PARK

HATFIELD THE CODEBREAKERS FRIEDMAN US- 67977

that er.. carried the liquor.

HAPE ROLL: 25

SHOT 132/1 - WIDE ANGLE

MRS. FRIEDMAN, U.S. CRYDTANACYST.

BRUCE:

FRIEDMAN: The Prohibition Amendment in the States was passed in 1919. For a very

washington. recorded. Why did the rum-runners start using codes? few years the em.. rumrunners er.. really personally arranged all of their plans for smuggling in liquor and it was more or less of an individual venture. But as it broadened and the operations began to.. became larger and involved more people and more ships, more boats, em. they had to take to using em.. code to use the general term. Em.. in 1924 was the first time that I was called in to attempt to solve the rum-running codes that were in use on the East Coast; in the meantime there was a tremendous development on the West Coast .. the Consolidated Exporters Corporation of Vancouver sent out what we called "mother" ships - very large ships which could carry as much as er.. 60,000 cases of liquor, would stop at a certain place, the Pacific, and stay there for months at a time until all their liquor was dispensed to what we call "intermediate" boats which were medium-sized, maybe carrying 15,- 20,000 cases; and then those intermediate ships would be met at sea by speedboats dashing out from shore and taking small quantities which were actually individual orders from liquor-dealers on shore. Em.. from the solution of their own messages we learned that they were starting - this was in 19.. around 1928 - they were starting to use wireless in er. instead of ordinary, the other means of communications. And er. from then on the ramifications in the er. code and cipher were enormous; er. they had even private codes of 10,000 groups made for them and their own meanings written in to these codes. Em.. they were well-trained; they had somebody who knew about the busines of solution of codes and ciphers because they were instructed never to include any plain text messages at all which.. in other words if er. somebody on a big ship needed a new pair of shoes or one of the messages I can remember was about Andrew losing a glass eye - all those types of messages were put in code and cipher so that there would be no hint of breaking in from that sort of gateway which was opened up. Er.. well it kept on growing more and more .. more complex and er. . the operations er. . became much more frequent and finally we had a fleet of em.. intermediate sized week vessels which were plying back and forth all the way from Nova Scotia to Belize, British Honduras. Er. this is all

general matter, it has .. the I'm Alone was only one of many of the ships

SMOT 132/1 contd.

BRUCE:

Gen. geog. layout of where these boats were operating and what they were doing FRIEDMAN: Well er.. the er.. the operation on the East Coast.. the rum-running vessels were smaller boats and it was usually between individual operators and an individual ship and an individual rum-runner or rum-saller on shore. Fr.. on the Eest Coast the operations were very large and magnified into three classes of vessles were taken in; by that time the large mother ship which stood way out at sea; the intermediate ship which carried our supply of liquor for maybe a number. perhaps as many as 8, 10, 12 liquor dealers on shore who were ordering this and then when they the intermediate ship reached a certain distance from shore a speedboat would go out and pick off an individual order of liquor for an individual liquor dealer, on land.

RUCE:

Describe complexity of linked codes between different kinds of ships. FRIEDMAN: Well they had a really very well organised, large operation of wireless. There were perhaps a dozen of the intermediate sized ships; say there were two mother ships that had come out from Canada with the main supply; then there might have been a dozen or more of the intermediate ships; they ould have other codes and ciphers between them. Exem For example er.. the intermediate ship named RAGNE had its code with the mother shipp the Corizel had its code with the mother ship and so on down the line; all these intermediate ships. So that em. em. we could actually graph where the ships were by the code they were using. So that we could almost draw a map of where these ships were at a given time and where their landing place would be where they would go to unload the liquor onto the smaller speedboats from shore. We could tell where they were going by the messages that went back and forth, between the mother ship and the intermediate ships. And that was true both in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Coast. Around New York there was always more or less independent rings that operated. In the case of the I'm Alone it was.. what's a good word for it.. it was a wingth singular case. The I'm Alone came out from Nova Scotia and er.. loaded with liquor, and started for the Gulf of Mexico. From there she went to Belize and loaded again and came back to the Gulf of Mexico. And it was about.. almost a year or perhaps a little more than a year when, after those operations began, before the I'm Alone was sited in the Gulf of Mexico. And then happened all the things that you want to know about, I guess.

SHOT 132/1 contd.

BRUCE: ,

Tell me why you were brought in to help the coastguards.

FRIEDMAN:

Well I have sometimes said as if it were a jest but it's literally true. My husband was a very, very famous and known to be the most skilful man in the world practically at that time in the solution of codes and ciphers whether they were done by hand, the messages were done by hand or whether they were done by machine. Because he was a genius at analysing machines. And er. so when the Treasury Dept. tried to find someone who could start in a consistent operation of reading these smugglers! messages em. they tried to get him, but he was very well occupied with the Signal Corps and the Army at the time and didn't want to leave his work so karkers they took me; so my story is, and it is true, that I was frequently called in to do things because they couldn't get my husband. So they took me.

BRUCE: FRIEDMAN:

What problems initially & why the coastguards had to call you in at all?
Well they had no-one. There was no department of Government that had any means of doing this type of work except er,, the Signal Corps of the Army. And of course they couldn't take this on because there was much too much else to do; they were covering the whole national and international field of communications of every kind. So someone had to start somewhere. CUT: RUN OUT OF FILM

CAM. ROLL 36. TAPE ROLL: 26

SHOT 132/2 MID-SHOT

BRUCE:

Why coastguards called you in?

FRIEDMAN:

MS

The Coastguards had to call someone in because er. they were frequently getting messages em. passing between, for example, the Bahaman and the Florida Coast. Between individuals in the two places. There were messages coming in from Cuba to Florida and back again. These were.. could be.. had to be treated singly because these were small individual operations and then later when the thing became of such size that boats to carry the liquor were employed, both all around New York and Florida and the Caribbean, they began to use formalised systems, not just what John Jones thought up in Cuba to use for a cipher and he had a confederate in Florida and they talked a system to each other. It became such an organised thing that there er. . were really em. . veey.. very well constructed cipher and code systems. Both of which were developed and in order to follow it em. there finally had to be built up a section of people at Coastguard Headquarters and I was.. in fact I argued the Government into setting up xxxxxixix such a section. But it meant I had to take young people and train them from the start because there were very, very very few people in the United States who.. outside the military services, who were capable of doing anything of that sort.



## SHOT 132/2 contd.

BRUCE:

What was the immediate result as far as the coastguards were concerned, of your activities?

FRIEDMAN:

Well the Coastguard, by the knowledge that they gained from messages, which were sent in cipher or code, were able many times to catch the boats ar ships that were coming in around New York and through this part of the coast. Er. and the men in the coastguards themselves er.did a certain amount of preliminary training by me were able, as soon as they intercepted the wireless messages, were able to reduce them to plain language and so there were many, many catches made that wouldn't otherwise have been made. And then, of course, there was this tremendous development on the West Coast em. which went all the way round the United States in the end. And I secured a small group of young college graduates in analytical science who were trained by me in the ski cipher principles and from then on we were a working unit and the final authority for all the things that nobody else could do on the spot, we did here, and of course conveyed the results to the operators in the coastguard and the coastguard went on and operated from there; catching the people in the act as it were.

BRUCE:

Describe kind of codes that rumrunners were using?

