air raid on Kiel.
2517	1600T. XMI	B & V		Hansen	Left Hamburg 23 Apr. '45 for front line operation. To be cleared up by Admty.
2518	1600T. XMI	B & V		Weidner II	Arrived Br. port from Norway by 7 June '45.

0000207

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YRSD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
2519	1600T. XXI	B & V		(Hohmann); Gremer	Left Hamburg for Kiel as transport boat 20 Apr. '45. Unheard of thereafter. To be cleared up by Admty.
2520	1600T. XXI	B & V		(Dopp); Schendel II; Schubart.	Decommissioned (?) 29 Apr. '45(?). To be cleared up by Admty.
2521	1600T. XXI	B & V		Kethner II	P.S. 5 May '45 by Br. A/C, K/547 in 56.23 N.-10.57 E.
2522	1600T. XXI	B & V		Giedt	Scuttled early May '45 in Gettingerucht.
2523	1600T. XXI	B & V			P.S. Jan. '45 in air raid on unknown port.
2524	1600T. XXI	B & V		von Mitseniorff	P.S. May '45. Scuttled in Wilhelmshaven.
2525	1600T. XXI	B & V		Otto I	Travemuende, 27 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
2526	1600T. XXI	B & V		Hohmann II	Possibly scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Luesbeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Admty.
2527	1600T. XXI	B & V		Goetze	Poss. scuttled in Travemuende area late Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
2528	1600T. XXI	B & V		Curio	Possibly scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Admty.
2529	1600T. XXI	B & V		Malicke or Teufel	In Kristiansund South of time of surrender of Germany - May '45.

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
2530	1600T. XXI	B & V			Sunk Mar. '45 in air raid on unknown port.
2531	1600T. XXI	B & V		Hless	Poss. scuttled in Trave- munde area late Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
2532	1600T. XXI	B & V			
2533	1600T. XXI	B & V		Quentner	Poss. scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 in Travemuende- Luebeck area. To be cleared up by Admty.
2534	1600T. XXI	B & V		Wolff II; Drews	P.S. Scuttled end of Apr. '45 in Travemuende Roadstead.
2535	1600T. XXI	B & V		Bitter	Poss. Scuttled late Apr. '45 in Travemuende Road- stead. To be cleared up by Admty.
2536	1600T. XXI	B & V		Voegel	P.S. Scuttled in Trave- munde-Luebeck area late Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
2537	1600T. XXI	B & V			
2538	1600T. XXI	B & V		Klapdor	Poss. scuttled late Apr. '45 in Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Admty.
2539	1600T. XXI	B & V		Jewinski	To be cleared up by Admty.
2540	1600T. XXI	B & V		Schultze	P.S. Scuttled end of Apr. '45 in Travemuende Roadstead.

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
2541	1600T. XXI	B & V		Stellmann	Scuttled early May '45 in Gettinger Bucht.
2542	1600T. XXI	B & V		Fiebschen	P.S. 31 Apr. '45 in air raid on Kiel.
2543	1600T. XXI	B & V		Stolzenburg	Arrived Kiel 15 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty
2544	1600T. XXI	B & V		Keinelschmidt	Scuttled by 5 May '45 in Kiel? To be cleared up by Admty.
2545	1600T. XXI	B & V		von Buelow	Poss. at Kiel, 19 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
2546	1600T. XXI	B & V		Dobbert	To be cleared up by Admty.
2547	1600T. XXI	B & V		Heimann	1 May '45: to be towed to Markwaarder Harbor and scuttled.
2548	1600T. XXI	B & V		Utischill	To be cleared up by Admty.
2549	1600T. XXI	B & V			
2550	1600T. XXI	B & V			
2551	1600T. XXI	B & V			
2552	1600T. XXI	B & V		Rudolf	Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
2553 through 3000					Allocation, if any, of 2553 - 3000, unknown.
3001	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Vogel I	Possibly at Wesermünde, 27 Apr. '45.