FRIEDMAN:

Well er. the er. big companies on the West Coast that had several large ships er. operating at what we called "mother" ships at sea, had someone build for them a private. what we called "private" code - a codebook, well, more or less like this, perhaps larger; 10,000 groups and it would contain only the subject matter that would apply to their particular profession. They weren't. they were confident not to use that without something additional being added to it, so there was cipher added to these groups from this codebook which had been created especially for a particular company. They added cipher and er. it might be a simple cipher, it might be a very complicated cipher. But em.. the messages were always picked up by our radio operators, always in the country, em. and then they were given to an office, somewhere locally, who had been supplied the solution for a particular system from my office in Washington. And from there they would go on; I was sent to the West Cost in 1928 togo up and down the coast and train a number of people in solution of the code and cipher that the rumrunners were using.

SHOT 132/2 contd.

BRUCE: Would you say that by this time the rumrunners had become professional in their security?

FRIEDMAN: Yes they were, they were. For one thing, they never, never put any plain text in their messages, which could possibly be a clue to break in. as one message read - there were some very amusing ones - the mother ship in Vancouver saying:

"Send Andrew a new glass eye". There was another messages, I remember, once coming from Vancouver to one of the big ships at sea and it said: "Inform second wife. second mate wife has given birth to twins" and back came the message all duly encoded in cipher, two or three or four or five steps.

Second mate had no wife .. so we got a few win laughs, as we went along!

But they were security-conscious to the extent that they never sent anything in plain language although it had to be something personal about somebody in the crew or that sort of thing. They were still made to be very careful. And they used the same group of vessels; big vessels would have a different. they might have the same basic code, but they would have a different form of encipherment that applied to that code with each of the different intermediate ships that came out from shore.

BRUCE:

How did you first become involved in the I'm Alone Case?

FRIEDMAN:

Well, the I'm Alone was was known about as a .. as a small..small.. I've forgotte the correct term - schooner, I guess. Which had been fitted out in Nova Scotia, in the autumn of 1926. And er.. loaded with liquor in Nova Scotia and started down the coast and into the Caribbean and there had a rendez-vous with the ships from shore. Er.. she went on to Belize, British Honduras and loaded with ·liquor there and came back to the Gulf and did not return to Canada. After the first journey her operations were all between Belize, British Honduras and the Gulf Coast. There the I'm Alone would come in to shore; inside, say ten or twelve miles of shore and there are some islands around there and she would have rendez-vous. And em.. the speedboats would dash in to shore and the I'm Alone would return to sea. Er., we never had any messages er.. from the I'm Alone - they never came into our possession at all; so far as we knew the I'm Alone could have been operating without sending any messages intracking inter ship and shore because none of them had ever been intercepted. Now there is a very good reason why we didn't intercept them; they used cable er..the messages finally came into my hands because I was called to Texas to decipher messages er.. hundreds of them .. in about 5 or 6 cases that were pending in the Southern district of Texas. And among.. they were messages which had been sub-poenaed from the Western Union office in New Orleans. Then.. er.. after I had sifted out all those that applied to the cases pending in Texas, I was left.

4

SHOT 132/2 contd.

FRIEDMAN; Ixx .... with a group of messages that had no connection with the Texas messages; the Texas messages had all been sent by .... I'm probably not using the right technical terms.. but it was wireless, calls, they transmitted back and forth wireless calls; in this case the messages were transmitted to cable addresses. They were actually sent by cable, not by wireless. RUN OUT OF FILM

### CAM. ROLL 37: TAPE ROLL 27

### SHOT INEX 132/3

BRUCE: Distinguish between wireless and cable messages.

FRIEDMAN: In 1928 I was called to Texas to work out some testimony which consisted, of course, of some solution of cipher messages in the cases of about six groups of smugglers on the coast of Texas and there was literally a truckful of messages · subpoenaed from the Western Union offices in New Orleans. Most of those were simply transmitted by wireless addresses, calls in other words, instead of addresses. However, there were 23 messages turned up in that group which were em. addressed and signed by actual registered rexult cable addresses. And the other end of the messages, New Orleans being one end, the other end of SHIL the messages was New York City. The cable addresses used were CARMELHA for RXX Belize though that wasn't stated on the messages, CAMMELHA and MOCANA in New York. I was perfectly convinced that these messages could have nothing to

do with the cases going on in Texas so I came back through New Orleans and gave this series of 23 messages to em. . the Supervisor and Customs Agent in New Orleans At that time they meant nothing to him. I realised that they were based on

Bentley's Code and a simple cipher had been applied to the code groups - it was just an additive really; they added five places or five numbers to a given group and substituted the meaning that was five places removed. There was also a number of groups, 5 letter groups in these 23 messages, which came from the private

supplement of this code and em.. they obviously stood, as always in run-running messages, was for names of people and names of liquors and em.. perhaps some

kind of abbreviated direction or order. So I turned them over to the supervising Customs agent in New Orleans and he had no idea at the time as to what they could refer. But a few days later he had occasion to er.. be shown by the State

Department er.. the manifest from the ship I'm Alone on the numerous journeys that she had made from Belize up to the Gulf of Mexico and he almost jumped out

of his chair like a shot when he saw that the numbers that I had put in as it. an actual solution of a message .. of a message from code plus this added

cipher er.. that the numbers of bottles that were ordered fit exactly the manifest of the I'm Alone. So em. this supervising Customs agent went to .... Shot 132/3 contd.

FRIEDMAN:

45

... New York .. went to the Hotel McAlpine where the Western Union operator had been sending and receiving these messages but the Western Union operator said that he had never seen the man who'd received the messages - they were always delivered by telephone. SoMr. Shamart got a grand jury assembled and em. . had this telephone operator on the Western Union subpoenaed and he appeared before the Grand Jury and he had to tell the name of the person who had registered these addresses. His name was said to be Jospeh H. Foran, and er.. he was said to be living at an apartment on the 5th Avenue. So armed with that much knowledge and nothing else, because er. Mr. Shamhart and the two men he took with him who were sheriffs or somebody in the district attorney's office, had no ida who they were looking for - they had no idea what man he was, what name he had, what he looked like or anything. So they waited in the er.. reception room of this hotel until two men came in who looked as if they might be run smugglers or bodyguards and then they told them they were arrested. Whereupon the bodyguard sprang out some guns and the Customs men were not armed but it ended amicably and em.. the apartment there was searched and it er.. definitely proved the evidence they found there which was too numerous to go into. Proved that they were connected with er.. with this operation.. between well..well the operations that were related in the messages that I deciphered, and turned over the to the supervising Customs agent, in New Orleans. But em., you want me to go on with the story?

BRUCE:

Explain MOCANA...

FRIEDMAN:

ON S

=

Well although I know nothing about er.. the er.. em.. international negotiations that were going on; you see, Canada had within 5 days after the sinking of the I'm Alone in the Gulf of Mexico in March 1929, Canada had sued the United States for a quarter of a million dollars to pay for the ship.. the loss of the ship and the cargo. And em.. er.. the er..

Well, it was keriane obvious that, at least to me, that the CARMELHA. it was just almost too obvious CARMELHA was a rem pronouncable number of letters made up from C.A. Melhalo Bros. Belize, British Honduras. They were the people who supplied all the liquor, for the Gulf of Mexico smugglers. Er. so that seemed quite obvious. Then I started to think about the cable address MOCANA and it seemed it to me that it was obviously meant ultimately for Montreal, Canada, MOCANA. by le ving out the TREAL of Montreal and the DA of Canada, it was very clearly Mocana, so that was . got us all into the locale and the negotiations between the United States and Canada had been going on for some time because an international tribunal had been appointed right after the I'm Alone was sunk. And Canada had issued this claim of damages for im.dollars

SHOT 132/3 contd.

FRIEDMAN:

So em.. from then on it was a question of finding the rest of the people who were involved in the case. This was Dan Hogan whom the supervising Customs agent had arrested in New York.

BRUCE:

Describe what the messages told you?

FRIEDMAN:

Well they talked almost exclusively about liquor .. The messages talked www. almost exclusively of liquor; some were long messages, some were short; among the short messages was one that said: "Radio operator no good" and later another message that said: "Have no radio operator abourd; cannot send or received messages". And that gave clues that people could run down and tie in with the I'm Alone and all that. Then we had to get the.. the study of the manifest and the kinds of liquor that were boarded em..on the I'm Alone in Belize we were able to determine meanings for these em.. groups which you could make up yourself and put your own meanings in and that's called a supplement to a commercial code. And all commercial codes have them.

BRUCE:

FRIEDMAN:

Customs people had no idea what I'm Alone was in fact, just had feeling? Yes, exactly. The Customs people had feelings, but they had absolutely nothing and found nothing to corroborate that, in all of their searches, until after these messages. Then they began making more er. . searches, and one of the interesting things in connection with that ... RUN OUT OF FILM

CAM. ROLL XX: TAPE ROLL XX

SHOT 132/4

BRUCE:

Tell me about indictment of Hogan....

RIEDMAN: Well, the.. Hogan was arrested under the assumed name because at that time the Customs agent were nt quite sure who he was - they had had a feeling all along that the vessel was American owned but they had absolutely no way of proving it. Well they had this man and er.. he was indicted and charged er.. and his bail was set at something like 40,000 dollars which he produced with without a murmur and went free for a while. Then as they found out more and more - they found, in searching that apartment, for example, on Fifth Avenue, they found a licence number of a car which was a Louisiana licence number and they'd found a train schedule er.. which operated between a small town in Louisianaz and New Jersey. Well the Customs men had a pretty good idea that one of the ways they operated was loading thousands and thousands of cases in bails of chicken hay if you please and shipping them up to New Jersey, before they were disposed of.

INTERVIEW: MRS. FRIEDMAN

SHOT 132/4 contd.

MRS. FRIED AN: So sooner or later em... Dan Hogan, and I've fogotten what name he was using at that time, was arrested in connection with another case in New Orleans, and at that time he couldn't post bail - there'd been another case where he had posted bail but that was in Norfolk. Then there was another case and he couldn't post bail and he went to prison. So then they dropped Dan Hogan for a while, the Customs agency people searching, and concentrated on getting the other man, because they kept hearing whispers about a Jim Clark. They didn't know him either, they didn't have any description of him except that he was called Big Jim - that gave some idea of what he was. Well about the time.. Hogan had served one sentence.. and er.. was.. got out of prison er.. they had found Jim Clark and he had been thrown into prison. This was like a cat and mouse thing, for a couple of years - they'd have Clark and Hogan would escape, they'd have Hogan and Clark would escape. So it went on and on and on. It was just one of these tussles. However they finally got Hogan on such a serious charge that he was in jail, in the Federal Penitentiary at the time of the final hearing, of the International Tribunal here in Washington in 1934 and 35.

CUT BECAUSE OF CHIMING CLOCK

### SHOT 132/5

BRUCE: International crisis...

FRIEDMAN: Well, when the I'm Alone was first sunk there was a tremendous furore all over the world. The British Press was full of query and condemnation; even the United States Press was horrified - I remember a very prominent editorial in a Washington paper which had a headline in letters two inches high: "Prohibition Gone Mad" and so then this intermational tribunal was appointed which exexited consisted of Supreme Court, Sir Lionel.. . Duff who was the .Chief Justice in Canada and of Justice Van der Benner of the United States Sufreme Court. And they held hearings over the years and many were the arguments going on and on, year after year, about what constituted international waters; from time immemorial maritime law has said three milesfrom shore but Canada had signed a treaty with the United States because of Prohibition that a twelve mile limit should be set up, in these cases. But Canada sort of repudiated that after the I'm Alone was sunk and there were claims made that the I'm Alone was not in international waters. Figuring from the three mile limit, but that she was within an hour's sailing distance and you're Extitive entitled to do hot pursuit .. I'm using a wrong term but I can't think of the right one.. hot pursuit which means that you can chase a vessel that is within an hour's sailing distance from shore.

SHOT 132/5 contd.

FRIEDMAN:

Well these questions went on concerning the two.. the Department of External Affairs in Canada, and the State Dept. here for years and years. meantime all these things had been going on; Hogan had been arrested under the name of GORDON somewhere and he had done one of his prison sentences, Clark had been arrested and was in jail for a while until the Government gave him immunity that he would talk, and he did talk at great length; and so all the years went on, the evidence piled up and they were still arguing about hot pursuit and international waters. And finally the whole matter came to a wind-up in Dec. and January of '34 and '35. At that time I testified -I made a affidavit before and I testified before the Justices - it was really a kind of an interesting episode in my life because I walked up and down in Ifront of the table .. table, bench or whatever that the two Justices were sitting behind and spread out my messages and showed them exactly every step that I went through. And they were just as itched.? as two ten-year old boys - I think it was their first meeting with codes and ciphers. And then it was decided - the case was finally decided by the Justices, that the ship was American owned and not Canadian owned and they awarded Canada 25,000 dollars for sinking the British flag and another 25,000 dollars to reimburse the crew manufax members of the I'm Alone for their personal belongings, which

BRUCE:

FRIEDMAN:

in CU

X X S . O.

Give me the statement about codebreaking.

had been sunk when the ship went down.

The value of codebreaking cannot be over-estimated it seems to me, because while we knew we were missing thousands and thousands and thousands of chances to make catch somebody er. when we did make a catch it was a really big one and er. quite important: it might have been as much as 60,000 cases in one catch. And that was usually er. happened because we had read the messages beforehand and knew that whatever names the ships might be called by er. the study and the knowledge of the ships that were coming in out of New York, New Jersey, New Orleans ports, the West Coast ports, and when Prohibition was repealed there were, oh I can't even name the number, but there were thousands upon thousands upon thousands of cases that never came to trial, because there was just too great a mass of them and they were good cases, they would have been won, because the evidence was irrefutable.

BRUCE: Same again: IN LONG SHOT

FRIEDMAN: Well I would say the value of codebreaking in Prohibition was er. very great indeed - I don't think that it had anything to do with the repeal of the Prohibition Amendment. I think that was just a pressure from every side, because finally the United States Government realised knext that it's the kind of thing you can't enforce; and so I don't think the codebreaking, had anything to do with the repeal but it certainly was em. very, very important in catching some of the leading operators who became big-time crime em. syndicate heads xxxx afterwards. A few of them were out of business, not all of them, by any means but I think the. well I really can't even comprehend what might have been the situation had there been no solution of code and cipher during those years.

Figuran: Well I feel sure myself that er.. a far greater percentage of the operators in the field were caught than went loose. Thousands and thousands of them were caught -.... RUN OUT OF FILM.