0000210

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YEAR	COIN.	COMMANDING OFFICERS.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
3002	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Menseck; Kaiser II	Possibly scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 in Lubeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Admty.
3003	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Kregelin	K.S. 4 Apr. '45 in air raid on Kiel.
3004	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Thurmann in Feb. '45; Paschel	1 May '45 to be towed from Markwaerder Harbor and scuttled. To be cleared up by Admty.
3005	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Sitek; Hinrichs II	Possibly scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 at base Wesermuende. To be cleared up by Admty.
3006	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Linder II; Fischer IV	Scuttled May '45 in Wilhelmshaven.
3007	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Menseck	Ordered to go to Kiel, 11 May '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
3008	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Schleamar	Arrived Kiel c. 14 May '45.
3009	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Schimpf	Possibly scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 at base Wesermuende. To be cleared up by Admty.
3010	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Moert III; Topp	Poss. Scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 in Lubeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Admty.
3011	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Tinschart	Poss. scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 in Lubeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Admty.

0000211

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COIN.	COMMANDING OFFICERS.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
3012	1600T. XII	De.B.		Kloevekorn	Possibly scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3013	1600T. XII	De.B.		Simmermacher	Poss. scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3014	1600T. XII	De.B.		Harbach	Poss. Scuttled end Apr. '45 in Travemuende -roadstead. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3015	1600T. XII	De.B.		Grau II	Scuttled early May '45 in Gattinger Wucht.
3016	1600T. XII	De.B.		Kaentzen; Peter	Poss. scuttled in Travemuende area late Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3017	1600T. XII	De.B.		Linischau	In Eorten at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
3018	1600T. XII	De.B.		Breinlinger	Possibly in Kiel area early May '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3019	1600T. XII	De.B.		Packy	25 Apr. '45; To be broken up to get engine parts for other boats. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3020	1600T. XII	De.B.		Kaewiller	Poss. scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3021	1600T. XII	De.B.		von Hoeteron	Poss. scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Adnty.

0000212

U/S No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS.	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
3022	1600T. XXI	Da.B.		Weber	In Stranderbucht 22 Mar. '45. Possibly at Kiel 1 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3023	1600T. XXI	Da.B.		Harms	Poss. scuttled in Trave- munde Bondstead 26 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3024	1600T. XXI	Da.B.		Blzich	Poss. scuttled in Trave- munde Bondstead 26 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3025	1600T. XXI	Da.B.		Vogel II	Poss. scuttled 26 Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Trave- munde area. To be clear- ed up by Adnty.
3026	1600T. XXI	Da.B.		Drescher	Poss. scuttled 26 Apr. '45 in Travemunde Bond- stead. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3027	1600T. XXI	Da.B.		Mehne	Poss. scuttled 26 Apr. '45 in Travemunde Bond- stead. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3028	1600T. XXI	Da.B.			Left Rosermunde 6 Mar. '45, possibly for Wick. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3029	1600T. XXI	Da.B.		Utischill; Dunby	Arrived Kiel 31 Mar. '45 To be cleared up by Adnty.
3030	1600T. XXI	Da.B.		Luettmann	Poss. Scuttled in Trave- munde Bondstead (XXI) end of Apr. '45.
3031	1600T. XXI	Da.B.		Sachs	To be cleared up by Adnty.

0000213

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMD.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
3032	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Slevogt	P.S. Scuttled end of Apr. '45 in Travemuende Roadstead. (?)
3033	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Carlsen	Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
3034	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Wellney and/or Wellner	To be cleared up by Adnty.
3035	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Gorke	Reached Br. port by 7 June '45 from Norwegian waters.
3036	1600T. XXI	De.B.			
3037	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Emmermann	Poss. scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3038	1600T. XXI	De.B.			Possibly at Kiel Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3039	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Ruperti or Wieth	Possibly at Bremen, Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3040	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Roberts	Possibly at Bremen Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3041	1600T. XXI	De.B.		Kornhold; Ruperti?	In Ertzen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
3042	1600T. XXI	De.B.			
3043	1600T. XXI	De.B.			In Bremen 20 Apr. '45. Possibly scuttled.

0000214

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMPL.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
3044	1600T. XXI	De. B.			
3045	1600T. XXI	De. B.			
3046	1600T. XXI	De. B.			
3047	1600T. XXI	De. B.			Poss. scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 at U-base Wesermünde.
3048	1600T. XXI	De. B.			
3049	1600T. XXI	De. B.			
3050	1600T. XXI	De. B.			Poss. scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 at U-base Wesermünde.
3051	1600T. XXI	De. B.			Poss. scuttled 26 th Apr. '45 at U-base Wesermünde.
3052	1600T. XXI	De. B.			
3053	1600T. XXI	De. B.			
3054	1600T. XXI	De. B.			
3055	1600T. XXI	De. B.			Possibly in Bremen Apr. '45. Prob. not yet commissioned by 3 Feb. '45.
3056	1600T. XXI	De. B.			Possibly in Bremen Apr. '45. Prob. not yet commissioned by 3 Feb. '45.

0000215

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CONH.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
3057 through 3500					Allocation, if any, of 3057 - 3500, unknown.
3501	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Kuenster	Possibly at Waermunde, 27 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3502	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Schultz	Bremen, 1 May '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3503	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Otto II; Deiring	P.S. 5 May '45 by Br. A/O, 0/26 in 56.45 N.-11.52 E.
3504	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Siebold	Wilhelmshaven, 14 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3505	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Willner	K.S. 3 Apr. '45 in air raid on Kiel.
3506	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Tractor	1 May '45 to be towed to Harbuerder harbor and scuttled. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3507	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Schley; Klothmann	Poss. scuttled 26/ Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travenmunde area. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3508	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		von Lehsten	K.S. 30 Mar. '45 in air raid on Wilhelmshaven.
3509	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Voswinkel to mid war. '45; Franko	Slightly damaged in air raid on Kiel, 5 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3510	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Schwarley	Scuttled May '45 in Luebeck.
3511	1600T. XXI	Sch. D 7		Katela	Poss. scuttled 26/ Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travenmunde area. To be cleared up by Adnty.

0000216

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS
3512	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Hornkohl	P.S. 8 Apr. '45 in air raid on Hamburg.
3513	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Nachtigall	Poss. scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3514	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Fritze	In Bergen at time of surrender of Germany - May '45.
3515	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Buscher	Arrived Br. port from Norway after surrender of Germany.
3516	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Wengel to Herrie	to Apr. '45; Poss. scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3517	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Huenster	Poss. scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3518	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Braemning	Kiel, end Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
3519	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		von Harpe	K.S. 2 Mar. '45 by mine near 54.15 N.-12.04 E.
3520	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Gallert, Senior	K.S. Mined 31 Jan. '45 in Bokernboerde.
3521	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Keller II	Poss. scuttled into Ger. '45 in Travemuende area.
3522	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Lanzmann	Poss. scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Luebeck-Travemuende area. To be cleared up by Adnty.

0000217

U/B No.	TYPE	BUILD. YARD	COMB.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
3523	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Mueller III	P.S. 5 May '45 by Br. A/C, T/224 in 56.06 N.-11.06 E.
3524	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Witt	Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
3525	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?			Arrived Travemuende after 20 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
3526	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Hilbig II	Scuttled early in Flensburg, early May '45.
3527	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Kronenbitter	Poss. scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Wesermuende.
3528	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Searg	Poss. scuttled 26? Apr. '45 in Wesermuende.
3529	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Schmidt	Scuttled in Flensburg early May '45.
3530	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Brauel	Poss. sunk 3 Apr. '45 in U.S. air raid on Kiel. To be cleared up by Admty.
3531	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?		Bergner	In Kiel after 26 Mar. '45.
3532	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?			Apparently in Danzig early Mar. '45. To be towed to Helm 9 & 10 Mar. '45.
3533	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?			Arrived in Kiel, 29 Mar. '45.
3534	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?			Arrived Kiel, 29 Mar. '45.
3535	1600T. XXI	Sch. D ?			To be launched at Danzig 15 Mar. '45. Seized by Russians?

0000218

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
3536	1600T. XII	Sch. D ?			To be launched at Danzig 15 Mar. '45. Seized by Russians?
3537	1600T. XII	Sch. D ?			To be launched at Danzig on 25 Mar. '45. Seized by Russians?
3538	1600T. XII	Sch. D ?			To be launched at Danzig on 25 Mar. '45. Seized by Russians?
3539	1600T. XII	Sch. D ?			Danzig, Mar. '45. To be towed to Hamburg area.
3540	1600T. XII	Sch. D ?			Danzig Mar. '45. To be towed to Hamburg area.
3541	1600T. XII	Sch. D ?			To be launched at Danzig, 15 Apr. '45. Seized by Russians?
3542	1600T. XII	Sch. D ?			To be launched at Danzig 15 Apr. '45. Seized by Russians?
3543 through 4301					Allocation, if any, of 3543 - 4301, unknown.
4302					Left Gdynia, 14 Mar. '45. Destination unknown.
4303					Left Gdynia, 14 Mar. '45. destination unknown.
4304 through 4700					Allocation, if any, of 4304 - 4700, unknown.
4701	225 T. XVIII			Weickmann	Left Rosane for Berns- munde, 3 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by ...