### TAPE ROLL 29: CAM. ROLL 39

### SHOT 132/6

BRUCE: Succinct statement about the value of codebreaking...

FRIEDNAM: Well er.. I don't suppose anybody ever sat down and figured it out in dollars and cents but I know that in one case a ship triedto escape er.. the coastguard by going up the Hudson River to New York but she was stopped at Albany and em.. her cargo was worth a million dollars on that one ship. And I never sat down and tallied the amounts of liquor that were said to.. were shown to be in these deals - em.. that we learned about through cipher and code messages, but em.. I dare say that if amounted to anywhere from 50,000 dollars a month to several million dollars a year. That meant not only the codebreaking of course; the codebreaking was only a part of the whole operation, of catching and running down the rum-runners.

cale. Ly

Well I think there's no boubt about the codebreaking leading to thousands of people being caught and er. if they were caught and jumped bail er. it was a very rich return to the United States Treasury. for example the two Raeffel brothers who owned the Conexco Corporation in Vancouver and all their big ships, were caught right after the repeal of the Prohibition Amendment, were found in Seattle, Washington overthere on some business or other - and they were arrested and the United States asked for a quarter of a million dollars bail and got it. And they went back to Canada and wever returned for any trial.

XMXXXXXXX

# INT: MRS. ERREDMAN


IN TO CU SHOT

BAUCE:

Tell me about the messages you discovered?

FRIEDMAN:

In the 1928,.. 1929 trip that I made to Houston, Texas to solve messages in connection with five or six cases going on there, I came across these 23 messages and em. I knew at once that they could have nothing to do with the cases in Texas, first because they had cable addresses instead of radio calls. Secondly reading the.. solving the cipher, at a simple cipher additive to Bentleys code groups I could read the great body of the text in the messages and it was very, very clearly dealing with shipments of liquor, out from Belize and in to the Lousiana coast so that the er. the messages were really the basis, they were the solid rock on which the whole development of the I'm Alone case thereafter had to go along that line, because that was indisputable and if we hadnet found these code messages, we might not have resolved the I'm Alone case.



Mrs. Friedman is regarded on the greatest ever civilian U.S. codebreaker.

INTERVIEW: POWELL

THE CODEBREAKERS

BRUC 56250/8330

CAM. ROLL 39: TAPE ROLL: 29 contd.

SHOT 133/1

TO CAM. R

BRUCE:
POWERLL:

What kind of problem did Prohbition create for the coastguards? Certainly the most immediate and pressing problem was due to the fact that er.. the rum-running had taken on such broad aspects for the time that the coastguard were assigned to the task.. the primary task of preventing er.. the trade afloat. Er.. that looms above all others immediately. There was much discussion as to what agency of the Government would carry out this responsibility; I believe that it is true that it was assigned to the Navy or at least expected to be assigned to the Navy and I believe the Navy manoeuvred out of it in some respects or other and so little sister, Coastguard tranxxx took over the job. Now the Coastguard did not have the vessels, they did not have the personnel; er.. they did not have the basis established - we had the surf station and the life-saving stations and we had a few large cutters. We had nothing like the necessary equipment, for combatting this trade. That's the big problem. Now, of course, we ran into problems all the way along. The rum-runners very soon adopted the practice of coded messages and that gave us some additional problems. We had to have an intelligence service to break these messages down. We em. . had to have facilities of other

We had to have these bases and er. we had contract for large numbers of vessels from various contractors and er. the trade was entirely new for us even though we'd been enforcing customs throughout the life of the coastguard. This was something new and these people did have their business well established, thoroughly established, and they had been right free, you know, to carry on this trade and they had acquired a lot of affluence and with more affluence they could make it more difficult for us. I think that answers your question, perhaps.

sorts. We had to have the small bases; the district headquarters just were

placed along the coast from which the fleet could operate. And er.. we had

too large and too infrequent along the coast. And we had to have bases,

trouble with our own personnel ....

INT. MR. POWELL SHOT 133/1 contd.

Bauch:

What kind of men were the rum-runners?

POWELL:

The rum-runners, I expect, ranged over the full category of individuals. We had some high-class people, I think, who were running rum. I think Captain Randall was of that calibre. He was an adventurer and he had er.. involved himself in some questionable deals, there's no doubt about that, but I think he had the instincts of a gentleman. He was a most interesting man to talk to - he'd had so many experiences over the world, had Polar expeditions and so forth and he was most interesting to talk to. Now we had some burly bums also who were of that class, you know; these shipmasters, they wanted good seamen but they couldn't always get them and in emergency they would take on what they would .. could get . But they ran the whole gamut I think. Good people and people who were not good people. They were what we would call high-class people, such as Captain Randall, and some of them were very, very low-class. Most of them in positions of importance on these vessels were right shrewd now, I'll tell you that.

## CAM.ROLL:40. TAPE ROLLX3 30

SHOT 133/2

BRUCE:

Describe the activities of the rum-runners.

POWELL:

majority of them I think were auxiliary sailing vessels; though we had some steamers, we had some without mechanical power, but most of them were auxiliaries. Some of them were ship-shape vessels, maintained in an excellent condition, many of them were quite bedraggled and er..disreputable looking and even dirty.inside. And they put out, I think, the largest number

of these vessels, perhaps, from Lunenberg, Nova Scotiż. Belize, Honduras might have been second; Yarmouth had a good many of them; Digbytown, St. Pierre had some and many other ports.. the ports.. Canadian ports up about the Bay

of Fundy....were heavily involved in this, and I think the vast majority of them came from that xixi vicinity. Er. it was typical of the rum-runners

that they didn't seem to have any definite objective in view as to the

The rum-runners.. the rum-running vessels were wark a varied lot. The vast

movements of their vessels; though we understood perfectly that they did have a definite objective but the movements of their vessels did not indicate it.

They would sail off in many directions; when approached, they would sometimes. drop anchor and pull up anchor without any apparent reason. We would frequently detect some radio messages, incoming and outgoing, before they

carried out one of these manoeuvres of heaving up anchor or changing course or something of this kind. And er.. they er.. would frequently come in to a

position quite well off the coast ....

SHOT 133/2 contd.

POWELL:

... as far as the danger of being apprehended was concerned; probably 15 or 16 miles most of the time, even a little further maybe for some of the better vessels. And there they would hang around as we found from approaching at various times; they would hang around and shore vessels would come out to pick up cargo; in fact we got many photographs of something of that kind going on. And er. . other vessels, where they had a more sophisticated set-up I think, would tell the vessels to come out at certain times to certainppositions and if they didn't make contact at the time and the place specified, they would return to shore and get fresh orders, new orders. That was the practice of them; it was typical of these vessels that they would not set a course and hold to it for a long time. Now there were some exceptions: now the I'm Alone was a decided exception. But so many of them were not of the calibre of the I'm Alohe. It was much smaller and the discipline was not so tight on most of them as it was .. in fact, it was very slack on many of them. The master of the I'm Alone did maintain excellent discipline; he was undoubtedly a skilful navigator; that could be determined from the slight changes that he made in his course and certain other indications; he was an excellent navigator, there's no doubt about that. And however, some of them were very slack in their navigation; I think they just meandered along in the ocean until they came to something they could identify and put in. But not so the I'm Alone.