0000219

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CORPS.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
4702	225T. XXIII			Seeliger	Scuttled in Flensburg early May '45.
4703	223 T. XXIII			Scholz	Arrived Warnemuende 18 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
4704	223 T. XXIII				Probably arrived 28 Mar. '45, in Kiel. To be cleared up by Adnty.
4705	223 T. XXIII			Eyzen	Hexoe, 31 Mar. '45.
4706	223 T. XXIII			Schneider	In Kristiansund South at time of surrender of Germany, May '45.
4707	223 T. XXIII			Leier	Scuttled May '45 in Flensburg.
4708	223 T. XXIII				
4709	223 T. XXIII				
4710	223 T. XXIII			Frenleburg	Scuttled early May '45 in Gettinger Licht.
4711	223 T. XXIII			Maier	To be cleared up by Adnty.
4712	223 T. XXIII			Dohlfing	Kiel, 3 Apr. '45. To be cleared up by Adnty.
					With 4712 the U-boat series by numbers ended, as far as is known.
				Loonig	E.S. 26 Dec. '42 in No. Atlantic. No info as to what U/B Loonig commanded.

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMB.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
--OTHER U-BOATS TAKEN OVER BY GERMANY--					
U-A		(G.X.)		Arco-Zinneberg; Georg Peters.	Arrived Eckernfoerde 2 Feb. '45. Originally built for Turkey - Batiray. To be cleared up by Admty.
U-3					Former KMS SEAL, not mentioned in 1944. (Lying derelict at Kiel Apr. '45). To be cleared up by Admty.
U2-1					(Old Norwegian sub. Pillau '42).
U2-2					(Old Norwegian sub.) Baltic, '45.
U0-1					Ex-Danish boat. Not mentioned since 2 Mar. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.
U2-2					Ex-Danish boat. To be cleared up by Admty.
U2-1					Ex-Dutch boat. Not mentioned in 1944. To be cleared up by Admty.
U2-2					Ex-Dutch boat. To be cleared up by Admty.
U2-3			(June '41)	Riegale	Ex-Dutch boat. Toss. in Kiel, 1 Mar. '45. Not mentioned since 24 July '44.
U2-4				Schaefer	Ex-Dutch boat. Arrived Eckernfoerde 2 Feb. '45. To be cleared up by Admty.

000221

U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	CONS.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
UB-5				Mahn	Ex-Dutch boat. Possibly in Kiel area, 26 Apr. '45.
UB-2					Ex-French boat. Not mentioned since 29 June '44. To be cleared up by Admty.

--ITALIAN SUBMARINES TAKEN OVER BY GERMANY--

Akira 1331 T. #1				ex-Italian TRUSSARDI	P.S. late May '43 in Bay of Biscay, poss. by A/C.
Akira 1051 T. #2 U-12-23				ex-Italian WERNER; Schaefer to Feb. '44; Striegler.	A.S. 15 Feb. '44 by Sr. sub in 04.33 W. - 100.12 E.
Akira 951 T. #3 U-12-24				ex-Italian G. WILHELM; Heinrich, while	In Japan at time of surrender of Germany. Seized by Japs. Became I-507.
Akira 1331 T. #4 U-12-21				ex-Italian WILHELM; Friedrich Steinfield	Destroyed by Germans 25 Aug. '44 in Bordeaux.
Akira 941 T. #5				ex-Italian BIBERICO	P.S. late June '43 en-route Japan from France, off Cape Finisterre (47)
Akira 1036 T. #6 U-12-25				ex-Italian WILHELM; W. Werner Striegler to post. '44; Schmidt to Oct. '44; Schmidt to end Nov. '44; Weber.	In Kobe at time of surrender of Germany. Seized by Japs. Became I-504.
Akira 800 T. #7				ex-Italian WILHELM	A.S. 15 Apr. '43 by U.S. A/C, W-83 in 04.00 W. - 31.20 N.