BRUCE:

POWELL:

Describe what the I'm Alone looked like & what she was doing?

The I'm Alone was a 2-masted auxiliary schooner, having very graceful lines, a very trim appearance; scrupulously clean and as I think I said before a high degree of discipline maintained on the ship; we used to call it among ourselves the "Battleship Discipline". The I'm Alone linesk as I say, were very, very graceful, I think with just a few changes she could have been made into a beautiful sailing yacht. And er. she was a vessel of considerable size, I think about 120 feet long with a beam of perhaps 18 - 20 feet; she undoubtedly had considerable cargo space; er. I would think that her gross tonnage would be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 250 tons.

BRUCE:

POWELL:

Describe ruses that rum-running vessels got up to to confuse you?

They resorted to many ruses. I think the most common .... The rum-runners resorted to many ruses. I think the most common, however, was to er.. leave no light showing except the stern light and then to suddenly obscure that light in some manner or other - perhaps they would turn a switch or perhaps they'd put a kx cleek over it or something; and suddenly there was no light. And that can be confusing not when the weather's fine and everything going along good, but when

WHOT 133/2 contd.

POWELL:

...the sea is rough and when the watch is changing; at such times as that it can put one out. On one occasion the I'm Alone not only ditched - that's a term that we used - ditched her stern light but simultaneously she put overboard a lighted buoy. We had light. you know, when the light on the stern went down, the sea would obscure that. We frequently lost sight momentarily of that vessel. on that occasion I was trailing her on this occasion and she er. evidently eid put this buoy overbeard and I was on the bridge myself - there was a change of watch just after midnight I believe. And I suddenly found our vessel piling up fast on this light and it occurred to me, of course, very soon that it was a buoy - an improvised buoy put overboard.

N.

RUCE:

Describe ship-to-shore radio & how rumrunners operated it?

POWELL:

The ship-to-shore radios er..carried out a very necessary function for the rumrunners. Whenver the weather, or whenever the coastguards interfered with them they could very easily re-establish their schedule for operations and I think it was essential for them. Very few of them of any importance attempted to operate without radio. They had some very good op. radio operators and all .. most of .. all of this radio communication was in code. They used various types of codes; but I think the simple substitution was probably the most common and next would come, would be the simple transposition and we had some dry graphic substitutions which we did have some instances of double transposition ciphers which are the most difficult of all to break down. Mrs. Friedman did wonderful work in this respect, breaking down these codes.

RUCE:

Can you tell me how Mrs. F. was brought in?

POWELL:

I cannot tell you the details of that. I know that the Army, of which Col. Friedman was a member of the military service, the Army, er. the Army was very co-operative with the Coastguard and at one time they er. there were various times. they loaned the services of Col F. to er. the coastguard. I believe Mrs. F. became immensely interested in this work. this cryptographic work. and my understanding that ther e. she was probably the leading cryptanalyst in the country at one timem about the time of the I'm Alone incident. That was my impression - I can't vouch for it.

We to

INTERVIEW: POWELL

CAM. ROLL 41: TAPE ROLL 31

SHOT 133/3

POWELL:

BURCE: How did Mrs. F's codebreaking activities help the Coastguard?

Mrs. Friedman's codebreaking activities were most helpful to the Coastguard, I think in two distinct respects. First they the help they gave the Coastguard in tracking down and apprehending the rumrunners er..to go over that in just a few words doesn't do justice to the immesne job that that presented the Coastguard finding these messages in code and while we developed our intellegience service it wasn't highly developed at the time and the Army had probably been, I think, pre-eminent in codebreaking in the Government and Mr.. Col. Friedman being in the Army, Mrs. Friedman taking to this, just like a duck to water, I think, was most helpful to the Coastguard. Now the second manner in which this helped us so much was in bulwarking our cases after one of these crask crask came in was in building up a case history and they could only do that through code-breaking. You could not do it otherwise in most instances, and Mrs. Friedman did most of this work for us in that respect at the high level.

SHOT 133/4

POWELL:

Will !

BRUCE: How did codebreaking help the coastguards?

The first and most important, I reckon, to us was the help they gave us in running down these vessels, finding them and knowing what they were talking about; what they planned to do and where they planned to go; when they planned to make contact And all of those things. That's the first, I think, and most important probably to the Coastguard. But when a crew was apprhended and brought into the United States court it always made us feel so much better to have a case history of what these vessels had done, how they had eluded is many times and gotten many loads in which we knew nothing about at the timebbut we learnt a bit later through codebreaking and through positions and so forth sent by code. Those were the two broad categories in which the breaking down of the codes helped the Coastguard.

SHOT 133/4 contd.

Describe 2nd incident when you were involved in tracking the I'm Alone? BRUCE: POWELL: The second occasion of tracking the I'm Alone, that is, by the Dexter, the vessel that I commanded, was unexpected in its inception and we were lying in the base at Pascagouda, Mississipi; on March 20th 1929 we had vessels at sea; we also had vessels in stand-by status; the Dexter was neigher at sea nor on stand-by; but we were ordered out late in the afternoon and we sailed about 5.30. I was informed that the Wolcott had picked the I'm Alone wi up within territorial waters and had maintained contact with the I'm Alone continuously since that time. I looked into these matters before I left the base. And er.. I steamed out and we had a little engine trouble which delayed us some but er.. we er.. corrected that trouble and after 8 or 10 hours we were able to proceed on full speed in a south-south-westerly direction. I had the position which the Wolcott had last sent in and I laid out this course in a south-south-westerly direction and we steamed on that Wednesday night and all day Thursday frequently/changing positions with the Wolcott. And we continued steaming on substantially the same course Thursday night until about 8 a.m. Friday the 22nd. About that time we had exchanged, the Wolcott and the Dexter had exchanged the morning latitude sites and after plotting the position which the Wolcott had given to me and I already had mine plotted of course - it looked as though we ought to be in sight of each other and I made some comment to that extent, .. in that direction. And our radio man who had brough the message up from the Wolcott was out on the starboard wing and he said: "I see something to starboard, on the starboard beam now" and that turned out to be the Wolcott and the I'm Alone. I appears approached the two vessels and I conferred with the Wolcott briefly just to reassure myself that everything was in order. And after conferring with the skipper of the Wolcott I proceeded up rather close alongside the I'm Alone, probably 20, 30 yards off. The sea was soer what rough and er. I er. I ordered the master of the I'm Alone to stop his vessel, indicating that I wished to board his vessel. And he indicated that he would not do so. These messages continued on for some little time, sometimes by signal, maybe semaphor, maybe international, maybe just by megaphone. But it became clearthat er.. the captain had no intention of stopping his vessel and I fired a blank orsaluting shot at the bow. I believe I fired several of those shots. And no change of attitude appearently on the part of the Ekipper of the I'm Alone.

change of

SHOT 133/4 contd.

POWELL: I directed some shots into the rigging and on the main deck and after a while I er.. stationed several responsible men on the wing of the bridge with rifles within that were Springfields 1930 I belive they were, and they're not very fast firing contrary to what er.. the Captain Randall said in his book.. wrote in his book. They were not fast firing at all. And we proceeded, I think, to apply a progressive force - we wanted him to stop his vessel, we didn't want to shoot it out from under him. But under the circumstances there was nothing else to do. Forced boarding was wholly impractical because of the state of the sea, and Captain Randall could see that in his original statement on this matter. So we just had to use the force that we had which was gun-fire and I shot .. directed my sheels in through the hull, above the water-line. It was a long time before i brought myself to firing below the water line. But eventually I had to do that. The last shell that was fired tore a large hole in her side, and she settled quickly then and went down.

BRUCE: Can you tell me how were and the I'm Alone and what happened?

BRUCE: Can you tell me how were any the I'm Alone and what happened?

POWELL: I put out from Pascagoula on the 20th March 1929 and proceeded in a general sout-westerly direction..south-south-westerly it was, and reached the I'm Alone and the Wolcott about 8 a.m. on the 22nd and after doing everything reasonable to induce the skipper to heave to, to allow us to board him, I applied progressive force beginning with saluting xxxxx shells and proceeding on to solid shells into the rigging of the deck and above the waterline. And continued on till we pumped solid shells into the hull below the waterline. Which doesn't take long to send her down. The crew jumped overboard .... RUN OUT OF FILM.

# APE 32: CAM. ROLL 42

SHOT 133/5

BRUCE: Tell me about chase of I'm Alone & what happened?

POWELL: I was informed that the Wolcott had picked up the I'm Alone.. this was common knowledge around the base.. had picked up the I'm Alone off of Trinity Shoals quite close in, within territorial waters and that afternoon, rather late, I was given some preliminary information to the effect that I would be sent out to sea. And about 5.30 I did sail on this mission to intercept the Wolcott and the I'm Alone. The I'm Alone.. the Wolcott had been unable to apply sufficient force to the I'm Alone to induce the master to stop his vessel or board him because his gun jammed. But he did maintain contact and trailed the vessel along.. ch, several hundred miles, I believe and I sailed Thursday night in this south-southwesterly course.. Wednesday night, I sailed again all day Thursday and Thursday night until about 8 a.m. Friday morning. At which time the Wolcott and the

SHOT 133/5 contd.

.... Dexter exchanged their morning positions sites, north star sites. And er.. they were very close together and I just remarked there when I plotted them both on the chart that we ought to be able to see the vessels at that time. And my radio man picked them up immediately there... I think it was sort of simultaneous. And I approached the vessels and conferred briefly with the skipper of the Wolcott; he assured me that the I'm Alone was picked up within territorial waters; that he had maintained constant contact with her, therefore pursuing the doctrine of hot pursuit which was very essential in this matter. If you don't have "hot pursuit" you haven't got any case in this at all. He assured me of those things and then I went along close..rather close alongside the I'm Alone, 20 to 30 yards off, I expect; having her on my port beam. I called upon the master to heave to for boarding and he indicated that he would not submit to boarding. I.. we used some signals - I don't recall how many; I think we used international signals and semaphor in addition to megaphone. and he repeatedly indicated that he would not submit to boarding and in fact at times he said "You can sink me if youwant to but you can't board me". We had no course to follow other than to apply such force as we had and we did and in view of the condition of the sea we could not carry out a forced boarding. So we directed gunfire at the I'm Alone, sending across her bow saluting charges which are the equivalent to blanks; and later sending some saluted charges into the rigging and maybe on deck and then following that with solid shots and coming on down we put some solid shots into the hull above the waterline; and following that we put solid shots into the hull below the waterline. The last shell - I think about 50 or 60 were fired - tore a large hole in the side of the vessel and she settled quickly - the crew all jumped overboard including the captanin - they jumped overboard - they'd thrown a few boards or something see one - we passed heaving lines out to them - one of our heaving lines carried especially far and out of them, all those that came aboard the Dexter grabbed onto that one line although we had four or five others out there. Describe value of codebreaking in fighting Prohibition?

BRUCE:

POWELL Codebreaking was essential in anything like satisfactory operations against the rumrunners. Without it we could not have carried on operations at all satisfactorily. We used code to such a broad extent to show the positions to make future contacts; when I failed to make a contact wwhich had been scheduled, to make arrangements for a later contact, without losing so much time. I think Captain Randall points out in his book that er.. without some arrangements that they had there - inone case he would have had to proceed back to Belize...

SHOT 133/5 contd.

POWELL:

....in order to get new orders, but he didn't have to do that; and the case history of the I'm Alone er.. which was largely derived from codebreaking and from reports of the vessels which trailed the I'm Alone; very.. over a sonsiderable period of time. Thexamx They enabled us to set up a case history; I think we thoroughly convinced the find Canadian Government that she had been parading in this fashion for a good long time and made a great deal of money out of it. They exx asked, I believe, for about 400,000 dollars damages. I don't think they pressed that claim; they settled for 25,000.

### SHOT 133/6

BRUCE:

Describe the I'm Alone.

POLL in

The I'm Alone was a very trim craft and unusually trim craft engaged in rumrunning. She had graceful lines; she was maintained in a graceful degree and state of cleanliness; she had good discipline on board; her skipper knew where he was almost any time of the day or night and knew how to get to where he wanted to go. And the I'm Alone was undoubtedly the most notorious rumrunner on the Atlantic Coast during her tour of duty, so to speak. She had evaded many of our cutters, many times; she was known as a vessel that would give a trailing vessel considerable trouble; the er.. I'm Alone operated up off of Boston for a while, and then I think she was in the New York area; eventually she came down to the Gulf. And that is where I knew her - I didn't know her in the Boston area; I had an experience the first time that I trailed her in 1928; I picked her up in the late afternoon or evening perhaps and at the change of the watch, just after midnight er.. I was on the bridge at the time; I found myself miling up on what I thought was the stern light of the I'm Alone. It turned out to be a buoy, an improvised buoy which Capt. Randall had put overboard with a light on it and he had simultaneously ditched his stern light. I put the vessel into a circular movement and played my searchlight around and I don't think she excaped us more than 5 or 6 minutes but perhaps not that long, and we picked herup again and continued trailing her on down. Exxxixxix I've had the stern lights ditchedon me many times by other vessels and on some axexix occasions I've had something ressembling a buoy but now this was a trim buoy - I picked this man had several of them on there and he had one to throw over when he wanted.

adOF 133/6

BRUCE: Describe value of codebreaking to coastguards.

The first and most important to the coastguard personnel was in maken enabling the coastguard vessels to locate these runrunners, to find them when they came into these landing positions for either at shore, or somewhere at sea out there; and the other category was in building up the case histories of the vessels which had been apprehended and came to court. And we needed that very very much, to impress the court with the long-standing operation of these vessels in this trade. That is it..

DK69-13

INT: MR. BORWN

#### THE CODEBREAKERS

6250/8330

TAPE 33: W/T to cover upstairs room in Mrs. E's house.

# TAPE //33, CAM. ROLL 43

SHOT 135/1

BRUCE: BROWN: What kind of problems Prohibition caused for the Customs officials? Well one of the main problems that Probabition caused for Customs officials was a great increase in work; whereas previously the importation of liquor had not been illegal and a large quantity of it was used in the United States, it became illegal and er. I don't know whether the quantities decreased but the number of smugglers greatly increased. Not only through

the porss but er.. across the St. Lawrence particularly and then with the

rise of the . Hove?.... vessels, all along the sea coast.

BRUCE:

Describe dodges the rumrunners got up to?