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U/B No.	TYPE	BLDG. YARD	COMM.	COMMANDING OFFICERS	FINAL DISPOSITION or REMARKS.
Akira 1036 #8	T.			ex-Italian DA VINCI	K.S. 23 May '43 by HMS ACTIVE & NESS in 42.10N. 15.40 W.
Akira 1031 #9 U-IT-22	T.			ex-Italian ANTONIO BIGNOLINI; Karl Wunderlich.	K.S. 11 Mar. '44 by So. African A/C in 41.28 S.- 17.40 E.
U-IT-1					La Spezia May '44.
U-IT-2					La Spezia, 20 May '44.

—JAPANESE SUBMARINES—

I-8	2600 T.			Cover Names - FLINDER; FRANIA	Made one round trip between Japan and Europe, in '43.
I-29	2600 T.			Cover Names - HAKU; KIMBA.	K.S. 25 July '44 by USS SAMFISH in Luzon Strait.
I-30	2600 T.			Cover Name - KINOSHIMIZU	P.S. before 22 Oct. '44, possibly by a mine in Singapore Harbor.
I-52	2533 T.			Cover Names - HOKI; TAKI; FUKI; GIMBATSU	K.S. 24 June '44 by A/C from USS SCORP in 15.16 N. - 39.55 W.

Appendix III to Volume I

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS

A. U-505 (HEMO), captured June 1944.

The need for a U/B library in the Atlantic Section of 20G was more than satisfied with the decision to house even the non-crypto and non-communications U-505 documents in 20G, where the secrecy of their source could best be safeguarded. The Atlantic Section assumed the responsibility for translating and disseminating information from Hemo documents under the limitations imposed by the Top Secret classification, subject to the direction of COMINCH (FX-01, COM 10th Fleet). The classification of translations which carried no reference either to source or to enemy codes and ciphers was subsequently reduced to Secret.

The processing of Hemo documents was inserted into the Atlantic Section's regular routine for handling U/B Ultra intelligence at a time when the decryptions of German Naval radio traffic had approximately tripled in volume as a result of the wholesale breakdown in German landline communications which came with the Allied Invasion of France. Although adequate personnel were not available for an exhaustive treatment of the documents,

matters of current interest, including technical documents, were translated and distributed. The speedy exploitation of the documents in the interest of supplementing U/B Ultra intelligence was of course 20 G's first aim. Priority was given to those items which were of particular concern to Cominch Combat Intelligence (F-21). Among the items which received immediate attention were the documents on the U/B Grid cipher ("Adressbuch" and "Schluesselheft F"), Standing War Orders of Comsubs, T-V acoustic torpedo, Schnorchel, Elektra-Sonne radio beacons, and radar interception gear.

Amount of U-505 Material

Approximately 1200 items appear on the catalogue of U-505 documents. Two-thirds (800) of these items were made up largely of technical drawings and charts (navigational and grid). The document library was based on the remaining 400 items. The rough classification adopted for the original inventory of these 400 documents showed the items divided as follows:

Torpedoes	15%
Radio Communications (operational & technical)	12%
Codes & ciphers	13%
Manuals for the C.O., orders, etc.	4%
Ship and A/C recognition	3%

Ships logs, receipts, & papers	10%
U/B technical documents (including periscopes, diesel & electric machinery	27%
Navigation	13%
Miscellaneous (personal, etc.)	3%

Statement on Amount Translated

U/B Standing, Operational, and Current War Orders,
including appendices: 103

U/B Communications War Orders: 41

Documents (including technical, on Schnorchel,
Elektra-Sonne, Bold, GSE) and U-505 war diary 20

Method of Processing

- a) Initial cataloguing
- b) Photographic duplication of selected documents and
charts
- c) Binding of one photographic copy as duplicate
library copy
- d) Classification and appropriate library routine
- e) Translation from originals according to priority
list (concurrently with the above)
- f) Duplication of translations, distribution.

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Distribution: (Following the initial dissemination of a complete catalogue of documents on hand)

- a) To GC & CS England (photographic copies or originals: grid charts, crypto and communications documents, all technical documents of current interest not already held by Admiralty)
- b) To F-21 (Cominch Combat Intelligence) (Translations)
- c) To FX-01 (Com 10th Fleet) (Translations)
- d) To OP-16-Z (OHI) (Notices of translations available)
- e) To OP-20 (translations of all U/B Communications War Orders)
- f) To Atlantic and Pacific Fleet headquarters and all U.S. Submarine Commands: (Communications and Operational U/B War Orders)

Technical sections of the U.S. Navy received material of interest to them, both in the original and in translations, via FX-01 and OP-16-Z.