BROWN:

These hovering vessels would come in loaded with all sorts of liquor and would be met either casually or more frequently according to pre-arrangement, by speedboats which would buy the liquor and then endeavour to get it ashore. The Customs function, of course, was to try and stop them, and they, of course, used their ingenuity to prevent being stopped in any way possible. The speed of the speedboats was one thing that was very important because they'd got the gastest boats they could and it took a still faster boat to get them. In some subsequent narcotic cases that I remember the Coastguarg was simply outrun by the smugglers' boats. ANd then on certain other occasion they would despatch decoy vessels - that is, vessels that look like, in fact were the same type of vessel they used to be loaded with liquor but which actually had nothing aboard in an endeavour to cause the enforcement officers

to chase them while the speedboat loaded with liquor & got ashore scot free.

BRUCE:

Describe problem of the three mile limit?

BROWN:

The traditional limit of jurisdiction for us was 3 miles which originated, I believe, in the distance that a cannon perhaps, of mediaeval design, could throw a cannonball from shore. This didn't take very long for a speedboat to traverse and unless an unfortunate officer was right there at the moment the speedboat landed, it could unload and be gone before he got there. In an attempt to do something about this the United States negotiated in 1924 a treaty with Great Britain since many of the rum xxxxxxx vessels were based on Greet Britain, were British possessions. Canada, Belize, Honduras, em. . Nova Scotia, which of course is part of Canada; anyhow ? vessels under British jurisdiction were one of our main concerns.

Shot 135/1 contd.

RMMEREX

BROWN:

And this treaty extended the enforcement limit to a distance which I think was never precisely defined although it later was qualified perhaps as a 12 mile limit, but which was originally stated as one hour's sailing distance from shore. This, naturally, gave the enforcement officers a little more time to work. And particularly if they had advance information through radio intercepts or something like that, they had more time to get there and to be in time to intercept the smuggled goods.

(BAD SOUND)

BROWN:

The traditional and original limit of off-shore juriddiction was 3 miles, originating, I believe, from the distance a cannonball could be fired by a presumably medieeval designed cannon to shore. Considering that speedboats took a very short time to negotiate this distance, the limit meant that an enforcement officer had only a few minutes after becoming aware of a smuggling attempt in order to intercept the smuggling vessel. Most of the vessels were based in some manner on British territory, whether in Canada proper, in Nova Scotia, in Belize Honduras, or in the Bahamas. And therefore in 1924 the United States negotiated a treaty with Breat Britain which specified for this purpose, at least, that enforcement territory would extend the distance from shore that a vessel could sail in an hour. This distance was never precisely defined in the treaty as I understand but subsequently it came to be recognised as a three mile limit. This of course gave much more time to intercept a smuggler particularly where there was advance information that he was coming, through intercept or otherwise.

#### TAPE 34: CAM. ROLL 44

SHOT 135/2

BRO:

3 miles limits, dummy decoys etc...

BROWN:

The traditional limit of off-shore jurisdiction was 3 miles which originated, I understand, in the distance that a cannon-ball could be fired presumably by an artillery ximm piece of mediaeval design from shore. When you're dealing with speedboats of course the distance like this can be traversed in a very short time. Meaning that an enforcement officer has a very short time to intercept a boat smuggling liquor or anything else. For this reason we negotiated in 1924 the treaty with Great Britain based on the fact that most of the offending hovering vessels were registered in British territory, whether Canada proper, Nova Scotia, Belize (Hondures), the Bahamas, or what not. And this treaty provided that enforcement jurisdiction should extend an hour's sailing distance from shore, which, while not specifically defined in the treaty, came to be recognised, at least subsequently, as 12 miles.

SHOT 135/2 contd.

BROWN: Having 12 miles to work in gave the intercepting officer.. the enforcement agent much more time to get along and he might need that much time because sometimes the violators would send out dummy vessels er.. apparently loaded with liquor, but actually empty, and intercepting them would cost time, and intercepting the actual vessel loaded with liquor. But with more time we could be more effective. Particularly if we happened to have an intercept of messages to tell us in advance which vessel was coming, and where they were expected to arrive.

BRUCE:

Describe kind ofmen that rumrunners were?

BROWN:

So far as I know the men that were engaged in this sort of thing, that is, in the actual smuggling from the hovering vessel to shore, were what we call hoodlums not a very high type wix of individual - gangsters, perhaps, is the more familiar word. It may be that the captains of summer some of the hovering vessels may have been a cut above that but er.. these people that ran the speedboats - I think they generally owned the speedboats - they were wooking as messengers for the xx distributors ashore and their interest was first not to lose their vessels, second, not to lose their own lives. Of course they had another interest - not to lose their cargo, but this was probably a subsidiary interest to the first two.

BRUCE:

Rumrunners using areas not usually covered by Customs officials.

BROWN: The problem of smuggling from off-shore hovering vessels was, of course, quite a lot different from the kind of problem that the Customs was normally called on to meet, because Customs officers are stationed in Customs ports where commercial vessels arrive. They're not stationed in desolate areas of the sea coast, which were favourite spots for the rumrunners to frequent. Consequently, in order to go to those places the enforcement officers had to have some warning, otherwise they would not be there and in this respect intercepted messages were, 65 course, invaluable.

BRUCE:

Being a Customs official was a potentially dangerous job during Prohibition? Naturally in the places where these smugglers arrived, the Customs officers did not have an army behind them. He may have had two or three colleagues or perhaps more, but essentially he was on his own, a few men trying to intercept.. a few men sometimes desperate. Therefore there was an element of risk. Perhaps not so great a risk as some people might imagine because it was simply not a healthy thing to kill or wound a Federal officer and most of these operators did not try it. An element in seeing that they didn't try it was setting up your interception mfrize operation in a proper way. Planning it so that when you did move in on the man you had him surrounded or helpless or persuaded it was useless to resist.

BROWN:

INZ. MR. BROWN

Shot 135/2 contd.

BRUCE:

Value of codebreaking ..

BROWN:

FALSE START. The possession of codes. of coded messages by the enforcement officer was of the greatest importance, but naturally they meant nothing unless sombody could find it possible to decode them. For a great many years I have known Mrs. Friedman's activities in this field and I am sure that over the entire period of the rumrunning, her activities in decoding coded messages intercepted were of the greatest value. Even after the days of the rumrunning, she decoded messages in several narcotic smuggling cases with which I myself was involved and these were vital in our success in bringing the violators to justice.

BRUCE:

Importance of sinking of I'm Alone.

BROWN:

The value of the Customs. The value of the I'm Alone matter to Customs in my opinion, came chiefly in making the violators realise that the Customs was in earnest. Of course the I'm Alone was sunk in 1929 and the indemnity was not paid until 1935. In that period of 6 years there were 5 years of Prohibition up until the repeal in 1934. When the ultimate dispensation was in question it was a question whether other xixxixx vessels might be similarly sunk and to me it seemed that that xxxxxxxx uncertainty must have had a considerable deterrent effect on the operators of hovering vessels. And made them think twice about er. engaging in the operation and much more wary in their conduct of it when they did so engage.

cose 1

BRUCE: I'm Alone became part of the Customs Officials mythology?

BROWN:

During the years after the I'm Alone case mention of it was frequently made even though the sinking was done by Coastguard vessels. Customs men knew that it had been done and it was something that everybody heard about.

TAPE 35: CAM. ROLL 45

SHOT 135/3

BRUCE: What kind of men were the rumrunners?

BROWN:

The rumrunners that the Customs had occasion to deal with were the speedboat men that came in from the hovering vessels. While the captains of some of the hovering vessels may have been men of some standing and integrity the speak speedboat operators, I think usually independent, were still something like gangsters and er. were not men of very high quality. Their interest, of course, was to lure their cargo but they did not feel interested in delivering their cargo as a rule, I believe, at the cost of losing their vessels. And certainly not at the cost of losing their lives. While they may have been ready to use fire2rms in certain cases, still the Customs officers intercepting them tried to set up the interceptions in such a way to free them from that temptation.

INT. 135/3 contd.

⊿RUUM:

YEMEXAR Value of codebreaking in detecting crime..

BORWN:

In all this operation of course it was very important to have intercept for several reasons, or at least for two reasons. One was to know when and where an attempt at violation would be made. And a second reason was to use as evidence after detection. And of course it should be pointed out that in this er.. connection you don't have the problem of when you're intercepting a private telephone conversation today, or monitoring a man's conversation which which the courts might look on with disfavour; the man who communicates with shore by ship-to-shore radio is broadcasting to the world to hear and if the world can tell what he's saying and has Mrs. Friedman to help him tell what he's saying, this is just his hard luck.

nes es

Bruce Norman, 22 Park Meadow, HATFIELD, Herts. 45 - 67977 CODEBREAKERS

D(69-13

ROLL 43 - PEARL HARBOUR

Mrs. E. Freidman, Washington.

#### TAKE 2

INT. Start off with the statement about your husband being a genius, and then going on to talk about what makes a good codebreaker.

Well, my husband can I think, only be explained by MRS. F. the word genius. Next to his passionate love of his country, the ruling precept of this life was Francis Bacon's dictum, knowledge is power. He had given some scientific analysis which were far out of the ordinary. Professor Manly of the University of Chicago, said to him right after world war one, that in thirty years close association with leading men of science, he had never if ever, seen one who's powers for scientific analysis equalled those of William Freedman. Code breaking, you say, what makes a code breaker, well you have to be a little bit of everything, you have to be a psychologist, you have to be able to place yourself in the other situation, imagination in the sense of imagining what would be going on at a given time. You have to have persistents beyond description, and, well those are the qualities of determination and persistents that only of course are the result of a great great compelling interest. And when my husband met up, if I may use an American expression, with cryptology he seemed to have found his genius, his genius lay there. The rest of us had to learn it by process of prognosis, but he unmistakeably quickly and directly went to the right conclusions. times when the authorities all over the world would say there arē certain systems or a certain machine was incypherable, he proved that not to be the truth, and he alone solved time after gime those systems or machines. One of those was the 8 TMT double key tape printing telegraph cypher, another was the Peaburn machine, and another was the ITNT printing telegraph cypher, and another was the Pletts device which the British had

developed from Sir Charles Wheatstone's invention of an eccentric double disc cypher, which the British thought was indecypherable, and were going to put it to use on the Western Front. The British said it was indecypherable, the French said it was indecypherable, the Cypher Bureau in Washington said it was indecypherable. Five very short test messages, not at all a representative test of the amount of m traffic that would have been in actual use on a given day on the Western Front, a very tiny portion of that, and yet he solved the cypher messages, based on the Plett device, in less than two hours, and the messages were cabled back to Great Britain within that time. Well, from then on you can imagine that he went from one thing to another, and the story of his life was one of brilliant and almost unprecedented success, but it was in a secret field where, and he could not receive the satisfaction and acclaim that would come to anyone in a field less secret than this.

Now let us see, did you have another question.

INT. We talked last night about what your husband camehome one night and said to you, now could you tell us about that.

MRS F. Yes, you asked about if I ever knew anything about my husband and his work on the Purple Machine. The only time, and of course at that time, the time I'm going to describe now, there was no such word as purple, it was not known by any specific name. My husband came home one evening and told me that Major General Moburn, the Chief Security Officer, had called him in that day, and told him, directed him to take charge of a small group of people who had been working on the Japanese diplomatic cypher for some two or three months and had not made any progress. General Moburn directed my husband to take charge of that group and do that to the exclusion of everything else, work on that cypher. That is the only time my husband ever mentioned what we now speak of as the Purple Cypher, to me. He never even mentioned it when

success came, as I read now, and I know that there was that day of success eventually, he didn't even mention it then. To me that seems astonishing, of course I knew he was under great strain, it was obvious. He was not sleeping, he was up until the wee small hours of the morning, and he used to make club sandwiches at one or two A.m., when he would relax and make jests and carry on an ordinary conversation for a short time, but he never told me anything about the Purple Cypher, I had no idea what a magic machine, which was built to automatically decypher the messages, I have no idea what it looked like, it was never described to me.

INT. Carry on this is fine. Interruption.

ROLL 2 - continuation of Tape 1

TAKE 3

MRS F. My husband always denied that he alone was responsible for the solution, he always said I led the group, nothing as complicated as that is ever done by a single man working alone.

INT. He needed to succeed.

MRS. F. Yes, he had a great compulsion to succeed. I think that no I can't describe ix any circumstances, I can't think of any circumstances that have ever stopped him from pursueing a given test, until its successful completion.

INT. The method of attack differs.

MRS. F. The method of attack in a problem does differ very much. Sometimes in simpler systems one can make assumptions of plain text, plain language. But in most of the more complicated cyphers, and the machine cyphers particularly, you don't deal with plain text at all, you deal with statistical elements, and the index of coincidence. By the way, did you ever, in your reading, learn that my husband wrote when he was only twenty-eight years old, a dissitation explaining a solution of his, but the paper that he wrote was called 'The Index of Coincidence', and that has been said, by experts, to have started all of the great complex, difficult, and frightfully involved types of attack on these systems that used millions and billions of combinations in producing the cypher text.

INT. What's the ultimate validity of a solution.

MRS F. The ultimate validity of a solution is that two people completely knowledgeable of what they are doing, working

entirely separately, must come to the same answer.

INT. Your husband x was the last of the great geniuses.

MRS F. I think that my husband was probably the last of the great geniuses who worked with pencil and paper. Before he retired from his profession, the matter had become a lifeless, feelingless, matter of punching eards, stuffing machines, getting answers from machines, has become a fragmented operation so that no one in my estimation, no one every gets the real feel of solving a system, because it's so fragmented, the attack upon it I mean, is so fragmented and dealt out like sub-contracts, here and there to other persons, that no one person gets the feel, or thrill of the great success that my husband did, in his earlier days.

INT. He was a very unselfish man, and had great influence on children and other people.

MRS. F. I would like to say something about his personal qualities. He was a man who loved people, he even loved children, and was very understanding of children. He had an influence on the life of children, many of them have never forgotten, and I still get letters from them, with expressions of gratitude for how he had awakened them to this or that, and the great tests of their ability to think, and had come to their mastery of what he had shown them when they were children. And, then too, he was/very sympathetic person, he understood everybodies troubles, and everybody used to go to him with their troubles, even in the days after NSA was formed, that tremendous organisation, he still left his door open, and his mind free to permit anyone who was bothered by a personal problem of any sort, to talk to him, and he did it. I have had many many beautiful tributes from these children who have grown up, from his students and colleagues, its almost unbelievable, the tributes that have been paid to his personal

influence on others, as well as his great analytical powers, and success in the science field.

INT. Thank you very much.