B. Admiralty Pinches

With the Allied Invasion of France captured documents became a major business, involving all parts of the Allied organization. As documents were received in England GC & CS kept 20G currently informed via the "Accession lists", with separate listings

of German code and cipher material. The Atlantic Section of 206 expanded its library facilities to include a running check on the accessions in England, noting duplications of items already held here from the U-505 and requesting copies of any documents which seemed of particular value, in addition to the code and cipher material which was requested via the Atlantic Section by our cryptanalysts.

C. Restoration of Ex U-852 Water Soluble Documents

An interesting problem in the exploitation of captured material was presented as the result of the abandonment of a sinking U/B, U-852, in coastal waters in May 1944.

The U-852 was attacked by A/C on 2 May 1944 in 10.35N 52.00E and was closed on 3 May by HMS Falmouth. The burning and sinking U/Boat was abandoned by her crew off Cape Guardafui. Eight days later a diver recovered 8 secret communications publications wrapped in an ordinary tablecloth. Of the 8 documents 5 had been printed in water soluble ink on special paper and their contents could be ascertained only from such vestiges of the titles as had not been printed with soluble ink. All documents were forwarded to Admiralty and were subsequently included in the Pinch accession list of 26 May 1944 (received

in OP-20-3-GI-A on 21 June) with a notation concerning the disappearance of the text.

Samples of undissolved water-soluble paper taken from the U-505 in June were sent by the Atlantic Section of 20G to Army chemists in Arlington Hall (Col. McGrail). Experiments on dissolution of text and subsequent restoration were successful in overcoming the closely printed lines of "jammer" in the special paper. The Atlantic Section then requested that GC & CS forward the dissolved U-852 documents, which British experiments had failed to restore.

Although the Army chemists had produced a satisfactory recovery of text in the U-505 samples after duplicating the effects of prolonged immersion in salt water, their initial work with the dissolved U-852 documents was disappointing. By straining the eyesight beyond all normal expectations it was possible to distinguish only a few words here and there on the photostatic reproduction of the page which had been subjected to chemical treatment. After several weeks of continued experimentation the resourceful Army chemists hit upon a slight revision of the hitherto "standard" method. A chemical solution was discovered whose action on the dissolved originals was such as to allow a

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photostatic reproduction which was almost entirely legible, unmarred by the lines of jammer that had blocked earlier efforts. All the material was subjected to the new method and approximately 90% of the text recovered. Both ZOG and the British expressed their pleasure at the final result.

The documents thus recovered were processed by the Atlantic Section in their German form and forwarded together with the originals and photostats to GC & CS. A study of the contents indicated that translation would prove valuable not only to GI-A but also to CinCPac and Frupac. Up to this time Ultra intelligence had not provided complete information on German communications procedure in the Far East. The increasing German interest in this area provided a corresponding increase in information via U/B traffic, but the background, including the relation of U/B communications to surface ship communications, was incomplete. By combining the U-852's "East-Asia" documents with past and current U/B Ultra it was possible to set up a fairly complete folder on German Far East communications and keep it up to date. Copies of this revised GI-A edition were sent to CinCPac and Frupac.

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Contents of ex U-852 documents

- I. Communication Order for East Asia Area with Appendices 1, 2, and 3.
(The basic order and the first 2 appendices had not been printed in water soluble ink.) Appendices 1 and 2 were brought up to date by Ultra; appendix 3 was furnished entirely from Ultra.
- II. Cipher Instructions "Himati"
(for surface ships)
- III. Short Signal Book "China"
(Code for surface ships; "PPP" signals.)
- IV. Radio Instructions "Kirschbluete"
with Appendices 1, 2, and 3 for U/Boats.
- V. German-Japanese Communication Agreement with
Appendices 1, 2, and 3.
- VI. Cipher Instructions "Sumatra".
(For joint German-Japanese Naval Communications.
Recovery of the substitution alphabets for "Sumatra"
was materially assisted by reading of Japanese Naval
Attache traffic.)
- VIII. Indicator-group list for Supply Ships.

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